{"id":"court_sdny_278_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":278,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":"2024-04-12","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"被告申报令答辩意见书 —— 美国诉 Miles Guo（Ho Wan Kwok）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #278（2024年4月12日提交）。被告 Yanping Wang 的律师主张，FBI 特工在被告要求律师后继续对手机密码提问，违反《米兰达法则》（Edwards v. Arizona）权利；政府未能证明\"不可避免发现\"例外适用。","summary_en":"Defendant's Post-Hearing Brief Supporting Motion to Suppress — United States v. Miles Guo (Ho Wan Kwok), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #278 (filed April 12, 2024). Defense counsel argues that FBI agents violated defendant's right to counsel by continuing interrogation regarding phone passcodes after invocation of counsel under Edwards v. Arizona, and that the Government cannot meet its burden to establish the inevitable discovery exception.","body_en":"## **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\n#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nv.\n\nYANPING WANG,\n\n20 Cr. 118-3 (AT)\n\nDefendant.\n\n## **POST-HEARING BRIEF IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT YANPING WANG'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS**\n\nBrendan F. Quigley Sarah Reeves BAKER BOTTS LLP 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10112 212 408 2520 brendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com sarah.reeves@bakerbotts.com\n\n*Attorneys for Yanping Wang*\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n| I.   | The Agents Violated Ms. Wang's Right to Counsel  1                                                                                       |                                                                                                                            |  |\n|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n|      | A.                                                                                                                                       | Documentary Evidence Shows that the Search of Ms. Wang's Apartment Began<br>Only After She Invoked Her Right to Counsel  1 |  |\n|      | B.                                                                                                                                       | The Agents Kept Ms. Wang at the Apartment for Over 45 Minutes After She<br>Invoked  3                                      |  |\n|      | C.                                                                                                                                       | The Agent's Notes and Report Are Consistent with Post-Invocation Questioning<br>Regarding the Phones  4                    |  |\n|      | D.                                                                                                                                       | The Agent Admitted She Might Have Asked Additional Post-Invocation Questions<br>About Ms. Wang's Phone  6                  |  |\n|      | E.                                                                                                                                       | Other Factors Are Consistent with Post-Invocation Questioning Regarding the<br>Phones  7                                   |  |\n| II.  | The Government Cannot Meet Its Burden to Show the \"777777\" Phone Passwords Would<br>Have Been Discovered Absent the Edwards Violation  8 |                                                                                                                            |  |\n|      | A.                                                                                                                                       | Applicable Law  8                                                                                                          |  |\n|      | B.                                                                                                                                       | Application 10                                                                                                             |  |\n| III. |                                                                                                                                          | Suppression Is Appropriate 13                                                                                              |  |\n|      |                                                                                                                                          | CONCLUSIONi 16                                                                                                             |  |\n\n| In re 650 Fifth Ave.,<br>830 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2016)9                                                                                  |    |\n|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|\n| In re 650 Fifth Ave.,<br>934 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2019)9, 12                                                                             |    |\n| Maryland v. Shatzer,<br>559 U.S. 98 (2010) 14                                                                                         |    |\n| Massiah v. United States,<br>377 U.S. 201 (1964) 11                                                                                   |    |\n| Minnick v. Mississippi,<br>498 U.S. 146 (1990) 14                                                                                     |    |\n| Nix v. Williams,<br>467 U.S. 104 (1984) 10                                                                                            |    |\n| Riley v. California,<br>573 U.S. 373 (2014) 15                                                                                        |    |\n| State v. Valdez,<br>---- P.3d. ---- 2023 UT 26, 2023 WL 8635197 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023) 14                                               |    |\n| United States v. Bing Yi Chen,<br>433 F. App'x 14 (2d Cir. 2011) 11                                                                   |    |\n| United States v. Djibo,<br>151 F. Supp. 3d 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 15                                                                     |    |\n| United States v. Gilkeson,<br>431 F. Supp. 2d 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) 15                                                                  |    |\n| United States v. Lauria,<br>70 F.4th 106 (2d Cir. 2023) 8, 9, 10, 12                                                                  |    |\n| United States v. McCoy,<br>407 F. App'x 514 (2d Cir. 2010) 14                                                                         |    |\n| United States v. Patane,<br>542 U.S. 630 (2004) 14, 15                                                                                |    |\n| <i>United States v. Shvartsman,</i><br>No. 23-CR-307 (LJL), 2024 WL 1193703 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2024) ................................ | 13 |\n\nYale Kamisar, *Postscript: Another Look at* Pantane *and* Seibert*, the, 2004* Miranda *\"Poisoned Fruit\" Cases,* 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 97, 105 n.42 (2004)................................................14, 15\n\nDefendant Yanping Wang respectfully submits this post-hearing memorandum in further support of her motion to suppress.\n\n#### **I. The Agents Violated Ms. Wang's Right to Counsel**\n\nThe evidence at the hearing showed that, consistent with Ms. Wang's affidavit, ECF No. 199-4, Ms. Wang invoked her right to counsel before being asked questions about the passwords to her cellphones. This conclusion is supported by (i) the fact the agents did not begin their search of Ms. Wang's apartment until after Ms. Wang's invocation; (ii) after her invocation, the agents kept Ms. Wang at her apartment for 45 minutes while they searched the apartment; (iii) the structure of the agent's contemporaneous report of the search; (iv) the agent's uncertainty about the effect of the assertion of a right to counsel; and (v) the other circumstances present on the morning of March 15, 2023.\n\n## **A. Documentary Evidence Shows that the Search of Ms. Wang's Apartment Began Only** *After* **She Invoked Her Right to Counsel**\n\nThe documentary evidence at the hearing showed that the search of Ms. Wang's apartment, during which the agents seized the cellphones at issue, began sometime after 6:18 am on March 15, 2023, i.e., *only after* Ms. Wang had asserted her right to counsel at 6:15 am. The timeline established at the hearing is thus consistent with Ms. Wang's affidavit that she invoked her right to counsel before she was asked about her cellphones' passwords.\n\nMore specifically, the FBI first knocked on the door of Ms. Wang's apartment no earlier than 6:00 am on March 15, 2023. (Tr. 20:1-8).<sup>1</sup> The FBI had both an arrest warrant for Ms. Wang and a search warrant for the apartment. (Tr. 6:2-:22). At approximately the same time, other teams\n\n<sup>1</sup> \"Tr.\" refers to the transcript of the April 9, 2024 suppression hearing.\n\nof agents were looking for Mr. Kwok at another apartment in Manhattan and locations in New Jersey and Connecticut. (Tr. 16:7:17; 18:13-16; 20:14-19).\n\nIt took Ms. Wang some time to come to the door,<sup>2</sup> and agents called four phone numbers to try to attempt to contact her. (Tr. 20:20-21:24).\n\nMs. Wang eventually came to the door, opened it, and was \"taken into custody\" and handcuffed. (Tr. 22:8-14). At approximately 6:05, she was \"passed\" to Agent Baccari, who read Ms. Wang her *Miranda* rights and began to \"interact with\" her. (Tr. 6:17-25).\n\nAgents planned to take Ms. Wang back inside the apartment to get her in clothes suitable to go to court, but first had to \"clear\" the apartment to make sure there was nothing dangerous or no other persons in the apartment. (Tr. 24:20-25:6). Before agents entered the apartment to clear it, Agent Baccari \"may\" have asked Ms. Wang questions about the presence of other people in the apartment. (Tr. 25:11-15).\n\nOther agents then went in to clear the apartment to make sure it was safe for Ms. Wang to re-enter and for the agents to begin their actual search. (Tr. 26:6-26:14).\n\nAgent Baccari and an another, unidentified female agent remained in the hallway alone with Ms. Wang at this time. (Tr. 7:1-7). While Agent Baccari asserted at the hearing that she did not ask Ms. Wang to make a statement in the hallway and Ms. Wang did not assert her right to counsel at that time (Tr. 7:10-18), Agent Baccari did not dispute that she was more equivocal in prior sessions with the AUSAs, telling them she didn't \"*think* I would have asked her in the hallway to make a statement,\" (Tr. 27:8-9) (emphasis added).\n\n<sup>2</sup> As Ms. Wang noted in her affidavit, she was asleep when the agents began knocking. ECF No. 199-4.\n\nRegardless, Ms. Wang invoked her right to counsel no later than 6:15 am, no more than ten minutes after she was read her rights. (Tr. 30:22-31:9).\n\nAfter agents completed \"clearing\" the apartment, finding no weapons, pets, or other people inside, an FBI photographer took \"entry photos\" at 6:18, and the \"search commenced thereafter,\" in other words some time after 6:18 a.m. *and indisputably after Ms. Wang's invocation*.\n\n*DX-2/3501-05*\n\n## **B. The Agents Kept Ms. Wang at the Apartment for Over 45 Minutes After She Invoked**\n\nFurther, while Agent Baccari testified the once Ms. Wang invoked at 6:15 a.m. \"the next step\" was to prepare Ms. Wang for transport to 26 Federal Plaza, Tr. 44:6-7,<sup>3</sup> the documentary evidence is wildly inconsistent with that statement. Instead, the \"next step\" was clearly for the agents to search the apartment, a search in which they found and seized numerous cellphones,<sup>4</sup> and to ask Ms. Wang questions about those cellphones.\n\nIndeed, the agents kept Ms. Wang on the scene for **45 minutes** after her 6:15 a.m. invocation, i.e., until approximately 7:00 a.m. (Tr. 34:21-25), a timeline that would have made no sense if the \"next step\" was simply to get Ms. Wang ready to go to court. Rather, the record indicates—again consistent with Ms. Wang's affidavit<sup>5</sup>—that agents questioned Ms. Wang during these 45 minutes, including about her cellphone password. Indeed, Agent Baccari was clear that Ms. Wang was asked about her cellphones on multiple occasions, including not only the password\n\n<sup>3</sup> *See also* (Tr. 12:5-12 (Baccari testimony that once Ms. Wang invoked \"our focus would have transitioned to processing her, taking her down to transport and process her\")).