{"id":"court_sdny_268_3","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":268,"sub_number":3,"doc_type":"EXHIBIT","filed_date":"2024-04-09","title":"Exhibit C ","summary_zh":"法庭记录附件 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok 案 SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #268（2024年4月9日）。包含法庭听证记录，显示各方律师代理人名单及法庭官员信息。","summary_en":"Court Proceeding Exhibit — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #268 (filed April 9, 2024). Contains court proceeding records with appearances of counsel and official court personnel information.","body_en":"# Exhibit C\n\n\n\n| | Case: 3:15-cr-00155-RNC Document 268-32 Filed 04/09/24 Page 2 of 73 |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | Page 2 |\n| 1 | APPEARANCES: |\n| 2 | |\n| 3 | FOR THE GOVERNMENT: |\n| 4 | U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE-NH |\n| 5 | 157 Church Street |\n| 6 | P.O. Box 1824; 23rd Floor |\n| 7 | New Haven, Connecticut 06510 |\n| 8 | BY: LIAM BRENNAN, AUSA |\n| 9 | HEATHER L. CHERRY, AUSA |\n| 10 | DAVID NOVICK, AUSA |\n| 11 | |\n| 12 | FOR ROSS SHAPIRO: |\n| 13 | PETRILLO, KLEIN & BOXER LLP |\n| 14 | 665 Third Avenue |\n| 15 | 22nd Floor |\n| 16 | New York, New York 10017 |\n| 17 | BY: GUY PETRILLO, ESQ. |\n| 18 | JOSHUA KLEIN, ESQ. |\n| 19 | AMY LESTER, ESQ. |\n| 20 | REID & RIEGE, P.C. |\n| 21 | One Financial Plaza |\n| 22 | Hartford, Connecticut 06103 |\n| 23 | BY: THOMAS V. DAILY, ESQ. |\n| 24 | |\n| 25 | FOR MICHAEL GRAMINS: |\n| | BRACEWELL & GIULIANI, LLP |\n| | 1251 Avenue of the Americas |\n| | 49th Floor |\n| | New York, New York 10020-1100 |\n| | BY: MARC L. MUKASEY, ESQ. |\n| | Kedar S. Bhatia, Esq. |\n\n| | Page 3 |\n| 1 | APPEARANCES (CONTINUED): |\n| 2 | |\n| 3 | FOR TYLER PETERS: |\n| 4 | ALSTON & BIRD, LLP-NY |\n| 5 | 90 Park Avenue
12th Floor |\n| 6 | New York, New York 10016
BY:
BRETT D. JAFFEE, ESQ.
MICHAEL L. BROWN, ESQ. |\n| 7 | BRAFMAN & ASSOCIATES, PC |\n| 8 | 767 Third Avenue
26th Floor |\n| 9 | New York, New York 10016
BY:
ALEX SPIRO, ESQ. |\n| 10 | |\n| 11 | |\n| 12 | |\n| 13 | |\n| 14 | |\n| 15 | |\n| 16 | |\n| 17 | |\n| 18 | |\n| 19 | |\n| 20 | |\n| 21 | |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| 25 | |\n| | |\n\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | |\n| 1 | 9:30 A.M. |\n| 2 | |\n| 3 | COURT REPORTER: Good morning, Judge Chatigny |\n| 4 | has joined the conference. Please state your appearances. |\n| 5 | MR. NOVICK: For the government, David Novick. |\n| 6 | Also present with me is Liam Brennan and Heather Cherry. |\n| 7 | Good morning, Your Honor. |\n| 8 | THE COURT: Good morning. |\n| 9 | MR. PETRILLO: Good morning, Your Honor, Guy |\n| 10 | Petrillo, Josh Klein, Amy Lester and Tom Daily; and |\n| 11 | Mr. Shapiro is on the line as well. |\n| 12 | MR. MUKASEY: Good morning, Judge, Marc Mukasey |\n| 13 | from Greenberg Traurig. I'm with me colleague, Kedar S. |\n| 14 | Bhatia, a few others here for the defendant, Michael |\n| 15 | Gramins, who is here with us. |\n| 16 | MR. BROWN: Good morning, Your Honor, Mike |\n| 17 | Brown, Alex Spiro and Brett Jaffee on behalf of Mr. Peters |\n| 18 | who is also on the line. |\n| 19 | THE COURT: Good morning. This is a telephone |\n| 20 | conference to talk about the jury questionnaires and also |\n| 21 | the motions that remain to be resolved. We're getting |\n| 22 | feedback on this line unfortunately. I don't know why |\n| 23 | that is; but, can everybody hear me all right? |\n| 24 | MR. NOVICK: From the government, yes, Your |\n| 25 | Honor. |\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\nSPEAKER: Yes, Your Honor, we can. THE COURT: Not hearing differently, I assume everybody can hear me.\n\nWith regard to the jury questionnaires, you have received copies of the questionnaires. You've had an opportunity to review them and discuss them, and it's my understanding that as of this morning you have agreed that 20 people should be excused for cause. In addition, there are 12 jurors with respect to whom for cause challenges have been raised by the defense but as to whom the government does not agree that the person should be excused. Then I gather we have quite a few people who have indicated that they would have great difficulty being available for one reason or another, and that group numbers, according to my chart, 61 people. So that's the status. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16\n\nWith regard to the stipulations that you have reached, I adopt your agreement as to those 20 and they will be excused accordingly. 17 18 19\n\nWith regard to the 12 people as to whom the defense has raised objection, does the government have anything to say as to any of those 12? 20 21 22\n\nMR. NOVICK: Sure, Your Honor. I could go through them individually, but I think what would probably make most sense as a broad kind of global matter. 23 24 25\n\n| 1 | I think the government's position on those 12 is |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | not necessarily that we wouldn't ultimately agree in some |\n| 3 | cases to a cause challenge, but that in reviewing the |\n| 4 | answers, it seems to us that additional questions would be |\n| 5 | appropriate, and if we were -- if we were in court, as we |\n| 6 | normally are when we go through this process, and those |\n| 7 | answers -- those questions were asked and those answers |\n| 8 | were given, that the Court or the Court either on its own |\n| 9 | or with the parties' suggestion, would likely follow up |\n| 10 | and ask additional questions to determine either about a |\n| 11 | conflict or an inability to sit medically or a view that |\n| 12 | may suggest a lack of impartiality. |\n| 13 | Oftentimes we find out on further pressing that |\n| 14 | the issue that what the juror thought was an issue for |\n| 15 | them really isn't as a matter of fairness. |\n| 16 | For example, someone who has seen the Big Short |\n| 17 | and thinks this case is all about the origination of RMBS |\n| 18 | and finds out it's really not, you know, that may change |\n| 19 | both the juror's and the parties' and the Court's view of |\n| 20 | whether there's a real conflict. |\n| 21 | So that was kind of our analysis in driving |\n| 22 | these were there follow-up questions that we thought |\n| 23 | were appropriate, and it's only fair to the remaining |\n| 24 | members of the jury pool that these jurors come in and be |\n| 25 | considered in terms of whether they're capable of being |\n| | Case: 1:23-cr-00118-AT Document 372 Filed 04/09/24 Page 8 of 73
Case: 3:15-cr-00155-RNC Document 268-3 Filed 05/02/17 Page 7 of 72
Page 7 |\n| 1 | fair and impartial. |\n| 2 | THE COURT: Okay, that's fine. Then there's no |\n| 3 | need for you to comment as to any of these individually. |\n| 4 | MR. NOVICK: Okay. |\n| 5 | THE COURT: If we bring those folks in for voir |\n| 6 | dire, then we can ask the follow-up questions that you |\n| 7 | think are necessary rather than try to do it in the |\n| 8 | abstract based on the questionnaire responses alone. |\n| 9 | At that rate, it's my understanding that |\n| 10 | removing the 20 by agreement would leave us with 102 |\n| 11 | people; and as to that group, we would have the 12 with |\n| 12 | regard to whom objections have already been made. |\n| 13 | Am I right that the government has an objection? |\n| 14 | MR. NOVICK: Yes, Your Honor. We had an |\n| 15 | objection to one juror who I think answered that their |\n| 16 | religion prevented them from passing judgment on people. |\n| 17 | THE COURT: That's juror 234, is that correct? |\n| 18 | MR. NOVICK: That's right, Your Honor, yes. |\n| 19 | THE COURT: Ordinarily when we have somebody who |\n| 20 | tells us that or something very much like that, the juror |\n| 21 | is excused from further service. Is there some reason why |\n| 22 | the defense wants me to hold on to this juror |\n| 23 | notwithstanding the juror's statement? |\n| 24 | MR. BHATIA: Your Honor, Kedar Bhatia. We think |\n| 25 | that juror falls into the same category as some of the |\n| | |\n\nothers where additional questions would be appropriate. But ultimately we agree that this might be a cause challenge, but we thought it was better to ask at least to bring them in to talk to them. THE COURT: Okay. Moving on from there, looking at the total situation, let's suppose that we have a hundred people who come into court to participate in voir dire, of that hundred, we have 61 who have already told us that for one reason or another they can't be available - is that correct? Hang on please. (Pause) THE COURT: Okay. So we have a hundred people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13\n\npotentially coming to court and 40 of those people have indicated to us that for one reason or another they don't think they can be available. Are you comfortable going forward on that basis? Or do you think that we need to do something in addition in order to get a jury? Bearing in mind that you've had an opportunity to review the responses to the questionnaires and given that we're going to need a jury of 12 plus an appropriate number of alternates and given the number of peremptories that you are entitled to under the rule, not to mention the defense's suggestion that an additional number might be fair for the defense. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nGiven all those factors, are you comfortable going ahead with a hundred people, approximately 40 of whom have indicated that they don't think they should be here?\n\nMr. Novick?\n\nMR. NOVICK: Your Honor, just so that I understand the sort of playing field here, the potential additional challenges that the defense has asked for which, you know, as a matter of fairness depending on the number the defense has asked for, the government may also request additional strikes, do we have an idea of, in doing our calculation in the potential for issues here, how many we're talking about of additional peremptories that the defense is asking for. I don't think we ever had discussions about actual numbers. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15\n\nTHE COURT: We have not.\n\nMR. NOVICK: Because ordinarily, if we were talking about just a standard number of peremptories, I think the government would be fine with the number of jurors that we're looking at here. It's more than we normally have for a criminal case. 17 18 19 20 21\n\nI understand that the case is longer than we normally have, so we're going to have more issues, but I think the numbers of people are appropriate here. 22 23 24\n\nAnd I also would say that a lot of the 20 that\n\n25\n\n16\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\nwe've agreed to strike, those were, it seemed to us, in many cases, the sort of immovable conflicts, you know, for example, I have a plane ticket bought on such and such a date as opposed to a jury who says, you know, my job is really important, which perhaps we look less favorably upon as an excuse. So I think a lot of the immovable conflicts will have been taken care of. I just hesitate -- so ordinarily I would say the government thinks that we're fine with the number we have I guess with the caveat that I don't know, you know, how many peremptories we're really talking about here. THE COURT: Does anybody want to speak on the defense side? MR. MUKASEY: Judge, Marc Mukasey. I think that an additional peremptory for each defendant, so three for the sort of three combined teams would be appropriate given the length and complexity of this case and are certainly permitted under the rules in Your Honor's discretion. And I'll just offer a comment with respect to Mr. Novick's request for additional strikes for the government. I don't think respectfully that this is an issue that should be treated proportionally. The reason we're 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nasking for extra strikes is because we have three defense teams here with three different defendants who operated at three different hierarchal levels at Nomura who come from three different law firms that are going to offer three different perspectives. I think we're largely on the same page, but we have individual clients to worry about, and offering each defendant one extra chance for the combines three teams. Three extra chances to ensure a fair and impartial jury in a case of this complexity I respectfully submit is important. The government is the government. They don't have extra teams, they don't have extra clients, they're presenting the same case regardless. They're not meshing with other U.S. Attorney's Offices and they're not protecting the rights of three different people at the same time. So at least as far as Mr. Gramins goes and to the extent that I speak for the three teams at this point, I think three additional defense peremptory challenges would be appropriate. MR. PETRILLO: Your Honor, Guy Petrillo for Mr. Shapiro. We join in that application. We think that makes eminent sense. MR. BROWN: As does Mr. Peters. THE COURT: Mr. Novick? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nMR. NOVICK: Sure, Your Honor. Respectfully I certainly understand the fact that there are three different defense teams here. 1 2 3\n\nThe government's request is a matter of fairness. We're all involved in a case which the defense has characterized just now as complex and lengthy, and that's true for all sides. And I understand that they each have clients to represent and the government though at the same time is prosecuting three distinct individuals at the same time. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10\n\nAnd I am not suggesting that we need move proportionally. The rules as it is give the defense more strikes than the government as a general matter, and those are the rules; and so I'm not necessarily suggesting that we need receive three additional peremptories, but some number of additional peremptories I think would be fair. 11 12 13 14 15 16\n\nThe government has an interest, just like the defendant, to have a fair trial with a panel of jurors who are going to be fair and impartial as to both sides. 17 18 19\n\nThis is not just a question of protecting the defendants' rights, which I understand frankly is in the interest of all parties, but also the government's interest in having this case tried fairly. 20 21 22 23\n\nTHE COURT: Okay. How many alternates do you think we should seat given the experience in the Litvak 24 25\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | |\n| 1 | trial? |\n| 2 | MR. NOVICK: From the government, Your Honor, I |\n| 3 | would say at least four, if not more. |\n| 4 | I mean, I think, God willing, the issues that we |\n| 5 | had in the Litvak case will not repeat themselves, |\n| 6 | however -- and that was a much shorter trial in the end, |\n| 7 | which I hope this will be true for this one, but obviously |\n| 8 | they were planning for a longer trial, so I would say at |\n| 9 | least four, if not five. |\n| 10 | THE COURT: How about on the defense side? |\n| 11 | MR. BHATIA: Your Honor, we thought that four |\n| 12 | was an appropriate number for the alternates. |\n| 13 | MR. PETRILLO: Agreed for Mr. Shapiro. |\n| 14 | THE COURT: At that rate, let's suppose that we |\n| 15 | were to have four alternates. That would entitle each |\n| 16 | side to two additional peremptories. On that basis -- |\n| 17 | gosh, I wish we didn't have that feedback on our system |\n| 18 | this morning, but be that as it may -- we have -- this is |\n| 19 | the arithmetic: |\n| 20 | We have 12 regular jurors, and under the |\n| 21 | applicable rule, Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal |\n| 22 | Procedure, the parties would be entitled to 16 |\n| 23 | peremptories in choosing the regular jurors, six for the |\n| 24 | government, ten for the defendants, so that would be 28; |\n| 25 | and if we add four alternates, that's 32 plus two |\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n16\n\nadditional peremptories per side for the alternates. That brings us to 36. That is the number of regular jurors and peremptories as to regular jurors plus four alternates with peremptories as to the alternates. 1 2 3 4\n\nThat brings us to a total of 36, such that if we had 36 people qualified to serve, you could exercise your peremptories as against the regular jurors and we could seat 12, you could exercise your peremptories as against the alternates and we could seat four and we would be ready to go with our jury. That's what the law provides by rule.\n\nI gather from what you said before, Mr. Novick, it's your view that if that's the number we need, you would be comfortable going ahead with the pool that we have at the moment, is that right? 12 13 14 15\n\nMR. NOVICK: Yes, Your Honor.\n\nTHE COURT: And let me ask the defendants that question. 17 18\n\nPutting aside for the moment your understandable interest in having as many peremptories as humanly possible, what do you say about going ahead with this pool if our minimal requirement is 36? 19 20 21 22\n\nMR. PETRILLO: Your Honor, may I ask, to the extent that we thought it would be prudent to summon more juror candidates, is that feasible for the Court? 23 24 25\n\nTHE COURT: I don't think so. You will recall that we tailored our communications with prospective jurors in an attempt to make it absolutely clear that if anybody had any concern about the schedule, they had to opt out at the first step and not come here and fill out a questionnaire. It's frustrating, to say the least, to be in a position where notwithstanding that, we see so many people coming in to tell us, belatedly, that they have a problem with the schedule. But we cannot summon additional people in advance of our next court date, the first week of May. MR. PETRILLO: Thank you. I think it's our position for Mr. Shapiro, that we will endeavor to go forward with this group and we believe it will work out given the numbers and the questionnaire responses as we've seen them to date. THE COURT: Other counsel on the defense side? MR. SPIRO: Judge, this is Alex Spiro. I think that makes sense what Mr. Petrillo said. MR. NOVICK: Your Honor, for defendant Gramins, we agree that the pool is fine as is. THE COURT: Okay. Then I think the best way for us to proceed is to go ahead, bring the people in, hope that we'll have a group that is large enough to enable me 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\n| | Case: 3:15-cr-00155-RNC Document 268-32 Filed 05/09/24 Page 16 of 73
