{"id":"court_sdny_273_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":273,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"UNKNOWN","filed_date":"2024-04-09","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"庭前动议 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵/Miles Guo）、Yanping Wang（王炎平/Yvette）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #273（2024年4月9日立案）。美国检察机关提出多项证据可采性动议，主张共同被告人陈述、关联计划证据、公开声明和视频等可采纳；同时请求法院禁止被告引入关于起诉程序合法性及特定国家政府活动的无关且偏见性证据。","summary_en":"Motion In Limine — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok a/k/a Miles Guo a/k/a Guo Wengui and Yanping Wang a/k/a Yvette, SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #273 (filed April 9, 2024). The Government seeks to establish admissibility of co-conspirator statements, related scheme evidence, public statements and videos, and other evidentiary categories; and requests that the Court preclude defendants from introducing evidence regarding prosecution motivation and foreign government activities.","body_en":"# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nv.\n\nHO WAN KWOK, a/k/a \"Miles Guo,\" a/k/a \"Miles Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Guo Wengui,\" a/k/a \"Brother Seven,\" a/k/a \"The Principal,\" a/k/a \"Boss,\" and\n\nYANPING WANG a/k/a \"Yvette,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendants.\n\n# **THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTIONS** *IN LIMINE*\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney Southern District of New York\n\nMicah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Justin Horton Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys - *Of Counsel* -\n\n  **S2 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n| FACTUAL BACKGROUND 1 |    |                                                                                                                                 |\n|----------------------|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| ARGUMENT 2           |    |                                                                                                                                 |\n| I.                   |    | Statements of the Defendants' Co-Conspirators and Agents Are Admissible 2                                                       |\n|                      | A. | Applicable Law 2                                                                                                                |\n|                      | 1. | The Rule Against Hearsay 2                                                                                                      |\n|                      | 2. | Rule 801(d)(2)(D) 2                                                                                                             |\n|                      | 3. | Rule 801(d)(2)(E) 3                                                                                                             |\n|                      | B. | Discussion 4                                                                                                                    |\n|                      | 1. | Statements of Co-Conspirators Are Not Hearsay 4                                                                                 |\n|                      | 2. | Statements of Kwok Enterprise Agents and Employees Are Not Hearsay 9                                                            |\n|                      | 3. | Videos, Posts, Articles, and Translations by the Defendants or Their Agents Are Not Hearsay 11                                  |\n| II.                  |    | Certain Evidence Is Admissible as Direct Evidence Or Pursuant to Rule 404(b) 12                                                 |\n|                      | A. | Applicable Law 13                                                                                                               |\n|                      | 1. | Direct Evidence 13                                                                                                              |\n|                      | 2. | Rule 404(b) 14                                                                                                                  |\n|                      | 3. | Rule 403 14                                                                                                                     |\n|                      | B. | Discussion 15                                                                                                                   |\n|                      | 1. | Evidence of Interconnected Schemes Is Admissible 15                                                                             |\n|                      | 2. | Evidence of the Defendant's False Promise to Donate \\$100 Million to the Rule of Law Charities Is Admissible 19                 |\n|                      | 3. | Evidence that Kwok's Assets Were Seized Prior to His Fundraising Is Admissible 21                                               |\n|                      | 4. | Post-Arrest Conduct Is Admissible with a Limiting Instruction 23                                                                |\n|                      | 5. | Evidence from Kwok's Bankruptcy Is Admissible 26                                                                                |\n| III.                 |    | The Court Should Admit Certain Evidence Regarding the GTV Private Placement 31                                                  |\n| IV.                  |    | The Court Should Permit the Authentication of Certain Records Under Rule 902(11) 34                                             |\n| V.                   |    | The Court Should Admit Bank Records From First Abu Dhabi Bank 36                                                                |\n| VI.                  |    | The Court Should Preclude the Defendant from Introducing Evidence and Arguments That Are Irrelevant and Unfairly Prejudicial 46 |\n\n| A. The Court Should Exclude Evidence and Argument That This Prosecution is<br>Improperly Linked to the CCP or in Any Way Malicious ................................. 4                                                                                                            |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| B. The Court Should Preclude the Defendants from Introducing Evidence and<br>Arguments Related to CCP Activities That Are Irrelevant and Unfairly Prejudicial\".... 4                                                                                                              |\n| 1. The Court Should Limit Evidence and Claims Regarding CCP Activities, Including<br>Targeting ................................................................................................................. 4                                                                |\n| 2. The Court Should Exclude Extrinsic Targeting Evidence, Outside of Defendants'<br>Testimony ................................................................................................................. 5                                                                 |\n| 3. The Court Should Closely Police Defendants' Testimony To Avoid Impermissible<br>Bases for a Verdict ................................................................................................... 5                                                                      |\n| 4. The Court Should Preclude Argument and Evidence Suggesting that the<br>Defendants' Fraud Was Justified, Necessary, or a Result of Duress ........................ 5                                                                                                            |\n| 5. The Court Should Preclude General Evidence of Contact Between the Chinese<br>Police and Victims ................................................................................................... 5                                                                          |\n| C. The Court Should Exclude Evidence and Claims of the Defendants' Good Acts<br>(Including Any Dissident Activity Against the CCP) To Prove Their Innocence ........... 5                                                                                                         |\n| D. The Court Should Preclude Defense Arguments, Evidence and Cross-Examination<br>Suggesting That the Defendants Are Not Guilty Because of Disclaimers in<br>Transaction Documents ............................................................................................ 6 |\n| E. The Court Should Exclude Evidence and Claims That Victims Were Negligent or<br>Failed to Conduct Adequate Due Diligence .............................................................. 6                                                                                       |\n| F. The Court Should Preclude Argument That the SEC or the Government Are<br>Responsible for Victims' Financial Losses ................................................................ 6                                                                                          |\n| G. The Court Should Exclude Evidence and Claims That the Defendants Intended to<br>Repay Victims .......................................................................................................... 6                                                                     |\n| H. The Court Should Exclude Evidence of the Defendant's Personal Circumstances<br>and Potential Punishment .......................................................................................... 7                                                                           |\n| I. The Court Should Preclude the Defendants from Offering Their Statements for Their<br>Truth ........................................................................................................................ 7                                                          |\n\n# **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n# Page(s)\n\n| Cases                                                                                                   |            |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|\n| Bourjaily<br>v.<br>United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)  3                                                |            |\n| Feis v. United States, 394 F. App'x 797 (2d Cir. 2010)  3                                               |            |\n| George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1990)  2                                                  |            |\n| In re Reserve Fund Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 4346 (PGG), 2012 WL 12354233 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3,<br>2012)  10 |            |\n| Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999)  64                                                           |            |\n| Pappas v. Middle Earth Condo. Ass'n, 963 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1992)  3, 9                                  |            |\n| Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage Corp., 38 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 1994)  35                        |            |\n| Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975)  70                                                         |            |\n| Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994) 70                                                        |            |\n| United States v. Adelekan, 567 F. Supp. 3d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)  65                                      |            |\n| United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2011)  59                                             |            |\n| United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007)  65                                                 |            |\n| United States v. Ayelotan, 917 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2019)  34, 35                                         |            |\n| United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980)  46                                                        |            |\n| United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1990)  46                                            |            |\n| United States v. Bankman-Fried, No. 22 Cr. 673 (LAK), 2023 WL 4194773 (S.D.N.Y.<br>June 27, 2023)  68   |            |\n| United States v. Battaglia, No. 05 Cr. 774 (KMW), 2008 WL 144826 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,<br>2008)  69        |            |\n| United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978)  58                                            |            |\n| United States v. Berger, 188 F. Supp. 2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)  69                                        |            |\n| <i>United States v. Buckley, 101 F.3d 685, 1996 WL 282140 (2d Cir. 1996)</i>                            | 68         |\n| <i>United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2000)</i>                                             | 13, 27     |\n| <i>United States v. Cheung Kin Ping, 555 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1977)</i>                                   | 67         |\n| <i>United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553 (2d Cir. 1991)</i>                                            | 13, 14     |\n| <i>United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir.)</i>                                                   | 14         |\n| <i>United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999)</i>                                                | 13, 14, 21 |\n| <i>United States v. Dupree, 706 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2013)</i>                                             | 2          |\n| <i>United States v. Dupree, 870 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2017)</i>                                              | 14         |\n| <i>United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980)</i>                                           | 15         |\n| <i>United States v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133 (2d Cir. 1995)</i>                                             | 15         |\n| <i>United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999)</i>                                             | 3          |\n| <i>United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936 (2d Cir. 1997)</i>                                           | 13         |\n| <i>United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014)</i>                                              | 3          |\n| <i>United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440 (D.C. Cir. 2007)</i>                                           | 70         |\n| <i>United States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1994)</i>                                              | 21         |\n| <i>United States v. Jabar, 19 F.4th 66 (2d Cir. 2021)</i>                                               | 68         |\n| <i>United States v. Josephberg, 562 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2009)</i>                                         | 67         |\n| <i>United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1995)</i>                                               | 46         |\n| <i>United States v. Lange, 834 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2016)</i>                                               | 69         |\n| <i>United States v. Males, 459 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2006)</i>                                              | 68         |\n| <i>United States v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2010)</i>                                             | 46         |\n| <i>United States v. Miller, No. 18 Cr. 202 (ARR), 2018 WL 4961458 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2018)</i>          | 35         |\n| <i>United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1991)</i>                                          | 69         |\n| <i>United States v. Padilla, 203 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2000)</i>                                            | 3          |\n| <i>United States v. Paul</i> , 110 F.3d 869 (2d Cir. 1997)                                              | 46         |\n| <i>United States v. Qualls</i> , 613 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2015)                                         | 35         |\n| <i>United States v. Quinones</i> , 511 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 2007)                                          | 13         |\n| <i>United States v. Ramirez</i> , 894 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1990)                                           | 14         |\n| <i>United States v. Rivera</i> , 22 F.3d 430 (2d Cir. 1994)                                             | 4          |\n| <i>United States v. Rivera</i> , No. 13 Cr. 149 (KAM), 2015 WL 1725991 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015)         | 59         |\n| <i>United States v. Roldan-Zapata</i> , 916 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1990)                                     | 15         |\n| <i>United States v. Rom</i> , 528 F. App'x 24 (2d Cir. 2013)                                            | 34         |\n| <i>United States v. Romero-Padilla</i> , 583 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2009)                                    | 21         |\n| <i>United States v. Russo</i> , 302 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 2002)                                              | 9          |\n| <i>United States v. Scarpa</i> , 897 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1990)                                             | 58         |\n| <i>United States v. Sindona</i> , 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1980)                                           | 69         |\n| <i>United States v. Snype</i> , 441 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2006)                                             | 15, 26     |\n| <i>United States v. Tarantino</i> , 846 F.2d 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1988)                                      | 4          |\n| <i>United States v. Thai</i> , 29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994)                                               | 13         |\n| <i>United States v. Thomas</i> , 581 F. App'x 100 (2d Cir. 2014)                                        | 68         |\n| <i>United States v. Tracy</i> , 12 F.3d 1186 (2d Cir. 1993)                                             | 4          |\n| <i>United States v. Tussa</i> , 816 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1987)                                              | 15, 26     |\n| <i>United States v. Vilar</i> , 729 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2013)                                              | 64         |\n| <i>United States v. Vincent</i> , 416 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2005)                                          | 68         |\n| <i>United States v. Watts</i> , 934 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)                                     | 68         |\n| <i>United States v. Weaver</i> , 860 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2017)                                             | 64, 65, 66 |\n| <i>United States v. Weigand</i> , No. 20 Cr. 188 (JSR), 2021 WL 568173 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2021)         | 35         |\n| <i>United States v. Zackson</i> , 12 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1993)                                           | 14         |\n\n|  | 18 U.S.C. § 3505  41, 43, 51 |  |  |\n|--|------------------------------|--|--|\n|  |                              |  |  |\n\n| Fed. R. Evid. 104(a)  9                 |  |\n|-----------------------------------------|--|\n| Fed. R. Evid. 402  65                   |  |\n| Fed. R. Evid. 403  21, 32, 52           |  |\n| Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(A) & 405(a)  54 |  |\n| Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)  20                |  |\n| Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)  8                 |  |\n| Fed. R. Evid. 802  8                    |  |\n| Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)  42                |  |\n| Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(D)  41             |  |\n\nThe Government respectfully submits these motions *in limine* in advance of the trial of defendants Ho Wan Kwok and Yanping Wang, scheduled to begin on May 20, 2024.\n\n#### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\nOn January 3, 2024, a grand jury returned Superseding Indictment S2 23 Cr. 118 (AT), ECF No. 215 (\"Indictment\"). That Indictment charged the defendants with a series of fraud and money laundering offenses for their acts in defrauding more than 1,000 victims out of more than \\$1 billion. The Indictment also charged the defendants with conspiring to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (\"RICO\") by conspiring to establish, and operate, an enterprise in furtherance of several fraud and money laundering crimes.\n\nThe charges arise out of the defendants' fraudulent misappropriation of million of dollars of funds sent by investors in the Kwok Enterprise, and the defendants' related false and misleading statements to those victim investors, all so that they could obtain and keep the victim money. The defendants then used millions of dollars in stolen funds for a variety of purposes, including, among other things, to make a high-risk, \\$100 million dollar bet via a hedge fund investment for the ultimate benefit of Kwok's son; to make payments for Kwok's yacht and for a private jet; to purchase, renovate, and furnish a 50,000-square-foot mansion in Mahwah, New Jersey (the \"Mahwah Mansion\") for approximately \\$40 million; to purchase a \\$4 million Ferrari for Kwok's son; to finance a \\$37 million \"loan\" relating to Kwok's yacht; and generally to enrich themselves.\n\nAt trial, the Government expects to call, among other witnesses, victim investors, former employees of companies within the Kwok Enterprise, and a summary witness whose financial analysis will show the misappropriation of investor funds. The Government also intends to introduce documentary evidence of the defendants' crimes, including, among other things, online broadcasts and posts, financial records, and private communications.\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n### **I. Statements of the Defendants' Co-Conspirators and Agents Are Admissible**\n\nAt trial, the Government will seek to introduce for their truth out-of-court statements by the defendants' co-conspirators, agents, and employees. Such statements, including particular statements described below, are admissible and are not barred by the rule against hearsay.\n\n#### **A. Applicable Law**\n\n#### 1. The Rule Against Hearsay\n\nThe Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as a declarant's out-of-court statement \"offer[ed] in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.\" Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is admissible only if it falls within an enumerated exception. Fed. R. Evid. 802. However, \"[i]f the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.\" Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) advisory committee's note. Thus, a statement offered to show its effect on the listener is not hearsay. *Id.*; *see also United States v. Dupree*, 706 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 2013) (\"We have repeatedly held that a statement is not hearsay where, as here, it is offered, not for its truth, but to show that a listener was put on notice.\"); *George v. Celotex Corp*., 914 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1990) (\"To be sure, an out of court statement offered not for the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to show that the defendant was on notice of a danger, is not hearsay.\").\n\n#### 2. Rule 801(d)(2)(D)\n\nFederal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) provides that \"[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . the statement is offered against an opposing party and . . . was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed.\" To admit a statement under this rule, the court must find \"(1) the existence of the agency relationship, (2) that the statement\n\nwas made during the course of the relationship, and (3) that it relates to a matter within the scope of the agency.\" *Feis v. United States*, 394 F. App'x 797, 799 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting *Pappas v. Middle Earth Condo. Ass'n*, 963 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1992)). As the Second Circuit has explained, \"admissibility under this rule should be granted freely,\" and there is a \"liberal\" standard for admissibility rooted in the understanding that agents and employees are usually the people \"best informed about certain acts committed in the course of [their] employment.\" *Pappas*, 963 F.2d at 537.\n\n#### 3. Rule 801(d)(2)(E)\n\nFederal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides in relevant part that \"[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . the statement is offered against an opposing party and . . . was made by the party's co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.\" To admit a statement under this rule, a district court must find two facts by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that a conspiracy that included the defendant and the declarant existed; and (2) that the statement was made during the course of, and in furtherance of, that conspiracy. *Bourjaily v. United States*, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987); *United States v. Gigante*, 166 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1999). \"In determining the existence and membership of the alleged conspiracy, the court must consider the circumstances surrounding the statement, as well as the contents of the alleged coconspirator's statement itself.\" *United States v. Gupta*, 747 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2014). When determining whether the predicate conspiracy has been established, the court is not bound by the Rules of Evidence, *see* Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), and \"the district court may consider the hearsay statement itself\" as evidence of \"the existence of a conspiracy.\" *United States v. Padilla*, 203 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing *Bourjaily*, 483 U.S. at 181). To be in furtherance of a conspiracy, a statement \"must in some way have been designed to promote or facilitate achievement of the goals of that conspiracy.\" *United States v.*  *Rivera*, 22 F.3d 430, 436 (2d Cir. 1994). Under this standard, a co-conspirator statement is admissible if it \"can reasonably be interpreted as encouraging a co-conspirator or other person to advance the conspiracy, or as enhancing a co-conspirator or other person's usefulness to the conspiracy.\" *United States v. Tarantino*, 846 F.2d 1384, 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1988).\n\n#### **B. Discussion**\n\n#### 1. Statements of Co-Conspirators Are Not Hearsay\n\nThe Government intends to offer into evidence statements by Kwok's and Wang's coconspirators, including co-defendant Kin Ming Je and other co-conspirators, such as Qiang Guo, a/k/a \"Mileson\" (Kwok's son) and Haoran He (the purported beneficial owner of several of the Kwok Enterprise entities, including G|CLUBS and G|FASHION). These statements were made in furtherance of the charged conspiracy and are therefore not precluded by the rule against hearsay.\n\nThe Court can make a preliminary ruling that statements of Je, Mileson, and He are admissible against the trial defendants, subject to the introduction of trial evidence (including the statements themselves) sufficient to show the existence of a conspiracy. *United States v. Tracy*, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993) (\"[S]tatements proffered as co-conspirator statements may be admitted in evidence on a conditional basis, subject to the later submission of the necessary evidence\" establishing that a conspiracy involving the defendant existed.). The evidence at trial readily will show by a preponderance that Kwok, Wang, Je, Mileson, and He entered into a conspiracy, and that these co-conspirators made statements during the course of, and in furtherance, of the conspiracy.\n\n#### a. *Recorded Crane Calls*\n\nOne category of evidence containing co-conspirator statements from Je and Mileson\n\nconsists of audio-recorded phone calls with an employee of the Kwok Enterprise (Employee-1). Employee-1 recorded a series of calls with individulas within the Kwok Enterprise. Some of the calls were conference calls with groups, at times including the defendants, while others were oneon-one calls directly with Je or one-on-one calls directly with Mileson. The general topic discussed in this series of calls was more than approximately \\$120 million that had been received by an entity called Crane Advisory Services (\"Crane\"). In connection with Employee-1's work for the Kwok Enterprise, Employee-1 incorporated Crane and opened bank accounts for Crane. Employee-1 agreed with defendant Wang to receive into a Crane bank account a transfer from a Farm consisting of G|CLUBS membership funds—with Crane acting as an escrow agent for G|CLUBS, which was unable to maintain functional bank accounts. Thereafter, Crane ultimately received more than approximately \\$120 million of G|CLUBS investor funds into Crane's bank accounts. After being pressured by the defendants to transfer these funds abroad, Employee-1 began recording his calls with the defendants and their co-conspirators. Ultimately, funds received by Crane were transferred to G|CLUBS and the escrow account Aaron Mitchell, an attorney who represented the defendants and G|CLUBS and received the funds on behalf of G|CLUBS. Mitchell's escrow account received approximately \\$46 million from Crane, which Mitchell did not then transfer to G|CLUBS. Instead, Mitchell transferred the entire amount to a bank account held by Je's purported investment fund, Hamilton. That money was then used to purchase and renovate the Mahwah Mansion, for approximately \\$40 million. That purchase and renovation was also arranged by Mitchell.\n\n## b. *Examples of Je's Statements*\n\nAs examples of Je's statements regarding the money received by Crane, in a recorded call between Employee-1 and Je on or about May 4, 2021, Je made several statements in furtherance\n\nof the conspiracy that are admissible for their truth. At the beginning of the call, Je stated that \"[t]he principal [*i.e.