\n\n<sup>4</sup> (Tr. 35:20-21).\n\n<sup>5</sup> ECF 199-4 \b6\b6 4-5.\n\n\"777777\" for a cellphone found in her bedroom (Tr. 9:16-22), but also passcodes for cellphones\n\nfound in other areas of the apartment at an uncertain time during the search.<sup>6</sup>\n\n# **C. The Agent's Notes and Report Are Consistent with Post-Invocation Questioning Regarding the Phones**\n\nThe fact that this questioning occurred *after* Ms. Wang asserted her right to counsel is also\n\nsupported by the structure of the agent's notes of the search and her report on the search.\n\nHer notes, introduced as DX-1\n\n![](_page_7_Picture_7.jpeg)\n\n*DX-1/3501-17*\n\n<sup>6</sup> (Tr. 12:25-13:15); *see also* DX-3 (indicating that Ms. Wang provided multiple \"phones' passcodes\").\n\nFurther, her report, written just days after the search and before Ms. Wang's suppression motion was filed, introduced as DX-3 at the hearing:\n\n![](_page_8_Picture_2.jpeg)\n\n*DX-3/3501-16*\n\n![](_page_8_Figure_4.jpeg)\n\nIn short, the agents' own report is consistent with the fact that Ms. Wang the agents questioned Ms. Wang about her cellphone passwords after she invoked her right to counsel.\n\n## **D. The Agent Admitted She Might Have Asked Additional Post-Invocation Questions About Ms. Wang's Phone**\n\nFurther, despite Agent Baccari's claim that Ms. Wang provided her cellphone password before she invoked her right to counsel, Agent Baccari was, respectfully, at best, unsure of whether an assertion of the right to counsel precluded her from asking questions about cellphones. She acknowledged, for example, telling the AUSAs that she may have asked Ms. Wang questions about her cellphone even after Ms. Wang had invoked her right to counsel. Tr. 32:7-33:11 (\"Yes, I guess I said that.\"). In other words, over a year later, Agent Baccari still had, at best, uncertainty over *Edwards'* requirement that an assertion of the right to counsel requires that all questioning cease, making it more than plausible, on the day of the arrest, she continued asking Ms. Wang questions about her cellphone post-invocation.<sup>7</sup> Agent Baccari also did not recall telling another agent who was questioning Ms. Wang that Ms. Wang had already invoked her right to counsel, Tr. 43:18-21, and did not \"recall\" \"specific[s]\" on how Ms. Wang's invocation was relayed to other agents (Tr. 44:2-4)—all this despite *Edwards'* clear rule that a suspect who invokes her right to counsel cannot\n\n<sup>7</sup> Overall, the record concerning the search at Ms. Wang's apartment reflects a confused scene, despite the fact that Ms. Wang was indisputably compliant. The search of Ms. Wang's apartment previously required the government to make a corrective disclosure based on a \"reinterview[]\" of the \"FBI agent who served as squad leader for the . . . search.\" *See* Letter from the Government to Hon. Robert W. Lehrburger, dated Apr. 17, 2023, ECF No. 47.\n\n\"be subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available,\" 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).<sup>8</sup>\n\n## **E. Other Factors Are Consistent with Post-Invocation Questioning Regarding the Phones**\n\n*Finally*, other factors are consistent with Agent Baccari asking Ms. Wang for a statement, and Ms. Wang invoking her right to counsel, in the opening minutes of her interaction with the FBI, again consistent with Ms. Wang's affidavit.\n\nFor one, based on the planning meeting the day before, one of Agent Baccari's aims was to get a statement from Ms. Wang (Tr. 19:15-17 (Baccari's role included \"try[ing] to talk to Ms. Wang on the day of [the] arrest\")), which is consistent with Agent Baccari asking for a statement as soon as Ms. Wang was in custody.\n\nSecond, relatedly, the FBI was \"unsure where Mr. [Kwok] was\" and had at least three operations \"simultaneously\" underway to find and arrest him. (Tr. 11:6-7; *see also* Tr. 16: 7-16 (agents were going to simultaneous look for Kwok at the Sherry Netherland Hotel and locations in Greenwich, Connecticut and Mahwah, New Jersey); 18:13-17 (FBI was not sure where Kwok was going to be)). Given this uncertainly, and the amount of FBI resources devoted to locating Mr. Kwok that morning, it would make sense that Agent Baccari asked Ms. Wang about Mr. Kwok's whereabouts—after which even Agent Baccari acknowledges Ms. Wang invoked<sup>9</sup>—before asking about the cellphones it was finding in Ms. Wang's apartment. Put another way, once Ms. Wang was arrested, the cellphones in her apartment weren't going anywhere, but the FBI was obviously concerned that morning (rightly or wrongly) about locating Mr. Kwok, and it would thus have\n\n9 (Tr. 12:3-4).\n\nmade sense for Agent Baccari to prioritize those questions (after which Ms. Wang indisputably invoked).\n\n\\*\\*\\*\n\nIn short, the hearing evidence, including that the agents did not begin their search of the apartment until after Ms. Wang's invocation, that the agents kept Ms. Wang at her apartment for 45 minutes after she invoked her right to counsel, the structure of the agent's report, the agent's uncertainty about the effect of the assertion of a right to counsel, and the other circumstances present on the morning of March 15, 2023, show that consistent with Ms. Wang's affidavit, the agents asked Ms. Wang about her cellphone passwords *after* she had invoked her right to counsel, and thereby violated her rights under *Edwards*.\n\n## **II. The Government Cannot Meet Its Burden to Show the \"777777\" Phone Passwords Would Have Been Discovered Absent the** *Edwards* **Violation**\n\nThe government cannot meet its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the contents of Ms. Wang's phones for which passwords was \"777777\" would have inevitably been discovered absent the *Edwards* violation at her apartment.