Page 16 |\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | to give you additional peremptories. If I can I will, but |\n| 2 | I may not be able to. |\n| 3 | I don't think that additional peremptories are |\n| 4 | strictly necessary in the interest of justice. I think |\n| 5 | that in this case given the defense that is common to the |\n| 6 | three defendants, i.e., that the misrepresentations were |\n| 7 | not material, the number of peremptories provided by the |\n| 8 | rule is adequate. At the same time, if I can give you |\n| 9 | additional ones, I'd be happy to do so. So we'll proceed |\n| 10 | accordingly. |\n| 11 | With regard to the procedure, I outlined for you |\n| 12 | a procedure whereby we would arrange to speak with each |\n| 13 | person individually in the courtroom, if only briefly. |\n| 14 | Is that something that appeals to you, |\n| 15 | Mr. Novick? |\n| 16 | MR. NOVICK: Yes, Your Honor. |\n| 17 | THE COURT: Okay. How about on the defense |\n| 18 | side? |\n| 19 | MR. PETRILLO: For Mr. Shapiro that appeals to |\n| 20 | us. |\n| 21 | MR. MUKASEY: For defendant Gramins, that |\n| 22 | appeals to us. |\n| 23 | MR. BROWN: And the same for defendant Peters. |\n| 24 | THE COURT: We'll proceed on that basis. In |\n| 25 | other words, we will endeavor to have a number of jurors |\n\nbrought from the jury assembly room to the vicinity of the courtroom where they can conveniently await coming in and seeing us individually for a few minutes, and we'll structure this so that we minimize the waiting time for people in the pool. 1 2 3 4 5\n\nI'm joined this morning here in chambers by Terri Glynn. And, Terri, I think we're going to need to prepare to do what we did last time. In other words, we can in effect release people so they can go get a cup of coffee, take a walk in the park, do whatever it is they want to do on the understanding that they're not going to be needed for some period of time, and in due course we'll work our way through the group of 100, if that's how many actually show up. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14\n\nOnce we complete that process, we can proceed with everybody who remains in the pool in the courtroom and do as I discussed, that is, bring a certain number forward to fill up seats. 15 16 17 18\n\nThere needs to be room to respond to contingencies as they arise. It may be that after we see people individually, the group will be reduced in size to the point where it really doesn't make sense to bring people forward to the jury box and we should instead treat the gallery as the jury box, if you will. We'll see. 19 20 21 22 23 24\n\n25\n\nBut unless there's something further with regard\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | to that, I'll turn to the motions in limine. |\n| 2 | Anything further on the jury selection? |\n| 3 | MR. NOVICK: Not from the government, Your |\n| 4 | Honor. |\n| 5 | MR. PETRILLO: Not from Mr. Shapiro, Your Honor. |\n| 6 | MR. MUKASEY: Not for Mr. Gramins. |\n| 7 | MR. BROWN: Or Mr. Peters. |\n| 8 | THE COURT: Okay, thank you. |\n| 9 | With regard to the motions, let me tell you what |\n| 10 | I have in mind. |\n| 11 | The first one that I want to address is the |\n| 12 | motion concerning the defendants' total compensation. |\n| 13 | This requires me to apply Rule 403. Looking at the |\n| 14 | probative value of the spreadsheet that is attached to the |\n| 15 | government's memo, the government says that this |\n| 16 | spreadsheet is important evidence of the defendants' |\n| 17 | financial motive to engage in fraud, the hierarchy that |\n| 18 | existed on the desk and the conspiratorial agreement |\n| 19 | alleged in the indictment. |\n| 20 | The spreadsheet shows the defendants' actual |\n| 21 | compensation on an annual basis for each of the years 2010 |\n| 22 | through 2015. The highest annual compensation was in |\n| 23 | 2013. For that year Mr. Shapiro's total compensation was |\n| 24 | . Mr. Peters, , and Mr. Gramins |\n| 25 | |\n| 1 | The government says that it will offer the |\n| 2 | testimony of Mr. Raiff, the head of Securitized Trading |\n| 3 | Products as of mid-2012. The government says that |\n| 4 | Mr. Raiff will testify that Mr. Shapiro was mainly |\n| 5 | responsible for compensation decisions with regard to |\n| 6 | traders on the desk. Mr. Raiff is expected to testify |\n| 7 | that Nomura allocated bonus money to the desk based on, |\n| 8 | among other factors, the profitability of the desk. |\n| 9 | Mr. Raiff is expected to testify that in determining the |\n| 10 | size of the bonus pool, he reviewed the profit and loss |\n| 11 | figures for the desk. Finally, he is expected to testify |\n| 12 | that Mr. Shapiro disbursed the bonus pool as he saw fit. |\n| 13 | In addition, the government says that it will |\n| 14 | offer the testimony of junior traders who will say that |\n| 15 | they knew the profitability of the desk had an impact on |\n| 16 | their compensation; that they were incentivized to squeeze |\n| 17 | every tick out of every trade, and they understood that |\n| 18 | this was important because it was tied to how well the |\n| 19 | desk performed which in turn impacted on their |\n| 20 | compensation. |\n| 21 | The question I ask at the outset is: What |\n| 22 | probative value do the total compensation numbers have |\n| 23 | with regard to motive? The government says that the total |\n| 24 | compensation numbers show that the profitability of the |\n| 25 | desk directly impacted the defendants' compensation. |\n\nIt's undisputed, as far as I know, that the defendants' compensation was affected to some extent by the profits produced by the desk. The question is to what extent was the profit based on the alleged misconduct? 1 2 3 4\n\nThe total compensation numbers themselves don't tell us to what extent the defendants' compensation was based on profits derived from fraudulent activities. There is no indication that a witness is prepared to say that profits from fraudulent trades increased the defendant's compensation by \"X\" amount or even \"X\" percent. There is no indication that the government will offer evidence of what the defendants' total compensation would have been without the fraudulent trades. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13\n\nSo the probative value of the total compensation numbers as proof of motive appears to me to be indirect, at best, and limited; and I think that if I allowed the total compensation numbers on that spreadsheet, I would need to have a stronger basis than that. 14 15 16 17 18\n\nI say that because I think that the probative value of the actual compensation numbers with regard to motive on the record in front of me right now is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Courts recognize that evidence of wealth can unduly prejudice a defendant during jury deliberations, and in this day and age, I think that remains true. I 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nthink that concerns about inequality in wealth are very much on the minds of many, if not most, people these days and I'm sure the jurors would be struck by these numbers. Can a jury instruction cure that? Well, I don't think you reach that question unless you have a stronger basis for putting the numbers in. With regard to the probative value of the total compensation numbers as proof of hierarchy or conspiratorial agreement, I think the probative value is substantially outweighed by the same concern. There is another danger that troubles me, and that is the risk of misleading the jury. If the government proposes to persuade the jury that these defendants were motivated to engage in fraud because it enabled them to pocket and the government can prove that, then the total compensation numbers in the spreadsheet could come in. That would not mislead the jury. But if the government is less ambitious, if the government proposes to prove that it had some effect on the defendants' compensation, I think offering the numbers in the spreadsheet carries a danger of misleading the jury into believing that this was a fraud when in fact it wasn't, and again a curative instruction may be helpful to deal with that danger, but I don't see a need to think in terms of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\nwhat such an instruction might look like in the absence of a stronger basis in probative value for submitting these numbers in the first place.\n\nSo the numbers aren't going to be mentioned in opening argument, we had already agreed to that, and they're not coming into evidence unless and until the government can persuade me that there's something new, something different. Maybe the calculus could change. It could be that not allowing the government to present these numbers would be misleading. It could be that the way the trial unfolds, the jury will be getting the impression that this was nickels and dimes and it really wasn't nickels and dimes, it was quite a bit more, and it may be that the calculus could change, but right now, I don't see a need for these numbers and I see that any need is substantially outweighed by these dangers that I've mentioned. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17\n\nI would note that I've considered the government's other arguments, for instance, the argument that the numbers are necessary to rebut a suggestion that the defendants are being treated unfairly because the junior traders haven't been criminally charged. Again, I mean, I don't see that as a basis for allowing the government to offer these numbers up front. If it should turn out that the defendants are beating that drum, then 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nthe calculus might change. 1\n\n| 2 | With regard to passive investors, the government |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 3 | wants to present evidence that the victim institutions |\n| 4 | managed money for sophisticated investors, sophisticated |\n| 5 | institutional investors, hedge funds, pension funds, |\n| 6 | endowments, mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, |\n| 7 | insurance companies and the PPIP program. It's my |\n| 8 | understanding that there's no particular objection to |\n| 9 | evidence along this line, that is, there's no objection to |\n| 10 | the government offering that kind of general testimony, |\n| 11 | what might be thought of as generic testimony with regard |\n| 12 | to the identities of the passive investors. |\n| 13 | Let me pause and ask: Is that correct? |\n| 14 | MR. PETRILLO: Your Honor, Guy Petrillo for |\n| 15 | Mr. Shapiro. |\n| 16 | We had objected on the defense side to the |\n| 17 | identification of pension funds and charitable |\n| 18 | institutions because of the potential that the jury would |\n| 19 | infer from the mention of those types of institutions that |\n| 20 | they're personally affected by the conduct. |\n| 21 | And the government's objection regarding PPIP, |\n| 22 | for the same reason we objected because we think it |\n| 23 | implicates for the jury whether this conduct in some way |\n| 24 | affected them personally by the Treasury. |\n| 25 | THE COURT: Okay. Well, I want to be careful to |\n\navoid that problem. I have to recuse myself if I own a share of stock in IBM and IBM is implicated in a case before me, so I'm sensitive to what you're talking about, and I want to avoid that problem for the jurors who for all intents and purposes are going to be our judges for this trial. 1 2 3 4 5 6\n\nBut even so, I think that the government is in a position where it needs to offer this typed of evidence for the reason it states. It goes to materiality with regard to whether the victim witness who is testifying should be viewed as a reasonable investor, and I gather it also does affect the behavior of the person in the position of the victim witness as the government explains. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13\n\nI understand the defendants do not agree. They think that the resumes of these witnesses are in themselves sufficiently impressive to remove any doubt, and they assert that the individual in the position of the victim witness owes the same fiduciary duty to everybody, but that's not something that I can take from the jury. So I ask whether there is any danger of unfair prejudice or confusing the issues or misleading the jury or otherwise by allowing this kind of evidence that substantially outweighs the probative value with regard to materiality, and I don't see that, generally speaking. The concern I have is what this motion really 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\naddresses is the government's desire to offer the testimony of Mr. Canter concerning his reaction to discovering similar fraudulent behavior by Mr. Litvak. That seems to be what this is really all about. 1 2 3 4\n\nFrom my perspective based on your submissions, it appears to me that the government wants very much to be able to tell that story. It wants to have Mr. Canter tell the jury about his interaction with Mr. Litvak and his shock and outrage on learning about Mr. Litvak's lie. 5 6 7 8 9\n\nBased on your submissions it's my understanding that the government would like to continue in that vein by offering evidence that Mr. Litvak was indicted, and the government would like to offer evidence of the fallout of that indictment. It seems that what the government has in mind is a case in which we could find ourselves with a jury verdict that acquits on the pre-Litvak indictment trades but convicts on the post-Litvak indictment trade. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17\n\nSo in that framework, let me ask: Of the 20 trades that the jury is going to be asked to consider, how many took place after the Litvak indictment? 18 19 20\n\nMR. NOVICK: Two, Your Honor, of the trades were after the Litvak indictment; however, there were others that were after news of Mr. Litvak's firing became public and the reasons for that firing. I think we address that issue in reporting it to Treasury, and I think we 21 22 23 24 25\n\n| 1 | addressed that issue in the most recent filing. |\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | The only thing I would ask, Your Honor, is -- |\n| 3 | and I think Your Honor has hit the nail on the head with |\n| 4 | regard to that possibility -- with the Canter narrative, |\n| 5 | that really is driven by the issue of materiality, to some |\n| 6 | degree intent, but largely materiality, his reaction. And |\n| 7 | a lot of the other bases for our offering would really |\n| 8 | have to deal with intent and wrongfulness. |\n| 9 | I think in the most recent filing by Mr. Shapiro |\n| 10 | raises the issue that, you know, Litvak doesn't go to the |\n| 11 | core issue in this trial, which is materiality. And what |\n| 12 | struck me was all along the defense has been raising to |\n| 13 | the Court that this case is unlike Litvak in that it's |\n| 14 | both about intent as well as materiality. |\n| 15 | And I think within intent -- it's both about |\n| 16 | intent to defraud and harm as well as about wrongfulness. |\n| 17 | And I suspect there will be arguments about that with |\n| 18 | regards to the jury instructions. |\n| 19 | But at any rate of course the reaction of the |\n| 20 | defendants to this similar conduct is critical evidence of |\n| 21 | their knowledge, of their intent. |\n| 22 | So that's the basis the government proceeds on, |\n| 23 | Your Honor. |\n| 24 | THE COURT: Okay. With regard to Mr. Canter's |\n| 25 | interaction with Mr. Litvak, do we have, among our 20 |\n\n| | |\n| 1 | trades, any trade involving a misrepresentation about the |\n| 2 | price of an RMBS within the PPIP program? |\n| 3 | MR. NOVICK: Yes, Your Honor. |\n| 4 | THE COURT: And can you tell me which one? |\n| 5 | MR. NOVICK: There are two of them. |\n| 6 | Just one moment please, Your Honor? |\n| 7 | THE COURT: Okay. |\n| 8 | (Pause) |\n| 9 | MR. NOVICK: Your Honor, sorry. So there is a |\n| 10 | trade in 2012. |\n| 11 | Sorry, one in 2011, one in 2012, both of them |\n| 12 | with AllianceBernstein. |\n| 13 | THE COURT: Was Mr. Canter involved in those |\n| 14 | trades? |\n| 15 | MR. NOVICK: Yes. Mr. Canter and Mr. Schiff. |\n| 16 | The narrative as to the 2012 trade I think Your |\n| 17 | Honor has spelled out in our most recent filing involving |\n| 18 | Mr. Canter's discovery that he was lied to in the course |\n| 19 | of that trade and then raises that within Nomura and then |\n| 20 | says something to the effect of -- and I'm going to be |\n| 21 | paraphrasing here -- don't you know that I was the person |\n| 22 | who just got Jesse Litvak or somebody else fired for doing |\n| 23 | something similar for lying to me and reported it to |\n| 24 | Treasury? |\n| 25 | THE COURT: Something similar. Let me clarify. |\n| | |\n| 1 | My question is whether we have a trade in which |\n| 2 | a misrepresentation was made with regard to the price. |\n| 3 | MR. NOVICK: That would have been the one the |\n| 4 | year before, Your Honor, I believe. |\n| 5 | THE COURT: In other words, Mr. Canter would |\n| 6 | testify that he was a victim of the very same type of |\n| 7 | misrepresentation made by Mr. Litvak when in 2011 he |\n| 8 | transacted with Nomura. In other words, a |\n| 9 | misrepresentation with regard to a price of the bond in |\n| 10 | the context of the PPIP program. |\n| 11 | MR. NOVICK: Your Honor, I'm going to have |\n| 12 | Mr. Brennan, since this is his witness, jump in here. |\n| 13 | MR. BRENNAN: Good morning, Your Honor, Liam |\n| 14 | Brennan. |\n| 15 | Mr. Canter, the evidence we intend to present at |\n| 16 | trial would be that Mr. Canter was lied to in 2011 about a |\n| 17 | trade purely about price in the PPIP program. |\n| 18 | Then in 2012, the one that blows up that he |\n| 19 | catches Nomura on, he was lied to both about ownership, |\n| 20 | which he was also lied to about Litvak, and he caught |\n| 21 | Litvak in that lie as well, and about the price. |\n| 22 | So what happens is on February 7, Nomura is |\n| 23 | supposedly trying to transact between third-party |\n| 24 | counterparty and Mr. Canter, but then they end up buying |\n| 25 | the bond, then the next day they continued to represent |\n\ntestify about his interaction with Mr. Litvak and I didn't allow evidence of the Litvak indictment, what does the government's case look like then? 1 2 3\n\nMR. NOVICK: It would look differently, Your Honor. 4 5\n\nI think that obviously the question of wrongfulness would be something we would get into with just the company policies, the rules and regulations from FINRA. But obviously my suspicion is the defendants are going to try to advance arguments that say that those policies and those rules do not cover the specific conduct that the defendants engaged in that they didn't have reason to know that this was wrongful. In fact, I'm quite certain that that would be an argument the defense would advance, and that's something the government has to prove. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15\n\nSo that's why, Your Honor, I think it's so critically probative both in assessing at the time how the defendants -- well, in explaining what the defendants knew. In other words, that now you have an instance not just where this kind of conduct could by argument be said to fall within these prohibitions both via compliance as well as via, you know, SEC rules and regulations. But now you have an actual example of where this kind of conduct has A: Gotten somebody fired for having lied to a counterparty, and it shows intent and materiality; and B, 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\n1\n\n2\n\nit shows after he gets indicted, that they had reason to believe that this implicates criminal law.\n\nNow, look, the defense could very well argue that at that time the defendants believed, oh, you know, yes, the government said it's criminal but we don't think it is, we continued to believe it wasn't, which is an argument they could make. But to the extent the government -- and even -- I mean, particularly on the defendants' view of the jury instructions, to the extent the government needs to prove that they knew that it was in violation of the law or had reason to believe that it was in violation of the law, there's no better evidence, Your Honor. And I think that the probative value is incredibly high here and it outweighs any prejudicial value, particularly in the sense, as we've argued, that the fact of another indictment, not a conviction, the fact of another indictment was something the courts regularly instruct on, the fact of an indictment at all in this case is something the courts regularly instruct jurors to ignore in making a judgment. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20\n\nTHE COURT: Well, do you see the problem there, Mr. Novick? You maintain that the probative value is critical, unique, very, very important and yet you want me to instruct the jury that the indictment is irrelevant and should be ignored. 21 22 23 24 25\n\nMR. NOVICK: I don't necessarily want you to instruct, Your Honor, that it should be ignored. I would limit the -- I think you could craft an instruction with the parties' assistance that it can be used for a limited purpose. I shouldn't have said \"ignored\", Your Honor, that it comes in for the limited purpose of its affect on knowledge, affect on the defendants' state of mind, and that's the limited purpose, at least in that context, that we're -- or materiality, that we're asking for it to be considered. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10\n\nYou know, the other thing, Your Honor, and I'm just ticking down the list of things that it bears on, is also a conversation that Mr. Jones, the head of sales in New York, has after that 2012 fraudulent trade in which Mr. Canter said to him that, you know, this is exactly the kind of conduct I just called out Jesse Litvak on or called out this other individual on. And then they had the discussion with Mr. Shapiro who promises, but we have no evidence that he actually followed through on that, to go talk to the desk. And that's in 2012, a year before the indictment. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21\n\nSo if we again preclude all evidence relating to Litvak, we lose another piece of probative information. 22 23\n\nAnd then, you know, the junior traders wouldn't be able to talk about the fallout from that trade; they 24 25\n\nwouldn't be able to explain what \"don't Litvak me\" means. And it doesn't just mean don't lie to me, it means don't lie to me in the context of there's a guy out there who did this in violation of -- at least as perceived by the indictment and within the defendants' state of mind -- in violation of the law. 1 2 3 4 5 6\n\nAnd we have to prove wrongfulness here. THE COURT: So without references to Litvak, you'd have the various policies and manuals and so forth and you would have the witnesses saying don't lie, do not lie, we do not lie, you have to agree not to lie. You would have all of that, but you think that the Litvak related evidence is necessary to rebut any suggestion that those policies, manuals, statements, et cetera, were ambiguous and didn't apply to this conduct? 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15\n\nMR. NOVICK: I think that's very true, Your Honor. I think that's very true, based on particularly the arguments that I've seen already in briefing which relate to the compliance policies, I think that's true. 16 17 18 19 20\n\nTHE COURT: Okay, thank you.\n\nLet me hear from defense counsel.\n\nIs it indeed your intention to advance that argument? Namely, that the manuals and policies and so on were ambiguous and did not cover this conduct? 22 23 24\n\nMR. KLEIN: Judge, Josh Klein on behalf of\n\n25\n\n21\n\n| | Case: 3:15-cr-00155-RNC Document 372 Filed 04/09/24 Page 35 of 73
