{"id":"court_sdny_290_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":290,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"RESPONSE","filed_date":"2024-04-17","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"答辩状（政府对被告审前动议的异议）——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #290（2024年4月17日提交）。检方就被告方多项 motions in limine 提出异议，主张涉及 GTV 投资人资金亏损、GTV 证券未注册发行、“马华（Mahwah）豪宅”与“空壳公司”等表述、同案被告王雁萍（Yanping Wang）薪酬及其与郭文贵个人关系、破产程序相关行为，以及关于 HCN/HDO 代币的专家证词等证据均应予采纳，并主张已履行 Brady 证据开示义务。","summary_en":"Response (the government's opposition to defendants' motions in limine) — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF No. 290 (filed April 17, 2024). The government opposed multiple defense motions in limine, arguing that evidence concerning GTV investor-fund losses, the unregistered nature of the GTV securities offering, references to the 'Mahwah Mansion' and 'shell companies,' co-defendant Yanping Wang's compensation and personal relationship with Kwok, bankruptcy-related conduct, and expert testimony on the HCN/HDO tokens should all be admitted at trial, and maintained that it has complied with its Brady disclosure obligations.","body_en":"## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n#### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nv.\n\nHO WAN KWOK, a/k/a \"Miles Guo,\" a/k/a \"Miles Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Guo Wengui,\" a/k/a \"Brother Seven,\" a/k/a \"The Principal,\" a/k/a \"Boss,\" and\n\nYANPING WANG a/k/a \"Yvette,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendants.\n\n## **THE GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS** *IN LIMINE*\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney Southern District of New York\n\nMicah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Justin Horton Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys - *Of Counsel* -\n\n **S2 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n| ARGUMENT 1 | | |\n|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|----|\n| I.
Evidence That GTV Investor Funds Sent to Fund-1 Lost \\$30 Million Is Admissible 1 | | |\n| A.
Background 1 | | |\n| B.
Discussion 3 | | |\n| II.
Evidence That the GTV Private Placement Constituted an Unregistered Offering of
Securities is Admissible 6 | | |\n| A.
Evidence of the Unregistered Nature of the GTV Stock Offerings is Admissible 7 | | |\n| B.
The Defendants Have Abundant Notice of the Relevance of the Unregistered
Offering Evidence 9 | | |\n| III.
Evidence That Those Who Threatened the Kwok Enterprise Were Disparaged and
Harassed Is Admissible 13 | | |\n| IV.
Additional Evidence Relating to the PAX Case and Kwok's Bankruptcy Is Admissible 17 | | |\n| A.
The Context for the \\$37 Million Transfer Is Admissible 18 | | |\n| B.
Certain Bankruptcy Evidence Is Admissible 19 | | |\n| 1.
Kwok's Declaration of Bankruptcy 19 | | |\n| 2.
Efforts to Obstruct the Bankruptcy 22 | | |\n| 3.
The Trustee's Mahwah Mansion Walkthrough 23 | | |\n| 4.
Rule 403 Does Not Bar This Highly Probative Evidence 24 | | |\n| V.
Evidence of Wang's Compensation Is Admissible 25 | | |\n| VI.
Evidence of Wang and Kwok's Personal Relationship Is Admissible 26 | | |\n| VII.
Accurate References to the \"Mahwah Mansion\" and to the Kwok Enterprise's \"Shell
Companies\" and \"Figurehead Executives\" Are Permissible 29 | | |\n| A.
Accurate References to Shell Companies and Related Terms Should Be Permitted 30 | | |\n| B.
Accurate References to the Mahwah Mansion Should Be Permitted 33 | | |\n| VIII.
Hypothetical Questions To Show Materiality Are Proper 35 | | |\n| IX.
Kwok's Motion Regarding Metadata Evidence Is Premature 38 | | |\n| X.
Kwok's Motion To Exclude Evidence Regarding
Is Moot 39 | | |\n| XI.
Professor Shams's Testimony Is Admissible 39 | | |\n| A.
Professor Shams's Disclosure 40 | | |\n| B.
Applicable Law 46 | | |\n| C.
Argument 47 | | |\n| 1.
Professor Shams's Testimony Is Admissible Expert Opinion 47 | | |\n| 2. | Professor Shams's Testimony Is Reliable | 53 |\n| 3. | Professor Shams's Testimony About HDO's Reserves Is Admissible | 55 |\n| XII. The Government Is in Compliance with Its Brady Obligations | | 56 |\n| CONCLUSION | | 57 |\n\nThe Government respectfully submits its consolidated oppositions to the defendants' motions *in limine*. *See* Dkt. 267 (\"Wang MIL\"), 271 (\"Kwok MIL\"). For the reasons stated below, the Court should deny the defendants' motions *in limine* and grant the Government's motions *in limine*. *See* Dkt. 273 (\"Gov't MIL\").\n\n#### **ARGUMENT**\n\n#### **I. Evidence That GTV Investor Funds Sent to Fund-1 Lost \\$30 Million Is Admissible**\n\nThe Court should admit evidence that the GTV investor funds sent to Fund-1 lost \\$30 million in value. Wang contends that such evidence is \"irrelevant\" or, alternatively, should be excluded under Rule 403 due to \"unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues, such as the investment strategy employed by Fund-1 and the market or other conditions that ultimately caused the alleged loss.\" Wang MIL at 3. Wang is wrong. While a loss to victims is not an element of the charged fraud offenses, the \\$30 million loss is inextricably intertwined with misstatements by Kwok and necessary to complete the story of the charged crimes.\n\n#### **A. Background**\n\n The evidence at trial will show that, almost immediately after raising \\$452 million in GTV investor funds, the defendants misappropriated \\$100 million of those funds (approximately 22%) and made an extremely high-risk investment in Fund-1 that, if successful, would have benefited Kwok's son. Wang herself signed the investment paperwork and personally transferred the \\$100 million in GTV investor funds—via an account held in the name of GTV's parent company, Saraca—to Fund-1. The Government expects that employees of Fund-1 will explain that the investment was, in essence, a bet that the Hong Kong dollar's price, which is pegged to the U.S. dollar, would become decoupled from the U.S. dollar and collapse. If that occurred, the value of investments in Fund-1 would dramatically increase. Such an investment typically serves as a\n\nhedge utilized by investors with significant exposure to an economic downturn in Asia. For strategic reasons, Fund-1 takes time to make all its options trades; as a result, only \\$30 million of the \\$100 million of Saraca's investment was deployed by Fund-1 into options trades prior to the SEC's intervention. Nearly the entirety of that \\$30 million investment was lost. Following the SEC's September 13, 2021 settlement with the GTV entities, the remaining \\$70 million was transferred by Fund-1 to the SEC's Fair Fund, for distribution to GTV investors. These GTV investors will not be made entirely whole, in substantial part because of the \\$30 million loss.\n\nMoreover, and inextricably intertwined with the evidence in this case, Kwok himself made misstatements relating to the investment of GTV investor funds in Fund-1 and the losses suffered. For example, on November 11, 2020, Kwok stated the following in an online video (as translated from Mandarin):\n\nAt the beginning, my comrades wanted to follow [the Chief Investment Officer of Fund-1], to do the 200 times leverage. Many comrades said that, this, Brother Seven, sent me a lot of messages, Brother Seven, I wanted to invest money. I wanted to invest money in shorting the Hong Kong dollar at 200 times the leverage. They all wrote authorization letters to me, but I refused them all. Everyone remembers this matter, right?\n\nThe US media announced that Biden was elected, the Hong Kong dollar, do you know how much you lost by shorting the Hong Kong dollar? Brothers and sisters? All [the Chief Investment Officer of Fund-1] funds lost 50%, lost 50%. You did not lose, fellow comrades, SARACA, you did not invest, SARACA invested, SARACA invested 100 million, 100 million US dollars, and now it has lost 50 million, it has lost 50 million. The day before yesterday, received a notification from the fund, telling everyone that half of your account balance has been lost in the market, which is 50 million. Brothers and sisters, if you said that Wen Gui had a bad conscience at that time, I would ask my comrades to invest, then today, half of your money would have been lost. I would like to ask everyone, is there any reason why GTV investment will be reduced by half? Never, [please, you can take everything]. It will never be. This is Wengui's feelings for his comrades. You can never lose half of your investment in GTV, because every penny you invest must be audited by American legal accountants. I can't use the money you invested to buy a Japanese meal today, so I will be arrested directly. The United States will really arrest you. Then you want to…the money invested by the comrades will all be in the comrades' companies, and GTV will never be able to, but if you heard today that you will lose 50% of your money because of Biden's false election, how painful would it be for you? Can Wengui sit here and have a Japanese meal with you? Impossible. Brothers and sisters, this is Wengui, measured by facts.\n\nThat is, Kwok lied to his followers about the loss, telling investors, falsely, among other things, that \"[y]ou did not lose\" any money. In reality, the loss of the \\$30 million was shouldered by GTV's investors, whose money was used to make the failed investment. More generally, Kwok repeatedly told GTV investors that they could not lose money, only make money, and that he would personally guarantee their losses—all of which were false.\n\n#### **B. Discussion**\n\nThe above facts are admissible at trial. To start, the Government has alleged and intends to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the investment in Fund-1 was inconsistent with the GTV offering memorandum, and inconsistent with Kwok's statements to GTV investors. The Government expects the defendants to argue that the investment was an appropriate expenditure of GTV funds, consistent with the terms of the offering. That makes the particulars of the Fund-1 investment, including, for example, \"the investment strategy employed by Fund-1,\" Wang MIL at 3, directly relevant to the charged offenses. The Government expects that the principal of Fund-1 will testify on that topic, including as to the acute risks of any investments in Fund-1. That witness, who was also a GTV board member, will testify that the defendants did not tell him that Saraca's investment was made with GTV investor funds, and that Fund-1 would never have accepted that money if that fact had been disclosed, in part due to the high-risk nature of Fund-1. That this risk \"materialized tended to show that [the defendants] intended to subject the [raised funds] to a risky investment in order to enrich [themselves].\" *United States v. Seabrook*, 814 F. App'x 661, 662 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (affirming admission of evidence showing that an investment\n\nprocured with a kickback had lost almost all its value due to a subsequent bankruptcy, including because \"[t]he loss evidence was also relevant to the element of materiality because it demonstrated the riskiness of the investments.\").\n\nMoreover, Kwok's own video-recorded false statements regarding the losses are clearly admissible. Kwok made false and misleading representations to investors about the losses to con them into continuing to make investments in GTV—evidence of those misrepresentations is at the very heart of the proof of the charged crimes on trial. Because the introduction of this evidence goes to the core of what this trial is about—the defendants' fraud on investors—it does not pose any risk of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. Further, the \\$30 million loss is relevant because it occurred while the charged schemes were ongoing and the defendants were still actively defrauding victims. That is, this is not a case where investors were tricked into making a single discrete investment through lies, and then that investment later suffered losses. This is a case where investors were misled through a cascade of deceit that spanned years, with the defendants tricking victims to invest, repeatedly, in sequential investment \"projects\" over an extended period. The defendants even tricked victims to \"reinvest\" their distributions from the SEC's Fair Fund. It is clearly proper to admit evidence that Kwok continued to trick victims by telling them they would suffer no losses and effectively bore no risk, despite Kwok's knowing, at least as of the time of the SEC's September 2021 settlement, that investors had already lost at least \\$30 million.1\n\nFinally, evidence regarding what happened with the investment into Fund-1 is necessary to complete the story of the charged crimes. It is settled law that evidence is admissible \"if it is\n\n1 *See* http (\"By late July 2020, Hedge Fund A had invested \\$30 million of Saraca's \\$100 million transfer and, to date, that \\$30 million investment in Hedge Fund A has lost approximately \\$29.2 million in value.\").\n\nnecessary to complete the story of the crime on trial.\" *United States v. Carboni*, 204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted). Here, without the evidence of the \\$30 million loss, the jury will be left wondering what happened to the \\$100 million investment of GTV investor funds in Fund-1. The Government should be entitled to present evidence to \"satisfy the jurors' expectations about what proper proof should be.\" *Old Chief v. United States*, 519 U.S. 172, 188 (1997); *see also United States v. Gotti*, No. 02 Cr. 743 (RCC), 2004 WL 2389755, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004) (ruling that the amount of loss created by a construction industry extortion conspiracy was admissible because \"a jury may well be left wondering why the Government did not establish the exact dollar amount, perhaps inferring that it could not do so\").\n\nThe cases that Wang cites in seeking to exclude this evidence are inapposite. *See* Wang MIL at 3. In *SEC v. Jensen*, evidence of a \\$9 million profit was excluded because there was no dispute that the profit \"does not reflect the effect of the Defendant's alleged misrepresentations.\" No. 11 Civ. 5316 (MLR), 2013 WL 12129377, at \\*6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013). Here, by contrast, the \\$30 million loss is inextricably intertwined with the defendant's misrepresentations; to continue the scheme, Kwok lied about that the Fund-1 investment loss. *United States v. Butler* involved false promises to invest victims' funds in student-loan-related assets. No. 08 Cr. 370 (JBW) (RER), 2010 WL 1692882, at \\*1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010). Instead of investing in those assets, the defendant invested in \"non-student-loan assets, such as mortgages and corporate debt,\" which \"differed materially\" from the promised investment. *Id.* at \\*1, \\*4. The trial judge \"precluded as irrelevant\" evidence establishing that the student-loan-related investments—*i.e.*, the promised and intended use of the victims' funds—had liquidity problems five months \"*after* the [victims] uncovered [the defendant's] fraud.\" *Id.* at \\*3 (emphasis added). In upholding that decision in a subsequent opinion, the court reasoned that such evidence \"does not tend to make the\n\nallegations of Butler's fraud and conspiracy more or less probable.\" *Id.* at \\*4. Here, of course, the loss of value in Fund-1 goes directly to the charged frauds, in that Kwok was making misrepresentations to investors about that specific loss and more generally about the risks of their preexisting and ongoing investments.\n\nAccordingly, the Court should admit evidence relating to the losses suffered by the investment of GTV investor funds into Fund-1.\n\n## **II. Evidence That the GTV Private Placement Constituted an Unregistered Offering of Securities is Admissible**\n\nEvidence that the GTV Private Placement was conducted by the defendants knowingly in contravention of securities regulations designed to protect unsophisticated investors is admissible. Moreover, this type of evidence is not limited to the GTV Private Placement; it applies equally to the Farm Loan Program, G|CLUBS, and the Himalaya Exchange, as explained below.\n\nThe Government intends to offer such evidence to prove acts in furtherance of the charged fraud and racketeering conspiracies, as a component of the charged substantive frauds, and to complete the story of the crimes charged. Evidence that the defendants conducted ther investment offerings in contravention of, and to circumvent, U.S. securities laws is also admissible to prove intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of mistake pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Any concerns that the jury could be confused as to whether the defendants are charged with violating the registration requirements for investment offerings are properly addressed by a straightforward limiting instruction reminding the jury that the defendants are not charged with any such violations.\n\nAccordingly, the Court should deny Wang's motion to exclude such evidence. *See* Wang MIL at 6-8.\n\n#### **A. Evidence of the Unregistered Nature of the GTV Stock Offerings is Admissible**\n\nThe defendants repeatedly sought to circumvent the disclosure requirements of U.S. securities laws and the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commision (\"SEC\") in order to target thousands of unsophisticated investors. Indeed, in many ways, the charges against the defendants boil down to conning inexperienced and unsophisticated investors out of their money. To do that, the defendants had to avoid the oversight of the SEC and U.S. securities laws.