\n\nFor clarity, the inevitable discovery doctrine does *not* apply to items 1b15, 1B16, 1B18, 1B69 through 1B772, and 1B93, which were accessed using the passcode provided by Ms. Wang.<sup>10</sup>\n\n### **A. Applicable Law**\n\n\"The inevitable discovery doctrine instructs that evidence obtained during the course of an unreasonable search and seizure should not be excluded if the government can prove the evidence would have been obtained inevitably without the constitutional violation.\" *United States v. Lauria*,\n\n<sup>10</sup> Based on the evidence at the hearing, items 1B17, 1B20, 1B68, and 1b77 were seized without using the PINs Ms. Wang provided. As such, we are no longer seeking to suppress them based on the *Edwards*  violation, but reserve, for purposes of any appeal, the other arguments made in the portion of our motion to suppress which the Court previously denied.\n\n70 F.4th 106, 122 (2d Cir. 2023). The government bears the \"burden . . . to 'prove that each event leading to the discovery of the evidence would have occurred with a sufficiently high degree of confidence for the district judge to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered.'\" *In re 650 Fifth Ave.*, 934 F.3d 147, 165 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting *In re 650 Fifth Ave.*, 830 F.3d 66, 102 (2d Cir. 2016)).\n\nFurther, \"the investigation supporting a claim of inevitable discovery cannot itself have occurred only because the misconduct resulting in the actual discovery was exposed.\" *Lauria*, 70 F.4th at 123.\n\nLast year, in *Lauria*, the Second Circuit reversed a district court's finding of inevitable discovery and suppressed the results of cell-site location information (CSLI) the FBI had obtained in a robbery investigation. The government's CSLI warrant applications contained numerous misstatements regarding the dates of certain robberies. The district court nonetheless denied suppression because \"the government would inevitably have discovered\" information placing one of the co-conspirators near the scene of the robbery on the date in question because \"the government could have obtained a lawful warrant for these records once it corrected\" the original application, and, also, could have discovered communications between the co-conspirators when it lawfully searched another defendant's cellphone. 70 F.4th at 123-24.\n\nThe Second Circuit rejected this reasoning, explaining that \"[t]he fundamental flaw with the district court's reasoning is that it rests on the assumption that the government, *once alerted to defects in the [CSLI warrant applications]*, could have easily corrected or supplemented its initial supporting affidavits and thereby procured lawful warrants. But the inevitable discovery doctrine does not ask whether the government *could have* obtained the evidence at issue by [lawful means] or *that it would have done so after the defense alerted it to defects*\" in the initial search. 70 F.4th at 124 (some emphasis in original).\n\n#### **B. Application**\n\n### **1. \"Biometrics\"**\n\nThe government cannot rely on \"biometrics\" as a means of inevitable discovery. For one, none of the devices were accessed via biometrics.<sup>11</sup> And while Mr. Isola testified that one of the devices had biometric capabilities, his examinations occurred the day before and the morning of the hearing.<sup>12</sup> As in *Lauria*, the record shows that \"but for the defense's exposure of\" the potentially unlawful conduct, here the *Edwards* violation concerning the passwords, \"the government would have had no reason—and, therefore, would have been unlikely—to pursue alternative lawful means,\" here the use of the devices' biometric capabilities, \"to procure the evidence at issue.\" 70 F.4th at 124. As such, biometric capabilities do not provide a basis for inevitable discovery.\n\n### **2. Evidence Obtained from Kwok's Apartment**\n\nNor can the government rely on the fact that the \"777777\" passcode was provided by Kwok and his assistant in response to Agent Cardenas' questions.\n\nFirst, inevitable discovery requires the government to show that the information would have discovered by \"lawful means.\" *Lauria*, 70 F.4th at 106 (quoting *Nix v. Williams*, 467 U.S. 104, 122 (1984)). The government cannot show that here, because it cannot show that Agent Cardenas' questioning of Kwok was itself legal, based on the record before the Court.\n\n<sup>11</sup> (Tr. 69:13-18 \"Q. You testified about biometrics on direct. Do you recall that? A. I do. Q. None of these devices were accessed via biometrics, correct? A. I don't believe so. Q. It certainly doesn't reflect that on this summary chart; correct? A. That's correct.\").\n\n<sup>12</sup> (Tr. 80:6-23).\n\nAgent Cardenas testified that, twice, she directly asked Kwok (and \"everyone that was in the foyer area”) about the passcodes for phones in Kwok's apartment.<sup>13</sup> At the time, however, Kwok had already been indicted,<sup>14</sup> and, as such, his *Sixth Amendment* right to counsel had automatically attached. *United States v. Bing Yi Chen*, 433 F. App'x 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2011) (\"The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches upon indictment . . . .\"). As such, the agents could not \"deliberately elicit[]\" statements from Kwok without a clear waiver of his right to counsel. *Massiah v. United States*, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (\"We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.\"). Yet, that is exactly what Agent Cardenas did, asking him, twice, about the passcodes to the cellphones that had been found in his apartment.<sup>15</sup> For that reason alone, the government cannot show that it used \"lawful means\" to get the passwords from Mr. Kwok.\n\nSecond, while the government introduced an email from Agent Zachary Effting in which he approved the use of the \"77777\" password to unlock two of Ms. Wang's phones, GX 4, the government could not establish that Agent Effting's recommendation and approval was independent from knowledge obtained via the *Edwards* violations at Ms. Wang's apartment.