Page 34 |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | Mr. Shapiro. |\n| 2 | I think we do intend to advance that argument |\n| 3 | with respect to the conduct that preceded the Litvak |\n| 4 | indictment. I think there is ample evidence that the |\n| 5 | compliance policies and compliance trainings did not apply |\n| 6 | the directive in those compliance policies to this |\n| 7 | specific conduct. |\n| 8 | I think the circumstance surrounding the |\n| 9 | termination of Mr. Litvak is a big distraction and I think |\n| 10 | it shows nothing more than that there was some |\n| 11 | business-related fallout within jeopardy following that |\n| 12 | incident. |\n| 13 | I think all the witnesses in trial are going to |\n| 14 | testify that they always perceived potential |\n| 15 | misrepresentations in the negotiations as a potential |\n| 16 | business issue and that if people were caught, that could |\n| 17 | lead to some discussion with counterparties, as occurred |\n| 18 | in the AllianceBernstein February 2012 incident. But I |\n| 19 | think that the objection with respect to the indictment is |\n| 20 | that it injects an enormous degree of prejudice. |\n| 21 | This is a case, unlike many criminal cases in |\n| 22 | which the defense believes there's a genuine issue as to |\n| 23 | whether or not the alleged misrepresentations were |\n| 24 | material, and once you inject the fact that an unrelated |\n| 25 | party at a different firm was indicted for similar |\n\nconduct, you are in effect telling the jury that these alleged misrepresentations are material because the jury is wondering, well, why is somebody being indicted for this? How can they be indicted in this other case as well? And if it's coming in with an instruction that goes to wrongfulness, how can it get to wrongfulness if it's not material? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7\n\nAnd so it injects this degree of undue prejudice into the case that impairs the defense's ability to not only advance intent defense -- put that aside -- it impairs our ability to advance the materiality defense, and we think for that reason it should not come in. It's unduly prejudicial and it does not in any respect, in any respect, it does not advance the government's argument that the pre-2013 policies at Nomura related to the alleged conduct. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16\n\nTHE COURT: What about the post-indictment trades? Isn't the indictment part of the story there. 17 18\n\nMR. KLEIN: We believe that with respect to the post-indictment trades, we don't believe that there's going to be an argument that -- certainly not on behalf of Mr. Shapiro -- we don't believe that there's going to be an argument that there was a view held that engaging in the alleged conduct was something that was condoned by the firm. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nI think that, you know, everyone acknowledges that post-Litvak indictment there was an understanding that, at least in the government's view, this was wrongful conduct, the government has brought an indictment with respect to conduct. But I don't think you need to get into any of that because internally there were directives that traders should not engage in this conduct. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7\n\nAnd I think what we're saying is that there's - there are methods by which the government could admit the fundamental evidence that there was a change of view within Nomura or within the industry, however they want to introduce that element, but there's a way of doing that that doesn't inject the undue prejudice that an indictment would inject into the case. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14\n\nAnd I would reiterate that as to Mr. Shapiro we have an application to strike reference to him in the overt acts. We don't believe there is any evidence that he was involved in any such conduct in 2015. 15 16 17 18\n\nTHE COURT: Suppose that was denied, do you still maintain that the post indictment trades can be properly litigated by the government without evidence of the Litvak indictment? 19 20 21 22\n\nIn other words, I understand that from Mr. Shapiro's point of view, the post-Litvak trades are trades in which he did not participate and thus they 23 24 25\n\nreally had no bearing on him. But let's suppose your motion fails and the government is permitted to argue that he was complicit in those post-indictment communications, would your position remain the same? 1 2 3 4\n\nMR. KLEIN: To the extent that Your Honor is -- I mean, I think our position is that if the government wants to make those arguments, they can do so without the introduction of the Litvak indictment. In other words, they can -- you know, we have proposed that there can be reference to a litigation development or something along those lines. They could, to the extent the Court denies our application, you know, they can make reference to the compliance directive that occurred following the Litvak indictment in which the RMBS desk was directed not to make misrepresentations relating to price in trade negotiations and, you know, that evidence can come in without reference to the prejudicial fact that an unrelated party at a different firm was indicted. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18\n\nTHE COURT: All right.\n\n19\n\nLet me hear from counsel for the other defendants. In light of what has just been said on behalf of Mr. Shapiro, I'd be interested to get your thoughts. 20 21 22\n\nIt would be simple enough, I suppose, if everybody said, yeah, we understood as of January 1, 2013 that you couldn't do this anymore and we never did it 23 24 25\n\nthe Court to be aware of that. 1\n\nJust another point regarding what Mr. Novick said in terms of that the courts instruct juries all the time that indictments are not evidence or indictments don't prove a case. I actually think that proves just the opposite point here, and I'm sure it's Your Honor's practice as it is almost all judges, if not all, that when a jury comes in, you say the evidence will be the evidence and the indictment is proof of nothing. This becomes an indictment on top of an indictment, and in my view it violates the due process clause. There's no way to cross-examine it, impeach it or do anything with it. It just exists and you can't fight it. And I think that becomes particularly meaningful in a case like this. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14\n\nYou know, you have both in the Litvak cases and here all these debates and discussions and legal motions about, you know, where the line of the law is and it strikes me that in such a case the introduction of some other finding of law is wholly prejudicial and improper. 15 16 17 18 19\n\nAnd I point to things that are just even in Litvak -- in Litvak 2/Litvak 1, in the way the Second Circuit dealt with it, just the fact that they're looking at the supervisor's direction as being something that's relevant, that again we've litigated here, and looking at expert testimony about where lines are, as we litigated 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nhere, sort of proves that point, that it's not, you know -- it doesn't matter what a supervisor says in a murder case because a murder as we all know is wrong. But it becomes complicated here, which just bolsters the improprieties introduced in the indictment. 1 2 3 4 5\n\nAs to the way Mr. Klein and Mr. Mukasey phrased what we believe the evidence will be and what our response is post learning of the Litvak indictment, which again to me the legal development is just as good and doesn't have any of these same issues, practicalities and everything else that I've already spoken to the Court about, but we expect our response to be exactly as Mr. Klein and Mr. Mukasey related. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13\n\nTHE COURT: Okay. Just to be clear in an effort to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the defense intends to take the position that no material misrepresentation was made in any of the subject trades, whether they occurred prior to Litvak's indictment or after the indictment? This is not a case, in other words, where the defense is going to say post-indictment they understood that these misrepresentations were material and could not be made and none were made; instead, the defense intends to take the position that there was no material misrepresentation in any of these trades regardless of the date of the trade? 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nMR. BROWN: Judge, Mike Brown on behalf of Mr. Peters. 1 2\n\nOur position on the post-Litvak issue is that it became -- that the fact of the indictment or what the rule was following the indictment, guidance was provided to the traders by the Nomura compliance department, so any uncertainty or ambiguity that existed prior to the Litvak indictments was clearly stated to the traders after the Litvak indictment. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9\n\nWe will be arguing more in line with the way Mr. Klein described it than the way that Mr. Mukasey described it. 10 11 12\n\nIn other words, our position is that after the Litvak indictment, Mr. Peters followed the advice and the guidance that he received from the compliance department. And in order to prove that, the government, in order to raise -- the government need not get into the fact of an indictment because there was a compliance meeting that was held and guidance that was provided after that, which I think is the way that Mr. Klein has described it in that the -- and I think it was the way that the Court went back to on it -- which is that any ambiguity was cleared up by compliance as to what is material and what is not material, and that at least insofar as Mr. Peters is concerned, he received that additional guidance. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nhas been concerned that without the evidence of the Litvak indictment, it would not be able to rebut the defense that the internal compliance manual was vague and actually allowed for this conduct. 20 21 22 23\n\nMR. NOVICK: Your Honor, I think that the way the defendants are framing what happened here kind of 24 25\n\nmakes the government's points for it.\n\n1\n\n6\n\n25\n\nThe defendants want to frame this that in lieu of Litvak they can just put on the evidence of the compliance presentation because that is a proxy for some change in policy on the part of the company. 2 3 4 5\n\nSo two things on that.\n\nFirst of all, as we have explained all through, and as I think the witnesses will explain, there was no change in policy. Lying has always been wrong and within the company, within the market. And the presentation that Nadine Cancell gave to the traders, the senior traders and the sales people, reflected that. It was inspired by or, I don't know what the correct word here is, it was suggested by the Litvak -- the fact of the Litvak indictment, that they ought to have something to remind people of that. But it was not, if you look at the one page PowerPoint slide that was given out, it was not a Litvak specific presentation, it was a compliance presentation that said do not lie and it had a number of other things that had absolutely nothing to do with Litvak. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21\n\nThe do not lie was the top line of the presentation, but then there are other things on the presentation as well as. 22 23 24\n\nIt didn't go through and say Jesse Litvak lied\n\ntherefore you should not lie. It was a reiteration of prior compliance policy. 1 2\n\nThe fact of the Litvak indictment is entirely different because it doesn't just reiterate policy, it has a completely independent basis not just about materiality, because I understand the defense wants to keep coming back to that this implies essentially something about materiality and that they are going to say that there were no material lies, I suppose, either before or after, which I understand always, all along, to be their position; but the government has to affirmatively prove intent, we have to affirmatively disprove good faith. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12\n\nI don't think that the defendants are going to get up there and concede that they knew that this particular kind of conduct was wrongful, was unlawful. Whether or not they argue that these things were material or immaterial. 13 14 15 16 17\n\nI mean, I look, Your Honor, at the defense exhibits and there are defense exhibits in there which go to the issue, I believe, if I understand correctly, of wrongfulness; and this indictment is another piece, a critical piece, of information in the minds of the defendants after the Litvak indictment. And then if you go backwards in time, their knowledge of Litvak's issues, the fact that he'd been fired for similar conduct for 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nlying about price or about ownership of the bonds, then you get into an entirely larger range of trades that this implicates. 1 2 3\n\nYou know, I'm looking at the indictment now, Your Honor. Several other trades that occurred between the time -- or other trades that occurred between the time of the now discovery and Mr. Canter's phone call, not in the Litvak issue but with Mr. Jones and Mr. Jones' subsequent conversation with Mr. Shapiro, and that, you know, one of the reasons we offered that 21st trade, Your Honor, was to reiterate the fact that this was occurring all along; that the defense implication, which seems to be throughout all of these motions, that these 20 are the only 20 trades out there, is just not true, and that there was another misrepresented trade, at least another one that we offered showing that Mr. Shapiro lied in the context of a trade after he had had that conversation with Mr. Canter, after he had that conversation with Mr. Jones. 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18\n\nAnd so, you know, again, Your Honor, this all comes back to the government's affirmative need to prove intent, and also to talk about why they moved from the typing in the Bloomberg chat to the phone, and why the jury may not see as much conduct post-Litvak as pre-Litvak. We're going to have witnesses on that. We're going to have exhibits in which somebody says that guy was 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nthe first one to move to the phone after the Litvak indictment. He's shady. 1 2\n\nI mean, that kind of encapsulates the whole point, Your Honor, and saying that there was some sort of legal development, Your Honor, particularly in a world where we need to prove either wrongfulness -- not just a legal development, but wrongfulness -- or unlawfulness, if you believe the defendants, the fact of the indictments has real probity. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9\n\nAnd I would add, Your Honor, it's not as if we are going to be putting in a copy of the Litvak indictment laying bare all the things that Mr. Litvak did. It's going to be extremely limited testimony about the fact of the indictment and the impact it had on various people, on the things that it begot. And we believe that that has significant probative value here. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16\n\nTHE COURT: What is the probative value, Mr. Novick? Are you going to argue that before the indictment maybe an ethical, responsible person could think the lie wasn't material, but after the indictment obviously it was material, the indictment establishing as a matter of law the materiality of the lie? Is that what you're going to argue? What is the probative value of an indictment? 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24\n\nUnder standard evidence treatises, indictments\n\n25\n\nare typically inadmissible. They're hearsay reflecting somebody's opinion about what somebody did. MR. NOVICK: Yes, I understand, Your Honor. THE COURT: And normally we spend time educating the jury that they are to ignore allegations in indictments because they're just that, they're just somebody's opinion. MR. NOVICK: Understood, Your Honor. And again I go back to the idea that we're not asking to put in a copy of the indictment, because the indictment in and of itself, Your Honor, I 100 percent agree with you is not proof of the contents of it. It is something that serves a number of purposes here. It serves a purpose of telling the defendants to the extent that it's in their minds of linking this kind of conduct to the securities laws, they can no longer claim ignorance that these two things are unrelated. Your Honor, the government's going to argue, and I concede we thought long and hard about this issue, to be completely candid, because we don't view a sea change in what the defendants should have known and did know because of the clarity in our view of the compliance policies; however, we do think that it is another thing. Like, Your Honor, asked at the very beginning of this colloquy whether it's possible the jury would acquit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nas to the pre-Litvak conduct and convict as to the post-Litvak conduct. That is a possibility, Your Honor. That is a reaction the jury could have. 1 2 3\n\nWe don't think that would be the right one, but we think a jury could decide if there was ambiguity previously and that there wasn't afterwards because again it made that connection. The defendants now understood in all the context of all of this, goes to the context of intent and materiality. Intent because now they understood the connection of the laws with the conduct and also because materiality, they hear people saying things like \"don't Litvak me\" and \"that guy moved to the phone.\" 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12\n\nThey also know, Your Honor, that the government was in possession of Litvak's chats and that's why they moved to the phone. They know that what got Mr. Litvak indicted was the fact that he's chatting with people about this stuff, and that provides motive to move to the phone. And that's another thing that happens. You're going to hear testimony about that. You're going to hear some of the phone calls that Mr. Gramins had with one of the victims, a phone call Mr. Gramins had with Mr. Romanelli in which they're talking about how they're going to get more money out of one of the victims. Why did they have that phone call? Why is his chat or communication with Mr. Choi, the victim in that case on the other side of the 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\n| Case: 3:15-cr-00155-RNC Document 268-3 Filed 05/09/24 Page 50 of 73