\n\nThus, in connection with the GTV Private Placement, the defendants *ostensibly* complied with securities regulations about private offerings—*i.e.*, the investment contracts with GTV contained the correct language—but the defendants *also* sent investors who were legally ineligible to participate in the offering to a third party, Voice of Guo Media (\"VOG\"), who pooled the investments of these less-wealthy investors and invested in GTV on their behalf. As discussed in the Government's motions *in limine*, the Government expects that a witness (\"Witness-1\") will testify about conversations he had with Wang, Kwok, and Je regarding this aspect of GTV Private Placement and, in particular, the legal risks associated with pooling non-accredited investors' funds. *See* Gov't MIL at 31-32.\n\nThe defendants' deliberate circumvention of U.S securities laws meant to protect investors did not stop there, however. The need to avoid the SEC and U.S. securities law was the driving purpose behind the Farm Loan Program and G|CLUBS, which were initiated almost immediately after the SEC intervened to stop the illegal GTV Private Placement. The offering of these *ostensible* \"loans\" and \"club memberships\" were, in reality, nothing but continuations of the defendants' illegal private offerings of GTV stock to often inexperienced and unsophisticated\n\nvictims, dressed up in an effort to avoid the SEC and U.S. law.2 Similarly, the need to avoid U.S. regulatory scrutiny was also why the Himalaya Exchange *ostensibly* did not allow U.S. residents to purchase HDO or HCN—even though, all the while, victim investors in the United States were simply told to use intermediaries in other countries to send money to the Himalaya Exchange.\n\nThis circumvention of the securities laws and targeting of unsophisticated investors was a key part of the investment frauds. Indeed, as described above, one of the notable misrepresentations made to victim investors in this case concerned the riskiness of their investments in GTV and the defendants' other investment projects. Kwok repeatedly told investors that they could not lose money, and he would personally guarantee any losses if they did. Nonaccredited investors—*i.e.*, investors who were ineligible under the U.S. securities laws to participate in private offerings like the GTV Private Placement—are exactly the type of investors who are most susceptible to the type of investment scams perpetrated by the defendants.\n\nThe foregoing evidence is admissible as direct evidence. \"In order to prove that [the defendants] sold securities 'through fraudulent means,' the prosecution must show the 'means' by which the fraud was perpetrated.\" *United States v. Ramer*, No. 14 Cr. 10 (GFVT), 2015 WL 13839476, at \\*5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2015). That the Indictment does not charge counts specifically for the violation of investment offering registration requirements does not alter the admissibility of this evidence showing a key component of the crimes that are charged. Where, as here, an\n\n2 Evidence showing that the GTV Private Placement was an unlawful unregistered stock offering is also admissible to provide the context for the the Farm Loan Program and G|CLUBS offerings that followed. That is, to prove that the Farm Loan Program and G|CLUBS offerings were \"in connection with a security\"—as the Government must, beyond a reasonable doubt, for the substantive securities fraud counts—the rules around which types of investors can participate in private offerings, and the noncompliance of the GTV Private Placement with those rules, are directly relevant and provide important context.\n\nindictment contains a conspiracy charge, \"[a]n act that is alleged to have been done in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy\" is considered \"part of the very act charged.\" *United States v. Diaz*, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir. 1999); *see also United States v. Thai*, 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that \"uncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself\"). Moreover, because the defendants' efforts to avoid the SEC and U.S. securities laws were so central to their schemes, this evidence is inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses. Thus, this evidence is also admissible to provide background to the conspiracy and complete the story of the charged crimes.\n\nAlternatively, the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) to show the defendants' intent, knowledge, lack of accident, and absence of mistake. The elaborate and deliberate efforts that the defendants undertook to avoid complying with disclosure requirements and evading the jurisdiction of the SEC is evidence that the defendants were acting with criminal knowledge and intent, not negligently or accidentally.\n\nIn short, evidence about the unregistered nature of the GTV Private Placement—and the defendants' attempts to circumvent the requirements of U.S. securities laws and evade the SEC is admissible. Indeed, such evidence is inextricably intertwined with even the most basic narrative of the defendants' course of conduct. It is also properly admitted to show the defendants' knowledge and fraudulent intent and lack of negligence or good faith. Accordingly, Wang's motion should be denied.\n\n## **B. The Defendants Have Abundant Notice of the Relevance of the Unregistered-Offering Evidence**\n\nWang's motion seeks to bar argument about the unregistered nature of the GTV Private Placement, purportedly to avoid a constructive amendment to, or prejudicial variance from, the\n\nIndictment. *See* Wang MIL at 6-8. This is a baseless concern. The purpose of the constructive amendment doctrine is to ensure \"that the defendant was given *notice* of the *core* of criminality to be proven at trial.\" *United States v. Banki*, 685 F.3d 99, 118 (2d Cir. 2012) (cleaned up and emphases in original). The \"core of criminality\" is defined broadly in connection with the indictment's allegations. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Salmonese*, 352 F.3d 608, 621 (2d Cir. 2003) (\"The core criminality pleaded in this indictment was a fraud scheme, operating between October 1995 and June 1996, whose ultimate purpose was the conspirators' realization of millions of dollars in illegal profits from their sales of [securities].\"). It \"involves the essence of a crime, in general terms; the particulars of how a defendant effected the crime falls outside that purview.\" *United States v. D'Amelio*, 683 F.3d 412, 418 (2d Cir. 2012).\n\nIn this case, the core of the defendants' charged conduct is several \"conspir[acies] to defraud thousands of victims of more than approximately \\$1 billion . . . through a series of complex fraudulent and fictitious businesses and investment opportunities,\" Indictment ¶ 1, with the GTV Private Placement as the fulcrum around which the schemes pivoted. Wang's motion references only \"the substantive securities fraud count relating to GTV,\" Wang MIL at 7, but that is just one piece of the charged scheme. The GTV Private Placement was at the core not only of \"the substantive securities fraud count relating to GTV\" charged in Count Six and the related substantive wire fraud charged in Count Five, but also of the later schemes that followed in the aftermath of the GTV Private Placement, when the defendants, in an effort to continue raising funds for the unregistered offering of GTV stock, fraudulently offered that stock for sale through the Farm Loan Program and G|CLUBS. *See* Indictment ¶¶ 17(a) (alleging that Farm Loan Program followed closure of Kwok Enterprise bank accounts after large wires \"referenced an unregistered stock offering\"), 18(f) (alleging that \"KWOK, JE, and WANG also used G|CLUBS as a\n\nmechanism to continue fraudulent private placement stock offerings\"). And indeed, the Indictment begins its detailed allegations about the Kwok Enterprise by *defining* the GTV Private Placement as \"an illegal\"—that is, improperly unregistered—\"private stock offering.\" Indictment ¶ 16. The charging instrument then alleges that the unregistered GTV Private Placement was critical to Count One's racketeering conspiracy, *id.* ¶ 16(a)-(i), constituted an overt act in furtherance of Count Four's securities-fraud conspiracy, ¶ 40(a), was at the core of the substantive wire and securities frauds charged in Counts Five and Six, ¶¶ 41-44, and gave rise to the follow-on frauds through the Farm Loan Program and G|CLUBS in Counts Seven through Ten, ¶¶ 45-52.\n\nThis case is therefore nothing like *United States v. Milstein*, 401 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2005), on which Wang pins her motion. *See* Wang MIL at 8 (arguing that permitting argument about the GTV Private Placement's unregistered nature would effect a constructive amendment \"[a]s in *Milstein*\"). In *Milstein*, the District Court permitted the Government to present evidence of a wholly alternative theory of liability premised on entirely different facts that \"the Government claim[ed] to have learned\" \"[f]ollowing Milstein's indictment.\" 401 F.3d at 64. Milstein's indictment charged that he misbranded drugs by repackaging them; the disputed trial evidence and argument was that Milstein in fact misbranded drugs by selling contaminated drugs. *Id.* at 65. While *Milstein*'s indictment never included any allegations about contaminated drugs, *id.* at 65- 66, the Indictment in this case is replete with allegations about the unregistered nature of the GTV Private Placement and the role that design played in effecting the defendants' related fraud schemes.3\n\n3 *Milstein* also makes clear that, even if the unregistered-offering evidence were inadmissible in connection with the substantive securities fraud charge (and it is not), that evidence *would* be admissible in connection with the charges of racketeering conspiracy, wire fraud conspiracy, and\n\nEven if the Indictment did *not* expressly allege the relationship between the GTV Private Placement's unregistered nature and the charged substantive and conspiracy offenses, evidence and argument about this feature of the scheme would be admissible without risking a constructive amendment or prejudicial variance. That is because the Government may prove even \"*unalleged* overt acts falling squarely within the charged scheme.\" *Salmonese*, 352 F.3d at 621. And Wang's warning against arguments \"that the defendants committed securities fraud *because* the offering was allegedly unregistered,\" Wang MIL at 8 (emphasis added), sounds a false alarm. \"The Government [will] not argue, and the Court [will] not charge, that the jury could find [the defendants] guilty of securities fraud,\" *Watts*, 2020 WL 6136211, at \\*8, *based only on* the unregistered nature of the GTV Private Placement. Rather, its deliberately unregistered design is evidence of the defendants' guilty knowledge and fraudulent intent; a means by which the securities fraud and related conspiracies were effected; and a key part of the complete story that explains, among other things, why the jury will hear indisputably admissible evidence about the conspirators' efforts to pool victim-investors' funds, *see* Indictment ¶ 16(g), and how the Farm Loan Program arose when banks \"began to freeze and close GTV-associated bank accounts because, among other reasons, the accounts had received dozens of large incoming wire transfers, some of which referenced an unregistered stock offering,\" *id.* ¶ 17(a). Moreover, *excluding* argument about the unregistered nature of the GTV Private Placement \"would risk confusing the\n\nsecurities fraud conspiracy, as to which the stock's unregistered nature played a critical role. In *Milstein*, the Second Circuit vacated a substantive drug-misbranding charge where the indictment alleged misbranding by repackaging and the evidence at trial established misbranding by selling contaminated drugs. 401 F.3d at 65-66. But the Second Circuit rejected a constructive-amendment challenge to Milstein's conspiracy conviction, holding that Milstein \"had notice of\" the contamination evidence before trial and that it constituted permissible evidence of \"an overt act not specified in the indictment\" in support of a conspiracy conviction. *See Milstein*, 401 F.3d at 66.\n\nissues at trial,\" Wang MIL at 8, while such evidence and argument would properly enable the Government to \"show the 'means' by which the fraud was perpetrated.\" *Ramer*, 2015 WL 13839476, at \\*5 (rejecting Rule 403 challenge to evidence about \"sale of unregistered securities\" in securities fraud prosecution).\n\nIn short, there is no risk of constructive amendment or prejudicial variance. The defendants have had ample notice that this case would include evidence they violated investment registration requirements. Any concern that the jury could be confused as to whether the defendants are charged with violating the registration requirements of the securities laws is easily addressed with a simple limiting instruction. Accordingly, the Court should admit this evidence and deny Wang's motion.\n\n## **III. Evidence That Those Who Threatened the Kwok Enterprise Were Disparaged and Harassed Is Admissible**\n\nEvidence that Kwok disparaged and caused his followers to harass those who threatened his criminal enterprise—including complaining victim investors, Chinese dissidents who criticized Kwok, unpaid creditors, and the bankruptcy Trustee—is admissible. *Cf.* Kwok MIL at 17-22.\n\nThe Government intends to offer evidence that Kwok labeled those who posed a threat to the continuation of his criminal enterprise as \"traitors\" and CCP \"spies\" or \"agents\" and directed his followers to harass those individuals. These tactics are a means and method of the Kwok Enterprise—indeed, they are what allowed Kwok to continue manipulating and deceiving his followers—and are admissible at trial as proof of the existence and scope of the Kwok Enterprise, as a component of the charged fraud, and to complete the story of the crimes charged. The evidence regarding the harassment of these various individuals, including complaining investors, includes the following:\n\n- Kwok disparaged complaining investors as \"traitors\" and CCP \"spies.\" This disparagement both discredited complaining victims and had a chilling effect on others who might have considered complaining or questioning Kwok, allowing the scheme to continue. The Government expects to call victims who will testify at trial to the effect of Kwok's harassment campaigns on them—including their onetime beliefs, as a result of Kwok's statements, that complaining investors and other critics were CCP spies, and then, their realizations that Kwok was running a scam, after which they became fearful of becoming targets themselves if they sought to recoup their investments or otherwise spoke out.\n- Kwok employed a similar tactic with a prominent one-time follower (\"Follower-1\"),4 whom Kwok referred to regularly as the \"nine-fingered demon,\" and whom Kwok sought to use as a scapegoat for the SEC's intervention in the GTV Private Placement. Kwok's statements about Follower-1 are particularly material to issues in this trial, as Kwok repeatedly stated that Follower-1 had committed crimes based on her conduct with respect to Voice of Guo Media (\"VOG\"). Kwok directed investors who were investing less than \\$100,000 to Follower-1 so they could invest in GTV via VOG. Follower-1 then facilitated those investors' transfers of funds to VOG. The evidence at trial will show that Kwok himself was directing Follower-1's conduct, which he later claimed was criminal.\n- Similarly, when Chinese dissidents criticized Kwok, potentially calling into question Kwok's own bona fides as a dissident, Kwok launched the same sorts of attacks on them—including labeling them CCP spies and paying protestors to protest outside their homes. These sorts of attacks allowed Kwok to maintain his credibility as a dissident and to cement his position as leader of the Kwok Enterprise.\n- When Kwok's assets, and the assets of the Kwok Enterprise, were threatened by the creditor claims of the investment fund Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\")—and, later, by the bankruptcy Trustee's investigation—Kwok caused his followers to harass those affiliated with PAX, including PAX's lawyers. Similarly, like Kwok's other targets, the Trustee and his family members, including the Trustee's children, were harassed and threatened by Kwok's followers after Kwok claimed that the Trustee and those associated with him were CCP agents.\n\nAs an initial matter, Kwok's argument that admitting such evidence would violate the First\n\nAmendment is baseless. *See* Kwok MIL at 17-19. Even assuming that Kwok's attacks on complaining investors and others who posed a threat to his criminal enterprise constituted\n\n4 *See* Dkt. 255 at 9 (discussing Kwok-directed harassment of Follower-1).\n\nprotected speech,5 evidence of those attacks is still admissible at this criminal trial. \"The First Amendment . . . does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.