*, Kwok] called,\" and Je understood that the remitters of the more than approximately \\$120 million \"have signed up to buy the membership from G Club.\" After Employee-1 explained that was not true for all the remitters, and that Crane had received wires in the millions of dollars—far above the highest G|CLUBS membership tier of \\$50,000—Je explained, \"I think they, first of all, they are buying the G Club membership, but they are expecting would probably receive some shares, you know, on on, on the future GTV, I think this is their expectation.\" Employee-1 therafter responded that \"now you are telling me G Club. Last week, it was for GTV investment directly. Ok? The amounts don't make any sense.\" Je replied, \"I know. I know. I know.\" Je later said, \"[I]s Yvette working on this? Like, I mean, she should be working on this, like she should be negotiating all those [conversations with a key Farm leader].\" Employee-1 replied: \"She is involved. But my involvement with Yvette was . . . the money is coming in to Crane for the purpose of investment in GTV media company in Bahamas . . . But now things shifted last week. It became the H Coin and then now G Club, and now the . . . the media company.\" Je then replied in part, \"all these money should belong to G Club.\" The call ended with Je stating \"[t]he principal [*i.e.*, Kwok] is calling.\" This recording (like the other Crane recordings) is admissible, and Je's statements—constituting the statements of a co-conspirator and agent of the defendants (like other Je statements that will be offered at trial)—may be offered for their truth.\n\n#### c. *Examples of Mileson's Statements*\n\nEmployee-1 also had several recorded calls with Kwok's son, Mileson, despite Mileson having no formal employment with G|CLUBS. For example, in a call on or about May 6, 2021, Employee-1 recorded a call with Mileson, Kwok, Mitchell, another of the defendants' attorneys, and the general counsel of G|CLUBS.<sup>1</sup> During the call, Mileson instructs Employee-1 to send him a documents tracking the investor funds and write on the documents \"confidentiality, lawyer's privilege.\" Mitchell responds that for privilege to apply, the attorneys have to represent the parties involved, and \"Mileson doesn't have, technically, any ownership interest in G Club.\" Mileson then replies: \"But actually, I do, Aaron [Mitchell] . . . I am the settler of the foundation, so, I do. . . . But I am not actively um, but UBO [ultimate beneficial owner] is Mr. [Haoran] He. I am just the settlor. By Dutch law, I do have some sort of saying, but I am not practicing it.\" Mileson's statements reference the Dutch foundation that ultimately owned the G|CLUBS entites, which was in turn nominally owned by Haoran He. Using Haoran He—instead of Mileson—to direct investor funds sent to G|CLUBS back into the hands of the defendants and Mileson was a central part of the conspiracy. Indeed, on this same May 6, 2021 call, Kwok stated to Mileson, speaking in Mandarin, which the other participants did not understand: \"For this money, it's legal. It's…wire to this foundation [*i.e.*, Hamilton], understand? Just following previously mentioned, two steps. Right? One is to transfer the money to BVI account [*i.e.*, the bank account of G|CLUBS parent entity, G Clubs International Limited, a BVI-incorporated entity], then Mr. He will command [the transfer of those funds to Hamilton]. Right? During this period, we do it according to the plan.\"<sup>2</sup> Of course, as described above, the Crane funds were, indeed, ultimately sent to Hamilton including by Mitchell—and then used to purchase, renovate, and furnish the Mahwah Mansion for Kwok and his family (which undertaking was also facilitated by Mitchell). This recording (like\n\n<sup>1</sup> As described below, G|CLUBS filed an arbitration claim against Crane regarding the disposition of funds received by Crane. In commuincations with the Government, G|CLUBS has waived privilege as to a variety of subject matter, including the Crane arbitration.\n\n<sup>2</sup> In a later call between just Mileson and Employee-1, Employee-1 asked, \"where is the money going? Where do you want it to go?\" Mileson responded simply: \"Anywhere out of U.S.\"\n\nthe other Crane recordings) is admissible and Mileson's statements—constituting the statements of a co-conspirator and agent of the defendants (like other Mileson statements that will be offered at trial)—may be offered for their truth.\n\n### d. *Examples of Haoran He Statements*\n\nThe evidence will also show that Haoran He was a co-conspirator, and his statements in furtherance of the conspiracy therefore are admissible. As insinuated by Kwok's statements to Mileson described above, Haoran He did, in fact, direct the transfer of G|CLUBS investor proceeds abroad, and on multiple occassions—to the United Kingdom, to Switzerland, to the Kyrgyz Republic. For example, Haoran He directed a transfer, styled as a \"loan,\" of \\$10 million of G|CLUBS funds to his purported real estate development company in the United Kingdom, named Fiesta Property Developments Ltd. (\"Fiesta\"). When the bank asked for the purpose of the initial wire, a G|CLUBS employee facilitating the transfer on behalf of Haoran He replied that Fiesta was also owned by Haoran He and this purported loan was \"for a possible down payment on a property they plan to purchase for a total of \\$10 million.\" 3 After the bank approved the wires and transferred \\$10 million to Fiesta, the G|CLUBS funds sent to Fiesta were used to pay for a \\$4 million Ferrari on behalf of Mileson, as shown in bank records, contracts, and email communications with the Ferrari dealer. Statements such as this one, regarding a supposed real estate down payment that Haoran He made, or caused to be made, are admissible as co-conspirator statements.\n\nFor many of the same reasons, statements from Je, Mielson, and Haoran He are also statements of the defendants' agents under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Indeed, Kwok was literally referred\n\n<sup>3</sup> This statement is also admissible because it is offered not for its truth, but for its falsity.\n\nto as \"the Principal\" by his agents, including his co-conspirators. As the proof at trial will demonstrate, Je, Mileson, and Haoran He worked for companies within the Kwok Enterprise, the defendants controlled and ran those companies, and the statements of Je, Mileson, and Haoran He—and employees who worked on their behalf—were within the scope of their agency relationships, and are therefore not hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(D). *See, e.g.*, *Pappas*, 963 F.2d at 537. To the extent the defense were to argue that these recordings and emails document legitimate business discussions as opposed to discussions designed to further a criminal scheme, that fact (which the Government disputes) would not undermine the admissibility of those materials under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), because the rule authorizes the admission of statements designed to further a joint venture with the defendants, whether or not the goal of that venture is criminal. *See United States v. Russo*, 302 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 2002) (\"the objective of the joint venture that justifies deeming the speaker as the agent of the defendant need not be criminal at all.\").\n\n#### 2. Statements of Kwok Enterprise Agents and Employees Are Not Hearsay\n\nThe evidence at trial will show that Kwok and Wang controlled the companies within the Kwok Enterprise, including (but not limited to) the Kwok family office entities, GTV, the Himalaya Farm entities, G|CLUBS, G|FASHION, G News, the HCHK entities, and the Himalaya Exchange. Statements made by Kwok Enterprise employees while they were employed by such companies, or by Farm members, as reflected in documents or as described during their anticipated trial testimony, are statements of the defendants' agents under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) and therefore not hearsay. As noted above, individuals working at companies within the Kwok Enterprise referred to Kwok as \"the Principal\" or \"Boss\" and Kwok exercised ultimate control over the companies. Wang played the role of functional Chief Executive Officer (\"CEO\") at the Kwok Enterprise\n\ncompanies, despite her typically lacking a formal role or the installment of other, figurehead CEOs at those companies. Similarly, Kwok controlled the Farms, discussing his investment \"projects\" on his broadcasts—at times directly, at other times more obliquely—and disseminating information and directives through the Farm's hierarchies to his thousands of followers. This same principle applies equally to other categories of agents, such as attorneys, <sup>4</sup> consultants, and translators working on behalf of the defendants or the Kwok Enterprise companies. *See In re Reserve Fund Sec. Litig.*, No. 09 Civ. 4346 (PGG), 2012 WL 12354233, at \\*7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012) (statements made by an employee of an entity are admissible when offered against the person who controls the entity).\n\nWhile this legal framework applies to statements by *all* of the defendants' agents and employees, the Government will not, of course, offer at trial statements from all of those people. In short, when assessing the admissibility of Kwok Enterprise employee or agent statements that the Government will offer, the Court should apply the foregoing framework: the statements are not hearsay and may be offered for their truth.\n\n<sup>4</sup> *See United States v. Amato*, 356 F.3d 216, 220 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (affirming admission of a letter from defendant's prior counsel); *United States v. Arrington*, 867 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1989) (there are no \"special procedures to be followed, or balancings to be performed as a prerequisite to the evidentiary use of a defendant's counsel's out-of-court statements\"); *United States v. McKeon*, 738 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1984) (\"The general admissibility of an attorney's statements . . . [is] well established.\"); *United States v. Margiotta*, 662 F.2d 131, 142 (2d Cir. 1981) (\"Statements made by an attorney concerning a matter within his employment may be admissible against the party retaining the attorney.\"); *United States v. Dolleris*, 408 F.2d 918, 921 (6th Cir. 1969) (affirming admission of statements made by an attorney at conferences, even though the client was not present at the conferences). The Second Circuit has developed a five-part test concerning the admission of *jury argument* by a criminal defendant's counsel in a *prior criminal trial*. *United States v. McKeon*, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984); *see United States v. Amato*, 356 F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 2004); *United States v. Arrington*, 867 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1989) (limiting the *McKeon*  five-part test to prior counsel's jury argument). That test has no relevance here, as the Government will not seek to introduce any prior jury argument.\n\n# 3. Videos, Posts, Articles, and Translations by the Defendants or Their Agents Are Not Hearsay\n\nThe Government will seek to offer videos, posts, and articles that were made by Kwok or Kwok's agents and often hosted on Kwok's media platforms, such as G News, GTV, and GETTR. This content and translations of this content by Kwok's agents (typically, Farm members working as volunteers)—which is often incorporated into the content itself, such as Kwok's video broadcasts that contain English subtitles—are statements of agents that are not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).\n\n The Farms and other NFSC-related organizations (such as NFSC News), which were controlled by Kwok, regularly posted on G News, GTV, and GETTR—media platforms that were controlled by Kwok and Wang.<sup>5</sup> These posts regularly transcribed or summarized in English the content of Kwok's online broadcasts and often included English-subtitled videos of Kwok's broadcasts. For example, a G News post by the Los Angeles Farm (Himalaya Los Angeles Pangu<sup>6</sup>) on November 16, 2021, roughly two weeks after the launch of the Himalaya Exchange, included an English-subtitled excerpt from Kwok's recent online broadcasts in which Kwok explains that people who sent money—\"Gclub's buyers\" \"donors to the Rule of Law Foundation\" and \"GTV investors, borrowers [*i.e.*, lenders in the Farm Loan Program], and H-Coin owners\"—will receive \"VVIP treatment in the future.\" As set forth in the G News post and accompanying video, Kwok then goes on to state that the Himalaya Exchange is worth \\$2 trillion and GTV investors own 5%\n\n<sup>5</sup> Indeed, content on these sites even proves the point. For example, in an April 2020 G News post by Kwok (under the verified handle \"Miles\"), summarizing one of Kwok's broadcasts, Kwok states: \"Comrades, I'm creating G-TV and G-News for you, is that right?\" Kwok also goes on to say, \"Everyone sees that we are so busy G-TV, G-News, Wang Yanping and all the employees of our rule of law fund.\" *See* http\n\n<sup>6</sup> Pangu is a reference to the Pangu Plaza, a real estate development project of Kwok's in Beijing.\n\nof it, or \\$100 billion:\n\nAccording to your different investments, no one in the whole mankind dares to do this\n\nYou never thought about how much total comrades in arms invested in GTV less than 1 billion U.S. dollars, and now GTV owns 5% of Himalaya Reserve You know how much it is worth? what is 5% of 2 trillion 100 billion US dollars, excluding other institutions investment How much money do you have, have you calculated it?\n\n![](_page_18_Picture_4.jpeg)\n\nVideos such as these—posted by Kwok's agents on websites that Kwok controls, containing statements of Kwok and the English translations of his agents—are not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).<sup>7</sup>\n\n# **II. Certain Evidence Is Admissible as Direct Evidence Or Pursuant to Rule 404(b)**\n\nAs described further below, evidence of the following is relevant and admissible at trial, both as direct proof of the charges and pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): (1) the evolving scams that the defendants used to continue to defraud their victims, including the A10 Project; (2) Kwok's false promise to donate \\$100 million to the Rule of Law entities; (3) the fact\n\n<sup>7</sup> Moreover, statements such as these are not hearsay for another reason: they are not offered for their truth, but for their falsity.\n\nthat Kwok's assets in China and Hong Kong were seized prior to his fundraising for the Kwok Enterprise; (4) the defendants' continued leadership of the Kwok Enterprise from jail following their arrests; and (5) Kwok's claim of bankruptcy.<sup>8</sup>\n\n#### **A. Applicable Law**\n\n### 1. Direct Evidence\n\nDirect evidence is \"not confined to that which directly establishes an element of the crime.\" *United States v. Gonzalez*, 110 F.3d 936, 941 (2d Cir. 1997). As the Second Circuit has explained, \"[t]o be relevant, evidence need only tend to prove the government's case, and evidence that adds context and dimension to the government's proof of the charges can have that tendency.\" *Id.*; *accord United States v. Coonan*, 938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit has repeatedly held that actions and statements are admissible as direct evidence of the crimes charged, and are \"not considered other crimes evidence under\" Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), if (a) they \"arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense,\" (b) they are \"inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense,\" or (c) they are \"necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial.\" *United States v. Carboni*, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000); *see also United States v. Quinones*, 511 F.3d 289, 309 (2d Cir. 2007).\n\nThus, where, as here, an indictment contains a conspiracy charge, \"[a]n act that is alleged to have been done in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy\" is considered \"part of the very act charged.\" *United States v. Diaz*, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir. 1999); *see United States v. Thai*, 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that \"uncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of\n\n<sup>8</sup> For the reasons explained herein, this evidence is all direct evidence of the racketeering, fraud, and money laundering offenses, for which no notice under Rule 404(b) is required. In any event, this motion constitutes notice pursuant to Rule 404(b) that the Government intends to offer such evidence at trial.\n\nthe conspiracy itself\"). Moreover, evidence of uncharged acts is properly admitted to provide background for the existence of a charged conspiracy, or the motive and intent for a charged crime. *Coonan*, 938 F.2d at 1561. In particular, \"[b]ackground evidence may be admitted to show, for example, the circumstances surrounding the events or to furnish an explanation of the understanding or intent with which certain acts were performed.\" *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Daly*, 842 F.2d 1380, 1388 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 488 U.S. 821 (1988)).\n\n#### 2. Rule 404(b)\n\nEvidence of a defendant's prior crimes, wrongs, or acts are admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove \"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.\" Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The Second Circuit follows an \"inclusionary approach\" under which \"prior act evidence is admissible for any purpose other than to show a defendant's criminal propensity.\" *United States v. Dupree*, 870 F.3d 62, 76 (2d Cir. 2017). Such evidence is admissible if (1) advanced for a proper purpose; (2) relevant to the crimes for which the defendant is on trial; (3) more probative than prejudicial; and (4) admitted subject to a limiting instruction, if such an instruction is requested. *See United States v. Zackson*, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993); *United States v. Ramirez*, 894 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1990). Other act evidence is routinely admitted \"to inform the jury of the background of the conspiracy charged, in order to help explain how the illegal relationship between participants in the crime developed, or to explain the mutual trust that existed between coconspirators.\" *Dupree*, 870 F.3d at 76 (citing *Diaz*, 176 F.3d at 79).\n\n#### 3. Rule 403\n\nWhether evidence is admitted as direct evidence or under Rule 404(b), the probative value of such evidence must not be \"substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.\" Fed. R. Evid. 403. The touchstone of the prejudice analysis under Rule 403 is whether the proffered evidence of uncharged acts does \"not involve conduct any more sensational or disturbing than the crimes with which [the defendant is] charged.\" *United States v. Roldan-Zapata*, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990). Generally speaking, \"any proof highly probative of guilt is prejudicial to the interests of that defendant. The prejudice that Rule 403 is concerned with involves 'some adverse effect . . . beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence.'\" *United States v. Gelzer*, 50 F.3d 1133, 1139 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting *United States v. Figueroa*, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980)). To the extent that there is any risk of unfair prejudice from otherwise probative evidence, the Court may provide limiting instructions to remind the jury that the defendant is not on trial for any offense other than the crimes charged. *See United States v. Tussa*, 816 F.2d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1987) (limiting instruction sufficient to preclude prejudice); *see generally United States v. Snype*, 441 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (\"[T]he law recognizes a strong presumption that juries follow limiting instructions.\").\n\n#### **B. Discussion**\n\n#### 1. Evidence of Interconnected Schemes Is Admissible\n\nEvidence of the defendants' evolving investment schemes is admissible as evidence of the charged offenses. The Indictment gave illustrative descriptions of the four principal schemes: the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, G|CLUBS, and the Himalaya Exchange. The particulars of these various fraud schemes were continually changing and evolving. For example, prior to the official launch of the Himalaya Exchange and its Himalaya Dollars (or H Dollars) and Himalaya Coins (or H Coins), the defendants solicited funds for G Dollars and G Coins at the time of the GTV Private Placement. As part of the Himalaya Exchange scheme, the defendants also solicited investment in a \"digital bank.\" As described in the Indictment, after the illegal GTV Private Placement was haulted, the defendants continued to trick followers into sending money for GTV shares via the the Farm Loan Program and G|CLUBS. At a certain point, since GTV was defunct, the investment was purportedly for a new media company called Freedom Media Ventures Limited, a BVI entity named as a member of the Kwok Enterprise in the Indictment. Indictment ¶ 3(a). When that purported media company went nowhere, the defendants then started raising for money a new scam called the \"A15 Project.\" According to that scam, the money sent by victim investors would now be used to own 5% of G|CLUBS, 5% of GETTR, and 5% of the Himalaya Exchange—all entities listed as members of the Kwok Enterprise in the Indictment.\n\nNearing the time of the defendants' arrests, the A15 scam was revised to the \"A10 Project,\" which excluded G|CLUBS shares and thus involved 5% of GETTR and 5% of the Himalaya Exchange. In online statements, Kwok directed his followers to \"Fei Fei\" for details on the A10 Project. A February 17, 2023 post on Kwok's G News platform, which, according to G News, has been viewed 4.3 thousand times, summarizes (in English) the A10 Project as described in Fei Fei's broadcasts as follows:\n\n## **About the A10 Project**\n\nThe 5% equity of Gettr and the 5% equity of Himalaya Reserve are called A10 together.\n\nGClubs is an operation form of private equity companies. As a top global club, it has a high level of confidentiality, so it does not participate in this project.\n\nAn investment of 1 yuan in A10 is equivalent to an investment of 10,000 yuan, and its shares are scarce and have high economic growth value.\n\nGettr and the Himalaya Reserve will not find institutions to raise funds, but will directly list and trade stocks. At this stage, the fundraising process has been completed through the participation of comrades-in-arms.\n\nSince A10's investment rights are irrelevant to the amount of investment, too much fundraising will dilute future expectations, and coupled with the continuous destruction of the CCP, fundraising will be closed at any time. Comrades who are interested in investing, rapid action is the biggest guarantee for participating in the A10 project.\n\nHow much will A10 stock be worth in the future? You can refer to the current market valuations of high-tech companies such as Twitter, Facebook, Google, and ChatGPT.\n\nNext, with the combination of AI technology and other high- tech, Gettr will be a social media platform with digital currency. What everyone holds is not only 5% of Gettr shares, but 5% of Gate plus 5% of blockchain digital currency.\n\nThe cold wallet to be launched by Himalaya Exchange can be exchanged with other digital currencies, which means that some digital assets can be traded.The blockchain technology (NFT) used cannot be faked, and is unique and special. Even the priceless antiques are incomparable, because even the best antiques can be imitated.\n\nA10 has to solve a series of legacy problems, and a lot of money is already in the project. Owners of new and old Gclub cards, SEC refunds, digital bank transfers to A10.\n\n# **The Righteous Essence of the A10 Project**\n\nThe SEC refund is returned to the private account of the original GTV investor, and individuals have the right to choose whether to invest or not. If you choose not to vote, the H Coin quota will be cancelled. There is no 5% reward for SEC switching, because there was a 0.5 H Coin quota before, but you have a card.\n\nThere are two types of new investment: more than 100,000 yuan and less than 100,000 yuan. The new investment is to consider many comrades in small investments, especially those inside the wall. The New Federal State of China has designed companies and funds like SPVs to help them. Every comrade-in-arms with a small amount of investment will have a corresponding contract and also have its own equity. Small grants are under application.\n\nThere is a 5% reward for more than 100,000. The new investment is to sign a contract with a new fund, and the individual, as a share of the fund, claims the stock through the fund, and directly issues the stock for listing and trading.\n\nWhy should we help comrades with small investment to join the A10 project?\n\nFirst of all, the New Federal State of China is not an investment institution, but an entity that aims to eliminate the Chinese Communist Party and create beliefs for the Chinese people and create real value.\n\nSecondly, what the Communist Party is more afraid of is the number of people who\n\nwill destroy the Communist Party and the gathering of people's hearts. We want to gather people with common values, not a group of rich people, so we hope that more comrades in small investment will participate.\n\n# **Investment Channel**\n\nIn each time zone of the world, whether it is legal currency or HDO, there are corresponding comrades who provide corresponding channels for everyone.\n\nBoth old and new GClubs cards have equity. The new investment is to invest in the current new card institution in Abu Dhabi. The nature and service of the two cards are exactly the same. GClubs is the core asset, so it moved to Abu Dhabi for operation.\n\nThe card is calculated in the unit of \"ten thousand\" US dollars. The only obligation of the GClubs card is to pay the annual fee. The activation of the card is handled by the special team of the alliance according to the individual's wishes.\n\nThe SEC switched, and there was Gettr coin. Those who enjoy the investment of 0.2 or 0.5 H Coin quota will not have a new 5% reward.\n\nThe new 5% reward is a reward for new fiat currency deposits and new investment systems.\n\nThe 5% reward of HDO is also the deposit of new fiat currency, because those who have deposited before have already obtained the quota of H Coin.\n\nAfter 0:00 on January 28, 2023, if you sell H Coin to get HDO or buy a card to invest in A10, you will no longer get a 5% reward.\n\nThe farm has detailed records and channels for depositing funds in fiat currency for HDO transfers to FMV account reports, currency refunds, and legal currency deposits after January 1, 2023. If you deposit through farm currency, there is a 5% reward.\n\nhttp (accessed March 24, 2024).<sup>9</sup> As shown in the foregoing, at the time,\n\nwhich was after the Government had executed the seizure warrants described in the Indictment\n\nand shortly before the defendants' arrests, the defendants were also promoting a GETTR Coin\n\n<sup>9</sup> Days ago, the Government preserved a copy of this article (and others) and produced a copy to the defendants. This article (and others) are now no longer available on G News.\n\nalong with other schemes.\n\nThe A10 scam—varying only as to its particular fraudulent details, but consistent in its promise of extremely high returns and a need to act fast—are admissible as direct evidence of the charges in the Indictment. Indeed, as shown above, the A10 Project is directly connected to earlier and ongoing schemes—with references to the \"original GTV investor,\" the Farms (i.e., the New Fedreal State of China) facilitating investment, the \"GClubs card,\" and HDO and H Coin—and constitutes admissible evidence as to each count charged in the Indictment. As reflected in the descriptions of recorded conversations about the money sent to Crane, *see supra* 5-8, once the defendants received victim money, they would repeatedly change and misrepresent how the victim funds were supposed to be used or invested. Were there any doubt that the defendants' myriad scams are connected, the Government expects that victim witnesses will testify they were defrauded across multiple of the defendants' investment \"projects.\" And there can be no serious dispute that interconnected scams such as the A10 Project are admissible evidence of the charged conspiracy, which includes racketeering, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering offenses. *See Diaz*, 176 F.3d at 79 (\"[a]n act that is alleged to have been done in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy\" is considered \"part of the very act charged.\"); *Thai*, 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that \"uncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself\").\n\n# 2. Evidence of the Defendant's False Promise to Donate \\$100 Million to the Rule of Law Charities Is Admissible\n\nThe charged racketeering conspiracy consisted of a series of interlocking frauds. Each one fed into the next, and all of them depended on Kwok's false promises. In November 2018, Kwok falsely represented that he would be donating \\$100 million to the Rule of Law organizations, a pair of nonprofits that Kwok established soon after making this false promise.<sup>10</sup> In truth, Kwok never donated \\$100 million to the Rule of Law charities. Indeed, Kwok instead began using those purported charities for his own purposes, including using funds donated to the charities by his followers to pay his family office entity monthly rent and to pay protestors involved in harassing his critics.\n\nKwok's lie regarding the Rule of Law entities is admissible as direct evidence of the charged offenses. As a general matter, the evidence relating to the Rule of Law entities is inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the charged offenses. For example, victim investors in GTV and subsequent fraudulent investment \"projects\" were required to donate to the Rule of Law entities as a prerequisite to be eligible to invest. *See* Indictment ¶ 9(b) (\"KWOK used the nonprofit organizations to amass followers who were aligned with his purported campaign against the Chinese Communist Party and who were also inclined to believe KWOK's statements regarding investment and money-making opportunities\"). As another example, the personnel at the Rule of Law entities overlapped with the personnel working at the other companies in the Kwok Enterprise, and many of these entities all shared a common workspace. Finally, the time period of the Rule of Law entities' operation, beginning in late 2018, overlaps entirely with the time period of the charged racketeering, fraud, and money laundering offenses.