{"id":"court_sdny_267_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":267,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MEMORANDUM","filed_date":"2024-04-09","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"审前动议备忘录(motions in limine)—— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok(郭文贵)案关联被告王雁平(Yanping Wang / Yvette Wang),SDNY 1:23-cr-00118(案号亦列 23 Cr. 118-3)ECF #267(2024-04-09 立案)。王雁平辩护律师(Baker Botts 律所)提出多项审前排除证据动议:主张排除 Fund-1 相关亏损证据、禁止检方使用「空壳公司」「挂名高管」「代持股东」等措辞、禁止指控 GTV 私募为未注册发行、排除其薪酬及购房相关证据、限制检方提出不当「重大性」问题,并要求排除其他诉讼程序中的司法认定作为证据。","summary_en":"Pretrial motions-in-limine memorandum — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 (also captioned 23 Cr. 118-3), ECF No. 267 (filed 2024-04-09). Co-defendant Yanping (Yvette) Wang's counsel (Baker Botts LLP) moves to exclude evidence of Fund-1's alleged losses, to bar the government from using terms such as \"shell company,\" \"figurehead executives,\" or \"straw owners,\" to preclude arguing that the GTV private placement was an improper unregistered offering, to exclude evidence of Wang's compensation and an apartment purchase, to limit improper \"materiality\" questioning, and to preclude judicial findings from other proceedings from being used against her.","body_en":"## **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\n### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nv.\n\nYANPING WANG,\n\n23 Cr. 118-3 (AT)\n\nDefendant.\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT YANPING WANG'S MOTIONS** *IN LIMINE*\n\nBrendan F. Quigley Sarah Reeves BAKER BOTTS L.L.P. 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10112 Tel: (212) 408-2520 brendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com sarah.reeves@bakerbotts.com\n\n*Attorneys for Yanping Wang*\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n**Page**\n\n|       |                                                                                                                                                | GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW  1                                                               |    |\n|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|\n|       |                                                                                                                                                | DISCUSSION  1                                                                             |    |\n| I.    | The Court Should Exclude Evidence that Fund-1 Allegedly \"Ultimately Lost<br>Approximately \\$30 Million in Value\"  1                            |                                                                                           |    |\n| II.   | The Court Should Prohibit the Government from Using the Terms \"Shell Company,\"<br>\"Figurehead Executives,\" \"Straw Owners,\" or Similar Terms  4 |                                                                                           |    |\n|       | A.                                                                                                                                             | Applicable Law  4                                                                         |    |\n|       | B.                                                                                                                                             | Discussion  5                                                                             |    |\n| III.  | The Court Should Prohibit the Government from Arguing that the GTV Private<br>Placement was an Improper Unregistered Offering  6               |                                                                                           |    |\n| IV.   | The Court Should Exclude Evidence of Ms. Wang's Compensation and the Purchase of<br>Ms. Wang's Apartment  9                                    |                                                                                           |    |\n|       | A.                                                                                                                                             | Applicable Law  9                                                                         |    |\n|       | B.                                                                                                                                             | Discussion  10                                                                            |    |\n| V.    |                                                                                                                                                | The Court Should Preclude the Government from Asking Improper Materiality Questions<br>12 |    |\n| VI.   | Judicial Findings in Other Proceedings Should Be Precluded  14                                                                                 |                                                                                           |    |\n| VII.  |                                                                                                                                                |                                                                                           | 16 |\n| VIII. |                                                                                                                                                | Ms. Wang Reserves the Right to File Additional Motions in Limine  17                      |    |\n|       |                                                                                                                                                | CONCLUSION  18                                                                            |    |\n\n## **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n## **Page(s)**\n\n## **CASES**\n\n| <i>Arlio v. Lively</i> ,<br>474 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2007).                                                         | 1  |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|\n| <i>Carroll v. Trump</i> ,<br>No. 20-CV-7311 (LAK), 2024 WL 97359 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2024)                        | 17 |\n| <i>Chiarella v. United States</i> ,<br>445 U.S. 222 (1980).                                                     | 14 |\n| <i>Davis v. Washington</i> ,<br>547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006)                         | 15 |\n| <i>Fountain v. United States</i> ,<br>357 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2004).                                              | 2  |\n| <i>Kleinman v. Elan Corp., Plc</i> ,<br>706 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2013)                                             | 14 |\n| <i>Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano</i> ,<br>131 S.Ct. 1309 (2011)                                       | 14 |\n| <i>MF Glob. Holdings Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP</i> ,<br>232 F. Supp. 3d 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).           | 5  |\n| <i>of Platt Fam. Artwork Tr. v. Michaan</i> ,<br>No. 19-CV-4234 (ER), 2023 WL 6292770 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2023) | 15 |\n| <i>Old Chief v. United States</i> ,<br>519 U.S. 172 Ct. 644 (1997)                                              | 5  |\n| <i>Sec. &amp; Exch. Comm'n v. Jensen</i> ,<br>No. CV 11-5316-R, 2013 WL 12129377 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013)      | 3  |\n| <i>United States v. Butler</i> ,<br>No. 08CR370 JBW RER, 2010 WL 1692882 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010)               | 3  |\n| <i>United States v. Connolly</i> ,<br>24 F.4th 821 (2d Cir. 2022)                                               | 12 |\n| <i>United States v. Cruz</i> ,<br>894 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1990)                                                    | 15 |\n| United States v. Ferguson,<br>No. 06-cr-137 (CFD), 2007 WL 4240782 (D. Conn. Nov. 30, 2007) 10, 12              |    |\n| United States. Gaudin 12                                                                                        |    |\n| United States v. Helbrans,<br>No. S2 19-CR-497 (NSR) (01) (02), 2021 WL 4778525 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2021) 5      |    |\n| United States v. Massino,<br>546 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2008)1                                                       |    |\n| United States v. Miller,<br>471 U.S. 130 (1985) 8                                                               |    |\n| United States v. Milstein,<br>401 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2005)7, 8                                                    |    |\n| United States v. Perryman,<br>No. 23CR117 (DLC), 2024 WL 639332 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2024) 1                      |    |\n| United States v. Rigas,<br>490 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2007)7, 8                                                      |    |\n| United States v. Shapiro et al,<br>No. 15-cr-155 (RNC) (D. Conn. Apr. 24, 2017), ECF No. 372 9                  |    |\n| United States v. Stahl,<br>616 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980)10                                                         |    |\n| United States v. Vilar,<br>729 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2013)2, 12                                                      |    |\n| United States v. White,<br>692 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Sept. 28, 2012) 1                           |    |\n| OTHER AUTHORITIES                                                                                               |    |\n| U.S. Const. Amend. VI 15                                                                                        |    |\n| Fed. R. Evid. 401 1, 3                                                                                          |    |\n| Fed. R. Evid. 402 1                                                                                             |    |\n| Federal R. of Evid. 403 1, 3, 4, 16                                                                             |    |\n| Fed. R. Evid. 801 15                                                                                            |    |\n\nDefendant Yanping Wang respectfully submits this memorandum in support of her motions *in limine*.\n\n## **GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW**\n\nPursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, \"[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible.\" Fed. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has \"'any tendency to make a [material] fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'\" *United States v. White*, 692 F.3d 235, 246 (2d Cir. 2012), *as amended* (Sept. 28, 2012) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401). \"A material fact is one that would affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.\" *Arlio v. Lively*, 474 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal punctuation and citation omitted).\n\nEven where evidence is relevant, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 empowers courts to \"exclude [the] evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.\" Fed. R. Evid. 403. \"The term unfair prejudice refers 'to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.'\" *United States v. Perryman*, No. 23CR117 (DLC), 2024 WL 639332, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2024) (quoting *United States v. Massino*, 546 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2008)).\n\n## **DISCUSSION**\n\n# **I. The Court Should Exclude Evidence that Fund-1 Allegedly \"Ultimately . . . Lost Approximately \\$30 Million in Value\"**\n\nThe operative Indictment alleges that the defendants \"misappropriated approximately \\$100 million raised from investors in the GTV Private Placement and directed that those funds be placed with a high-risk hedge fund . . .\" and \"[u]ltimately, the investment into Fund-1 lost approximately \\$30 million in value.\" S2 Indictment, ECF No. 215 ¶ 16(h) (\"S2 Indictment\"). The GTV Private\n\nPlacement forms the basis for the substantive securities and wire fraud charges in Counts Five and Six, *see id.* ¶¶ 41-44, and the transfer of the \\$100 million forms the basis for the unlawful monetary transaction charge in Count Twelve, *see id.* ¶¶ 57-58.\n\nThe Court should preclude argument or evidence concerning the \"los[s]\" allegedly \"ultimately\" suffered by Fund-1. *Id.* ¶ 16(h). \"Loss\" is not an element of either the substantive mail or wire fraud offenses charged in Counts Five and Six. *See Fountain v. United States*, 357 F.3d 250, 255 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that \"the essential elements of a mail or wire fraud violation are (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) money or property as the object of the scheme, and (3) use of the mails or wires to further the scheme\" (internal punctuation, citation, and alteration omitted)); *United States v. Vilar*, 729 F.3d 62, 92 (2d Cir. 2013) (\"to convict a defendant of securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, the government must prove that in connection with a domestic purchase or sale of a security the defendant willfully made a material misrepresentation (or a material omission if the defendant had a duty to speak) or used a fraudulent device\"). Nor is \"loss\" an element of the unlawful monetary transaction charge1\n\nAdditionally, there is no allegation that Ms. Wang was somehow enriched by, or benefited from, the money that was transferred to Fund-1. Indeed, the S2 Indictment specifically alleges that the \"vast majority of the proceeds derived from investors in the GTV Private Placement . . . were deposited directly into bank accounts held in the name of Saraca, GTV's parent company, which is beneficially owned by Relative-1.\" S2 Indictment ¶ 16(f). Accordingly, any evidence that Fund-\n\n<sup>1</sup> *See* Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instr. 50A-26 (elements are (i) \"that the defendant engaged (or attempted to engage) in a monetary transaction in or affecting interstate commerce,\" (ii) \"that the monetary transaction involved criminally derived property of a value greater than \\$10,000,\" (iii) \"that the property was derived from specified unlawful activity,\" (iv) \"that the defendant acted knowingly that is, with knowledge that the transaction involved proceeds of a criminal offense,\" and (v) \"that the transaction took place in the United States (or the defendant is a United States person, as I will define that term for you).\").