\" *Wisconsin v. Mitchell,* 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993). The Second Circuit has repeatedly upheld the admission of evidence of \"speech\" in furtherance of establishing elements of criminal conduct, including the existence of and the defendant's participation in a RICO enterprise. *See United States v. Salameh*, 152 F.3d 88, 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting First Amendment argument regarding admission of evidence, and stating \"[i]t is difficult to comprehend this argument since it is beyond cavil that the First Amendment does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent\") (cleaned up); *United States v. Pierce*, 785 F.3d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 2015) (rejecting First Amendment argument regarding admission of rap lyrics, reasoning that the \"challenge is meritless . . . because here the speech is not itself the proscribed conduct. The speech was not the basis for the prosecution, but instead it was used to establish the existence of, and [the defendant's] participation in, the alleged RICO enterprise.\"); *United States v. Herron*, 762 F. App'x 25, 29–30 (2d Cir. 2019) (following\n\n5 As set forth above, while the Court need not decide the question of whether Kwok's harassment campaigns constitute protected speech, they do not. \"[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud\" and \"other forms of public deception.\" *Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc.*, 538 U.S. 600, 611-12 (2003). More generally, the First Amendment does not protect \"speech integral to unlawful conduct.\" *United States v. Hansen*, 599 U.S. 762, 783 (2023). Here, Kwok's retaliation against those who threatened the continuation of the Kwok Enterprise was an \"integral\" part of Kwok's racketeering conspiracy. *Id.* Kwok's harassment campaigns and related conduct were also intended to obstruct multiple court proceedings, and there is no First Amendment right to obstruct justice. *See United States v. Shoulberg*, 895 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990) (\"The First Amendment does not guarantee a right to make intimidating threats against government witnesses.\"); *United States v. Dahda*, No. 12 Cr. 20083 (DDC), 2023 WL 8113265, at \\*11 (D. Kan. Nov. 22, 2023) (\"No component of the First Amendment shields a defendant from prosecution or a sentence enhancement for conduct that obstructs justice.\" (citing cases)).\n\n*Pierce*). Indeed, the Government is not aware of any case—and Kwok has not cited one—holding evidence inadmissible in a criminal trial because that evidence constituted speech protected under the First Amendment.6\n\nKwok also asserts that such evidence is inadmissible because it is not probative of elements of the charged offenses, including the relationships among member entities of the Kwok Enterprise. *See* Kwok MIL at 20-21. That argument fails for two reasons. First, Kwok's premise is wrong. These tactics were a means and method of the Kwok Enterprise, not because they illustrate the relationships between the entities within the Kwok Enterprise, but because these tactics were employed *in order to facilitate and perpetuate* the Kwok Enterprise and its investment frauds. As such, these tactics are highly probative of the charged crimes; indeed, victim witnesses will testify to their effects, as noted above. Moreover, and in any event, this evidence *does* show the relationship among members of the Kwok Enterprise. Kwok instigated and promoted his harassment campaigns through posts on his own media websites such as G News, GTV, and GETTR, 7 organized protests through the Farms, and paid protestors using the Rule of Law\n\n6 *See also United States v. Walters*, 350 F. App'x 826, 829 (4th Cir. 2009) (\"The First Amendment does not bar evidence of a person's associations when it provides a link to criminal activity.\"); *Dressler v. McCaughtry*, 238 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting defendant's First Amendment argument about admission of evidence); *United States v. Beasley*, 72 F.3d 1518, 1527 (11th Cir. 1996) (\"The government did not indict the Yahweh religion, but only named it as the racketeering enterprise. The First Amendment's protection of beliefs and associations does not preclude such evidence where relevant to a trial issue.\"); *United States v. Barnett*, 667 F.2d 835, 844 (9th Cir. 1982) (\"[T]he [F]irst [A]mendment does not compel the exclusion of evidence simply because it consists of speech. If a defendant's words or his silence are relevant to prove some issue in the case, they are admissible subject to the rules of evidence . . . .\"); *cf. Dembele v. Decker*, No. 18 Civ. 5070 (JPO), 2018 WL 4960234, at \\*2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2018) (holding that immigration judge's consideration of Facebook post did not violate First Amendment).\n\n7 G News, GTV, and GETTR were, in turn, owned or controlled by additional entities within the Kwok Enterprise: Saraca, Hamilton, and Freedom Media Ventures.\n\nentities.8 To a one, these entities are alleged in the Indictment to be within the Kwok Enterprise. *See* Indictment ¶ 3(a).\n\nThe probative value of this evidence is not substantially outweighed by a risk of unfair prejudice. There is nothing unfair about introducing evidence about a critical means through which the defendants effectuated and continued their fraud. That the defendants' tactics to perpetuate the scheme involved \"intimidation\" and \"physical assault,\" Kwok MIL at 21, is no basis to exclude a critical means and method of the Kwok Enterprise. And to the extent there is any risk of potential confusion as to whether the defendants are charged with assault or other uncharged offenses, the Court may issue a limiting instruction to eliminate any potential for confusion. *See United States v. Tussa*, 816 F.2d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1987) (limiting instruction sufficient to preclude prejudice); *see generally United States v. Snype*, 441 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (\"[T]he law recognizes a strong presumption that juries follow limiting instructions.\"). A limiting instruction would address the concerns raised by the defense, while permitting the jury to hear critical evidence of the operation of the Kwok Enterprise, about which victims themselves will testify while explaining their investment-related decisions.\n\n#### **IV. Additional Evidence Relating to the PAX Case and Kwok's Bankruptcy Is Admissible**\n\nThe Court should admit certain additional evidence regarding the PAX case and Kwok's bankruptcy proceedings. *Cf.* Kwok MIL at 23-30. As set forth in the Government's motions *in limine*, *see* Gov't MIL at 27-31, the PAX case provides the background and context for important and plainly admissible evidence at this trial. First, the PAX litigation led to Kwok filing for bankruptcy in February 2022. *See* Indictment ¶ 20 (discussing bankruptcy). Second, following\n\n8 That protestors regularly wore G|Fashion shows the connection to another entity in the Kwok Enterprise.\n\nKwok's claim of bankruptcy, the PAX litigation prompted the \\$37 million \"loan\" between an entity controlled by Kwok's daughter and one of the Himalaya Exchange entities controlled by defendant Kin Ming Je. *See* Indictment ¶ 19(g). The relevance of these topics is discussed in turn.\n\n#### **A. The Context for the \\$37 Million Transfer Is Admissible**\n\nTurning first to the \\$37 million loan, evidence related to the PAX litigation is admissible, as it provides essential context for the charged crimes (the Himalaya Exchange wire fraud count and related conspiracies) and proves the defendants' control over, and misuse of, Himalaya Exchange funds. This \"loan\" of Himalaya Exchange funds to Kwok's daughter was made for Kwok's benefit—a fact that can only be proved by providing the context surrounding the PAX litigation—and thus shows Kwok's ultimate control over funds held by the Himalaya Exchange. In arguing that this evidence proving a specific allegation and count charged in the Indictment is somehow not admissible, Kwok attacks a straw man, claiming the \\$37 million loan is inadmissible \"motive\" evidence. *See* Kwok MIL at 28. But the \\$37 million transfer from the Himalaya Exchange for Kwok's benefit will not be offered to show \"motive.\" It shows that that Kwok *could*—and, indeed, *did*—use the Himalaya Exchange funds for his benefit. It is thus direct, and highly probative, evidence of (among other things) Kwok's fraudulent intent when making misrepresentations about the Himalaya Exchange. And it also demonstrates that Kwok actied through intermediaries and agents, including entities and individuals that are members of the Kwok Enterprise. Notably, despite the misdirection in Kwok's motion *in limine* relating to supposed \"motive\" evidence, Kwok has acknowledged in prior filings that the \"\\$37 million loan from the Exchange to an entity controlled by one of Mr. Kwok's relatives . . . *is a basis of the count in the Indictment related to the Exchange*.\" Dkt. 219 (Kwok's Renewed Motion to Stay the Bankruptcy)\n\nat 2 (emphasis added). There is thus no question that evidence relating to this transfer is admissible as direct evidence at this trial; it is, in Kwok's words and any fair reading of the charges, \"a basis\" for one of the counts charged in the Indictment. *Id.* Finally, to the extent there is any risk of unfair prejudice stemming from the fact that the benefit to Kwok from this \\$37 million transfer related to fines and contempt orders against Kwok in the PAX litigation, the Court can eliminate any such prejudice by issuing a limiting instruction. *See Snype*, 441 F.3d at 129; *Tussa*, 816 F.2d at 68.\n\n#### **B. Certain Bankruptcy Evidence Is Admissible**\n\nBankruptcy-related evidence is likewise admissible as direct evidence of the charged offenses. While Kwok now asserts that his bankruptcy is \"unrelated\" to this case, *see* Kwok MIL at 3 and 10, he has previously represented to the Court \"that there is not a shred of daylight between the subject matter of this case and the Bankruptcy Cases.\" Dkt. 219 (Kwok's Renewed Motion to Stay the Bankruptcy) at 4. As Kwok correctly noted in his earlier filings,\n\nthe Indictment . . . alleges that Mr. Kwok's filing for bankruptcy protection itself was an act in furtherance of the government's purported schemes. Moreover, the alleged 'enterprise' upon which the government relies is a constellation of corporate entities that include twelve entities against which the Trustee has commenced adversary proceedings to date, and numerous other entities which the Trustee has contended are Mr. Kwok's alter egos.\n\n*Id.* Simply put, there is no question that the bankruptcy proceedings are \"relevant\" to this case under Rule 401. The only question is what limits, if any, must be placed on bankruptcy-related evidence under Rule 403. Importantly, the Government does not intend to offer exhaustive evidence relating to the bankruptcy litigations or go entry by entry through the voluminous bankruptcy dockets. Rather, the Government intends to offer particularly probative evidence from the bankruptcy proceedings, as discussed below.\n\n#### 1. Kwok's Declaration of Bankruptcy\n\nFirst, the basic fact that Kwok declared bankruptcy in February 2022 and Kwok's sworn\n\ndeclaration claiming bankruptcy are clearly admissible as direct evidence because they show that Kwok was knowingly lying to investors about his wealth and ability to personally guarantee investors' losses. Kwok's portrayal of himself as a billionaire in a position to personally guarantee his victims' investments was a critical part of the scheme to defraud investors, from the outset of the racketeering conspiracy through Kwok's arrest in March 2023. In the April 2020 GTV offering memorandum, Kwok is described first and foremost as \"a billionaire.\"9 Yet less than two years later, after the imposition of less than \\$300 million in fines in the PAX litigation, this \"billionaire\" who could supposedly personally guarantee over a billion dollars in investor money, declared bankruptcy, claiming \\$100,000 or less in assets and over \\$374 million in liabilities. This evidence is, thus, directly relevant to establishing certain of Kwok's misrepresentations to investors.\n\nKwok's arguments against admitting bankruptcy evidence rely principally on the timing of the bankruptcy, which Kwok himself voluntarily initiated in the midst of carrying out the charged offenses in February 2022.10 *See* Kwok MIL at 27 (\"The filing of the Bankruptcy Cases and the\n\n9 The first sentence describing the \"Sponsor and Adviser of GTV Media\" reads: \"The sponsor and adviser of GTV Media, Mr. Wengui Guo (a/k/a Miles Guo, Ho Wan Kwok or Miles Kwok), is a billionaire, a successful businessman and a dissident in China.\"\n\n10 Kwok also reasons that because he is not charged with *bankruptcy fraud*, his bankruptcy filings and his own statements in connection therewith cannot be direct evidence in this case. Kwok MIL at 25. Of course, direct evidence need not be so tightly tethered to the charged offenses to be relevant and admissible. If a defendant falsely tells investors that he is a billionaire and can reimburse any of the investors' losses, the fact that the defendant also declared bankruptcy at or around the same time is plainly evidence that the defendant was lying—an essential element of any fraud charge, and thus direct evidence in a trial on such charges.\n\nAdditionally, Kwok argues that the bankruptcy proceedings were \"personal to him\" and do not relate to the Kwok Enterprise. Kwok MIL at 25-26. Kwok is wrong. The bankruptcy did not relate merely to Kwok personally, because Kwok used the Kwok Enterprise to obscure and conceal the assets, including fraud proceeds, he controlled and used to pay for personal expenses. Kwok's assertion is also belied by Kwok's previous filing acknowledging that \"the 'enterprise' upon which the government relies is a constellation of corporate entities that include twelve entities against\n\nensuing proceedings post-dated the alleged criminal activity\"); *id.* (\"Kwok's supposed need for money in February 2022 does not show that he similarly needed money at the time of\" certain earlier illustrative misrepresentations described in the Indictment); *id.* (\"Kwok's ability to pay his debts in November 2021 and February 2022 was dramatically different\"); *id.* at 28 (\"the Bankruptcy Cases cannot be evidence of the 'background' of any of the charged offenses because it occurred after the start of the charged offenses\"). The primary problem with Kwok's temporal argument is that Kwok's deception of investors—and the fraud offenses charged in the Indictment—continued \"up to and including at least in or about March 2023,\" over a year *after* Kwok had declared bankruptcy.11 Indeed, the Government's evidence at trial will include videorecorded broadcasts by Kwok which post-date his bankruptcy, in which he continued to personally guarantee any investor losses. Similarly, the Government's evidence at trial will show that Kwok was misappropriating investor funds after declaring bankruptcy, including by using G|Fashion funds to purchase luxury custom clothing for himself. The defendants actively concealed the fact that Kwok was the beneficiary of these misappropriations by describing the payments for Kwok's custom luxury clothing on internal G|Fashion paperwork using euphemisms like \"Research and Development: Special.\"\n\nwhich the Trustee has commenced adversary proceedings to date, and numerous other entities which the Trustee has contended are Mr. Kwok's alter egos.\" Dkt. 219 (Kwok's Renewed Motion to Stay the Bankruptcy) at 4.\n\n11 At one point, Kwok acknowledges the time period charged in the Indictment. *See* Kwok MIL at 28. Yet Kwok then asserts, puzzlingly, that because the bankruptcy filing and subsequent proceedings occurred *during* the charged fraud, the \"Bankruptcy Cases are neither the start or the end of the charged offenses, and thus cannot properly be admitted to 'complete the story of the crime on trial,'\" *id.* at 28-29. That reasoning is nonsensical. That the filing of the Bankruptcy came in the midst of the charged crimes and not at the beginning nor the end makes it no less relevant.\n\nIn addition to being direct evidence of the charged crimes, Kwok's voluntary declaration of bankruptcy is clearly admissible as to the defendants' motive, knowledge, intent, absence of mistake, and lack of accident under Rule 404(b). As to motive, in its motions *in limine*, the Government explained how, when declaring bankruptcy, Kwok admitted that his assets had been seized beginning in 2017, including through a Hong Kong court order put into effect one month before Kwok began raising money from his followers. *See* Gov't MIL at 21-23 (admissibility of asset seizures immediately prior to Kwok starting to raise funds from his followers). That Kwok's assets were seized before he began soliciting money from his followers shows Kwok's motive for committing his investment frauds. With respect to Kwok's knowledge and intent, Kwok declaring bankruptcy while representing to investors, at the same time, that he would personally guarantee their losses, shows that Kwok knew his representations were false and misleading.