\n\n<sup>13</sup> (Tr. 49:12-50:8 (\"I just directed the question to the room to everyone that was in the foyer area . . . I directed the question to the room: What is the passcode?\")).\n\n<sup>14</sup> (Tr. 18:22-23).\n\n<sup>15</sup> That \"Jason\" answered the second question (after Kwok answered the first time) should not matter, as both of Agent Cardenas' questions were directed to Kwok and the others in the room, a clear attempt a \"deliberate elicitation\" from an individual who had a right to counsel.\n\nAgent Effting was one of the case agents on the GTV investigation and involved in the planning of the search on Ms. Wang's apartment. (*See* Tr. 15:4-8). Ms. Volchko acknowledged she did not know \"what information Agent Effting had about the search on East 64th Street\" when he authorized attempting \"777777\" passcode to unlock Ms. Wang's devices and had \"no way of knowing whether information from\" the search of Ms. Wang's \"apartment impacted his decision to tell [her] to proceed\" with that passcode. (Tr. 71:19-25).\n\nFurther, any suggestion that the government would have eventually determined the passcode of Ms. Wang's phone is belied by Ms. Volchko's own contemporaneous warning to the agents that \"it's important to note that unsuccessful PIN attempts *always* run the risk of permanently disabling or wiping the device.\" GX 4 (emphasis added).\n\nFinally, the government cannot show, that at the time of the of the *Edwards* violations at Ms. Wang's apartment, the agents knew they would have obtained Kwok's passwords. *In re 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties*, 934 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2019) (instructing district courts to \"view[] affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search . . .\" (citation and quotation omitted)).\n\n#### **3. \"Brute Force\"**\n\nNor can the government rely on the FBI's \"Brute Force\" tool to claim inevitable discovery. First, the evidence at the hearing showed that Brute Force capabilities are not available for any iPhone that in version 12 or later, meaning it was not available for all but two of the iPhones that the agents unlocked using Ms. Wang's password, *cf.* GX S-1. And, for those two iPhones, 1B70 and 1B71, Mr. Isolda testified he determined that those devices could be \"Brute Forced\" *the morning of the hearing*. (Tr. 80:3-17). Once again, as in *Lauria*, \"but for the defense's exposure of\" the potentially unlawful conduct, here the *Edwards* violation concerning the passwords, \"the government would have had no reason—and, therefore, would have been unlikely—to pursue alternative lawful means,\" 70 F.4th at 124, here Brute Force on 1B70 and 1B71. Accordingly, Brute Force does not provide a basis for inevitable discovery.\n\n\\*\\*\\*\n\nThe government cannot meet its burden to show the inevitable discovery doctrine applies.\n\n## **III. Suppression Is Appropriate**\n\nFinally, suppression of the searches of the phones with the \"777777\" passcodes is appropriate because communicating a cellphone passcode is a testimonial statement and the fruits of an *Edwards* violation should be suppressed.\n\n*First,* communicating a passcode is a testimonial statement; it is a traditional verbal statement, not merely an action. Just last month, Judge Liman held that a suspect's disclosure of a passcode to a law enforcement officer was testimonial. *United States v. Shvartsman*, No. 23-CR-307 (LJL), 2024 WL 1193703, at \\*23 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2024). In doing so, Judge Liman noted that, \"under fundamental Fifth Amendment principles,\" a law enforcement agent's questioning concerning a cellphone passcode meant the suspect \"faced the 'cruel trilemma' of 'truth, falsity, or silence,\" and \"required the suspect to \"express the contents of his mind . . . by making an assertion[ ] of fact or belief.\" *See id.* (cleaned up, citations and quotations omitted) (also noting that \"had he been confronted with the question before the grand jury, a false statement could have exposed him to a charge of perjury and a refusal to answer could have subjected him to a charge of contempt\"). Similarly, as the Utah Supreme Court observed just several months ago, directly providing a passcode to law enforcement is a \"traditional testimonial communication\":\n\ndirectly providing a passcode to law enforcement is not an 'act' It is a statement. There is no need to tease out whether the statement implicitly communicates information to determine whether it has testimonial value. The statement explicitly communicates information from the suspect's own mind. Accordingly, it is a traditional testimonial communication.\n\n*State v. Valdez*, ---- P.3d. ---- 2023 UT 26, ¶ 51, 2023 WL 8635197 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023).\n\n*Second*, the fruits of an *Edwards* violation should be suppressed. Whatever the wisdom of the Supreme Court's decision in *United States v. Patane*, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) that a failure to give *Miranda* warnings \"does not require suppression of nontestimonial 'physical evidence discovered as a consequence of unwarned statements that are voluntary and uncoerced,'\"<sup>16</sup> *Edwards* violations should be, and are, treated differently than *Miranda* violations. As the Court already observed in its March 22 order directing a suppression hearing be held, \"'[t]he merit of the *Edwards* decision lies in the clarity of its command and the certainly of its application,'\"<sup>17</sup> in that while police can resume questioning a suspect under certain circumstances following her invocation of the right to silence, \"*Edwards* demands that questioning cease until an attorney is present or unless there is a break in custody lasting at least fourteen days.\"<sup>18</sup> Indeed, *Edwards* itself notes the need for \"additional safeguards . . . when the accused asks for counsel.\" 477 U.S. at 484.