\n\n1 lost \\$30 million does not impact *any* material fact and is therefore irrelevant to the instant proceedings and should be excluded. *See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jensen*, No. CV 11-5316-R, 2013 WL 12129377, at \\*6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013) (\"Defendant argues the SEC should be prohibited from referencing his alleged nine million dollar profits because, as evidenced by the opinions of both experts, the nine million dollar figure does not reflect the effect of Defendant's alleged misrepresentations. The Court agrees. Thus, any reference to nine million dollars in profits is prohibited under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 as it is irrelevant, and under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as its probative value is outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice and confusing the issue of violations of SEC requirements.\"); *United States v. Butler*, No. 08CR370 JBW RER, 2010 WL 1692882, at \\*3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010) (observing, in context of securities fraud and wire fraud prosecution, that the \"victim's loss. . . does not constitute an element of any of these crimes and is, therefore, irrelevant to the determination of the case.\").\n\nEven if the Court were to find relevant the evidence that Fund-1 \"ultimately\" lost \\$30 million, it should still exclude that evidence as the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues, such as the investment strategy employed by Fund-1 and the market or other conditions that ultimately caused the alleged loss. As discussed above, the loss of some of the proceeds invested into Fund-1 is not an element of any of the relevant charges. Evidence of this alleged, \"ultimate[]\" loss would serve only to distract the jury assessing whether the government has proved each element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt and should be precluded.\n\n## **II. The Court Should Prohibit the Government from Using the Terms \"Shell Company,\" \"Figurehead Executives,\" \"Straw Owners,\" or Similar Terms**\n\nThe government has repeatedly used the terms \"shell company,\" \"figurehead executives,\" \"straw owners,\" and other similar terms when describing the businesses allegedly associated with Defendants. *See* Gov't Opp'n to Motion for Bail, ECF No. 26 at 8 (\"as a review of the bankruptcy docket indicates, Kwok has acted through others and a network of shell companies . . .\"); Gov't Opp'n to Motion for Bond Determination, ECF No. 42 at 7 n.5 (\"HCHK Technologies—a Kwokcontrolled company that the defendant effectively owns through her BVI-registered shell company—sent employees . . . .\"); Gov't Opp'n to Motion for Order Revoking Order of Detention, ECF No. 89 at 7 n.4 (\"Wang held 99.9999% of the shares of the HCHK entities through her BVIregistered shell company . . . .\"); *id.* at 29 (\"By design, most of these shell companies were owned or operated by others on paper . . .\"); Gov't Reply Memo in Opp'n to Pretrial Release, ECF No. 192 at 3 (\"Gettr (a social media company that Kwok controls through a series of shell companies) . . .\"); S2 Indictment ¶ 20 (\"As another example, the defendants installed figurehead executives and/or straw owners at the entities within the Kwok Enterprise . . .\").\n\nThe use of such phrases is unnecessary as it merely communicates a conclusion about these companies and individuals to the jury and will prove unfairly prejudicial to Defendants.\n\n## **A. Applicable Law**\n\nAs explained above, Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides that \"[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.\" \"[U]nfair prejudice\" in the context of criminal defendants \"speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.\" *Old Chief v. United States*, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 Ct. 644, 650 (1997).\n\nCourts frequently preclude the use of potentially charged or pejorative terms due to the danger of unfair prejudice. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Helbrans*, No. S2 19-CR-497 (NSR) (01) (02), 2021 WL 4778525, at \\*17 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2021) (prohibiting the government from \"refer[ring] to the Lev Tahor community or its leaders as members of a 'cult'\" or \"insinuat[ing] that leaders brainwash or force members of the community to behave in or observe their religion in a certain way\" where such suggestions and characterizations did not \"provide context more necessary than it [was] prejudicial\"); *MF Glob. Holdings Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP*, 232 F. Supp. 3d 558, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (\"courts often prohibit the use of certain pejorative terms when such categorizations [are] inflammatory and unnecessary to prove a claim and such statements do not bear on the issues being tried\" (internal punctuation and citation omitted)).\n\n### **B. Discussion**\n\nHere, the use of the terms \"shell company,\" \"figurehead executives,\" and \"straw owners,\" or other similar terms is clearly prejudicial as the terms communicate a conclusion to the jury, *i.e.*, that these were illegitimate companies or that they were used for nefarious purposes. Indeed, in *United States v. Watts*, Eastern District Judge Matsumoto found that \"the terms 'shell company' or 'shell corporation' could be perceived to have a pejorative meaning\" and prohibited the government from using them. 934 F. Supp. 2d 451, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). The court found that there was \"[n]o evidentiary value . . . added by allowing . . . witness[es] to use those terms\" and instructed the government \"to expressly instruct its witnesses to avoid use of the terms 'shell corporation' or 'shell company' at trial.\" *Id.*\n\nThe Court should do the same here. In all the examples listed above, there was no probative value in the use of any of these terms. For example, where the government claimed that \"Wang held 99.9999% of the shares of the HCHK entities through her BVI-registered shell company,\" Gov't Opp'n to Motion for Order Revoking Order of Detention, ECF No. 89 at 7 n.4, it could have merely alleged that Wang held 99.9999% of the shares of HCHK entities through her BVIregistered company. The use of the word \"shell\" adds no probative value to this sentence and is simply designed to create unfair prejudice and suggest a conclusion to the jury. Accordingly, the Court should prohibit the government from using the term \"shell company,\" \"figurehead executives,\" \"straw owners,\" and other similarly pejorative terms.\n\n# **III. The Court Should Prohibit the Government from Arguing that the GTV Private Placement was an Improper Unregistered Offering**\n\nAs alleged, the GTV Private Placement took place in or about the spring of 2020. In the \"speaking\" portion of the S2 Indictment, the government notes \"[t]he GTV Private Placement was not made pursuant to a registration statement filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ('SEC'). Rather, the offering was purportedly made pursuant to SEC regulations that permit the sale of unregistered securities subject to limitations on the type of investors to whom the securities are offered and the manner in which their investments may be solicited.\" S2 Indictment ¶ 16(g).<sup>2</sup> The government asserts that these limitations were not followed and that Mr. Kwok \"and others under his control used at least one intermediary entity to purchase GTV stock on behalf of pools of investors who did not individually qualify to participate in the GTV Private Placement.