\n\n#### 2. Efforts to Obstruct the Bankruptcy\n\nNext, the Government intends to offer evidence that, through agents of the Kwok Enterprise, the defendants sought to obstruct the bankruptcy proceeding, because the Trustee's investigation threatened to expose Kwok's fraud and placed the fraud proceeds in jeopardy of confiscation. As explained above, *supra* at 13-17, evidence that Kwok disparaged and harassed the Trustee and those associated with him is admissible. That harassment was just one dimension of the defendants' efforts to obstruct the bankruptcy proceedings. For example, Wang's coaching of Kwok's daughter, Mei Guo (\"Mei\"), in connection with Mei's false claim of ownership over the Lady May, and Mei's perjurious testimony to the same effect when deposed by the Trustee on that topic and that of the \\$37 million \"loan\" of Himalaya Exchange funds, is also admissible. Wang and Kwok also sought to transfer ownership of entities in the Kwok Enterprise so that they\n\nwould be beyond the reach of the Trustee.12 Such evidence shows the efforts of the defendants to conceal their crimes, through obstruction and false testimony, and Kwok's ultimate control over assets like the Lady May and the funds held by the Himalaya Exchange, as well as other entities in the Kwok Enterprise. As evidence of a means and method of the Kwok Enterprise, these facts are direct evidence of the charged racketeering conspiracy. Alternatively, this evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) as highly probative of the defendants' intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, and lack of accident. That the defendants sought to obstruct court proceedings that might unveil their crimes or lead to the confiscation of fraud proceeds demonstrates consciousness of guilt—and that the defendants ran the Kwok Enterprise with the requisite *mens rea*, and not negligently or in good faith.\n\n#### 3. The Trustee's Mahwah Mansion Walkthrough\n\nAs a final example, the Government intends to offer evidence arising from the Trustee's September 2023 walkthrough of Mahwah Mansion. As the Court is aware, following the defendants' arrests and the unsealing of the Government's charges related to the misappropriation of G|CLUBS funds to purchase a personal home for Kwok and his family, Kwok's followers accessed the Mahwah Mansion and modified the premises in a blatant attempt to obstruct justice.\n\n12 To the extent the jury needs, in order to undrestand this evidence, context regarding what was happening in the bankruptcy, the Government intends to offer evidence regarding the bankruptcy litigations sufficient to provide that context. To be clear, however, the Government does not intend to offer any orders or any judicial factual findings from the bankruptcy proceedings for their truth. Wang's motion to preclude the introduction of \"findings in other judicial proceedings\" as hearsay thus proceeds from a mistaken premise. *See* Wang MIL at 14. The Government does not intend to offer \"findings\" or any other evidence from \"other judicial proceedings\" for their truth, but rather to explain and provide essential context, where necessary, for the actions the defendants and their co-conspirators took in furtherance of the charged crimes. *See, e.g.*, *supra* at 17-19 (admissibility of the PAX litigation and contempt order as essential context for the \\$37 million transfer of Himalaya Exchange funds for Kwok's benefit). When admitting such evidence, the Court can cure any risk of prejudice or confusion by issuing a limiting instruction.\n\nSpecifically, Kwok's followers placed placards stating \"NFSC / G|CLUBS\"—in an effort to bolster Kwok's argument at trial that the Mahwah Mansion was a secret \"base.\"13 This obstructive conduct was discovered through, and documented with photographs and videos taken during, the Trustee's walkthrough. When introducing this evidence, the Government is entitled to provide at least some basic context for the Trustee's walkthrough.\n\n#### 4. Rule 403 Does Not Bar This Highly Probative Evidence\n\nBecause the foregoing bankruptcy-related evidence is highly probative of the central issues on trial, it is admissible. Kwok's Rule 403 arguments to the contrary, claiming unfair prejudice, are unpersuasive. *See* Kwok MIL at 29. In *HTC Corp. v. Tech. Properties Ltd.*, No. 08 Civ. 00882 (PSG), 2013 WL 4782598, at \\*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013), the magistrate judge excluded evidence of a party's bankruptcy because the opposing party had \"fail[ed] to tie TPL's bankruptcy to\" the relevant issue at trial, namely, \"a lack of success in licensing the MMP portfolio.\" *Id.* at \\*2. That failure \"le[ft] the court guessing on the cause of TPL's bankruptcy,\" which may have been unconnected to the relevant issue. *Id.* at \\*2 & n.2. Not so here, where Kwok's voluntary bankruptcy is directly probative of several relevant issues, such as Kwok's representations to victim investors about his wealth and ability to repay their losses. The other case Kwok relies on is similarly inapposite. *Pedroza v. Lomas Auto Mall, Inc.*, Civ. No. 07 Civ. 0591 (JB) (RHS), 2009 WL 1325440 (D.N.M. Apr. 6, 2009) concerned a dispute about a used car, and the court excluded evidence of \"negligible relevance\" regarding a plaintiff's prior and unrelated bankruptcy. *Id.* at \\*7. Unlike the *Pedroza* plaintiff's bankruptcy, Kwok's bankruptcy occurred in the midst of this case's investment frauds, is inextricably intertwined with the Kwok Enterprise, and is highly\n\n13 In recorded jail calls following their arrests, the defendants appear to be discussing with followers this supposed \"base.\"\n\nprobative of essential elements of the charges in this case, such as the making of fraudulent representations to investors.\n\nIf anything, the Court can address any risk of unfair prejudice from the bankruptcy-related evidence by issuing a limiting instruction to the jury. That is plainly the proper outcome, as opposed to excluding outright such highly probative evidence, connected to voluntarily initiated bankruptcy proceedings contemporaneous with the charged offenses, particularly when \"there is not a shred of daylight between the subject matter of this case and the Bankruptcy Cases.\" Dkt. 219 (Kwok's Renewed Motion to Stay the Bankruptcy) at 4.14\n\n#### **V. Evidence of Wang's Compensation Is Admissible**\n\nEvidence of Wang's compensation is probative of her intent to commit the charged crimes. It shows she received financial rewards for her role in the Kwok Enterprise. Wang seeks to preclude this evidence, arguing only that her financial compensation was not linked to or derived from the proceeds of the fraud. Wang MIL at 10. Not so. To start, Wang's salary was paid to compensate her *for her role in the Kwok Enterprise*. The Government intends to introduce W2s and payroll information reflecting as much. That makes it relevant—it shows Wang had a financial motive to participate in the Enterprise, and shows that Wang did, in fact, participate in the Enterprise. Evidence of compensation is also relevant to Wang's knowledge and intent—it shows that Wang was on the payroll for some entities in the Kwok Enterprise but not for others, such as G|CLUBS, even though she was its *de facto* CEO. This evidence indicates that Wang tried to conceal her involvement in G|CLUBS, which demonstrates her intent. Any prejudice is minimal\n\n14 Kwok also raises Rule 403 concerns regarding the bankruptcy court's contempt order related to Kwok's invocation of the Fifth Amendment. Kwok MIL at 29-30. The Government will not offer any evidence regarding that contempt order or related litigation.\n\nand does not outweigh this significant probative value.\n\nWang is, of course, free to argue that this compensation was not connected to the criminal conduct. But those arguments go to the weight of this evidence, and not its admissibility. The cases upon which Wang relies are not the contrary. In *United States v. Ferguson*, a court in the District of Connecticut partially granted the defendant's motion to exclude evidence of bonuses paid to him because those bonuses were \"irrelevant\" to the charged conduct. But the court determined that evidence of the defendant's \"deferred compensation plan [was] relevant to proving motive\" because it showed a reason why he sought to manipulate stock. 2007 WL 4240782, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Nov. 30, 2007). The circumstances are no different here—evidence that Wang was paid for her role(s) in the Kwok Enterprise is plainly relevant and not unduly prejudicial. 15 Accordingly, the evidence is admissible.16\n\n#### **VI. Evidence of Wang and Kwok's Personal Relationship Is Admissible**\n\nWang seeks to preclude, pursuant to Rule 403, evidence that Wang and Kwok\n\n. *See* Wang MIL at 16-17. Wang's motion\n\n15 Wang's reliance on *United States v. Stahl* is also misplaced. Evidence of Wang's compensation is not offered to make an \"appeal to class prejudice\"—it simply reflects that Wang was paid for her criminal acts. 616 F.2d 30, 31-33 (2d Cir. 1980). As for *United States v. Shapiro*, No. 15 Cr. 155 (RNC) (D. Conn. Apr. 24, 2017), ECF No. 372, it appears (though is not clear from the copy Wang provided the Court) that the compensation at issue was significant (the amount is redacted). To the extent that was the reason for that court's exclusion of compensation, there is no similar concern here. Wang was not paid excessive sums. But that she earned a comfortable salary through the Kwok Enterprise is highly probative of her motive to involve herself in it.\n\n16 Wang also seeks to preclude evidence relating to the purchase of a condominium apartment on her behalf. Wang MIL at 10-11. The Government does not presently intend to offer evidence regarding Wang's condominium purchase at trial. In the event that changes, the Government will alert Wang's counsel, and if necessary the Court, before introducing any such evidence at trial.\n\nshould be denied.\n\nWang does not appear to dispute that evidence of is relevant. Rather, Wang's objection turns solely on Rule 403. That is whether and the associated personal relationship between Wang and Kwok is \"substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.\" Fed. R. Evid. 403. It is not.\n\n\"Unfair\" prejudice is that which \"tends to have some adverse effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence.\" *United States v. Gilliam*, 994 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting *United States v. Figueroa*, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980)). Typically, unfair prejudice is an \"undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.\" Fed. R. Evid. 403, Advisory Comm. Note; *see also* Weinstein, § 403.04(1)(c) at 403-42-403-47 (traditional examples of unfair prejudice include evidence that appeals to the jury's sympathies, evidence that arouses jurors' sense of horror and evidence that provokes a jury's instinct to punish).\n\n![](_page_29_Figure_4.jpeg)\n\n Wang's suggestion that Wang MIL at 17, does not establish prejudice sufficient to exclude this evidence. Even if that is the case for some jurors, the jury will be instructed to place any such feelings to the side when deliberating. And any possible prejudice can be eliminated through a proper limiting instruction or a targeted\n\nquestioning posed during *voir dire*. Moreover, Wang's argument ignores that courts frequently admit prior *criminal acts* between two co-defendants because it is probative of the level of trust between co-defendants. The Second Circuit has stated repeatedly that Rule 403 favors the admission of evidence where uncharged *crimes* \"did not involve conduct more serious that the charged crime[s].\" *Williams*, 205 F.3d at 33-34. The proposed evidence here,\n\nis not a *bad* act—it is not unfairly prejudicial to the defendants because it is not \"any more sensational or disturbing\" than the charged conduct. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Sanpedro*, 352 Fed. App'x 482, 485 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (noting that \"prejudice is informed by the crimes with which the defendant has been charged\"); *United States v. Taylor*, 767 F. Supp. 2d 428, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that evidence of other robberies in a Hobbs Act robbery case was admissible and not prejudicial).\n\nWang argues this evidence is unduly prejudicial because \"there is *unlikely* to be any serious dispute\" that Wang and Kwok had a close relationship. Wang MIL at 16 (emphasis added). It is, of course, the Government's burden to prove the charged offenses and, as relevant here, to establish the closeness of Kwok and Wang's relationship. That Wang may not contest that closeness does not provide an evidentiary basis for establishing it, as the Government must do. The nature of Kwok and Wang's relationship is relevant to the jury's consideration of the charged offenses. Kwok placed Wang in charge of his vast criminal apparatus. The jury will likely question why Kwok trusted her—and why Wang agreed to take on that role. That Kwok and Wang\n\nis evidence from which the jury can drawn inferences that may answer those questions.17 This is particularly the case given that Wang has\n\n17 To the extent Wang and Kwok wish to stipulate to their close and personal relationship, the\n\nargued that she was not financially rewarded for her participation in the criminal conduct. Wang MIL at 9 (\"The original indictment filed by the government against Ms. Wang contained no allegation that investor money went to Ms. Wang, or that she personally benefitted from the alleged scheme in any way.\"). Indeed, Wang's financial rewards were different in degree than Kwok, Je, or some Kwok family members; the Government is permitted to argue that some of her incentive to participate in the schemes was not just financial, but personal, an argument supported by evidence of Kwok and Wang's personal relationship, .\n\nWang contends that if this evidence is admitted the only way for her to \"meet the Government's allegations\" is for her to testify about Wang MIL at 17. If Wang wishes to present admissible evidence to cut against the Government's allegation that the two codefendants had a , she may do so, whether through witness testimony or the introduction of exhibits; indeed, the discovery in this case includes, for example, a recording of Kwok yelling at Wang that might suggest a breakdown in their relationship. Regardless of how Wang chooses to advance this argument, the Government must be able to prove the two codefendants had a level of trust significant enough to operate a vast RICO enterprise with each other, including through the introduction of the evidence.\n\nAccordingly, the evidence is admissible.\n\n## **VII. Accurate References to the \"Mahwah Mansion\" and to the Kwok Enterprise's \"Shell Companies\" and \"Figurehead Executives\" Are Permissible**\n\nThe Court should permit accurate references to the Kwok Enterprise's use of shell companies and figurehead executives, and to Kwok's New Jersey residence as a mansion in\n\nGovernment would welcome a dialogue about the scope and language of such a stipulation. However, to date, neither defendant has broached the Government about such a stipulation.\n\nMahwah. *See* Kwok MIL at 33-36; Wang MIL at 4-6. Kwok and Wang's motions to preemptively preclude references to \"shell companies\" and related terms, and Kwok's motion to preclude references to his New Jersey home as the \"Mahwah Mansion,\" are premised on the assertion that these terms are inherently and unfairly prejudicial. But a term's permissibility must be evaluated in context. *Cf., e.g.*, *United States v. Banki*, 685 F.3d 99, 120 (2d Cir. 2012) (appropriateness of arguments must be evaluated \"within the context of the entire trial\"). For this reason, courts typically do not preclude the use of purportedly prejudicial terms if they have some basis in the evidence. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Runner*, No. 18 Cr. 578 (JS), 2023 WL 3727532, at \\*5 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2023) (denying motion to preclude references to \"shell companies\" in fraud and money laundering case). Neither the Government nor its witnesses should be precluded from referencing terms that accurately describe certain of the Kwok Enterprise's entities and Kwok's New Jersey residence.\n\n## **A. Accurate References to Shell Companies and Related Terms Should Be Permitted**\n\nKwok's and Wang's motions to preclude references to \"shell companies\" and related terms18 relies on a single criminal case involving meaningfully different allegations. Kwok MIL at 33-35 (citing *United States v. Watts*, 934 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Wang MIL at 4-5 (citing same case). But a full view of the case law points to a different standard: these terms are presumptively \"neutral\" and should be permitted where \"a factual predicate . . . shows the subject entities are shell companies prior to usage of the descriptive term.\" *Runner*, 2023 WL 3727532,\n\n18 Kwok's motion also seeks preclusion of the related terms \"shell corporation\" and \"alter ego,\" Kwok MIL at 33-35, and Wang's motion also seeks preclusion of the related terms \"figurehead executives\" and \"straw owners,\" Wang MIL at 4-5.\n\nat \\*5 (denying similar motion where indictment alleged defendant used various entities to commit fraud and money laundering conspiracies).\n\nDespite Kwok's comparison of these terms to more colloquial slights like \"vulture funds,\" Kwok MIL at 35, \"shell corporation\" is a common descriptor of a corporate entity that exists solely or primarily to serve the purposes of another person or entity. *See, e.g.*, SHELL CORPORATION, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining the term neutrally as \"[a] corporation that has no active business and usu[ally] exists only in name as a vehicle for another company's business operations\"). For that reason, \"shell corporation\" and similar terms often serve a useful explanatory function in cases involving allegations of the transfer and concealment of funds. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Abdullaev*, 761 F. App'x 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (describing trial evidence that witness \"served as Director of [a relevant entity's] corporate shell\" and observed \"how [a relevant entity's] Russian clients used shell companies to pay their invoices\"); U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3), cmt. n.5 (suggesting consideration of use of \"shell corporations\" in determining whether to apply \"sophisticated laundering\" enhancement). Wang's additional argument—that the terms are \"clearly prejudicial as [they] communicate a conclusion to the jury,\" Wang MIL at 5—misstates the law. The Federal Rules of Evidence prohibit only *unfairly* prejudicial evidence and \"communicat[ing] a conclusion to the jury\" is the very purpose of advocates' arguments and the testimony and evidence they seek to elicit. *See Old Chief v. United States*, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (\"'Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision *on an improper basis* . . .\" (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403, advisory committee's notes) (emphasis added)); *see also* Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) (\"An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.\").\n\nMoreover, in *Watts*—Kwok's and Wang's sole cited authority—both the movant's arguments and the Court's ruling suggested that it *would* be appropriate to refer to entities—like Kwok's—that were used \"to evade bankruptcy rules and to commit mail and wire fraud\" as \"shell corporations.\" *Watts*, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 482 (citing *United States v. Ross*, 77 F.3d 1525, 1535-36 (7th Cir. 1996)); *Watts*, No. 10 Cr. 627 (KAM), Dkt. 610-1 at 19-20 (same). *Watts* involved a comparatively straightforward scheme to obtain loans for companies by falsifying their financial statements. *See United States v. Dupree (Watts)*, 781 F.Supp.2d 115, 121-22 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (providing background). The structure of the holding company that owned the various debtor companies was irrelevant to the case, and there were no allegations of concealing or promoting the offenses by taking advantage of any features of corporate structure. *Id.* In other words, *Watts*'s decision to preclude references to a \"shell company\" came in a context where those features of the company were irrelevant to the charges. In stark contrast, the Indictment in this case charges that the defendants \"operated the Kwok Enterprise through a series of complex fraudulent and fictitious businesses and investment opportunities that connected dozens of interrelated entities.\" Indictment ¶ 1. It further alleges that the means and methods of the crimes involved \"years-long efforts to obscure the funds used and controlled by KWOK,\" \"mov[ing] funds within the Kwok Enterprise and for the benefit of KWOK, his family, and his associates, by disguising the money movements as 'loans' or 'investments,'\" and \"install[ing] figurehead executives and/or straw owners at the entities within the Kwok Enterprise, while the entities within the Kwok Enterprise were, in reality, owned and/or controlled by\" the defendants.\" *Id.* ¶ 20. All of this conduct involved taking advantage of the design of entities described accurately as \"shell companies,\" giving the term a factual predicate that was lacking in *Watts*, where those features were irrelevant.\n\nConsistent with the weight of authority, the Court should deny Kwok's and Wang's motions and find that \"shell company,\" \"figurehead executives,\" and similar terms are presumptively neutral and can appropriately be referenced at trial if they are consistent with other evidence in the case. *See, e.g.*, *Wherevertv, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC*, No. 18 Civ. 0529 (WJF) (NPM), 2023 WL 2664200, at \\*5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2023) (denying without prejudice motion to exclude reference to \"shell company\"); *H&L Farms LLC v. Silicon Ranch Corp.*, No. 21 Cv. 0134 (CDL), 2023 WL 1795705, at \\*6 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 7, 2023) (\"If there is evidence that any of the defendants is a shell corporation . . . then Plaintiffs shall not be precluded from using the term 'shell company.'\"); *DNT, LLC v. Sprint Spectrum, LP*, No. 09 Cv. 0021 (JRS), 2010 WL 582164, at \\*4-5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2010) (finding \"shell company\" to be a \"neutral term[ ]\" and permitting references should the term be \"accurate\").\n\n#### **B. Accurate References to the Mahwah Mansion Should Be Permitted**\n\nKwok's motion to preclude references to the \"Mahwah Mansion\"—and to require the use of two impracticably lengthy and specific alternatives—should also be denied. *See* Kwok MIL at 35 (requesting that Court mandate use of \"675 Ramapo Valley Road\" or \"675 Ramapo\"). As set forth in greater detail below, the use of the term \"mansion\" is not unfairly prejudicial. It has, in fact, been used to describe the residence that Kwok bought for himself and his family in 2021 by Kwok's own media outlet, G News. That is because the property is, indisputably, a mansion. Accordingly, there is no basis to preclude the use of an accurate and entirely proper term or to mandate an unwieldy alternative.\n\nKwok cites no authority for the proposition that \"mansion\" is an unfairly prejudicial term. Indeed, courts routinely refer to unusually large residences as \"mansions,\" even in criminal cases proceeding before juries. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Al Kasser*, 660 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2011)\n\n(referring to trial evidence of the defendant extending an invitation \"to his mansion in Spain to further discuss the Nicaraguan arms deal\"); *United States v. Trupin*, 119 F. App'x 323, 326 (2d Cir. 2005) (summary order) (referring to trial evidence of the defendant's evasion of taxes owed on \"proceeds from the sale of his 63-room, beachfront mansion\"); *United States v. Monaco*, 194 F.3d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1999) (referring to trial evidence that defendant \"used [his parents'] mansion to meet with his fellow drug traffickers and to store cash, equipment, cars, and his yacht\"). And at least one District Court in the Second Circuit has rejected the related argument that \"referring to the defendants' home as a 'mansion'\" improperly \"invoked class bias\" and caused \"prejudicial and inflammatory\" pretrial publicity. *United States v. Sabhnani*, No. 07 Cr. 429 (TCP), 2007 WL 2769487, at \\*3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2007).\n\nPrecluding references to Kwok's Mahwah residence as a \"mansion\" makes particularly little sense in view of the indisputable fact that the home continues to be referred to by its historical names, which include the \"Crocker Mansion\" and the \"Darlington Mansion.\" *See, e.g.*, Crocker-McMillin Mansion, Wikipedia, http (last accessed April 17, 2024). Even Kwok's own media outlets refer to the residence as a \"mansion.\" After Kwok's arrest on the charges giving rise to this trial, G News19 referred to the Mahwah property as the former \"Darlington Mansion.\" *See* 乱世天堂:新中国联邦基地, GNEWS, April 11, 2023, available at http (last accessed April 16, 2024) (reference in English in original). 20 And business records relating to the renovations of the Mahwah Mansion using\n\n19 In an April 2020 G News post by Kwok (under the verified handle \"Miles\"), summarizing one of Kwok's broadcasts, Kwok states: \"Comrades, I'm creating G-TV and G-News for you, is that right?\" Kwok also goes on to say, \"Everyone sees that we are so busy G-TV, G-News, Wang Yanping and all the employees of our rule of law fund.\" *See* http\n\n20 Moreover, Kwok's agents purchased the Mahwah Mansion in 2021 from its previous owner,\n\ninvestor funds—which the Government intends to offer as exhibits at trial—similarly refer to the property as the \"Crocker Mansion\" or a \"mansion.\"\n\nThere is no basis to preclude references at trial to one of the Mahwah residence's most commonly used names. Kwok's motion should be denied.\n\n#### **VIII. Hypothetical Questions To Show Materiality Are Proper**\n\nThe Court should permit the Government to ask hypothetical questions of fact witnesses such as victim investors or bank representatives—in order to prove the materiality of false and misleading representations and omissions. *Cf.* Wang MIL at 12-14 (relating to hypothetical questions).\n\nThe propriety of such questions is well established. In *United States v. Cuti*, 720 F.3d 453 (2d Cir. 2013), the Second Circuit affirmed the use of \"what-if-you-had-known\" questions in the securities fraud prosecution of two defendants who had schemed to inflate their company's reported earnings. *See id.* at 455-57. In that case, two accountants testified at trial about \"how they had accounted for the proceeds from the fraudulent transactions; how they would have accounted for the transactions had they been aware of the full facts; and how the material information that was withheld from them led to misstatements in the company's financial statements.\" *Id.* at 456. The Court held that such testimony \"was properly admitted as factual testimony,\" and \"alternatively h[e]ld that it [was] admissible as lay opinion.\" *Id.* at 459. The Court reasoned, where \"the issue for the fact-finder's determination is reduced to impact—whether a witness would have acted differently if he had been aware of additional information—the witness so testifying is engaged in 'a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life'\" and is properly understood as\n\nCrocker Mansion Estate LLC. *See* Deed, *Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC et al.*, Adv. P. No. 23- 05017 (JAM), Dkt. 23-2 at 2 (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 23, 2023).\n\noffering lay opinion testimony. *Id.* (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 701, advisory committee's note, 2000\n\namend.). At bottom, the Second Circuit concluded that\n\na witness may testify to the fact of what he did not know and how, if he had known that independently established fact, it would have affected his conduct or behavior. As this case illustrates, 'what-if-you-had-known' questions that present withheld facts to a witness are especially useful to elicit testimony about the impact of fraud.\n\n*Id.*21\n\nAccordingly, provided the framework set forth in *Cuti* is followed, this Court should permit the Government to ask \"what-if-you-had-known\" questions in order to prove materiality. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Velissaris*, No. 22 Cr. 105 (DLC), 2022 WL 17076747, at \\*1, \\*4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.\n\n18, 2022) (explaining \"well-established legal principles,\" including that \"[w]hen a fact witness is\n\n21 As the Second Circuit noted in *Cuti*, its holding accords with that of other Circuits to have considered the issue. *See United States v. Musselwhite*, 709 F. App'x 958, 972 (11th Cir. 2017) (not error to \"allow[] the bank representatives to testify as to their respective banks' mortgageapproval procedures and to answer hypothetical questions about whether their respective banks would have approved the loans had the banks known that the buyer's income, employment history, assets, earnest money deposit, and cash-to-close were misrepresented\"); *United States v. Hill*, 643 F.3d 807, 841-42 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting argument that \"lender representatives should not have been allowed to testify about what their institutions would have done had they known that several representations in various loan applications were falsified\"); *United States v. Orr*, 692 F.3d 1079, 1095-97 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming propriety of hypothetical question—\"Q. What affect, [sic] if any, would it have had upon you if you had been told that all tests done on Mr. Orr's own fuel did not show the advantages disclosed in those documents?\"—because the \"prosecutor's question went to the material nature of Orr's statements\"); *United States v. Laurienti*, 611 F.3d 530, 549- 50 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming propriety of hypothetical question—\"If you had known prior to purchasing [a house stock] that Hampton Porter prevented or discouraged their brokers from allowing their clients to sell their shares of [the house stock], would you have purchased the [shares of the house stock]?\"—in order to establish materiality); *United States v. Jennings*, 487 F.3d 564, 581–82 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that, unlike with respect to character witnesses, it is generally permissible to ask guilt-assuming hypotheticals of fact witnesses to prove materiality, and noting that \"[t]he government would be hard pressed to prove this element [*i.e.*, materiality] without asking whether the undisclosed information would have affected the decision maker's analysis.\"); *United States v. Dukes*, 242 F. App'x 37, 45 (4th Cir. 2007) (affirming propriety of the hypothetical question, \"And if he had told you that [fact which was omitted], would that have affected your decision to invest in Financial Warfare Club?\").\n\nasked a hypothetical question about facts for which a foundation is laid in the record, and asked as well in answering the question to apply a reasoning process similar to that in which the witness normally engages, such testimony is admissible as testimony from a fact witness or, depending on the question, as lay opinion testimony.\" (citing *Cuti*)); *see also United States v. Patel*, No. 21 Cr. 220 (VAB), 2023 WL 2643815, at \\*44 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2023) (following *Cuti* and concluding that \"the Government may solicit answers to hypothetical questions that fall within this framework and have the proper foundation\").\n\nThe Government's evidence at trial will lay the factual foundation that the defendants spent investor funds improperly on Kwok's and his family's personal expenses, as described in the Indictment, and that these payments were facilitated and approved by Wang. Kwok, moreover, made numerous representations to investors that falsely represented how he would use investors' money and misleadingly omitted that he intended to use investor funds for his and his family's personal benefit. *See, e.g.*, *supra* at 2-3 (Kwok representing to investors: \"You can never lose half of your investment in GTV, because every penny you invest must be audited by American legal accountants. *I can't use the money you invested to buy a Japanese meal today*, so I will be arrested directly. The United States will really arrest you. Then you want to . . . *the money invested by the comrades will all be in the comrades' companies . . .*\" (emphases added)). Accordingly, pursuant to *Cuti*, the Government is entitled to ask investors whether, if they had known that Kwok would use investor funds to pay for personal items, they would have invested in GTV and the other investment projects.22\n\n22 Just as courts allow co-conspirator statements to be admitted subject to connection with subsequent trial evidence establishing the declarant as a co-conspirator, *see, e.g.*, *United States v. Vidal*, No. 22 Cr. 2857, 2024 WL 397630, at \\*4 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2024) (affirming Judge Cote's\n\nTo the extent that Wang's motion is concerned about hypothetical questions that are unconnected to Kwok's false or misleading statements, or that suggest a limitless \"open-ended duty to disclose,\" *see* Wang MIL at 14, the Government does not intend to ask such questions. Accordingly, the Court should permit the Government to ask proper hypothetical questions, and Wang's motion should be denied as moot.\n\n#### **IX. Kwok's Motion Regarding Metadata Evidence Is Premature**\n\nKwok's motions include a statement that he \"reserves his right to oppose\" the introduction of \"metadata as evidence.\" Kwok MIL at 58. He outlines several potential features of metadata, including that it \"is not necessarily accurate\" and \"may also be altered.\" *Id.* These are, of course, features of virtually all documentary evidence—and the Government similarly reserves its right to oppose the introduction of unauthenticated or altered evidence. But as Kwok's motion also makes clear, metadata can provide relevant and probative information about \"who authored [a] document, who accessed [a] document, when the document was first created, when the document was last edited and by whom\"—all of which are potentially critical to establishing matters of knowledge and intent that are at the core of a fraud case. Kwok MIL at 58. Indeed, the same Sedona Principles that Kwok cites counsel the production and admission of metadata where it sheds relevant light. *See The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production*, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1, 212 (2018) (metadata often\n\nemploying such a procedure, over the objections of the defense); *United States v. Tracy*, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993) (\"[S]tatements proffered as coconspirator statements may be admitted in evidence on a conditional basis, subject to the later submission of the necessary evidence of those . . . prerequisites.\"); *United States v. Geaney*, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969) (\"[T]he practicalities of a conspiracy trial may require that hearsay be admitted 'subject to connection[]' . . . when all the evidence is in.