Page 50 | |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | chat over the phone? Why is his conversation with |\n| 2 | Mr. Romanelli over the phone? |\n| 3 | The government is within its right to argue that |\n| 4 | that's because they knew that the chats are what got them |\n| 5 | in trouble in the first place. We certainly can make that |\n| 6 | argument, Your Honor. |\n| 7 | THE COURT: Okay. Let me follow up, Mr. Novick, |\n| 8 | and then we're going to have to get off the phone. The |\n| 9 | reporter needs a break and I need a break. |\n| 10 | Obviously the Litvak piece of this case is very |\n| 11 | important to both sides. It's evident from the amount of |\n| 12 | time and energy you've given to litigate the Litvak piece. |\n| 13 | Why is that? Well, the government feels |\n| 14 | strongly that it helps its case and the defense feels |\n| 15 | strongly that it helps the government's case, and it |\n| 16 | presents a unique problem. |\n| 17 | The government wants to argue to this jury that |\n| 18 | it can find these defendants guilty under this indictment |\n| 19 | because somebody else got indicted. That's a very unusual |\n| 20 | argument, one I've not heard before; and how do you |\n| 21 | respond to Mr. Brown's point that there's no way for a |\n| 22 | defendant to come to grips with such a pitch by the |\n| 23 | government? How does somebody defend against that pitch? |\n| 24 | You can convict these people under this |\n| 25 | indictment because somebody else got indicted in a |\n\ndifferent case? How do you deal with that? MR. NOVICK: Your Honor, first of all, that is -- I mean, that is not what the government is saying. Again, the government is arguing that this goes to discrete pieces of the case that are things the government has to prove. 1 2 3 4 5 6\n\nWe're not saying at all, I think, that the jury should convict these three defendants because someone else was charged with the crime hard stop. What we're saying is that that is a critical piece of knowledge evidence of what was in the defendants' minds at the time they acted, critical times they acted; not just the fact of the indictment, but the fact that they become aware that Mr. Litvak had the issue; why we know they went to the phone and why they went to the phone after the indictment. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15\n\nAll of these things that I just described, we're not again -- and that I think is a critical distinction between what the government is arguing and the way the defense is defending this -- is we are we are not saying that -- and I don't think we would ever say that they should convict Mr. Shapiro and Mr. Gramins or Mr. Peters simply because someone else was charged with this crime. We are simply saying that the knowledge of that charge, the knowledge of the fact that someone else was indicted for securities fraud because of similar conduct is 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nobviously a critical piece in terms of showing the state of mind of the defendants at the time they acted. THE COURT: Let me ask you to stop right there, Mr. Novick, and explain to me why that's true. Take the last statement that you made and please explain to me why that's true. MR. NOVICK: Absolutely, Your Honor. Because all of the compliance policies, everything else in the rules and regulations, everything else, says -- obviously, we think we've raised this with the Court -- that lying, material misrepresentations are wrong, et cetera. And I understand the defendants to be arguing that they didn't have the intent, they didn't believe these were material misrepresentations, they didn't have the intent, and they did not believe that this was wrongful. I understand the defendants to be defending this case on the idea that this was not unlawful conduct, not wrongful conduct, and that they had no way to connect in their minds the conduct that they were taking with violation of the law. And what we're saying is that this is a piece of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22\n\ninformation, the fact of the indictment, which directly ties those two things together. 23 24\n\n25\n\nIt also impacts, Your Honor -- again showing how\n\nit impacted, how it changed their behavior -- impacts the way they worked by moving onto the phones, showing that it did have an impact on their behavior, showing that it had an impact on their state of mind. 1 2 3 4\n\nAnd again so a critical piece of information, a critical piece of the government's case.\n\n5\n\n6\n\nWe will argue this at that they should have known or did know all along that this was wrongful, that these were material misrepresentations, but we can't be, Your Honor, respectfully, can't be cabined in proving a case in the various ways that we have available to us. And this is obviously, as Your Honor pointed out, the reason why the government feels so strongly about this. There's no more salient piece of evidence, probative piece of evidence, that these were potentially implicated -- its conduct potentially indicates a securities law in the minds of defendants. 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17\n\nAnd again, not an absolute, right? We're not saying that the indictment is evidence of the commission of a crime. It is evidence of the tying of, in the defendants' minds, their conduct to the securities laws and it implicates or provides context which describes why the defendants did what they did afterwards. 18 19 20 21 22 23\n\nJust as we use evidence of flight at trial to explain the state of mind of a defendant. We do things 24 25\n\nlike that all the time, Your Honor, to show why the defendants did what they did to reflect some guilty knowledge. And we believe that this is evidence of the defendants' guilty knowledge. It's evidence of the defendants' knowledge that what they were doing implicated material misrepresentations, that it was wrongful. 1 2 3 4 5 6\n\nAnd that's why we continue to press this issue, Your Honor. 7 8\n\nTHE COURT: Okay. If we put aside that piece of it, which maybe that surfaced earlier in the case and I missed it, it could be, but it seems to me to be relatively new to the discussion, but put that aside for the moment, as I listen to you, it sounded to me like the probative value of the indictment lies in the fact that the defendants learned that the government regarded this type of misrepresentation as material and would bring an indictment on that basis if they had the opportunity to do so. That was the probative value that I heard you articulate. Is that right? 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19\n\nMR. NOVICK: I think I would nuance it a little bit differently, Your Honor. The probative value is the tying together of the conduct, in other words, lying to counterparties with the securities regulations. That I think is the probative value. 20 21 22 23 24\n\n25\n\nTHE COURT: So let's suppose the government\n\nthrough the SEC had issued a release saying that, you would say that that would be admissible for proof of intent with regard to any subsequent activity, right? MR. NOVICK: If that were the case, Your Honor, 1 2 3 4\n\nyeah, I think that's right; it would be probative evidence if the SEC issued a release.\n\nBut again, it's different because we're talking about laws of the United States versus rules and regulations of the SEC. And to the extent that we need to prove wrongfulness, either it's just wrongfulness or unlawfulness, and again I don't know where the Court is going to go with this. There is a distinction, particularly when it's reflective of the defendants' mind. Because again we don't need to prove 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14\n\nwrongfulness in absolute terms, we need to prove the knowledge and the state of mind of the defendants.\n\nTHE COURT: If you step back, and I am going to have to conclude here, if you step back and look at this in the broadest terms, we have a party here, the U.S. government, vying for an opportunity to bring to the attention of this jury the fact that it indicted somebody else for very similar conduct, and the government views that as very important, it views it as a critical part of the case. 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24\n\n25\n\n5\n\n6\n\n15\n\n16\n\nIn this very case the defendants are saying that\n\nthey don't agree with the government notwithstanding their own indictment in this case, they're saying the government is wrong. 1 2 3\n\nHow is the defendant facing this rather unusual case theory? How is the defendant supposed to deal with the indictment of the other person? How is the defendant supposed to respond? 4 5 6 7\n\nMR. NOVICK: Your Honor, here's -- I mean, the problem here with that issue is just like in many other cases, these are the facts of the case. The fact that the defendants reacted to the indictment and the implications that had for their conduct subsequently. Those are just the facts. 8 9 10 11 12 13\n\nThe fact that the indictment became a thing in the market, became a thing within the RMBS trading desk, became a thing that motivated other people to say things, that caused the defendants to act in a different way, all those things are just facts of this case. And what the defendants are suggesting is to, I believe, Your Honor, is to artificially take a critical piece of information out of this trial. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21\n\nTo the extent that I hope that this trial is a search for the truth of what happened here, what was in the defendants' minds at the time all this was going on. What they're essentially suggesting is to take one of the 22 23 24 25\n\n1\n\n2\n\nmost significant pieces of information that could bear on the defendants' intent out of the trial.\n\nSo we're going to be left with this kind of artificial construct, and which now the defendants are going to come and they're going to say, well, there was this do not lie conference in, you know, January or February of 2013, and that Mr. Shapiro came and he said, you know, to the desk, you know, do not lie, with having no idea where that came from, what that was, that there's going to be evidence that they moved to the phone after February of 2013 and stopped chatting as much with these kinds of issues, and we're going to have no idea why that occurred. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13\n\nWe're going to be taking out of the trial a critical piece of information that was in the minds of the defendants, was in the minds of some of the victims, was in the minds of the testifying co-conspirator witnesses, artificially and creating essentially a trial that is not going to be, at least in the government's view, now a search for the truth but an effort to manipulate sort of the facts now for the benefit of, you know, an argument the defendants want to make. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22\n\nAnd we just view this evidence as important in that respect, Your Honor, is to complete the picture, to understand what was in the defendants' minds, why 23 24 25\n\neverybody did what they did. 1\n\nAnd it just, again, it is for all the reasons I've said before. I understand Your Honor is under time pressure here. We believe it was a critical piece of evidence that was present. It was there and it was of what everybody was thinking about and it drove how they reacted. 2 3 4 5 6 7\n\nTHE COURT: Help me understand this part of it, if you would, please, Mr. Novick: As I understand it, most of the trades that the jury will be asked to consider in this case occurred before Mr. Litvak was indicted. MR. NOVICK: Yes. 8 9 10 11 12\n\nTHE COURT: So how could the fact of the Litvak indictment and its impact on the market and these individuals have any bearing object the majority of the trades at issue? 13 14 15 16\n\nMR. NOVICK: Well, a couple of things, Your Honor. 17 18\n\nFirst of all, they're obviously critical evidence that related to the trades that occurred after the indictment. And as Your Honor said at the very beginning, we don't think, and I said this a couple of minutes ago, while we don't think it would be a right result, a jury could theoretically decide that that was a significant moment in the market and that any lies after 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nthat should be treated differently than lies before that. That's a thing the jury can do. And to the extent we are seeking the truth and seeking a just result here, I don't want to deprive the jury of the ability to make a decision if they think it's fit. We're going to argue against that distinction. And so, you know, that's the for instance. 1 2 3 4 5 6\n\nThe second thing, Your Honor, is we know that they -- because of the Litvak indictment -- and by the way, Your Honor, the defendants -- well, withdraw that.\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\nWe know because of the Litvak indictment that everybody moved to the phone -- not everybody -- a lot of the traders moved to the phone more frequently, knew that chats were going to be a problem, and did that more and chatted -- excuse me -- used the phone more and chatted on Bloomberg less. 10 11 12 13 14 15\n\nSo that's a thing that would explain why there's fewer fraudulent trades after. It's also just simply more time before the Litvak indictment than there is after. When the government's investigations began, the defendants were put on suspension. So we're really talking about a year timeframe versus a -- you know, post indictment versus a three-year, four-year timeframe beforehand. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22\n\nYou know, in addition to that, Mr. Shapiro had been promoted and so he at that point is trading less and supervising more. And just in terms of volume, you know, 23 24 25\n\n|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 1 | it's different. |\n| 2 | And so I think that answers the question Your |\n| 3 | Honor asked. |\n| 4 | THE COURT: I don't want to prolong this, but in |\n| 5 | all fairness, Mr. Novick, you really didn't. The question |\n| 6 | related to the trades before the indictment. |\n| 7 | How can the fact of the indictment have any |\n| 8 | bearing on those trades which comprised the majority of |\n| 9 | the trades at issue? |\n| 10 | MR. NOVICK: Sure. So two things, Your Honor. |\n| 11 | I think that the fact that they moved to the |\n| 12 | phones after the indictments and did more work on the |\n| 13 | phones after the indictment is reflective of the idea that |\n| 14 | they had intended to do wrong the entire time. |\n| 15 | THE COURT: That's what I was wondering. That's |\n| 16 | something I need to think about because it strikes me that |\n| 17 | that's what may be in store for us, that you would wind up |\n| 18 | arguing to the jury that no matter what they might make of |\n| 19 | the pre-Litvak indictment trades, without the benefit of |\n| 20 | the Litvak indictment, once that indictment came down, we |\n| 21 | see people behaving in a way that shows they were bad news |\n| 22 | all along. |\n| 23 | MR. NOVICK: Yes, Your Honor. |\n| 24 | THE COURT: Their post-Litvak indictment |\n| 25 | behavior allows the jury to find that they had a guilty |\n\nrather than agency regulation or some other means? I'm thinking about this in the broadest terms.\n\nI have a case in which people apparently can say that at the time they engaged in most of these trades, they believed in good faith that what they were doing was not illegal. No one had ever been charged with doing this, even though everybody did it, and certainly nobody had ever been convicted of doing it. They thought that it was okay, and the government has decided to use the criminal law as a means of educating the people in this industry about where the line is. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11\n\nDo we have a precedent for that? Is there any other area of securities regulation where the government proceeded by way of indictment rather than some lesser means? 12 13 14 15\n\nMR. NOVICK: I guess I'm not completely following. Are you saying, Your Honor, precedent to show that -- I mean, there are many white collar cases where the -- I have white collar cases where the defense is \"here's what I did, I didn't think it was wrong,\" and the government has to prove that it was wrong, that it was illegal. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22\n\nYou know, I think that's pretty common, and certainly, you know -- 23 24\n\nTHE COURT: Do you have any case where the\n\n25\n\n1\n\n2\n\n| 1 | government was allowed to offer evidence of an indictment |\n|----|------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | of someone else in a previous case in order to prove guilt |\n| 3 | in the charges under an indictment on trial? Any other |\n| 4 | case where an indictment was used for the purpose for |\n| 5 | which it's being sought to be used here? |\n| 6 | MR. NOVICK: I don't have a case either way, |\n| 7 | Your Honor, either allowing it or disallowing it. |\n| 8 | THE COURT: Okay, all right. |\n| 9 | With regard to other things, very, very quickly, |\n| 10 | I'm going to go through this list that I have. |\n| 11 | I've talked about the motion to exclude evidence |\n| 12 | and argument regarding the defendants' compensation. |\n| 13 | That's ECF-160, and that's granted in line with what I |\n| 14 | said before today. If the government wants to offer the |\n| 15 | spreadsheet, it's going to need to persuade me that it |\n| 16 | should be allowed to do so. Based on the analysis to |\n| 17 | date, I don't see that it should come in. |\n| 18 | With regard to the motion to preclude evidence |\n| 19 | and references to the PPIP program and the identities of |\n| 20 | passive investors and the funds managed by counterparty |\n| 21 | institutions, ECF-162, that's granted in part. I am not |\n| 22 | persuaded that Mr. Canter should be allowed to discuss his |\n| 23 | reaction to his discovery of Mr. Litvak's |\n| 24 | misrepresentation. It's something that I need to think |\n| 25 | about some more in light of our conversation today, but I |\n\nwant the government to realize that it's in doubt. I think that the government should be able to offer evidence of the identities of the passive investors in these funds, and that includes charities, college endowments, et cetera. I think that any danger of unfair prejudice or anything else arising from that evidence can be adequately dealt with through a jury instruction, and I think it's important to educating the jury about what these people are doing when they trade on behalf of these passive investors. With regard to the PPIP program in particular, if we're going to be hearing from Mr. Canter about his interactions with the defendants in the context of the PPIP program, then that answers itself. If that's going to be evidence here, then there's nothing for me to say, that trade or trades is part of the case and I'm not going to conceal the PPIP program if we have PPIP trades. With regard to the motion to preclude admission of the FINRA study guides absent proper foundation, we discussed this at a court session awhile ago and I said by its terms this motion should be granted. It's self-evident that in the absence of a proper foundation the guides can't come in. That's the last I know we touched on this, and so I'm granting that motion on the same basis. If the government proposes to use the FINRA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\nguides, I presume it proposes to lay a proper foundation. That was ECF-163 for the benefit of the clerk. The motion to exclude evidence that the defendants acted as agents or brokers or owed any agency duties to counterparties, ECF-164, I believe we resolved that at that court session. There isn't going to be any suggestion by the government that the defendants owed fiduciary duties to the counterparties, and so that motion can be granted. MR. NOVICK: I'm sorry, Your Honor, from the government's perspective there was another part of that, I think. We obviously concede that we're not going to suggest that there's an agency relationship as a matter of law, but I think the defendants were also looking to preclude the testimony of the witnesses that they perceived one and that they were made believed by the defendants that there was one. And I believe my recollection, it's been a long time, Your Honor, that the Court was inclined to permit the witnesses to testify in that manner. THE COURT: Yes, yes. I see that Judge Hall dealt with that in her recent ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal of a new trial. She described that testimony in great detail. I think that if we have a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\n|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| | |\n| 1 | witness who wants to say that he thought that the |\n| 2 | defendant was acting as his agent, he could be |\n| 3 | cross-examined on that. |\n| 4 | MR. NOVICK:
Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 5 | THE COURT:
With regard to the motion to exclude |\n| 6 | evidence of the absence of criminal activity, ECF-159, I |\n| 7 | don't know where that stands.
Is that still something |\n| 8 | that you are disputing?
Or is that moot? |\n| 9 | MR. NOVICK:
Yes, Your Honor, I think -- I don't |\n| 10 | know to what degree the -- one moment, please, Your Honor, |\n| 11 | I'm sorry. |\n| 12 | (Pause) |\n| 13 | MR. BRENNAN:
Your Honor, Liam Brennan here, we |\n| 14 | are -- our motion was to preclude the actions to criminal |\n| 15 | activity in all there are like thousands of other trades, |\n| 16 | and that is something persisted in.
I think the question |\n| 17 | is whether the defense intends to bring in the non-charged |\n| 18 | trades, the ones that aren't the 21 trades we've given |\n| 19 | notice we're going to introduce. |\n| 20 | MR. MUKASEY:
Your Honor, if I may address Liam |\n| 21 | briefly. |\n| 22 | I think we've tried to meet and confer on this, |\n| 23 | and I thought we had.