\" *Id.*\n\n## Ex. A (USAO-REL\\_000105165).\n\n<sup>2</sup> Indeed, the GTV Private Placement memoranda disclosed that \"\n\nHowever, the substantive securities fraud count relating to GTV in the S2 Indictment alleges that the defendants \"conducted the GTV Private Placement to sell GTV stock and obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money,\" *see* S2 Indictment ¶ 44, not that the defendants violated the securities laws by engaging in an unregistered, non-exempt offering. Accordingly, the Court should prohibit the government from arguing that the GTV Private Placement was an improper unregistered offering because doing so risks a constructive amendment to the S2 Indictment, a prejudicial variance, and confusion of the issues.\n\n\"An indictment has been constructively amended when the trial evidence or the jury charge operates to broaden the possible bases for conviction from that which appeared in the indictment.\" *United States v. Rigas*, 490 F.3d 208, 225 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal punctuation, alteration and citation omitted). For example, in *United States v. Milstein*, 401 F.3d 53, 65 (2d Cir. 2005), the Court of Appeals found a constructive amendment when an indictment alleged that the defendant had distributed misbranded drugs based on an alleged forgery or falsification of the packaging material, but the government then later argued at trial that the defendant misbranded the drugs because they were allegedly not sterile. *Id.* at 65 (\"[W]e are persuaded that the indictment, charging Milstein with misbranding due to his repackaging of the drugs, was constructively amended when the Government alleged that the drugs were misbranded because they were not sterile.\").\n\n\"Alternatively, a variance occurs when the charging terms of the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.\" *Rigas*, 490 F.3d at 226 (internal punctuation, alteration and citation omitted). In order for a variance to warrant reversal, a defendant \"must show substantial prejudice.\" *Id.* (internal punctuation omitted).\n\nHere, the S2 Indictment's charging language related to the GTV Private Placement refers to the alleged misappropriation of proceeds from the offering, not the unregistered nature of the offering. *See* S2 Indictment ¶¶ 42, 44. As in *Milstein*, allowing the government to argue or suggest that the defendants committed securities fraud because the offering was allegedly unregistered and not subject to any exemption would impermissibly \"'broaden [ ] the possible bases for conviction from that which appeared in the indictment,'\" *Milstein*, 401 F.3d at 65 (quoting *United States v. Miller*, 471 U.S. 130, 138 (1985)) (explaining that when this happens, \"the indictment has been constructively amended\"). And even if not necessarily a constructive amendment, proof or argument to the jury regarding the unregistered nature of the offering and evidence concerning the exemptions to registration would risk a potential prejudicial variance, because that evidence would be \"materially different from [the basis of the charges related to GTV] alleged in the indictment.\" *Rigas*, 490 F.3d at 226. Further, given the complex nature of exemptions from the registration requirement under the securities laws, focusing the jury on issues surrounding whether the offering was exempt or not (and who bears the blame for it losing any potentially applicable exemption) would risk confusing the issues at trial.\n\nAs such, the Court should preclude the government from arguing or from introducing evidence that the GTV Private Placement was an improper unregistered offering because doing so risks a constructive amendment to the S2 Indictment, prejudicial variance, and confusion of the issues.\n\n## **IV. The Court Should Exclude Evidence of Ms. Wang's Compensation and the Purchase of Ms. Wang's Apartment**\n\nThe original indictment filed by the government against Ms. Wang contained no allegation that investor money went to Ms. Wang, or that she personally benefitted from the alleged scheme in any way. We noted this in our pre-trial motion for severance filed on December 15, 2023. Memorandum, ECF No. 197 at 23, 25. Two and a half weeks later, the government responded in the S2 Indictment on January 3, 2024, by alleging that Ms. Wang \"was paid at least approximately \\$500,000 per year, was gifted an approximately \\$1.1 million-dollar Manhattan condominium, and was promised millions of dollars' worth of a purported cryptocurrency.\" S2 Indictment ¶ 5.\n\nAfter Ms. Wang moved for, and the Court granted in part, her motion for a bill of particulars, *see* Order, ECF No. 251, the government disclosed that the \"\\$1.1 million condo\" was allegedly gifted to Ms. Wang on February 21, 2020, *see* Ex. B (Dates of Transfers), *i.e.*, months *before* the GTV Private Placement offering, implementation of the G Clubs membership, and the Farm Loan program. *See* S2 Indictment ¶ 16 (describing the GTV Private Placement offering as occurring between about April 2020 and June 2020), ¶ 17.a.-e. (describing the purported Farm Loan scheme as beginning in or about June 2020 and going through, at least, August 2020), ¶ 18 (describing the G|Clubs scheme as running from at least June 2020 through at least March 2023).3\n\n## **A. Applicable Law**\n\nEvidence of a defendant's compensation *may* be relevant only if the government can link that compensation to the proceeds of fraudulent activities. *See* Tel. Conf. Tr. 20:5-13, *United States v. Shapiro et al*, No. 15-cr-155 (RNC) (D. Conn. Apr. 24, 2017), ECF No. 372 (attached as Ex. C) (granting defendants' motion in limine to exclude evidence of defendants' compensation because\n\n<sup>3</sup> Ms. Wang is not charged in the Himalaya Exchange counts.\n\n\"[t]he total compensation numbers themselves don't tell us to what extent the defendants' compensation was based on profits derived from fraudulent activities . . . [and] [t]here is no indication that the government will offer evidence of what the defendants' total compensation would have been without the fraudulent trades\"); *see also United States v. Ferguson*, No. 06-cr-137 (CFD), 2007 WL 4240782, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Nov. 30, 2007) (precluding evidence of defendant's salary and bonuses because they \"were not affected by AIG's stock price,\" but allowing evidence of deferred compensation plan to support motive because the company's performance effected the defendant's benefits).\n\nCourts have rejected attempts by the government to introduce evidence of a defendant's compensation where there is no such link, because such evidence is irrelevant to the charges at hand and risks biasing the jurors. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Stahl*, 616 F.2d 30, 31-33 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding prosecutor had \"impermissibly equate[d] success, affluence and a single minded occupation with one's business affairs with greed and corruption,\" and made \"a persistent appeal to class prejudice\" warranting reversal of defendant's conviction of conspiring and aiding and abetting the bribery of a government official \"[b]ecause such appeals are improper and have no place in the court room\"); *Ferguson*, 2007 WL 4240782, at \\*1 (excluding compensation evidence that was \"irrelevant to the charges\" and \"not probative of any financial incentive\" the defendant may have had to participate in the alleged scheme).