\"), the Court should permit the Government to pose these hypothetical questions to victims who testify early in this lengthy trial, subject to connection with the evidence establishing that Kwok used investor funds for himself and his family.\n\nnecessary to ensure \"a fair representation of the file as kept and used in the ordinary course of business\"); *id.* at 211 (\"Sometimes metadata is needed to authenticate a disputed document or to establish facts material to a dispute . . .\"). For this reason, the Court should reject any attempt to classify metadata as categorically suspect evidence and instead should apply the Federal Rules of Evidence to any metadata offered into evidence in the ordinary course at trial. *See, e.g.*, *Sexton v. Lecavalier*, 11 F. Supp. 3d 439, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (\"As the Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin recently observed, e-mails may contain metadata with a significant amount of evidentiary value\") (Torres, J.) (citing *Sekisui Am. Corp. v. Hart,* 945 F. Supp. 2d 494, 506 n.71 (S.D.N.Y.2013)); *United States v. Shea*, No. 20 Cr. 412 (AT), 2022 WL 1598189, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2022) (approving parties' agreement to present testimony \"on the metadata associated with certain documents\"); *see also, e.g.*, *Swearngin v. Rowell*, 846 S.E.2d 263, 266-67 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (arguments about metadata's potential for manipulation \"went to the weight to be given the evidence rather than its admissibility\").\n\nKwok's metadata motion *in limine* should accordingly be denied as premature.\n\n# **X. Kwok's Motion To Exclude Evidence Regarding Is Moot**\n\nThe Government does not intend to offer evidence regarding\n\n. Accordingly, Kwok's motion to preclude this evidence should be denied as moot. *See* Kwok MIL at 30-33.\n\n#### **XI. Professor Shams's Testimony Is Admissible**\n\nFor the reasons explained below, Kwok's motion to exclude the testimony of Professor Amin Shams should be denied. *See* Kwok MIL at 38-57.\n\nProfessor Amin Shams holds a Ph.D. from the University of Texas and is currently an Assistant Professor at The Ohio State University, Fisher College of Business. At Ohio State, Prof.\n\nShams teaches courses in Financial Technology (commonly known as \"FinTech\") including Blockchain and Machine Learning in Finance Research. Through his vast experience, Prof. Shams has acquired specialized knowledge regarding cryptocurrencies. Prof. Shams performed a series of analyses on the Himalaya Dollar (\"HDO\") and Himalaya Coin (\"HCN\"). Based on those analyses, Prof. Shams seeks to offer at trial opinions that \"will assist the jury\" in determining facts at issue—namely, whether HCN and HDO are actual cryptocurrencies. *United States v. Mostafa*, No. 04 Cr. 356 (KBF), 2014 WL 1744717, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2014) (quoting *United States v. Locascio*, 6 F.3d 924, 936 (2d Cir.1993)).\n\nA fundamental issue at this trial will be whether HCN (a purportedly variably priced cryptocurrency), HDO (a purported stablecoin), and the Himalaya Exchange are fraudulent. The Government is permitted to meet that issue with expert analysis and opinions that assist the jury in understanding evidence that requires specialized knowledge. Prof. Shams used his specialized knowledge in the field of cryptocurrencies to analyze, through rigorous objective analyses, HCN and HDO, and will offer the jury a series of opinions about whether HCN and HDO behaved like cryptocurrencies or have features common among true cryptocurrencies.\n\nKwok's quibbles with Prof. Shams mostly go to the weight of his testimony and not its admissibility. To the extent that Kwok disagrees with Prof. Shams, his counsel will be able to test Prof. Shams's conclusions, and analyses, through rigorous cross-examination. Ultimately, it will be for the jury to determine what, if any, weight to assign to Prof. Shams's opinions and analyses. As relevant here, Kwok offers no legal basis to exclude his testimony.\n\n#### **A. Professor Shams's Disclosure**\n\nProf. Shams's detailed disclosure, the sufficiency of which Kwok does not challenge, outlines the topics of his testimony, explains the analyses he performed and the methodology he\n\napplied, and details his opinions. At a high level, Prof. Shams analyzed HCN and HDO. Kwok MIL, Ex. D (\"Shams Disclosure\") at 1. Specifically, Prof. Shams tested whether HCN and HDO behave like cryptocurrencies, have features consistent with cryptocurrencies, and, with respect to HDO, are collateralized in a manner consistent with other stablecoins. Prof. Shams's disclosure separates his proposed testimony into six parts, as well as an overall conclusion, which are discussed in turn. Shams Disclosure at 2.\n\nFirst, Shams intends to provide the jury a brief background about cryptocurrencies generally. This information is based on Prof. Shams experience and research, and constitutes information that is outside the knowledge base of an average juror. For example, while some jurors may have heard about Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies in general, few will have an understanding about what a cryptocurrency is—how blockchain technology works, how cryptocurrencies are managed in a decentralized fashion, what \"smart contracts\" are, and what stablecoins are. Shams Disclosure at 4-9. This background information provides the jury information necessary to understand Prof. Shams's analyses, as well as to understand cryptocurrency generally.\n\nSecond, Prof. Shams performed a rigorous, and objective, analysis on HCN's market capitalization and trading volume, and compared HCN's behavior to the cryptocurrency market to determine if HCN acts like other cryptocurrencies. Shams Disclosure at 14-16; *id.* at 15 (describing \"Methodology\"). Next, Prof. Shams relied on public data related to other tokens23 the sort of data commonly used in this field—to compare HCN's pricing, volume, and market capitalization to those other similar tokens. Shams Disclosure at 21-22. Prof. Shams explained\n\n23 As relevant here, exchange tokens are a type of cryptocurrency issued by a cryptocurrency exchange.\n\nhe chose certain tokens as benchmarks to compare against HCN because those tokens where the \"top centralized exchange tokens\"—that is, they were tokens similarly situated to what HCN purports to be. Shams Disclosure at 15. Prof. Shams then analyzed HCN's market capitalization over time, and concluded its average market capitalization was \\$32 billion, with an average daily trading volume of \\$4.1 million. Shams Disclosure at 23. Prof. Shams then compared those averages to other benchmarks. Based on that benchmark comparison, Prof. Shams opined that HCN's price, daily trading volume and market capitalization were highly dissimilar to the benchmarks. Shams Disclosure at 24 (\"The trading volume of HCN does not appear to align with the size of its market cap.\"). Prof. Shams further offers that HCN's large market capitalization (\\$32 billion) is \"unproportional\" to its trading volume. *Id.*\n\nThird, Prof. Shams examined HCN's price movements compared to the broader cryptocurrency market. Shams Disclosure at 25. Prof. Shams explained that research in the field has concluded that cryptocurrency prices are correlated with the price of Bitcoin. Shams Disclosure at 26 (\"Academic literature on cryptocurrencies show that the returns of cryptocurrencies are positively correlated . . . . Cryptocurrency prices typically moves in the same direction as Bitcoin\" (citing published studies)). Prof. Shams then tested that hypothesis on HCN. As he explains in his \"Methodology\" section, Prof. Shams analyzed the \"correlation coefficient and coefficient of determination (adjusted R2, or R²) between HCN and various market indices[, which] are [then] compared with 100 similarly-sized tokens.\" 24 Shams Disclosure at 27- 28.\n\n24 Prof. Shams explained why those tokens were selected as a benchmark for his analysis: \"The 100 similarly-sized tokens are selected based on having the closest market cap to HCN on November 2, 2021, not being a stablecoin, and having a non-zero market cap at the beginning and end of the sample period (November 2, 2021 – March 14, 2023).\" Shams Disclosure at 27.\n\n $R^2$ analysis is a common statistical test that examines the proportion of the variation of one variable compared to a baseline. *See* Shams Disclosure at 27-29. After performing these objective tests, *see* Shams Disclosure 29-35, Prof. Shams concluded that unlike the pricing of the overall cryptocurrency market, \"HCN's price movements are relatively independent of the broader market trends.\" Shams Disclosure at 29. Indeed, Prof. Shams concluded that HCN's price has a very low correlation to Bitcoin's price as well as Ethereum's price (which is another highly popular cryptocurrency). Shams Disclosure at 29-34. Thus, Prof. Shams opines that HCN's price behavior does not behave like real cryptocurrencies. *See* Shams Disclosure at 32 (\"virtually none of HCN's price movement is explained by BTC price movements\"); *id.* at 34 (\"contrast to the returns of cryptocurrencies being largely explained by ETH returns, virtually none of HCN's price movement is explained by ETH price movements\"). \"This suggests that HCN's price was disconnected from the price of cryptocurrencies,\" which is contrary to how cryptocurrencies behave based on academic research Prof. Shams cited. Shams Disclosure at 36.25\n\nFourth, Prof. Shams analyzed HCN and HDO's concertation of ownership. By way of background, cryptocurrencies track their transaction history, and individual coin/token ownership, on a public blockchain. In this way, true cryptocurrencies are \"decentralized\" and are not subject to the whims of a single governing body. Prof. Shams explains in his \"Methodology\" that he reviewed the \"'on-chain' transactions\" of HCN and HDO based on public blockchain records. Shams Disclosure at 38. Prof. Shams then compared the HCN/HDO on-chain transactions to\n\n25 Prof. Shams also provided an example of the highly abnormal price behavior of HCN. Prof. Shams examined the May 9, 2022 TerraUSD stable coin crash, which generally sent cryptocurrencies prices down market wide. However, HCN's price during that time \"was virtually unchanged,\" which Prof. Shams opined is further evidence that \"HCN's price behavior differed from cryptocurrencies and appeared disconnected from market forces.\" Shams Disclosure at 35.\n\nBitcoin, Ethereum, and \"other benchmark cryptocurrencies selected because they are tokens associated with cryptocurrency exchanges.\"26 *Id*.\n\nAfter reviewing the public blockchains of HCN and HDO, Prof. Shams opined that from November 2, 2021 through March 14, 2023, 27 HCN and HDO had 206 and 251 on-chain transactions, respectively. Shams Disclosure at 39-40. The top 5 (for HCN) and top 8 (for HDO) transactions account for more than 99.9999% of all tokens transferred. *Id*. Further, Prof. Shams opined that the top owner of HCN owns 99.9994% of all HCN, and there are only 12 total holders of the token. Shams Disclosure at 46. There are only 16 holders of HDO and 99.999997% of the supply is held by one owner. Shams Disclosure at 47. A comparison to the benchmark cryptocurrencies shows that these metrics are highly irregular. *See* Shams Disclosure at 54. Prof. Shams analyzed the results of this analysis and opined that these metrics are not typical of cryptocurrencies. *See* Shams Disclosure at 55.\n\nFifth, Prof. Shams analyzed the software code in HCN and HDO's underlying \"smart contracts.\" That is, Prof. Shams used his specialized knowledge to review and analyze the software that governs how HCN and HDO operate on the internet. Shams Disclosure at 57-58 (\"HCN's implementation [smart] contract consists of 14 files, written in the solidity programming language.\"). Based on his review of the coding language, Prof. Shams opined that HCN's and HDO's smart contract is \"mutable, meaning someone could change the underlying code.\" Shams Disclosure at 61. This mutability is inconsistent with other cryptocurrency exchange-associated\n\n26 HCN and HDO, like the benchmarks, are associated with a cryptocurrency exchange—the Himalaya Exchange.\n\n27 This is the relevant time range for all analyses conducted by Prof. Shams and runs from the establishment of HCN/HDO and to the day before this criminal case was unsealed.\n\ntokens. *Id*. Prof. Shams opined that these mutability features provide additional information that demonstrates HCN and HDO are not like cryptocurrencies because cryptocurrencies are \"decentralized [to] ensure[ ] that no single entity can dominate or has control over the data or the network, making it resistant to censorship, collusion, and single points of failure.\" Shams Disclosure at 4; *see id.* at 61.\n\nSixth, Prof. Shams objectively analyzed HDO's purported reserves. By way of background, HDO purports to be a \"stablecoin\" which requires a reserve or some kind of asset backing. As Prof. Shams explained, \"[r]eserves are crucial for a stablecoin because they serve as collateral or backing, ensuring that [its] holders can redeem their stablecoins for the underlying asset at any time which maintains stability.”28 Shams Disclosure at 67.29 Prof. Shams reviewed an audit by Armanino, which the Himalaya Exchange had previously trumpeted, and which alleged that the Himalaya Exchange held \\$401 million in reserves for HDO. Prof. Shams opines that the \\$401 million reserves are insufficient. Shams Disclosure at 69. This is because at the time of the audit, there were \\$1.5 billion HDO that had been issued. *Id*. Further, Prof. Shams opines that based on his review he was unable to locate any evidence that HDO was backed by gold, which is\n\n28 Indeed, as the Indictment alleges, Kwok trumpeted that HDO was backed by gold. *See* Indictment ¶ 19(a)(i) (\"[I]t has the attribute of currency, why? It has 20% gold. Awesome[.] [I]t was born as currency on the first day, so it has value and it is linked to gold . . . clear gold directly. No matter how much it raises, 20% will turn into gold.\"); ¶ 19(a)(ii) (\"If the H Coin is worthless, [the issuer of H coin] can sell all 20% of the gold, exchange it to you, and become your money. Or take all the value of 20% gold and ask everyone to unify it and make it yours.\").\n\n29 Prof. Shams notes that in the cryptocurrency field, the co-mingling of reserves with operational assets has been an indicator of fraud, citing to the FTX case and the NYS Attorney General's investigation of USDT. The Government does not intend to elicit testimony about FTX or the USDT investigation from Prof. Shams. These examples were included in Prof. Shams's disclosure to provide a full accounting of information known to, and relied upon by, individuals in his field and by Prof. Shams in carrying out his analysis.\n\nsomething Kwok claimed on several occasions. *Id*.\n\n*Finally,* Prof. Shams synthesizes these separate analyses to offer opinions about whether HCN and HDO behave like typical cryptocurrencies. Prof. Shams concludes that they do not. Shams Disclosure at 73 (\"Summary of Conclusions\"). That is, Prof. Shams uses his specialized knowledge in the FinTech field to conduct several reliable and testable analyses on HCN and HDO. Based on those analyses, Prof. Shams offers several opinions, including that HCN and HDO do not behave like, or have features consistent with, cryptocurrencies. *Id*. These analyses and opinions will assist lay jurors as they assess whether HCN and HDO were cryptocurrencies or merely a component of the defendants' fraud.\n\n#### **B. Applicable Law**\n\nUnder Rule 702, where \"specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact,\" an expert witness may give opinion testimony if \"[1] the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; [2] the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and [3] the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.\" Fed. R. Evid. 702. The party proffering expert testimony bears the burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the expert testimony is admissible. *See United States v. Williams*, 506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2007); Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee notes (2000). The trial court must \"ensur[e] that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.\" *Daubert v. Merrell Dow*, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993); *see also Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.*, 303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002). \"Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.\" *Daubert*, 509 U.S. at 597. To determine whether the expert testimony is reliable, \"the district court should consider the indicia of reliability identified in Rule 702.\" *Amorgianos*, 303 F.3d at 265. Specifically, the district court \"must focus on the principles and methodology\n\nemployed by the expert, without regard to the conclusions the expert has reached.” *Id.* at 266.\n\nTo assess whether expert testimony is relevant, the district court must consider whether the evidence has \"any tendency to make the evidence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\" *Id.* at 265.\n\n#### **C. Argument**\n\nIn seeking to preclude Prof. Shams' testimony, Kwok attacks its relevance, the methods Prof. Shams employed, and raises Rule 403 issues. All of Kwok's arguments should be rejected. Indeed, most are premised on a mistaken premise that Prof. Shams proposed testimony \"fails to provide expert opinions,\" and offers only \"factual statements or observations\" that are \"not relevant.