\n\nWith respect to the GTV Private Placement, the Farm Loan Program, G|CLUBS, and the Himalaya Exchange, Kwok's supposed \\$100 million donation lent the false impression that he was capable of *self*-funding his movement and that the investment opportunities were nothing but a\n\n<sup>10</sup> *See, e.g.*, Cezary Podkul & Brian Spegele, *Steve Bannon, Chinese Critic Create Fund to Investigate Beijing*, Wall St. J. (Nov. 20, 2018), http (reporting that \"Guo said he would provide the [\\$100 million] funding for the so-called 'Rule of Law Fund'\").\n\ngenerous benefit being offered by Kwok to his followers; it supplied false reassurance to investors that he would have no inclination to steal their money. In other words, evidence about Kwok's \\$100-million-donation misrepresentation is admissible \"because [the] schemes were connected\": Kwok \"used his [Rule of Law donors] as a source of [future investments], and used the connections\" to the nonprofits he falsely claimed to generously finance \"to burnish his reputation for respectability so as to recruit and reassure potential investors.\" *United States v. Hsu*, 669 F.3d 112, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2012) (evidence of prior uncharged Ponzi scheme admissible as direct evidence of later campaign finance fraud); *see also Baez*, 349 F.3d at 93 (\"uncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of the [racketeering] conspiracy itself\"); *Diaz*, 176 F.3d at 79 (an act \"done in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy\" is considered \"part of the very act charged\"); *United States v. Inserra*, 34 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1994) (\"[E]vidence of other bad acts may be admitted to provide the jury with the complete story of the crimes charged by demonstrating the context of certain events relevant to the charged offense.\").\n\nAlternatively, Kwok's lie is admissible under Rule 404(b) to show his intent, knowledge, lack of accident, and motive. Kwok's bald-faced lie about donating a large sum of money to his charities while soliciting donations to those charities shows that Kwok's subsequent lies to investors to obtain their money were done with knowledge and intent, not negligently or by mistake. Moreover, Kwok's false announcement of his supposed donation came just one month after Hong Kong authorities froze his assets, and is admissible evidence of Kwok's motive to raise funds by deception, as further described below. *See United States v. Romero-Padilla*, 583 F.3d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming the admission of other crimes evidence as direct evidence where it shed light on the defendant's motivation to participate in the charged crimes).\n\n3. Evidence that Kwok's Assets Were Seized Prior to His Fundraising Is Admissible\n\nThe fact that, according to Kwok's own statements, Kwok's assets were seized by Chinese and Hong Kong authorities prior to his fundraising—beginning with Rule of Law and continuing with the G entities—is admissible. The fact of these seizures is admissible \"to provide the jury with the complete story of the crimes charged by demonstrating the context of certain events relevant to the charged offense.\" *Inserra*, 34 F.3d at 89. While Kwok portrayed himself to investors as a billionaire with seemingly limitless assets, in reality, his assets were being seized by Hong Kong and Chinese authorities since 2017, just prior to the start of the charged conspiracy. Particularly striking is the proximity between the freezing of Kwok's assets in Hong Kong and the start of Kwok's fundraising efforts. On October 23, 2018, Hong Kong issued restraining orders for the assets of Kwok, his son, and their associates and shell companies. The very next month, Kwok announced the launch of the Rule of Law entities (and made his spurious promise of a \\$100 million donation, described *supra*) and soon began soliciting donations. Accordingly, the fact of these seizures is admissible to provide background to, and complete the story of, the crimes charged.\n\nAlternatively, the fact that Kwok's assets were seized is admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b). The seizure of Kwok's assets is powerful evidence of motive—obtaining other people's money for Kwok's own use. This evidence is also admissible to show absence of mistake, knowledge, and intent. Kwok did not mistakenly use other people's money for his own personal enrichment; he did so because his money was being seized.\n\nTo be clear, the Government does not intend to introduce in its case-in-chief any evidence regarding what underlies the asset seizures, such as proving up the conduct that violated money laundering statutes in Hong Kong and led to the seizure order. The Government simply intends\n\nto prove that Kwok's assets were seized before he started raising money from his followers. And proving the fact of these seizures will be straightforward, as Kwok has described them himself many time—including under oath in his February 2022 affidavit declaring bankruptcy. *See In re Kwok*, No. 22-50073 (JAM), Dkt. 107 ¶ 17 & n.8 (incorporating by citation an October 23, 2018 Hong Kong restraining order and stating that \"[s]ince 2017, the CCP has also frozen and seized family assets and purported assets in China and Hong Kong, making it impossible for me even to maintain a bank account\"). To the extent there is any risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant by the introduction of the fact of the seizures or the Hong Kong seizure order itself, the Court can cure any such prejudice by issuing a limiting instruction.\n\n### 4. Post-Arrest Conduct Is Admissible with a Limiting Instruction\n\nThe Government intends to offer evidence that the defendants continued to direct the affairs of the Kwok Enterprise following their arrests and detention. These facts are direct evidence of the defendants' roles in the Kwok Enteprise, their control of the Kwok Enterprise, their knowledge of the activities of the Kwok Enterprise, their willful continuation of the Kwok Enterprise's schemes, and, through attempts at concealment, their consciousness of guilt.\n\nFirst, the Government intends to offer into evidence recorded jail calls made by Kwok following his arrest. By way of example11:\n\n- Following Kwok's detention, Kwok, from jail, called into online broadcasts with his supporters. In such a broadcast, Kwok declared that Qidong Xia, a/k/a Changdao, a/k/a \"Long Island David,\" a/k/a \"Long Island Brother,\" a/k/a \"Viagra Brother,\" is the new leader of the Himalaya Alliance.\n- In a jail call on March 21, 2023, Qidong updated Kwok on the Kwok's Enterprise businesses, explaining, in sum and substance, that the CEOs of the Himalaya Alliance are all in Abu Dhabi with some financial difficulties but Qidong and others are helping\n\n<sup>11</sup> The following summaries are based on English summaries of Kwok's Mandarin calls; certified translations are being prepared.\n\nthem as much as possible. Kwok instructs Qidong, in sum and substance, to help them with maximum effort but do not allow the CEOs to leave Abu Dhabi and to keep the operation well run.\n\n- In a March 29, 2023 jail call, Kwok, in sum and substance, instructed his team to follow Qidong's lead unconditionally; after asking about H Coin and G Fashion, Kwok told his team to follow the original without any delays. When Qidong mentioned a certain individual, Kwok cut off Qidong and cautioned him not to say anything or the name of the company that individual works for.\n- In a March 30, 2023 jail call with Qidong, Kwok told Qidong, in sum and substance, (1) that Kwok was arrested because the U.S. Government did not want him to testify in the trial of Prakazrel Michel, and (2) the value of a purported contract Kwok was going to sign on March 17, which would have surely been a value of \\$5 trillion that has disappeared for comrades. In the same call, Kwok and Qidong agreed not to talk about that \"Complex\"—which appears to be a reference to Mahwah Mansion. Kwok and Qidong continued to discuss the work of the Kwok Enterprise, with Kwok giving priorities and instructions, including (1) license, (2) payment system, (3) \"third party,\" and (4) \"Euro.\"\n- In a March 31, 2023 call, Kwok instructed several Alliance members, in sum and substance, that the [investment] projects, big or small, must not stop and continue as they should, despite the funding needs to be controlled temporarily.\n- In an April 28, 2023 call with a supporter connected to G Fashion, Kwok, in sum and substance, instructed the individual not to say anything about the company as the call is monitored, and subsequently asked the supporter to pass his words around: this supporter has the final say in operations but must follow the NFSC's decision and financial directives.\n\nIn addition to having calls directly with their agents, the Government intends to offer\n\nevidence at trial showing that, while detained and while their calls are recorded by the MDC, the defendants have been having attorney meetings with a co-conspirator who is a licensed attorney and who is not counsel of record in the criminal case—and using that attorney to ferry messages between the defendants and the Kwok Enterprise. Similarly, the Government intends to offer recorded conversations with individuals within the Kwok Enterprise demonstrating that Wang while in custody, following her arrest in this case—used her prior counsel to ferry her request to retrieve bank checks consisting of millions of dollars of G|CLUBS funds, *i.e.*, fraud proceeds, that were in a postal box in New York City.\n\nThe foregoing is admissible as direct evidence. Indeed, it is powerful evidence of willful violations of U.S. criminal laws. For context, the evidence at trial, including witness testimony, will show how the defendats began moving the operations of the Kwok Enterprise to Abu Dhabi in advance of their arrests. In broadcasts, Kwok described this as an effort to avoid the \"long arm jurisdiction of the United States.\" *See* Dkt. 7 at 19 (citing gnews.org/articles/949854); *see also* Indictment ¶¶ 21, 57-58 (charging obstruction of justice for Je's attempt to transfer funds to Abu Dhabi to obstruct the Government's seizures). Kwok's and Wang's continued control of the Kwok Enterprise even while detained, and their attempt to obtain and conceal the proceeds of their frauds even while detained, is powerful evidence of a lack of good faith, willfulness, and fraudulent intent. That is, even after the defendants were in jail for their conduct related to the G entities, they attemped to secure the fraudulent proceeds of the G entities and instructed their agents to continue the schemes unabated. Moreover, the fact that the defendants used attorneys to facilitate *and conceal* their control and the continuation of their crimes (because *attorney* communications are not subject to monitoring by the MDC) is further evidence of willfulness and consciousness of guilt.\n\nAdmission of evidence showing—through the defendants' own words or the words of their agents—that the defendants continued to control and operate the Kwok Enterprise's schemes from the MDC is not barred by Rule 403. To start, the probative value of post-arrest evidence is extremely high. This evidence goes directly to the defendant's fraudulent intent and lack of good faith—the central disputed issue at trial. That probative value is not \"substantially outweighed\" by a risk of \"unfair prejudice.\" Fed. R. Evid. 403. Indeed, there is nothing *unfairly* prejudicial about introducing the defendnats' own words and actions that were undertaken with full notice of the Government's case and, with respect jail calls, of the fact that their words were being recorded. Nor is this evidence any more sensational than the evidence that will indisputably come before the jury: that the defendants perpetrated a massive con, tricking thosaunds of people out of more than a billion dollars, enriching themselves while leading a lavish lifestyle of yachts, mansions, and other luxuries, and generally operating their scheme in contempt of the law—seeking to evade the enforcement of fraud, money laundering, and bankruptcy laws, and intimidating and harassing their victims in an attempt to silence them. In any event, to the extent that there is any risk of *unfair* prejudice from otherwise highly probative evidence, the Court may provide a limiting instruction as to the fact that the defendants were detained, as is customary when, for example, a defendant's admissions in jail calls are offered into evidence. *See United States v. Tussa*, 816 F.2d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1987) (limiting instruction sufficient to preclude prejudice); *see generally United States v. Snype*, 441 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (\"[T]he law recognizes a strong presumption that juries follow limiting instructions.\"); *see, e.g.*, *United States v. Russo*, 302 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2002) (admitting defendant's recorded prison calls as party opponent admissions); *United States v. Donovan*, 577 F. Supp. 3d 107, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (\"Courts frequently allow the government to introduce statements by defendants made during recorded jail phone calls.\").\n\n#### 5. Evidence from Kwok's Bankruptcy Is Admissible\n\nEvidence relating to Kwok's ongoing bankruptcy case captioned *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.) and the related adversary proceedings (collectively, the \"Kwok Bankruptcy Cases\"), and the events leading up to Kwok's February 15, 2022 bankruptcy filing, are admissible as direct evidence of the charged offenses.\n\nAs Kwok has argued twice now, the criminal charges in this case \"overlap in many ways with the issues in the [Kwok] Bankruptcy Cases.\" Dkt. 131 at 17; *see also* Dkt. 219 at 4. The Court found insufficient overlap between the bankruptcy and criminal cases to support a stay of the Kwok Bankruptcy Cases, given that the criminal case concerns \"questions of criminal liability\" and distinct legal issues such as \"Kwok's intent and the materiality of his conduct,\" while the Kwok Bankruptcy Cases seek \"to identify properties to compensate Kwok's creditors.\" Dkt. 204 (Stay Order) at 7-9; Dkt. 250 (Second Stay Order) at 2, 6-7. However, the Court acknowledged that \"some overlap between the proceedings exists,\" and noted that the fact of Kwok's filing for bankruptcy is mentioned in the indictment \"in the context of providing examples of Kwok's alleged means of concealing funds within the 'Kwok Enterprise'\", *i.e.*, as a means and method of the charged RICO conspiracy. Stay Order at 6-7.\n\nThe Kwok Bankruptcy Cases, and the events leading up to Kwok's filing for bankruptcy, are inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offenses and are necessary to complete the story of the crimes at issue in the upcoming trial. *Carboni*, 204 F.3d at 44. Details of the Kwok Bankruptcy Cases also help to explain the circumstances surrounding Kwok's fraudulent conduct and explain the intent with which Kwok performed certain acts. *Coonan*, 938 F.2d at 1561.\n\nIn 2017—years after Kwok's arrival in the United States, and just one year before Kwok founded the Rule of Law entities—the investment fund Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\") filed a civil lawsuit against Kwok in New York Superior Court, seeking the repayment of approximately \\$88 million for an overdue loan that Kwok had personally guaranteed. On or about February 3, 2021, PAX secured a judgment against Kwok in the amount of approximately \\$116,402,000. *See* PAX Lawsuit, No. 652077/2017, Dkt. 716. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2018) (Ostrager, J.). After PAX secured its judgment, it undertook efforts to enforce the judgment by identifying and then attempting to levy upon Kwok's assets in the United States. However, \"PAX encountered difficulty identifying assets over which Kwok exercised control because Kwok, who is a self-declared multi-billionaire, had secreted his assets in a maze of corporate entities and with family members.\" PAX Lawsuit, Index 652077/2017, Dkt. 1181, at 7- 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022). One such asset was a yacht called the Lady May, which Kwok and his associates had arranged to sail from New York to Florida, and then to the Bahamas, in late 2020. On or about March 16, 2021, Justice Barry Ostrager issued a conditional order of civil contempt, which directed that if Kwok failed to return the Lady May to the jurisdiction of the New York Superior Court by May 31, 2021, he would be subject to a \\$500,000 fine for each day that the Lady May remained outside the jurisdiction. After a year of Kwok hiding his assets and failing to pay PAX as ordered, on February 9, 2022, Judge Ostrager entered a final Order of Civil Contempt against Kwok for his \"efforts to avoid and deceive his creditors by parking his substantial personal assets with a series of corporations, trusted confidants, and family members.\" PAX Lawsuit, Index 652077/2017, Dkt. 1181, at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022). The total judgment of \\$254 million included \\$134 million in contempt fees, arising from what Judge Ostrager described as Kwok's \"shell game\" to shield his assets from PAX. The February 9, 2022 decision and contempt order directed Kwok to pay the \\$134 million contempt fine to PAX within five days, or he would face contempt sanctions. *See id.*, Dkt. 1183, at 2.\n\nSix days later, on February 15, 2022, Kwok filed for bankruptcy. In his initial filings, Kwok claimed to have as much as \\$500 million in debt and, despite living in expensive properties, surrounded by luxury cars and lavishly expensive furniture, claimed to have no more than \\$100,000 in assets. *See In Re Ho Wan Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM). But in the years leading up to Kwok's bankruptcy filing, Kwok made representations to his victims about his personal wealth in furtherance of the charged fraud offenses to induce them to send him money. Those representations included, among others, that Kwok would fund the Rule of Law entities with \\$100 million of his own money, and that Kwok personally guaranteed investors against any losses resulting from their investments in his various fraudulent ventures (including GTV).\n\nIn bankruptcy court filings, Kwok also has represented that specified assets—including the Lady May—were not his, but rather were properties belonging to family members, shell companies, and other financial entities. On April 19, 2022, HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC (the entity owned by Kwok's daughter, Mei Guo, that formally owned the Lady May) entered into a \"loan agreement\" with co-defendant Kin Ming Je's Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd., pursuant to which HK USA \"borrowed\" \\$37 million (*i.e.*, the value of the Lady May) to \"be used as security for the court in relation to the Yacht\" until \"the yacht is returned to the U.S.A.\" *In re Ho Wan Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Dkt. 36 Ex. 79 at 3, 5. By side letter dated April 29, 2022, the parties amended the \"loan\" to become a personal guarantee, rather than a loan secured against the Lady May; the consideration for that side letter amendment was £1. *Id.* at Dkt. 36 Ex. 80. Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd. is one of the entities that is part of the Kwok Enterprise, *see* Indictment ¶ 3(a), and the Government seized approximately \\$318,000 in Himalaya Exchange fraud proceeds from bank accounts held in the name of that entity between in or about October 2022 and March 2023. *Id.* ¶¶ 59(16), (19). Business records the Government has collected during this investigation and will introduce as evidence at trial include emails relating to this \\$37 million transaction; specifically, Je's request to transfer the \\$37 million (in Himalaya Exchange fraud proceeds) from his Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd. account to an escrow account in the name of a particular law firm. The Government's evidence also includes encrypted communications between defendant Yanping Wang and Mei Guo that were recovered from one of Wang's devices, which show Wang coaching\n\nMei Guo on how to claim (falsely) to attorneys that the Lady May in fact belonged to her, not to Kwok—a perjurious claim that Mei Guo later repeated under oath during her testimony in the Kwok Bankruptcy Cases. *See* Dkt. 255 (Gov't Letter re: Discovery and Scheduling) at 11, Exs. D-G. Indeed, Kwok filmed many of the broadcasts where he promoted the fraudulent investment opportunities from the deck or interior of the Lady May—reinforcing, for his followers and potential investors, his own wealth.\n\nKwok has also engaged in obstructive behavior in connection with the Kwok Bankruptcy Cases that mirrors his obstruction in this criminal case—including directing protests against victims who have complained about his fraudulent conduct or requested refunds of their investments and evidence tampering. *See, e.g.*, Dkt. 255 at 8-9; Dkt. 51 at 9. That obstruction includes defying court orders and directing his followers and supporters, including members of the NFSC, to harass, threaten, and engage in violence against the trustee of the Kwok Bankruptcy Cases, the trustee's employer, and the trustee's family members and their employers. *Id.* at 9-11. Kwok supporters and NFSC members have also tampered with the Mahwah Mansion postindictment in an apparent effort to suit Kwok's defense narrative (unsupported by the evidence) that the Mahwah Mansion was purchased not as Kwok's own residence, but as a type of clubhouse for the NFSC and G|CLUBS members. *See* Dkt. 148 (Gov't Letter re: Bankr. Stay) at 4-5; *see also* Dkt. 131 (Kwok Mem. in Support of Mot. to Stay Bankr.) at 20 (claiming that the Mahwah Mansion was purchased as \"a covert headquarters for use by\" Kwok's supporters \"and in furtherance of the business of GTV.\").\n\nThe circumstances leading to Kwok's bankruptcy filing, and the details of the Kwok Bankruptcy Cases and actions Kwok and his followers have taken in connection with those cases, are admissible as direct evidence of the charged offenses, including the RICO conspiracy and the conspiracy to launder the fraudulent proceeds. Evidence relating to the Kwok Bankruptcy Cases also provides background for the existence of the charged Kwok Enterprise and explains the intent with which certain acts were performed—including, for example, Je's transfer of \\$37 million in Himalaya Exchange fraud proceeds to Kwok's daughter to avoid Kwok's being assessed substantial civil penalties for his obstructive conduct in transferring the Lady May outside the jurisdiction of the New York Superior Court. There can be no serious dispute that evidence relating to the Kwok Bankruptcy Cases and the events leading up to Kwok's bankruptcy filing are admissible evidence of the charged conspiracy, which include racketeering, wire fraud, bank fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering offenses.\n\n#### **III. The Court Should Admit Certain Evidence Regarding the GTV Private Placement**\n\nOne of the Government's witnesses (\"Witness-1\") is expected to testify about conversations he had with Kwok, Wang, and Je regarding the GTV Private Placement and, in particular, legal risks associated with pooling non-accredited investors' funds. As set forth in greater detail below, Witness-1 was acting in a business, and not a legal, capacity at the time he had those conversations; moreover, GTV is no longer a going concern, and there is no one authorized to assert attorney-client privilege over any communications on behalf of GTV. Accordingly, the Court should admit testimony by Witness-1 regarding his conversations with Kwok, Wang, and Je regarding the GTV private placement.\n\nWitness-1 is expected to testify about conversations he had with Kwok, Wang, and Je about the GTV private placement, including the possibility of accepting money from non-accredited investors, or individuals who did not meet the threshold qualifications to participate in an unregistered private placement. At the time, Witness-1 had been appointed as a Director and the Secretary of GTV, but he did not hold a legal position at GTV, nor did Witness-1 have an attorneyclient relationship with Kwok, Wang, or Je relating to the subject matter of GTV.12 Further, Kwok and Je did not have any formal association with GTV.\n\nIn or about July 2023, former GTV Director Aaron Mitchell testified in the Kwok Bankruptcy Cases in his capacity as a former attorney for GTV and Saraca. Mitchell testified, in sum and substance: \"I believe I still represent GTV and Saraca in a couple of cases.\" *In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.), Adv. Proc. No. 22-5003, A. Mitchell Testimony July 18, 2023, Tr. at 29. Mitchell further testified that when he worked for GTV and Saraca, he would speak with Witness-1 and Wang; that he resigned from GTV and Saraca in April 2023; that \"over the last year or so [*i.e.*, from in or about mid-2022 through mid-2023], there's been no one to speak to. I was the director, so there was no one to speak to. There was no one else there\"; and that he was \"not . . . aware of anyone\" who was working at Saraca and GTV since in or about December 2022. *Id.* at 34-35. Mitchell also testified that GTV \"stop[ped] operating . . . several years\" before his July 18, 2023 testimony in the Kwok Bankruptcy Cases. *Id.* at 56. Specifically, Mitchell testified that, \"[p]rior to the settlement with the SEC, the company was no longer operational. The employees had all left. The website had shut down. And then after that it was really just trying to work with the SEC to get the money back to the investors.\" *Id.* at 55-56.\n\nAs described above, Witness-1 was not acting as a lawyer for GTV, so any conversations Witness-1 had regarding GTV were not protected by any attorney-client privilege. However, even\n\n<sup>12</sup> Witness-1 was the General Counsel of Golden Spring (New York) Ltd., one of the Kwok family offices, from in or about June 2018 through September 2020, at which point Witness-1 transitioned into a business role. As General Counsel of Golden Spring, Witness-1 was primarily responsible for coordinating with other attorneys regarding Kwok's various civil litigations. During a telephonic meeting of bankruptcy creditors, Kwok stated that Witness-1 \"used to be Golden Spring attorney and my personal attorney.\" *See In re Ho Wan Kwok*, Dkt. 876-1 at 12, Ex. 4.\n\nif Witness-1 had been acting in a legal capacity (which he was not), any privilege terminated when GTV's operations ended. For organizations, the general rule is that when the organization ceases to have legal existence such that no one can act in its behalf, the attorney-client privilege terminates. *See Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Carillo Huetell LLP*, No. 13 Civ. 1735(GBD)(JCF), 2015 WL 1610282, at \\*2-\\*3 (S.D.N.Y. April 8, 2015) (privilege does not survive dissolution of corporation); *TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Inc.*, No. 07-1141, 2009 WL 3255297, at \\*2 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2009) (\"Absent some compelling reason to the contrary, the attorney client privilege does not survive the death of the corporation.\"); *Lewis v. United States*, No. 02-2958 B/AN, 2004 WL 3203121, at \\*4 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 7, 2004) (same); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. k (2000); 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5499 (1st ed. West 2019). *See also Lopes v. Vieira*, 688 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1068- 69 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (former attorney of corporate entity that, although formally still active and in good standing with Secretary of State, had effectively ceased to function did not have authority to assert entity's attorney-client privilege). *Cf. Official Comm. of Admin. Claimants v. Moran*, 802 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949-50 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (stating that courts should look to \"practical business realities\" rather than technical legal status in determining whether a corporation has \"died\" for purposes of asserting attorney-client privilege and concluding that plaintiff corporation could assert privilege because it had continued to pursue claim against defendant after it had entered bankruptcy and thus was never entirely defunct).\n\nHere, Witness-1 had conversations with Kwok, Wang, and Je relating to the GTV Private Placement. To the extent GTV sought to assert attorney-client privilege over those conversations, GTV would need to be a going concern with an employee or representative who is authorized to\n\nassert such privilege. No such individual exists here. According to Mitchell's testimony, GTV ceased to exist as of in or about 2020. Witness-1 is expected to testify that he never held any legal role vis-à-vis GTV (including when he participated in the conversations in question) and that he never signed any agreement relating to, or was compensated for, his apparent appointment as Director and Secretary of GTV. Moreover, neither Kwok nor Je held formal positions at GTV that would place them within the protection of any corporate attorney-client privilege—if it even existed. Accordingly, the Court should admit Witness-1's testimony regarding conversations with Kwok, Je, and Wang regarding the terms of the GTV Private Placement.\n\n#### **IV. The Court Should Permit the Authentication of Certain Records Under Rule 902(11)**\n\nTo the extent the defendants do not agree to the authentication of routine business records by stipulation, the Government intends to authenticate certain records that were created and maintained in the regular course of business by certain third parties pursuant to certifications that comply with Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11).\n\nRecords of regularly conducted activity that meet the necessary conditions to qualify under the hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) may be authenticated, among other methods, by a certification that complies with Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11) for records stored domestically. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(D). \"Rule 902(11) extends Rule 803(6) by allowing a written foundation in lieu of an oral one.\" *United States v. Rom*, 528 F. App'x 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2013); *see also United States v. Ayelotan*, 917 F.3d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 2019) (\"Records are self-authenticating if they include a custodian certification that the records 'meet[] the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C).'\"). Specifically, Rule 902(11) provides, in relevant part, that \"[t]he original or a copy of a domestic record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), as shown by a certification of the custodian or another qualified person\" is self-authenticating and requires no extrinsic evidence of authenticity to be admitted. Prior to trial, \"the proponent must give an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record—and must make the record and certification available for inspection—so that the party has a fair opportunity to challenge them.\" *Id.* Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3505 provides that a \"foreign record of regularly conducted activity, or a copy of such record, shall not be excluded as evidence by the hearsay rule if a foreign certification attests that\" the record meets the elements of Rule 803(6). *See also United States v. Qualls*, 613 F. App'x 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming admission of foreign records accompanied by certification of authenticity); *United States v. Miller*, No. 18 Cr. 202 (ARR), 2018 WL 4961458, at \\*3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2018) (\"The language of § 3505 'tracks quite closely to the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)' and 'should be interpreted in the same manner as the comparable language in Rule 803(6) is interpreted.'\").<sup>13</sup>\n\nA record of regularly conducted activity meets the necessary conditions to qualify as a business record under Rule 803(6) when (1) \"the record was made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted by—someone with knowledge,\" (2) \"the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business,\" and (3) \"making the record was a regular practice of that activity.\" Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). \"A business record may include data stored electronically on computers and later printed out for presentation in court, so long as the original computer data compilation was prepared pursuant to a business duty in accordance with regular business practice.\" *Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage Corp*., 38 F.3d 627, 632 (2d Cir. 1994).\n\nThe Government expects to offer into evidence certain records that were created and\n\n<sup>13</sup> \"[A] custodian's certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11) is not testimonial,\" and therefore use of such certifications to authenticate business records does not violate the Confrontation Clause. *United States v. Weigand*, No. 20 Cr. 188 (JSR), 2021 WL 568173, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2021).\n\nmaintained in the regular course of business by certain third parties, including: bank records, bank transaction information, IP logs, call detail records, subscriber information, emails from search warrant returns, and business records, which have been provided to the Government either pursuant to subpoenas or voluntarily. The Government has generally produced the relevant certifications for these records in discovery in this case and is unaware of any basis to challenge their status as business records; for any records for which the certification has not yet been produced, the Government will produce the relevant certification in advance of trial. In the event that no stipulations as to authenticity are reached, such evidence may be authenticated through a certificate under Rule 902(11) for domestic records under Rule 803(6), and 18 U.S.C. § 3505 for foreign records.\n\n#### **V. The Court Should Admit Bank Records From First Abu Dhabi Bank**\n\n#### 1. Background\n\nThe Government intends to offer at trial a series of bank records, emails, and documents, from First Abu Dhabi Bank, which is a bank in the United Arab Emirates, pertaining to an account held in the name of \"ACA Capital Group Ltd.\" (the \"ACA Bank Account\"). The ACA Bank Account is an account that was opened by co-defendant Kin Ming Je, a/k/a William Je. As further described below, ACA Bank Account records demonstrate misappropriation of victim funds and are significantly probative evidence that shows the existence of the Kwok Enterprise, the defendants' intent to defraud, and money laundering. These records are substantially important to the Government's case and are appropriately admissible under the circumstances.\n\nThe Government obtained the ACA Bank Account records from the Securities and Exchange Commission (\"SEC\"). As explained in Exhibit A, which is a sworn declaration from Marlee Miller who is the Senior Special Counsel in Securities and Exchange Commission's Office of International Affairs, the SEC obtained the ACA Bank Account records pursuant to the International Organization of Securities Commissions (\"IOSCO\") Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning (\"MMoU\"). Ex. A ¶ 6. The MMoU represents an understanding among signatories, which include the SEC and the Securities and Commodities Authority of the United Arab Emirates (\"SCA\"). *Id*. Under the MMoU, if the SCA is able to assist the SEC with a records request, the SCA will use its own domestic procedures to obtain requested documents and transmit them to the SEC. *See* Ex. A ¶ 5.\n\n#### 2. Applicable Law\n\nFederal Rule of Evidence 807 authorizes the admission of a hearsay statement of an unavailable witness when the statement is \"not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804,\" but has \"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.\" This residual exception constitutes a generally applicable basis for the admission of an out-of-court statement when a court finds, on a case-by-case basis, that the statement is sufficiently reliable and meets the other requirements of the rule. *See Idaho v. Wright*, 497 U.S. 805 (1990). Rule 807 permits admission of hearsay if: (i) it is particularly trustworthy; (ii) it bears on a material fact; (iii) it is the most probative evidence addressing that fact that can be obtained through reasonable efforts; (iv) its admission is consistent with the rules of evidence and advances the interest of justice; and (v) its proffer follows adequate notice to the adverse party. *See United States v. Bryce*, 208 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1999). Examining these factors in turn:\n\n#### 3. Discussion\n\n### **a.** *The ACA Bank Account Records are Trustworthy*\n\nThe \"determination of whether a document is sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Rule 807 is a highly fact-specific inquiry.\" *United States v. Turner*, 718 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2013). Courts are instructed to \"view the evidence in context,\" *Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc.*, 189 F.3d 218, 236 (2d Cir. 1999), including by evaluating the process by which the records were obtained, as well as the content and appearance of the records themselves, *see United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd.*, 319 F.R.D. 459, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).\n\nFirst, and as detailed in the accompanying sworn declaration, the ACA Bank Account records were obtained pursuant to a reliable and routine process. Consistent with the procedures of the MMoU, on February 23, 2021 and March 14, 2022, the SEC requested from the SCA, bank records held in the name of ACA Capital Group Limited (\"ACA\").14 *Id*. ¶ 6. On May 23, 2021, June 20, 2021, and May 20, 2022, the SEC received via email the SCA's production in response the request. This procedure was \"consistent with the routine practice for transmitting foreign bank records responsive to requests under the [ ] MMoU.\" Ex. A ¶ 10. That is, the records were obtained in an ordinary manner that is indicative of trustworthiness: one government financial regulator obtained records from another government financial regulator pursuant to an international agreement. *See* Ex. A ¶ 10 (ACA Bank Account records were provided \"in a manner consistent with the routine practice for transmitting foreign bank records responsive to requests under the IOSCO MMoU\"). Indeed, courts have admitted records under Rule 807 that were obtained in a manner that is far less trustworthy than the ordinary procedure in this case. *See Prevezon*, 319 F.R.D. at 465 (admitting bank records obtained under \"unique circumstances\" by an individual who took \"efforts photographing the contents of [a Russian criminal case file containing the records] in a Russian courthouse under the supervision of court staff over the course of several days\"). And while the SEC requested a certification statement, and did not obtain one\n\n<sup>14</sup> As alleged in the Indictment, ACA Capital Group Ltd. is a part of the Kwok Enterprise.\n\nfrom the SCA, the SEC reviewed the ACA Bank Account records and confirmed \"[t]hese documents are the records of the ACA Account provided by the SCA to OIA [*i.e.* Office of International Affairs of the SEC].\"15\n\nSecond, a review of the appearance of the ACA Bank Account records demonstrates their trustworthiness. The ACA Bank Account records are visually unremarkable. They appear to be bank records, and they bear the insignia of First Abu Dhabi Bank. \"While these facts standing alone are not dispositive, they nevertheless bear favorably on trustworthiness. [This is because b]ank records 'provide circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness because' [as] they are relied on by 'banks and their customers [for] their accuracy in the course of [ ] business.'\" *Prevezon Holdings, Ltd.*, 319 F.R.D. at 467 (quoting *United States v. Pelullo*, 964 F.2d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 1992)). Here, the bank records, selections of which are provided in Exhibit F, appear authentic and include documents one would expect a bank to maintain: account opening documentation, signature pages, and excel files containing transactional information.16 *See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger*, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (admitting bank records pursuant to Rule 807 and observing the records \"appear in the exact manner that one would expect\").\n\nThird, an analysis of the content of the ACA Bank Account records demonstrates that the information in those records is authentic and reliable. This is because the transactional information in the ACA Bank Account records is corroborated by *other* business records. By way of example, and as merely a sample, the Government identified twelve transactions that appear in the ACA\n\n<sup>15</sup> Any suggestion by the defendants that the UAE financial regulator has some ulterior motive that might taint the production of the records would be no more than speculation. Indeed, Kwok and his co-conspirators have used the UAE as a trusted safe haven. Je has been hiding in the UAE since this case was unsealed. Moreover, Kwok has conceded that he was a Emirati citizen.\n\n<sup>16</sup> The SCA declined to provide bank statements.\n\nBank Account records and are corroborated by other sources, as set forth in greater detail below.\n\n| October 20 and October 22, 2022 transfers to \"Greenwich Land\" | i. |  |  |  |  |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------|----|--|--|--|--|\n|---------------------------------------------------------------|----|--|--|--|--|\n\n| VAL.DATE  | TRANS.REF.NO | DESCRIPTION    | AMOUNT        | Beneficiary Details                           | Account number | Bank Name      | PAYMENT.DETAILS                                                               |\n|-----------|--------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| 20 OCT 20 | FT2029470010 | Telex Transfer | -1,000,000.00 | WESTERN UNION BUSINESS<br>SOLUTIONS           | 8901309192     | SW-IRVTUS3NXXX | /RFB/Bank of Princeton BP1701 FFC Greenwich<br>Land Account 350000199         |\n| 22 OCT 20 | FT2029670009 | Telex Transfer | -4,000,000.00 | WESTERN UNION BUSINESS<br>SOLUTIONS (USA) LLC | 8901309192     | SW-IRVTUS3NXXX | /RFB/Bank of Princeton (BP1701G) Greenwich Land<br>LLC / Account: 3500000199. |\n\n The ACA Bank Account records excel file (pictured above) indicates that on October 20, 2020 and October 22, 2020, \\$1 million and \\$4 million, respectively, was transferred, via Western Union, to \"Bank of Princeton . . . Greenwich Land Account 3500000199.\"<sup>17</sup> Greenwich Land LLC is another of the Kwok Enterprise entities named in the indictment. Certified bank records from the Bank of Princeton, corroborate those two transfers, as indicated in the excerpt below:\n\n| Image: B The Bank of Princeton<br>Bank Wisely.                                    | Statement Ending 10/30/2020<br>Greenwich Land Llc Page 1 of 4<br>Account Number: 3500000199 |  |  |  |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|\n| 183 Bayard Lane, Princeton, NJ 08540<br>609.921.1700   www.thebankofprinceton.com |                                                                                             |  |  |  |\n| RETURN SERVICE REQUESTED                                                          | Managing Your Accounts                                                                      |  |  |  |\n|                                                                                   | Branch Name<br>Bayard Lane                                                                  |  |  |  |\n| GREENWICH LAND LLC                                                                | Phone Number<br>609-921-1700                                                                |  |  |  |\n| DANIEL PODHASKIE<br>667 MADISON AVE FL 4<br>NEW YORK NY 10065-8029                | Mailing Address<br>183 Bayard Lane<br>Princeton NJ 08540                                    |  |  |  |\n|                                                                                   | Website<br>www.thebankofprinceton.com                                                       |  |  |  |\n\n| Date       | Description                                  | Amount         |\n|------------|----------------------------------------------|----------------|\n| 10/15/2020 | Incoming Wire 43026324 SAVIO LAW LLC         | \\$5,000,000.00 |\n| 10/21/2020 | Incoming Wire 43122836 ACA CAPITAL GROUP LTD | \\$999,893.22   |\n| 10/23/2020 | Incoming Wire 43183595 ACA CAPITAL GROUP LTD | \\$3,999,915.00 |\n\nThe one-day difference in transaction dates between the ACA Bank Account records and the Bank of Princeton records reflect time zone differences between Princeton, New Jersey and Abu Dhabi, as well as any attendant delay from using Western Union to facilitate the transfer. Further, the fact\n\n<sup>17</sup> Due to its format, the Excel file will be provided to the Court separately as Exhibit G.\n\nthat the incoming amounts in the Bank of Princeton records were slightly below \\$1 million and \\$4 million indicate that transfer fees had been deducted—indeed, the Bank of Princeton records reflect a \\$25 \"incoming\" wire fee, with the remainder likely a Western Union fee.<sup>18</sup>\n\nii. *November 12, 2020 \"Loans\" to Saraca via \"Savio Law LLC\"*\n\n|           | <br>. | TERRENERSEN   REME TEMER TEMEER   MEN                     | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |                |                            |\n|-----------|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|\n| 12 NOV 20 |       | FT2031770021 Telex Transfer   -9.500.000.00 Savio Law LLC | 8136098162                                                                                                                                                                     | SW-PNCCUS33XXX | /RFB/Loan to Saraca Part 1 |\n| 12 NOV 20 |       | FT2031770069 Transfer   -8.500.000.00 Savio Law LLC       | 8136098162 8 8136098162                                                                                                                                                        | SW-PNCCUS33XXX | /RFB/Loan to Saraca Part 2 |\n\nThe ACA Bank Account records excel file further lists two November 12, 2020 transfers from the ACA Bank Account to a bank account in the name of \"Savio Law LLC,\" with account number 8136098162. The reference on these transfers was \"Loan to Saraca Part 1\" and \"Loan to Saraca Part 2\" (*i.e.*, Saraca Media Group, another of the Kwok Enterprise entities). Sure enough, bank records from PNC Bank reflect these transfers and thus corroborate the information in the ACA Bank Account records:\n\n<sup>18</sup> These minor differences help to corroborate the authenticity of the ACA Bank Account records because they reflect the realities of bank account transfer times, by way of a third-party, and assessment of transfer fees.\n\n**Payment Instruction**\n\n| Settlement / CCY /  | 9,500,000.00 / USD / 11-12-2020 | FX Number / Rate    |                             |\n|---------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------|\n| Debit / CCY / Date  | 9,500,000.00 / USD / 11-12-     | Credit / CCY / Date | 9,500,000.00 / USD / 11-12- |\n| Instructing Bank Id | 021000089                       | Instructed Bank Id  |                             |\n| CUSIP               |                                 | Par Amount          |                             |\n| Receiving Side      |                                 | Sending Information |                             |\n\n| <b>Debit Information</b> |                                         | <b>Beneficiary Information</b> |               |\n|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|\n| Account Type             |                                         | Account Type                   | D-DDA         |\n| Account#                 | AE870357771201996490026                 | Account#                       | 8136098162    |\n| Name                     | ACA CAPITAL GROUP LTD                   | Name                           | SAVIO LAW LLC |\n| Address                  | 49F.BANK OF CHINA<br>TOWER, NO. 1GARDEN | Address                        | 3 DALE CT     |\n\nThe ACA Bank Account is held in the name of \"ACA Capital Group Ltd.,\" which name appears in the PNC records (pictured above). Similarly, the ACA Bank Account IBAN 23-digit number matches the \"Account#\" in the PNC records. And the amounts transferred match. Indeed, the PNC records have the same reference information—\"Loan to Saraca\"—as was listed in the ACA Bank Account excel file, as pictured here:\n\nOrig to BNF Info RFB LOAN TO SARACA PART\n\n# iii. *February Transfers to Hudson Diamond NY LLC*\n\n| 02 FEB 21 | FT2103370016 | Telex Transfer | -6,000,000.00 | HUDSON DIAMOND NY LLC | 6807438 | SW-IDBYUS33XXX | /RFB/Loan to Hudson Part 1 of 3 |\n|-----------|--------------|----------------|---------------|-----------------------|---------|----------------|---------------------------------|\n| 09 FEB 21 | FT2104070016 | Telex Transfer | -6,000,000.00 | HUDSON DIAMOND NY LLC | 6807438 | SW-IDBYUS33XXX | /RFB/Loan to Hudson Part 2      |\n| 10 FEB 21 | FT2104170019 | Telex Transfer | -6,000,000.00 | HUDSON DIAMOND NY LLC | 6807438 | SW-IDBYUS33XXX | /RFB/Loan to Hudson Part 3      |\n\nFinally, the Government highlights three transfers from the ACA Bank Account to an account number ending in \"7438,\" held in the name of \"HUDSON DIAMOND NY LLC\" (*i.e.*, another of the Kwok Enterprise entities) in the amounts of \\$6 million, with reference to a \"Loan to Hudson.\" Corroborating those transfers are bank records from an IDBBANK with the same account name, an account number ending in \"7438,\" and matching transfer amounts.\n\n| Labels | Values |\\n| :--- | :--- |\\n| Account Title | HUDSON DIAMOND NY LLC |\\n| Account Number | xxxxxx7438 |\n\n| Date  | Description                                                                | Debits | Credits        | Balance         |\n|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|----------------|-----------------|\n|       | Beginning balance on 02/01                                                 |        |                | \\$0.00          |\n| 02/02 | NONREF<br>/RFB/LOAN TO HUDSON PART 1NTRF<br>ACA CAPITAL GROUP HONG KONG HK |        | \\$5.999.990.00 | \\$5.999.990.00  |\n| 02/03 | FEE REVERSAL<br>FEE REVERSAL VAL 02/02 USDNTRF<br>IDB BANK NY NEW YORK NY  |        | \\$10.00        | \\$6.000.000.00  |\n| 02/09 | NONREF<br>/RFB/LOAN TO HUDSON PART 2NTRF<br>ACA CAPITAL GROUP HONG KONG HK |        | \\$6.000.000.00 | \\$12.000.000.00 |\n| 02/10 | NONREF<br>/RFB/LOAN TO HUDSON PART 3NTRF<br>ACA CAPITAL GROUP HONG KONG HK |        | \\$6.000.000.00 | \\$18.000.000.00 |\n\nThe Government is prepared to further detail corroboration of transfers in the ACA Bank Account records to other bank records, to the extent that Court believes it is necessary to do so.\n\n## iv. Additional Corroborative Evidence\n\nFurther details in the ACA Bank Account records corroborate their trustworthiness. The ACA Bank Account records also contain biographical information of Kin Ming Je, the account holder, including his passport number (the \"Je Passport Number\"). William Je also used the Je Passport Number in connection with his attempts to open a bank account at Citibank. Indeed, Je's signature on the Citibank documents appears to match Je's signature in the ACA Bank records:\n\n| <p>By signing below, I: (1) agree to be bound by all Citibank, N.a. te<br/>Client Manual Consumer Accounts, its Marketplace Addendum a<br/>understand and acknowledge that such note(s)/agreement(s) on<br/>arbitration; and (3) unless I am opening a Personal Loan or Secu<br/>other Citibank deposit, Custom Credit Line, Ready Credit, Secur<br/>accounts.</p> <table><tr><td>Signer 1 Signature</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Signer 3 Signature</td><td></td></tr></table> | Signer 1 Signature |  | Signer 3 Signature |  | <p>ACCOUNT, IF PROVED OTHERWISE, WITHOUT ANY NOTICE TO ME/US.</p> <p><b>SECTION F: SIGNATURE(S) OF AUTHORISED PERSO</b></p> <table><tr><td>Name:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Name:</td><td></td></tr></table> | Name: |  | Name: |  |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|--|--------------------|--|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|--|-------|--|\n| Signer 1 Signature                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                    |  |                    |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |       |  |       |  |\n| Signer 3 Signature                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |                    |  |                    |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |       |  |       |  |\n| Name:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                    |  |                    |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |       |  |       |  |\n| Name:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |                    |  |                    |  |                                                                                                                                                                                                             |       |  |       |  |\n\nThese examples demonstrate that the ACA Bank Account records are trustworthy.\n\n## **b.** *The ACA Bank Account Records Bear on Material Facts and Are The Most Probative Evidence Of Those Facts*\n\nThat the ACA Bank Account records bear on material facts, and are the most probative evidence of those facts, cannot reasonably be disputed. Analysis of the ACA Bank Account records demonstrates that from August 2020 through February 2021, at least \\$130 million of Farm Loan Program proceeds were deposited into the ACA Bank Account. Once in the ACA Bank Account, the fraud proceeds were misappropriated through transfers to, for example, a bank account in the name of \"Lamp Capital,\" which is owned by Kwok's son. That Lamp Capital bank account was used to pay for yacht expenses, luxury vehicles, and a private plane, as well as to send hundreds of thousands of dollars to Kwok's daughter. Distributions from the ACA Bank Account also demonstrate \\$10 million in transfers to William Je and his wife, and a \\$1 million transfer to a company associated with Steve Bannon, a co-conspirator. Certain of these transfers of fraud proceeds can only be established using the ACA Bank Account records. That is because the ACA Bank Account was a financial hub that collected, and then directed, fraud proceeds from this Abu Dhabi bank to other foreign banks including in Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Collecting records from that many jurisdictions especially because some of those governments have enhanced bank privacy laws, such as Switzerland, is not feasible.\n\nFurther, and of significant importance, *only* the ACA Bank Account records establish that William Je, the financial architect of the Kwok Enterprise, opened this account, in Abu Dhabi, in furtherance of the conspiracy to funnel fraudulent proceeds back to Kwok, his family, Je and others. The ACA Bank Account records cannot be reasonably obtained in other ways. The United Arab Emirates provision of records pursuant to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty is irregular, at best, nor will the SCA provide a certification for the records to the SEC.\n\n### **c.** *Admitting the ACA Bank Account Records Is in the Interests of Justice*\n\nAdmitting the ACA Bank Account records advances the cause of justice. Even though the residual exception is rarely relied upon, it is appropriate where an international criminal conspiracy uses a foreign jurisdiction to try to hide their assets and thwart investigators from uncovering evidence. *See Prevezon*, 319 FRD at 467 (\"At issue in this action are bank and financial records of foreign entities that are alleged to have participated in a massive fraud spawning numerous criminal investigations into the laundering of proceeds.\"). Further, the ACA Bank Account records are relevant and not unduly prejudicial. *United States v. Hwa*, No. 18 Cr. 538 (MKB), 2022 WL 856877, at \\*5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2022) (records \"advance[ ] the interests of justice, as the [information in it is] relevant under Rule 401 and not unduly prejudicial under Rule 403\"). And admitting these records is not materially different than admitting bank records pursuant to Rule 902(11), (12) or 18 U.S.C. § 3505. For similar reasons there are no confrontation clause issues. *See United States v. Adefehinti*, 510 F.3d 319, 328 (D.C. Cir. 2007), *as amended* (Feb. 13, 2008), *judgment entered*, 264 F. App'x 16 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing *Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004)); *United States v. Qualls*, 553 F. Supp. 2d 241, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (\"In the context of traditional hearsay exceptions, the Supreme Court noted that business records 'by their nature were not testimonial'\" (quoting *Crawford,* 541 U.S. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354)). In any event, Marlee Miller, or a similarly situated individual at the SEC, is available to testify as to these records at trial if required.\n\n### **d.** *The Defendants Have Adequate Notice*\n\nFinally, this motion sereves as written notice that the Government intends to rely upon the residual exception to admit the ACA Bank Account records—Exhibit A identifies each of these records by Bates number. This notice comes nearly six weeks before trial, which is more than sufficient time for the defendants to have a \"fair opportunity to meet\" the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 807; *See United States v. Lino,* No. 00 CR. 632 (WHP), 2001 WL 8356, at \\*22 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001) (Thirty days' notice sufficient); *See Robinson v. Shapiro,* 646 F.2d 734, 741–42 (2d Cir.1981) (notice served six weeks before trial sufficient); *see also United States v. Yonkers Contracting Co.*, 701 F. Supp. 431, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (one-week notice sufficient in Rule 804(b)(5)).\n\n## **VI. The Court Should Preclude the Defendant from Introducing Evidence and Arguments That Are Irrelevant and Unfairly Prejudicial**\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Evidence 402, \"[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible\" at trial, Fed. R. Evid. 402, and under Rule 403, a court may exclude even relevant evidence \"if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence,\" Fed. R. Evid. 403; *see also United States v. Miller*, 626 F.3d 682, 689-90 (2d Cir. 2010).\n\nA defendant is entitled to present a defense only if it has a foundation in the evidence, *see United States v. Kwong*, 69 F.3d 663, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1995), and as long as it does not fail as a matter of law, *see United States v. Bakhtiari*, 913 F.2d 1053, 1057 (2d Cir. 1990). If the Court finds a defense insufficient as a matter of law, the Court is under no duty to allow the defendant to present the evidence, or advance the defense, to the jury. *See United States v. Paul*, 110 F.3d 869, 871 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing *United States v. Bailey*, 444 U.S. 394, 416-17 (1980)).\n\n## **A. The Court Should Exclude Evidence and Argument That This Prosecution is Improperly Linked to the CCP or in Any Way Malicious**\n\nThe Kwok Enterprise has dispatched a number of statements claiming that this prosecution is the result of malign CCP influence on the Department of Justice. It should not need to be said, but the prosecution of the defendants has nothing to do with the CCP or its efforts. Accordingly, there is no basis to make such arguments, and they must be precluded. Moreover, any such argument is nothing more than an improper selective prosecution claim. \"[A] selective prosecution defense alleges a defect in the institution of the prosecution, [it] is an issue for the court rather than the jury.\" *United States v. Farhane*, 634 F.3d 127, 167 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, any arguments that the Government has improper motives, or is somehow advancing a CPP-backed effort, must be precluded. *United States v. Stewart*, No. 03 Cr. 717 (MGC), 2004 WL 113506, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004). After all, \"the Government is not on trial.