\n\n### **B. Discussion**\n\nHere, there is no basis to conclude that Ms. Wang's apartment purchase or her salary were derived from proceeds of the frauds alleged in the S2 Indictment.\n\nAs for the apartment, the government's recent bill of particulars confirms it was purchased on February 21, 2020, *see* Ex. B (Dates of Transfers), meaning it pre-dates by months each of the three alleged fraud schemes in which Ms. Wang is charged (the GTV Private Placement, the\n\nG|Clubs matter, and the Farms Loans matter). *See* S2 Indictment ¶¶ 16-18. Thus, it is impossible for the condo to have been purchased with \"profits derived from fraudulent activities\" that had not even begun. In addition, notably, the indictment uses the passive voice (\"was gifted\") and does not actually allege the \"gift\" came from Mr. Kwok, Mr. Je, or anyone else connected to the alleged fraudulent scheme. *See* S2 Indictment ¶ 5.\n\nAs for Ms. Wang's salary, the government is similarly unable to connect it to the charged fraud schemes to show that it was derived from fraud proceeds or that it served as motive to engage in the purported fraudulent schemes at issue. Each of the frauds Ms. Wang is alleged to have engaged in occurred in 2020. *See* S2 Indictment ¶¶ 16-18. That year, her salary was ,<sup>4</sup> a modest increased from the the year before.<sup>5</sup>\n\nFurther, as may be obvious from the government's inability to link Ms. Wang's salary to the fraudulent proceeds, the government has also failed to raise any allegations as to what Ms. Wang's salary would be without the alleged fraudulent proceeds. Moreover, by 2020, Ms. Wang had worked for the Kwok family for approximately ten years, long before the alleged fraudulent scheme began in 2018. Accordingly, the government has not, and cannot, show that the salary Ms. Wang received during over a decade of work for the Kwok family is directly tied to, or was derived from, fraudulent proceeds of the purported fraudulent enterprise, when no alleged misappropriation from investors occurred before 2020. Further, unlike the deferred compensation plan in *Ferguson*, Ms. Wang's salary was not tied to the performance of the business, and therefore, cannot be used to show motive.\n\n<sup>4</sup> *See* Ex. D (USAO-REL\\_000005370 at 5428).\n\n<sup>5</sup> *See* Ex. E (USAO-REL\\_000005664 at 5699).\n\nBecause the government has not tied either Ms. Wang's salary or her Manhattan condo to the proceeds of the alleged scheme, evidence of her salary is irrelevant to the charges at hand and risks biasing the jurors. Accordingly, this evidence should be excluded.\n\n# **V. The Court Should Preclude the Government from Asking Improper Materiality Questions**\n\nThe Court should preclude the government from asking improper materiality questions, divorced from the misrepresentations the government contends were fraudulent. Materiality is an element of both the securities fraud and wire fraud charges in the S2 Indictment. *See United States v. Connolly*, 24 F.4th 821, 833 (2d Cir. 2022) (\"[T]o come within the federal fraud statutes, a 'scheme to defraud' must have employed a falsehood that was 'material.'\" (emphasis and internal punctuation omitted)); *Vilar*, 729 F.3d at 92 (\"[T]o convict a defendant of securities fraud under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, the government must prove that in connection with a domestic purchase or sale of a security the defendant willfully made a material misrepresentation (or a material omission if the defendant had a duty to speak) or used a fraudulent device.\").\n\nThe Supreme Court has explained that the question of materiality consists of three questions: (1) \"what statement was made;\" (2) \"what decision was the [recipient of the statement] trying to make;\" and (3) \"whether the statement was material to the decision.\" *United States. Gaudin*, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995) (internal punctuation omitted). In order for the statement to have been material to the decision, it \"must have a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the decision of the [decisionmaker] to which it was addressed.\" *Id.* at 509 (internal punctuation, alteration and citation omitted).\n\nHere, the question for the jury will be whether the statements made in connection with the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, G|Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange were material to potential investors considering whether to invest. Accordingly, the government must (1) identify the statements it alleges were misleading, and (2) establish that these statements were in fact material to potential investors.\n\nHere, it is worth noting that the government has largely failed to indicate the actual statements it alleges were fraudulent (and thus potentially material) in connection with GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, G|Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange. *See* S2 Indictment ¶ 42 (alleging defendants \"conducted the GTV Private Placement to sell GTV stock and fraudulently obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money . . .\"), ¶ 44 (alleging defendants made \"conducted the GTV Private Placement to sell GTV stock and obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money . . .\"), ¶ 46 (alleging defendants \"conducted the Farm Loan Program to fraudulently obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money . . .\"), ¶ 48 (alleging defendants \"conducted the Farm Loan Program to obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money . . .\"), ¶ 50 (alleging defendants \"promoted and marketed G|CLUBS to fraudulently obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money . . .\"), ¶ 52 (alleging defendants \"promoted and marketed G|CLUBS to obtain money from victims through false statements and misrepresentations, including regarding, among other things, the purpose and use of victims' money . . .\" ).<sup>6</sup>\n\n<sup>6</sup> Again, while the speaking portion of the indictment contains some apparent specific examples of alleged misrepresentations, none of this detail appears in the actual statutory allegations. *See, e.g.*, S2 Indictment ¶ 8(a); ¶ 16(.a-d); *id.* ¶ 17; *id.* ¶ 18(e); *id.* ¶ 19(i).\n\nAs such, the government should be precluded from asking investors or other witnesses general hypothetical questions, such as \"would you have liked to know [x]\" or \"would [x] have been important to you,\" without reference to alleged promises or statements that were actually made to investors or others in connection with alleged investments at issue. To allow otherwise would run afoul of *Gaudin*'s caution that \"materiality\" requires \"the determination of at least two subsidiary questions of purely historical fact: (a) 'what statement was made?' and (b) 'what decision was the [individual] trying to make,' 515 U.S. 512, and impermissibly risks a conviction based on a supposed, non-existent, open-ended duty to disclose. *See Chiarella v. United States*, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (\"When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\"); *Kleinman* v. *Elan Corp., Plc*, 706 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (\"Disclosure is required . . . only when necessary 'to make statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.'\") (quoting *Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.