\" Kwok MIL at 43. For the reasons that follow, Kwok is mistaken.\n\n#### 1. Professor Shams's Testimony Is Admissible Expert Opinion\n\nKwok's first attack against Prof. Shams is that his testimony is not an expert opinion at all. Kwok MIL at 43. In making this argument Kwok picks at certain components of Prof. Shams analyses to manufacture a concept that Prof. Shams \"provides merely a series of fact statements.\" *Id*. At best, Kwok has missed the proverbial forest for the trees. As recounted above, and as detailed in the Shams Disclosure, Prof. Shams used his specialized knowledge to conduct, based on facts and data, reliable analyses about which Prof. Shams offered opinions.\n\n## a. Prof. Shams's Opinions Regarding HCN's Market Capitalization and Price Movements Are Admissible\n\nTo start, Kwok asserts that Prof. Shamss' analysis of HCN's market capitalization as a ratio to its trading volume is not an opinion. Kwok MIL at 43. Kwok ignores that analyzing market capitalization for cryptocurrencies, as an average over time, and as compared to its trading volume, requires specialized knowledge that average jurors do not possess, but assists their consideration\n\nof the evidence. *See Jacobs v. Verizon Commc'ns Inc.*, No. 16. Cv. 1082 (PGG) (RWL), 2023 WL 3027311, at \\*18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2023) (permitting expert testimony where \"the underlying facts concerning the [] Fund's performance will be before the factfinder, [the expert] summarizes what the different metrics show when applied to the facts . . . and would thus be helpful to the factfinder\"); *see also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 643 F. Supp. 2d 482, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (\"Expert witnesses provide laymen with crucial knowledge where the common experience of such jurors is insufficient to comprehend particular facts of a case.\"). The market capitalization analysis is itself admissible. But, more to the point, and contrary to Kwok's claim, Prof. Shams uses the results of the market capitalization analysis to offer an opinion: \"The trading volume of HCN does not appear to align with the size of its market cap.\" Shams Disclosure at 24 (listing opinions based on the market capitalization analysis). That is surely an opinion, and one that assists jurors in assessing whether HCN is a legitimate cryptocurrency.30\n\nThe remainder of Kwok's arguments about Prof. Shams's market capitalization opinions and his opinions regarding HCN's pricing do not make sense. He complains Prof. Shams \"does not indicate that he will testify or explain why a supposedly low 'Market Cap Ratio' matters.\" Kwok MIL at 44. And that Prof. Shams does not explain what is \"unusual\" about HCN's lack of correlation to an index of 100 similarly-sized tokens. Kwok MIL at 45. But Prof. Shams explains\n\n30 To the extent that Kwok is complaining that an expert cannot testify about the *facts* upon which they relied to render their opinions, such an argument is nonsensical, and contrary to the law. *See* Fed. R. Evid. 703 (permitting experts to base their opinions on any facts or data \"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field\"); *U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. PHL Variable Life Ins. Co.*, 112 F. Supp. 3d 122, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that an expert \"is permitted to rely on facts, opinions, and data not of the expert's own making—including analyses performed or findings made by another expert in the case—even if those facts, opinions, and data are otherwise inadmissible\").\n\nboth these things. His disclosure notes that there is a \"strong positive relationship found in academic research between cryptocurrencies and Bitcoin [and the] aggregate crypto market.\" Shams Disclosure at 36; *id.* at 26 (“Academic literature on cryptocurrencies show that the returns of cryptocurrencies are positively correlated\"). However, HCN's price movements, combined with other observations such as its trading volume, indicate that \"the price and market cap of HCN do not seem realistic according to market forces.\" Shams Disclosure at 74. That is, HCN's low market capitalization ratio, in Prof. Shams's opinion, indicates HCN does not behave like a typical, legitimate cryptocurrency. Similarly, Prof. Shams conducts a rigorous $R^2$ analysis to assess the correlation between HCN and 100 similarly-sized tokens. Based on that testing, Prof. Shams concludes that HCN has a low correlation to Bitcoin and cryptocurrency prices, generally. Shams Disclosure at 29-35. He further opines that HCN's lack of correlation to Bitcoin pricing is \"unusual\" and \"suggests that HCN's price was disconnected from the price of cryptocurrencies traded.\" Shams Disclosure at 36. That is, HCN's price behavior does not perform like typical cryptocurrencies do, which is relevant to the question whether HCN is a cryptocurrency.31\n\n31 Kwok also attacks the relevance of these analyses, in part, by arguing that Prof. Shams's testimony pertains to things that the Indictment did not allege, such as price manipulation. Kwok MIL at 55. The Government is not limited at trial to the allegations in the Indictment. *United States v. Rigas*, 490 F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 2007) (\"[P]roof at trial need not, indeed cannot, be a precise replica of the charges contained in an indictment\" (quotation omitted)); *United States v. LaSpina*, 299 F.3d 165, 182 (2d Cir. 2002) (\"the Government may offer proof of acts not included within the indictment, as long as they are within the scope of the conspiracy.\" (quotation omitted)). But, even if the Government were so limited, that HCN's price is not subject to market forces surely is relevant to the question of whether it is a real cryptocurrency, because pricing of real cryptocurrencies are highly correlated to cryptocurrency market movements. As this Court has written, \"the bar for relevance is 'low,' and [expert] testimony [that offers] 'specialized knowledge that will help the jury determine a fact at issue in the case'\" is admissible. *Ripple Labs*, 2023 WL 5670711, at \\*18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2023) (quoting *United States v. Jones*, No. 16 Cr. 553, 2018 WL 1115778, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2018)). Prof. Shams's reliable, objective, and testable analyses demonstrate that HCN's pricing is divorced from broader economic forces; those analyses\n\nThe market capitalization analysis and price analysis are not, as Kwok wishes, a \"recit[itation] [of] a factual narrative[.]\" Instead, they are rigorous, objective, analyses based on an accepted thesis (that cryptocurrencies prices are correlated to Bitcoin), and from which Prof. Shams offers opinions that are helpful to the triers of fact.32\n\n## b. Prof. Shams's Analyses and Opinions about the HCN and HDO Blockchains Are Admissible.\n\nKwok next attacks Prof. Shams's analysis of the HCN and HDO blockchains claiming that\n\nthey are just \"technical observations\" from a public record. Kwok MIL at 46-47. Here too, Kwok\n\nmisses that Prof. Shams's analysis of the HDO and HCN blockchain data was used by Prof. Shams\n\nto form an opinion that \"HCN and HDO demonstrate significantly lower on-chain activity\" than\n\nclear this low relevance bar. *See Amorgianos*, 303 F.3d at 266 (expert testimony relevant if it has \"evidence has \"any tendency to make the evidence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable\"); *see also Ripple Labs*, 2023 WL 5670711, at \\*17 (opinion may be relevant even if it is \"not [] dispositive of the core legal issue in this case\").\n\n32 Kwok also objects to the benchmarks Shams selected. \"Experts often use benchmarks as a comparison for evidence under examination.\" *In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig.*, 321 F.R.D. 64, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). That Prof. Shams did so here is not remarkable. Indeed, Prof. Shams explained in his disclosure how the benchmarks were selected. *See* Shams Disclosure at 15 (\"top centralized exchange tokens based on market cap on 3/14/2023, according to Cornmarket\"); *id. at* 27 (\"100 similarly-sized tokens are selected based on having the closest market cap to HCN on November 2, 2021, not being a stablecoin, and having a non-zero market cap at the beginning and end of the sample period (November 2, 2021 – March 14, 2023); *id*. at 38 (\"benchmark cryptocurrencies selected because they are tokens associated with cryptocurrency exchanges\"). It is wrong for Kwok to claim Prof. Shams selection of benchmarks was \"anecdotal.\" Kwok MIL at 43-44. Kwok is, of course, free to disagree with the benchmarks Prof. Shams chose, and can crossexamine Prof. Shams about those choices, but Kwok offers no reason to exclude Prof. Shams on this basis. *See Gem Fin. Serv., Inc. v. City of New York*, No. 13 Civ. 1686 (RPK) (RER), 2023 WL 4850523, at \\*12 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2023) (\"disputes about the comparability of the yardsticks [expert] used go to weight, not admissibility\"); *AngioDynamics, Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.*, No. 117 Civ. 00598 (BKS) (CFH), 2021 WL 2403107, at \\*7 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 2021) (\"the usual rule [is] that comparability questions are issues of weight, rather than admissibility\") (collecting cases).\n\napplicable benchmarks. Shams Disclosure at 55; *id*. (comparing HCN/HDO blockchain information to benchmarks). Thus, the blockchain analysis reveals an opinion, but even if that were not the case, jurors do not have the specialized knowledge necessary for them to review the HCN/HDO blockchain and understand what it means, thus a technical analysis of the blockchains is admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 702(a) (permitting expert to offer \"technical . . . knowledge\"); *cf. United States v. Mulder*, 273 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (a \"district court should not admit testimony that is 'directed solely to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert's help.'\").\n\n## c. Prof. Shams's Analyses about the HCN and HDO Smart Contracts Are Admissible.\n\nAn expert is permitted to analyze the features of HCN and HDO, and particularly their underlying software code, to make assessments about those features and convey opinions about the same to the jury. *See Ripple Labs*, 2023 WL 5670711, at \\*4 (permitting an expert to \"opine on the design features of [digital assets and their components] XRP, the XRP Ledger, and ODL\"). And, of course, a lay juror cannot be expected to read and understand the software code of HCN or HDO smart contracts, thus Prof. Shams's technical analysis of it is appropriately admissible. So too, is Prof. Shams's opinion that HCN and HDO differ from other similarly situated tokens in that their smart contracts are mutable. *See* Shams Disclosure at 61 (\"This is unlike typical exchange tokens, which are often immutable\"). Again, at most, Kwok disagrees with the benchmark Prof. Shams used to compare HCN and HDO. *United States v. Romano*, 859 F. Supp. 2d 445, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), *aff'd*, 794 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2015) (permitting expert to testify where opinion relies on \"well-established industry standards, publications and market trends\" even if opinion has a \"subjective component\"). Kwok's disagreement is appropriate for crossexamination. If there are similarly situated tokens that have mutable smart contracts, that can be\n\ntested through cross-examination, not preclusion. *See Washington v. Kellwood Co.*, 105 F. Supp. 3d 293, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (\"while the evidence underlying [expert's] Yardstick Analysis [a form of benchmarking and comparison] may, in defendant's view, be thin, questionable, or selfservingly selective, our role as gatekeeper is not to divest defendant of the task of challenging the weight of such evidence before the trier of fact.\").\n\nKwok next asserts that Prof. Shams relied \"simply [on] his word\" that typical cryptocurrencies ownership is diversified—whereas HCN and HDO are held by a single entity. Kwok MIL at 49. This argument ignores analysis that Prof. Shams performed. *See* Shams Disclosure 39-54. Prof. Shams assessed HCN/HDO ownership concentrations as compared to other similar tokens to show, objectively, that HCN and HDO ownership concentrations are atypical. (Shams Disclosure 39-54.) Moreover, Prof. Shams is able to opine that HCN and HDO's ownership concentration (which he analyzed to be greater than 99.999%) is a stark outlier compared to the broad cryptocurrency about which Prof. Shams has significantly studied. This kind of assessment is appropriate and admissible expert testimony. *See Fort Worth Emps. Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.*, 301 F.R.D. 116, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (When an expert “bases his testimony on practical experience rather than scientific analysis, courts recognize that experts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through the use of . . . general truths derived from specialized experience.\") (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Kwok is also wrong to fault Prof. Shams for opining that such highly concentrated ownership \"departs from the decentralized nature of blockchain.\" Kwok MIL at 50 (citing Shams Disclosure at 64). That HCN and HDO are more than 99.999% owned by a single entity is a unique factor unlike any of the benchmarks Prof. Shams analyzed, Prof. Shams is allowed under Rule 702 to offer an opinion about the import of the highly concentrated ownership. Thius is especially the case because that\n\nopinion helps to inform Prof. Shams's overall conclusions about whether HCN and HDO are like real cryptocurrencies. Shams Disclosure 73-74. Once again, if Kwok wishes to question or undermine Prof. Shams's opinion that a 99.999% ownership concertation is atypical of other cryptocurrencies, that is appropriately a subject for cross-examination. *United States v. Jones*, 965 F.3d 149, 160 (2d Cir. 2020) (affirming trial court which concluded that questions about \"underlying assumptions\" regarding a DNA tool were \"best heard by a jury, which may accordingly adjust the weight it gives such evidence\").\n\nKwok's arguments that Prof. Shams cannot analyze the features, or lack of features, offered by HCN and HDO is also wrong. Kwok MIL at 50. There is nothing improper about such testimony. *See In re Celsius Network LLC*, 655 B.R. 301, 310 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2023) (admitting expert testimony on value of cryptocurrency which \"had no intrinsic value\"). Further, the lack of features and innovative technology of HCN and HDO informed Prof. Shams' opinions about the abnormal price behavior of HCN. Prof. Shams will not offer testimony during trial that the mutability of the HCN/HDO smart contracts *will* lead to investor losses, *see* Kwok MIL at 51; rather, he is simply opining that this feature means HCN and HDO are ultimately controlled by a single entity—the Himalaya Exchange—and that should undermine its value rather than cause it to spike.33\n\n### 2. Professor Shams's Testimony Is Reliable\n\nKwok next contends that Prof. Shams overall approach is not reliable. Kwok is wrong. In\n\n33 At trial, the Government will not elicit testimony from Prof. Shams comparing HCN/HDO to other fraudulent cryptocurrencies, unless the defense opens the door to such testimony. Comparisons to Squid Game and CP3R are included in the disclosure to demonstrate that Prof. Shams' view of smart contract mutability is not speculative and is, instead, based on documented occurrences.\n\n*Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that a trial court must determine \"whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the [expert's] testimony is . . . valid and . . . whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” *Id.* at 592-93; *see also United States v. Kwong*, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995). Courts should view challenged expert testimony consistent with the \"with the liberal admissibility standards of the federal rules and recognizes that our adversary system provides the necessary tools for challenging reliable, albeit debatable, expert testimony.\" *Amorgianos*, 303 F.3d at 267. Even \"[a] minor flaw in an expert's reasoning or a slight modification of an otherwise reliable method will not render an expert's opinion per se inadmissible.\" *Id*. Indeed, a court \"should not exclude evidence simply because [a district court] thinks that there is a flaw in the expert's investigative process which renders the expert's conclusions incorrect. The judge should only exclude the evidence if the flaw is large enough that the expert lacks 'good grounds' for his or her conclusions.\" *In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.*, 35 F.3d 717, 746 (3d Cir. 1994).\n\nProfessor Shams' analyses are each reliable, objective, and testable.34 The reliability of Prof. Shams's methodology is supported by the analyses themselves—his benchmarks offer sufficient support to demonstrate that HCN/HDO are very different than cryptocurrencies, and that information is helpful to a lay juror. Prof. Shams compared HCN's market capitalization and trade volume to other similar tokens—HCN was an outlier. Next, Prof. Shams compared HCN's price movements to the broader cryptocurrency market—HCN was an outlier. Then, Professor Shams analyzed transaction volume and ownership concentration on the HCN and HDO blockchains and compared it to other exchange tokens—HCN and HDO were outliers. Prof. Shams also analyzed\n\n34 Kwok is free to run the analyses himself, as the Government provided the defendants all of the underlying data Prof. Shams used to form his opinions.