\" *United States v. Carton*, No. 17 CR 680 (CM), 2018 WL 5818107, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018). It would be legally improper for the defense to suggest otherwise. *See United States v. Preldakaj,* 456 F. App'x 56, 60 (2d Cir.2012) (summary order) (finding district court did not commit plain error by instructing the jury that \"the fact that certain investigative techniques were not used by law enforcement authorities[, but t]he government is not on trial, and law enforcement techniques are not your concern\").\n\n# **B. The Court Should Preclude the Defendants from Introducing Evidence and Arguments Related to CCP Activities That Are Irrelevant and Unfairly Prejudicial\"**\n\n1. The Court Should Limit Evidence and Claims Regarding CCP Activities, Including Targeting\n\nThe Court should preclude under Rule 403 evidence regarding CCP activities, including \"Operation Fox Hunt\" and other CCP targeting, beyond the defendants' own testimony as to their state of mind, because the probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by a danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury. Permitting the defense to introduce evidence regarding the CCP's activities, other than testimony regarding the defendants' beliefs that they were targeted, and the bases for those beliefs, \"risks creating a 'multi-ringed sideshow of minitrials on collateral issues . . . that may have only tangential bearing, if at all, to the issues and claims disputed in this case.\" *Park W. Radiology v. CareCore Nat'l LLC*, 675 F. Supp. 2d 314, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); *see* Fed. R. Evid. 403; *United States v. Yousef*, 327 F.3d 56, 128 (2d Cir. 2003) (\"Under the Sixth and Fourteen Amendments of the Constitution, a person charged with a crime has a fundamental right to present a defense. Nonetheless, a criminal defendant's right to present a full defense and to receive a fair trial *does not entitle him to place before the jury evidence normally inadmissible*.\" (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); *United States v. Bifield*, 702 F.2d 342, 350 (2d Cir. 1983) (\"A defendant's right to present a full defense, including the right to testify on his own behalf, is not without limits. In responding to the charges against him, an accused must comply with the established rules of procedure and evidence, as must the prosecution, in order to insure a fair trial.\")*.*\n\nNo matter the level of the CCP's interest in Kwok, any activities targeting Kwok including efforts to silence him on social media—do not render true the false and misleading statements that Kwok made to obtain victim funds. Kwok's focus on the CCP's activities, in prior filings, is (at best) an attempt by the defense to improperly portray Kwok as a sympathetic figure, introduce inadmissible good acts, and confuse the jury as to what is at issue at trial. This trial is not about whether Kwok was a *bona fide* dissident, or whether the NFSC is a pro-democracy movement. It is not about whether Kwok was targeted by the CCP. It is about whether Kwok conned victims through false promises about stock and business opportunities so he could get their money. And the risk that evidence regarding the CCP's activities, including targeting, would generate confusion and unfair prejudice is not hypothetical; it is almost certain. The Court need look no further than Kwok's filings in this case to understand how Kwok intends to distract the jury away from the charged conduct by creating a mini-trial regarding the CCP's activities and targeting. Indeed, Kwok has rebranded the Court's order compelling the production of certain materials reflecting the CCP's targeting of Kwok, his family, his co-defendants, and the entities in the indictment as the \"*Fox Hunt* Order.\" *See*, *e.g.*, Dkt. 259 (Kwok Response) (emphasis added). Kwok's efforts to obtain a Rule 17 subpoena for materials in the possession of a separate prosecution team in the Eastern District of New York that is prosecuting CCP operatives, and his conclusory claim that such evidence is \"indisputably helpful to him,\" *id.* at 8, reveals that he intends only to direct the jury's focus away from the charged fraud offenses in an attempt to impermissibly paint himself as a victim of the CCP's targeting and to \"unduly distract[] their attention from the charged crimes through sympathy.\" *United States v. Malka*, 602 F. Supp. 3d 510, 527 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2022). The Court should not permit Kwok to do so.\n\n# 2. The Court Should Exclude Extrinsic Targeting Evidence, Outside of Defendants' Testimony\n\nAs outlined, the probative value of *any* CCP activities, including evidence of targeting, is low in this case. That is because Kwok's and Wang's guilt or acquittal of the charges in this case do not turn on whether the Chinese government sought to target, repatriate, or silence Kwok. First and foremost, the CCP's activities have *nothing* to do with the fact that Kwok knowingly lied to investors—over and over, for a period of years—about the use and purpose of their investment, the value of their investment, the risk (or lack thereof) of their investment, the need to act fast to invest, whether Kwok would benefit from the investment, and whether Kwok would personally guarantee investor losses. Similarly, efforts by the Chinese government to repatriate or silence Kwok have nothing to do with Kwok's misusing and stealing investor money after fraudulently obtaining it—evidencing his clear fraudulent intent.\n\nTo be sure, the Court has held that evidence establishing that Kwok, his family, his codefendants, or the corporate entities relevant to the indictment have been targeted by the CCP is relevant for purposes of *Rule 16* discovery, which is a \"low bar,\" to the extent such evidence shows \"that Kwok's fears of CCP targeting are objectively legitimate\" and therefore \"'could be used to . . . bolster [his] defense.'\" (MTC Order at 6, citing *United States v. Stevens*, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993).) The relevance of CCP targeting-related evidence identified by the Court is that it could have affected Kwok's *state of mind* when engaging in certain actions that could reflect a guilty mind, such as being secretive about Mahwah Mansion, or his use of dozens of electronic devices.\n\nAccordingly, the Government does not contest that, if Kwok testifies, he could seek to explain—again, within the bounds of Rule 403—that the CCP's targeting of him or his family members informed the actions he took in some way. Moreover, if Kwok testifies to his belief contemporaneous with the charged conduct—that he was being targeted by the CCP, he could also testify to the bases for his belief at that time and, indeed, could likely introduce some admissible evidence to establish that his belief was \"objectively legitimate.\" For example, the defendants might offer public reports that they read at that time regarding efforts to target them, provided such evidence is (a) not offered for its truth, and (b) not cumulative, overly confusing, or unfairly prejudicial. *See* Fed. R. Evid. 403. In other words, through his testimony, Kwok could offer his belief about CCP targeting—to the extent relevant to the charges, and in proportion to the probative value of this belief—and any objectively legitimate bases for that contemporaneous belief. Beyond that, however, no targeting evidence is even relevant, much less admissible under Rule 403. Kwok can show his beliefs were \"objectively legitimate\" by testifying about the objective evidence he knew at the time—the only such evidence relevant to his state of mind.\n\nHowever, the defendants should not be permitted to prove up various acts of targeting through experts or other evidence, which would constitute a massive sideshow of trials-within-atrial regarding issues that go neither to the defendants' state of mind, nor to any element of the charged offenses. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Sutton*, No. CR 21-0598 (PLF), 2024 WL 278070, at \\*11 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2024) (\"Although criminal defendants have a right to present a defense, courts are not required to permit defendants to present to the jury evidence that is not admissible because it is not relevant or probative of a fact of consequence.\"); *United States v. Carton*, No. 17 CR 680 (CM), 2018 WL 5818107, at \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) (denying Rule 17 subpoena because a defrauded hedge fund's \"level of diligence and sophistication is not relevant to [the defendant's] intent to defraud\" where defendant was charged lying to obtain an investment and misappropriating the funds; defense strategy was \"merely a facile attempt to blame the victim – which is an impermissible strategy in a fraud case\"). For example, Kwok has informed the Government that he may call an expert witness to testify generally about \"tactics and practices of the government of the People's Republic of China to target political dissidents.\" The expert notice then lists *twenty-eight* broad topics on which the expert \"is expected to testify\"—all of which relate to general opinions, and none of which references either Kwok or Wang, or the relevance (if any) of the anticipated testimony to the charged fraud and money laundering offenses in this case. The content of this expert notice alone telegraphs the defendants' intent to derail the trial in this fraud case by advancing an irrelevant—and distracting and confusing—narrative about the CCP's activities and practices. The Court should not permit the defendants to do so. *See Taylor v. Illinois*, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (\"The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is . . . inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.\"); *United States v. Mi Sun Cho*, 713 F.3d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 2013) (right to present a defense \"is not absolute, for a defendant must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability. Thus, a defendant does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is inadmissible under the rules\n\nof evidence.\"); *United States v. Rivera*, No. 13 Cr. 149 KAM, 2015 WL 1886967, at \\*5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2015) (The defendants' constitutional right to present a defense does not entitle them to unfettered presentations of inadmissible and irrelevant evidence.\").\n\n# 3. The Court Should Closely Police Defendants' Testimony To Avoid Impermissible Bases for a Verdict\n\nThe subjects of Kwok's (or Wang's) testimony regarding targeting should be carefully policed, to avoid confusing the jury and/or suggesting they render a verdict on bases impermissible under the law. *See Bifield*, 702 F.2d 342, 350 (\"A defendant's right to present a full defense, including the right to testify on his own behalf, is not without limits. . . . The district court's ruling that evidence legally inadmissible was not to be presented to the jury did not therefore deprive appellant of his constitutional right to testify as to other matters which could properly be received.\"). To date, the defendants' counsel have referenced \"Fox Hunt\" in discussions about, among other things, the purchase and renovation of the Mahwah Mansion, the GTV private placement and the valuation of GTV, and the defendants' use of hundreds of bank accounts held in the names of numerous entities, including the Kwok Enterprise entities. Even assuming that Kwok or Wang were targets of CCP targeting, that fact does not exculpate either defendant from their legal culpability for the charged conduct. Nor does the CCP's targeting of Kwok, his family members, his co-defendants, or the entities in the indictment offer any defense against the charges in the indictment.\n\n### **a.** *The Mahwah Mansion*\n\nThe indictment alleges that most of the hundreds of millions of dollars that the defendants collected from G|CLUBS members \"did not fund the business of G|CLUBS,\" and that Kwok misappropriated G|CLUBS funds, including by spending approximately \\$39.5 million of G|CLUBS membership funds to purchase and renovate his Mahwah Mansion. Indictment ¶ 18(h). The Government will introduce evidence at trial establishing that the Mahwah Mansion was not purchased for the benefit or use of G|CLUBS members, and Kwok can seek to introduce admissible evidence to rebut that allegation. However, Kwok cannot take the next step that he proposes and introduce extrinsic evidence regarding CCP targeting (including Operation Fox Hunt) in an effort to justify the alleged need for the purchase of the Mahwah Mansion as a \"secure location\" for the NFSC \"to conduct its business.\" (Def. MTC Mem. at 21). The NFSC is legally separate from G|CLUBS, which is a purported \"exclusive, high-end membership program\" offering \"a gateway to carefully curated world-class products, services and experiences.\" Indictment ¶ 18(b). The Government's allegations relate to Kwok's misrepresentations regarding G|CLUBS, including the claims that G|CLUBS members would receive stock in GTV or G|Fashion and that G|CLUBS membership money would be used to fund G|CLUBS services when, in truth and in fact, members never received stock and Kwok used G|CLUBS money to fund his own lavish lifestyle. Even if Kwok establishes that he \"believed in good faith that purchasing the property was an appropriate and nonfraudulent use of G|CLUBS dues,\" that belief is not a defense to the fraud charges, because it does not equate to a good faith belief that the representations made to G|CLUBS were true. (MTC Order at 6-7.) Indeed, testimony that Kwok believed purchasing the Mahwah Mansion was an appropriate use of member dues has no bearing on whether Kwok conducted a scheme to defraud, through the use of wires, to obtain money or property. *United States v. Jabar*, 19 F.4th 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted); MTC Order at 4. The representations Kwok made to G|CLUBS investors included that the \"purchase of G|CLUBS memberships would entitle them to stock in KWOK-affiliated entities, such as GTV and G|Fashion\"—he did *not* represent that G|CLUBS would purchase an estate, or provide a physical location where G|CLUBS members could convene. Indictment ¶ 18(f).\n\n### **b.** *The GTV Private Placement*\n\nKwok's argument regarding the relevance of the CCP's targeting of him to the GTV private placement is similarly tortured, and also poses an impermissible risk of distracting the jury from the charges in this case. If Kwok testifies, he is entitled to introduce admissible evidence to support his claim that he believed, at the time of the GTV private placement, that \\$2 billion was a reasonable valuation for GTV. That evidence could include, among other things, financial analyses and data regarding the potential market for GTV. Kwok can also argue, as he already has, that that he had believed that his supporters \"would be particularly enthusiastic in supporting GTV's business because they were [] committed to GTV's mission to combat the CCP and believed their support of GTV would help that mission,\" Dkt. 172 at 24, and GTV would be successful and that there was a large market for GTV, including because he understood at the time that the CCP was taking steps to proscribe Kwok's efforts. But the Court should reject the attenuated and entirely unsupported argument that the CCP's activities and targeting \"creat[ed] both the necessity for, and the potential monopoly position of, GTV\"—particularly in the absence of evidence that GTV had any potential (much less proven) success in breaking through the great firewall and delivering content to individuals in China. *See* Dkt. 172 at 25. That Kwok and Wang misappropriated \\$100 million in GTV investor funds for a high-risk hedge fund investment on behalf of Kwok's family member within weeks of the private placement belies the self-serving claim that the creation and promotion of GTV was motivated by Kwok's fear of, and opposition to, the CCP. The Court similarly should reject Kwok's claim that Fox Hunt \"is . . . critical to demonstrating Mr. Kwok's intent when making statement concerning GTV's potential value.\" *Id.*  Any Chinese government efforts to suppress Kwok's access to online platforms would be extrinsic evidence that is not admissible at this trial, other than to establish the defendant's states of mind at the time of the charged offenses (and, even then, only if the defendants testify), and such evidence would have little probative value with respect to the fraud charges. Moreover, any such value of that evidence would be substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice that would result from introducing such inflammatory and politically-charged topics at trial. *See Carroll v. Trump*, 20 Cv. 7311 (LAK), 2024 WL 97359, \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2024). Such evidence would also confuse and distract the jury from the underlying issues—specifically, Kwok's lies to investors and his misuse of money he fraudulently obtained.\n\n### **c.** *Bank Accounts*\n\nKwok also should not be permitted to testify about his knowledge of the CCP's general efforts to interfere with *other* dissidents' banking relationships, nor to introduce extrinsic evidence to that effect. *See* Def. MTC Mem. at 23, n.4. Consistent with the reasoning set forth above, Kwok may testify to his state of mind in utilizing of hundreds of bank accounts (testifying, perhaps, that this use was a response to the CCP's targeting of him, rather than his effort \"[t]o conceal the illegal source of the funds\" he fraudulently obtained). Notably, however, that defense amounts to a concession that Kwok exercised control over those bank accounts, which processed more than \\$1 billion in fraud proceeds. Regardless, to permit Kwok to introduce extrinsic evidence regarding the CCP's general efforts to interfere with *other* dissidents' banking relationships, creates an \"undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.\" Fed. R. Evid. 402 advisory committee's note. Specifically, allowing such general evidence about the CCP's targeting of banking relationships of other (non-Kwok) dissidents could suggest that the CCP was also targeting Kwok's bank accounts in the U.S., which would invite the jury to draw unsupported inferences.\n\nAccordingly, if (and only if) the defendants testify, evidence regarding the CCP's efforts\n\nto target Kwok, his family members, his co-defendants, or the entities relevant to the indictment are admissible to the extent they are relevant to the defendants' state of mind at the time of the charged offenses. But the Court should strictly police any attempts by the defense to introduce extrinsic evidence regarding the CCP's activities (including targeting) and should exclude any general evidence regarding the CCP's activities against Kwok. The defendants cannot be permitted to put forth a mini-trial regarding CCP targeting that would, unquestionably, impermissibly distract and confuse the jury from the key issues: whether the defendants defrauded their victims to improperly obtain money, and laundered and misappropriated the fraud proceeds.\n\n## 4. The Court Should Preclude Argument and Evidence Suggesting that the Defendants' Fraud Was Justified, Necessary, or a Result of Duress\n\nThe defendants cannot argue, or introduce evidence tending to suggest, that their actions were justified or necessary as a result of targeting by the CCP (whether through Fox Hunt or otherwise), or that they operated under duress. In order to establish a claim of duress that constitutes a legal excuse for criminal conduct, a defendant must show that \"(a) 'at the time the conduct occurred,' he was subject to actual or threatened force, (b) the force or threat was of such nature as to induce a well-founded fear of impending death or serious bodily harm, and (c) there was no reasonable opportunity to escape from the force or threat other than by engaging in the otherwise unlawful activity.\" *United States* v. *Stevens*, 985 F.2d 1175, 1181 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing *United States v. Mitchell*, 725 F.2d at 837). Evidence of a defendant's \"generalized fear\" does not satisfy the requirement of a well-founded fear of impending death or serious bodily harm; there must have been a threat that was specific and prospects of harm that were immediate. *See United States v*. *Esposito*, 834 F.2d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1987); *United States v. Lorenzo*, 52 Fed. App'x 553, 554 (2d Cir. 2002) (summary order). Moreover, \"where there is reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm, the defendant must take reasonable steps to avail himself of that opportunity, whether by flight or by seeking the intervention of the appropriate authorities.\" *United States v. Bakhtiari*, 913 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). The Government is unaware of any evidence suggesting a duress defense can be made. Absent a specific showing from the defense any argument that the CCP (or anyone else) placed them instate of duress must necessarily be precluded.\n\nFor similar reasons, the defendants cannot argue their conduct was necessary or justified due to any external threat by the CCP (or anyone else) or because they promoted any sort of \"just\" cause. A justification defense requires evidence that (1) the defendant was under an unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury; (2) the defendant did not negligently or recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct; (3) the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law; and (4) there was a direct causal relationship between the criminal action and the avoidance of the threatened harm. *See United States* v. *Smith*, 160 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1998); *see also United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative*, 532 U.S. 483, 490-91 & nn.3-4 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court has never recognized a necessity defense to any federal statute and questioned \"whether federal courts ever have authority to recognize a necessity defense not provided by statute\").\n\n# 5. The Court Should Preclude General Evidence of Contact Between the Chinese Police and Victims\n\nThe defendant's *ex parte* memorandum of law, which was provided in part in support of a motion for a subpoena to the USAO-EDNY, states that defense counsel located evidence that \"Chinese police have forced some GTV investors into filing false claims with the SEC, FBI, and U.S. financial institutions.\" While it could be appropriate cross-examination to challenge any *particular* Government witness about whether their testimony was a result of coercion by the CCP—something the Government has no reason to believe is the case as to its witnesses—it is not appropriate to introduce generalized evidence (or argument) that the Government's case is tainted by the CCP, including by CCP efforts to coerce victims. That is, the defendants cannot introduce *general evidence* about \"counsel's investigation\" into the Chinese police force to suggest that the *specific evidence* the Government has introduced at trial is somehow tainted by the CCP. Such evidence and argument would be irrelevant and unduly prejudicial to the Government. By way of example, even assuming that defense counsel learned that “Witness-A” was coerced by the CCP, such information has no relevance to this trial unless Witness-A testifies. For similar reasons, the defense is not entitled to call their own witnesses, whom the Government did not rely upon, simply to introduce that those defense witnesses were coerced by the CCP.\n\n## **C. The Court Should Exclude Evidence and Claims of the Defendants' Good Acts (Including Any Dissident Activity Against the CCP) To Prove Their Innocence**\n\nTo the extent that the defendants may seek to present evidence or argument concerning their prior commission of \"good acts\" or to offer evidence of non-criminal activities to disprove guilt of the crimes charged, they should be precluded from doing so. Specific-act propensity evidence is no more admissible to refute a criminal charge than it is to establish one.\n\nIt is settled law that \"[a] defendant may not seek to establish his innocence . . . through proof of the absence of criminal acts on [other] specific occasions.\" *United States v. Scarpa*, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1990). Similarly, while under appropriate circumstances a defendant may offer general testimony from a character witness about his reputation for a \"pertinent trait\" of character, or the witness's opinion of the defendant as regards that trait, *see* Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(A) & 405(a), a defendant can neither testify nor offer other proof to establish specific acts in conformity with that trait that are not an element of the offense. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Benedetto*, 571 F.2d 1246, 1249-50 (2d Cir. 1978) (evidence of defendant's specific acts improperly admitted because\n\n\"character evidence has long been admissible only in the form of reputation and not in the form of a recitation of good or bad acts\"); *United States v. Fazio*, No. 11 Cr. 873 (KBF), 2012 WL 1203943, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2012) (\"[A] defendant may not affirmatively try to prove his innocence by reference to specific instances of good conduct; character is to be proven by reputation or opinion evidence.\"), *aff'd*, 770 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2014).\n\nFurthermore, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, \"a district court may exclude evidence of a defendant's prior good acts if it finds that any minimal probative value of such evidence is outweighed by the likelihood of jury confusion and the risk of jury nullification.\" *United States v. Rivera*, No. 13 Cr. 149 (KAM), 2015 WL 1725991, at \\*2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015) (citing *United States v. Al Kassar*, 660 F.3d 108, 124 (2d Cir. 2011) (\"And the trial judge was rightly concerned that, to the extent any of the evidence [of prior good acts] could be construed to relate to the charged conspiracies, the jury would find it extremely confusing, if not incomprehensible.\")).\n\nThe defendants should be precluded from offering evidence or argument, including in their opening statements, of any charity, philanthropy, or any other specific instance or instances of the defendants' prior good acts, or the lack of commission of other bad acts, is proof of their innocence.\n\nThat the defendants may attempt to make such arguments to the jury is not a theoretical concern. In pre-trial submissions, and as discussed above, Kwok has repeatedly attempted to put at issue whether the defendants were *bona fide* CCP dissidents. For example, in Kwok's *ex parte* brief seeking an early return of documents from USAO-EDNY (which was partially disclosed to the Government), Kwok argued that \"[t]he government also asserts in the Indictment that Mr. Kwok and his fellow movement members are not genuine dissidents.\" (March 5, 2024, Kwok *ex*  *parte* brief, at 9.) This is not true. Many of the individuals who joined Kwok's movement were genuine dissidents; nevertheless, Kwok and Wang subsequently defrauded them. More to the point, whether Kwok or Wang were true dissidents is not a question the jury must answer to render a verdict. Indeed, *Kwok and Wang can be guilty of every crime charged in the Indictment even if they, and any organization associated with them, are anti-CCP*—that point is undeniable and, accordingly, the relevance of the defendants' dissident activities is extremely low, if any.\n\nAt most, if the defendants testify, their testimony may provide context and general background—including that they were involved in some anti-CCP activities. And, the Government recognizes that some evidence of the defendants' anti-CCP efforts will be introduced at trial, to the extent it is necessary for context. For example, in many cases victims were attracted to Kwok and Wang because of their anti-CCP message and thus provides context about how victims learned of the defendants. But, beyond that context, the Court should not permit the defendants to introduce evidence of a collateral matter—the defendants' anti-CCP activities. Policing such evidence is important to prevent a (prolonged) trial-within-a-trial about an irrelevant issue—the extent to which the defendants were *bona fide* dissidents. *Manko v. United States*, 63 F. App'x 570, 573 (2d Cir. 2003) (\"[a] trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence [that] is only slightly probative if its introduction would confuse and mislead the jury by focusing its attention on collateral issues and if it would unnecessarily delay the trial\") (quotation and citation omitted); *United States v. Doyle*, No. 16 Cr. 506 (ALC), 2018 WL 1902506, at \\*20 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2018) (excluding collateral issue that would \"unavoidably result in a mini-trial . . . . the finders of fact will be led so far afield from the essence of the charges to be tried that their truth-seeking mission will be lost on them\").\n\nFurther, and of significant importance, the defense must be precluded from arguing, in\n\nsubstance, that if the defendants *were bona fide* dissidents, they are *innocent* of the charges. Any such argument is wrong as a matter of law, and would fundamentally confuse the jury if permitted. The jury is not empaneled to decide whether, and to what extent, Kwok created a movement against the CCP, nor whether the defendants genuinely held anti-CCP beliefs. The jury's task is only to decide whether the evidence establishes the elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. No element in the charged crimes requires the Government to prove the *bona fides* of the defendants' dissident activities—nor is proof of those *bona fides* a defense to any of the charged crimes. Indeed, Kwok's material misrepresentations included promising outsized financial returns and other benefits to his victims. Kwok is not charged for lying about his status as a dissident. And any argument by the defense that the defendants are not guilty because they were \"true dissidents\" fundamentally distorts what this trial is about. The defendants must be precluded from making such arguments.\n\nThird, \"[a] defendant may not seek to establish his innocence . . . through proof of the absence of criminal acts on specific occasions.\" *United States v. Dawkins*, 999 F.3d 767, 792 (2d Cir. 2021) (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, the defense cannot use the defendants' dissident activities to demonstrate the absence of fraudulent conduct on some other occasions. *See United States v. Walker*, 191 F.3d 326, 336 (2d Cir. 1999) (\"Whether [the defendant] had prepared other, nonfraudulent applications was simply irrelevant to whether the applications charged as false statements were fraudulent.