* v. *Siracusano*, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 1321 (2011)).\n\n### **VI. Judicial Findings in Other Proceedings Should Be Precluded**\n\nIn support of its arguments in this case, the government has repeatedly cited findings by the bankruptcy judge in the District of Connecticut presiding over Mr. Kwok's bankruptcy as well as other courts' findings. *See, e.g.*, Gov't Letter to Court, Mar. 31, 2024, ECF No. 255 at 8 (citing \"finding[s] . . . 'of other courts'\" concerning Mr. Kwok); Gov't Opp'n to Wang Pre-Trial Release, June 20, 2023, ECF No. 89 at 34-36 (discussing Mr. Kwok's conduct in the bankruptcy proceeding).\n\nThe Court should prohibit the government from introducing findings in other judicial proceedings in this trial. Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence precludes the introduction of hearsay, *i.e.*, a statement that \"the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and [that] a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.\" Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(1)-(2). Absent the application of a relevant hearsay exception, such statements are inadmissible at trial. *See, e.g.*, *Platt as co-trustees of Platt Fam. Artwork Tr. v. Michaan*, No. 19-CV-4234 (ER), 2023 WL 6292770, at \\*13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2023).\n\n*First*, findings by other courts are hearsay, as they are out of court statements that the government may seek to offer for the truth of the matter asserted (*i.e.*, that one or more defendants was found to have violated court orders or was lacking in credibility). Notably, the government routinely argues that prior credibility findings against law enforcement officers and other witnesses are not admissible. *See*, *e.g.*, *United States v. Cruz*, 894 F.2d 41, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court's refusal to admit prior adverse credibility finding made against government information).\n\n*Second*, in addition to violating the hearsay provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, prior judicial findings would also run afoul of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation clause if offered against a criminal defendant. U.S. Const. Amend. VI (\"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\"). Judicial findings are similar to the type of formal, solemn declarations that have been found to be \"testimonial\" and thus fall within the Confrontation clause. *See, e.g.*, *Davis v. Washington*, 547 U.S. 813, 826, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006); *see also id.* 547 U.S. at 836 (Thomas, J. concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing as examples \"affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confession\" (internal punctuation and citation omitted)).\n\nAccordingly, the Court should preclude the government from introducing prior judicial findings against the Defendants.\n\n![](_page_19_Picture_2.jpeg)\n\n# **VIII. Ms. Wang Reserves the Right to File Additional Motions** *in Limine*\n\nFinally, particularly since the government has neither completed Rule 16 discovery nor furnished its exhibit list, witness list, or 3500 material, nor provided any notice of \"other acts\"\n\n![](_page_20_Picture_4.jpeg)\n\nevidence under Rule of Evidence 404(b), Ms. Wang reserves the right to make further motions *in*\n\n*limine* following the government's production of these materials.\n\n# **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons outlined above, the Court should grant Ms. Wang's motions *in limine*.\n\nDated: April 9, 2024\n\nDated: April 9, 2024 Respectfully submitted,\n\n# BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.\n\n*/s/ Brendan F. Quigley* Brendan F. Quigley Sarah Reeves 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10112 Tel: (212) 408-2500 brendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com sarah.reeves@bakerbotts.com\n\n*Attorneys for Yanping Wang*","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国），\n\n诉\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），\n\n23 Cr. 118-3 (AT)\n\n被告。\n支持被告 YANPING WANG（王雁平）审前排除动议之法律备忘录\n\nBrendan F. Quigley Sarah Reeves BAKER BOTTS L.L.P. 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10112 电话：(212) 408-2520 brendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com sarah.reeves@bakerbotts.com\n\nYanping Wang（王雁平）的代理律师\n\n目录\n\n页码\n普遍适用的法律  1\n论述  1\nI. 法院应排除关于 Fund-1 据称「最终贬值约 3,000 万美元」的证据  1\nII. 法院应禁止政府使用「空壳公司」、「傀儡高管」、「稻草人所有人」或类似术语  4\nA. 适用法律  4\nB. 论述  5\nIII. 法院应禁止政府主张 GTV 私募属于不当的未注册发行  6\nIV. 法院应排除关于王女士薪酬及购买王女士公寓的证据  9\nA. 适用法律  9\nB. 论述  10\nV. 法院应阻止政府提出不当的实质性问题  12\nVI. 应阻止在其他诉讼程序中作出的司法认定  14\nVII.  16\nVIII. 王女士保留提出其他审前排除动议的权利  17\n结论  18\n\n权威判例与出处目录\n页码\n判例\nArlio v. Lively ,\n474 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2007). 1\nCarroll v. Trump ,\nNo. 20-CV-7311 (LAK), 2024 WL 97359 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2024) 17\nChiarella v. United States ,\n445 U.S. 222 (1980). 14\nDavis v. Washington ,\n547 U.S. 813, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006) 15\nFountain v. United States ,\n357 F.3d 250 (2d Cir. 2004). 2\nKleinman v. Elan Corp., Plc ,\n706 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2013) 14\nMatrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano ,\n131 S.Ct. 1309 (2011) 14\nMF Glob. Holdings Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ,\n232 F. Supp. 3d 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 5\nof Platt Fam. Artwork Tr. v. Michaan ,\nNo. 19-CV-4234 (ER), 2023 WL 6292770 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2023) 15\nOld Chief v. United States ,\n519 U.S. 172 Ct. 644 (1997) 5\nSec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jensen ,\nNo. CV 11-5316-R, 2013 WL 12129377 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013) 3\nUnited States v. Butler ,\nNo. 08CR370 JBW RER, 2010 WL 1692882 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010) 3\nUnited States v. Connolly ,\n24 F.4th 821 (2d Cir. 2022) 12\nUnited States v. Cruz ,\n894 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1990) 15\nUnited States v. Ferguson,\nNo. 06-cr-137 (CFD), 2007 WL 4240782 (D. Conn. Nov. 30, 2007) 10, 12\nUnited States. Gaudin 12\nUnited States v. Helbrans,\nNo. S2 19-CR-497 (NSR) (01) (02), 2021 WL 4778525 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2021) 5\nUnited States v. Massino,\n546 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2008) 1\nUnited States v. Miller,\n471 U.S. 130 (1985) 8\nUnited States v. Milstein,\n401 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2005) 7, 8\nUnited States v. Perryman,\nNo. 23CR117 (DLC), 2024 WL 639332 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2024) 1\nUnited States v. Rigas,\n490 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2007) 7, 8\nUnited States v. Shapiro et al,\nNo. 15-cr-155 (RNC) (D. Conn. Apr. 24, 2017), ECF No. 372 9\nUnited States v. Stahl,\n616 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1980) 10\nUnited States v. Vilar,\n729 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2013) 2, 12\nUnited States v. White,\n692 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Sept. 28, 2012) 1\n\n其他权威出处\nU.S. Const. Amend. VI 15\nFed. R. Evid. 401 1, 3\nFed. R. Evid. 402 1\nFederal R. of Evid. 403 1, 3, 4, 16\nFed. R. Evid. 801 15\n\n被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）谨提交本备忘录，以支持其审前排除动议。\n\n普遍适用的法律\n\n根据《联邦证据规则》（Federal Rules of Evidence），「不相关的证据不具可采性。」