\n\nFurther, not suppressing the fruit of an *Edwards* violation creates perverse incentives for law enforcement. As Professor Kamisar stated (in an article originally cited by the government in its January 15 opposition to Ms. Wang's motion to suppress), \"excluding only the statement obtained by questioning someone who has asked for a lawyer, but not the physical evidence the statement produced, is a woefully weak sanction in a situation where the police have nothing to lose by continuing to question the suspect, but something to gain (the physical evidence).\" Yale\n\n<sup>16</sup> 3/22/24 Order, ECF No. 251 at 19 (quoting *United States v. McCoy*, 407 F. App'x 514, 516 (2d Cir. 2010)).\n\n<sup>17</sup> *Id.* at 20 & n.7 (quoting *Minnick v. Mississippi*, 498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990)).\n\n<sup>18</sup> *Id.* (citing *Maryland v. Shatzer*, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010)); *see also* Yale Kamisar, *Postscript: Another Look at* Patane *and* Seibert*, the 2004* Miranda *\"Poisoned Fruit\" Cases*, 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 97, 105 n.42 (2004).\n\nKamisar, *Postscript: Another Look at* Patane *and* Seibert*, the 2004* Miranda *\"Poisoned Fruit\" Cases*, 2 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 97, 105 n.42 (2004); *accord United States v. Gilkeson*, 431 F. Supp. 2d 270, 294 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (Explaining that \"once an arrestee has invoked the right to counsel, the police know that the interview is the last opportunity they will have to interrogate the arrestee without counsel. There is no incentive to cease questioning if the arrestee can be induced to make incriminating statements or to reveal information which leads to physical evidence that can be admitted in a subsequent criminal case. The fact that the statements themselves would not be admissible is not a sufficient remedy to protect the individual's right to be free from compelled self-incrimination.\").\n\nThese perverse incentives are particularly high in a case where the information the police obtain in violation of *Edwards* is then used to obtain and access cellphones. As the Supreme Court noted, cellphones \"differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other\" kinds of evidence and are, often, \"in fact minicomputers\" which \"typically expose to the government far *more* than the most exhaustive search of a house.\" *Riley v. California*, 573 U.S. 373, 393, 396 (2014) (emphasis in original). Indeed, in *United States v. Djibo*, 151 F. Supp. 3d 297, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), the court refused to apply *Patane* to the search of a cellphone, noting \"in today's modern world, a cell phone passcode is the proverbial \"key to a man's kingdom,\" because a cellphone is the \"combined footprint of what has been occurring socially, economically, personally, psychologically, spiritually and sometimes even sexually, in the owner's life . . . .\"\n\n*Finally*, the record from the suppression hearing reflects for both the Kwok and Wang searches, frankly, a carefree attitude by FBI agents over whether the defendants had a right to counsel, either through invocation or because adversary proceedings had commenced. As discussed above, Agent Baccari seemingly admitted that Ms. Wang was asked at least some questions about her cellphone after she invoked,<sup>19</sup> it was unclear how (if at all) Ms. Wang's invocation was communicated to the other agents on the search,<sup>20</sup> and Agent Cardenas didn't even care to ask whether Mr. Kwok had asserted his right to counsel before asking him questions about his phone passwords. In other words, the agents' conduct reflects a pattern that is far afield from *Edwards*' bright-line rule that, once a suspect invokes the right-to-counsel, she \"is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available . . . . ” 451 U.S. at 484–85.\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the Court should grant Ms. Wang's motion to suppress.\n\nDated: April 12, 2024\n\nDated: April 12, 2024 Respectfully submitted,\n\nBAKER BOTTS LLP\n\n*/s/ Brendan F. Quigley*\n\nBrendan F. Quigley Sarah Reeves 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10112 (212 ) 408-2500 brendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com sarah.reeves@bakerbotts.com\n\n*Attorney for Yanping Wang*\n\n<sup>19</sup> (*See* Tr. 32:2-33:11).\n\n<sup>20</sup> (*See* Tr. 43:18-25).","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）,\n\nv.\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平）,\n\n20 Cr. 118-3 (AT)\n\nDefendant（被告）.\n\n被告 YANPING WANG（王雁平）进一步支持其证据排除动议之听证会后辩护简短意见书\n\nBrendan F. Quigley Sarah Reeves BAKER BOTTS LLP（贝克博茨律师事务所） 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, N.Y. 10112 212 408 2520 brendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com sarah.reeves@bakerbotts.com\n\nYanping Wang 的辩护律师\n\n目录\nI. 执法人员侵犯了王女士获得律师协助的权利 1\nA. 书证表明对王女士公寓的搜查始于她主张获得律师协助的权利之后 1\nB. 执法人员在王女士主张权利后将其滞留在公寓超过 45 分钟 3\nC. 执法人员的笔记和报告与主张权利后针对手机的讯问相符 4\nD. 执法人员承认其可能在主张权利后就王女士的手机提出了进一步问题 6\nE. 其他因素与主张权利后针对手机的讯问相符 7\nII. 政府无法完成其举证责任以证明若不存在 Edwards 案违反正当程序行为，\"777777\" 这一手机密码仍会被必然发现 8\nA. 适用法律 8\nB. 法律适用 10\nIII. 排除证据是正当适当的 13\n结论 16\n\nIn re 650 Fifth Ave., 830 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2016) 9\nIn re 650 Fifth Ave., 934 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2019) 9, 12\nMaryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010) 14\nMassiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) 11\nMinnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) 14\nNix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 104 (1984) 10\nRiley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) 15\nState v. Valdez, ---- P.3d. ---- 2023 UT 26, 2023 WL 8635197 (Utah Dec. 14, 2023) 14\nUnited States v. Bing Yi Chen, 433 F. App'x 14 (2d Cir. 2011) 11\nUnited States v. Djibo, 151 F. Supp. 3d 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 15\nUnited States v. Gilkeson, 431 F. Supp. 2d 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) 15\nUnited States v. Lauria, 70 F.4th 106 (2d Cir. 2023) 8, 9, 10, 12\nUnited States v. McCoy, 407 F. App'x 514 (2d Cir. 2010) 14\nUnited States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) 14, 15\nUnited States v. Shvartsman, No. 23-CR-307 (LJL), 2024 WL 1193703 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2024) 13\n\nYale Kamisar, Postscript: Another Look at Pantane and Seibert, the 2004 Miranda \"Poisoned Fruit\" Cases, 2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 97, 105 n.42 (2004) 14, 15\n\n被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）谨此提交本听证会后备忘录，进一步支持其证据排除动议。