I thought we've sort of reached an |\n| 24 | agreement that there could be reference to many, many |\n| 25 | other trades both by you and by us, but you would not |\n| | |\n\nwhat the defendants have in mind in that regard, but it would be helpful if you could educate me, we can't do it now, but to the extent that remains open, to the extent the defendants intend to offer evidence that these trades were in fact profitable, I would ask you to discuss that with the government and see if you can work that out. If you can't, fine, I'll deal with it, but I'm going to deny that without prejudice to renewal pending that discussion. Next one, motion to preclude evidence regarding other broker/dealers, ECF-187, again, I don't know where that stands today, so I think I'm going to treat it the same way. I'm denying it without prejudice to renewal on the understanding that if the defendants seek to offer evidence in that vein, they will confer with counsel for the government and in that way give the government fair notice of exactly what they have in mind, and then the government can renew its motion if it wants to. There's a motion regarding expert witnesses, which I think we've addressed. This leads me to the latest motions. I've got Mr. Shapiro's motion to strike surplusage. That motion is denied for substantially the reasons stated by the government, and the alternative request to admit evidence relating to Nomura's internal review is denied for substantially the reasons stated by 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\nWe talked about the summary charts. You were going to have a follow-up on that. As I said, I think summary charts are useful, probably unavoidable, and it's just a question of whether the charts themselves are somehow or other inaccurate or otherwise unfairly prejudicial. 1 2 3 4 5 6\n\nI think that takes care of everything that I needed to deal with today, and in any event, we need to adjourn, so please continue to talk and get back to me if you need anything further from me. In the meantime, I'll continue to think about the Litvak part of this and I will be in touch with you. 7 8 9 10 11 12\n\nThere is one last point.\n\n13\n\nWith regard to jury instructions, in your recent submissions reference is made to your competing requests for instructions on the elements of the offenses. My question for you would be: Why shouldn't I use Judge Hall's instructions as a starting point? She devoted substantial time and attention to these matters in the course of those two trials and heard extensive argument and wound up with a set of jury instructions that I believe went to the jury without objection, or if there was objections, there weren't too many. My sense is that they were able to come up with a set of instructions that made everybody reasonably happy. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25\n\n| 1 | So my question for you would be: Why shouldn't |\n|----|-----------------------------------------------------------|\n| 2 | we use her instructions as a starting point recognizing |\n| 3 | that they would need to be tailored to our case, but on |\n| 4 | such things as a general statement of the elements of the |\n| 5 | offenses, why couldn't we use the instructions that were |\n| 6 | used there. I'd be interested to hear back from you on |\n| 7 | that. You could email Katie and let her know your |\n| 8 | thoughts. |\n| 9 | Thank you all, I need to run. |\n| 10 | MR. MUKASEY: Judge, can you just really quickly |\n| 11 | seal the portion of the transcript in which you referred |\n| 12 | to the defendants' compensation today, Judge? |\n| 13 | MR. BROWN: We join in that, Your Honor. |\n| 14 | THE COURT: Yes, that will be sealed. |\n| 15 | SPEAKER: Thank you, Your Honor. |\n| 16 | MR. NOVICK: Thanks, Your Honor. |\n| 17 | THE COURT: All right, thank you. |\n| 18 | (Proceedings adjourned at 11:45 a.m.) |\n| 19 | |\n| 20 | |\n| 21 | |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| 25 | |\n| | |\n\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|\n| | |\n| 1 | C E R T I F I C A T E |\n| 2 | |\n| 3 | In Re: U.S. vs. SHAPIRO |\n| 4 | |\n| 5 | |\n| 6 | I, Darlene A. Warner, RDR-CRR, Official Court |\n| 7 | Reporter for the United States District Court for the |\n| 8 | District of Connecticut, do hereby certify that the |\n| 9 | foregoing pages are a true and accurate transcription of |\n| 10 | my shorthand notes taken in the aforementioned matter to |\n| 11 | the best of my skill and ability. |\n| 12 | |\n| 13 | |\n| 14 | |\n| 15 | /s/__________________________ |\n| 16 | DARLENE A. WARNER, RDR-CRR |\n| 17 | Official Court Reporter |\n| 18 | 450 Main Street, Room #223 |\n| 19 | Hartford, Connecticut 06103 |\n| 20 | (860) 547-0580 |\n| 21 | |\n| 22 | |\n| 23 | |\n| 24 | |\n| 25 | |\n| | |","body_zh":"证据附录 C\n\n\nCase: 3:15-cr-00155-RNC Document 268-32 Filed 04/09/24 Page 2 of 73\n\n出庭人员：\n\n代表政府方：\nU.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE-NH（新罕布什尔州联邦检察官办公室）\n157 Church Street\nP.O. Box 1824; 23rd Floor\nNew Haven, Connecticut 06510\n代理人：LIAM BRENNAN（利亚姆·布伦南），AUSA（联邦助理检察官）\nHEATHER L. CHERRY（希瑟·L·切里），AUSA\nDAVID NOVICK（大卫·诺维克），AUSA\n\n代表 ROSS SHAPIRO（罗斯·夏皮罗）：\nPETRILLO, KLEIN & BOXER LLP（佩特里洛、克莱因与博克瑟有限责任合伙律师事务所）\n665 Third Avenue\n22nd Floor\nNew York, New York 10017\n代理人：GUY PETRILLO（盖伊·佩特里洛），ESQ.（律师）\nJOSHUA KLEIN（约书亚·克莱因），ESQ.\nAMY LESTER（艾米·莱斯特），ESQ.\nREID & RIEGE, P.C.（里德与里格职业公司）\nOne Financial Plaza\nHartford, Connecticut 06103\n代理人：THOMAS V. DAILY（托马斯·V·戴利），ESQ.\n\n代表 MICHAEL GRAMINS（迈克尔·格拉敏斯）：\nBRACEWELL & GIULIANI, LLP（布雷斯韦尔与朱利安尼有限责任合伙律师事务所）\n1251 Avenue of the Americas\n49th Floor\nNew York, New York 10020-1100\n代理人：MARC L. MUKASEY（马克·L·穆凯西），ESQ.\nKedar S. Bhatia（凯达尔·S·巴蒂亚），Esq.\n\n出庭人员（续）：\n\n代表 TYLER PETERS（泰勒·彼得斯）：\nALSTON & BIRD, LLP-NY（奥斯顿与伯德有限责任合伙律师事务所纽约分所）\n90 Park Avenue\n12th Floor\nNew York, New York 10016\n代理人：\nBRETT D. JAFFEE（布雷特·D·贾菲），ESQ.\nMICHAEL L. BROWN（迈克尔·L·布朗），ESQ.\nBRAFMAN & ASSOCIATES, PC（布拉夫曼律师事务所）\n767 Third Avenue\n26th Floor\nNew York, New York 10016\n代理人：\nALEX SPIRO（亚历克斯·斯皮罗），ESQ.\n\n上午 9:30\n\n法庭速记员：早上好，Chatigny（沙蒂尼）法官已加入会议。请陈述各位的出庭代表身份。\n诺维克先生：大卫·诺维克代表政府方出庭。与我一同出席的还有利亚姆·布伦南和希瑟·切里。法官阁下，早上好。\n法庭：早上好。\n佩特里洛先生：早上好，法官阁下，盖伊·佩特里洛、乔什·克莱因、艾米·莱斯特和汤姆·戴利；夏皮罗先生也在电话线上。\n穆凯西先生：早上好，法官，我是 Greenberg Traurig（格林伯格·特劳里格律师事务所）的马克·穆凯西。我和我的同事凯达尔·S·巴蒂亚，以及这里的其他几位代表被告人迈克尔·格拉敏斯出庭，他正和我们在一起。\n布朗先生：早上好，法官阁下，迈克·布朗、亚历克斯·斯皮罗和布雷特·贾菲代表彼得斯先生出庭，彼得斯先生也在电话线上。\n法庭：早上好。这是一次电话会议，旨在讨论陪审员调查问卷以及尚待解决的各项动议。遗憾的是，这条线路上有回音反馈。我不知道原因是什么；不过，大家都能听清我说话吗？\n诺维克先生：政府方能听清，法官阁下。\n发言者：是的，法官阁下，我们能听清。法庭：没有听到不同意见，我假定大家都能听清我说话。\n\n关于陪审员调查问卷，你们已经收到了问卷副本。你们已有机会对其进行审阅和讨论，据我了解，截至今天上午，你们已达成一致，同意有 20 人应因法定事由予以免除。此外，辩方就 12 名陪审员提出了附理由回避申请，但政府方并不同意免除这些人。然后我得知，有相当多的人表示他们出于某种原因将很难出席，根据我的统计表，该群体共有 61 人。情况就是这样。\n\n关于你们已达成的各项约定，我采纳你们就这 20 人达成的协议，相应地，他们将被免除。\n\n关于辩方提出异议的那 12 个人，政府方对这 12 人中的任何一人有何陈述吗？\n\n诺维克先生：好的，法官阁下。我可以逐一说明，但我认为从整体、全局的角度来谈可能最合理。\n我认为政府方对这 12 人的立场并不一定是我们在某些案件中最终不同意附理由回避申请，而是在审阅答案时，我们认为进行追加提问是恰当的，如果我们是在法庭上——就像我们通常进行这一程序时那样——并且提出了这些问题，给出了这些答案，法庭无论是依职权还是根据当事人的建议，可能都会跟进并提出额外的问题，以查明是否存在利益冲突、是否存在因医疗原因无法履职的情况，或者是否存在可能表明缺乏公正性的观点。\n很多时候，在进一步追问下我们会发现，陪审员原先自认为属于问题的情况，从公正的角度来看其实并不成其为问题。\n例如，有人看过电影《大空头》（The Big Short），以为本案完全是关于 RMBS（住房抵押贷款支持证券）的设立发起，后来发现其实根本不是，您知道，这可能会改变陪审员、当事人以及法庭对于是否存在实质利益冲突的看法。\n所以，这就是推动我们提出这些意见的分析考量——是否存在我们认为恰当的追加提问，并且只有让这些陪审员到庭并就其是否具备公正客观的履职能力接受审查，对其余的陪审团候选成员才算公平。\nCase: 1:23-cr-00118-AT Document 372 Filed 04/09/24 Page 8 of 73\nCase: 3:15-cr-00155-RNC Document 268-3 Filed 05/02/17 Page 7 of 72\n第 7 页\n公正和客观。\n法庭：好的，没问题。那么您就无需逐一对此进行评价了。\n诺维克先生：好的。\n法庭：如果我们传唤这些人来进行 voir dire（陪审员资格审查），那么我们就可以提出您认为必要的追加问题，而不是仅凭调查问卷的回答在抽象层面进行处理。\n照这样计算，我的理解是，依协议排除这 20 人后，我们还剩 102 人；就该群体而言，我们还有已提出异议的那 12 人。\n政府方是否有异议，我没说错吧？\n诺维克先生：是的，法官阁下。我们对一名陪审员提出了异议，我认为该陪审员回答说其宗教信仰阻止其对他人做出评判。\n法庭：那是 234 号陪审员，对吗？\n诺维克先生：正是，法官阁下，是的。\n法庭：通常情况下，当有人对我们陈述该情况或非常类似的情况时，该陪审员就会被免除进一步服役。辩方是否有某种理由希望我保留这名陪审员，尽管该陪审员作出了上述陈述？\n巴蒂亚先生：法官阁下，我是凯达尔·巴蒂亚。我们认为该陪审员与其他一些适合进行追加提问的人属于同一类别。但归根结底，我们同意这可能构成一项附理由回避申请，但我们认为最好至少申请将他们带到法庭并与他们谈谈。法庭：好的。接下来的问题，纵观整体情况，假设我们有 100 人到庭参与陪审员资格审查，在这 100 人中，已有 61 人告知我们由于某种原因他们无法出席——是这样吗？请稍候。（暂停）法庭：好的。所以我们有 100 个人\n\n可能到庭，而这其中的 40 人已向我们表明，由于某种原因，他们认为自己无法出席。在此基础上推进程序，你们觉得可以接受吗？还是你们认为我们需要采取额外措施来组成陪审团？