\").\n\nFourth, evidence of the defendants' dissident activities is improper because it invites jury sympathy and risks jury nullification. *See In re United States*, 945 F.3d 616, 626 (2d Cir. 2019) (\"Our case law is clear: 'it is not the proper role of courts to encourage nullification.'\"); *id.* at 630 (\"Evidence admitted solely to encourage nullification is by definition irrelevant, and thus inadmissible, regardless of what other evidence might be introduced at trial\").\n\nAccordingly, other than as background if they choose to testify, the Court should preclude the defendants from introducing evidence of their anti-CCP activities, and prohibit entirely any argument that the defendants' dissident activities demonstrate their innocence.\n\n# **D. The Court Should Preclude Defense Arguments, Evidence and Cross-Examination Suggesting That the Defendants Are Not Guilty Because of Disclaimers in Transaction Documents**\n\nThe defendants should be precluded from making arguments, offering evidence, or crossexamining witnesses, which in any manner suggests that disclaimers in transactional documents render the defendants innocence of the charges. Specifically, the defendants should not be permitted to use the disclaimers to argue that the victims should not have relied on other representations, that the disclaimers render other representations immaterial, or that the disclaimers demonstrate the defendants' good faith. The existence of disclaimers is not relevant to the defense and it is likely to confuse and mislead the jury as to the elements of wire fraud.\n\nAt trial, the Government expects to offer into evidence the GTV Private Placement Memorandum (\"GTV PPM\"). That memorandum contains disclaimers including that:\n\n> assumptions and judgments may or may not prove to be correct and there can be no assurance that any projected results are attainable or will be realized. [Investors] may not rely upon this document in evaluating the merits of participating in any transaction referred to herein. This document contains only selected information and does not purport to be all-inclusive or to contain all of the information that may be relevant to your participation in any such transaction. This document does not constitute and should not be interpreted as either a recommendation or advice, including investment, legal, financial, tax or accounting advice . . . . [information in the document] cannot guarantee future results, levels of activity, performance or achievements.\n\n(Ex. B. at 2-4.)\n\nThe GTV PPM also contains a \"risks\" section which stated the investors bear economic risks, and stated that \"Saraca owns a controlling interest in the Company, and can exercise significant control over the Company.\" (Ex. B at 25.) Ultimately, Kwok and Wang misappropriated \\$100 million from the GTV Private Placement and invested it in a hedge fund in the name of \"Saraca.\"\n\nWith respect to the Farm Loan Program, contracts signed by some victims contain language stating that \"Lender is sufficiently experienced in financial and business matters to be capable of . . . evaluat[ing] the merits and risk of this loan and make an informed decision relating thereto.\" Contracts also declare that the \"loan proceeds . . . is for the general working capiral purposes of the Borrower,\" which the Lender acknowledged in the contract. (Ex. C)\n\nAt certain times, G|CLUBS included a disclaimer in its membership agreement, and on its website, which stated, *inter alia*, to prospective members \"[y]ou should not rely on any descriptions by Mr. Guo Wengui or any other person of (i) the benefits that could or would be available to G|CLUBS' members or (ii) any other aspect of the structure or terms of membership in G|CLUBS. Membership is not an investment in G|CLUBS, nor does it provide an equity or ownership interest in G|CLUBS or any other entity.\" (Ex. D.)\n\nFinally, the Himalaya Exchange issued \"white papers\" providing details about the Himalaya Dollar and Himalaya Coin. Those white papers contain language seeking to limit the Himalaya Exchange from civil liability:\n\n> PROSPECTIVE PURCHASERS OF HIMALAYA COIN OR HIMALAYA COIN CREDITS SHOULD ENSURE THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF AND RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH A PURCHASE. . . . WHILE THE INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT IS BELIEVED TO BE ACCURATE AND RELIABLE, NONE OF THE ISSUER, THE HIMALAYA EXCHANGE OR THEIR AGENTS, ADVISORS, DIRECTORS,\n\nOFFICERS, EMPLOYEES AND SHAREHOLDERS MAKE ANY REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO THE ACCURACY OF SUCH INFORMATION AND EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM ANY AND ALL LIABILITY THAT MAY BE BASED ON SUCH INFORMATION OR ERRORS OR OMISSIONS THEREOF.\n\n(Ex. E, HCN White paper at 35.)\n\nThe disclaimers described above, and those similar to them, are directed at civil causes of action they do not (and could not) release the defendants from criminal liability. Thus, any arguments suggesting otherwise would be improper. Argument about these disclaimers would serve no relevant purpose and will be more prejudicial than probative. This is because reliance is not an element of the charged crimes.\" *Weaver*, 860 F.3d at 95 (\"common-law requirements of justifiable reliance and damages plainly have no place in the federal fraud statutes\" (citing *Neder v. United States*, 527 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999));; *see also United States v. Vilar*, 729 F.3d 62, 88 (2d Cir. 2013) (reliance not an element of criminal securities fraud).\n\nNor do disclaimers go to materiality of the misrepresentation. Indeed, in *Weaver* the Second Circuit closely examined disclaimers analogous to the ones in this case. In *Weaver* the defendant deployed a scheme that encouraged victims to purchase vending machines and promised that the victims' investments in these machines \"had 'little risk.'\" *Weaver*, 860 F.3d at 92. Victims then spoke to salespeople who promised \"utterly unrealistic earnings and claim[ed] that the investments were sound.\" *Id.* After customers agreed to purchase the machines, they were required to sign a purchase order contract which included \"disclaimers in capital letters\" that stated:\n\n> this purchase order contains the entire understanding of the agreement between the parties and there is no reliance upon any verbal representation whatsoever. Seller has not guaranteed any minimum or maximum earnings . . . . It is further acknowledged\n\nthat no statements, promises[,] or agreements influenced this purchase or are expected other than anything contained in this purchase order . . . .\n\n*Id.*\n\nThe defense argued these disclaimers rendered their prior misrepresentations \"immaterial.\" *Id.* at 93. The Second Circuit flatly rejected that argument, and held that “contractual disclaimers of reliance on prior misrepresentations do not render those misrepresentations immaterial under the criminal mail and wire fraud statutes.\" *Id.* at 95. That is because \"a disclaimer of reliance on certain representations\" does not \"mean that the [prior] oral representations were immaterial or without tendency to influence,\" *Weaver*, 860 F.3d at 95, thus disclaimers have no relevant purpose in the trial. Indeed, it would undermine the purposes of the fraud laws to permit \"[f]raudsters [to] . . . escape criminal liability for lies told to induce gullible victims . . . to sign a contract containing disclaimers of reliance.\" *Id.* at 96.\n\nHaving no relevant purpose, defense evidence or arguments about disclaimers are also properly excluded under Rule 403 because they are likely to confuse the jury. Indeed, permitting argument relating to the disclaimers could incorrectly lead the jury to believe that civil or common law fraud principles apply to the case, that the jury should evaluate the victims' sophistication, or that disclaimers are somehow probative of materiality, which they are not. *Weaver*, 860 F.3d 90, 95 (\"We agree with our sister circuits, and hold that contractual disclaimers of reliance on prior misrepresentations do not render those misrepresentations immaterial under the criminal mail and wire fraud statutes.\")<sup>19</sup>\n\n# **E. The Court Should Exclude Evidence and Claims That Victims Were Negligent or Failed to Conduct Adequate Due Diligence**\n\n<sup>19</sup> At the close of evidence, it may be necessary for the Court to instruct the jury that the existence of disclaimers does not limit their criminal liability and is not probative any supposed good faith.\n\nThe defendants should be precluded from arguing or adducing evidence that victims were negligent, gullible, or insufficiently vigilant. \"The Court of Appeals routinely has rejected a gullible victim defense for wire-fraud charges.\" *United States v. Adelekan*, 567 F. Supp. 3d 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing *United States v. Amico*, 486 F.3d 764, 780 (2d Cir. 2007) and *United States v. Weaver*, 860 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2017)). That is because \"reliance is not an element of criminal fraud,\" and \"the unreasonableness of a fraud victim in relying (or not) on a misrepresentation does not bear on a defendant's criminal intent.\" *Weaver*, 860 F.3d at 95-96. Accordingly, the defendant may not argue that victims should have paid closer attention to the details in the GTV Private Placement Memorandum, G|CLUBS contractual provisions, or that victims should have understood they were engaging in risky transactions. *See United States v. Thomas*, 377 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 2004) (collecting and endorsing cases holding that victim's negligence in failing to discover crime perpetrated against it is no defense to criminal conduct).\n\nIn particular, the defendants should be precluded from cross-examining witnesses about whether they adequately investigated Kwok's representations or the deal documentation they may have signed. Nor is any victim's risk tolerance or willingness to lose money a relevant fact for the jury to consider. *See United States v. Frenkel*, 682 F. App'x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming instruction that did not require jury to consider materiality from \"from the subjective perspective of the victim\" because \"materiality for purposes of wire fraud, mail fraud, and bank fraud, . . . a matter is material if '*a reasonable man* would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question'\" (quotation and citation omitted)).\n\n## **F. The Court Should Preclude Argument That the SEC or the Government Are Responsible for Victims' Financial Losses**\n\nKwok, through his various media apparatuses, has made a number of public statements that suggest he may attempt to shift blame for the failure of GTV, or other components of the fraud, to the SEC or the Government. By way of background, after the defendants raised \\$452 million from the GTV Private Placement, the SEC learned of the impropriety of that purported stock sale. The SEC ultimately recovered money from the fraudulent GTV private placement. In broadcasts, Kwok and his agents have blamed the SEC for the collapse of GTV. Similarly, pursuant to judicially authorized warrants, in the fall of 2023, the Government seized funds from several entities in the Kwok Enterprise, including several hundred million dollars from the Himalaya Exchange. This was done to preserve, for later distribution to victims, the money that the defendants obtained through fraud.\n\nArguments attempting to shift the blame for GTV's collapse, or any failure of the Himalaya Exchange, onto regulators and the Government are improper and should be excluded. To start, the charged crimes do not require the Government to prove actual harm to any victims. *United States v. Greenberg*, 835 F.3d 295, 305-06 (2d Cir. 2016) (\"[T]he wire fraud statute requires the Government to show proof of a scheme or artifice to defraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which itself demands a showing that the defendant possessed a fraudulent intent, but the Government need not prove that the victims of the fraud were *actually* injured, but only that defendants *contemplated*  some actual harm or injury to their victims.\").\n\nSecond, blaming the SEC and the Government is no more than an attempt by the defendants to turn this case into one about policy concerns regarding the role of regulation in the financial markets. *See United States v. Cheung Kin Ping*, 555 F.2d 1069, 1073 (2d Cir. 1977)(affirming\n\ninstruction to jury that \"law enforcement policy was not its concern,\" and that it should \"focus its attention on the real issue, namely, whether the government had proved the facts alleged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt\"); *see also United States v. Josephberg*, 562 F.3d 478, 497 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's finding that it was improper for defendant to argue in summation \"that the Internal Revenue Service was 'arrogant,' … and that because of this, Defendant should be acquitted\").\n\nBecause such evidence and argument would have no probative value and would serve only to create a danger of undue prejudice, to confuse the issues, and to mislead the jury, it should be precluded.\n\n## **G. The Court Should Exclude Evidence and Claims That the Defendants Intended to Repay Victims**\n\nThe defendants should be precluded from offering evidence or arguing that they intended to return or repay victims' funds and therefore that they did not act with intent to defraud. While the crime of wire fraud requires a \"contemplated harm to the victim,\" *Jabar*, 19 F.4th at 76, it does not require that the defendant \"intended to permanently deprive the victim's money or property,\" *United States v. Males*, 459 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2006). Thus, \"an intent to return money or property is not a defense to the charge of embezzlement.\" *United States v. Thomas*, 581 F. App'x 100, 102 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing *United States v. Buckley*, 101 F.3d 685, 1996 WL 282140, at \\*2 (2d Cir. 1996)). \"Nor is it a defense to [wire fraud] that the accused voluntarily returned the funds.\" *United States v. Vincent*, 416 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2005). \"[i]t is immaterial as a matter of law whether [a] defendant intended to repay the misappropriated funds because the offense is 'complete' where . . . there is an 'immediate intent to misapply and defraud.'\" *United States v. Bankman-Fried*, No. 22 Cr. 673 (LAK), 2023 WL 4194773, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2023).\n\nHere, the defendants should not be permitted to argue that they intended to repay or return the funds of their victims, or that they believed victims would be made whole in the end. *See United States v. Watts*, 934 F. Supp. 2d 451, 473 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (precluding argument that defendant believed his lies to a victim lender would cause no ultimate harm because the lender would be repaid).\n\nTo the extent that the defendants seek to argue that they believed GTV investors would ultimately not be harmed because the value of GTV (or any other Kwok-linked entity) would reach significant heights that would not be a permissible argument to the jury. Where defendants and their co-conspirators \"intended to immediately deprive investors of their capital through fraud,\" their belief, even if truly held, \"that in the long-term [their companies] would ultimately succeed,\" is not a defense to securities fraud or wire fraud. *United States v. Lange*, 834 F.3d 58, 79 (2d Cir. 2016); *see also United States v. Berger*, 188 F. Supp. 2d 307, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (\"Were a jury to find that [the defendant] intentionally caused others to issue materially false or misleading statements of the [company's] value to its investors . . . he properly would be found guilty, even if he 'firmly believed' that, in the end, his strategy would 'work out.'\"). Thus, the defendants should not be permitted to argue that they are not guilty because they thought victims would not ultimately be harmed.\n\nThe defendants should also be precluded from offering evidence about the amount of money and assets the Government have seized for purposes of suggesting to the jury that victims will be made whole. Such evidence is irrelevant, and is no different than improper evidence of a defendant's own efforts to repay misappropriated funds. *See United States v. Sindona*, 636 F.2d 792, 800 (2d Cir. 1980) (\"The offense occurred and was complete when the misapplication took place. What might have later happened as to repayment is not material and could not be a defense.\").\n\n## **H. The Court Should Exclude Evidence of the Defendant's Personal Circumstances and Potential Punishment**\n\nThe defendants may not offer evidence or argument concerning family background, health, age, pretrial detention, or any other similar factors. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Paccione*, 949 F.2d 1183, 1201 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming preclusion of evidence that defendant had son with cerebral palsy whom defendant had devoted his life to care for); *United States v. Battaglia*, No. 05 Cr. 774 (KMW), 2008 WL 144826, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008) (precluding \"evidence of Defendant's family and personal status\" as not \"relevant to the issue of whether Defendant committed the crimes charged\"); *see also United States v. Harris*, 491 F.3d 440, 447-48 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming preclusion of evidence designed \"mainly to cast [the defendant] in the sympathetic light of a dedicated family man\").\n\nThe defendants should similarly be precluded from offering evidence or argument concerning the punishment or consequences they face if convicted. Where the jury has no role at sentencing—such as in this case—it \"should be admonished to 'reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed.'\" *Shannon v. United States*, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (quoting *Rogers v. United States*, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975)). This is so for good reason: argument concerning punishment \"invites [jurors] to ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts them from their factfinding responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion.\" *Id.*\n\n# **VII. The Court Should Preclude the Defendants from Offering Their Statements for Their Truth**\n\nThe defendants should be precluded from offering any of their own statements from any emails, mobile chat threads, text messages, voicemails, public statements, or videos, as they are inadmissible hearsay. Although, as described above, the Government may offer a defendant's\n\nstatement as a party admission, a defendant does not have a parallel ability to offer his own statements into evidence without subjecting himself to cross-examination. “When the defendant seeks to introduce his own prior statement for the truth of the matter asserted, it is hearsay, and it is not admissible.” *Marin*, 669 F.2d at 84; *see also United States v. Yousef*, 327 F.3d 56, 153 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant “could have testified to everything asserted in his statement, [but] he could not offer the document itself for the truth of the matter asserted”); *United States v. Rea*, 958 F.2d 1206, 1225 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); *United States v. Fernandez*, 839 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[D]efense counsel wished to place [the defendant’s] statement before the jury without subjecting [the defendant] to cross-examination, precisely what the hearsay rule forbids.”).\n\n![](_page_77_Figure_2.jpeg)\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons set forth above, the Court should grant the Government's motions *in limine*.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York\n\nBy: /s/\n\n> Micah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Justin Horton Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys (212) 637-2190 / 6612 / 2276 / 2314\n\nDated: April 9, 2024 New York, New York","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n诉\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），又名“Miles Guo”、“Miles Kwok”、“Guo Wengui”、“七哥”、“校长”、“Boss”，以及\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），又名“Yvette”、“Y”，\n\n被告。\n政府审前预备动议\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯） 纽约南区联邦检察官\n\nMicah F. Fergenson（米卡·F·费根森） Ryan B. Finkel（莱恩·B·芬克尔） Justin Horton（贾斯汀·霍顿） Juliana N. Murray（朱莉安娜·N·默里） 助理联邦检察官 —— 特聘法律顾问 ——\n\nS2 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n目录\n事实背景 1\n论证 2\nI. 被告同谋及代理人的陈述具有可采性 2\nA. 适用法律 2\n1. 传闻证据排除规则 2\n2. 规则第 801(d)(2)(D) 条 2\n3. 规则第 801(d)(2)(E) 条 3\nB. 讨论 4\n1. 同谋者的陈述不属于传闻 4\n2. 郭氏企业代理人及雇员的陈述不属于传闻 9\n3. 被告或其代理人的视频、帖子、文章和翻译不属于传闻 11\nII. 某些证据作为直接证据或依据规则第 404(b) 条具有可采性 12\nA. 适用法律 13\n1. 直接证据 13\n2. 规则第 404(b) 条 14\n3. 规则第 403 条 14\nB. 讨论 15\n1. 互相关联的欺诈计划的证据具有可采性 15\n2. 被告虚假承诺向法治慈善机构捐款 $100 Million 的证据具有可采性 19\n3. 郭文贵资产在筹款前被查封的证据具有可采性 21\n4. 逮捕后行为在附有限制性指示的情况下具有可采性 23\n5. 郭文贵破产案件中的证据具有可采性 26\nIII. 法院应准许采纳关于 GTV 私募的某些证据 31\nIV. 法院应允许根据规则第 902(11) 条对某些记录进行真实性鉴真 34\nV. 法院应采纳来自 First Abu Dhabi Bank（阿布扎比第一银行）的银行记录 36\nVI. 法院应排除被告提出不相关且具有不公偏见性的证据和论点 46\nA. 法院应排除声称本起诉与中共存在不当关联或在任何方面属于恶意起诉的证据与论点 46\nB. 法院应排除被告提出与中共活动相关但无关且具有不公偏见性的证据和论点 48\n1. 法院应限制有关中共活动（包括针对行动）的证据和主张 48\n2. 法院应排除被告证词之外的外在针对性证据 50\n3. 法院应严格监督被告的证词，以避免出现不可采纳的裁决依据 51\n4. 法院应排除暗示被告的欺诈行为具有正当性、必要性或系受胁迫所致的论点和证据 53\n5. 法院应排除关于中国警方与受害者之间接触的一般性证据 56\nC. 法院应排除被告用以证明自身无罪的善行证据和主张（包括任何针对中共的异见活动） 57\nD. 法院应排除暗示被告因交易文件中的免责声明而不构成犯罪的辩护论点、证据和交叉询问 62\nE. 法院应排除声称受害者存在过失或未进行充分尽职调查的证据和主张 65\nF. 法院应排除声称 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）或政府对受害者的经济损失负有责任的论点 66\nG. 法院应排除声称被告意图偿还受害者的证据和主张 67\nH. 法院应排除关于被告个人情况及可能面临之处罚的证据 69\nI. 法院应排除被告为了证明其自身陈述的真实性而提出该等陈述 71\n\n权威判例与法规目录\n页码\n判例\nBourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) 3\nFeis v. United States, 394 F. App'x 797 (2d Cir. 2010) 3\nGeorge v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1990) 2\nIn re Reserve Fund Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 4346 (PGG), 2012 WL 12354233 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012) 10\nNeder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) 64\nPappas v. Middle Earth Condo. Ass'n, 963 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1992) 3, 9\nPotamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage Corp., 38 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 1994) 35\nRogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975) 70\nShannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994) 70\nUnited States v. Adelekan, 567 F. Supp. 3d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) 65\nUnited States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2011) 59\nUnited States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007) 65\nUnited States v. Ayelotan, 917 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2019) 34, 35\nUnited States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) 46\nUnited States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1990) 46\nUnited States v. Bankman-Fried, No. 22 Cr. 673 (LAK), 2023 WL 4194773 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2023) 68\nUnited States v. Battaglia, No. 05 Cr. 774 (KMW), 2008 WL 144826 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008) 69\nUnited States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978) 58\nUnited States v. Berger, 188 F. Supp. 2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 69\nUnited States v. Buckley, 101 F.3d 685, 1996 WL 282140 (2d Cir. 1996) 68\nUnited States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2000) 13, 27\nUnited States v. Cheung Kin Ping, 555 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1977) 67\nUnited States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553 (2d Cir. 1991) 13, 14\nUnited States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir.) 14\nUnited States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 1999) 13, 14, 21\nUnited States v. Dupree, 706 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2013) 2\nUnited States v. Dupree, 870 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2017) 14\nUnited States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1980) 15\nUnited States v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133 (2d Cir. 1995) 15\nUnited States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999) 3\nUnited States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936 (2d Cir. 1997) 13\nUnited States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014) 3\nUnited States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 70\nUnited States v. Inserra, 34 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1994) 21\nUnited States v. Jabar, 19 F.4th 66 (2d Cir. 2021) 68\nUnited States v. Josephberg, 562 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2009) 67\nUnited States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1995) 46\nUnited States v. Lange, 834 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2016) 69\nUnited States v. Males, 459 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2006) 68\nUnited States v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 2010) 46\nUnited States v. Miller, No. 18 Cr. 202 (ARR), 2018 WL 4961458 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2018) 35\nUnited States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1991) 69\nUnited States v. Padilla, 203 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2000) 3\nUnited States v. Paul, 110 F.3d 869 (2d Cir. 1997) 46\nUnited States v. Qualls, 613 F. App'x 25 (2d Cir. 2015) 35\nUnited States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 2007) 13\nUnited States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1990) 14\nUnited States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430 (2d Cir. 1994) 4\nUnited States v. Rivera, No. 13 Cr. 149 (KAM), 2015 WL 1725991 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015) 59\nUnited States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1990) 15\nUnited States v. Rom, 528 F. App'x 24 (2d Cir. 2013) 34\nUnited States v. Romero-Padilla, 583 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2009) 21\nUnited States v. Russo, 302 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 2002) 9\nUnited States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1990) 58\nUnited States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1980) 69\nUnited States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2006) 15, 26\nUnited States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 4\nUnited States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785 (2d Cir. 1994) 13\nUnited States v. Thomas, 581 F. App'x 100 (2d Cir. 2014) 68\nUnited States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186 (2d Cir. 1993) 4\nUnited States v. Tussa, 816 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1987) 15, 26\nUnited States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2013) 64\nUnited States v. Vincent, 416 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2005) 68\nUnited States v. Watts, 934 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 68\nUnited States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2017) 64, 65, 66\nUnited States v. Weigand, No. 20 Cr. 188 (JSR), 2021 WL 568173 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2021) 35\nUnited States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178 (2d Cir. 1993) 14\n18 U.S.C. § 3505 41, 43, 51\nFed. R. Evid. 104(a) 9\nFed. R. Evid. 402 65\nFed. R. Evid. 403 21, 32, 52\nFed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(A) & 405(a) 54\nFed. R. Evid. 404(b) 20\nFed. R. Evid. 801(c) 8\nFed. R. Evid. 802 8\nFed. R. Evid. 803(6) 42\nFed. R. Evid. 803(6)(D) 41\n\n在定于 2024年5月20日 开始对被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）和 Yanping Wang（王雁平）进行审判之前，政府谨此提交这些审前预备动议。\n\n事实背景\n\n2024年1月3日，大陪审团作出了替代起诉书 S2 23 Cr. 118 (AT)，ECF No. 215（“起诉书”）。该起诉书指控被告犯有一系列欺诈和洗钱罪行，指控其行为诈骗了 1,000 多名受害者超过 $1 billion。起诉书还指控被告密谋违反《反勒索与受贿组织法》（“RICO”），即密谋建立并运营一个企业以推进多项欺诈和洗钱犯罪。\n\n这些指控源于被告欺诈性挪用投资者汇入郭氏企业的数百万美元资金，以及被告对这些受害投资者所作的相关虚假和误导性陈述，其目的全在于获取并据有受害者的资金。随后，被告将数百万美元的被盗资金用于各种用途，其中包括：通过对冲基金投资进行高风险的 $100 million 押注，最终使郭文贵的儿子受益；为郭文贵的游艇和私人飞机支付费用；斥资约 $40 million 购买、翻修和布置位于新泽西州马瓦市的一座面积达 50,000 平方英尺的豪宅（“马瓦豪宅”）；为郭文贵的儿子购买一辆价值 $4 million 的法拉利轿车；为与郭文贵游艇相关的 $37 million “贷款”提供资金；以及总体上用于自我牟利。\n\n在审判中，政府方预计将传唤受害投资者、Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）旗下公司的前雇员，以及一名其财务分析将证明投资者资金遭到挪用的总结性证人等证人。政府方还打算出示被告人犯罪行为的书面及纪录证据，其中包括网络直播与发帖、财务记录以及私人通信等。\n\n辩论意见\n\nI. 被告人的共谋人及代理人的陈述具有可采性\n\n在审判中，政府方将寻求将被告人的共谋人、代理人及雇员的庭外陈述作为证明其所述事实真实性的证据出示。此类陈述（包括下文所述的特定陈述）具有可采性，且不受传闻证据规则的排除。\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n1. 传闻证据规则\n\n《联邦证据规则》（Federal Rules of Evidence）将传闻定义为陈述者在庭外作出的、“在证据中提出以证明陈述中所主张事项之真实性”的陈述。Fed. R. Evid. 801(c)。传闻证据仅在符合列举的例外情形时方具可采性。Fed. R. Evid. 802。然而，“如果所提出的陈述的意义仅仅在于其被作出的这一事实本身，则不会对其所主张之任何事项的真实性提出异议，该陈述便不是传闻。”Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) 顾问委员会注释。因此，为证明其对听者产生之影响而提出的陈述不是传闻。同上；亦见 United States v. Dupree, 706 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 2013)（“我们一再裁定，如果一项陈述如同本案一样提出并非为了证明其真实性，而是为了证明听者已受到告知，则该陈述不是传闻。”）；George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1990)（“诚然，一项庭外陈述若非为了证明所主张事项的真实性而提出，而仅仅是为了证明被告已知晓某种危险，则该陈述不是传闻。”）。\n\n2. 规则第 801(d)(2)(D) 条\n\n《联邦证据规则》第 801(d)(2)(D) 条规定，“在下列情况下，陈述不是传闻……该陈述系针对相对方提出，且……由该方的代理人或雇员在该关系存续期间就属于该关系范围内的事项所作出。”若要根据本条规则采纳一项陈述，法院必须认定：“(1) 存在代理关系；(2) 该陈述是在该关系存续期间作出的；以及 (3) 该陈述涉及属于该代理范围内的事项。”Feis v. United States, 394 F. App'x 797, 799 (2d Cir. 2010)（援引 Pappas v. Middle Earth Condo. Ass'n, 963 F.2d 534, 537 (2d Cir. 1992)）。正如第二巡回法院所阐述的那样，“根据本条规则的可采性应当予以宽容准许”，并且存在一种“宽松的”可采性标准，该标准植根于这样一种认识：代理人和雇员通常是对其“受雇期间所实施的某些行为最为了解”的人。Pappas, 963 F.2d at 537。\n\n3. 规则第 801(d)(2)(E) 条\n\n《联邦证据规则》第 801(d)(2)(E) 条相关部分规定，“在下列情况下，陈述不是传闻……该陈述系针对相对方提出，且……由该方的共谋人在共谋期间为推动共谋而作出。”若要根据本条规则采纳一项陈述，地区法院必须依优势证据标准认定两项事实：(1) 存在包含被告及陈述者在内的共谋；以及 (2) 该陈述是在该共谋过程中且为推动该共谋而作出的。Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987); United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1999)。“在认定指控的共谋之存在及成员构成时，法院必须考虑该陈述周围的环境情况，以及指控的共谋人陈述本身的內容。”United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2014)。在认定作为前提条件的共谋是否已经成立时，法院不受《证据规则》的约束，参见 Fed. R. Evid. 104(a)，且“地区法院可以考虑传闻陈述本身”作为“共谋存在”的证据。United States v. Padilla, 203 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2000)（援引 Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 181）。