Fed. R. Evid. 402。证据如果具有「『使某一［实质性］事实比没有该证据时更有可能或更不可能成立的任何倾向』」，即具有相关性。United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235, 246 (2d Cir. 2012), as amended (Sept. 28, 2012)（援引 Fed. R. Evid. 401）。「实质性事实是指根据准据法会影响诉讼结果的事实。」Arlio v. Lively, 474 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2007)（内部标点及引文省略）。\n\n即使证据具有相关性，《联邦证据规则》第 403 条也授权法院「在证据的证明价值被以下一种或多种危险实质性压倒时予以排除：不公平偏见、混淆争议焦点、误导陪审团、不当拖延、浪费时间或无谓地提供累赘证据。」Fed. R. Evid. 403。「不公平偏见这一术语是指『某些公认相关的证据诱使事实认定者基于独立于针对所指控罪名特定证明之外的理由宣布有罪的能力。』」United States v. Perryman, No. 23CR117 (DLC), 2024 WL 639332, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2024)（援引 United States v. Massino, 546 F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2008)）。\n\n论述\n\nI. 法院应排除关于 Fund-1 据称「最终……贬值约 3,000 万美元」的证据\n\n现行有效的起诉书指控被告「挪用了在 GTV 私募中向投资者筹集的约 1 亿美元，并指示将这些资金存入一家高风险对冲基金……」且「最终，对 Fund-1 的投资损失了约 3,000 万美元的价值。」S2 起诉书，ECF No. 215 第 16(h) 段（「S2 起诉书」）。GTV 私募构成了第五项和第六项罪名项中实质性证券欺诈和电汇欺诈指控的基础，参见同上第 41-44 段；而这 1 亿美元的转移构成了第十二项罪名项中非法货币交易指控的基础，参见同上第 57-58 段。\n\n法院应阻止有关 Fund-1 据称「最终」遭受的「损失」的辩论或证据。同上第 16(h) 段。「损失」并非第五项和第六项罪名项所指控的实质性邮信欺诈或电汇欺诈犯罪的构成要件。参见 Fountain v. United States, 357 F.3d 250, 255 (2d Cir. 2004)（解释「邮信或电汇欺诈违法行为的基本要件是 (1) 欺诈计划，(2) 以金钱或财产作为该计划的目标，以及 (3) 使用邮政或电汇手段推进该计划」（内部标点、引文及修改省略））；United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 92 (2d Cir. 2013)（「要根据第 10(b) 条和第 10b-5 条规则判定被告犯有证券欺诈罪，政府必须证明，在涉及国内购买或出售证券的过程中，被告故意作出了实质性不实陈述（或在被告负有披露义务时作出了实质性遗漏），或使用了欺诈手段」）。「损失」亦非非法货币交易指控的构成要件1。\n\n此外，并无任何指控称王女士以某种方式从转移给 Fund-1 的资金中获取了收益或好处。事实上，S2 起诉书明确指控「从 GTV 私募投资者处获得的绝大部分收益……被直接存入以 Saraca 名义开立的银行账户，Saraca 是 GTV 的母公司，由 Relative-1（亲属-1）实益拥有。」S2 起诉书第 16(f) 段。因此，任何关于 Fund-1 损失 3,000 万美元的证据都不会影响任何实质性事实，故而与本诉讼程序无关，应当予以排除。参见 Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Jensen, No. CV 11-5316-R, 2013 WL 12129377, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013)（「被告主张应禁止 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）提及他据称获得的 900 万美元利润，因为正如两位专家的意见所证明的那样，900 万美元这一数字并不能反映被告据称的不实陈述所产生的影响。法院对此表示赞同。因此，根据《联邦证据规则》第 401 条，任何关于 900 万美元利润的提及均被禁止，因其不具相关性；根据《联邦证据规则》第 403 条亦被禁止，因其证明价值被不公平偏见及混淆违反 SEC 要求这一争议焦点的危险所压倒。」）；United States v. Butler, No. 08CR370 JBW RER, 2010 WL 1692882, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010)（在证券欺诈和电汇欺诈检控背景下指出，「受害人的损失……不构成这些犯罪中任何一项的构成要件，因此与本案的裁决无关。」）。\n\n1 参见《现代联邦陪审团指示》（Modern Federal Jury Instructions）第 50A-26 条指示（要件为 (i)「被告从事（或企图从事）涉及或影响州际商业的货币交易」，(ii)「该货币交易涉及价值超过 10,000 美元的犯罪衍生财产」，(iii)「该财产衍生自特定的非法活动」，(iv)「被告系故意行为，即明知该交易涉及犯罪收益」，以及 (v)「该交易发生在美国境内（或被告为美国人，正如我将为您定义的该术语那样）」）。\n\n即使法院认定关于 Fund-1「最终」损失 3,000 万美元的证据具有相关性，仍应排除该证据，因为此类证据的证明价值被不公平偏见以及混淆争议焦点（例如 Fund-1 采用的投资策略，以及最终导致据称损失的市场或其他状况）的危险实质性压倒。如上所述，投资于 Fund-1 的部分收益发生损失，并非任何相关指控的构成要件。关于这一据称的「最终」损失的证据，只会分散陪审团在评估政府是否已排除合理怀疑证明了被指控罪名的每一项构成要件时的注意力，应当予以阻止。\n\nII. 法院应禁止政府使用「空壳公司」、「傀儡高管」、「稻草人所有人」或类似术语\n\n政府在描述据称与被告有关联的企业时，反复使用了“空壳公司”（shell company）、“傀儡高管”（figurehead executives）、“稻草人所有者”（straw owners，即名义代持所有人）以及其他类似术语。参见政府对保释动议的反对意见（Gov't Opp'n to Motion for Bail），ECF No. 26 第 8 页（“正如对破产案卷宗的审查所表明的那样，Kwok［郭文贵］通过他人和空壳公司网络进行运作……”）；政府对保释金裁定动议的反对意见（Gov't Opp'n to Motion for Bond Determination），ECF No. 42 第 7 页脚注 5（“HCHK Technologies——一家由郭控制的公司，被告通过其在英属维尔京群岛注册的空壳公司对其进行实际控制——派遣了员工……”）；政府对撤销羁押命令动议的反对意见（Gov't Opp'n to Motion for Order Revoking Order of Detention），ECF No. 89 第 7 页脚注 4（“Wang［王雁平］通过其在英属维尔京群岛注册的空壳公司持有 HCHK 实体 99.9999% 的股份……”）；同上，第 29 页（“按照设计，这些空壳公司中的大部分在纸面上由他人拥有或运营……”）；政府对审前释放答辩反对意见的回复备忘录（Gov't Reply Memo in Opp'n to Pretrial Release），ECF No. 192 第 3 页（“Gettr［一家由郭通过一系列空壳公司控制的社交媒体公司］……”）；S2 起诉书（S2 Indictment）第 20 段（“作为另一个例子，被告在郭氏企业［Kwok Enterprise］内部的各实体中设立了傀儡高管和/或稻草人所有者……”）。\n\n使用此类词组是不必要的，因为这仅仅是在向陪审团传达关于这些公司和个人的某种定性结论，并将被证明对被告造成不当的偏见性损害。\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n如上所述，Fed. R. Evid. 403（《联邦证据规则》第 403 条）规定：“如果相关证据的证明价值被下列一项或多项危险实质性压倒，法院可以排除该证据：不当偏见、混淆争议焦点、误导陪审团、不当拖延、浪费时间或不必要地提出累赘证据。”在刑事被告人的语境下，“不当偏见”（unfair prejudice）“指的是某些公认相关的证据促使事实认定者基于不同于针对被控罪名的特定证据的理由而宣布有罪的能力。”Old Chief v. United States，519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 Ct. 644, 650 (1997)。\n\n由于存在不当偏见的危险，法院经常禁止使用具有潜在煽动性或贬损性的用语。参见，例如，United States v. Helbrans，No. S2 19-CR-497 (NSR) (01) (02), 2021 WL 4778525, at *17 (S.D.N.Y.［纽约南区联邦地区法院］Oct. 12, 2021)（禁止政府“将 Lev Tahor 社区或其领导人称为‘邪教’（cult）成员”，或“影射领导人洗脑或强迫社区成员以某种特定方式行事或遵守其宗教信仰”，因为此类暗示和定性并未“提供比其偏见性更必要的背景”）；MF Glob. Holdings Ltd. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP，232 F. Supp. 3d 558, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)（“当此类定性具有煽动性且对证明主张并非必要，并且此类陈述与审理的争议问题无关时，法院通常禁止使用某些贬损性用语”（省略内部标点和引文））。\n\nB. 讨论\n\n在此，使用“空壳公司”、“傀儡高管”和“稻草人所有者”或类似术语显然具有偏见性，因为这些术语向陪审团传达了一种定性结论，即这些公司是不合法的，或者它们被用于恶意/不法目的。事实上，在 United States v. Watts 一案中，Eastern District（纽约东区联邦地区法院）Matsumoto 法官认定“‘空壳公司’（shell company）或‘空壳法团’（shell corporation）一词可能会被理解为具有贬损含义”，并禁止政府使用这些词语。934 F. Supp. 2d 451, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)。法院认定，允许证人使用这些术语并“未增加任何证据价值……”，并指示政府“明确指示其证人在庭审中避免使用‘空壳法团’或‘空壳公司’这些术语。”同上。\n\n本法院在此亦应采取相同做法。在上述列举的所有示例中，使用这些术语中的任何一个都没有任何证明价值。例如，当政府声称“王通过其在英属维尔京群岛注册的空壳公司持有 HCHK 实体 99.9999% 的股份”时，政府对撤销羁押命令动议的反对意见，ECF No. 89 第 7 页脚注 4，它完全可以仅仅指控王通过其在英属维尔京群岛注册的公司持有 HCHK 实体 99.9999% 的股份。“空壳”（shell）一词的使用并未为该句子增加任何证明价值，其目的仅仅是为了制造不当偏见并向陪审团暗示某种结论。因此，法院应禁止政府使用“空壳公司”、“傀儡高管”、“稻草人所有者”以及其他类似的贬损性术语。\n\nIII. 法院应禁止政府主张 GTV 私募属于不当的未注册发行\n\n据指控，GTV 私募（GTV Private Placement）发生在大约 2020 年春季。在 S2 起诉书的“述因”（speaking）部分中，政府指出：“GTV 私募并未依据向 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会，简称‘SEC’）提交的注册说明书进行。相反，该发行据称是依据 SEC 允许出售未注册证券的规定进行的，但须受限于向其要约出售证券的投资者类型以及招揽其投资的方式的限制。”S2 起诉书第 16(g) 段。2 政府声称这些限制未被遵守，且郭先生“及其控制下的其他人利用了至少一个中介实体，代表不具备单独参与 GTV 私募资格的投资者资金池购买 GTV 股票。”同上。\n\n附件 A（USAO-REL_000105165）。\n\n2 事实上，GTV 私募备忘录披露了“\n\n然而，S2 起诉书中与 GTV 相关的证券欺诈实质性罪名项指控被告“进行 GTV 私募以出售 GTV 股票，并通过虚假陈述和不实陈述（包括涉及受害者资金的目的和使用等方面）从受害者处获取资金”，参见 S2 起诉书第 44 段，而非指控被告因从事未注册且非豁免的发行而违反了证券法。因此，法院应禁止政府主张 GTV 私募属于不当的未注册发行，因为这样做存在造成对 S2 起诉书的推定修改、构成具偏见性的证据与指控不符（prejudicial variance）以及混淆争议焦点的风险。\n\n“当庭审证据或陪审团指示的作用是将可能定罪的依据扩大到起诉书中所出现的依据之外时，起诉书即已被推定修改（constructively amended）。”United States v. Rigas，490 F.3d 208, 225 (2d Cir. 2007)（省略内部标点、修改和引文）。例如，在 United States v. Milstein，401 F.3d 53, 65 (2d Cir. 2005) 一案中，Court of Appeals（联邦第二巡回上诉法院）认定存在推定修改，因为起诉书指控被告基于对包装材料的伪造或变造分发了贴假标签的药品，但政府随后在庭审中主张被告分发贴假标签的药品是因为这些药品据称未经无菌处理。同上，第 65 页（“[W]e are persuaded that the indictment, charging Milstein with misbranding due to his repackaging of the drugs, was constructively amended when the Government alleged that the drugs were misbranded because they were not sterile.”［“我们确信，指控 Milstein 因重新包装药品而贴假标签的起诉书，在政府声称药品贴假标签是因为它们未经无菌处理时，已被推定修改。”］）。\n\n“或者，当起诉书的指控条款未被改动，但庭审中提供的证据证明了与起诉书中所指控的事实存在实质性差异的事实时，即发生事实不符（variance）。”Rigas，490 F.3d at 226（省略内部标点、修改和引文）。为了使事实不符成为撤销原判的充分理由，被告“必须证明存在重大偏见损害（substantial prejudice）。”同上（省略内部标点）。\n\n在此，S2 起诉书中与 GTV 私募相关的指控用语指向的是涉嫌挪用发行收益，而非该发行的未注册性质。参见 S2 起诉书第 42、44 段。正如在 Milstein 案中一样，允许政府主张或暗示被告犯下证券欺诈是因为该发行据称未经注册且不符合任何豁免条件，将不可容许地“‘将可能定罪的依据扩大到起诉书中所出现的依据之外’”，Milstein，401 F.3d at 65（引自 United States v. Miller，471 U.S. 130, 138 (1985)）（解释说当发生这种情况时，“起诉书已被推定修改”）。即使不一定构成推定修改，向陪审团证明或辩论发行的未注册性质以及关于注册豁免的证据也会带来潜在的偏见性事实不符的风险，因为该证据将“与起诉书中所指控的［与 GTV 相关指控的依据］存在实质性差异。”Rigas，490 F.3d at 226。此外，鉴于证券法项下注册要求豁免条款的复杂性，让陪审团将注意力集中在关于该发行是否免于注册（以及失去任何潜在适用豁免的责任由谁承担）的争议问题上，将带来在庭审中混淆争议焦点的风险。\n\n因此，法院应阻止政府主张或引入证据证明 GTV 私募属于不当的未注册发行，因为这样做存在造成对 S2 起诉书的推定修改、具偏见性的事实不符以及混淆争议焦点的风险。\n\nIV. 法院应排除关于王女士薪酬及购买王女士公寓的证据\n\n政府针对王女士提起的原始起诉书中未包含任何关于投资者资金流向王女士、或她以任何方式从被指控的计划中个人获利的指控。我们在 2023 年 12 月 15 日提交的审前分案审理动议中指出了这一点。备忘录，ECF No. 197 第 23、25 页。两周半后，政府于 2024 年 1 月 3 日在 S2 起诉书中作出回应，指控王女士“每年获得至少约 500,000 美元的报酬，获赠一套价值约 1,100,000 美元的 Manhattan（曼哈顿）共管公寓，并被许诺获得价值数百万美元的所谓加密货币。”