请记住，你们已有机会审阅调查问卷的答复，并且鉴于我们将需要由 12 人组成的陪审团外加适量的候补陪审员，以及鉴于根据规则你们有权享有的无因回避名额数量，更不用说辩方提出为辩方增加额外名额可能更为公平的建议了。\n\n考虑到所有这些因素，你们是否赞成在有 100 人（其中约 40 人已表明他们认为自己不应出席）的情况下继续进行？\n\n诺维克先生？\n\n诺维克先生：法官阁下，只是为了让我弄清这里的基本局势，辩方所申请的潜在额外回避权，您知道，出于公平起见，取决于辩方申请的数量，政府方也可能会要求增加无因排除名额，在计算这里的潜在问题时，我们是否清楚辩方申请的额外无因回避名额具体是多少。我不认为我们曾就具体数字进行过讨论。\n\n法庭：我们没有讨论过。\n\n诺维克先生：因为通常情况下，如果我们只是在讨论标准数量的无因回避，我认为政府方对我们目前所考虑的陪审员人数是没有意见的。这比我们通常在刑事案件中拥有的数量要多。\n\n我知道本案审理时间比我们通常经历的要长，所以我们会遇到更多问题，但我认为这里的人数是恰当的。\n\n并且我还要说，在我们同意排除的 20 人中，在我们看来，很多情况下都是属于无法调和的冲突，比如，在某年某月某日买了飞机票，而不是像某些陪审员所说的那样，您知道，我的工作真的很重要，对于这种理由我们可能不太看好。所以我认为许多无法调和的冲突届时都已经处理完毕了。我只是有所迟疑——所以在通常情况下，我会说政府方认为现有人数是可以的，我想前提是我还不知道，您知道，我们在这里真正讨论的无因回避名额究竟是多少。法庭：辩方有人想发言吗？穆凯西先生：法官，我是马克·穆凯西。我认为每名被告人增加一个额外的无因回避名额，也就是为这三个联合团队共计增加三个名额是恰当的，鉴于本案的审理期限和复杂性，并且在法官阁下的自由裁量权下，这在规则上当然是允许的。对于诺维克先生为政府方争取额外排除名额的请求，我只提一点意见。我谨认为，这个问题不应当按比例对等处理。我们之所以\n\n申请额外的排除名额，是因为我们这里有三个辩护团队，代表三名不同的被告人，他们在 Nomura（野村）处于三个不同的层级，来自三家不同的律师事务所，将提供三种不同的视角。我认为我们大体上步调一致，但我们有各自的当事人需要顾虑，为每个被告人提供一次额外的机会，即三个团队合计三次额外的机会，以在如此复杂的案件中确保产生一个公平且中立的陪审团，我谨认为这是至关重要的。政府就是政府。他们没有额外的团队，没有额外的当事人，无论如何他们呈现的都是同一个案子。他们不需要与其他联邦检察官办公室协调融合，也不需要同时保护三个不同个体的权利。因此，至少就格拉敏斯先生而言，并且在此时我代表三个团队发言的范围内，我认为为辩方增加三个无因回避名额是恰当的。佩特里洛先生：法官阁下，盖伊·佩特里洛代表夏皮罗先生发言。我们支持该项申请。我们认为这极为合理。布朗先生：彼得斯先生也附议。法庭：诺维克先生？\n\n诺维克先生：好的，法官阁下。出于尊重，我当然理解这里有三个不同的辩护团队这一事实。\n\n政府方的请求关乎公平问题。我们都卷入了一起辩方刚才称之为复杂且冗长的案件中，对各方而言事实皆是如此。并且我理解他们各自都有当事人需要代理，然而与此同时，政府方也是在同时对三个不同的人提起公诉。\n\n我并不是说我们需要按比例调整。现行规则通常赋予辩方的回避次数多于政府方，规则就是这样规定的；因此我并不一定是在主张我们需要获得三次额外的无因回避权（peremptories），但我认为给予一定数量的额外无因回避权是公平的。\n\n政府方和被告一样，都有利益要求由一个对双方都公平且公正的陪审团来进行公正的审判。\n\n这不仅是保护被告人权利的问题（坦率地说，我知道这符合所有当事方的利益），也是政府方希望本案得到公正审理的利益所在。\n\n法庭：好的。鉴于在 Litvak（利特瓦克）案审判中的经验，你们认为我们应该设多少名候补陪审员？\nNOVICK（诺维克）先生：法官阁下，从政府方的角度来看，我认为至少四个，如果不是更多的话。\n我的意思是，我想，但愿我们在 Litvak 案中遇到的问题不会重演，然而——而且那场审判最终时间要短得多，我希望本案也是如此，但显然他们当时是按更长的审判时间做准备的，所以我认为至少四个，甚至是五个。\n法庭：辩方怎么看？\nBHATIA（巴蒂亚）先生：法官阁下，我们认为四个候补陪审员是合适的人数。\nPETRILLO（佩特里洛）先生：代表 Shapiro（夏皮罗）先生表示同意。\n法庭：按这个比例，假设我们要有四名候补陪审员。那将赋予每一方两次额外的无因回避权。在此基础上——天哪，真希望今天早上我们的系统没有那个回音干扰，但不管怎样——我们有——这是算术计算：\n我们有 12 名正式陪审员，根据适用的规则，即《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure）第 24 条，双方在挑选正式陪审员时将享有 16 次无因回避权，政府方 6 次，被告方 10 次，这样就是 28 人；如果加上 4 名候补陪审员，那就是 32 人，再加上候补陪审员每方两次额外的无因回避权。总数就达到了 36 人。这就是正式陪审员人数及针对正式陪审员的无因回避次数，加上 4 名候补陪审员及针对候补陪审员的无因回避次数的总和。\n\n这样总数就达到了 36 人，因此如果我们有 36 名合格履职的人选，你们可以对正式陪审员行使无因回避权，我们可以确定 12 人就座，你们可以对候补陪审员行使无因回避权，我们可以确定 4 人就座，我们的陪审团就可以准备就绪了。这就是法律通过规则所作出的规定。\n\nNovick 先生，从你之前所说的话来看，你的观点是，如果这就是我们所需要的人数，你对于使用我们目前现有的候选库继续推进感到可行，是这样吗？\n\nNOVICK 先生：是的，法官阁下。\n\n法庭：那让我向被告方也问一下这个问题。\n\n暂时搁置你们希望尽可能多获得无因回避权的合情合理诉求，如果我们的最低要求是 36 人，你们对使用现有候选库继续推进怎么看？\n\nPETRILLO 先生：法官阁下，我可以请问一下，就我们认为传唤更多陪审员候选人是审慎之举而言，这对法庭是否可行？\n\n法庭：我认为不可行。你们会记得，我们专门调整了与潜在陪审员的沟通方式，力求明确无误地表明，如果任何人对日程安排有任何顾虑，他们必须在第一步就选择退出，而不是来到这里填写问卷。在尽管如此的情况下，看到这么多人来到这里，迟延地告诉我们他们的日程安排有问题，退一步说，这令人非常沮丧。但是，在我们下一次开庭日期（即 5 月的第一周）之前，我们无法再传唤更多的人了。PETRILLO 先生：谢谢。我认为代表 Shapiro 先生的立场是，我们将努力依现有人员继续推进，并且鉴于目前的数字以及我们迄今所看到的问卷回复，我们相信这是行得通的。法庭：辩方的其他律师呢？SPIRO（斯皮罗）先生：法官，我是 Alex Spiro（亚历克斯·斯皮罗）。我认为 Petrillo 先生说的有道理。NOVICK 先生：法官阁下，对于被告 Gramins（格拉敏斯），我们同意现有的候选库维持现状即可。法庭：好的。那么我认为对我们而言最好的推进方式就是继续进行，把人带进来，希望我们能有一个足够大的群体，让我能够\nCase: 3:15-cr-00155-RNC Document 268-32 Filed 05/09/24 Page 16 of 73\nPage 16 |\n给予你们额外的无因回避权。如果可以，我会给，但我可能无法做到。\n我认为从司法利益出发，额外的无因回避权并不是严格必需的。我认为在本案中，鉴于三名被告人共同的主张，即虚假陈述不具有实质性，规则所规定的无因回避次数是充分的。与此同时，如果我能给你们额外的次数，我很乐意这样做。因此我们将据此推进。\n关于程序，我向你们概述了一个程序，即我们将安排在法庭内与每个人单独交谈，哪怕只是简短交谈。\nNovick 先生，这对你有吸引力吗？\nNOVICK 先生：是的，法官阁下。\n法庭：好的。辩方这边呢？\nPETRILLO 先生：代表 Shapiro 先生，这对我们有吸引力。\nMUKASEY（穆凯西）先生：代表被告 Gramins，这对我们有吸引力。\nBROWN（布朗）先生：对被告 Peters（彼得斯）也是一样。\n法庭：我们将在此基础上推进。换句话说，我们将努力让若干名陪审员\n\n从陪审员集中室带到法庭附近，在那里他们可以方便地等候进来与我们单独面谈几分钟，我们将对此进行合理安排，以尽量减少候选库中人员的等候时间。\n\n今天早上 Terri Glynn（特丽·格林）在内室与我在一起。Terri，我认为我们需要准备照我们上次的做法去做。换句话说，我们实际上可以先让人们离开，以便他们去喝杯咖啡、在公园散散步，做任何他们想做的事，前提是明确他们在一段时间内不会被叫到，随后我们将逐步处理这 100 人的群体（如果实际到场人数确实有这么多的奇）。\n\n一旦我们完成该程序，我们就可以让所有留在候选库中的人员进入法庭继续进行，并按照我之前讨论的方式处理，即带一定数量的人上前填满座位。\n\n必须留出应对突发情况的余地。可能在与每个人单独面谈之后，人员规模缩减到让大家上前就座陪审席确实没有意义的地步，而我们应该将旁听席视作陪审席。我们到时再看。\n但关于这一点如果各位没有其他事项，我将转向审前排除证据动议（motions in limine）。\n在陪审团挑选方面还有其他事项吗？\nNOVICK 先生：政府方没有了，法官阁下。\nPETRILLO 先生：Shapiro 先生这边没有了，法官阁下。\nMUKASEY 先生：Gramins 先生没有了。\nBROWN 先生：Peters 先生也没有了。\n法庭：好的，谢谢。\n关于各项动议，让我告诉你们我的想法。\n我要处理的第一个动议是关于被告人总薪酬的动议。\n这需要我适用 Rule 403。审查附在政府方备忘录后电子表格的证明价值，政府方表示该表格是被告人从事欺诈的经济动机、交易组内部存在的层级结构以及起诉书中所指控的共谋协议的重要证据。\n该表格显示了被告人在 2010 年至 2015 年各年度的实际薪酬。最高年度薪酬出现在 2013 年。该年度 Shapiro 先生的总薪酬为 。Peters 先生为 ，而 Gramins 先生为\n\n政府方表示将提供 Raiff（赖夫）先生的证词，他是截至 2012 年年中的证券化交易产品部（Securitized Trading Products）主管。政府方表示 Raiff 先生将作证称，Shapiro 先生主要负责该交易组交易员的薪酬决定。预计 Raiff 先生将作证称，Nomura（野村）根据该交易组的盈利能力等多项因素向该交易组分配奖金。预计 Raiff 先生将作证称，在确定奖金池规模时，他审查了该交易组的损益数据。最后，预计他将作证称，Shapiro 先生按照他认为合适的方式发放奖金池资金。\n此外，政府方表示将提供初级交易员的证词，他们会表示他们知道该交易组的盈利能力对他们的薪酬有影响；他们受到激励去榨取每笔交易中的每一个最小价格变动单位（tick），并且他们明白这很重要，因为这与交易组的业绩挂钩，而这反过来又影响了他们的薪酬。\n我一开始提出的问题是：总薪酬数字在动机方面具有什么证明价值？政府方称，总薪酬数字表明交易组的盈利能力直接影响了被告人的薪酬。\n\n据我所知，各方对被告人的薪酬在某种程度上受到交易组产生的利润影响这一事实没有争议。问题在于，利润在多大程度上是基于所指控的不当行为？\n\n总薪酬数字本身并没有告诉我们，被告人的薪酬在多大程度上是基于来自欺诈活动的利润。没有任何迹象表明有证人准备说明来自欺诈交易的利润使被告人的薪酬增加了“X”数额甚至是“X”百分比。没有任何迹象表明政府方会提供证据，证明在没有欺诈交易的情况下被告人的总薪酬会是多少。\n\n因此，在我看来，总薪酬数字作为动机证明的证明价值充其量是间接的且有限的；而且我认为，如果我允许采用该表格上的总薪酬数字，我需要有比这更有力的依据。\n\n我之所以这样说，是因为我认为根据我现在面前的案卷记录，实际薪酬数字在动机方面的证明价值被不当偏见的危险实质性地压倒。法院承认，财富证据在陪审团评议期间可能会对被告造成不当偏见，在当今时代，我认为这依然成立。我\n\n我认为，对财富不平等的担忧如今在许多人、甚至可以说是大多数人的脑海中都非常强烈，我确信陪审员们会被这些数字所震撼。陪审团指示能否弥补这一点？嗯，我认为除非有更充分的依据来提交这些数字，否则根本涉及不到那个问题。关于总薪酬数字作为层级结构或共谋协议证明的证明力，我认为该证明力已被同样的担忧实质性地压倒了。还有一个令我困扰的危险，那就是误导陪审团的风险。如果政府打算说服陪审团相信这些被告人之所以有动机从事欺诈是因为这能让他们中饱私囊，而且政府能够证明这一点，那么电子表格中的总薪酬数字就可以采纳。那不会误导陪审团。但如果政府的要求没那么高，如果政府打算证明这对被告人的薪酬产生了一定影响，我认为提交电子表格中的数字存在误导陪审团使其相信这属于欺诈而事实并非如此的危险，同样，补救性指示可能有助于应对这一危险，但由于首先提交这些数字缺乏更充分的证明力依据，我看不出有考虑此类指示具体形式的必要。\n\n因此，在开庭陈述中不得提及这些数字，我们此前已经就此达成一致，并且除非且直到政府能够说服我存在某些新的、不同的情况，否则这些数字不得作为证据进入庭审。也许权衡考量可能会发生变化。有可能是如果不允许政府出示这些数字会造成误导。有可能随着庭审的展开，陪审团会得到一种印象，以为这只是些蝇头小利，而事实上这根本不是蝇头小利，而是相当大的一笔数额，或许权衡考量可能会因此改变，但就目前而言，我看不出有出示这些数字的必要，而且我认为任何必要性都被我提到的这些危险所实质性压倒。\n\n我要指出的是，我已经考虑了政府的其他主张，例如主张这些数字对于反驳有关被告人因初级交易员未受到刑事指控而遭受不公平对待的说法是必要的。我再次强调，我不认为这是允许政府先行出示这些数字的依据。如果事实证明被告人正在大肆宣扬这种论调，那么权衡考量可能会发生改变。\n\n关于被动投资者，政府希望出示证据证明受害机构为成熟投资者、成熟机构投资者、对冲基金、养老基金、捐赠基金、共同基金、主权财富基金、保险公司以及 PPIP（公私投资计划，Public-Private Investment Program）项目管理资金。我的理解是，对于这方面的证据并无特别异议，也就是说，对于政府出示这类关于被动投资者身份的通用证言，或者可以说是概括性证言，并无异议。让我停下来问一下：是这样吗？\nPETRILLO 律师：法官阁下，我是代表 Shapiro（夏皮罗）先生的 Guy Petrillo（盖伊·佩特里洛）。\n辩方曾对指明养老基金和慈善机构提出异议，因为陪审团可能会从提及这些类型的机构中推断出他们个人受到了该行为的影响。\n而关于 PPIP 的政府异议，出于同样的原因我们提出了异议，因为我们认为这会引发陪审团对该行为是否通过财政部在某种程度上对他们个人造成了影响产生联想。\n法庭：好的。嗯，我想谨慎避免那个问题。如果我拥有 IBM 的一股股票，而 IBM 牵涉到我面前的案件中，我就必须回避，所以我对你们所说的很敏感，我想为陪审员们避免那个问题，因为无论从哪方面来看，他们都将是我们本次审判的裁判者。\n\n但即便如此，我认为政府有理由根据其陈述的原因出示这类证据。这涉及到实质重要性，即作证的受害人证人是否应被视为一名合理的投资者，而且正如政府所解释的那样，据我理解这也确实会影响处于受害人证人地位的人的行为。\n\n我知道被告人不同意。他们认为这些证人的履历本身就足够令人印象深刻，足以消除任何疑问，并且他们主张处于受害人证人地位的个人对每个人都负有相同的受托义务，但这不是我可以从陪审团手中夺走的职权。因此我要问，允许此类证据是否存在任何不公平偏见、混淆争议焦点或误导陪审团等危险，且该危险实质性地压倒了其在实质重要性方面的证明力，总的来说，我没有看到这一点。我所关心的，是这项动议真正针对的是政府希望出示 Canter（坎特）先生关于其发现 Litvak（利特瓦克）先生类似欺诈行为时所作反应的证言。这似乎才是本案的真正核心所在。\n\n从我的角度根据你们提交的文件来看，在我看来政府非常希望能够讲述那个故事。它希望让 Canter 先生告诉陪审团他与 Litvak 先生的互动，以及他在得知 Litvak 先生的谎言后的震惊和愤怒。\n\n根据你们提交的文件，我的理解是政府希望沿着这个脉络继续出示 Litvak 先生被起诉的证据，并且政府希望出示该起诉所造成后果的证据。看来政府设想的情况是，我们最终可能会面临陪审团对 Litvak 被起诉前的交易裁定无罪、但对 Litvak 被起诉后的交易裁定有罪的判决。\n\n那么在这样的框架下，让我问一下：在将要求陪审团审理的 20 笔交易中，有多少笔是在 Litvak 被起诉之后发生的？\n\nNOVICK 检察官：法官阁下，有两笔交易发生在 Litvak 被起诉之后；然而，还有其他交易发生在 Litvak 先生被解雇的消息及其解雇原因公开之后。我认为我们在向财政部报告该情况时涉及到了该问题，并且我认为我们在最近提交的文件中也涉及到了该问题。\n我唯一想说明的是，法官阁下——而且我认为法官阁下对于那种可能性确实切中了要害——对于 Canter 的陈述，那确实是由实质重要性问题驱动的，在某种程度上也涉及故意，但主要是实质重要性，即他的反应。而我们出示证据的许多其他依据确实必须涉及故意和违法性。\n我认为在 Shapiro 先生最近提交的文件中提出了这样一个问题，即 Litvak 并不涉及本案庭审的核心问题，也就是实质重要性。而让我感到震惊的是，辩方一直向法庭提出本案不同于 Litvak 案，因为它既涉及故意，也涉及实质重要性。\n而且我认为在故意范畴内——既涉及诈骗和造成损害的故意，也涉及违法性。我预计在陪审团指示方面会有关于这一点的争辩。\n但无论如何，被告人对这种类似行为的反应当然是证明其知情、其故意的关键证据。\n因此这就是政府所依据的基础，法官阁下。\n法庭：好的。关于 Canter 先生与 Litvak 先生的互动，在我们的 20 笔交易中，是否存在任何涉及在 PPIP 项目中对 RMBS（住房抵押贷款支持证券，Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities）价格进行虚假陈述的交易？\nNOVICK 检察官：是的，法官阁下。\n法庭：你能告诉我具体是哪一笔吗？\nNOVICK 检察官：有两笔。\n请稍等片刻，法官阁下？\n法庭：好的。\n（休顿）\nNOVICK 检察官：法官阁下，抱歉。有一笔交易是在 2012 年。\n抱歉，一笔在 2011 年，一笔在 2012 年，两笔都是与 AllianceBernstein（联博集团）进行的。\n法庭：Canter 先生参与了那些交易吗？\nNOVICK 检察官：是的。Canter 先生和 Schiff（希夫）先生。\n关于 2012 年交易的陈述，我认为法官阁下在我们最近提交的文件中已经详细说明了，其中涉及 Canter 先生发现在那笔交易过程中有人对他撒谎，随后他在 Nomura（野村证券）内部提出了这个问题，然后说了一些大致意思为——我在这里意译一下——难道你们不知道我就是那个刚刚让 Jesse Litvak（杰西·利特瓦克）或其他人因为类似行为、因为对我撒谎而被解雇并报告给财政部的人吗？