要构成推动共谋，一项陈述“必须在某种程度上旨在促进或便利实现该共谋的目标。”United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 436 (2d Cir. 1994)。在此标准下，共谋人的陈述如果“可以被合理解释为鼓励共谋人或其他人推进共谋，或增强共谋人或其他人对共谋的效用”，则具有可采性。United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1988)。\n\nB. 论析\n\n1. 共谋人的陈述不是传闻\n\n政府方打算将 Kwok（郭文贵）和 Wang（王雁平）的共谋人的陈述作为证据出示，包括共同被告人 Kin Ming Je（余建明）以及其他共谋人，例如 Qiang Guo（郭强），又名“Mileson”（郭文贵之子），以及 Haoran He（何浩然，郭氏企业旗下数个实体（包括 G|CLUBS 和 G|FASHION）的主张实益拥有人）。这些陈述是为推动所指控的共谋而作出的，因此不受传闻证据规则的排除。\n\n法院可以作出初步裁定，认定余建明、Mileson 及何浩然的陈述针对本案审判被告人具有可采性，但须以在审判中出示足以证明共谋存在的证据（包括陈述本身）为前提条件。United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993)（“[作为共谋人陈述提出的陈述可以在附条件的基础上被采纳为证据，但须以随后提交确立存在涉及被告之共谋的必要证据为前提条件]”）。审判中的证据将依优势证据充分证明郭文贵、王雁平、余建明、Mileson 及何浩然加入了共谋，且这些共谋人在共谋过程中并为推动共谋作出了陈述。\n\na. 录音的 Crane 通话\n\n包含余建明和 Mileson 的共谋人陈述的一类证据，由与郭氏企业一名雇员（Employee-1（雇员-1））的电话录音组成。雇员-1 录制了与郭氏企业内部人员的一系列通话。其中一些通话是包含多人的电话会议，有时包括各被告人，而另一些通话则是直接与余建明的一对一通话，或直接与 Mileson 的一对一通话。这一系列通话中讨论的总体议题，是一个名为 Crane Advisory Services（Crane（克莱恩咨询服务公司））的实体收到的超过约 120,000,000 美元的资金。结合雇员-1 为郭氏企业所从事的工作，雇员-1 注册成立了 Crane 并为 Crane 开设了银行账户。雇员-1 与被告人王雁平达成合意，将来自某农场的一笔由 G|CLUBS 会员费资金构成的转账接收至 Crane 的银行账户中——由 Crane 充当 G|CLUBS 的托管代理，因为 G|CLUBS 无法维持正常运作的银行账户。此后，Crane 最终在其银行账户中接收了超过约 120,000,000 美元的 G|CLUBS 投资者资金。在受到被告人要求将这些资金转至境外的施压后，雇员-1 开始录制其与被告人及其共谋人的通话。最终，Crane 收到的资金被转账至 G|CLUBS 以及 Aaron Mitchell（亚伦·米切尔）的托管账户，米切尔是一名代表各被告人及 G|CLUBS 并代表 G|CLUBS 接收资金的律师。米切尔的托管账户从 Crane 接收了约 46,000,000 美元，但米切尔随后并未将该款项转给 G|CLUBS。相反，米切尔将全部金额转入由余建明名义上的投资基金 Hamilton 持有的银行账户。随后，该笔款项被用于以约 40,000,000 美元购买和翻修 Mahwah Mansion（马鞍豪宅）。该购买和翻修亦由米切尔安排。\n\nb. 余建明陈述的示例\n\n作为余建明就 Crane 所接收款项之陈述的示例，在 2021年5月4日 或该日前后雇员-1 与余建明之间的一次录音通话中，余建明作出了数项为推动共谋且可作为证明其事实真实性之证据采纳的陈述。在通话开始时，余建明表示“负责人［即郭文贵］打电话来了”，且余建明理解这笔超过约 120,000,000 美元款项的汇款人“已经签约购买 G Club 的会员资格”。在雇员-1 解释并非所有汇款人都是如此、且 Crane 收到了数百万美元的电汇——远高于 G|CLUBS 最高 50,000 美元的会员级别——之后，余建明解释道：“我认为他们首先是购买 G Club 会员资格，但他们期望可能……你知道，在未来的 GTV 上获得一些股份，我认为这是他们的期望。”雇员-1 随后回应称：“现在你跟我说是 G Club。上周还是直接用于 GTV 投资。好吗？这些金额根本说不通。”余建明回答说：“我知道。我知道。我知道。”余建明随后说：“Yvette（王雁平）在跟进这件事吗？比如，我的意思是，她应该跟进这件事，比如她应该负责去谈所有那些［与某关键农场负责人的对话］。”雇员-1 回答说：“她参与了。但我与 Yvette 的接洽是……这笔钱进到 Crane 是为了投资巴哈马的 GTV 媒体公司……但上周情况变了。先是变成了喜币，然后现在是 G Club，现在又是……媒体公司。”余建明随后部分回答道：“所有这些钱都应该属于 G Club。”通话以余建明陈述“负责人［即郭文贵］来电话了”结束。该录音（与 Crane 的其他录音一样）具有可采性，且余建明的陈述——构成被告人的共谋人及代理人的陈述（如同将在审判中出示的余建明的其他陈述一样）——可用于证明其所述事实的真实性。\n\nc. Mileson 陈述的示例\n\n雇员-1（Employee-1）还与Kwok（郭文贵）的儿子Mileson（郭强）进行过数次通话录音，尽管郭强在G|CLUBS并无正式任职。例如，在2021年5月6日或该日前后的一次通话中，雇员-1录下了一次与郭强、郭文贵、被告的另一名律师Mitchell（米切尔）以及G|CLUBS的总法律顾问之间的通话。1 在通话期间，郭强指示雇员-1向其发送一份追踪投资者资金的文件，并在文件上写明“保密，律师特权”（confidentiality, lawyer's privilege）。米切尔回应称，若要适用特权，律师必须代表相关当事方，并且“严格从法律上讲，郭强在G Club没有任何所有权权益”。郭强随后回答：“但实际上我有，Aaron [Mitchell]（亚伦·[米切尔]）……我是该基金会的委托人，所以我有。……但我并不是积极地，嗯，但UBO [ultimate beneficial owner，最终实益所有人] 是He [Haoran]（[何]浩然）先生。我只是委托人。根据荷兰法律，我确实有某种话语权，但我没有行使它。”郭强陈述中指的是最终拥有G|CLUBS实体的荷兰基金会，而该基金会转而名义上为何浩然所有。利用何浩然——而非郭强——将发送至G|CLUBS的投资者资金转回至被告及郭强手中，正是该阴谋的核心部分。确实，在2021年5月6日的同一次通话中，郭文贵用其他参会人员听不懂的普通话对郭强说：“对于这笔钱，它是合法的。它是……汇到这个基金会 [即 Hamilton] ，明白吗？就按照之前说的，两个步骤。对吧？一个是把钱转到BVI账户 [即 G|CLUBS 母实体 G Clubs International Limited 的银行账户，一家在英属维尔京群岛注册成立的实体] ，然后何先生会下达指令 [将这些资金转至 Hamilton] 。对吧？在此期间，我们按照计划行事。”2 当然，如上所述，Crane（克莱恩）资金确实最终被汇至Hamilton（汉密尔顿）——包括由米切尔汇出——随后用于为郭文贵及其家人购买、翻修和装修Mahwah Mansion（马瓦豪宅）（该事项亦由米切尔协助促成）。该录音（正如\n\n1 如下文所述，G|CLUBS就克莱恩收到的资金的处置对克莱恩提起了仲裁索赔。在与政府方的沟通中，G|CLUBS已就包括克莱恩仲裁在内的多项标的事项放弃了特权。\n\n2 在随后郭强与雇员-1两人之间的通话中，雇员-1询问：“钱去哪儿了？你想让它去哪儿？”郭强简单回答道：“美国境外的任何地方。”\n\n克莱恩的其他录音一样）具有可采性，且郭强的陈述——构成被告的共谋者及代理人的陈述（如同将在庭审中出示的其他郭强陈述一样）——可作为其实质真实性证据出示。\nd. 何浩然陈述之范例\n\n证据还将显示，何浩然是一名共谋者，因此其为推进该阴谋而作出的陈述具有可采性。如上述郭文贵对郭强的陈述所暗指的，何浩然实际上确实指示了将G|CLUBS投资者的收益转往境外，且发生过多次——转至United Kingdom（英国）、转至Switzerland（瑞士）、转至Kyrgyz Republic（吉尔吉斯共和国）。例如，何浩然指示将一笔以“贷款”为名义的1000万美元G|CLUBS资金转至其在英国据称拥有的名为Fiesta Property Developments Ltd.（简称“Fiesta”）的房地产开发公司。当银行询问该笔首次电汇的用途时，一名代表何浩然协助办理该笔转账的G|CLUBS员工回复称，Fiesta亦为何浩然所有，这笔据称的贷款是“用于他们计划以总价1000万美元购买的房产的可能首付款”。3 在银行批准电汇并将1000万美元转至Fiesta后，转至Fiesta的G|CLUBS资金被用于代表郭强支付一辆价值400万美元的法拉利跑车，这在银行记录、合同以及与法拉利经销商的电子邮件沟通中均有体现。何浩然作出的或指使他人作出的、关于所谓房地产首付款的此类陈述，作为共谋者陈述具有可采性。\n\n基于诸多相同理由，Je（余建明）、郭强和何浩然的陈述根据《联邦证据规则》第 801(d)(2)(D) 条亦属于被告代理人的陈述。事实上，郭文贵字面上被\n\n3 该陈述亦具有可采性，因为出示该陈述并非为了证明其实质真实性，而是为了证明其虚假性。\n\n其代理人（包括其共谋者）称为“委托人”（the Principal）。正如庭审证据将证明的，余建明、郭强和何浩然在Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）旗下的公司工作，被告控制并运营这些公司，而余建明、郭强和何浩然——以及代表他们工作的员工——的陈述均在其代理关系范围之内，因此依据第 801(d)(2)(D) 条不属于传闻证据。参见，例如，Pappas 案，963 F.2d at 537。在辩方可能主张这些录音和电子邮件记录的是合法的商业讨论而非旨在推进犯罪计划的讨论的范围内，该事实（政府方对此存疑）也不会削弱这些材料在第 801(d)(2)(D) 条下的可采性，因为该规则准许采纳旨在推进与被告的合资/共同事业的陈述，无论该事业的目标是否具有犯罪性质。参见 United States v. Russo 案，302 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 2002)（“支持将发言者视作被告代理人的合资事业目标根本无需具有犯罪性质。”）。\n2. 郭氏企业代理人及雇员的陈述不属于传闻证据\n\n庭审证据将显示，郭文贵与Wang（王雁平）控制着郭氏企业旗下的各家公司，包括（但不限于）郭氏家族办公室实体、GTV、Himalaya Farm（喜马拉雅农场）实体、G|CLUBS、G|FASHION、G News、HCHK实体以及Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）。郭氏企业雇员受雇于上述公司期间所作出的陈述，或由农场成员所作出的陈述，如文件所反映或其预期的庭审证词中所述，依据第 801(d)(2)(D) 条均属于被告代理人的陈述，因此不属于传闻证据。如上所述，在郭氏企业旗下公司工作的人员称郭文贵为“委托人”或“老板”，郭文贵对这些公司行使最终控制权。王雁平在郭氏企业\n\n各公司中扮演着实质上的首席执行官（“CEO”）角色，尽管她在这些公司通常缺乏正式职务，或者这些公司另设了其他傀儡CEO。同样，郭文贵控制着各农场，在其网络直播中讨论其投资“项目”——有时很直接，有时较为隐晦——并通过农场的层级结构向其数以千计的追随者传播信息与指令。这一相同原则同样适用于代表被告或郭氏企业公司工作的其他类别代理人，例如律师、4 顾问及翻译。参见 In re Reserve Fund Sec. Litig. 案，No. 09 Civ. 4346 (PGG), 2012 WL 12354233, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012)（当针对控制实体的人出示时，该实体员工所作陈述具有可采性）。\n\n虽然该法律框架适用于被告所有代理人和雇员的陈述，但政府方当然不会在庭审中出示所有这些人员的陈述。简而言之，在评估政府方将要出示的郭氏企业雇员或代理人陈述的可采性时，法院应适用上述框架：这些陈述不属于传闻证据，可作为其实质真实性证据出示。\n\n4 参见 United States v. Amato 案，356 F.3d 216, 220 (2d Cir. 2004)（per curiam）（维持采纳被告前任律师信函的裁定）；United States v. Arrington 案，867 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1989)（“对于在证据上使用被告律师庭外陈述的前提条件，并无须遵循的特殊程序或须进行的利益权衡”）；United States v. McKeon 案，738 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1984)（“律师陈述的一般可采性……已得到确立。”）；United States v. Margiotta 案，662 F.2d 131, 142 (2d Cir. 1981)（“律师就其受聘范围内事项所作的陈述，可作为针对聘用该律师当事方的证据采纳。”）；United States v. Dolleris 案，408 F.2d 918, 921 (6th Cir. 1969)（维持采纳律师在会议上所作陈述的裁定，即便当事人当时并未出席会议）。第二巡回法院就刑事被告人的律师在前次刑事审判中的陪审团辩论意见的可采性确立了五要素检验标准。United States v. McKeon 案，738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984)；参见 United States v. Amato 案，356 F.3d 216 (2d Cir. 2004)；United States v. Arrington 案，867 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1989)（将 McKeon 案五要素检验标准限制于前任律师的陪审团辩论意见）。该检验标准在此并无关联，因为政府方不会寻求引入任何先前的陪审团辩论意见。\n3. 被告或其代理人制作的视频、帖子、文章及翻译不属于传闻证据\n\n政府方将寻求出示由郭文贵或郭文贵的代理人制作的、且通常托管于郭文贵名下媒体平台（如 G News、GTV 和 GETTR）上的视频、帖子和文章。该内容以及郭文贵代理人（通常是以志愿者身份工作的农场成员）对此类内容进行的翻译——这些翻译通常已整合到内容本身之中，例如带有英文字幕的郭文贵视频直播——属于代理人的陈述，依据第 801(d)(2)(D) 条不属于传闻证据。\n\n 各农场及其他与NFSC（新中国联邦）相关的组织（如 NFSC News），均由郭文贵控制，并定期在 G News、GTV 和 GETTR 上发布内容——这些媒体平台受郭文贵和王雁平控制。5 这些帖子经常将郭文贵网络直播的内容转录或用英文总结，且通常包含郭文贵直播的英文字幕视频。例如，Los Angeles Farm（洛杉矶农场，Himalaya Los Angeles Pangu，喜马拉雅洛杉矶盘古6）于2021年11月16日（即喜马拉雅交易所推出约两周后）在 G News 上发布的一篇帖子，包含了郭文贵近期网络直播的英文字幕摘录，其中郭文贵解释称汇款的人——“Gclub的买家”、“法治基金的捐赠者”以及“GTV投资者、借款人 [即 农场借贷项目中的出借人] 和喜币持有者”——未来将获得“VVIP待遇”。如该 G News 帖子及随附视频所述，郭文贵随后进一步表示喜马拉雅交易所价值2万亿美元，而GTV投资者拥有其5%\n\n5 确实，这些网站上的内容甚至证明了这一点。例如，在郭文贵于2020年4月在 G News 上发布的总结其一次直播的帖子中（使用经认证的用户名“Miles”），郭文贵表示：“战友们，我给你们打造 G-TV、G-News，是不是？”郭文贵还接着说：“大家都看到我们忙得不得了，G-TV、G-News、王雁平和我们法治基金的所有员工。”参见 http\n\n6 盘古系指盘古大观，即郭文贵在北京的一个房地产开发项目。\n\n的股份，即1000亿美元：\n\n根据你们不同的投资，全人类没人敢这么做\n\n你们从来没想过战友们总共投资了 GTV 多少，不到10亿美元，而现在 GTV 拥有喜马拉雅储备 5% 的股份，你们知道这价值多少吗？2万亿的 5% 是多少，1000亿美元，这还不包括其他机构的投资，你们有多少钱，你们算过吗？\n\n[图像：_page_18_Picture_4.jpeg]\n\n此类视频——由郭文贵的代理人发布在郭文贵控制的网站上，包含郭文贵的陈述及其代理人的英译文——依据第 801(d)(2)(D) 条不属于传闻证据。7\nII. 某些证据作为直接证据或依据第 404(b) 条具有可采性\n\n如后文详述，以下证据在审判中具有相关性且可采纳，既作为对指控罪名的直接证据，亦依据《联邦证据规则》（Federal Rule of Evidence）第 404(b) 条：（1）被告人用于继续诈骗被害人的不断演变的骗局，包括 A10 项目（A10 Project）；（2）Kwok（郭文贵）关于向法治实体（Rule of Law entities）捐赠 1 亿美元的虚假承诺；（3）郭文贵的中国及香港资产在为 Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）筹款之前即已被查封的事实；7\n\n7 此外，诸如此类的陈述由于另一原因亦非传闻证据：提出这些陈述并非为了证明其真实性，而是为了证明其虚假性。\n\n（4）被告人在被捕后继续从监狱领导郭氏企业的事实；以及（5）郭文贵的主张破产。8\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n1. 直接证据\n\n直接证据“并不限于直接确立犯罪构成要件的证据”。United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936, 941 (2d Cir. 1997)。正如第二巡回法院所解释的那样，“为了具备相关性，证据只需倾向于证明政府的主张，而能够为政府对指控的证明增加背景和维度的证据即具有该倾向。”Id.；accord United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir. 1991)。第二巡回法院一再裁定，如果行为和陈述（a）“产生于与被控罪行相同的交易或一系列交易”，（b）“与关于被控罪行的证据不可分割地交织在一起”，或者（c）“对于完整交代受审罪行的始末必不可少”，则可作为被控罪行的直接证据采纳，且“根据《联邦证据规则》第 404(b) 条不被视为其他犯罪证据”。United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000)；see also United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 309 (2d Cir. 2007)。\n\n因此，在起诉书包含共谋罪名项的情况下（如同本案），“据称为了推进所指控共谋而实施的行为”被视为“所控行为本身的一部分”。United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir. 1999)；see United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir. 1994)（解释称“未被起诉的行为可作为共谋本身的直接证据采纳”）。\n\n8 基于本文阐述的理由，该等证据均为关于敲诈勒索、欺诈和洗钱罪行的直接证据，无需依据第 404(b) 条提供通知。无论如何，本动议依据第 404(b) 条构成政府意图在审判中提供该等证据的通知。\n\n此外，未被起诉的行为的证据可被正当地采纳，以提供被控共谋存在的背景，或被控犯罪的动机和故意。Coonan, 938 F.2d at 1561。特别是，“背景证据可被采纳以表明例如围绕事件的环境，或对实施某些行为时的理解或故意作出解释。”Id.（引用 United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1388 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988)）。\n\n2. 第 404(b) 条\n\n被告人既往犯罪、不当行为或其他行为的证据可根据第 404(b) 条予以采纳，以证明“动机、机会、故意、准备、计划、明知、身份、无疏忽或非出于意外”。Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)。第二巡回法院遵循一种“包容性方法”，据此“只要目的不是为了表明被告人的犯罪倾向，既往行为证据可用于任何目的而被采纳”。United States v. Dupree, 870 F.3d 62, 76 (2d Cir. 2017)。此类证据在满足以下条件时可予采纳：（1）出于正当目的提出；（2）与被告人受审的罪行具有相关性；（3）证明力大于偏见性；以及（4）如经请求，在限制性指示的约束下采纳。See United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1990)。其他行为证据通常被采纳“以向陪审团告知被控共谋的背景，从而有助于解释犯罪参与者之间非法关系的演变过程，或解释共同共谋者之间存在的互信”。Dupree, 870 F.3d at 76（引用 Diaz, 176 F.3d at 79）。\n\n3. 第 403 条\n\n无论证据是作为直接证据采纳还是根据第 404(b) 条采纳，该等证据的证明价值均不得“被不当偏见的危险实质性压倒”。Fed. R. Evid. 403。根据第 403 条进行偏见分析的试金石在于，所提供的未被起诉行为的证据是否“不涉及任何比［被告人被］指控的罪行更具轰动性或更令人不安的行为”。United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990)。总的来说，“任何高度证明有罪的证据都会对该被告人的利益造成损害。第 403 条所关注的偏见涉及‘除倾向于证明证明其获准采纳的事实或争议点之外的某种不利影响’”。United States v. Gelzer, 50 F.3d 1133, 1139 (2d Cir. 1995)（引用 United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980)）。只要原本具有证明力的证据存在任何产生不当偏见的风险，法院即可提供限制性指示，以提醒陪审团被告人并未因被控罪行之外的任何罪行受审。See United States v. Tussa, 816 F.2d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1987)（限制性指示足以排除偏见）；see generally United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2006)（“[法]律承认陪审团遵循限制性指示的强烈推定”）。\n\nB. 论述\n\n1. 互相关联的骗局的证据具有可采性\n\n被告人不断演变的投资骗局的证据，可作为被控罪行的证据予以采纳。起诉书对四大主要骗局进行了例示性描述：GTV私募（GTV Private Placement）、农场贷款项目（Farm Loan Program）、G|CLUBS 以及喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）。这些各类欺诈骗局的具体细节一直在不断变化和演变。例如，在喜马拉雅交易所及其喜马拉雅美元（或喜美元，H Dollars）和喜马拉雅币（或喜币，H Coins）正式推出之前，被告人在 GTV 私募期间招揽资金购买 G 美元（G Dollars）和 G 币（G Coins）。作为喜马拉雅交易所骗局的一部分，被告人还招揽对“数字银行”的投资。正如起诉书所述，在非法的 GTV 私募被叫停后，被告人继续通过农场贷款项目和 G|CLUBS 诱骗追随者汇款购买 GTV 股份。在某一节点，由于 GTV 已停业，据称投资是针对一家名为 Freedom Media Ventures Limited（自由媒体风投有限公司）的新媒体公司，该公司在起诉书中被指定为郭氏企业的成员实体。起诉书 ¶ 3(a)。当该所谓的媒体公司无疾而终时，被告人随后开始为一个名为“A15项目”（A15 Project）的新骗局筹集资金。根据该骗局，受害投资者寄出的资金此时将用于持有 G|CLUBS 5% 的股份、GETTR 5% 的股份以及喜马拉雅交易所 5% 的股份——所有这些实体均在起诉书中被列为郭氏企业的成员。\n\n临近被告人被捕之时，A15 骗局被修改为“A10项目”（A10 Project），该项目排除了 G|CLUBS 股份，因而涉及 GETTR 5% 的股份和喜马拉雅交易所 5% 的股份。在网络陈述中，郭文贵指示其追随者联系“Fei Fei（飞飞）”以获取 A10 项目的详细信息。2023 年 2 月 17 日在郭文贵的 G News 平台上发布的一篇帖子（根据 G News 的数据，该帖子已被浏览 4300 次）将飞飞在直播中描述的 A10 项目（英文）总结如下：\n\n关于 A10 项目\n\nGettr 的 5% 股权和 Himalaya Reserve（喜马拉雅储备）的 5% 股权合称为 A10。\n\nGClubs 是私募股权公司的一种运营形式。作为全球顶级俱乐部，其保密级别极高，因此不参与本项目。\n\n在 A10 投资 1 元相当于投资 10,000 元，其股份具有稀缺性和极高的经济增长价值。\n\nGettr 和喜马拉雅储备将不会寻找机构募集资金，而是将直接上市并交易股票。现阶段，通过战友们的参与，筹款流程已经完成。\n\n由于 A10 的投资权益与投资金额无关，募集过多资金会摊薄未来的预期，再加上中共（CCP）的持续破坏，筹款将随时关闭。有意投资的战友，迅速行动是参与 A10 项目的最大保障。\n\nA10 股票未来将价值几何？大家可以参考 Twitter、Facebook、Google 和 ChatGPT 等高科技公司当前的市场估值。\n\n接下来，结合人工智能（AI）技术和其他高科技，Gettr 将成为一个带有数字货币的社交媒体平台。大家持有的不仅是 Gettr 5% 的股份，更是 5% 的 Gate 加 5% 的区块链数字货币。\n\n喜马拉雅交易所即将推出的冷钱包可以与其他数字货币兑换，这意味着部分数字资产可以进行交易。所采用的区块链技术（NFT）无法伪造，且独一无二、极为特殊。即便无价古董亦无法与之相提并论，因为再好的古董也能被仿造。\n\nA10 必须解决一系列遗留问题，大量资金已经进入该项目。新老 Gclub 卡持有者、SEC（美国证券交易委员会）退款、数字银行资金转入 A10。\n\nA10 项目的正义本质\n\nSEC 退款将退回至原 GTV 投资者的个人账户，个人有权选择是否投资。如果选择不投票，喜币配额将被取消。SEC 转换没有 5% 的奖励，因为此前已有 0.5 的喜币配额，但你拥有一张卡。\n\n新增投资分为两种：10 万元以上和 10 万元以下。新增投资是为了顾及许多小额投资的战友，尤其是墙内的战友。新中国联邦（New Federal State of China）设计了像特殊目的载体（SPV）这样的公司和基金来帮助他们。每位小额投资的战友都会有相应的合同，并拥有自己的股权。小额资助正在申请中。\n\n10 万元以上有 5% 的奖励。新增投资是与新基金签订合同，个人作为基金的一份份额，通过该基金认领股票，并直接发行股票用于上市和交易。\n\n为什么我们要帮助小额投资的战友加入 A10 项目？\n\n首先，新中国联邦不是投资机构，而是一个旨在消灭中国共产党、为中国人民树立信仰并创造真正价值的实体。\n\n其次，共产党更害怕的是将要消灭共产党的人数以及民心的凝聚。我们要凝聚拥有共同价值观的人，而不是一群富人，所以我们希望有更多小额投资的战友参与进来。\n\n投资渠道\n\n在世界各个时区，无论是法定货币还是 HDO，都有相应的战友为大家提供相应的渠道。\n\n新老 GClubs 卡都拥有股权。新增投资是投资于目前在阿布扎比的新卡机构。两种卡的性质和服务完全相同。GClubs 是核心资产，因此迁至阿布扎比运营。\n\n该卡以“万美元”为单位计算。GClubs 卡唯一的义务是缴纳年费。卡的激活由联盟专班根据个人意愿办理。\n\nSEC（美国证券交易委员会）进行了切换，随后出现了盖特币（Gettr coin）。那些享有0.2或0.5喜币（H Coin）额度投资的人将不再享有新的5%奖励。\n\n新的5%奖励是针对新法币入金和新投资体系的奖励。\n\nHDO（喜美元）的5%奖励也是新法币入金，因为此前入金的人已经获得了喜币的额度。\n\n2023年1月28日0:00之后，如果通过卖出喜币获取HDO或购卡投资A10，将不再获得5%的奖励。\n\n农场对2023年1月1日之后的HDO转账至FMV账户报告、退币以及法定货币入金等法币入金资金均有详细记录和渠道。如果通过农场币入金，则享有5%的奖励。\n\nhttp（访问于2024年3月24日）。9 如上所示，当时（即在政府执行了起诉书中所述的扣押令之后、被告被捕前不久），被告还在推销盖特币以及其他骗局。\n\n9 数日前，政府保存了该文章（及其他文章）的副本并向被告进行了开示。该文章（及其他文章）目前在G News上已无法访问。\n\nA10骗局——虽在具体欺诈细节上有所不同，但均以承诺极高回报以及需要迅速行动为特征——可作为起诉书中指控罪名的直接证据予以采纳。诚然，如上所示，A10项目与早期及正在进行的骗局直接相关——涉及对“原始GTV投资者”、协助投资的农场（即新中国联邦）、“GClubs会员卡”以及HDO和喜币的提及——并构成就起诉书中所指控的每一项罪名均可采纳的证据。正如关于向Crane汇款的录音对话描述所体现的那样（见上文第5-8页），一旦被告收到受害者的款项，他们就会一再改变并不实陈述受害者资金本应如何使用或投资。如果对被告的众多骗局是否存在关联尚存任何疑问，政府预计受害证人将作证称其在被告的多个投资“项目”中均遭受了欺骗。而且毫无争议的是，诸如A10项目此类相互关联的骗局，是指控的共谋犯罪（包括敲诈勒索、电信欺诈、银行欺诈、证券欺诈和洗钱犯罪）的可采证据。见 Diaz 案，176 F.3d at 79（“[被指控为促进涉案共谋而实施的]行为”被视为“所指控行为本身的组成部分”）；Thai 案，29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir. 1994)（解释称“未受指控的行为可作为共谋本身的直接证据予以采纳”）。\n\n2. 关于被告虚假承诺向法治慈善机构捐赠1亿美元的证据具有可采性\n\n所指控的敲诈勒索共谋由一系列环环相扣的欺诈构成。每一个骗局都为下一个骗局提供支撑，且全部依赖于Kwok（郭文贵）的虚假承诺。2018年11月，郭文贵虚假陈述称他将向法治组织（Rule of Law organizations，郭文贵在作出该虚假承诺后不久建立的一对非营利组织）捐赠1亿美元。10 事实上，郭文贵从未向法治慈善机构捐赠过1亿美元。相反，郭文贵开始将这些所谓的慈善机构用于其个人目的，包括利用其追随者向慈善机构捐赠的资金为其家族办公室实体支付月租，以及向参与骚扰其批评者的抗议者支付报酬。\n\n郭文贵关于法治实体的谎言可作为所指控罪名的直接证据予以采纳。总体而言，与法治实体相关的证据与所指控罪名的证据密不可分。例如，GTV及后续欺诈性投资“项目”中的受害投资者被要求向法治实体捐款，以此作为获得投资资格的前提条件。见起诉书第9(b)段（“郭文贵利用该等非营利组织聚集了支持其所谓反对中国共产党运动的追随者，这些追随者同样倾向于相信郭文贵关于投资和赚钱机会的言论”）。又如，法治实体的人员与在郭文贵企业（Kwok Enterprise）旗下其他公司工作的人员存在重叠，且其中许多实体共用一个办公场所。最后，法治实体的运营时间段（始于2018年底）与所指控的敲诈勒索、欺诈和洗钱犯罪的时间段完全重合。\n\n关于GTV私募、农场借贷项目、G|CLUBS和喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange），郭文贵所谓的1亿美元捐款造成了一种虚假印象，即他有能力为其运动自行提供资金，且这些投资机会不过是郭文贵向其追随者提供的一项慷慨福利；这向投资者提供了虚假的安全感，使他们相信郭文贵绝无侵吞其资金的意图。换言之，关于郭文贵虚假陈述捐赠1亿美元的证据具有可采性，“因为[这些]骗局是相互关联的”：郭文贵“利用其[法治机构捐赠者]作为[未来投资]的来源，并利用”与其声称慷慨资助的非营利组织的关联“来粉饰其体面声誉，从而招募潜在投资者并使其安心”。United States v. Hsu 案，669 F.3d 112, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2012)（此前未受指控的庞氏骗局证据可作为其后竞选资金欺诈的直接证据予以采纳）；亦见 Baez 案，349 F.3d at 93（“未受指控的行为可作为[敲诈勒索]共谋本身的直接证据予以采纳”）；Diaz 案，176 F.3d at 79（“为促进涉案共谋而实施的”行为被视为“所指控行为本身的组成部分”）；United States v. Inserra 案，34 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1994)（“[可]采纳其他不良行为的证据，通过展示与所指控罪名相关的特定事件的背景，向陪审团提供所指控罪行的完整经过。”）。\n\n10 参见，例如 Cezary Podkul & Brian Spegele，《史蒂夫·班农与中国批评人士设立基金调查北京》（Steve Bannon, Chinese Critic Create Fund to Investigate Beijing），《华尔街日报》（Wall St. J.）（2018年11月20日），http（报道称“郭表示他将为所谓的‘法治基金’提供[1亿美元]资金”）。\n\n或者，根据《联邦证据规则》第404(b)条，郭文贵的谎言亦可采纳用于证明其意图、明知、非出于意外以及动机。郭文贵在向其慈善机构募集捐款的同时，就向其慈善机构捐赠巨额款项一事公然说谎，这表明郭文贵随后为获取投资者资金而向其说谎是出于故意和明知，而非出于过失或错误。此外，郭文贵虚假宣布其所谓的捐赠恰好发生在中国香港当局冻结其资产的一个月之后，正如文后进一步所述，该证据可作为证明郭文贵通过欺骗筹集资金的动机的可采证据。见 United States v. Romero-Padilla 案，583 F.3d 126, 130 (2d Cir. 2009)（维持将其他犯罪证据作为直接证据采纳的裁定，因为该证据阐明了被告参与所指控犯罪的动机）。\n\n3. 关于郭文贵的资产在其筹款前被扣押的证据具有可采性\n\n根据郭文贵本人的陈述，郭文贵的资产在其实施筹款（始于法治组织，继而在G系列实体中继续）之前已被中国和中国香港当局扣押，这一事实具有可采性。这些扣押的事实具有可采性，“目的在于通过展示与所指控罪名相关的特定事件的背景，向陪审团提供所指控罪行的完整经过。”Inserra 案，34 F.3d at 89。虽然郭文贵向投资者将自己塑造成拥有看似无限资产的亿万富翁，但实际上，自2017年起，即在所指控的共谋开始前夕，其资产就已经在被中国香港和中国当局扣押。尤为引人注目的是郭文贵在香港的资产被冻结与郭文贵开始筹款活动之间在时间上的紧密相连。2018年10月23日，中国香港针对郭文贵、其子以及他们的关联人员和空壳公司的资产签发了限制令。就在次月，郭文贵宣布成立法治实体（并作出了上文所述的捐赠1亿美元的虚假承诺），并不久后开始募集捐款。因此，这些扣押的事实可作为展示背景并补全所指控罪行完整经过的证据予以采纳。\n\n或者，郭文贵资产被扣押的事实可依据《联邦证据规则》第404(b)条予以采纳。郭文贵资产被扣押是证明其动机——即获取他人资金供郭文贵个人使用——的有力证据。该证据亦可采纳用于证明不存在错误、明知以及意图。郭文贵并非误将他人资金用于个人私利；其之所以这样做，是因为其自身资金正被扣押。\n\n需要明确的是，政府并不打算在其主案举证（case-in-chief）中引入关于资产扣押背后实质原因的任何证据，例如证实违反中国香港洗钱法规并导致扣押令的行为。政府仅仅打算证明郭文贵的资产在其实际向追随者筹集资金之前已被扣押。\n\n证明这些扣押的事实将是显而易见的，因为郭文贵本人曾多次描述过这些情况——包括在其2022年2月声明破产的宣誓誓章中。见 In re Kwok 案，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，ECF 编号 107 第17段及注8（引述并纳入了2018年10月23日的中国香港限制令，并声明“自2017年以来，中共还冻结并扣押了在中国和中国香港的家族资产和所谓资产，导致我甚至无法持有银行账户”）。如果引入扣押事实或香港扣押令本身存在对被告造成不公偏见（unfair prejudice）的任何风险，法院均可通过发布限制性指示来消除任何此类偏见。\n\n4. 捕后行为在附有限制性指示的情况下具有可采性\n\n政府打算提出证据，证明被告在被捕和羁押后继续指导郭氏企业的事务。这些事实是被告在郭氏企业中的角色、其对郭氏企业的控制、其对郭氏企业活动的明知、其故意延续郭氏企业骗局，以及通过企图隐匿而体现出的作贼心虚（consciousness of guilt）的直接证据。\n\n首先，政府打算将郭文贵被捕后在狱中拨打的录音电话作为证据提出。举例而言11：\n\n- 郭文贵被羁押后，从狱中连线参与了与其支持者的在线直播。在一次此类直播中，郭文贵宣布夏奇东（又名长岛、又名“长岛伟哥”、又名“长岛哥”、又名“伟哥”）为喜马拉雅联盟（Himalaya Alliance）的新领导人。\n- 在2023年3月21日的一通狱中电话中，夏奇东向郭文贵汇报了郭氏企业业务的最新情况，概括其实质内容为，喜马拉雅联盟的首席执行官们都在阿布扎比并面临一定的财务困难，但夏奇东等人正在尽全力协助他们。郭文贵指示夏奇东，概括其实质内容为，要尽最大努力协助他们，但不得允许各首席执行官离开阿布扎比，并要保持业务良好运转。\n\n11 以下摘要基于郭文贵普通话通话的英文摘要；正式认证翻译件正在制作中。\n\n- 在 2023 年 3 月 29 日的一通监狱通话中，Kwok（郭文贵）大意是指示其团队无条件服从 Qidong（Qi Dong / 齐东）的领导；在询问了 H Coin（喜币）和 G Fashion 的情况后，郭指示其团队按照原计划执行，不得有任何拖延。当齐东提及某个人时，郭打断了齐东，并告诫他不要说出任何话，也不要说出该人所供职公司的名称。\n\n- 在 2023 年 3 月 30 日与齐东的一通监狱通话中，郭大意是告诉齐东：(1) 郭之所以被捕，是因为 U.S. Government（美国政府）不希望他在 Prakazrel Michel（普拉卡兹雷尔·米歇尔）一案的审理中作证；(2) 郭原定于 3 月 17 日签署的一份据称的合同的价值，该合同本来肯定价值 $5 trillion，如今对战友们而言已经化为乌有。在同一通通话中，郭与齐东同意不谈论那处「Complex（建筑群）」——这似乎是指 Mahwah Mansion（马 Wah 庄园/大宅）。郭与齐东继续讨论 Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）的工作，郭给出了优先事项和指示，包括 (1) 牌照、(2) 支付系统、(3)「第三方」以及 (4)「欧元」。\n\n- 在 2023 年 3 月 31 日的一通通话中，郭大意是指示几位联盟成员：投资项目无论大小都绝不能停，必须按部就班继续进行，尽管资金需要暂时受到控制。\n\n- 在 2023 年 4 月 28 日与一名同 G Fashion 有关联的支持者的通话中，郭大意是指示该人不要谈论有关公司的任何事情，因为通话受到监听；郭随后要求该支持者传达其话语：该支持者在运营方面拥有最终决定权，但必须遵守 NFSC（New Federal State of China / 新中国联邦）的决定和财务指令。\n\n除了直接与他们的代理人通电话之外，政府还打算在审判中提供\n\n证据以证明，在被羁押且通话受到 MDC（Metropolitan Detention Center / 大都会拘留中心）录音期间，被告一直与一名同案共谋者举行律师会面，该人是一名执业律师，但并非本刑事案件的记录在案律师——被告利用该律师在被告与郭氏企业之间传递消息。同样，政府打算提供与郭氏企业内部人员的录音对话，以证明 Wang（王雁平）在羁押期间——即在本案中被捕之后——利用其先前的代理律师传递其请求，以取回存放在 New York City（纽约市）一个邮政信箱中的、包含数百万美元 G|CLUBS 资金（即欺诈所得）的银行支票。\n\n上述内容作为直接证据具有可采性。事实上，这是故意违反美国刑法的有力证据。作为背景，审判中的证据（包括证人证言）将表明，被告在被捕前如何开始将郭氏企业的业务转移到 Abu Dhabi（阿布扎比）。在直播中，郭将此举描述为逃避「United States（美国）的长臂管辖权」的努力。参见 Dkt. 7 at 19（引用 gnews.org/articles/949854）；亦参见起诉书 ¶¶ 21, 57-58（指控 Je 企图将资金转移到阿布扎比以阻碍政府扣押的行为构成妨碍司法公正罪）。郭和王即使在被羁押期间仍继续控制郭氏企业，并企图在被羁押期间获取和隐匿其欺诈所得，这是缺乏善意、故意以及具有欺诈意图的有力证据。也就是说，即使在被告因与 G 系列实体相关的行为而入狱之后，他们仍企图获取 G 系列实体的欺诈所得，并指示其代理人毫无减弱地继续执行这些骗局。此外，被告利用律师来协助并隐匿他们的控制以及犯罪行为的延续（因为律师通信不受 MDC 监控）这一事实，是证明其故意和具有罪责意识的进一步证据。\n\n采纳显示——通过被告本人的话语或其代理人的话语——被告继续从 MDC 控制和运营郭氏企业骗局的证据，不受 Rule 403（《联邦证据规则》第 403 条）的禁止。首先，被捕后证据的证明价值极高。该证据直接涉及被告的欺诈意图和缺乏善意——这是审判中的核心争议问题。该证明价值并没有被「不当偏见」的风险「实质性压倒」。Fed. R. Evid. 403。事实上，引入被告本人的言行并不存在任何不当偏见，因为这些言行是在完全知悉政府指控的情况下做出的，且就监狱通话而言，是在完全知悉其话语正被录音的情况下做出的。这些证据也并不比无可争议地将呈现在陪审团面前的证据更具煽动性：即被告实施了一场大规模骗局，骗取数千人超过十亿美元，在过着游艇、豪宅和其他奢侈品的奢华生活的同时自肥，并且普遍藐视法律运营其骗局——企图逃避欺诈、洗钱和破产法律的执行，并恐吓和骚扰其受害者以企图使他们噤声。无论如何，只要原本具有高度证明价值的证据存在任何不当偏见的风险，法院都可以就「被告已被羁押」这一事实提供限制性指示，正如在例如将犯罪嫌疑人在监狱通话中的自认作为证据提出时的惯常做法一样。参见 United States v. Tussa, 816 F.2d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1987)（限制性指示足以排除偏见）；通常参见 United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2006)（「法律承认陪审团遵循限制性指示的强有力推定。」）；参见例如 United States v. Russo, 302 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 2002)（采纳被告被录音的监狱通话作为相对方当事人的自认）；United States v. Donovan, 577 F. Supp. 3d 107, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)（「法院经常允许政府采纳被告在录音监狱电话通话中所作的陈述。」）。\n\n5. 郭的破产案中的证据具有可采性\n\n与郭目前正在进行的案名为 In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al., Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.)（康涅狄格区破产法院）的破产案件及相关对抗性程序（统称「郭氏破产案」）相关的证据，以及导致郭于 2022 年 2 月 15 日提出破产申请的事件，作为被控罪名的直接证据具有可采性。\n\n正如郭现已两次主张的那样，本案中的刑事指控「在许多方面与【郭氏】破产案中的争议问题重叠」。Dkt. 131 at 17；亦参见 Dkt. 219 at 4。鉴于刑事案件关乎「刑事责任问题」以及诸如「郭的意图及其行为的实质性」等不同的法律问题，而郭氏破产案旨在「查明财产以赔偿郭的债权人」，法院认为破产案与刑事案之间没有充分的重叠来支持中止郭氏破产案的审理。Dkt. 204 (Stay Order) at 7-9；Dkt. 250 (Second Stay Order) at 2, 6-7。然而，法院承认「程序之间存在某些重叠」，并指出起诉书中提到了郭申请破产的事实，「背景是提供郭涉嫌在『郭氏企业』内部隐匿资金的手段的例子」，即作为被控 RICO conspiracy（RICO 团伙犯罪阴谋）的手段和方法。Stay Order at 6-7。\n\n郭氏破产案以及导致郭申请破产的事件，与有关被控罪名的证据密不可分，并且对于交代即将在审判中审理的犯罪故事的全貌是必不可少的。Carboni, 204 F.3d at 44。郭氏破产案的细节也有助于解释围绕郭的欺诈行为的情状，并解释郭实施某些行为时的意图。Coonan, 938 F.2d at 1561。\n\n2017 年——即郭抵达美国数年后，且在郭创立 Rule of Law（法治）实体的前一年——投资基金 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（「PAX / 太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金」）在 New York Superior Court（纽约州最高法院）对郭提起民事诉讼，要求偿还郭个人担保的一笔约 $88 million 的逾期贷款。大约在 2021 年 2 月 3 日，PAX 获得了针对郭的金额约为 $116,402,000 的判决书。参见 PAX Lawsuit, No. 652077/2017, Dkt. 716. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 28, 2018) (Ostrager, J.)。PAX 获得判决后，通过查明并试图扣押郭在美国的资产，采取了执行该判决的措施。然而，「PAX 在查明郭实际控制的资产方面遇到了困难，因为自称百亿万富豪的郭将其资产隐匿在一个由公司实体和家族成员构成的迷宫中。」PAX Lawsuit, Index 652077/2017, Dkt. 1181, at 7- 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022)。其中一项资产是一艘名为 Lady May（梅女士号）的游艇，郭及其同伙在 2020 年底安排该游艇从纽约驶往佛罗里达，随后驶往巴哈马。大约在 2021 年 3 月 16 日，Barry Ostrager 法官发布了一项民事藐视法庭附条件裁定，指示如果郭未能在 2021 年 5 月 31 日前将梅女士号归还至纽约州最高法院的管辖范围内，梅女士号留在管辖范围外的每一天，他将被处以 $500,000 的罚款。在郭隐匿其资产且未按命令向 PAX 付款一年之后，2022 年 2 月 9 日，Ostrager 法官对郭作出了民事藐视法庭终局裁定，原因是郭「通过将其大笔个人资产存放于一系列公司、受信任的密友和家族成员名下，企图避开并欺骗其债权人」。PAX Lawsuit, Index 652077/2017, Dkt. 1181, at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022)。总额达 $254 million 的判决中包括 $134 million 的藐视法庭罚金，这源于 Ostrager 法官所描述的郭为防止其资产被 PAX 取得而玩的「皮包把戏/空壳把戏」。2022 年 2 月 9 日的决定和藐视法庭裁定指示郭在五天内向 PAX 支付 $134 million 的藐视法庭罚金，否则他将面临藐视法庭制裁。参见前引文件, Dkt. 1183, at 2。\n\n六天后，即 2022 年 2 月 15 日，郭申请破产。在最初的破产文件中，郭声称负债高达 $500 million，并且尽管居住在昂贵的房产中，周围有名车和极其昂贵的家具，却声称资产不超过 $100,000。参见 In Re Ho Wan Kwok, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)。但是在导致郭申请破产的几年里，郭为了推进被控的欺诈罪行向其受害者就其个人财富作出了虚假陈述，以诱使受害者向其寄钱。这些陈述包括但不限于：郭将用自己拥有的 $100 million 资金资助法治实体，以及郭向投资者个人担保承担因投资其各种欺诈性合资项目（包括 GTV）而造成的任何损失。\n\n在破产法院的归档文件中，Kwok（郭文贵）还曾声称特定资产——包括 Lady May 号游艇——并非其所有，而是属于其家族成员、空壳公司及其他金融实体的财产。2022年4月19日，HK International Funds Investments (USA) Limited, LLC（由郭文贵的女儿 Mei Guo［郭美］所有、名义上拥有 Lady May 号的实体）与共同被告人 Kin Ming Je（余建明）所有的 Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际金融集团有限公司）签订了一份“贷款协议”，据此 HK USA“借入”了 3700 万美元（即 Lady May 号的价值），用作“与该游艇相关的向法院提供的担保”，直至“该游艇被归还至美国”。见 In re Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵破产案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，Dkt. 36 附件 79 第 3、5 页。通过日期为2022年4月29日的附函，各方修改了该笔“贷款”，使其变成个人担保，而非以 Lady May 号作为抵押担保的贷款；该附函修改的对价为 1 英镑。同上，Dkt. 36 附件 80。Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd. 是属于 Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）的实体之一，参见起诉书第 3(a) 段，且政府在大约2022年10月至2023年3月期间，从以该实体名义开设的银行账户中扣押了大约 318,000 美元的 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）欺诈所得。同上，第 59(16)、(19) 段。政府在本次调查期间收集并将在庭审中作为证据出示的业务记录包括与这笔 3700 万美元交易相关的电子邮件；具体而言，是余建明要求将其 Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd. 账户中的 3700 万美元（喜马拉雅交易所欺诈所得）转入以某律师事务所名义开设的托管账户。政府的证据还包括从被告人 Yanping Wang（王雁平）的其中一台设备中恢复的其与郭美之间的加密通信，这些通信显示王雁平指导郭美如何（虚假地）向律师声称 Lady May 号实际上属于她而非郭文贵——郭美随后在郭文贵破产案的宣誓作证中重复了这一伪证主张。参见 Dkt. 255（政府关于证据开示和日程安排的信函）第 11 页，附件 D-G。事实上，郭文贵宣传虚假投资机会的许多网络直播就是在 Lady May 号的甲板上或内室中拍摄的——借此向其追随者和潜在投资者强化其自身的财富形象。\n\n郭文贵在郭文贵破产案中还实施了妨碍司法的行为，与其在本刑事案件中的妨碍行为如出一辙——包括指使抗议针对那些就其欺诈行为进行投诉或要求退还投资款的受害者，以及篡改证据。参见例如 Dkt. 255 第 8-9 页；Dkt. 51 第 9 页。该妨碍行为包括蔑视法院裁定，并指使包括 NFSC（新中国联邦）成员在内的追随者和支持者，对郭文贵破产案的受托人、受托人的雇主、受托人的家属及其雇主进行骚扰、威胁并实施暴力。同上，第 9-11 页。郭文贵的支持者和新中国联邦成员还在起诉书下达后篡改了 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦豪宅），其明显企图是迎合郭文贵（缺乏证据支持的）辩护陈述，即购买马瓦豪宅并非用作郭文贵本人的住所，而是作为新中国联邦和 G|CLUBS（G俱乐部）成员的一种会所。参见 Dkt. 148（政府关于中止破产程序的信函）第 4-5 页；亦参见 Dkt. 131（郭文贵支持中止破产程序动议的备忘录）第 20 页（声称购买马瓦豪宅是作为郭文贵支持者“使用的秘密总部，并用于促进 GTV 的业务”）。\n\n导致郭文贵申请破产的情况，以及郭文贵破产案的细节和郭文贵及其追随者就这些案件所采取的行动，均可作为被指控罪行（包括 RICO 敲诈勒索共谋以及共谋清洗欺诈所得）的直接证据予以采信。与郭文贵破产案相关的证据还为被指控的郭氏企业的存在提供了背景，并解释了实施某些行为的意图——例如，包括余建明将 3700 万美元的喜马拉雅交易所欺诈所得转给郭文贵的女儿，以避免郭文贵因将 Lady May 号转移出 New York Superior Court（纽约州高等法院）管辖范围的妨碍行为而被处以巨额民事罚款。毫无争议的是，与郭文贵破产案以及导致郭文贵申请破产的相关事件的证据，均属于被指控共谋（包括敲诈勒索、电汇欺诈、银行欺诈、证券欺诈和洗钱罪名）的可采信证据。\n\nIII. 法院应采信关于 GTV 私募的某些证据\n\n政府的其中一名证人（“证人-1”）预计将就其与郭文贵、王雁平及余建明就 GTV 私募、特别是集中非合资格投资者资金的相关法律风险进行的对话作证。如下文更详细所述，证人-1 在进行这些对话时是以商业身份而非法律身份行事；此外，GTV 已不再是一个持续经营的企业，没有任何人有权代表 GTV 就任何通信主张律师-当事人保密特权。因此，法院应当采信证人-1 关于其与郭文贵、王雁平及余建明就 GTV 私募进行对话的证言。\n\n证人-1 预计将就其与郭文贵、王雁平及余建明关于 GTV 私募的对话作证，包括接受非合资格投资者（即不符合参与未注册私募门槛资格的个人）资金的可能性。当时，证人-1 已被任命为 GTV 的董事兼秘书，但他并未在 GTV 担任法律职务，证人-1 亦未就涉及 GTV 的事项与郭文贵、王雁平或余建明存在律师-当事人关系。12 此外，郭文贵和余建明与 GTV 均无任何正式关联。\n\n大约在2023年7月，GTV 前董事 Aaron Mitchell（亚伦·米切尔）以 GTV 和 Saraca（萨拉卡公司）前律师的身份在郭文贵破产案中作证。米切尔作证的主旨和实质内容为：“我认为我目前仍在几起案件中代表 GTV 和萨拉卡公司。”In re Ho Wan Kwok, et al.，案号 22-50073 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.)（康涅狄格区破产法院），兼审诉讼案号 22-5003，A. Mitchell 证言 2023年7月18日，庭审记录第 29 页。米切尔进一步作证称，当他为 GTV 和萨拉卡公司工作时，他会与证人-1 及王雁平交谈；他于2023年4月从 GTV 和萨拉卡公司辞职；“在过去大约一年左右的时间里［即从大约2022年年中至2023年年中］，没有任何人可以交谈。我是董事，所以没有任何人可以交谈。那里再没有其他人了”；并且自大约2022年12月起，他“未……意识到有任何人在萨拉卡公司和 GTV 工作”。同上，第 34-35 页。米切尔还作证称，在他于2023年7月18日在郭文贵破产案中作证的“几年前”，GTV 就已经“停止运营”。同上，第 56 页。具体而言，米切尔作证称：“在与 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）达成和解之前，该公司就已经不再运营了。员工全部离开了。网站已经关闭。之后，实际上就只是试图与 SEC 配合把资金退还给投资者。”同上，第 55-56 页。\n\n如上所述，证人-1 并非作为 GTV 的律师行事，因此证人-1 就 GTV 进行的任何对话均不受任何律师-当事人保密特权的保护。然而，即便\n\n12 证人-1 自大约2018年6月至2020年9月期间担任 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（郭氏家族办公室之一）的总法律顾问，在此节点证人-1 转岗至商业职位。作为 Golden Spring 的总法律顾问，证人-1 主要负责就郭文贵的各项民事诉讼与其他律师进行协调。在一次破产债权人电话会议中，郭文贵称证人-1“曾是 Golden Spring 的律师和我的私人律师”。参见 In re Ho Wan Kwok，Dkt. 876-1 第 12 页，附件 4。\n\n证人-1 曾以法律身份行事（但他并未如此），任何特权也在 GTV 终止运营时归于消灭。对于组织机构而言，一般规则是，当该组织不再具有法律存在且无人能代表其行事时，律师-当事人保密特权即告终止。参见 Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Carillo Huetell LLP，案号 13 Civ. 1735(GBD)(JCF), 2015 WL 1610282, 第 *2-*3 页 (S.D.N.Y. 2015年4月8日)（特权在公司解散后不复存在）；TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Inc.，案号 07-1141, 2009 WL 3255297, 第 *2 页 (C.D. Ill. 2009年10月7日)（“在缺乏相反的令人信服的理由的情况下，律师-当事人保密特权在公司消亡后不复存在。”）；Lewis v. United States，案号 02-2958 B/AN, 2004 WL 3203121, 第 *4 页 (W.D. Tenn. 2004年12月7日)（同上）；《律师执业法重述（第三版）》§ 73 评注 k (2000)；24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5499 (1st ed. West 2019)。亦参见 Lopes v. Vieira, 688 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1068-69 (E.D. Cal. 2010)（虽然形式上仍处于有效状态并在州务卿处保持良好存续，但实际上已停止运作的公司实体的原律师，无权主张该实体的律师-当事人保密特权）。对照 Official Comm. of Admin. Claimants v. Moran, 802 F. Supp. 2d 947, 949-50 (N.D. Ill. 2011)（指出法院在判断一家公司是否为了主张律师-当事人保密特权的目的而“消亡”时，应考量“实际的商业现实”而非纯技术性的法律地位，并认定原告公司可以主张特权，因为其在进入破产程序后仍继续向被告主张权利，因而从未完全停业）。\n\n在本案中，证人-1 与郭文贵、王雁平及余建明进行了涉及 GTV 私募的对话。就 GTV 试图对这些对话主张律师-当事人保密特权而言，GTV 必须是一个具有被授权主张该等特权的雇员或代表的持续经营企业。\n\n在本案中并不存在这样的人员。根据米切尔的证词，GTV 截至大约2020年起已不复存在。证人-1 预计将作证称其从未担任过针对 GTV 的任何法律职务（包括在他参与涉案对话时），且其从未就其被指派为 GTV 董事兼秘书签署过任何协议，亦未因此获得任何报酬。此外，郭文贵和余建明均未在 GTV 担任任何正式职位以使其受到任何公司律师-当事人保密特权（如果该特权确实存在）的保护。因此，法院应当采信证人-1 关于其与郭文贵、余建明及王雁平就 GTV 私募条款进行对话的证言。\n\nIV. 法院应准许根据《联邦证据规则》第 902(11) 条对某些记录进行认证\n\n如果被告不同意通过规定协议对常规业务记录进行认证，政府拟根据符合《联邦证据规则》第 902(11) 条的证明书，对由某些第三方在常规业务过程中制作和保管的某些记录进行认证。\n\n符合《Federal Rule of Evidence（联邦证据规则）》第 803(6) 条传闻证据例外适用必要条件且在常规开展的活动中制作的记录，对于在美国境内保存的记录而言，除其他方法外，可通过符合《Federal Rule of Evidence》第 902(11) 条的证明书进行鉴真。Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(D)。“第 902(11) 条通过允许以书面证据基础替代口头证据基础，扩展了第 803(6) 条。”United States v. Rom, 528 F. App'x 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2013)；亦见 United States v. Ayelotan, 917 F.3d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 2019)（“若记录包含保管人证明该记录‘符合第 803(6)(A)-(C) 条的要求’的证明书，则该记录属于自证真实的记录。”）。具体而言，第 902(11) 条相关部分规定，“经保管人或其他合资格人员证明符合第 803(6)(A)-(C) 条要求的境内记录的正本或副本”属于自证真实的记录，无须外部鉴真证据即可被采纳为证据。在审判前，“主张方必须向不利方发出关于拟出示该记录的合理书面通知——且必须使该记录及证明书可供查验——以便该当事方有公平的机会对它们提出质疑。”同上。同样地，18 U.S.C. § 3505 规定，“如果有外国证明书证明”该记录符合第 803(6) 条的要件，则“常规开展的活动中制作的外国记录或该等记录的副本，不得被传闻规则作为证据排除”。亦见 United States v. Qualls, 613 F. App'x 25, 28 (2d Cir. 2015)（维持采纳附有真实性证明书的外国记录的裁定）；United States v. Miller, No. 18 Cr. 202 (ARR), 2018 WL 4961458, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2018)（“§ 3505 的措辞‘与《Federal Rule of Evidence》第 803(6) 条的措辞十分紧密对应’，且‘应按解释第 803(6) 条中相仿措辞的相同方式进行解释’。”）。13\n\n在常规开展的活动中制作的记录，在满足下列条件时即符合第 803(6) 条下作为业务记录的必要条件：(1)“该记录是由知情人员——或根据知情人员传递的信息——在该时间或临近该时间制作的”，(2)“该记录是在企业常规开展的活动过程中保存的”，以及 (3)“制作该记录是该项活动的常规做法”。Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)。“业务记录可包括以电子方式存储在计算机上并于日后打印出来以便在法庭上出示的数据，只要原始计算机数据汇编是根据业务职责并按照常规业务做法编制的。”Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage Corp., 38 F.3d 627, 632 (2d Cir. 1994)。\n\n政府方预计将出示某些由特定第三方在常规业务过程中制作和\n\n13 “依据《Federal Rule of Evidence》第 902(11) 条出具的保管人证明书不属于证词性质”，因此使用此类证明书对业务记录进行鉴真并不违反对质条款。United States v. Weigand, No. 20 Cr. 188 (JSR), 2021 WL 568173, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2021)。\n\n维护的记录作为证据，包括：银行记录、银行交易信息、IP 日志、通话详单记录、订户信息、搜查令调取获得的电子邮件以及业务记录，这些记录系根据传票或自愿提供给政府方的。政府方通常已在本案的证据开示中出示了这些记录的相关证明书，并且不知道有任何质疑其作为业务记录资格的依据；对于尚未出示证明书的任何记录，政府方将在审判前出示相关证明书。若未能就真实性达成规定协议，此类证据可根据第 803(6) 条，通过第 902(11) 条项下的境内记录证明书以及 18 U.S.C. § 3505 项下的外国记录证明书进行鉴真。\n\nV. 法院应采纳来自 First Abu Dhabi Bank 的银行记录\n\n1. 背景\n\n政府方拟在审判时出示一系列来自 First Abu Dhabi Bank（第一阿布扎比银行）的银行记录、电子邮件和文件，该银行是 United Arab Emirates（阿拉伯联合酋长国）的一家银行，相关记录涉及以“ACA Capital Group Ltd.”名义开立的账户（下称“ACA 银行账户”）。ACA 银行账户是由共同被告人 Kin Ming Je（余建明，又名 William Je）开立的账户。如下文进一步详述，ACA 银行账户记录证明了对受害者资金的挪用，并且是证明 Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）的存在、被告人的欺诈意图以及洗钱行为的极其有证明力的证据。这些记录对政府方的案件极为重要，并且在当前情况下应予合理采纳。\n\n政府方从 Securities and Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会，下称“SEC”）处获得了 ACA 银行账户记录。正如证据 A（来自担任证券交易委员会国际事务办公室高级特别法律顾问的 Marlee Miller 的宣誓声明）中所解释的，SEC 系依据《International Organization of Securities Commissions（国际证券事务监察委员会组织，下称“IOSCO”）Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning（多边谅解备忘录，下称“MMoU”）》获得 ACA 银行账户记录的。证据 A 第 6 段。MMoU 代表了签署方之间的谅解，签署方包括 SEC 和 Securities and Commodities Authority of the United Arab Emirates（阿拉伯联合酋长国证券和商品管理局，下称“SCA”）。同上。根据 MMoU，如果 SCA 能够协助 SEC 进行调取记录的请求，SCA 将使用其本国程序获取所请求的文件并将其移交给 SEC。见证据 A 第 5 段。\n\n2. 适用法律\n\n《Federal Rule of Evidence》第 807 条授权采纳无法出庭证人的传闻陈述，当该陈述“未被第 803 或 804 条具体涵盖”，但具有“同等的保障可信性的附随情况”。当法院在个案审查的基础上认定该陈述具有充分的可靠性并符合该规则的其他要求时，该剩余例外构成了采纳庭外陈述的普遍适用依据。见 Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990)。第 807 条允许在满足下列条件时采纳传闻证据：(i) 具有特别的可信性；(ii) 关涉实质性事实；(iii) 是通过合理努力所能获得的针对该事实最具证明力的证据；(iv) 采纳该证据符合证据规则并增进司法公正利益；以及 (v) 提出该证据前已向不利方发出充分通知。见 United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1999)。依次审查这些因素：\n\n3. 讨论\n\na. ACA 银行账户记录具有可信性\n\n“关于一份文件是否具有充分的可信性以根据第 807 条予以采纳的认定，是一项高度基于具体事实的审查。”United States v. Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2013)。法院被指示“结合上下文审查证据”，Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 236 (2d Cir. 1999)，包括通过评估获取记录的过程，以及记录本身的内容和外观，见 United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., 319 F.R.D. 459, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)。\n\n首先，如随附的宣誓声明中所详述，ACA 银行账户记录是依据可靠且常规的程序获取的。符合 MMoU 的程序，于 2021 年 2 月 23 日和 2022 年 3 月 14 日，SEC 向 SCA 请求调取以 ACA Capital Group Limited（下称“ACA”）名义持有的银行记录。14 同上，第 6 段。于 2021 年 5 月 23 日、2021 年 6 月 20 日和 2022 年 5 月 20 日，SEC 通过电子邮件收到了 SCA 响应请求而提供交付的文件。该程序“符合根据 [ ] MMoU 响应请求传输外国银行记录的常规做法”。证据 A 第 10 段。也就是说，这些记录是通过表明具有可信性的常规方式获取的：一家政府金融监管机构依据一项国际协定从另一家政府金融监管机构获取记录。见证据 A 第 10 段（ACA 银行账户记录系“以符合根据 IOSCO MMoU 响应请求传输外国银行记录的常规做法的方式”提供的）。事实上，法院曾依据第 807 条采纳过以远不如本案常规程序可信的方式获取的记录。见 Prevezon, 319 F.R.D. at 465（采纳在“特殊情况”下获取的银行记录，系由一名个人“在数天的时间里，在法院工作人员的监督下，在一家俄罗斯法院努力拍摄 [包含该等记录的俄罗斯刑事案件卷宗] 的内容”而获得的）。