\n\nI. 执法人员侵犯了王女士获得律师协助的权利\n\n听证会上的证据表明，与王女士的宣誓书（ECF No. 199-4）相一致，王女士在被询问手机密码之前就已经主张了获得律师协助的权利。支持这一结论的理由包括：(i) 执法人员直到王女士主张权利之后才开始对其公寓进行搜查的事实；(ii) 在王女士主张权利后，执法人员在搜查公寓期间将王女士扣留在公寓长达 45 分钟；(iii) 执法人员就搜查制作的同时期报告的结构；(iv) 执法人员对主张律师权利之法律效力的不确定性；以及 (v) 2023年3月15日上午存在的其他情况。\n\nA. 书证表明对王女士公寓的搜查始于她主张获得律师协助的权利之后\n\n听证会上的书证表明，执法人员查扣涉案手机所针对的王女士公寓搜查，始于 2023年3月15日上午 6:18 之后的某个时间，即仅在王女士于上午 6:15 主张获得律师协助的权利之后。因此，听证会上确立的时间线与王女士的宣誓书相吻合，即她在被询问手机密码之前就已经主张了获得律师协助的权利。\n\n具体而言，FBI（联邦调查局）最早在 2023年3月15日上午 6:00 才敲响王女士公寓的大门。（Tr. 20:1-8）。1 FBI 当时既持有对王女士的逮捕令，也持有对该公寓的搜查令。（Tr. 6:2-:22）。大约在同一时间，其他行动小组\n\n1 \"Tr.\" 指 2024年4月9日证据排除听证会的记录誊本。\n\n的执法人员正在曼哈顿的另一处公寓以及新泽西州和康涅狄格州的各处地点寻找 Mr. Kwok（郭文贵先生）。（Tr. 16:7:17; 18:13-16; 20:14-19）。\n\n王女士过了一段时间才来开门，2 执法人员拨打了四个电话号码试图与她取得联系。（Tr. 20:20-21:24）。\n\n王女士最终走到门口并开了门，随后被\"拘留\"并戴上手铐。（Tr. 22:8-14）。大约在 6:05，她被\"移交\"给特工 Baccari，后者向王女士宣读了 Miranda（米兰达）权利，并开始与她\"互动\"。（Tr. 6:17-25）。\n\n执法人员计划将王女士带回公寓内换上适合出庭的衣服，但首先必须对公寓进行\"清场\"，以确保公寓内没有危险物品或其他人员。（Tr. 24:20-25:6）。在执法人员进入公寓清场之前，特工 Baccari \"可能\"就公寓内是否有其他人向王女士提出了问题。（Tr. 25:11-15）。\n\n随后其他特工进入公寓进行清场，以确保王女士重新进入公寓以及特工开始实际搜查时的安全。（Tr. 26:6-26:14）。\n\n此时，特工 Baccari 和另一名未具名的女性特工与王女士单独留在走廊里。（Tr. 7:1-7）。虽然特工 Baccari 在听证会上坚称她没有在走廊里要求王女士作陈述，王女士当时也没有主张其律师权利（Tr. 7:10-18），但特工 Baccari 并不否认她在先前与 AUSA（联邦助理检察官）交谈时态度更加模棱两可，她曾告诉检方人员她不\"认为我会在走廊里要求她作陈述\"（Tr. 27:8-9）（强调为后加）。\n\n2 正如王女士在其宣誓书中所述，执法人员开始敲门时她正在睡觉。ECF No. 199-4。\n\n无论如何，王女士最迟在上午 6:15 就主张了获得律师协助的权利，距她被宣读权利不超过十分钟。（Tr. 30:22-31:9）。\n\n在特工完成对公寓的\"清场\"并确认屋内没有武器、宠物或其他人员后，一名 FBI 摄影师于 6:18 拍摄了\"进场照片\"，\"随后搜查便开始了\"，换句话说，是在上午 6:18 之后的某个时间，且无可争议地是在王女士主张权利之后。\n\nDX-2/3501-05\n\nB. 执法人员在王女士主张权利后将其滞留在公寓超过 45 分钟\n\n此外，虽然特工 Baccari 作证称，一旦王女士在上午 6:15 主张权利，\"下一步\"就是准备将王女士押送至 26 Federal Plaza（联邦广场26号），Tr. 44:6-7，3 但书面证据与该说法严重不符。相反，\"下一步\"显然是特工搜查公寓（在搜查中他们发现并查扣了多部手机），4 并就这些手机向王女士提问。\n\n事实上，在王女士于上午 6:15 主张权利之后，执法人员将她留在现场长达 45 分钟，即大约持续到上午 7:00（Tr. 34:21-25），如果\"下一步\"仅仅是让王女士准备出庭，那么这样的时间线完全讲不通。相反，记录表明——这再次与王女士的宣誓书相一致 5——特工在这 45 分钟内对王女士进行了讯问，包括询问她的手机密码。事实上，特工 Baccari 明确表示，曾多次向王女士询问关于手机的事宜，不仅包括其卧室中发现的一部手机的密码\n\n3 亦见（Tr. 12:5-12（Baccari 证言，称一旦王女士主张权利，\"我们的重点就会转变为对她进行入册处理，带她下去押送并办理入册手续\"））。\n\n4 (Tr. 35:20-21)。\n\n5 ECF 199-4 第 4-5 段。\n\n\"777777\"（Tr. 9:16-22），还包括在搜查过程中某个不确定的时间在公寓其他区域发现的手机的密码。6\n\nC. 执法人员的笔记和报告与主张权利后针对手机的讯问相符\n\n这一讯问发生在王女士主张律师权利之后的事实，也得到了该特工搜查笔记和搜查报告结构的印证。\n\n她的笔记，作为物证 DX-1 提交\n\n[图片：DX-1]\n\nDX-1/3501-17\n\n6 (Tr. 12:25-13:15)；亦见 DX-3（表明王女士提供了多部\"手机的密码\"）。\n\n此外，她在搜查后仅几天、且在王女士提出证据排除动议之前撰写的报告，在听证会上作为物证 DX-3 提交：\n\n[图片：DX-3]\n\nDX-3/3501-16\n\n[图片：DX-3-续]\n\n简而言之，执法人员自己的报告与以下事实相符：执法人员是在王女士主张获得律师协助的权利之后，才就手机密码对王女士进行了讯问。\n\nD. 执法人员承认其可能在主张权利后就王女士的手机提出了进一步问题\n\n此外，尽管特工 Baccari 声称王女士是在主张律师权利之前提供了手机密码，但恕直言，特工 Baccari 充其量根本不确定主张获得律师协助的权利是否禁止她询问有关手机的问题。例如，她承认曾告诉联邦助理检察官，即使在王女士主张律师权利之后，她也可能向王女士询问了有关其手机的问题。Tr. 32:7-33:11（\"是的，我想我是这么说的。\"）。换言之，一年多之后，特工 Baccari 充其量仍对 Edwards 案关于主张律师权利即要求停止一切讯问的规定存在不确定性，这使得在逮捕当天，她在王女士主张权利后继续询问有关手机的问题变得极其可信。7 特工 Baccari 也不记得曾告诉另一名正在讯问王女士的特工王女士已经主张了律师权利，Tr. 43:18-21，并且不\"记得\"王女士的主张是如何转达给其他特工的\"具体细节\"（Tr. 44:2-4）——所有这一切发生的同时，Edwards 案早已确立了明确的规则：主张律师权利的嫌疑人不得\n\n7 总体而言，关于王女士公寓搜查的记录反映出一个混乱的现场，尽管王女士无可争议地十分配合。此前，政府因对\"担任搜查小队队长的 FBI 特工\"进行\"再次询问\"，已就王女士公寓的搜查做出了更正披露。参见 2023年4月17日政府致 Hon. Robert W. Lehrburger（罗伯特·W·勒伯格法官阁下）的信函，ECF No. 47。\n\n“受当局进一步讯问，直至获得律师协助，”451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)。8\n\nE. 其他因素与在主张权利后就手机进行讯问相符\n\n最后，其他因素与 Agent Baccari（巴卡里探员）要求 Ms. Wang（王女士）录供，以及王女士在与 FBI（联邦调查局）互动的最初几分钟内主张其获得律师协助的权利相符，这同样与王女士的宣誓书相符。\n\n一方面，根据前一天的规划会议，巴卡里探员的目标之一是获取王女士的陈述（Tr. 19:15-17（巴卡里探员的职责包括“在逮捕当日尝试与王女士谈话”）），这与巴卡里探员在王女士被羁押后立即要求录供相符。\n\n第二，与此相关的是，联邦调查局“不确定 Kwok（郭文贵）先生身在何处”，并“同时”开展了至少三项行动以寻找并逮捕他。（Tr. 11:6-7；亦见 Tr. 16: 7-16（探员们打算同时在 Sherry Netherland Hotel（雪莉荷兰酒店）以及位于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）Greenwich（格林威治）和 New Jersey（新泽西州）Mahwah（马瓦）的地点寻找郭先生）；18:13-17（联邦调查局不确定郭先生会在何处））。鉴于这种不确定性，以及联邦调查局当天上午为定位郭先生所投入的资源数量，巴卡里探员在询问在王女士公寓内发现的手机之前，先向王女士询问郭先生的下落——连巴卡里探员也承认在此之后王女士主张了权利9——是合乎情理的。换句话说，王女士一旦被捕，其公寓内的手机哪儿也去不了，但联邦调查局当天上午显然（无论对错）对定位郭先生极为关切，因此\n\n9 (Tr. 12:3-4)。\n\n巴卡里探员优先提出这些问题（在此之后王女士无可争议地主张了权利）是合乎情理的。\n\n***\n\n简而言之，听证证据——包括探员直到王女士主张权利后才开始搜查公寓、探员在王女士主张获得律师协助的权利后将她留在公寓内达45分钟、探员报告的结构、探员对主张律师权效力的不确定性，以及2023年3月15日上午存在的其他情况——表明，与王女士的宣誓书相符，探员是在王女士主张获得律师协助的权利之后询问了其手机密码，从而侵犯了她在 Edwards 案下的权利。\n\nII. 政府无法履行其举证责任证明在不存在 Edwards 违反正当程序的情况下本必然会发现“777777”手机密码\n\n政府无法以优势证据证明，在王女士公寓内不存在 Edwards 违规的情况下，王女士密码为“777777”的手机内容本必然会被发现。\n\n为明确起见，必然发现原则不适用于物品 1b15、1B16、1B18、1B69 至 1B772 以及 1B93，这些物品是使用王女士提供的密码访问的。10\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n“必然发现原则规定，在不合理搜查和扣押过程中获得的证据，若政府能证明在不存在宪法违规的情况下该证据本必然会被获得，则不应被排除。”United States v. Lauria（美国诉劳里亚案），\n\n10 根据听证会上的证据，物品 1B17、1B20、1B68 和 1b77 是在未使用王女士提供的 PIN 码的情况下被扣押的。因此，我们不再根据 Edwards 违规主张排除这些物品，但为了任何上诉之目的，保留在我们此前被法院驳回的排除动议部分中提出的其他论点。\n\n70 F.4th 106, 122 (2d Cir. 2023)。政府承担“证明……导致发现该证据的每项事件发生的置信度足够高，足以让地区法院法官以优势证据得出该证据本必然会被发现的结论”的“举证责任”。In re 650 Fifth Ave.（第650号第五大道案），934 F.3d 147, 165 (2d Cir. 2019)（援引 In re 650 Fifth Ave.，830 F.3d 66, 102 (2d Cir. 2016)）。\n\n此外，“支持必然发现主张的调查本身，不能仅仅是因为导致实际发现的不当行为被揭露才发生。”Lauria，70 F.4th at 123。\n\n去年，在 Lauria 案中，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）推翻了地区法院关于必然发现的认定，并排除了联邦调查局在一宗抢劫案调查中获得的小区基站位置信息（CSLI）的结果。政府的 CSLI 令状申请包含关于若干抢劫日期的多处失实陈述。尽管如此，地区法院驳回了证据排除请求，理由是“政府本必然会发现”将其中一名共谋者与相关日期抢劫现场联系起来的信息，因为“政府一旦更正”原始申请，“本可以获得关于这些记录的合法令状”，而且在合法搜查另一名被告的手机时，也本可以发现共谋者之间的通信。70 F.4th at 123-24。\n\n第二巡回法院驳回了这一推理，解释称“地区法院推理的根本缺陷在于，它建立在这样的假设之上，即政府一旦获悉 [CSLI 令状申请中的] 瑕疵，本可以轻松更正或补充其最初的支持宣誓书，从而取得合法令状。但必然发现原则并不探究政府是否本可以通过 [合法手段] 获得涉案证据，或者在辩方指出其初始搜查中的瑕疵后政府是否本会这样做”。70 F.4th at 124（部分强调为原文所加）。\n\nB. 法律适用\n\n1. “生物识别”\n\n政府不能依赖“生物识别”作为必然发现的手段。其一，没有任何设备是通过生物识别进行访问的。11 尽管 Mr. Isola（伊索拉先生）作证称其中一台设备具有生物识别功能，但他的检测发生在听证会的前一天和当天上午。12 与 Lauria 案一样，案卷记录显示，“若非辩方揭露了”可能非法的行为（此处指涉及密码的 Edwards 违规行为），“政府本没有理由——因此也本不可能——寻求替代性的合法手段”（此处指利用设备的生物识别功能）“来获取涉案证据”。70 F.4th at 124。