S2 起诉书第 5 段。\n\n在王女士提出且法院部分批准了其关于案件要点说明书（bill of particulars）的动议之后，参见裁定，ECF No. 251，政府披露该“110 万美元的公寓”据称于 2020 年 2 月 21 日赠予王女士，参见附件 B（转账日期），即在 GTV 私募发行、G Clubs（G俱乐部）会员计划实施以及农场贷款（Farm Loan）项目实施之前的数月。参见 S2 起诉书第 16 段（将 GTV 私募发行描述为发生在大约 2020 年 4 月至 2020 年 6 月之间），第 17.a.-e. 段（将所谓的农场贷款计划描述为始于大约 2020 年 6 月并至少持续至 2020 年 8 月），第 18 段（将 G|Clubs 计划描述为自至少 2020 年 6 月持续至至少 2023 年 3 月）。3\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n只有在政府能够将薪酬与欺诈活动的收益联系起来时，关于被告薪酬的证据才可能具有相关性。参见电话会议笔录 20:5-13，United States v. Shapiro et al，No. 15-cr-155 (RNC) (D. Conn.［康涅狄格区联邦地区法院］Apr. 24, 2017)，ECF No. 372（作为附件 C 附后）（批准被告排除被告薪酬证据的预先排除证据动议［motion in limine］，原因在于\n\n3 王女士未在喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）罪名项中受到指控。\n\n“薪酬总额本身并不能告诉我们被告的薪酬在多大程度上是基于来自欺诈活动的利润……[并且]没有迹象表明政府将提供证据证明如果没有欺诈性交易，被告的薪酬总额会是多少”）；亦见 United States v. Ferguson，案号 06-cr-137 (CFD), 2007 WL 4240782, at *1 (D. Conn.（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）Nov. 30, 2007)（排除被告工资和奖金的证据，因为它们“未受 AIG（美国国际集团）股价的影响”，但允许递延薪酬计划的证据以支持动机，因为公司业绩影响了被告的福利）。\n\n法院驳回了政府在缺乏此类关联的情况下引入被告薪酬证据的企图，因为此类证据与当前指控无关，并有可能使陪审团产生偏见。参见，例如，United States v. Stahl, 616 F.2d 30, 31-33 (2d Cir.（第二巡回上诉法院）1980)（认定检察官“不容许地将成功、富裕以及全神贯注于个人商业事务等同于贪婪和腐败”，并进行了“持续诉诸阶级偏见”，鉴于“此类诉求是不正当的且在法庭上没有容身之地”，构成了撤销被告串谋及协助和教唆向政府官员行贿定罪的理由）；Ferguson, 2007 WL 4240782, at *1（排除“与指控无关”且“不能证明被告参与被指控计划可能具有任何经济诱因”的薪酬证据）。\n\nB. 讨论\n\n在此，没有任何依据可以得出 Wang 女士（王雁平）购买公寓或其薪酬源自 S2 Indictment（S2 第二次替代起诉书）中所指控欺诈收益的结论。\n\n关于公寓，政府最近的诉状细目确认其购买于 2020年2月21日，参见 Ex. B（转账日期），这意味着它早于指控 Wang 女士所涉三起欺诈计划（GTV Private Placement（GTV 私募）、G|Clubs 事项以及 Farms Loans（农场贷款）事项）中任何一起数月之久。参见 S2 起诉书第 16-18 段。因此，这套共有公寓不可能用甚至尚未开始的“来自欺诈活动的利润”购买。此外，值得注意的是，起诉书使用了被动语态（“was gifted”（被赠予）），并未实际指控该“赠与”来自 Kwok 先生（郭文贵）、Je 先生（余建明）或与被指控欺诈计划有关的任何其他人。参见 S2 起诉书第 5 段。\n\n关于 Wang 女士的薪酬，政府同样无法将其与被指控的欺诈计划联系起来，以证明其源自欺诈收益或作为参与涉案被指控欺诈计划的动机。指控 Wang 女士参与的各项欺诈行为均发生在 2020年。参见 S2 起诉书第 16-18 段。当年，她的薪酬为 ，4 较前一年适度增加。5\n\n此外，正如有鉴于政府无法将 Wang 女士的薪酬与欺诈收益联系起来这一显而易见的事实，政府也未能就若没有被指控的欺诈收益 Wang 女士的薪酬会是多少提出任何指控。而且，到 2020年，Wang 女士已为郭氏家族工作了大约十年，远早于被指控的欺诈计划于 2018年 开始之时。因此，在 2020年 之前未发生任何指控的挪用投资者资金行为的情况下，政府没有、也无法证明 Wang 女士在为郭氏家族工作逾十年期间收取的薪酬与被指控欺诈企业的欺诈收益直接相关或源自其中。此外，与 Ferguson 案中的递延薪酬计划不同，Wang 女士的薪酬与企业业绩无关，因此不能用于证明动机。\n\n4 参见 Ex. D（USAO-REL_000005370 第 5428 页）。\n\n5 参见 Ex. E（USAO-REL_000005664 第 5699 页）。\n\n因为政府既没有将 Wang 女士的薪酬，也没有将其曼哈顿共有公寓与被指控计划的收益联系起来，所以关于其薪酬的证据与当前的指控无关，并有可能使陪审团产生偏见。因此，该证据应予排除。\n\nV. 法院应阻止政府提出不当的实质性问题\n\n法院应阻止政府提出脱离政府主张构成欺诈的虚假陈述的不当实质性问题。实质性是 S2 起诉书中证券欺诈和电汇欺诈指控的法定构成要件。参见 United States v. Connolly, 24 F.4th 821, 833 (2d Cir. 2022)（“[为]纳入联邦欺诈法规的范围，‘欺诈计划’必须采用了‘具有实质性的’虚假陈述”[强调及内部标点省略]）；Vilar, 729 F.3d at 92（“[为]依据 Section 10(b)（第 10(b) 条）及 Rule 10b-5（第 10b-5 条规则）判定被告犯有证券欺诈罪，政府必须证明在涉及境内购买或出售证券的过程中，被告故意作出了实质性虚假陈述[或者在被告负有说明义务的情况下作出了实质性遗漏]或使用了欺诈手段”）。\n\n最高法院已解释，实质性问题由三个问题组成：(1) “作出了什么陈述”；(2) “[陈述的接收者]试图作出什么决定”；以及 (3) “该陈述对该决定是否具有实质性”。United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995)（内部标点省略）。为了使该陈述对决定具有实质性，它“必须具有影响其所针对的[决策者]决定的自然倾向，或能够影响该决定的能力”。Id. at 509（内部标点、修改及引文省略）。\n\n在此，陪审团需要裁决的问题将是：就 GTV 私募、Farm Loan Program（农场贷款项目）、G|Clubs 以及 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）所作的陈述，对考虑是否投资的潜在投资者而言是否具有实质性。因此，政府必须 (1) 指明其指控具有误导性的陈述，并且 (2) 证明这些陈述对潜在投资者而言实际上具有实质性。\n\n在此，值得注意的是，关于 GTV 私募、农场贷款项目、G|Clubs 以及喜马拉雅交易所，政府基本上未能指出其指控构成欺诈（从而可能具有实质性）的实际陈述。参见 S2 起诉书第 42 段（指控被告“开展 GTV 私募以出售 GTV 股票，并通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者处骗取资金，包括关于受害者资金的目的和用途等方面……”）、第 44 段（指控被告“开展 GTV 私募以出售 GTV 股票，并通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者处获取资金，包括关于受害者资金的目的和用途等方面……”）、第 46 段（指控被告“开展农场贷款项目以通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者处骗取资金，包括关于受害者资金的目的和用途等方面……”）、第 48 段（指控被告“开展农场贷款项目以通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者处获取资金，包括关于受害者资金的目的和用途等方面……”）、第 50 段（指控被告“宣传和推销 G|CLUBS 以通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者处骗取资金，包括关于受害者资金的目的和用途等方面……”）、第 52 段（指控被告“宣传和推销 G|CLUBS 以通过虚假陈述和误导性陈述从受害者处获取资金，包括关于受害者资金的目的和用途等方面……”）。6\n\n6 同样，虽然起诉书的叙述部分包含了一些涉嫌虚假陈述的显见具体示例，但这些细节均未出现在实际的法定指控中。参见，例如，S2 起诉书第 8(a) 段；第 16(.a-d) 段；同前第 17 段；同前第 18(e) 段；同前第 19(i) 段。\n\n因此，应当阻止政府在不提及实际上就涉案指控投资向投资者或其他人所作的指控承诺或陈述的情况下，向投资者或其他证人提出一般的假设性问题，例如“你是否本希望了解[某事]”或“[某事]对你而言是否重要”。允许提出此类问题将违背 Gaudin 案的警示，即“实质性”要求“确定至少两个属于纯粹历史事实的附随问题：(a) ‘作出了什么陈述？’以及 (b) ‘[该个人]试图作出什么决定’”，515 U.S. 512，并存在基于假定存在、实际并不存在的无限制披露义务而导致定罪的不受允许的风险。参见 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)（“当欺诈指控基于未予披露时，在缺乏说明义务的情况下便不存在欺诈”）；Kleinman v. Elan Corp., Plc, 706 F.3d 145, 153 (2d Cir. 2013)（“仅在‘根据作出陈述时的情况，为使所作陈述不致产生误导’所必需时，才要求进行披露”）（引自 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S.Ct. 1309, 1321 (2011)）。\n\nVI. 应排除其他诉讼程序中的司法认定\n\n为支持其在本案中的论点，政府反复援引主持 Kwok 先生破产案的 District of Connecticut（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）破产法官所作出的认定以及其他法院的认定。参见，例如，政府致法院信函，2024年3月31日，ECF No. 255 第 8 页（引用关于 Kwok 先生的“‘其他法院’的……认定”）；政府反对 Wang 审前释放意见书，2023年6月20日，ECF No. 89 第 34-36 页（讨论 Kwok 先生在破产程序中的行为）。\n\n法院应禁止政府在本次审判中引入其他司法程序中的认定。《联邦证据规则》Rule 801（第 801 条规则）禁止引入传闻证据，即“陈述者在当前审判或听证中作证时未作出的；且[当事一方]作为证据提供以证明该陈述中所主张事项之真实性的陈述”。Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)(1)-(2)。在不适用相关传闻证据例外的情况下，此类陈述在审判中不可采信。参见，例如，Platt as co-trustees of Platt Fam. Artwork Tr. v. Michaan, 案号 19-CV-4234 (ER), 2023 WL 6292770, at *13 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）Sept. 27, 2023)。\n\n首先，其他法院的认定属于传闻证据，因为它们属于庭外陈述，政府可能试图将其用于证明所主张事项的真实性（即一名或多名被告被认定违反了法院命令或缺乏可信度）。值得注意的是，政府历来主张先前针对执法人员和其他证人作出的可信度不利认定不可采信。参见，例如，United States v. Cruz, 894 F.2d 41, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1990)（认定地区法院拒绝采信先前针对政府线人作出的不利可信度认定并不构成滥用裁量权）。\n\n其次，除了违反《Federal Rules of Evidence（联邦证据规则）》的传闻证据条款外，若将先前的司法认定用于对付刑事被告，还将抵触《Sixth Amendment（第六修正案）》的对质条款。U.S. Const. Amend. VI（“在一切刑事追诉中，被告享有……与对其不利之证人对质的权利。”）。司法认定类似于已被认定属于“证言性质（testimonial）”并因而落入对质条款范围的正式、庄严的声明类型。参见例如 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224 (2006)；另见 同上案 547 U.S. at 836 (Thomas, J.（托马斯大法官）部分赞同判决并部分反对)（引用“宣誓书、庭外采证书、先前的证词或口供”作为例证（内部标点符号及引用省略））。\n\n因此，法院应当阻止政府针对被告人提出先前的司法认定。\n\nVIII. 王女士保留提出附加预先排除动议（Motions in Limine）的权利\n\n最后，鉴于政府既未完成 Rule 16（第16条规则）项下的证据开示，也未提供其证物清单、证人清单或 3500 材料，亦未根据 Rule of Evidence 404(b)（证据规则第404(b)条）就“其他行为”证据发出任何通知，王女士保留在政府出示上述材料后提出进一步预先排除动议（motions in limine）的权利。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述原因，法院应当支持王女士的预先排除动议（motions in limine）。\n\n日期：April 9, 2024\n\n日期：April 9, 2024\n谨呈，\nBAKER BOTTS L.L.P.（贝克博茨律师事务所）\n\n/s/ Brendan F. Quigley\nBrendan F. Quigley（布伦丹·F·奎格利）\nSarah Reeves（萨拉·里夫斯）\n30 Rockefeller Plaza\nNew York, N.Y. 10112\nTel: (212) 408-2500\nbrendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com\nsarah.reeves@bakerbotts.com\n\nYanping Wang（王雁平）的代理律师","key_entities":["GTV","Kwok","Je","Farm Loan","Yanping Wang","HCHK","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","CIPA","Saraca","G Clubs","GETTR"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":26,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":42,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":89,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":192,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":197,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":215,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":251,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":255,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":372,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":5581,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-04-09 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-04-09","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:00:03"}