虽然 SEC 请求了证明声明书，且并未从 SCA 处获得\n\n14 如起诉书所指控，ACA Capital Group Ltd. 是 Kwok Enterprise 的一部分。\n\n该声明书，但 SEC 审查了 ACA 银行账户记录并确认“这些文件是 SCA 向 OIA [即 SEC 国际事务办公室] 提供的 ACA 账户记录”。15\n\n其次，对 ACA 银行账户记录外观的审查证明了其可信性。ACA 银行账户记录在视觉上无异常之处。它们看起来就是银行记录，并且带有 First Abu Dhabi Bank 的标识。“虽然仅凭这些事实并不具有决定性，但它们仍对可信性产生有利影响。[这是因为] 银行记录‘提供保障可信性的附随情况，是因为’[由于] 它们在‘业务过程中因其准确性而被银行及其客户所依赖’。”Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., 319 F.R.D. at 467（援引 United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 1992)）。在此，相关银行记录（其选录部分见证据 F）看起来具有真实性，并包含人们预期银行会保存的文件：开户文件、签名页以及包含交易信息的 Excel 文件。16 见 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（依据第 807 条采纳银行记录，并指出这些记录“完全以人们所预期的方式呈现”）。\n\n第三，对 ACA 银行账户记录内容的分析表明，这些记录中的信息是真实可靠的。这是因为 ACA 银行账户记录中的交易信息得到了其他业务记录的印证。作为示例且仅作为抽样，政府方指出了出现在 ACA\n\n15 被告人关于阿联酋金融监管机构具有某种可能损害记录提供真实性的别有用心的动机的任何暗示，纯属推测。事实上，郭文贵及其同谋将阿联酋用作值得信赖的避风港。自本案解封以来，余建明一直躲藏在阿联酋。此外，郭文贵已承认他是阿联酋公民。\n\n16 SCA 拒绝提供银行对账单。\n\n银行账户记录中并得到其他来源印证的十二笔交易，详见下文。\n\ni. 2022 年 10 月 20 日和 10 月 22 日向“Greenwich Land”的转账\n起息日　交易参考号　描述　金额　收款人明细　账号　银行名称　付款明细\n20 OCT 20　FT2029470010　电汇　-1,000,000.00　WESTERN UNION BUSINESS SOLUTIONS | 8901309192 | SW-IRVTUS3NXXX | /RFB/Bank of Princeton BP1701 FFC Greenwich Land Account 350000199 |\n22 OCT 20　FT2029670009　电汇　-4,000,000.00　WESTERN UNION BUSINESS SOLUTIONS (USA) LLC | 8901309192 | SW-IRVTUS3NXXX | /RFB/Bank of Princeton (BP1701G) Greenwich Land LLC / Account: 3500000199. |\n\nACA银行账户记录Excel文件（见上图）显示，在2020年10月20日和2020年10月22日，分别有$100万美元和$400万美元通过Western Union（西联汇款）被转至“Bank of Princeton . . . Greenwich Land Account 3500000199”。17 Greenwich Land LLC（格林威治土地有限责任公司）是起诉书中指名的郭氏企业（Kwok Enterprise）旗下另一实体。来自Bank of Princeton（普林斯顿银行）经认证的银行记录证实了这两笔转账，如下方摘录所示：\n图片：B 普林斯顿银行\n明智理财。 账单周期截止日 10/30/2020\nGreenwich Land Llc 第 1 页，共 4 页\n账号：3500000199\n183 Bayard Lane, Princeton, NJ 08540\n609.921.1700 www.thebankofprinceton.com\n请求退件服务 管理您的账户\n分行名称\nBayard Lane\nGREENWICH LAND LLC 电话号码\n609-921-1700\nDANIEL PODHASKIE\n667 MADISON AVE FL 4\nNEW YORK NY 10065-8029 邮寄地址\n183 Bayard Lane\nPrinceton NJ 08540\n网站\nwww.thebankofprinceton.com\n日期 说明 金额\n10/15/2020 入账电汇 43026324 SAVIO LAW LLC $5,000,000.00\n10/21/2020 入账电汇 43122836 ACA CAPITAL GROUP LTD $999,893.22\n10/23/2020 入账电汇 43183595 ACA CAPITAL GROUP LTD $3,999,915.00\n\nACA银行账户记录与普林斯顿银行记录之间一天的交易日期差异，反映了新泽西州普林斯顿与阿布扎比之间的时区差异，以及使用西联汇款促成转账所伴随的任何延迟。此外，这一事实\n\n17 由于其格式原因，该Excel文件将作为证物G（Exhibit G）另行提供给法院。\n\n即普林斯顿银行记录中的入账金额略低于$100万美元和$400万美元，表明转账手续费已被扣除——事实上，普林斯顿银行记录反映了$25美元的“入账”电汇费用，其余部分可能是西联汇款的费用。18\n\nii. 2020年11月12日通过“Savio Law LLC”向Saraca发放的“贷款”\n\n. TERRENERSEN REME TEMER TEMEER MEN\n12 NOV 20 FT2031770021 电汇转账 -9.500.000.00 Savio Law LLC 8136098162 SW-PNCCUS33XXX /RFB/向Saraca贷款第1部分\n12 NOV 20 FT2031770069 转账 -8.500.000.00 Savio Law LLC 8136098162 8 8136098162 SW-PNCCUS33XXX /RFB/向Saraca贷款第2部分\n\nACA银行账户记录Excel文件进一步列出了2020年11月12日从ACA银行账户转至以“Savio Law LLC”名义开立的银行账户（账号为8136098162）的两笔转账。这些转账上的附言附注为“向Saraca贷款第1部分”和“向Saraca贷款第2部分”（即Saraca Media Group（萨拉卡媒体集团），郭氏企业旗下的另一实体）。正如所料，来自PNC Bank（PNC银行）的银行记录反映了这些转账，从而印证了ACA银行账户记录中的信息：\n\n18 这些微小的差异有助于证实ACA银行账户记录的真实性，因为它们反映了通过第三方进行银行账户转账的时间以及转账手续费评估的实际情况。\n\n付款指令\n结算 / 币种 / 9,500,000.00 / USD / 11-12-2020 外汇编号 / 汇率\n借记 / 币种 / 日期 9,500,000.00 / USD / 11-12- 贷记 / 币种 / 日期 9,500,000.00 / USD / 11-12-\n指示银行编号 021000089 被指示银行编号\nCUSIP 面值金额\n接收方 发送信息\n借记信息 受益人信息\n账户类型 账户类型 D-DDA\n账号 AE870357771201996490026 账号 8136098162\n名称 ACA CAPITAL GROUP LTD 名称 SAVIO LAW LLC\n地址 49F.BANK OF CHINA\nTOWER, NO. 1GARDEN 地址 3 DALE CT\n\nACA银行账户以“ACA Capital Group Ltd.”的名义持有，该名称出现在PNC记录中（见上图）。同样，ACA银行账户的23位IBAN号码与PNC记录中的“账号”一致。转账金额也相吻合。事实上，PNC记录包含了与ACA银行账户Excel文件中列出的相同的附言信息——“向Saraca贷款”，如下图所示：\n\n汇款人至受益人信息 RFB 向SARACA贷款第X部分\niii. 二月份向Hudson Diamond NY LLC的转账\n02 FEB 21 FT2103370016 电汇转账 -6,000,000.00 HUDSON DIAMOND NY LLC 6807438 SW-IDBYUS33XXX /RFB/向Hudson贷款第1部分（共3部分）\n09 FEB 21 FT2104070016 电汇转账 -6,000,000.00 HUDSON DIAMOND NY LLC 6807438 SW-IDBYUS33XXX /RFB/向Hudson贷款第2部分\n10 FEB 21 FT2104170019 电汇转账 -6,000,000.00 HUDSON DIAMOND NY LLC 6807438 SW-IDBYUS33XXX /RFB/向Hudson贷款第3部分\n\n最后，政府方重点指出从ACA银行账户向以“HUDSON DIAMOND NY LLC”（即郭氏企业旗下的另一实体）名义持有的尾号为“7438”的账户进行的金额为$600万美元的三笔转账，附言注明“向Hudson贷款”。证实这些转账的是来自IDBBANK（以色列贴现银行）的银行记录，该记录具有相同的账户名称、尾号为“7438”的账号以及相匹配的转账金额。\n标签 数值\n账户名称 HUDSON DIAMOND NY LLC\n账号 xxxxxx7438\n日期 说明 借记 贷记 余额\n02/01 期初余额 $0.00\n02/02 非参考\n/RFB/向HUDSON贷款第1部分内部转账\nACA CAPITAL GROUP HONG KONG HK $5.999.990.00 $5.999.990.00\n02/03 手续费冲回\n手续费冲回 起息日 02/02 美元内部转账\nIDB BANK NY NEW YORK NY $10.00 $6.000.000.00\n02/09 非参考\n/RFB/向HUDSON贷款第2部分内部转账\nACA CAPITAL GROUP HONG KONG HK $6.000.000.00 $12.000.000.00\n02/10 非参考\n/RFB/向HUDSON贷款第3部分内部转账\nACA CAPITAL GROUP HONG KONG HK $6.000.000.00 $18.000.000.00\n\n在法院认为有必要的情况下，政府方准备进一步详述ACA银行账户记录中转账与其他银行记录的印证情况。\niv. 其他佐证证据\n\nACA银行账户记录中的更多细节进一步证实了其可靠性。ACA银行账户记录还包含账户持有人Kin Ming Je（余建明）的个人身份背景信息，包括其护照号码（“余氏护照号码”）。William Je（余建明）在试图于Citibank（花旗银行）开设银行账户时也使用了该余氏护照号码。事实上，花旗银行文件上余建明的签名似乎与ACA银行记录中余建明的签名一致：\n通过在下方签字，本人：(1) 同意受花旗银行所有条款约束\n客户手册个人账户及其市场附录\n理解并确认该等票据/协议包含\n仲裁；以及 (3) 除非本人正在开设个人贷款或担保\n其他花旗银行存款、自定义信用额度、随时信贷、担保\n账户。\n签署人 1 签名\n签署人 3 签名\n签署人 1 签名 签署人 3 签名 账户，如证实相反，无需向本人/我们发出任何通知。\nF 部分：获授权人员签名\n姓名：\n姓名：\n姓名： 姓名：\n签署人 1 签名\n签署人 3 签名\n姓名：\n姓名：\n\n这些示例表明ACA银行账户记录是可信的。\nb. ACA银行账户记录涉及实质性事实，且是证明该等事实最具有证明力的证据\n\nACA银行账户记录涉及实质性事实，且是证明该等事实最具有证明力的证据，这一点无可合理争议。对ACA银行账户记录的分析表明，从2020年8月至2021年2月，农场贷款项目（Farm Loan Program）的收益中至少有$1.3亿美元被存入ACA银行账户。一旦进入ACA银行账户，欺诈收益便被通过转账进行挪用，例如转至以“Lamp Capital”名义开立的银行账户，该账户由郭文贵的儿子所有。该Lamp Capital银行账户被用于支付游艇费用、豪华车辆和私人飞机，并向郭文贵的女儿汇出数十万美元。ACA银行账户的资金分配还显示，有$1000万美元转给了余建明及其妻子，并有$100万美元转给了一家与共谋者Steve Bannon（斯蒂芬·班农）相关的公司。对这些欺诈收益的某些转账，只能通过ACA银行账户记录来予以证实。这是因为ACA银行账户是一个金融枢纽，它将欺诈收益归集自该阿布扎比银行，随后引导至其他外国银行，包括瑞士、开曼群岛、荷兰、新西兰、澳大利亚和英国的银行。从如此多的司法管辖区调取记录是不可行的，特别是因为其中一些国家（如瑞士）拥有更严格的银行保密法。\n\n此外，且极其重要的是，只有ACA银行账户记录能够证实，郭氏企业的金融操盘手余建明在阿布扎比开设了该账户，以推进将欺诈收益回流给郭文贵、其家人、余建明及其他人的共谋。ACA银行账户记录无法通过其他合理途径获取。阿拉伯联合酋长国根据《刑事司法协助条约》（Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty）提供记录的情况即便从最好的方面看也是极不规律的，阿联酋证券和商品管理局（SCA）也不会向美国证券交易委员会（SEC）提供针对这些记录的认证。\nc. 采纳ACA银行账户记录符合司法公正利益\n\n采纳ACA银行账户记录有助于促进司法公正。尽管残余例外条款（residual exception）很少被援引，但当跨国犯罪共谋利用外国司法管辖区企图隐匿其资产并阻碍调查人员发现证据时，适用该条款是适当的。参见 Prevezon 案，319 FRD at 467（“本案争议焦点是涉嫌参与巨额欺诈的外国实体的银行和财务记录，该欺诈引发了多起针对收益洗钱的刑事调查。”）。此外，ACA银行账户记录具有关联性，且不存在不当的偏见。《美国诉Hwa案》（United States v. Hwa），案号 18 Cr. 538 (MKB)，2022 WL 856877，第 *5 页（E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院）2022年3月22日）（记录“促进了司法公正的利益，因为其中的信息根据《联邦证据规则》第401条具有关联性，且根据第403条不存在不当偏见”）。而且，采纳这些记录与根据《联邦证据规则》第902(11)条、第(12)条或《美国法典》第18编第3505条（18 U.S.C. § 3505）采纳银行记录并无实质区别。出于类似的原因，本案不存在对质条款（confrontation clause）问题。参见《美国诉Adefehinti案》（United States v. Adefehinti），510 F.3d 319, 328 (D.C. Cir. 2007)，修订于2008年2月13日，判决书录入于 264 F. App'x 16 (D.C. Cir. 2008)（援引《Crawford v. Washington案》，541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004)）；《美国诉Qualls案》（United States v. Qualls），553 F. Supp. 2d 241, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)（“在传统传闻例外的语境下，最高法院指出业务记录‘就其性质而言不属于证言性质’”（引自 Crawford 案，541 U.S. at 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354））。无论如何，如果需要，Marlee Miller 或SEC具有类似地位的人员均可在庭审中就这些记录出庭作证。\nd. 各被告人已获得充分通知\n\n最后，本动议用作书面通知，告知政府打算依据残余例外采纳 ACA Bank Account（ACA 银行账户）记录——附件 A（Exhibit A）通过贝茨编号（Bates number）指明了其中的每一份记录。该通知在审判前近六周发出，对于被告获得“应对证据的公平机会”而言时间绰绰有余。Fed. R. Evid. 807；参见 United States v. Lino, No. 00 CR. 632 (WHP), 2001 WL 8356, at *22 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2001)（提前三十日通知已属充分）；参见 Robinson v. Shapiro, 646 F.2d 734, 741–42 (2d Cir.1981)（审判前六周送达通知已属充分）；另见 United States v. Yonkers Contracting Co., 701 F. Supp. 431, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)（在 Rule 804(b)(5) 项下提前一周通知已属充分）。\n\nVI. 法院应排除被告提出不具相关性且具有不公正偏见性的证据及主张\n\n根据《联邦证据规则》（Federal Rule of Evidence）第 402 条，“不具相关性的证据在审判中不可采纳”，Fed. R. Evid. 402，且根据第 403 条，如果相关证据的“证明价值实质上被以下一种或多种危险所压倒：不公正偏见、混淆争议焦点、误导陪审团、不当拖延、浪费时间或不必要地提出累赘证据”，法院甚至可以排除该等相关证据，Fed. R. Evid. 403；另见 United States v. Miller, 626 F.3d 682, 689-90 (2d Cir. 2010)。\n\n被告只有在抗辩具有证据基础的情况下，才有权提出该抗辩，参见 United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1995)，且前提是该抗辩在法律层面上不能不能成立，参见 United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1057 (2d Cir. 1990)。如果法院认定某项抗辩在法律层面上不充分，法院没有责任允许被告向陪审团提出该证据或推进该抗辩。参见 United States v. Paul, 110 F.3d 869, 871 (2d Cir. 1997)（援引 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 416-17 (1980)）。\n\nA. 法院应排除声称本起起诉与 CCP（中共）存在不当关联或在任何方面具有恶意性的证据及主张\n\nKwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）已发布多份声明，声称本起起诉是 CCP 对 Department of Justice（司法部）施加恶劣影响的结果。无需赘言，对被告的起诉与 CCP 或其行动毫无关系。因此，提出此类主张毫无依据，必须予以排除。此外，任何此类主张不过是不当的选择性起诉指控。“选择性起诉抗辩主张提起公诉的程序存在瑕疵，[这]是应当由法院而非陪审团裁决的事项。”United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 167 (2d Cir. 2011)（内部引号省略）。因此，任何声称政府怀有不当动机或在某种程度上推进受 CPP 支持之行动的主张，都必须予以排除。United States v. Stewart, No. 03 Cr. 717 (MGC), 2004 WL 113506, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004)。毕竟，“受审的不是政府。”United States v. Carton, No. 17 CR 680 (CM), 2018 WL 5818107, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018)。辩方若作相反暗示，在法律上是不当的。参见 United States v. Preldakaj, 456 F. App'x 56, 60 (2d Cir.2012)（简要命令）（裁定地方法院指示陪审团“执法机关未采用某些侦查技术的事实[，但]受审的不是政府，执法技术不是你们所应关心的事项”并未构成明显错误）。\n\nB. 法院应排除被告提出与 CCP 活动相关的、不具相关性且具有不公正偏见性的证据及主张\n\n1. 法院应限制有关 CCP 活动（包括针对性行动）的证据和主张\n\n法院应根据 Rule 403 排除有关 CCP 活动（包括“Operation Fox Hunt（猎狐行动）”及其他 CCP 针对性行动）的证据，但被告自身就其心态所作的证言除外，因为此类证据的证明价值实质上被混淆争议焦点和误导陪审团的危险所压倒。允许辩方引入有关 CCP 活动的证据（除关于被告认为自己受到针对之确信及其确信依据的证言外），“存在造成‘对附随问题进行多环节穿插的小型审判之余兴闹剧……而这些问题与本案中存在争议的问题和主张即使有联系，也可能仅有极微弱的牵连’的风险。”Park W. Radiology v. CareCore Nat'l LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 314, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)；参见 Fed. R. Evid. 403；United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 128 (2d Cir. 2003)（“根据宪法第六和第十四修正案，被指控犯罪的人享有提出抗辩的基本权利。尽管如此，刑事被告人提出充分抗辩和获得公正审判的权利并不赋予其向陪审团提交通常不可采纳之证据的权利。”（引文省略）（后加强调））；United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 350 (2d Cir. 1983)（“被告人提出充分抗辩的权利，包括为自己作证的权利，并非毫无限制。在回应针对自己的指控时，被告人必须遵守既定的程序和证据规则，控方亦是如此，以确保审判的公正性。”）。\n\n无论 CCP 对 Kwok（郭文贵）的关注程度如何，任何针对 Kwok 的活动——包括在社交媒体上使其噤声的企图——都不能使 Kwok 为获取受害者资金而作出的虚假和误导性陈述成真。Kwok 在以往的诉讼文书中对 CCP 活动的关注，（充其量）是辩方试图不当地将 Kwok 塑造成同情对象、引入不可采纳的良好行为证据，并就审判争议焦点混淆陪审团视听。本案审判并不涉及 Kwok 是否为真正的异见人士，或者 NFSC（新中国联邦）是否为亲民主运动。本案审判亦不涉及 Kwok 是否受到 CCP 的针对。本案审判关乎的是 Kwok 是否通过关于股票和商业机会的虚假承诺诈骗受害者，以便获取他们的资金。而且，关于 CCP 活动（包括针对性行动）的证据会造成混淆和不公正偏见的风险并非出于假设，而是几乎必然发生。法院只需查看 Kwok 在本案中的诉讼文书，即可明白 Kwok 打算如何通过就 CCP 的活动和针对性行动制造小型审判，从而将陪审团的注意力从被指控的罪行中引开。事实上，Kwok 已将法院强制开示反映 CCP 针对 Kwok、其家人、其共同被告以及起诉书中相关实体的特定材料的命令改称为“Fox Hunt Order（猎狐命令）”。例如，参见 Dkt. 259（Kwok 答辩意见）（后加强调）。Kwok 试图通过 Rule 17 传票获取由 Eastern District of New York（纽约东区）另一支正在起诉 CCP 特工的起诉团队所掌握的材料，以及他作出的该等证据“对其无可争议地有利”的结论性主张，同上，第 8 页，这表明他仅企图将陪审团的焦点从被指控的欺诈罪行中转移开，试图不可采纳地将自己描绘成 CCP 针对性行动的受害者，并“通过同情心不当地将其注意力从被指控的罪行中分散开”。United States v. Malka, 602 F. Supp. 3d 510, 527 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2022)。法院不应允许 Kwok 这样做。\n\n2. 法院应排除被告证言之外的外部针对性证据\n\n如前所述，在本案中，任何 CCP 活动（包括针对性证据）的证明价值都很低。这是因为 Kwok 和 Wang（王雁平）在本案指控中是有罪还是被判无罪，并不取决于中国政府是否试图针对、遣返或使 Kwok 噤声。首先且最重要的是，CCP 的活动与 Kwok 多年间一再在投资用途与目的、投资价值、投资风险（或无风险性）、快速投资的必要性、Kwok 是否会从投资中获益以及 Kwok 是否会为投资者损失提供个人担保等问题上蓄意欺骗投资者这一事实毫无关系。同样，中国政府遣返或使 Kwok 噤声的企图，与 Kwok 在通过欺诈手段获取投资者资金后挪用和盗窃该笔资金的行为也毫无关系——这证明了他具有明确的欺诈意图。\n\n诚然，法院已裁定，证明 Kwok、其家人、其共同被告或与起诉书相关的公司实体曾受到 CCP 针对的证据，在 Rule 16 开示程序的目的范围内具有相关性——该程序的“门槛较低”——前提是该等证据表明“Kwok 对 CCP 针对性行动的恐惧在客观上是合理的”，并因此“‘可用于……支持[其]抗辩’”。（MTC 裁定第 6 页，援引 United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993)）。法院认定的 CCP 针对性相关证据的相关性在于，它可能影响了 Kwok 在从事某些可能反映有罪心态的行为时的心态，例如对 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦豪宅）保密，或其使用数十台电子设备的行为。\n\n因此，政府并不反对：如果 Kwok 出庭作证，他可以试图解释——同样，在 Rule 403 的限度内——CCP 对其本人或其家人的针对在某种程度上影响了他所采取的行动。此外，如果 Kwok 就其与被指控行为同时发生的心态作证——即他确信自己受到 CCP 的针对——他亦可就其当时确信的依据作证，而且实际上他可能可以提出某些可采证据来证明其确信在“客观上是合理的”。例如，被告可以提出他们在当时读到的关于针对他们企图的公开报道，前提是该等证据(a)不作为事实真相提出，且(b)不具有累赘性、过度混淆性或不公正偏见性。参见 Fed. R. Evid. 403。换言之，通过其证言，Kwok 可以陈述其关于 CCP 针对性行动的确信——在与指控具有相关性且与该确信的证明价值相称的范围内——以及该当时确信的任何客观合理依据。然而，除此以外，没有任何针对性证据具有相关性，更不用说在 Rule 403 项下具有可采性了。Kwok 可以通过就其当时知悉的客观证据作证来表明其确信在“客观上是合理的”——这是唯一与其心态相关的此类证据。\n\n然而，不应允许被告通过专家证人或其他证据来证实各种针对性打压行为，因为这将在与被告的心理状态无关、也与被控罪名的任何构成要件无关的问题上，构成一场案中案的庞大旁枝闹剧。参见例如 United States v. Sutton, No. CR 21-0598 (PLF), 2024 WL 278070, at *11 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2024)（“尽管刑事被告人有权提出抗辩，但法院无须允许被告人向陪审团提交因不具相关性或对实质性事实不具证明力而不可采信的证据。”）；United States v. Carton, No. 17 CR 680 (CM), 2018 WL 5818107, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018)（在被告被控通过说谎获取投资并挪用资金的案件中，驳回依据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第17条发出的传票，理由是被受骗对冲基金的“尽职调查水平和专业程度与［被告的］欺诈意图无关”；辩方的策略“纯粹是将责任推卸给受害者的轻率企图——这在欺诈案件中是不可采纳的策略”）。例如，Kwok（郭文贵）已告知 Government（政府方），他可能会传唤一名专家证人，就“People's Republic of China（中华人民共和国）政府针对政治异见人士的策略和惯用手法”作概括性作证。随后，专家证词通知列出了该专家“预计作证”的二十八个宽泛主题——所有这些主题均涉及一般性意见，且无一提及 Kwok（郭文贵）或 Wang（王雁平），亦未提及预期的证词与本案被控的欺诈及洗钱罪名之间存在何种关联性（如有）。仅凭该专家证词通知的内容，就已显露出被告企图通过提出关于 CCP（中国共产党）的活动及惯用手法的不相关、且具干扰性和误导性的叙事，使本起欺诈案件的审理脱轨的意图。法院不应允许被告这样做。参见 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988)（“被告人并无不受约束地提供依据标准证据规则……不具可采性的证词的权利。”）；United States v. Mi Sun Cho, 713 F.3d 716, 721 (2d Cir. 2013)（提出抗辩的权利“并非绝对，因为被告必须遵守旨在确保公正与可靠性的既定程序和证据规则。因此，被告并无不受约束地提供依据证据规则不具可采性的证词的权利。”）；United States v. Rivera, No. 13 Cr. 149 KAM, 2015 WL 1886967, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2015)（“被告人提出抗辩的宪法权利并不赋予其不受约束地出示不可采信且不具相关性之证据的权利。”）。\n\n3. 法院应严密管控被告的证词，以避免出现不被法律允许的裁决依据\n\n对郭文贵（或王雁平）关于针对性打压的作证主题应予以审慎管控，以避免误导陪审团，以及/或者暗示陪审团根据法律不允许的依据作出裁决。参见 Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 350（“被告进行充分抗辩的权利，包括为自己作证的权利，并非毫无限制。……因此，地方法院关于不得向陪审团出示法律上不具可采性证据的裁定，并未剥夺上诉人就其他可正当采纳的事项作证的宪法权利。”）。迄今为止，被告的辩护律师在讨论以下事项时提及了 Fox Hunt（“猎狐行动”）：购买和翻修 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦豪宅）、GTV 私募配售及 GTV 的估值，以及被告使用以众多实体（包括郭氏企业实体）名义开设的数百个银行账户等。即使假定郭文贵或王雁平确实是中共针对性打压的目标，该事实也不能免除任何一名被告对被控行为应承担的法律责任。中共针对郭文贵、其家属、其共同被告或起诉书中所列实体的打压，亦不构成对起诉书中所控罪名的任何抗辩理由。\n\na. 马瓦豪宅\n\n起诉书指控，被告从 G|CLUBS（G俱乐部）会员处募集的数亿美元资金中的绝大部分“并未用于资助 G|CLUBS 的业务”，且郭文贵挪用了 G|CLUBS 资金，包括花费大约 $39.5 million 的 G|CLUBS 会员资金用于购买和翻修其马瓦豪宅。起诉书 ¶ 18(h)。政府方将在庭审中出示证据，证明马瓦豪宅并非为了 G|CLUBS 会员的利益或使用而购买，郭文贵可以寻求出示可采信的证据来反驳该项指控。然而，郭文贵不能采取其提议的下一步行动，即引入有关中共针对性打压（包括“猎狐行动”）的外部证据，试图为其所谓的购买马瓦豪宅作为 NFSC（新中国联邦）“开展业务”的“安全地点”的必要性进行辩解。（Def. MTC Mem. at 21）。新中国联邦在法律上独立于 G|CLUBS，而后者声称是一项“独家高端会员计划”，提供“通往精心策划的世界级产品、服务和体验的门户”。起诉书 ¶ 18(b)。政府方的指控涉及郭文贵关于 G|CLUBS 的虚假陈述，包括声称 G|CLUBS 会员将获得 GTV 或 G|Fashion 的股票，以及 G|CLUBS 会员费将用于资助 G|CLUBS 服务，而事实真相是，会员从未收到股票，且郭文贵将 G|CLUBS 资金用于资助其个人的奢靡生活。即便郭文贵能够证明其“善意地认为购买该房产是对 G|CLUBS 会费的合宜且非欺诈性的使用”，该确信亦不构成对欺诈罪名的抗辩，因为这并不等同于善意地确信对 G|CLUBS 所作的陈述是真实的。（MTC Order at 6-7.）事实上，关于郭文贵认为购买马瓦豪宅是对会员费的合宜使用的证词，与郭文贵是否通过使用电汇实施了获取金钱或财产的欺诈计划毫无关联。United States v. Jabar, 19 F.4th 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2021)（引文省略）；MTC Order at 4。郭文贵向 G|CLUBS 投资者所作的陈述包括“购买 G|CLUBS 会员资格将使其有权获得郭氏关联实体（如 GTV 和 G|Fashion）的股票”——他并未陈述 G|CLUBS 将购买一处庄园，或提供一个供 G|CLUBS 会员聚会的实体场所。起诉书 ¶ 18(f)。\n\nb. GTV 私募配售\n\n郭文贵关于中共对其针对性打压与 GTV 私募配售具有关联性的论点同样牵强附会，且同样带来了使陪审团偏离本案罪名指控的不可允许的风险。如果郭文贵出庭作证，他有权出示可采信的证据，以支持其关于在 GTV 私募配售时认为 $2 billion 是对 GTV 合理估值的主张。该等证据可包括关于 GTV 潜在市场的财务分析和数据等。郭文贵还可以像他之前那样辩称，他曾认为其支持者“会特别热心地支持 GTV 的业务，因为他们……致力于 GTV 反对中共的使命，并认为他们对 GTV 的支持将有助于该使命”（Dkt. 172 at 24），且 GTV 会取得成功，GTV 拥有巨大的市场，原因之一是他当时了解到中共正在采取措施禁止郭文贵的行动。但法院应驳回中共的活动和打压“既造就了 GTV 的必要性，又造就了其潜在垄断地位”这一牵强且完全没有根据的论点——特别是在没有任何证据表明 GTV 具有突破网络防火墙并向中国境内个人传送内容的任何潜在（更不用说经证明的）成功可能性的情况下。参见 Dkt. 172 at 25。郭文贵和王雁平在私募配售后数周内，就代表郭文贵的家属将 $100 million 的 GTV 投资者资金挪用于一项高风险对冲基金投资，这一事实戳穿了所谓创建和推广 GTV 是出于郭文贵对中共的恐惧和反对这一自私自利的说法。法院同样应当驳回郭文贵关于“猎狐行动”对于“……证明郭先生在就 GTV 的潜在价值发表言论时的意图至关重要”的主张。出处同上。中国政府压制郭文贵访问网络平台的任何企图都属于外部证据，在本案庭审中均不可采信，除非用于确立被告在被控犯罪发生时的心理状态（并且即使如此，也仅在被告出庭作证的情况下适用），且此类证据对于欺诈罪名几乎没有证明价值。此外，该等证据的任何此类价值都将被在庭审中引入此类具有煽动性和政治色彩的主题所导致的不公正偏见所实质性压倒。参见 Carroll v. Trump, 20 Cv. 7311 (LAK), 2024 WL 97359, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2024)。此类证据还会混淆并分散陪审团对根本问题的注意力——具体而言，即郭文贵对投资者的谎言及其对欺诈所得资金的滥用。\n\nc. 银行账户\n\n同样不应允许郭文贵就其知悉中共普遍干扰其他异见人士银行关系的情况作证，亦不应允许其为此出示外部证据。参见 Def. MTC Mem. at 23, n.4。根据上文阐述的理由，郭文贵可以就其使用数百个银行账户时的心理状态作证（或许会作证称，这种使用是为了应对中共对其本人的针对性打压，而非企图“掩饰其欺诈所得资金的非法来源”）。然而值得注意的是，该抗辩相当于承认郭文贵对这些处理了超过 $1 billion 欺诈收益的银行账户行使了控制权。无论如何，允许郭文贵就中共普遍干扰其他异见人士银行关系的企图出示外部证据，会造成“导致根据不当依据作出裁决的不当倾向”。Fed. R. Evid. 402 advisory committee's note。具体而言，允许出示关于中共针对其他（非郭文贵）异见人士银行关系的此类一般性证据，可能会暗示中共也在针对郭文贵在美国的银行账户，从而引导陪审团作出毫无依据的推论。\n\n因此，如果（且仅在）被告出庭作证的情况下，有关中共针对郭文贵、其家属、其共同被告或与起诉书相关的实体的打压企图的证据，在与被告在被控犯罪发生时的心理状态相关的范围内，具有可采性。但法院应严格管控辩方引入有关中共活动（包括针对性打压）的外部证据的任何企图，并应排除有关中共针对郭文贵活动的任何一般性证据。绝不能允许被告就中共的针对性打压展开一场小规模审判，因为这毫无疑问会不可允许地分散并混淆陪审团对关键问题的注意力：即被告是否通过欺诈受害者而不当获取资金，并对欺诈收益进行了洗钱和挪用。\n\n4. 法院应排除暗示被告的欺诈具有正当理由、具有必要性或系受胁迫所致的辩论及证据\n\n被告不能主张、也不能提出意图表明其行为系因受到 CCP（中国共产党）（无论是通过 Fox Hunt（猎狐行动）还是其他途径）的目标针对而具有正当性或必要性，亦不能主张其系在胁迫下行事。为了确立构成对犯罪行为的法定免责事由的胁迫主张，被告必须证明：“(a) ‘在行为发生时’，其受到了实际使用或威胁使用的武力；(b) 该武力或威胁具有足以引起对即将到来的死亡或严重身体伤害的合理恐惧的性质；并且 (c) 除了从事该等在其他情况下属违法的活动外，没有合理的机会逃脱该武力或威胁。”United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1181 (2d Cir. 1993)（援引 United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d at 837）。被告“泛化恐惧”的证据不满足对即将发生死亡或严重人身伤害具有合理恐惧的要求；必须存在明确具体的威胁以及迫在眉睫的受害前景。参见 United States v. Esposito, 834 F.2d 272, 276 (2d Cir. 1987)；United States v. Lorenzo, 52 Fed. App'x 553, 554 (2d Cir. 2002)（简要裁定）。此外，“凡存在逃避所受威胁伤害的合理机会之处，被告必须采取合理措施利用该机会，无论通过逃离还是寻求有关当局的介入。”United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1990)（引文省略）。政府方未获悉任何表明可以提出胁迫抗辩的证据。在辩方未作出具体证明的情况下，任何关于 CCP（或任何其他人）使其处于胁迫状态的主张都必须予以排除。\n\n出于类似理由，被告不能主张其行为是由于 CCP（或任何其他人）的任何外部威胁而具有必要性或正当性，亦不能主张因其推进了某种“正义”事业而具有正当性。正当化事由抗辩要求提供证据证明：(1) 被告面临不法且眼前的死亡或严重身体伤害威胁；(2) 被告未因疏忽或轻率而使自己陷入被迫从事犯罪行为的境地；(3) 除了违法之外，被告没有合理的合法替代方案；以及 (4) 犯罪行为与避免所受威胁的伤害之间存在直接因果关系。参见 United States v. Smith, 160 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1998)；亦见 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 490-91 & nn.3-4 (2001)（指出最高法院从未承认针对任何联邦法规的紧急避险抗辩，并质疑“联邦法院是否拥有承认法规未规定的紧急避险抗辩的权力”）。\n\n5. 法院应排除关于中国警方与受害者之间接触的泛化证据\n\n被告提交的单方（ex parte）法律备忘录（该备忘录的部分内容系用于支持向 USAO-EDNY（纽约东区联邦检察官办公室）发出传票的动议）中声称，辩护律师找到了证明“中国警方强迫某些 GTV 投资者向 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）、FBI（联邦调查局）和美国金融机构提出虚假索赔”的证据。虽然就任何特定政府证人的证词是否系受 CCP 强迫的结果对其进行交叉质询可能是恰当的——政府方没有任何理由认为其证人存在这种情况——但提出概括性的证据（或辩论意见）声称政府方的案件受到了 CCP 的玷污（包括受 CCP 胁迫受害者的影响）是不恰当的。也就是说，被告不能提出关于“辩护律师对中国警方的调查”的泛化证据，以此暗示政府方在审判中提出的具体证据在某种程度上受到了 CCP 的玷污。此类证据和辩论意见是不相关的，且会对政府方造成不正当的偏见。举例来说，即使假定辩护律师获悉“证人-A”受到了 CCP 的强迫，除非证人-A出庭作证，否则此类信息与本案审判毫无关联。出于类似理由，辩方无权仅仅为了引入该等辩方证人曾受 CCP 强迫的事实，而传唤政府方并未依赖的辩方自己的证人。\n\nC. 法院应排除被告以其良好行为（包括任何针对 CCP 的异见活动）证明其无罪的证据和主张\n\n在被告可能试图提出关于其过往实施“良好行为”的证据或辩论意见，或提供非犯罪活动的证据以反驳被指控罪名有罪的范围内，法院应禁止其这样做。用以反驳刑事指控的特定行为倾向性证据，其可采性并不高于用以确立刑事指控的证据。\n\n以下属于既定法理：“被告不得试图通过证明在[其他]特定场合不存在犯罪行为……来确立其无罪。”United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1990)。同样，虽然在适当情况下，被告可以提供品格证人关于其在某一“相关特征”方面的声誉的概括性证词，或证人关于被告在该特征方面的意见，参见 Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(A) 及 405(a)，但被告既不能作证，也不能提供其他证据来证明符合该特征且不属于犯罪构成要件的特定行为。参见，例如，United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1249-50 (2d Cir. 1978)（被告特定行为的证据被不当采纳，因为“长期以来，品格证据仅能以声誉的形式被采纳，而不能以列举良好或不良行为的形式被采纳”）；United States v. Fazio, No. 11 Cr. 873 (KBF), 2012 WL 1203943, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2012)（“[被告]不得通过提及具体的良好行为实例来主动试图证明其无罪；品格应当通过声誉或意见证据来证明”），aff'd, 770 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2014)。\n\n此外，根据《联邦证据规则》第 403 条，“如果地区法院认定被告过往良好行为证据的任何微小证明价值均被造成陪审团混淆的可能性和陪审团弃法裁决的风险所压倒，则可以排除该等证据。”United States v. Rivera, No. 13 Cr. 149 (KAM), 2015 WL 1725991, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015)（援引 United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 124 (2d Cir. 2011)（“审判法官的担忧是完全正确的：在任何[过往良好行为]证据可能被解释为与被指控的共谋相关联的范围内，陪审团都会发现其极其令人困惑，甚至无法理解。”））。\n\n应禁止被告提出证据或辩论意见（包括在其开庭陈述中），主张其任何慈善、公益行为或被告过往良好行为的任何其他具体实例，亦或未实施其他不良行为的事实，属于其无罪的证明。\n\n被告可能试图向陪审团提出此类辩论意见并非出于理论上的担忧。在审前提交的文件中，且如上所述，Kwok（郭文贵）屡次试图将被告是否系真正的 CCP 异见人士作为一个争议焦点。例如，在郭文贵寻求从 USAO-EDNY 提前调取文件的单方简报中（该简报已向政府方作了部分披露），郭文贵辩称“[政]府方还在起诉书中声称，郭先生及其运动同仁不是真正的异见人士。”（2024年3月5日，郭文贵单方简报，第 9 页。）这并非实情。加入郭文贵运动的许多人是真正的异见人士；然而，郭文贵和 Wang（王雁平）随后对他们实施了诈骗。更关键的是，郭文贵或王雁平是否为真正的异见人士并不是陪审团作出裁决所必须回答的问题。事实上，即使郭文贵和王雁平以及任何与其相关的组织是反 CCP 的，他们仍可能在起诉书指控的每项罪名上均告成立——这一点是无可辩驳的，因此，被告异见活动的相关性即使有，也是极低的。\n\n充其量，如果被告出庭作证，他们的证词可能会提供背景和总体情况——包括他们曾参与某些反 CCP 活动。而且，政府方承认，在符合提供背景所必需的限度内，审判中将引入被告反 CCP 努力的某些证据。例如，在许多情况下，受害者系受到郭文贵和王雁平的反 CCP 言论吸引，这提供了受害者如何知悉被告的背景情况。但是，在超出该背景之外，法院不应允许被告引入属于附带事项的证据——即被告的反 CCP 活动。管控此类证据对于防止就无关问题——即被告在何种程度上是真正的异见人士——演变成（旷日持久的）案中之案至关重要。Manko v. United States, 63 F. App'x 570, 573 (2d Cir. 2003)（“[审判]法官有权自由裁量排除证明力微弱的证据，如果引入该证据会因将注意力集中于附带问题上而混淆和误导陪审团，并且会不必要地拖延审判”）（引文和引用省略）；United States v. Doyle, No. 16 Cr. 506 (ALC), 2018 WL 1902506, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2018)（排除将“不可避免地导致一场小型审判……事实裁判者将被带偏至远离待审指控的核心，以至于他们查明真相的使命将丧失殆尽”的附带问题）。\n\n此外，且至关重要的是，必须禁止辩方进行实质上的辩论，主张如果被告是真正的异见人士，则他们在指控中就是无罪的。任何此类辩论在法律上都是错误的，如果予以允许，将从根本上混淆陪审团。遴选陪审团不是为了决定郭文贵是否以及在何种程度上发起了一场反对 CCP 的运动，也不是为了决定被告是否真诚地持有反 CCP 信仰。陪审团的任务仅在于判定证据是否能够毫无合理怀疑地确立被指控罪名的构成要件。被指控罪名中的任何要件均不要求政府方证明被告异见活动的真实性——证明这些真实性亦不是对任何被指控罪名的抗辩。事实上，郭文贵的重要虚假陈述包括向其受害者承诺高额的财务回报及其他利益。郭文贵并未因谎报其异见人士身份而被指控。辩方提出被告因系“真正异见人士”而无罪的任何辩论意见，从根本上歪曲了本场审判的核心所在。必须禁止被告提出此类辩论意见。\n\n第三，“被告不得试图通过证明在特定场合不存在犯罪行为……来确立其无罪。”United States v. Dawkins, 999 F.3d 767, 792 (2d Cir. 2021)（引文和引用省略）。因此，辩方不能利用被告的异见活动来证明在其他某些场合不存在欺诈行为。参见 United States v. Walker, 191 F.3d 326, 336 (2d Cir. 1999)（“[被告]是否曾准备过其他无欺诈的申请，与被指控含有虚假陈述的申请是否存在欺诈根本无关。”）。\n\n第四，被告异见活动的证据是不当的，因为它会博取陪审团同情并带来陪审团弃法裁决的风险。参见 In re United States, 945 F.3d 616, 626 (2d Cir. 2019)（“我们的判例法很明确：‘鼓励弃法裁决并非法院的正当职能。’”）；同上，第 630 页（“仅仅为了鼓励弃法裁决而采纳的证据根据定义是不相关的，因此无论在审判中可能引入何种其他证据，均不具有可采性”）。\n\n因此，除被告若选择作证可作为背景介绍之外，法院应禁止被告提出其反中共（anti-CCP）活动的证据，并完全禁止提出任何以被告的异见活动证明其无罪的辩解。\n\nD. 法院应排除暗示被告因交易文件中的免责声明而不构成犯罪的辩护意见、证据和交叉询问\n\n应禁止被告提出以任何方式暗示交易文件中的免责声明使被告对指控不构成犯罪的辩解、出示此类证据或对证人进行交叉询问。具体而言，不应允许被告利用免责声明来辩称受害者不应信赖其他陈述、免责声明使得其他陈述不具重大性（immaterial），或免责声明证明了被告的善意（good faith）。免责声明的存在与辩护无关，且极可能在电汇欺诈的构成要件上使陪审团产生困惑和误导。\n\n在审理中，政府方预计将提出 GTV 私募备忘录（GTV Private Placement Memorandum，简称「GTV PPM」）作为证据。该备忘录包含以下免责声明：\n\n> 假设和判断可能被证明正确，也可能不正确，并且无法保证任何预测的结果是可以实现的或将会实现。[投资者]在评估参与本文所述任何交易的价值时，不得依赖本文件。本文件仅包含选定信息，并非旨在包罗万象，亦不包含可能与您参与任何此类交易相关的所有信息。本文件不构成且不应被解释为建议或意见，包括投资、法律、财务、税务或会计建议……[文件中的信息]不能保证未来的结果、活跃度、业绩或成就。\n\n（附件 B，第 2-4 页。）\n\nGTV PPM 还包含一个“风险”章节，其中指出投资者承担经济风险，并声明“Saraca（萨拉卡公司）拥有本公司的控股权益，并能对本公司行使重大控制权。”（附件 B，第 25 页。）最终，Kwok（郭文贵）和 Wang（王雁平）从 GTV 私募中挪用了 $100 million，并以“Saraca”的名义投资于一家对冲基金。\n\n关于农场贷款项目（Farm Loan Program），部分受害者签署的合同中包含如下表述：“出借人在财务和商业事务方面具有充分经验，有能力……评估该笔贷款的价值和风险，并就此做出知情决定。”合同还声明“贷款收益……用于借款人的一般营运资金用途”，出借人在合同中对此予以确认。（附件 C）\n\n在某些时期，G|CLUBS 在其会员协议中以及其网站上包含了免责声明，其中特别向潜在会员声明：“您不应依赖 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）先生或任何其他人对以下事项的任何描述：(i) G|CLUBS 会员可能或将会获得的权益，或 (ii) G|CLUBS 会员资格的结构或条款的任何其他方面。会员资格不是对 G|CLUBS 的投资，也不提供对 G|CLUBS 或任何其他实体的股权或所有权权益。”（附件 D。）\n\n最后，Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）发布了提供有关 Himalaya Dollar（喜币/喜马拉雅美元）和 Himalaya Coin（喜币/喜马拉雅币）详细信息的“白皮书”。这些白皮书包含试图限制喜马拉雅交易所民事责任的措辞：\n\n> 喜马拉雅币或喜马拉雅币积分的潜在购买者应确保其理解此类购买的性质及相关风险。……尽管本文件中的信息被认为是准确和可靠的，但发行人、喜马拉雅交易所或其代理人、顾问、董事、\n\n高级职员、雇员和股东均不对该等信息的准确性作出任何明示或暗示的陈述或保证，并明确声明免除可能基于该等信息或其错误或遗漏而产生的任何及所有责任。\n\n（附件 E，HCN 白皮书第 35 页。）\n\n上述及类似的免责声明针对的是民事诉因，它们并没有（也不可能）免除被告的刑事责任。因此，任何暗示相反观点的辩解都是不当的。关于这些免责声明的辩解没有任何相关目的，且其造成的偏见将超过其证明价值。这是因为信赖并非被控罪名的构成要件。*Weaver* 案，860 F.3d at 95（“普通法关于合理信赖和损害的要求在联邦欺诈法规中显然没有立足之地”（援引 *Neder v. United States* 案，527 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999)））；另见 *United States v. Vilar* 案，729 F.3d 62, 88 (2d Cir. 2013)（信赖不是刑事证券欺诈的构成要件）。\n\n免责声明也不涉及虚假陈述的重大性。事实上，在 *Weaver* 案中，第二巡回法院仔细审查了与本案类似的免责声明。在 *Weaver* 案中，被告实施了一项诱导受害者购买自动售货机的计划，并承诺受害者对这些机器的投资“‘风险很小’”。*Weaver* 案，860 F.3d at 92。随后受害者与销售人员交谈，后者承诺了“完全不切实际的收益，并声称投资是稳妥的。”同上。在客户同意购买机器后，他们被要求签署一份采购订单合同，其中包括以下“大写字母的免责声明”：\n\n> 本采购订单包含双方协议的全部谅解，绝不依赖任何口头陈述。卖方未保证任何最低或最高收益……进一步确认\n\n除本采购订单中包含的任何内容外，没有任何陈述、承诺或协议影响了本次购买或被寄予期望……\n\n同上。\n\n辩方辩称，这些免责声明使其先前的虚假陈述“不具重大性”。同上，第 93 页。第二巡回法院断然拒绝了该辩解，并认定“在联邦刑事邮件和电汇欺诈法规下，对先前虚假陈述不予信赖的合同免责声明并不能使这些虚假陈述不具重大性。”同上，第 95 页。这是因为“对某些陈述的不予信赖声明”并不“意味着[先前的]口头陈述是不具重大性或没有产生影响的倾向”，*Weaver* 案，860 F.3d at 95，因此免责声明在审理中没有任何相关目的。事实上，允许“[欺诈者]……逃避因诱骗容易受骗的受害者……签署包含不予信赖免责声明的合同所说的谎言而应承担的刑事责任”，将破坏欺诈法的立法目的。同上，第 96 页。\n\n由于没有相关目的，根据 Rule 403（《联邦证据规则》第 403 条），辩方关于免责声明的证据或辩解亦应予以排除，因为它们极可能混淆陪审团。事实上，允许与免责声明相关的辩解可能会错误地引导陪审团认为民事或普通法欺诈原则适用于本案、陪审团应当评估受害者的成熟度，或者免责声明在某种程度上可证明重大性，而事实并非如此。*Weaver* 案，860 F.3d 90, 95（“我们认同姊妹巡回法院的意见，并认定在刑事邮件和电汇欺诈法规下，对先前虚假陈述不予信赖的合同免责声明并不能使这些虚假陈述不具重大性。”）19\n\nE. 法院应排除关于受害者存在过失或未能进行充分尽职调查的证据和主张\n\n19 在举证结束时，法院可能有必要指示陪审团，免责声明的存在并不限制其刑事责任，也不能证明任何所谓的善意。\n\n应禁止被告辩称或提出证据证明受害者存在过失、容易受骗或缺乏足够的警惕性。“上诉法院历来驳回针对电汇欺诈指控的易受骗受害者辩解。”*United States v. Adelekan* 案，567 F. Supp. 3d 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）2021)（援引 *United States v. Amico* 案，486 F.3d 764, 780 (2d Cir. 2007) 及 *United States v. Weaver* 案，860 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2017)）。这是因为“信赖不是刑事欺诈的构成要件”，并且“欺诈受害者在信赖（或不信赖）虚假陈述时的不合理性并不影响被告的犯罪故意。”*Weaver* 案，860 F.3d at 95-96。因此，被告不得辩称受害者本应更加密切地关注 GTV 私募备忘录、G|CLUBS 合同条款中的细节，也不得辩称受害者本应明白他们正在参与高风险交易。参见 *United States v. Thomas* 案，377 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 2004)（汇总并赞同认定受害者未能发现针对其犯罪的过失不能作为刑事犯罪抗辩的判例）。\n\n特别是，应禁止被告就证人是否对 Kwok（郭文贵）的陈述或他们可能签署的交易文件进行了充分调查进行交叉询问。任何受害者的风险承受能力或承受损失的意愿也不是供陪审团考量的相关事实。参见 *United States v. Frenkel* 案，682 F. App'x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017)（维持未要求陪审团“从受害者的主观视角”考量重大性的指示，因为“就电汇欺诈、邮件欺诈和银行欺诈而言的重大性，……如果‘*理性人*在确定其在相关交易中的行为选择时，会对其存在或不存在赋予重要性’，则该事项具有重大性”（引文及出处省略））。\n\nF. 法院应排除指称 SEC 或政府方应对受害者的经济损失负责的辩解\n\nKwok（郭文贵）通过其各种媒体机构发表了多项公开声明，表明他可能企图将 GTV 的失败或欺诈的其他组成部分的责任转嫁给 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）或政府方。作为背景情况，在被告从 GTV 私募中筹集了 $452 million 之后，SEC 获悉了该所谓股票销售的不当行为。SEC 最终从欺诈性的 GTV 私募中追回了资金。在广播中，郭文贵及其代理人将 GTV 的倒闭归咎于 SEC。同样，根据司法授权的令状，在 2023 年秋季，政府方从郭氏企业（Kwok Enterprise）的多个实体中查扣了资金，其中包括从喜马拉雅交易所查扣的数亿美元。这样做是为了保全被告通过欺诈获取的资金，以便日后分配给受害者。\n\n企图将 GTV 的倒闭或喜马拉雅交易所的任何失败责任转嫁给监管机构和政府方的辩解是不当的，应当予以排除。首先，被控罪名并不要求政府方证明对任何受害者造成了实际损害。*United States v. Greenberg* 案，835 F.3d 295, 305-06 (2d Cir. 2016)（“电汇欺诈法规要求政府方出示欺诈方案或欺计的证据，18 U.S.C. § 1343，这本身要求证明被告具有欺诈故意，但政府方无需证明欺诈的受害者受到了*实际*损害，而只需证明被告*意图*对其受害者造成某种实际伤害或损害。”）。\n\n其次，指责 SEC 和政府方不过是被告企图将本案转变为一场关于金融市场监管作用的政策考量之争。参见 *United States v. Cheung Kin Ping* 案，555 F.2d 1069, 1073 (2d Cir. 1977)（维持原判\n\n向陪审团作出指示，说明“执法政策并非其关心的事项”，且其应当“将注意力集中在真正的问题上，即政府是否已排除合理怀疑证明了起诉书中所指控的事实”）；亦见 United States v. Josephberg, 562 F.3d 478, 497 (2d Cir. 2009)（维持地方法院的认定，即被告在总结陈词中辩称“Internal Revenue Service（国税局）‘傲慢自大’……且正因如此，被告应当被宣判无罪”是不当的）。\n\n由于此类证据和辩论不具有任何证明价值，且只会造成不当偏见的危险、混淆争议焦点并误导陪审团，因此应当予以排除。\n\nG. 法院应当排除关于被告意图偿还受害者的证据和主张\n\n应当禁止被告提出证据或辩称其意图退还或偿还受害者的资金，并因此认为自己不具有欺诈故意。虽然电信欺诈罪要求“对受害者造成了预期的损害”，Jabar, 19 F.4th at 76，但并不要求被告“意图永久剥夺受害者的金钱或财产”，United States v. Males, 459 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2006)。因此，“归还金钱或财产的意图并非对侵占指控的有效抗辩。”United States v. Thomas, 581 F. App'x 100, 102 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014)（援引 United States v. Buckley, 101 F.3d 685, 1996 WL 282140, at *2 (2d Cir. 1996)）。“被告人自愿退还资金亦不能构成对[电信欺诈]的抗辩。”United States v. Vincent, 416 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2005)。“在法律意义上，被告人是否有意偿还挪用的资金并不重要，因为只要……存在‘立即挪用和欺诈的意图’，犯罪即告‘既遂’。”United States v. Bankman-Fried, No. 22 Cr. 673 (LAK), 2023 WL 4194773, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2023)。\n\n在本案中，不应允许被告辩称其意图偿还或退还受害者的资金，或辩称其相信受害者最终会获得全额受偿。见 United States v. Watts, 934 F. Supp. 2d 451, 473 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)（排除被告关于其认为对受害者出借人说谎不会造成最终损害因出借人会得到偿还的辩论主张）。\n\n在被告试图辩称其相信 GTV 投资者最终不会受损，因为 GTV（或任何其他与 Kwok 相关的实体）的价值将达到可观高度的限度内，这对陪审团而言属于不被允许的辩论主张。当被告及其共谋者“意图通过欺诈立即剥夺投资者的资金”时，即便其真诚地持有“从长远来看[其公司]最终会成功”的信念，亦不能构成对证券欺诈或电信欺诈的抗辩。United States v. Lange, 834 F.3d 58, 79 (2d Cir. 2016)；亦见 United States v. Berger, 188 F. Supp. 2d 307, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)（“若陪审团认定[被告]故意致使他人向其投资者发布关于[公司]价值的重大虚假或误导性陈述……即使他‘坚信’其策略最终会‘奏效’，他仍会被正当地认定有罪。”）。因此，不应允许被告辩称由于其认为受害者最终不会受损因而不构成犯罪。\n\n被告还应被禁止提出关于政府扣押的金钱和资产数额的证据，以向陪审团暗示受害者将获得全额受偿。此类证据是不相关的，且与关于被告自身努力偿还挪用资金的不当证据无异。见 United States v. Sindona, 636 F.2d 792, 800 (2d Cir. 1980)（“当挪用行为发生时，犯罪即已发生并告既遂。事后关于还款可能发生的情况并不重要，亦不能构成抗辩。”）。\n\nH. 法院应当排除关于被告个人情况及潜在刑罚的证据\n\n被告不得就家庭背景、健康状况、年龄、审前羁押或任何其他类似因素提出证据或进行辩论。见，例如，United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1201 (2d Cir. 1991)（维持排除关于被告育有一名患有脑瘫的儿子且被告毕生致力于照顾该儿子的证据）；United States v. Battaglia, No. 05 Cr. 774 (KMW), 2008 WL 144826, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2008)（以与“被告是否实施了所指控的犯罪这一问题不具有相关性”为由排除“关于被告家庭和个人状况的证据”）；亦见 United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440, 447-48 (D.C. Cir. 2007)（维持排除旨在“主要将被告塑造成具有同情色彩的顾家之人”的证据）。\n\n类似地，应当禁止被告就其一旦被定罪所面临的刑罚或后果提出证据或进行辩论。当陪审团在量刑中不承担任何职能时——正如本案中的情形——陪审团“应当受到告诫，‘在不考虑可能判处何种刑罚的情况下作出裁决’。”Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994)（援引 Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975)）。这具有充分的正当理由：关于刑罚的辩论“诱使[陪审员]思考不属于其职责范围的事项，分散其对事实认定职责的注意力，并极可能造成混淆。”同上。\n\nVII. 法院应当禁止被告为证明陈述内容的真实性而提出其自身的陈述\n\n应当禁止被告提出其在任何电子邮件、手机聊天记录、短信、语音信箱留言、公开声明或视频中的任何自身陈述，因为这些陈述属于不可采信的传闻证据。尽管如上所述，政府可以将被告的陈述作为当事人自认提出，但被告并不具有在不接受交叉询问的情况下将其自身陈述作为证据提出的同等权利。“当被告试图提出其先前陈述以证明陈述内容的真实性时，该陈述即为传闻，且不可采信。”Marin, 669 F.2d at 84；亦见 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 153 (2d Cir. 2003)（裁定被告“本可以就其陈述中所断言的一切进行作证，[但]他不能为了证明陈述内容的真实性而直接出示该文件本身”）；United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1225 (2d Cir. 1992)（同上）；United States v. Fernandez, 839 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1987)（“[辩护律师]希望在不让[被告]接受交叉询问的情况下将[被告的]陈述呈交陪审团，这正是传闻证据规则所明令禁止的。”）。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，法院应当批准政府的预先排除证据动议（motions in limine）。\n\n谨此提呈，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区）联邦检察官\n\n签署人：/s/\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\nRyan B. Finkel\nJustin Horton\nJuliana N. Murray\n助理联邦检察官\n(212) 637-2190 / 6612 / 2276 / 2314\n\n日期：2024年4月9日\n纽约州纽约市","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","GTV","CCP","Himalaya","CIPA","Himalaya Exchange","Saraca","GETTR","Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Farm Loan","Kin Ming Je","William Je","Yanping Wang","RICO","Horton","Fergenson","Murray","Finkel","Himalaya Alliance","Chinese Communist Party","Miles Guo","Wang Yanping","HCHK","G Clubs"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":7,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":36,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":51,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":107,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":131,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":148,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":172,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":204,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":215,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":219,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":250,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":255,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":259,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":716,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":876,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":1181,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":1183,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":25322,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-04-09 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-04-09","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:32:29"}