\n法庭：类似行为。让我澄清一下。\n我的问题是我们是否存在涉及对价格进行虚假陈述的交易。\nNOVICK 检察官：我认为那应该是前一年的那一笔，法官阁下。\n法庭：换句话说，Canter 先生将作证称，当他在 2011 年与野村证券进行交易时，他是 Litvak 先生所实施的完全相同类型的虚假陈述的受害者。换句话说，是在 PPIP 项目背景下关于债券价格的虚假陈述。\nNOVICK 检察官：法官阁下，既然这是 Brennan（布伦南）先生的证人，我想请他来参与说明。\nBRENNAN 检察官：早上好，法官阁下，我是 Liam Brennan（利亚姆·布伦南）。\n关于 Canter 先生，我们打算在审判中出示的证据是，Canter 先生在 2011 年一笔纯粹关于价格的 PPIP 项目交易中被欺骗了。\n随后在 2012 年那笔搞砸并被他当场抓到野村证券把柄的交易中，他在所有权方面被骗了（他在这一点上也曾被 Litvak 骗过，并且他也当场抓到了 Litvak 的这一谎言），同时在价格方面也被骗了。\n所以发生的情况是，在 2 月 7 日，野村证券表面上试图在第三方交易对手方与 Canter 先生之间进行撮合交易，但后来他们自己买下了该债券，随后第二天他们继续陈述称\n\n就其与 Litvak 先生的互动出庭作证，而我不允许出示关于 Litvak 起诉书的证据，那么政府的案情届时会是怎样的？\n\nNOVICK 检察官：情况会有所不同，法官阁下。\n\n我认为显而易见违法性问题将是我们仅凭公司政策、来自 FINRA（美国金融业监管局，Financial Industry Regulatory Authority）的规则和条例就会涉及的内容。但很明显，我的预判是被告人将试图提出辩解，称那些政策和规则并不涵盖被告人所从事的具体行为，称他们没有理由知道这是违法的。事实上，我非常确信这是辩方会提出的辩解，而这正是政府必须证明的事项。\n\n因此这就是为什么，法官阁下，我认为这在评估当时被告人如何——嗯，在解释被告人知晓什么方面具有如此关键的证明力。换句话说，现在你所面对的情况不仅在于这种行为依理可以被认为属于通过合规机制以及通过，你知道，SEC（美国证券交易委员会，Securities and Exchange Commission）规则和条例所禁止的范围。而且现在你有一个实际的例子，即这种行为第一：已经导致某人因对交易对手方撒谎而被解雇，这表明了故意和实质重要性；第二，这表明在他被起诉后，他们有理由相信这涉及刑法。\n\n现在，请看，辩方完全可以辩称，在那时被告认为，噢，你知道的，是的，政府说是犯罪，但我们不这么认为，我们一直认为不是，这是他们可以提出的论点。但是只要政府——甚至——我的意思是，特别是在被告对陪审团指示的看法上，只要政府需要证明他们知道那是违法的，或者有理由相信那是违法的，就没有更好的证据了，法官阁下。而且我认为此处的证明价值极高，并且超过了任何偏见性价值，特别是从某种意义上说，正如我们所辩论的那样，另一份起诉书（而不是定罪）的事实，是法院经常作出指示的内容；在本案中，起诉书的事实本身就是法院经常指示陪审员在作出判决时予以忽略的内容。\n\n法庭：嗯，诺维克先生（Mr. Novick），你看出问题所在了吗？你坚持认为其证明价值是关键的、独特的、非常非常重要的，然而你却要我指示陪审团起诉书是不相关的且应当予以忽略。\n\n诺维克先生：我并不一定想让您指示应当予以忽略，法官阁下。我想限制——我认为您可以在双方当事人的协助下拟定一项指示，使其可用于有限的目的。法官阁下，我不该用“忽略”这个词，它是为了其对知情的影响、对被告心态的影响这一有限目的而采纳的，而这就是我们要求予以考虑的有限目的，至少在那个语境下——或者是实质性。\n\n法官阁下，您知道，另一件事——我只是逐一列出它所涉及的事项——也是琼斯先生（Mr. Jones，纽约销售主管）在2012年那笔欺诈性交易之后进行的一场对话，在对话中坎特先生（Mr. Canter）对他说，你知道，这正是针对杰西·利特瓦克（Jesse Litvak）或针对另一个人的那种行为，我刚刚指责过的。然后他们与沙皮罗先生（Mr. Shapiro）进行了讨论，沙皮罗先生承诺去跟交易台谈，但我们没有证据表明他实际履行了这一承诺。那是在2012年，也就是起诉书出台的一年前。\n\n因此，如果我们再次排除与利特瓦克有关的所有证据，我们就失去了另一项具有证明力的信息。\n\n而且，您知道，初级交易员将无法谈论那笔交易的后续后果；他们\n\n将无法解释“别搞利特瓦克那一套”（don't Litvak me）是什么意思。这不仅仅意味着别对我撒谎，它的意思是在有人由于违反——至少在起诉书中所认为的那样以及在被告的心态中——违反法律而做出这种行为的背景下，别对我撒谎。\n\n而且我们在此必须证明行为的不法性。法庭：那么，如果不提及利特瓦克，你将拥有各种政策、手册等，并且你会有证人说不要撒谎、绝不撒谎、我们不撒谎、你必须同意不撒谎。你会有所有这一切，但你认为与利特瓦克相关的证据对于反驳关于那些政策、手册、陈述等存在模棱两可且不适用于该行为的任何暗示是必要的？\n\n诺维克先生：我认为确实如此，法官阁下。我认为确实如此，特别是根据我已经在与合规政策相关的简报中看到的论点，我认为确实如此。\n\n法庭：好的，谢谢。\n\n让我听听辩方律师的意见。\n\n提出该论点确实是你们的意图吗？即手册和政策等存在模棱两可之处且并未涵盖该行为？\n\n克莱因先生（Mr. Klein）：法官，乔希·克莱因（Josh Klein）代表\n\n案件：3:15-cr-00155-RNC 案卷文件 372 归档于 04/09/24 第 35 页，共 73 页\n第 34 页 |\n沙皮罗先生。\n我认为关于利特瓦克\n起诉书之前的行为，我们确实打算提出这一论点。我认为有充分的证据表明，\n合规政策和合规培训并没有将\n这些合规政策中的指令适用于这项\n具体行为。\n我认为围绕利特瓦克先生\n被解雇的情况是一个极大的干扰，而且我认为\n它不过表明在该事件之后，\n某些处于危险之中的业务受到了后续影响。\n我认为庭审中的所有证人都会\n作证说，他们始终将谈判中潜在的\n虚假陈述视为潜在的\n业务问题，如果有人被抓到，那可能会\n导致与交易对手进行一些讨论，就像\n在2012年2月联博基金（AllianceBernstein）事件中发生的那样。但我\n认为针对起诉书的异议在于，\n它引入了极大的偏见。\n本案不同于许多刑事案件，在这起案件中，\n辩方认为关于涉嫌的虚假陈述是否\n具有实质性存在真正的争议，一旦你引入一个与本案无关的\n第三方在另一家公司因类似\n\n行为被起诉的事实，你实际上就是在告诉陪审团这些涉嫌的虚假陈述具有实质性，因为陪审团会纳闷，嗯，为什么会有人因此被起诉？他们怎么也会在另一个案件中被起诉？而且如果它是伴随着一项涉及不法性的指示被引入的，如果它不具有实质性，又怎么能涉及不法性呢？\n\n因此，它向案件中引入了这种程度的不当偏见，不仅损害了辩方提出意图抗辩的能力——暂且不论这点——它还损害了我们提出实质性抗辩的能力，我们认为出于这个原因，它不应当被采纳。它具有不当的偏见性，并且在任何方面、在任何方面都没有推进政府关于野村证券（Nomura）2013年之前的政策与涉嫌行为相关的论点。\n\n法庭：起诉书之后的交易呢？起诉书难道不是那段经过的一部分吗？\n\n克莱因先生：我们认为，关于起诉书之后的交易，我们不认为会有论点——当然代表沙皮罗先生绝不会——我们不认为会有论点认为有人持有从事涉嫌行为是公司所纵容的行为这一观点。\n\n我认为，您知道，大家都承认，在利特瓦克起诉书之后，大家都明白，至少在政府看来，这是不法行为，政府已经就该行为提起了起诉书。但我认为你不需要深入讨论其中的任何内容，因为在内部有指示要求交易员不应从事这种行为。\n\n而且我认为我们所说的是，有——存在一些方法，使政府可以借此采纳野村证券内部或行业内部观点发生变化的基础证据，无论他们想如何引入该要素，但有一种方法可以做到这一点，而不会引入起诉书会给案件带来的不当偏见。\n\n而且我想重申，对于沙皮罗先生，我们有一项要求删除公开行为中对他的提及的申请。我们不认为有任何证据表明他参与了2015年的任何此类行为。\n\n法庭：假设该申请被驳回，你是否仍然坚持认为，在没有利特瓦克起诉书证据的情况下，政府可以对起诉书之后的交易进行适当的诉讼？\n\n换句话说，我知道从沙皮罗先生的角度来看，利特瓦克之后的交易是他没有参与的交易，因此这些交易\n\n实际上对他没有任何影响。但是，假设你的动议失败了，政府被允许辩称他在起诉书发布后的那些通讯中存在共谋，你的立场会保持不变吗？\n\n克莱因先生：在法官阁下——我的意思是，我认为我们的立场是，如果政府想提出这些论点，他们可以在不引入利特瓦克起诉书的情况下做到这一点。换句话说，他们可以——您知道，我们已经提议可以提及诉讼进展或类似的内容。在法院驳回我们申请的情况下，您知道，他们可以提及利特瓦克起诉书之后发布的合规指令，其中住房抵押贷款支持证券（RMBS）交易台被指示在交易谈判中不得就价格做出虚假陈述，并且，您知道，该证据可以在不提及一家不同公司的无关方被起诉这一具有偏见性的事实的情况下被采纳。\n\n法庭：好的。\n让我听听其他被告律师的意见。鉴于刚才代表沙皮罗先生所陈述的内容，我很想听听你们的想法。\n\n我想，如果每个人都说，是的，截至2013年1月1日，我们都知道不能再这样做了，而且我们再也没有这样做过，事情就足够简单了\n\n法庭注意到这一点。\n\n关于诺维克先生所说的法院一直指示陪审团起诉书不是证据或起诉书不能证明案件的说法，我再补充一点。我其实认为这在此处恰恰证明了相反的观点，我确信这是法官阁下的做法，也几乎是所有法官（即使不是全部的话）的做法，即当陪审团进场时，你会说证据就是证据，起诉书什么都证明不了。这变成了起诉书之上的起诉书，在我看来，这违反了正当程序条款。没有任何办法对其进行交叉质询、弹劾或采取任何措施。它就是存在着，你无法反驳它。我认为这在类似本案的案件中变得尤为重要。\n\n您知道，无论是在利特瓦克案件中还是在此处，你都有关于法律界限在哪里的所有这些辩论、讨论和法律动议，而在这样一个案件中，引入某些其他的法律认定完全具有偏见性且是不当的，这让我深感触动。\n\n我指出的事情甚至就存在于利特瓦克案中——在利特瓦克案第2次审理/利特瓦克案第1次审理中，在第二巡回法院（Second Circuit）处理它的方式中，仅仅是他们将主管的指示视为相关事项这一事实，我们在此处再次就此进行了诉讼，并且关注关于界限在哪里的专家证言，正如我们诉讼的那样\n\n在这里，这在某种程度上证明了这一点，即这不是，您知道——在谋杀案中主管说什么并不重要，因为众所周知谋杀是错误的。但在这里情况变得复杂，这只会加剧起诉书中引入的不当之处。\n\n至于克莱因先生和穆卡西先生（Mr. Mukasey）表述的关于我们认为证据会是什么以及我们在得知利特瓦克起诉书后的回应是什么，对我来说，法律进展同样适用，并且不会产生我已经向法庭陈述过的任何这些相同的问题、实际情况和其他一切，但我们预计我们的回应将完全如克莱因先生和穆卡西先生所叙述的那样。\n\n法庭：好的。为了澄清起见并尽量避免任何可能的误解，辩方的立场是否打算主张：在涉案的所有交易中，无论发生在Litvak（利特瓦克）被起诉之前还是之后，均不存在重大不实陈述？换句话说，本案并不是辩方打算声称在起诉书下达后他们明白这些不实陈述具有重大性且不得作出并因此未曾作出；相反，辩方的立场是否打算主张：无论交易日期为何，在所有这些交易中均不存在重大不实陈述？\n\nBROWN（布朗）律师：法官阁下，Mike Brown（迈克·布朗）代表Peters（彼得斯）先生发言。\n\n我们在涉及利特瓦克之后的问题上的立场是，利特瓦克被起诉这一事实或起诉之后的规则，已经由Nomura（野村证券）合规部向交易员提供了指导，因此在利特瓦克被起诉之前存在的任何不确定性或模糊之处，在利特瓦克起诉书下达后都已向交易员明确阐述。\n\n我们将更多地按照Klein（克莱因）先生的阐述方式进行抗辩，而不是按照Mukasey（穆凯西）先生的阐述方式。\n\n换句话说，我们的立场是，在利特瓦克起诉书下达后，彼得斯先生遵循了他从合规部收到的建议和指导。为了证明这一点，政府为了提出——政府无需涉及起诉书这一事实，因为在那之后召开了合规会议并提供了指导，我认为这正是克莱因先生所阐述的方式——而且我认为这也是法庭此前所回顾的方式——即合规部澄清了关于何为重大、何为非重大的任何模糊之处，并且至少就彼得斯先生而言，他收到了该额外指导。\n\n一直担心如果缺乏利特瓦克起诉书的证据，将无法反驳辩方关于内部合规手册含糊不清且实际上允许此类行为的辩护意见。\n\nNOVICK（诺维克）检察官：法官阁下，我认为被告方对此处发生情况的定性方式，在某种程度上\n\n恰恰印证了政府的观点。\n被告方希望将其定性为：他们可以用合规宣讲的证据来替代利特瓦克案，因为那是公司方面某些政策转变的体现。\n\n因此就此有两点需要说明。\n\n首先，正如我们自始至终所解释的那样，以及我认为证人们将会解释的那样，政策并没有发生改变。无论在公司内部还是在市场之中，说谎从来都是错误的。Nadine Cancell（纳丁·坎塞尔）向交易员、高级交易员以及销售人员所作的宣讲反映了这一点。它是受到利特瓦克——利特瓦克被起诉这一事实的启发，或者我不知道这里最准确的词是什么，是由其引发的建议，即他们应当通过某些内容来提醒大家。但是，如果查看当时分发的一页PPT幻灯片，它并不是针对利特瓦克的专门宣讲，而是一次内容为“不得说谎”的合规宣讲，并且其中还包含了许多与利特瓦克完全无关的内容。\n\n“不得说谎”是该宣讲的重中之重，但宣讲中也包含了其他内容。\n\n它并未逐一说明Jesse Litvak（杰西·利特瓦克）说了谎\n\n因此你们不应当说谎。这是对先前合规政策的重申。\n\n利特瓦克被起诉的事实则完全不同，因为它不仅仅是重申政策，它具有完全独立的依据，不仅关乎重大性——因为我知道辩方总是想绕回这一点，即这实质上暗示了某些关于重大性的问题，并且我想他们打算声称无论之前还是之后都不存在重大的谎言，据我理解这自始至终是他们的立场；但是政府必须主动证明犯罪故意，我们必须主动推翻善意信赖。\n\n我不认为被告会站上法庭承认他们明知这种特定行为是错误的、是非法的。无论他们是否辩称这些事情是重大的还是不重大的。\n\n我是说，法官阁下，我查看了辩方的证据，其中有一些辩方证据我认为如果我理解正确的话，直指不当性这一问题；而这份起诉书是被告在利特瓦克起诉书下达后脑海中的另一条信息、关键信息。然后如果你倒推时间，他们对利特瓦克问题的知晓，即利特瓦克曾因在价格或债券归属上\n\n说谎等类似行为而被解雇的事实，那么就会牵涉到此案所涉及的范围大得多的交易。\n\n法官阁下，我正在查看这份起诉书。在如今证据开示与Canter（坎特）先生通电话期间发生的其他几笔交易——或者说发生在当时的其他交易，并非在利特瓦克问题中，而是与Jones（琼斯）先生以及琼斯先生随后与Shapiro（夏皮罗）先生的对话有关，法官阁下，我们提出那第21笔交易的原因之一，就是为了重申这种情况一直都在发生；辩方在所有这些动议中似乎都在暗示这20笔交易就是仅有的20笔交易，这根本不是事实，而且还存在另一笔作出虚假陈述的交易，至少我们提出的另一笔交易显示夏皮罗先生在与坎特先生交谈之后、在与琼斯先生交谈之后，在一笔交易的背景下说了谎。\n\n因此，法官阁下，再次重申，这一切都归结为政府必须主动证明犯罪故意，并且还要说明他们为什么从在Bloomberg（彭博）终端打字聊天转为使用电话沟通，以及为什么陪审团在利特瓦克之后看到的行为可能不如利特瓦克之前那么多。我们对此将有证人出庭作证。我们还将提出书证，其中有人表示那个人\n\n是利特瓦克起诉书下达后第一个转为使用电话的人。他很可疑。\n\n法官阁下，我的意思是这概括了整个要点；如果要说存在某种法律层面的发展，法官阁下，特别是在我们需要证明不当性——不仅是法律层面的发展，而且是不当性——或者违法性的情况下，如果您采信被告的说法，那么起诉书的事实具有实质的证明力。\n\n而且我想补充的是，法官阁下，我们并不是要提交一份利特瓦克起诉书的副本，将利特瓦克先生所做的一切赤裸裸地展现出来。这只会有极其有限的证词，涉及起诉书的事实及其对不同人产生的影响、以及它所引发的后果。我们认为这在此处具有显著的证明价值。\n\n法庭：证明价值何在，诺维克先生？您是否打算辩称在起诉书之前，一个合乎道德、负责任的人或许会认为谎言并不重大，但在起诉书之后显而易见它是重大的，起诉书在法律层面上确立了该谎言的重大性？这就是您打算辩称的内容吗？起诉书的证明价值究竟何在？\n\n根据标准的证据法著作，起诉书\n通常是不可采纳的。它们属于传闻证据，反映的是某人对另一人所作所为的看法。\n诺维克检察官：是的，我明白，法官阁下。\n法庭：而且通常情况下，我们会花时间教育陪审团，告知他们应当忽略起诉书中的指控，因为指控仅仅是指控，仅仅是某人的看法。\n诺维克检察官：明白了，法官阁下。我再次回到刚才的观点，我们并非要求提交起诉书的副本，因为就起诉书本身而言，法官阁下，我百分之百同意您的看法，它并不是其内容的证据。它在这里发挥多项作用。只要它存在于被告的脑海中，它就起到了将此类行为与证券法联系起来的作用，他们便不能再声称不知情、认为这两者毫无关联。法官阁下，政府打算主张——坦白讲，我承认我们对这个问题进行了深思熟虑，因为鉴于我们认为合规政策十分明确，我们并不认为被告应当知晓以及实际知晓的内容发生了翻天覆地的变化；然而，我们确实认为这是另一回事。正如法官阁下在本次对话刚开始时询问的那样，陪审团是否有可能宣告无罪\n\n针对利特瓦克之前的行为宣告无罪，而针对利特瓦克之后的行为定罪。这是一种可能性，法官阁下。这是陪审团可能做出的反应。\n\n我们认为那并不是正确的反应，但我们认为陪审团可以判定此前是否存在模糊之处，而此后不再存在，因为起诉书再次建立了那种联系。被告现在在这一切背景下都理解了这一点，这关乎故意和重大性的背景。故意是因为他们现在理解了法律与该行为之间的关联，同时重大性也是因为他们听到有人说出诸如“别把我搞成利特瓦克那样”和“那家伙转去用电话了”之类的话。\n\n法官阁下，他们还知道政府掌握了利特瓦克的聊天记录，这就是为什么他们转去使用电话。他们知道导致利特瓦克先生被起诉的原因在于他就这些事情与他人聊天的事实，而这提供了转去使用电话的动机。这也是发生的另一件事。您将听到相关的证词。您将听到Gramins（格拉敏斯）先生与其中一名受害者的部分通话录音，格拉敏斯先生与Romanelli（罗马内利）先生的一通电话录音，其中他们谈论如何从其中一名受害者那里榨取更多资金。他们为什么要打那通电话？为什么他与该案中处于另一方的受害者Choi（崔）先生的沟通\n\n把聊天转为通过电话进行？为什么他与罗马内利先生的对话要通过电话进行？\n政府完全有权辩称这是因为他们知道聊天记录正是最初让他们陷入麻烦的原因。法官阁下，我们当然可以提出这一论点。\n法庭：好的。让我追问一句，诺维克先生，然后我们就得挂断电话了。