因此，生物识别功能不能作为必然发现的依据。\n\n2. 从郭先生公寓获得的证据\n\n政府也不能依赖郭先生及其助手针对 Agent Cardenas（卡德纳斯探员）的提问提供了“777777”密码这一事实。\n\n首先，必然发现要求政府证明该信息本会通过“合法手段”被发现。Lauria，70 F.4th at 106（援引 Nix v. Williams（尼克斯诉威廉姆斯案），467 U.S. 104, 122 (1984)）。政府在此无法证明这一点，因为根据法院面前的案卷记录，政府无法证明卡德纳斯探员对郭先生的讯问本身是合法的。\n\n11 (Tr. 69:13-18 “问：你在主询问中作证谈到了生物识别。你还记得吗？答：记得。问：这些设备中没有任何一台是通过生物识别访问的，对吗？答：我认为没有。问：这在这张汇总图表上肯定没有体现；对吗？答：是的。”）。\n\n12 (Tr. 80:6-23)。\n\n卡德纳斯探员作证称，她两次直接向郭先生（以及“门厅区域内的所有人”）询问郭先生公寓内手机的密码。13 然而，当时郭先生已被起诉，14 因此，其 Sixth Amendment（第六修正案）下的律师协助权已自动产生。United States v. Bing Yi Chen（美国诉陈秉毅案），433 F. App'x 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2011)（“第六修正案律师协助权在起诉后即产生……”）。因此，在没有明确放弃律师协助权的情况下，探员不得从郭先生处“故意引出”陈述。Massiah v. United States（马赛厄斯诉美国案），377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)（“我们认定，当在审判中针对上诉人使用了其自证有罪的言辞证据，而这些证据是联邦探员在上诉人被起诉后且在没有其律师在场的情况下故意从其口中引出时，上诉人便被剥夺了该宪法保障的基本保护。”）。然而，这恰恰是卡德纳斯探员所做的事，她两次向其询问在其公寓内发现的手机密码。15 仅凭这一点，政府就无法证明其使用了“合法手段”从郭先生处获取密码。\n\n其次，尽管政府提交了 Agent Zachary Effting（扎卡里·埃夫廷探员）的一封电子邮件（GX 4），他在邮件中批准尝试使用“77777”密码解锁王女士的两部手机，但政府无法确立埃夫廷探员的建议和批准是独立于通过王女士公寓内的 Edwards 违规行为所获知的信息的。\n\n13 (Tr. 49:12-50:8（“我只是向房间内门厅区域的所有人提出了这个问题……我向房间里发问：密码是什么？”））。\n\n14 (Tr. 18:22-23)。\n\n15 “Jason”回答了第二个问题（在郭先生第一次回答之后）这一事实并不重要，因为卡德纳斯探员的两个问题都是针对郭先生和房间内的其他人提出的，这显然是对享有律师协助权的人进行“故意引出”的企图。\n\n埃夫廷探员是 GTV（GTV传媒集团）调查案的主办探员之一，并参与了搜查王女士公寓的规划。（见 Tr. 15:4-8）。Ms. Volchko（沃尔奇科女士）承认，当埃夫廷探员授权尝试使用“777777”密码解锁王女士的设备时，她不知道“埃夫廷探员掌握了关于东64街搜查的何种信息”，并且“无法知道来自”搜查王女士“公寓的信息是否影响了他指示 [她] 继续使用”该密码的决定。（Tr. 71:19-25）。\n\n此外，任何关于政府最终会确定王女士手机密码的说法，都被沃尔奇科女士本人当时向探员发出的警告所推翻，即“必须注意，PIN 码尝试失败始终存在永久禁用或擦除设备的风险”。GX 4（强调为后加）。\n\n最后，政府无法证明，在王女士公寓发生 Edwards 违规之时，探员们就已知晓他们本会获得郭先生的密码。In re 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties，934 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2019)（指示地区法院“审视非法搜查前一刻所存在的各项事态……”（引文及引号省略））。\n\n3. “暴力破解”\n\n政府也不能依赖联邦调查局的“暴力破解”工具来主张必然发现。首先，听证会上的证据表明，暴力破解功能对 iPhone 12 或更高版本的任何设备均不可用，这意味着除了探员使用王女士密码解锁的两部 iPhone 之外，其余所有 iPhone 均无法使用该功能，参见 GX S-1。而且，对于这两部 iPhone（1B70 和 1B71），伊索拉先生作证称，他是在听证会当天上午才确定这些设备可以被“暴力破解”的。（Tr. 80:3-17）。与 Lauria 案一样，案卷再次表明，“若非辩方揭露了”可能非法的行为（此处指涉及密码的 Edwards 违规行为），“政府本没有理由——因此也本不可能——寻求替代性的合法手段”，70 F.4th at 124，即对 1B70 和 1B71 进行暴力破解。因此，暴力破解不能作为必然发现的依据。\n\n***\n\n政府无法履行其举证责任证明必然发现原则适用。\n\nIII. 予以排除是适当的\n\n最后，排除对使用密码「777777」的手机的搜查是恰当的，因为告知手机密码属于证言性陈述，且违反 Edwards 案规则所获的毒树之果应当予以排除。\n\n第一，告知密码属于证言性陈述；这是一种传统的口头陈述，而不仅仅是一种行为。就在上个月，Liman 法官裁定，嫌疑人向执法人员披露密码具有证言性质。United States v. Shvartsman，案号 23-CR-307 (LJL)，2024 WL 1193703，第 *23 页（S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）2024年3月20日）。在作出该裁定时，Liman 法官指出，「根据第五修正案的基本原则」，执法人员就手机密码进行的讯问意味着嫌疑人「面临着『真实、虚假或沉默』的『残酷三难困境』」，并且「要求嫌疑人通过作出事实或信念的断言来……表达其内心想法」。见同上出处（已清理引文格式，省略引文和引用标记）（亦指出「如果他在大陪审团面前被问及该问题，虚假陈述可能使他面临伪证罪指控，而拒绝回答则可能使他面临藐视法庭罪指控」）。同样，正如犹他州最高法院在几个月前所指出的那样，直接向执法部门提供密码属于「传统的证言性交流」：\n\n直接向执法部门提供密码不是一种「行为」，而是一种陈述。无需去推敲该陈述是否隐含地传达了信息来判定其是否具有证言价值。该陈述明确传达了来自嫌疑人自身大脑中的信息。因此，这是一种传统的证言性交流。\n\nState v. Valdez，---- P.3d. ---- 2023 UT 26，第 51 段，2023 WL 8635197（Utah 2023年12月14日）。\n\n第二，违反 Edwards 案规则所获的毒树之果应当予以排除。无论最高法院在 United States v. Patane，542 U.S. 630 (2004) 一案中作出的「未作 Miranda（米兰达）警告并不要求排除作为自愿且未受强迫的未获警告陈述之结果而发现的非证言性『实物证据』」这一裁决是否英明16，违反 Edwards 案规则的行为应当、且事实上确实受区别于违反米兰达规则的处理。正如本法院在其3月22日指示举行证据排除听证会的命令中已经指出的那样，「『Edwards 案裁决的价值在于其命令的明确性及其适用的确定性』」17，因为虽然警方在嫌疑人援引沉默权后可以在某些情况下恢复对其讯问，但「Edwards 案规则要求停止讯问，直到律师在场，或者羁押出现至少为期十四天的中断」18。事实上，Edwards 案本身就指出了「当被告人要求聘请律师时……需要额外的保障措施」。477 U.S. 第 484 页。\n\n此外，不排除违反 Edwards 案规则所获之果会给执法部门带来不正当的诱因。正如 Kamisar 教授所述（在政府于1月15日对 Wang（王）女士排除证据动议的反对意见中最初引用的文章里）：「在警察继续讯问嫌疑人毫无损失却有所收获（获得实物证据）的情况下，仅排除通过讯问要求聘请律师的人而获得的陈述，而不排除该陈述产生的实物证据，是一种极其无力的制裁。」Yale\n\n16 3/22/24 命令，ECF 编号 251 第 19 页（引用 United States v. McCoy，407 F. App'x 514, 516 (2d Cir. 2010)）。\n\n17 同上出处，第 20 页及注释 7（引用 Minnick v. Mississippi，498 U.S. 146, 151 (1990)）。\n\n18 同上出处（引用 Maryland v. Shatzer，559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010)）；并参见 Yale Kamisar 所著《Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, the 2004 Miranda \"Poisoned Fruit\" Cases》，载于《2 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 97》，第 105 页注释 42（2004年）。\n\nKamisar 所著《Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, the 2004 Miranda \"Poisoned Fruit\" Cases》，载于《2 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 97》，第 105 页注释 42（2004年）；一致意见见 United States v. Gilkeson，431 F. Supp. 2d 270, 294 (N.D.N.Y.（纽约北区联邦地区法院）2006年)（阐明「一旦被捕者援引了获得律师协助的权利，警方就知道这次讯问是他们在没有律师在场的情况下讯问被捕者的最后机会。如果能诱导被捕者作出自证其罪的陈述或透露可导致在随后的刑事案件中被采纳为实物证据的信息，那么停止讯问就毫无诱因。仅使陈述本身不可采纳这一事实，不足以作为保护个人免受强迫自证其罪权利的充分补救措施」）。\n\n在警方利用违反 Edwards 案规则所获信息进而获取并访问手机的案件中，这种不正当诱因尤为显著。正如最高法院所指出的，手机在「数量和质量上都不同于其他」种类的证据，并且通常「实际上是微型计算机」，「通常向政府暴露的内容远多于对一处住宅进行的最详尽搜查所暴露的内容」。Riley v. California，573 U.S. 373, 393, 396 (2014)（原文强调）。事实上，在 United States v. Djibo，151 F. Supp. 3d 297, 310 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院）2015年) 一案中，法院拒绝将 Patane 案规则适用于对手机的搜查，并指出「在当今现代社会，手机密码可以说是通往『一个人的王国的钥匙』」，因为手机是「机主生活中在社交、经济、个人、心理、精神，有时甚至是性方面所发生的一切的综合足迹……」。\n\n最后，证据排除听证会的记录坦率地反映出，在对 Kwok（郭）和 Wang（王）的搜查中，FBI（联邦调查局）特工对于被告人是否享有获得律师协助的权利（无论是因为援引该权利还是因为对抗性诉讼程序已经开始）抱有一种毫不在意的态度。如上所述，Baccari 特工似乎承认，在 Wang 女士援引该权利后，至少就其手机向她提出了一些问题19；尚不清楚（如果有的话）Wang 女士援引权利的情况是如何传达给参与搜查的其他特工的20；而 Cardenas 特工在询问 Kwok 先生有关其手机密码的问题之前，甚至根本不在意去询问 Kwok 先生是否已经主张了获得律师协助的权利。换言之，特工们的行为反映出一种模式，这种模式完全脱离了 Edwards 案的明确界线规则，即一旦嫌疑人援引获得律师协助的权利，她「在获得律师协助之前，不得再受到当局的进一步讯问……」。451 U.S. 第 484–85 页。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，本法院应准予 Wang 女士的排除证据动议。\n\n日期：2024年4月12日\n\n日期：2024年4月12日 谨呈，\n\nBAKER BOTTS LLP（贝克博茨律师事务所）\n\n/签名/ Brendan F. Quigley\n\nBrendan F. Quigley\nSarah Reeves\n30 Rockefeller Plaza\nNew York, N.Y. 10112\n(212 ) 408-2500\nbrendan.quigley@bakerbotts.com\nsarah.reeves@bakerbotts.com\n\nYanping Wang（王雁平）的代理律师\n\n19（见庭审记录第 32:2-33:11 页）。\n\n20（见庭审记录第 43:18-25 页）。","key_entities":["Kwok","Je","Yanping Wang","GTV"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":47,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":199,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":251,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":4776,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-04-12 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-04-12","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:43:27"}