法庭记录员需要休息，我也需要休息。\n显而易见，本案中涉及利特瓦克的部分对双方都非常重要。从你们为就利特瓦克部分进行诉讼所投入的时间和精力就可以明显看出。\n为什么会这样？嗯，政府坚信这有助于其主控案情，而辩方也坚信这有助于政府的案情，这就带来了一个独特的问题。\n政府希望向本届陪审团主张：由于他人被起诉，陪审团便可以根据本案起诉书认定这些被告有罪。这是一个非常不寻常的论点，一个我此前从未听过的论点；那么，对于布朗先生提出的“被告根本无法应对政府的这种主张”这一观点，您如何回应？一个人该如何防范这种主张？\n“你可以根据本案起诉书给这些人定罪，因为其他人在另一起……”\n\n其他案件？您怎么应对这一点？NOVICK（诺维克）先生：法官阁下，首先，那是——我的意思是，那并非检方所主张的。检方再次重申，这是关乎本案中检方必须证明的具体要件。\n\n我想，我们绝不是在主张陪审团应当仅仅因为另一个人被指控犯有该罪行就给这三名被告人定罪。我们所主张的是，这是关于被告人在其实施行为时、在其实施行为的关键时刻其内心想法的关键认知证据；不仅是起诉书这一事实，而且还包括他们知晓Litvak（利特瓦克）先生遇到了问题这一事实；以及为什么我们知道他们改用电话联系，以及为什么他们在起诉书发布后改用电话联系。\n\n我刚才描述的所有这些事情，我们再次——并且我认为这是检方所主张的与辩方针对本案的辩护方式之间的一个关键区别——我们并不是说——而且我认为我们绝不会说陪审团应该仅仅因为另一个人被指控犯有该罪行就给Shapiro（夏皮罗）先生、Gramins（格拉敏斯）先生或Peters（彼得斯）先生定罪。我们只是在说，对该项指控的知晓，对他人因类似行为被控证券欺诈这一事实的知晓，\n\n显然是证明被告人在实施行为时的内心状态的关键要素。法官：诺维克先生，请允许我让您先停在这里，并向我解释为什么这是事实。请针对您刚才说的最后一句话，向我解释为什么那是事实。诺维克先生：当然可以，法官阁下。因为所有的合规政策，以及规章制度中的所有其他内容，所有的一切都表明——显然，我们认为我们已经向法庭提出过这一点——撒谎、重大失实陈述是错误的，等等。而我理解被告人的抗辩主张是他们没有故意，他们不认为这些是重大失实陈述，他们没有故意，并且他们不认为这是不当的。我理解被告人是以该行为不是非法行为、不是不当行为，并且他们在思想上完全无法将其实施的行为与违法联系起来为由进行辩护的。而我们所主张的是，起诉书这一事实正是直接将这两件事联系起来的关键信息。\n\n法官阁下，它还产生了影响——再次展示了它是如何产生影响的，它是如何改变了他们的行为——通过改用电话联系影响了他们的工作方式，这表明它确实对他们的行为产生了影响，表明它对其内心状态产生了影响。\n\n因此，这再次是一项关键信息，是检方案件的关键组成部分。\n我们将在此辩称，他们理应知道或一直都知道这是不当的，这些属于重大失实陈述，但是，法官阁下，恕我直言，我们不能在以各种可行方式证明案件时受到限制。而且正如法官阁下所指出的，这显然也是检方对此态度如此坚决的原因。再没有比这更突出、更具证明力的证据能够证明这些行为可能牵涉到——其行为在被告人的内心意识中可能牵涉到证券法了。\n\n而且再说一次，这不是绝对的，对吧？我们并没有说起诉书本身就是实施犯罪的证据。它是在被告人内心将其行为与证券法联系起来的证据，它牵涉到或提供了背景背景信息，说明了被告人为什么在事后会采取那些举动。\n\n就像我们在审判中利用潜逃证据来解释被告人的心理状态一样。法官阁下，我们一直都是这样做的，以此来证明被告人为什么会采取那些行为，以反映某种有罪认知。我们认为这就是被告人具有有罪认知的证据。这是证明被告人知道自己的所作所为牵涉到重大失实陈述、知道那是不当行为的证据。\n\n法官阁下，这就是我们继续坚持这一主张的原因。\n\n法官：好的。如果我们先把那部分放在一边——也许这在案件早期就出现过而我漏掉了，有这种可能，但在我看来这在目前的讨论中相对较新——但暂且把它放在一边，听了您的发言，在我看来，起诉书的证明价值在于：被告人获悉检方认为此类失实陈述具有重大性，并且如果有机会，检方将以此为由提起公诉。这就是我听您阐述的证明价值。对吗？\n\n诺维克先生：法官阁下，我想我的表述可能会略有细微差别。其证明价值在于将该行为（换句话说，即对交易对手撒谎）与证券法规联系在一起。我认为这就是其证明价值所在。\n法官：那么假设检方\n\n通过SEC（美国证券交易委员会）发布了一份声明阐明了这一点，您会说该声明对于证明随后任何行为的故意具有可采性，对吧？诺维克先生：法官阁下，如果真是那样的话，\n\n是的，我认为是这样；如果SEC发布了声明，那将是具有证明力的证据。\n\n但这又有所不同，因为我们讨论的是美国法律与SEC的规章制度。至于我们需要证明不当性的程度，无论它仅是不当性还是违法性——我再次说明我不知道法庭对此会持何种立场。这两者是有区别的，特别是当它反映了被告人的内心认知时。因为我们再次强调，我们不需要以绝对的标准来证明不当性，我们需要证明的是被告人的认知和内心状态。\n\n法官：如果您退一步看——我马上要对此作结了——如果您退一步从最宽泛的角度来看，我们这里有一方当事人，即美国政府，正极力争取机会让本案陪审团注意到它曾因极其相似的行为起诉了其他人这一事实，而且检方认为这非常重要，认为这是案件的关键部分。\n就在本案中，被告人表示，\n\n尽管他们自己在该案中被起诉，但他们不同意检方的观点，他们主张检方是错误的。\n\n面对这种相当不寻常的控诉理论，被告人该如何应对？被告人该如何应对针对另一个人的起诉书？被告人该如何回应？\n\n诺维克先生：法官阁下，这里——我的意思是，该问题的症结在于，就像在许多其他案件中一样，这些都是案件的事实。被告人对起诉书作出了反应，以及该反应对其随后的行为产生了影响。这些纯粹就是事实。\n\n起诉书在市场上引起反响，在RMBS（住房抵押贷款支持证券）交易部门引起反响，成为促使其他人发表言论的诱因，导致被告人采取了不同的行事方式，所有这些都纯粹是本案的事实。而我认为，法官阁下，被告人所提议的，是人为地从本次审判中剥离一项关键信息。\n\n如果说我希望这次审判是对事实真相的探寻，探寻在此期间被告人内心的真实想法。那么他们实质上建议的是，把可能影响被告人故意的最重要信息之一从审判中排除出去。\n\n因此，我们将会陷入这样一种人为构建的假象中：被告人现在出庭声称，在2013年1月或2月举行了一次不得撒谎会议，并且夏皮罗先生来到交易台说不要撒谎，而完全不知道这从何而来、是怎么回事；还将有证据表明他们在2013年2月之后改用电话联系，并不再频繁就此类问题进行在线聊天，而我们将完全不知道为什么会发生这种情况。\n\n我们将从审判中人为地抽走存在于被告人心中、存在于部分受害人心中、存在于出庭作证的共犯证人手中的关键信息，并实质上制造出一场至少在检方看来不再是探寻真相的审判，而变成了一种为了被告人想要提出的某种辩解而操纵事实的图谋。\n\n法官阁下，我们正是出于这一层面的考量而认为该证据非常重要，它是为了拼凑出完整的画面，以理解被告人内心的想法，以及为什么\n\n每个人都采取了当时的行为。\n\n再次重申，这正是出于我之前所说的全部理由。我知道法官阁下在此面临时间压力。我们认为这是当时确实存在的一项关键证据。它客观存在，属于所有人都在考虑的事情，并且主导了他们随后的反应。\n\n法官：诺维克先生，请帮我理解这部分内容：据我理解，陪审团在本案中被要求审理的大多数交易都发生在利特瓦克先生被起诉之前。诺维克先生：是的。\n\n法官：那么利特瓦克起诉书的事实及其对市场和这些个人的影响，怎么可能对涉案的大多数交易产生任何影响呢？\n\n诺维克先生：法官阁下，有几点原因。\n\n首先，对于起诉书发布后发生的交易而言，它们显然是关键证据。正如法官阁下在最开始所说的，我们并不认为——我几分钟前也说过——尽管我们认为这不会是正确的结果，但陪审团在理论上可以认定那是市场上的一个重要节点，并且该节点之后的任何谎言\n\n都应当与该节点之前的谎言区别对待。那是陪审团可以做出的决定。就我们在本案中寻求真相和公正结果而言，如果陪审团认为合适，我不想剥夺他们做出决定的能力。我们将针对这种区分提出反驳。所以，您知道，这是一个例子。\n\n第二点，法官阁下，我们知道他们——由于利特瓦克起诉书——顺便说一句，法官阁下，被告人——嗯，撤回那句话。\n我们知道，由于利特瓦克的起诉书，所有人都改用电话联系——不是所有人——很多交易员更频繁地改用电话联系，知道聊天记录会成为一个问题，并且更多地这样做，聊天——请原谅——更多地使用电话，更少地在Bloomberg（彭博）上聊天。\n\n因此，这可以解释为什么在起诉书之后欺诈性交易变少了。这也仅仅是因为利特瓦克起诉书之前的时间跨度要长于之后的时间跨度。当检方的调查开始时，被告人被停职了。所以我们实际上是在比较起诉后大约一年的时间跨度与起诉前三到四年的时间跨度。\n\n您知道，除此之外，Mr. Shapiro（夏皮罗先生）当时已经升职，因此他在那个节点交易减少，监管增多。而且仅就交易量而言，您知道，情况有所不同。因此我认为这回答了法官阁下提出的问题。\n法庭：我不想拖延时间，但平心而论，Mr. Novick（诺维克先生），您其实并没有回答。问题涉及起诉书下达之前的交易。起诉书这一事实怎么会对构成涉案交易绝大多数的那些交易产生任何影响？\n诺维克先生：好的。那么有两点，法官阁下。我认为，他们在起诉书下达后转向电话沟通并在起诉书下达后通过电话进行更多工作这一事实，反映出他们一直怀有违法意图。\n法庭：这正是我所疑惑的。这是我需要思考的事情，因为我感到我们接下来可能要面对的情况是，您最终会向陪审团辩称，无论他们如何看待Litvak（利特瓦克）起诉书下达前的交易，即使没有利特瓦克起诉书的参考，一旦该起诉书下达，我们就会看到当事人的行为方式表明他们从始至终就是劣迹斑斑。\n诺维克先生：是的，法官阁下。\n法庭：他们在利特瓦克起诉书下达后的行为，让陪审团得以认定他们具有有罪的\n\n而不是通过行政监管机构的规制或其他手段？我是从最广泛的层面来考虑这一点的。\n\n我手头的案件中，当事人显然可以说，在进行其中大部分交易时，他们真诚地相信自己的所作所为并不违法。从未有人因这样做而被指控，尽管人人都这么做，而且当然也从未有人因这样做而被定罪。他们认为这没问题，而政府决定利用刑法作为一种手段，来教育该行业从业人员底线在哪里。\n\n我们对此是否有先例？在证券监管的任何其他领域，政府是否曾通过起诉书的方式而非某些程度较轻的手段来推进？\n\n诺维克先生：我想我没有完全跟上您的思路。法官阁下，您的意思是表明……的先例？——我的意思是，在许多白领犯罪案件中——我处理过的白领犯罪案件中，辩方的辩解是“这就是我所做的事情，我不认为这是错误的”，而政府必须证明那是错误的、是非法的。\n\n您知道，我认为这相当普遍，而且当然，您知道——\n\n法庭：您手头是否有任何判例允许政府提供先前案件中针对他人的起诉书作为证据，以证明正在受审的起诉书所指控罪名的罪责？是否有任何其他案件将起诉书用于此处试图使用的目的？\n诺维克先生：法官阁下，无论允许还是不允许，我手头都没有先例。\n法庭：好的，明白了。\n关于其他事项，非常非常快速地，我来过一遍我手头的这份清单。\n我谈到了排除有关被告报酬的证据及辩论意见的动议。即 ECF-160，按照我今天早些时候所说的，该动议予以准许。如果政府想要提供该电子表格，就需要说服我应当允许其这样做。根据迄今为止的分析，我认为不应准许引入该证据。\n关于排除涉及 PPIP（Public-Private Investment Program，公私投资计划）项目以及被动投资者身份和交易对手机构所管理基金的证据与提及内容的动议，即 ECF-162，该动议部分予以准许。我尚未被说服应当允许 Mr. Canter（坎特先生）讨论其在发现利特瓦克虚假陈述后的反应。结合我们今天的对话，这是我需要进一步思考的问题，但我\n\n希望政府意识到这一点存在疑问。我认为政府应当能够提供这些基金中被动投资者身份的证据，其中包括慈善机构、大学捐赠基金等等。我认为由该证据引起的任何不当偏见或其他危险，都可以通过陪审团指示得到充分化解，而且我认为这对于让陪审团了解这些人在代表这些被动投资者进行交易时的所作所为非常重要。特别是关于公私投资计划项目，如果我们将听取坎特先生关于他在公私投资计划项目背景下与被告互动的证言，那么答案就不言自明了。如果那将作为本案证据，那么我无话可说，该项或多项交易是本案的一部分，如果我们涉及公私投资计划交易，我不会隐瞒公私投资计划项目。关于在缺乏正当立论基础时排除采纳 FINRA（Financial Industry Regulatory Authority，美国金融业监管局）学习指南的动议，我们前段时间在一次庭审中讨论过此事，我说过按照其条款该动议应当予以准许。显而易见，在缺乏正当立论基础的情况下，这些指南不能采纳为证据。这是我所知我们最后一次涉及此事，因此我基于同样的理由准许该动议。如果政府拟使用美国金融业监管局\n\n指南，我推测其拟奠定正当立论基础。为方便法庭书记官记录，那是 ECF-163。关于排除有关被告充当代理人或经纪人或对交易对手负有任何代理义务之证据的动议，即 ECF-164，我认为我们在那次庭审中已经解决了。政府不会暗示被告对交易对手负有信义义务，因此该动议可以予以准许。\n诺维克先生：抱歉，法官阁下，从政府的角度来看，我认为其中还有另一部分。我们显然承认，在法律层面上我们不会主张存在代理关系，但我认为被告还希望排除证人的证言，即证人感知到存在代理关系且被告使他们相信存在代理关系。而且我相信我的记忆（时间已经过去很久了，法官阁下），法庭倾向于允许证人以这种方式作证。\n法庭：是的，是的。我看到 Judge Hall（霍尔法官）在最近关于无罪判决或重新审判动议的裁决中处理了这个问题。她非常详细地描述了该证言。我认为，如果我们有一位证人想要表示他认为被告是作为其代理人行事，他可以在这一点上接受交叉询问。\n诺维克先生：谢谢法官阁下。\n法庭：关于排除不存在犯罪活动之证据的动议，即 ECF-159，我不知道目前的进展如何。你们还在争议此事吗？还是说这已经无争议了？\n诺维克先生：是的，法官阁下，我认为——我不知道在何种程度上——请稍等片刻，法官阁下，抱歉。\n（休庭）\nMR. BRENNAN（布伦南先生）：法官阁下，我是 Liam Brennan（利亚姆·布伦南），我们……我们的动议是排除关于总计涉及数千笔其他交易中不存在犯罪活动的证据，而这是被告一直坚持要主张的。我认为问题在于辩方是否打算引入未被指控的交易，即并非我们已通知将引入的 21 笔交易之外的交易。\nMR. MUKASEY（穆凯西先生）：法官阁下，如果我可以简要向利亚姆说明一下。我认为我们曾试图就此进行磋商，而且我以为我们已经磋商过了。我以为我们已达成了某种共识，即无论贵方还是我方都可以提及许多许多其他交易，但贵方不会\n\n被告在这方面是怎么考虑的，但如果您能向我说明一下会有所帮助，我们现在无法进行，但在该事项仍悬而未决的范围内，在被告打算提供证据证明这些交易实际上是盈利的范围内，我要求你们与政府进行讨论，看看能否协商解决。如果协商不成，没关系，我会处理，但我将在该讨论得出结果之前，在不影响重新提出之权利的前提下驳回该动议。下一项，关于排除涉及其他经纪商/自营商之证据的动议，即 ECF-187，同样，我不知道今天进展如何，因此我想我将按同样方式处理。我将在不影响重新提出之权利的前提下予以驳回，条件是如果被告试图提供类似证据，他们应与政府律师进行磋商，从而让政府充分获知他们的具体意图，届时政府如果愿意可以重新提出动议。还有一项关于专家证人的动议，我认为我们已经处理过了。这就引出了最近的几项动议。我手头有夏皮罗先生提出的剔除起诉书多余内容的动议。基于政府所述的实质理由，该动议予以驳回；并且基于……所述的实质理由，备位请求准许引入涉及 Nomura（野村）内部审查的证据亦予以驳回\n\n我们谈到了汇总图表。你们打算就此进行后续跟进。正如我所说，我认为汇总图表是有用的，可能是不可避免的，问题仅在于图表本身是否以某种方式存在不准确之处，或者在其他方面造成不当偏见。\n\n我认为今天需要我处理的所有事项都已处理完毕，无论如何，我们现在需要休庭，因此请继续沟通，如果需要我进一步处理任何事项，请再联系我。在此期间，我将继续思考关于利特瓦克的部分，届时会与你们联系。\n\n还有最后一点。\n关于陪审团指示，在你们最近提交的文件中，提到了你们各自就犯罪构成要件所提出的相互竞争的指示请求。我想问你们的是：为什么我不能以 Hall 法官（霍尔法官）的指示作为出发点呢？在那两次审理过程中，她在此类事项上投入了大量的时间和精力，听取了广泛的辩论，并最终形成了一套陪审团指示；我相信这套指示在提交给陪审团时是没有异议的，或者即便有异议，也不算多。我的感觉是，他们最终拟定出了一套让各方都大体满意的指示。\n\n所以我的问题是：在认识到需要针对本案进行调整的前提下，我们为什么不能以她的指示为出发点，特别是在犯罪构成要件的一般性陈述等事项上，我们为什么不能采用当时所使用的指示呢？我很想听听你们对这一点的反馈意见。你们可以发电子邮件给 Katie（凯蒂），让她知道你们的想法。\n谢谢各位，我得走了。\nMUKASEY 先生（穆凯西先生）：法官，能否请您尽快将您今天提到被告薪酬的那部分庭审记录予以封存，法官？\nBROWN 先生（布朗先生）：我们附议，法官阁下。\n法庭：好的，该部分将被封存。\n发言者：谢谢您，法官阁下。\nNOVICK 先生（诺维克先生）：谢谢，法官阁下。\n法庭：好的，谢谢。\n（庭审于上午 11:45 休庭）\n\n证明书\n\n关于：U.S. vs. SHAPIRO（美国诉夏皮罗案）\n\n本人，Darlene A. Warner（达琳·A·华纳），RDR-CRR，United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格区联邦地方法院）官方庭审速记员，特此证明：在本人专业技能与能力的最大限度范围内，上述页面为本人在上述案件中所作速记笔记之真实且准确的转录本。\n\n/s/__________________________\nDARLENE A. WARNER, RDR-CRR\n官方庭审速记员\n450 Main Street, Room #223\nHartford, Connecticut 06103\n(860) 547-0580","key_entities":["Je","Guo","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":372,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":16713,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-04-09 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-04-09","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:27:28"}