\n\nthe software code governing HCN and HDO, and compared their features to similarly situated tokens—again, HCN and HDO were outliers. Thus, these analyses are several different comparisons between HCN and HDO, on the one hand, and other comparable digital assets, on the other. Each time, HCN and HDO were unusual and not like real cryptocurrencies.\n\n#### 3. Professor Shams's Testimony About HDO's Reserves Is Admissible\n\nKwok suggests that Prof. Shams should not be able to testify about HDO's reserves. Kwok complains that Prof. Shams's opinion on this issue is improperly based on hearsay because Prof. Shams analyzed HDO's whitepaper. But HDO's whitepaper is a statement of Kwok's agents and co-conspirators, and thus is not hearsay. *See* Gov't MIL at 2-11; *see also Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc.*, 315 F.R.D. 33, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"Expert testimony . . . admissible where it 'synthesizes' or 'summarizes' data in a manner that streamlines the presentation of that data to the jury, saving the jury time and avoiding unnecessary confusion.\" (alterations and quotation omitted)). Kwok also complains that Prof. Shams should not be able to offer an opinion about what the data does *not* show—specifically, that he observed no evidence of gold backing HDO. *See* Kwok MIL at 54. But Rule 702 does not preclude experts from offering opinions about theses the evidence does *not* support. *See In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig.*, 638 F. Supp. 3d 227, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (permitting expert to opinion about what the \"evidence does not show\" if within his expertise). Again, if Kwok seeks to call into question Prof. Shams's opinion—for example if he believes there is evidence that gold backs HDO—then he is free to test Prof. Shams's opinion on this subject through vigorous cross-examination.\n\nFinally, Kwok argues, as a Rule 403 matter, that Prof. Shams's comparison of the features of HCN and HDO to other tokens, which lack technological advancements or marketability, should be excluded as unduly prejudicial. Kwok MIL at 55-56. These comparisons are not unduly\n\nprejudicial. They appropriately contextualize HCN and HDO and offer a further explanation as to why HCN's pricing and market capitalization do not suggest that HCN and HDO behave like a typical cryptocurrency.\n\n#### XII. **The Government Is in Compliance with Its** *Brady* **Obligations**\n\nKwok seeks an order for the Government to disclose any \"orally communicated\" *Brady* material in its possession. The Government recognizes, and takes seriously, its obligations under *Brady*. To the extent that the Government has identified *Brady*, or otherwise disclosable material, the Government has disclosed it. This includes statements that were orally communicated—which the Government has disclosed to defense counsel via letters or by producing notes of those statements. As a result, Kwok's request for an order compelling production of *Brady* that was orally communicated should be denied as moot. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Sezanayev*, No. 17 Cr. 262 (LGS), 2018 WL 2324077, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2018) (\"The Government's good faith representations of its continuing compliance with its *Brady* disclosure obligations is sufficient.\").\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the reasons set forth above, the Court should deny the defendants' motions *in limine*\n\nand grant the Government's motions *in limine*.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York\n\nBy: /s/\n\nMicah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Justin Horton Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys (212) 637-2190 / 6612 / 2276 / 2314\n\nDated: April 17, 2024 New York, New York","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国联邦纽约南区地方法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n诉\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），又名“Miles Guo”、“Miles Kwok”、“Guo Wengui”、“七哥”、“校长”、“老板”，以及\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），又名“Yvette”、“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\n政府针对被告审前动议的反对意见\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯） 纽约南区联邦检察官\n\nMicah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Justin Horton Juliana N. Murray 联邦助理检察官 —— 辩护律师 ——\n\nS2 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n目录\n论证 1\nI.\n转入 Fund-1 的 GTV 投资者资金损失 3000 万美元的相关证据具有可采性 1\nA.\n背景 1\nB.\n讨论 3\nII.\n证明 GTV 私募构成未注册证券发行的证据具有可采性 6\nA.\n证明 GTV 股票发行未经注册的证据具有可采性 7\nB.\n被告已充分获悉未注册发行证据的关联性 9\nIII.\n证明威胁 Kwok 企业的人士受到诋毁和骚扰的证据具有可采性 13\nIV.\n与 PAX 案及 Kwok 破产相关的补充证据具有可采性 17\nA.\n3700 万美元转账的背景具有可采性 18\nB.\n某些破产证据具有可采性 19\n1.\nKwok 的破产声明 19\n2.\n阻挠破产的行径 22\n3.\n破产管理人对马瓦豪宅的实地勘验 23\n4.\n《联邦证据规则》第 403 条并不排除此项极具证明力的证据 24\nV.\n关于 Wang 薪酬的证据具有可采性 25\nVI.\n关于 Wang 与 Kwok 个人关系的证据具有可采性 26\nVII.\n准许准确提及“马瓦豪宅”以及 Kwok 企业的“空壳公司”和“傀儡高管” 29\nA.\n应当准许准确提及空壳公司及相关术语 30\nB.\n应当准许准确提及马瓦豪宅 33\nVIII.\n用以证明实质性的假设性问题是正当的 35\nIX.\nKwok 关于元数据证据的动议为时尚早 38\nX.\nKwok 排除相关证据的动议已无实际意义 39\nXI.\nShams 教授的证词具有可采性 39\nA.\nShams 教授的信息披露 40\nB.\n适用法律 46\nC.\n论证 47\n1.\nShams 教授的证词属于可采的专家意见 47\n2. Shams 教授的证词具有可靠性 53\n3. Shams 教授关于 HDO 储备金的证词具有可采性 55\nXII. 政府遵守了《布雷迪》案下的法定义务 56\n结论 57\n\n政府谨此就被告的各项审前动议提出综合反对意见。参见 Dkt. 267（“王审前动议”）、271（“郭审前动议”）。基于下述理由，法院应当驳回被告的审前动议，并支持政府的审前动议。参见 Dkt. 273（“政府审前动议”）。\n\n论证\n\nI. 转入 Fund-1 的 GTV 投资者资金损失 3000 万美元的相关证据具有可采性\n\n法院应当采纳证明转入 Fund-1 的 GTV 投资者资金损失 3000 万美元价值的证据。Wang 主张该证据“不具关联性”，或者根据第 403 条规则应因“不公平的偏见和混淆争议问题，例如 Fund-1 所采用的投资策略以及最终导致指控损失的市场或其他条件”而予以排除。王审前动议第 3 页。Wang 的观点是错误的。尽管受害者的损失并非所指控欺诈罪名的构成要件，但这 3000 万美元的损失与 Kwok 的虚假陈述密不可分，且对于完整呈现所指控犯罪的事实全貌至关重要。\n\nA. 背景\n\n庭审证据将证明，在募集到 4.52 亿美元 GTV 投资者资金后几乎立刻，各被告便挪用了其中 1 亿美元的资金（约占 22%），并对 Fund-1 进行了极高风险的投资，若该投资成功，Kwok 的儿子将从中受益。Wang 本人签署了投资文件，并通过以 GTV 母公司 Saraca 名义持有的账户，亲自将 1 亿美元 GTV 投资者资金转入 Fund-1。政府预计 Fund-1 的员工将说明，该投资本质上是一场赌博，押注与美元挂钩的港币汇率将脱钩并崩溃。如果发生这种情况，在 Fund-1 中的投资价值将大幅增加。此类投资通常用作在亚洲经济下行中承担重大风险敞口的投资者所使用的对冲手段。出于策略原因，Fund-1 需要时间来完成其所有的期权交易；因此，在 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）介入之前，Saraca 的 1 亿美元投资中只有 3000 万美元被 Fund-1 实际投入期权交易。该 3000 万美元的投资几乎全部损失。在 SEC 于 2021 年 9 月 13 日与 GTV 各实体达成和解之后，剩余的 7000 万美元由 Fund-1 转入 SEC 的公平基金，以便分发给 GTV 投资者。由于这 3000 万美元的损失，这些 GTV 投资者在很大程度上将无法获得全额赔偿。\n\n此外，与本案证据密不可分的是，Kwok 本人就 GTV 投资者资金对 Fund-1 的投资及遭受的损失发表了虚假陈述。例如，在 2020 年 11 月 11 日，Kwok 在一段网络视频中发表了以下言论（自中文翻译而来）：\n\n一开始战友们想跟着[Fund-1 首席投资官]，做那个 200 倍杠杆。很多战友说，这个，七哥，给我发很多信息，七哥我想投钱。我想投钱 200 倍杠杆做空港币。都给我写了授权书，我都给拒绝了。大家记得这事儿吧？\n\n美国媒体宣布拜登当选，港币，你知道做空港币赔了多少钱吗？兄弟姐妹们？[Fund-1 首席投资官]所有基金赔了 50%，赔了 50%。你们没赔，战友们，SARACA，你们没投，SARACA 投了，SARACA 投了 1 亿，1 亿美元，现在赔了 5000 万，赔了 5000 万。前天收到基金的通知，告诉大家你们账上的钱在市场上已经赔了一半了，就是 5000 万。兄弟姐妹们，你说当时文贵要是没良心，我让战友们投，那今天你的一半钱就没了。我请问大家，GTV 投资有任何理由会减半吗？永远不可能，[随便，你们拿走一切]。永远不可能。这就是文贵对战友的感情。你在 GTV 投资永远不可能减半，因为你投的每一分钱都必须经过美国合法会计师的审计。我今天不可能拿你们投资的钱去买一顿日本料理，那我就会直接被抓。美国是真的会抓人的。然后你想……战友们投资的钱都会在战友们的公司里，GTV 永远不可能，但如果你今天听到因为拜登假当选你就要损失 50% 的钱，你该有多痛苦？文贵还能坐在这里跟你们一起吃日本料理吗？不可能。兄弟姐妹们，这就是文贵，用事实说话。\n\n也就是说，Kwok（郭文贵）就该亏损对其追随者说了谎，向投资者虚假声称（除其他事项外）“你们没有损失”任何资金。实际上，这3000万美元的亏损由GTV的投资者承担，因为正是他们的资金被用于进行这项失败的投资。更普遍的是，郭文贵反复向GTV投资者声称，他们绝不会赔钱，只会赚钱，且他将个人担保他们的亏损——所有这些全属虚假陈述。\n\nB. 论述\n\n上述事实在审理中具有可采性。首先，政府方指控并打算排除合理怀疑地证明，对Fund-1（一号基金）的投资与GTV的招募说明书不符，并与郭文贵向GTV投资者发表的声明不符。政府方预计被告人会辩称，该投资属于对GTV资金的合理支出，符合招募条款。这使得一号基金投资的具体细节，例如包括“一号基金所采用的投资策略”，Wang MIL（王动议）第3页，与被指控的罪名直接相关。政府方预计一号基金的负责人将就该主题作证，包括任何针对一号基金的投资所具有的严重风险。该证人同时也是GTV的董事会成员，他将证明被告人并未告知他Saraca（萨拉卡公司）的投资使用的是GTV投资者的资金，且如果该事实被披露，部分由于一号基金的高风险性质，一号基金绝不会接受该笔资金。该风险“得以显现，往往表明［被告人］意图将［募集的资金］置于高风险投资中以谋取［自身］私利”。United States v. Seabrook，814 F. App'x 661, 662 (2d Cir. 2020)（简要裁定）（维持采纳证据，该证据表明一项通过收取回扣获得的投资由于随后的破产而几乎损失了全部价值，理由包括“损失证据亦与重大性要件相关，因为其证明了投资的风险性。”）。\n\n此外，郭文贵自身关于亏损录制的视频虚假陈述显然具有可采性。郭文贵向投资者就亏损做出虚假和误导性陈述，以诱骗他们继续向GTV投资——这些虚假陈述的证据正是审理中指控罪名证明的核心所在。由于引入此项证据触及了本案审理的核心——被告人对投资者的欺诈——它不会带来任何不公正偏见或混淆争议焦点的风险。此外，这3000万美元的亏损具有关联性，因为它发生于被控计划仍在进行且被告人仍积极诈骗受害者期间。也就是说，本案并非投资者因谎言受骗进行单笔独立投资，且随后该投资遭受损失的情况。本案中，受害者被跨越数年的连环欺骗所误导，被告人诱骗受害者在长时期内反复投资于相继推出的投资“项目”。被告人甚至诱骗受害者将其从SEC（美国证券交易委员会）公平基金中获得的分配款进行“再投资”。尽管郭文贵至少在SEC于2021年9月达成和解之时就已知晓投资者已损失至少3000万美元，但他仍继续欺骗受害者，告知其不会遭受任何损失且实际上不承担任何风险，采纳证实此点的证据显然是正当的。1\n\n最后，有关向一号基金投资发生之后续情况的证据，对于拼合被控罪行的完整经过是必要的。判例法明确确立，“如果证据对于拼合审判中所控罪行的完整经过是必要的”，该证据即具有可采性。United States v. Carboni，204 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 2000)（引文引号省略）。在本案中，若无3000万美元亏损的证据，陪审团将难以理解GTV投资者向一号基金投资的1亿美元究竟发生了什么。政府方应当有权提交证据以“满足陪审员关于何为适当证明的合理预期”。Old Chief v. United States，519 U.S. 172, 188 (1997)；亦见 United States v. Gotti，No. 02 Cr. 743 (RCC), 2004 WL 2389755, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2004)（裁定建筑行业勒索共谋所造成的损失金额具有可采性，因为“陪审团很可能会纳闷为何政府方没有确立具体的美元金额，甚至可能推断政府方无法做到这一点”）。\n\nWang（王）在寻求排除该证据时所引用的判例并不适用。参见王动议第3页。在 SEC v. Jensen 案中，一份900万美元利润的证据被排除，因为各方对该利润“并未反映被告人涉嫌的虚假陈述之影响”没有争议。No. 11 Civ. 5316 (MLR), 2013 WL 12129377, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013)。与此相反，在本案中，3000万美元的亏损与被告人的虚假陈述密不可分；为了维持该计划，郭文贵就一号基金的投资亏损说了谎。United States v. Butler 案涉及将受害者资金投资于学生贷款相关资产的虚假承诺。No. 08 Cr. 370 (JBW) (RER), 2010 WL 1692882, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2010)。被告人并未投资于这些资产，而是投资于“非学生贷款资产，例如抵押贷款和企业债务”，这与承诺的投资“存在实质性差异”。同上，at *1, *4。主审法官“以不具关联性为由预先排除”了用于证明学生贷款相关投资——即受害者资金承诺及预期的用途——在“［受害者］发现［被告人的］欺诈行为五个月后”存在流动性问题的证据。同上，at *3（强调为原文所加）。在随后的一份意见书中维持该决定时，法院认为此类证据“并不会使有关Butler（巴特勒）欺诈和共谋的指控更有可能或更不可能成立”。同上，at *4。当然，在本案中，一号基金的价值损失与被控欺诈直接相关，因为郭文贵就该具体损失以及更广泛地就其先前存在和正在进行的投资风险向投资者做出了虚假陈述。\n\n1 参见 http（“截至2020年7月下旬，对冲基金A已将萨拉卡公司转账的1亿美元中的3000万美元进行了投资，迄今为止，对冲基金A中的这笔3000万美元投资已缩水约2920万美元。”）。\n\n因此，法院应采纳与GTV投资者资金投入一号基金所遭受的亏损相关的证据。\n\nII. 证明GTV私募构成未注册证券发行的证据具有可采性\n\n证明被告人明知故犯地违反旨在保护非专业投资者的证券法规而进行GTV私募的证据具有可采性。此外，此类证据不仅限于GTV私募；如下所述，它同样适用于农场贷款项目（Farm Loan Program）、G|CLUBS 以及喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）。\n\n政府方打算提出此类证据，以证明推进被控欺诈和敲诈勒索共谋的行为，将其作为被控实质性欺诈罪名的组成部分，并用以拼合被控罪行的完整经过。证明被告人违反并规避美国证券法开展投资发行的证据，根据《联邦证据规则》第404(b)条，亦可用于证明故意、预备、计划、知情以及不存在误解。至于对陪审团是否会就是否指控被告人违反投资发行注册要求产生混淆的任何担忧，可通过一项直接的限制性指示得到妥善解决，该指示提醒陪审团被告人并未被指控犯有任何此类违法行为。\n\n因此，法院应驳回王排除此类证据的动议。参见王动议第6-8页。\n\nA. 证明GTV股票发行具有未注册性质的证据具有可采性\n\n被告人屡次企图规避美国证券法的披露要求以及Securities and Exchange Commission（证券交易委员会，“SEC”）的管辖权，以瞄准数以千计的非专业投资者。事实上，在许多方面，对被告人的指控归结起来就是骗取缺乏经验和非专业投资者的资金。为此，被告人必须避开SEC和美国证券法的监管。\n\n因此，在GTV私募方面，被告人表面上遵守了有关私募发行的证券法规——即与GTV签订的投资合同包含正确的措辞——但被告人还将法律上无资格参与该发行的投资者引向第三方Voice of Guo Media（郭媒体，“VOG”），后者将这些财力较弱的投资者的投资进行资金池归集，并代表他们投资于GTV。正如政府方的原审前提请裁决动议中所述，政府方预计一名证人（“证人-1”）将就其与王、郭文贵以及Je（余建明）就GTV私募的这一方面，特别是与归集非合资格投资者资金相关的法律风险所进行的谈话作证。参见政府方原审前提请裁决动议第31-32页。\n\n然而，被告人蓄意规避旨在保护投资者的美国证券法的行为并未就此止步。规避SEC和美国证券法的需求，是农场贷款项目和G|CLUBS背后的驱动目的，这两个项目在SEC出面叫停非法的GTV私募后几乎立即启动。提供这些表面上的“贷款”和“俱乐部会员资格”，实际上无非是被告人非法向往往缺乏经验和非专业的受害者私募发行GTV股票的延续，其经过包装粉饰以企图规避SEC和美国法律。2 同样，规避美国监管审查的需求，也是喜马拉雅交易所表面上不允许美国居民购买HDO或HCN的原因——尽管自始至终，美国的受害投资者只是被告知使用其他国家的中介机构向喜马拉雅交易所汇款。\n\n这种规避证券法并针对非专业投资者的行为是该投资欺诈的关键组成部分。事实上，如上所述，本案中向受害投资者做出的显著虚假陈述之一，涉及他们在GTV和被告人其他投资项目中投资的风险性。郭文贵反复向投资者声称他们绝不会赔钱，如果赔钱他将个人担保任何亏损。非合资格投资者——即根据美国证券法无资格参与诸如GTV私募等私募发行的投资者——正是最容易受到被告人所实施的此类投资骗局侵害的投资者类型。\n\n上述证据作为直接证据具有可采性。“为了证明［被告人］‘通过欺诈手段’出售证券，控方必须证明实施欺诈所用的‘手段’。”United States v. Ramer，No. 14 Cr. 10 (GFVT), 2015 WL 13839476, at *5 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2015)。起诉书未针对违反投资发行注册要求单独指控罪名项，并不影响证明所控罪行关键组成部分的该证据的可采性。正如本案中，当一项\n\n2 显示 GTV 私募（GTV Private Placement）属于非法未注册股票发行的证据，亦可作为证据采信，以提供随后开展的农场贷款项目（Farm Loan Program）和 G|CLUBS 发行的背景脉络。也就是说，为了证明农场贷款项目和 G|CLUBS 发行是“与证券相关”——正如政府就实质性证券欺诈罪名项所必须达到排除合理怀疑的证明标准——关于哪些类型的投资者可以参与私募发行的规则，以及 GTV 私募对这些规则的不合规情况，均具有直接相关性并提供了重要的背景脉络。\n\n起诉书包含共谋指控，“据称是为了推进指控的共谋而实施的行为”被视为“所指控行为本身的组成部分”。United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir. 1999)；另见 United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir. 1994)（阐明“未被指控的行为可作为共谋本身的直接证据予以采信”）。此外，由于被告规避 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）和美国证券法的企图对其犯罪方案至关重要，该证据与所指控的犯罪不可分割地交织在一起。因此，该证据亦可采信，以提供共谋的背景并补全所指控罪行的全貌。\n\n备选地，根据 Rule 404(b)（《联邦证据规则》第 404 条 (b) 款），该证据可用于证明被告的意图、明知、非出于意外以及不存在疏忽差错。被告为避免遵守披露要求并规避 SEC 管辖权而付出的精心且蓄意的努力，证明了被告是在具备犯罪明知和意图的情况下行事，而非出于过失或意外。\n\n简而言之，关于 GTV 私募未注册性质的证据——以及被告规避美国证券法要求和规避 SEC 的企图——是可采信的。事实上，此类证据与被告行为过程哪怕最基本的叙述都不可分割地交织在一起。妥善采信该证据，亦可用于证明被告的明知、欺诈意图以及缺乏过失或善意。因此，Wang（王雁平）的动议应予驳回。\n\nB. 被告充分知悉未注册发行证据的相关性\n\n王的动议试图禁止就 GTV 私募的未注册性质进行辩论，据称是为了避免对起诉书构成推定修改（constructive amendment）或造成具有偏见性的实质差异（prejudicial variance）。见 Wang MIL 第 6-8 页。这一担忧毫无根据。推定修改原则的目的在于确保“被告获知审判中将证明的犯罪行为核心的通知”。United States v. Banki, 685 F.3d 99, 118 (2d Cir. 2012)（经文字清理，强调为原文所加）。“犯罪行为核心”结合起诉书的指控被作广义界定。例如参见 United States v. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608, 621 (2d Cir. 2003)（“本起诉书所诉的犯罪核心是一项欺诈方案，运行于 1995 年 10 月至 1996 年 6 月之间，其最终目的是共谋者通过出售[证券]实现数百万美元的非法利润。”）。它“概括性地涉及犯罪的实质；被告如何实施犯罪的细节则不属于该范畴”。United States v. D'Amelio, 683 F.3d 412, 418 (2d Cir. 2012)。\n\n在本案中，被告被指控行为的核心是数项“通过一系列复杂的欺诈性和虚构性业务及投资机会，共谋诈骗数千名受害者超过约 10 亿美元……”的共谋，起诉书第 1 段，而 GTV 私募正是这些方案赖以运转的支点。王的动议仅提及“与 GTV 相关的实质性证券欺诈罪名项”，Wang MIL 第 7 页，但那仅是指控方案中的一部分。GTV 私募不仅是第六项罪名指控的“与 GTV 相关的实质性证券欺诈罪名项”以及第五项罪名指控的相关实质性电汇欺诈的核心，也是 GTV 私募之后随之而来的后续方案的核心——当时被告为了继续为 GTV 股票的未注册发行筹集资金，通过农场贷款项目和 G|CLUBS 欺诈性地发售该股票。见起诉书第 17(a) 段（指控在大额电汇“提及未注册股票发行”后 Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）银行账户遭关闭，随后推出了农场贷款项目）、第 18(f) 段（指控“KWOK（郭文贵）、JE（余建明）和 WANG 还利用 G|CLUBS 作为继续进行欺诈性私募股票发行的机制”）。确实，起诉书在详细指控郭氏企业时，首先将 GTV 私募定义为“非法的”——即不当未注册的——“私募股票发行”。起诉书第 16 段。随后，控诉文书指控未注册的 GTV 私募对第一项罪名的敲诈勒索共谋至关重要，同上第 16(a)-(i) 段；构成了推进第四项罪名证券欺诈共谋的明显公开行为（overt act），第 40(a) 段；是第五和第六项罪名所指控的实质性电汇及证券欺诈的核心，第 41-44 段；并引发了第七至第十项罪名中通过农场贷款项目和 G|CLUBS 进行的后续欺诈，第 45-52 段。\n\n因此，本案与王赖以提出动议的 United States v. Milstein, 401 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2005) 案完全不同。见 Wang MIL 第 8 页（主张允许就 GTV 私募的未注册性质进行辩论将构成推定修改，“正如在 Milstein 案中一样”）。在 Milstein 案中，地区法院允许政府提出一种完全替代性的责任理论，该理论基于“政府声称”在“米尔斯坦被起诉后”才“得知”的完全不同的事实。401 F.3d at 64。米尔斯坦的起诉书指控他通过重新包装药品来实施药品贴假标签行为；而在审判中有争议的证据和控诉主张则是米尔斯坦实际上通过销售受污染药品来实施药品贴假标签。同上第 65 页。虽然 Milstein 案的起诉书从未包含任何关于受污染药品的指控，同上第 65-66 页，但本案起诉书充斥着关于 GTV 私募未注册性质以及该设计在实施被告相关欺诈方案中所起作用的指控。3\n\n3 Milstein 案还明确表明，即使未注册发行的证据在实质性证券欺诈指控中不可采信（事实并非如此），该证据在敲诈勒索共谋、电汇欺诈共谋及证券欺诈共谋的指控中也是可以采信的，而该股票的未注册性质在其中发挥了关键作用。在 Milstein 案中，第二巡回法院撤销了一项实质性药品贴假标签罪名，因为起诉书指控的是通过重新包装贴假标签，而审判证据确立的是通过销售受污染药品贴假标签。401 F.3d at 65-66。但第二巡回法院驳回了对米尔斯坦共谋定罪的推定修改异议，认定米尔斯坦在审判前已“获知”污染证据的通知，且该证据构成了支持共谋定罪的“起诉书中未明确说明的明显公开行为”的可采证据。见 Milstein, 401 F.3d at 66。\n\n即使起诉书没有明确指控 GTV 私募的未注册性质与所指控的实质性犯罪和共谋犯罪之间的关系，关于该方案这一特征的证据和辩论亦可在不冒推定修改或产生偏见性实质差异风险的情况下予以采信。这是因为政府甚至可以证明“完全属于指控方案范围内的未指控明显公开行为”。Salmonese, 352 F.3d at 621。王警告不得提出“被告实施证券欺诈是因为该发行据称未注册”的辩论，Wang MIL 第 8 页（强调为原文所加），这是在虚张声势。“政府不会辩称，且法院也不会指示陪审团可以仅凭” GTV 私募的未注册性质“裁定被告犯有证券欺诈罪”，Watts, 2020 WL 6136211, at *8。相反，其蓄意的未注册设计是被告具有犯罪明知和欺诈意图的证据；是被告实施证券欺诈及相关共谋的手段；也是完整事实全貌的关键组成部分，解释了（除其他事项外）为何陪审团将听到关于共谋者归集受害者投资者资金的企图这一无可争议的可采证据，见起诉书第 16(g) 段，以及当银行“开始冻结并关闭与 GTV 相关的银行账户，原因包括但不限于这些账户收到了数十笔大额汇入电汇，其中一些提及未注册股票发行”时，农场贷款项目是如何产生的，同上第 17(a) 段。此外，排除关于 GTV 私募未注册性质的辩论“将有混淆审判焦点的风险”，Wang MIL 第 8 页，而此类证据和辩论将正当地使政府能够“证明实施欺诈的‘手段’”。Ramer, 2015 WL 13839476, at *5（在证券欺诈起诉中驳回针对“出售未注册证券”证据提出的 Rule 403 异议）。\n\n简而言之，不存在推定修改或造成偏见性实质差异的风险。被告已获得充分通知，知悉本案将包含他们违反投资注册要求的证据。任何关于陪审团可能在被告是否被指控违反证券法注册要求方面产生混淆的担忧，均可通过简单的限制性说明轻易化解。因此，法院应采信该证据并驳回王的动议。\n\nIII. 威胁郭氏企业者遭到贬损与骚扰的证据具有可采性\n\n有关郭贬损并指使其追随者骚扰威胁其犯罪企业之人——包括提出投诉的受害者投资者、批评郭的中国异见人士、未获偿付的债权人以及破产受托人（Trustee）——的证据具有可采性。比较 Kwok MIL 第 17-22 页。\n\n政府拟提出证据，证明郭将那些对其犯罪企业的存续构成威胁的人贴上“叛徒”和中共“间谍”或“特务”的标签，并指使其追随者骚扰这些人。这些策略是郭氏企业的手段和方法——事实上，正是这些策略让郭得以继续操纵和欺骗其追随者——并且在审判中可作为证明郭氏企业的存在和范围、作为所指控欺诈的组成部分以及补全所指控罪行全貌的证据予以采信。关于骚扰包括提出投诉的投资者在内的上述各类人员的证据包括以下内容：\n\n- Kwok（郭文贵）贬损申诉的投资者为“叛徒”和中共“间谍”。这种贬损既败坏了申诉受害者的信誉，又对其他可能曾考虑过申诉或质疑郭文贵的人产生了寒蝉效应，从而使该骗局得以继续进行。政府预计将传唤受害者在审判中作证，说明郭文贵的骚扰行动对他们造成的影响——包括他们因郭文贵的言论而一度相信申诉的投资者和其他批评者是中共间谍，随后意识到郭文贵是在进行诈骗，此后他们因害怕在试图收回投资或以其他方式公开发声时自己也会成为目标而产生恐惧。\n\n- 郭文贵对一位知名的一度追随者（“Follower-1（追随者-1）”）4采用了类似的手段，郭文贵经常称其为“九指妖”，并试图将她作为SEC（美国证券交易委员会）干预GTV私募一事的替罪羊。郭文贵关于追随者-1的言论与本次审判中的争议焦点尤为实质相关，因为郭文贵曾反复声称追随者-1因其在Voice of Guo Media（“VOG”，郭媒体）方面的行为而构成了犯罪。郭文贵指示投资金额不足$100,000的投资者去找追随者-1，以便他们能够通过VOG投资GTV。随后追随者-1协助了这些投资者将资金转账至VOG。审判中的证据将表明，郭文贵本人当时在指挥追随者-1的行为，而他后来却声称该行为构成犯罪。\n\n- 同样，当中国异见人士批评郭文贵，从而可能使郭文贵自己作为异见人士的真实性受到质疑时，郭文贵对他们发起了同类的攻击——包括给他们贴上中共间谍的标签，以及出资雇佣抗议者在他们的住所外抗议。这类攻击使郭文贵得以维持其作为异见人士的信誉，并巩固其作为Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）头目的地位。\n\n- 当郭文贵的资产以及郭氏企业的资产受到投资机构Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（“PAX”，太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限合伙）的债权人索赔威胁时——以及后来受到破产Trustee（受托人）调查的威胁时——郭文贵指使其追随者骚扰与PAX有关联的人员，包括PAX的律师。同样，与郭文权的其他目标一样，在郭文贵声称受托人及其关联人员是中共特工后，受托人及其家庭成员（包括受托人的子女）遭到了郭文贵追随者的骚扰和威胁。\n\n首先，郭文贵关于采纳此类证据将违反第一修正案（First Amendment）的主张是毫无根据的。见Kwok MIL第17-19页。即使假定郭文贵对申诉投资者以及对其犯罪企业构成威胁的其他人的攻击构成了受保护言论，5此类攻击的证据在本次刑事审判中仍然具有可采性。“第一修正案……并不禁止将言论用作证据来确立犯罪要件或证明动机或意图。”Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993)。第二巡回法院（Second Circuit）屡次支持采纳“言论”证据以进一步确立犯罪行为的构成要件，包括RICO（《反勒索及受贿组织法》）企业的存在以及被告在该企业中的参与。见United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 112 (2d Cir. 1998)（驳回关于证据采纳的第一修正案抗辩，并指出“鉴于无可争辩的是第一修正案并不禁止将言论用作证据以确立犯罪要件或证明动机或意图，该主张令人难以理解”）（已清理文本）；United States v. Pierce, 785 F.3d 832, 841 (2d Cir. 2015)（驳回关于采纳说唱歌词的第一修正案抗辩，理由是“该质疑毫无依据……因为此处的言论本身并非被禁止的行为。该言论不是起诉的依据，而是用来确立所指控的RICO企业的存在以及［被告］在该企业中的参与”）；United States v. Herron, 762 F. App'x 25, 29–30 (2d Cir. 2019)（遵循Pierce案）。事实上，政府不知道有任何判例——且郭文贵也未援引任何判例——裁定证据在刑事审判中不可采是因为该证据构成了受第一修正案保护的言论。6\n\n4 见Dkt. 255第9页（讨论郭文贵指使骚扰追随者-1）。\n\n5 如上所述，尽管法院无需判定郭文贵的骚扰行动是否构成受保护言论的问题，但它们并不构成。“第一修正案并不庇护欺诈”和“其他形式的公众欺骗”。Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 611-12 (2003)。更广泛地说，第一修正案不保护“非法行为不可分割的组成部分言论”。United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 783 (2023)。在本案中，郭文贵对威胁郭氏企业存续之人实施的报复，是郭文贵诈骗勒索共谋“不可分割”的一部分。出处同上。郭文贵的骚扰行动及相关行为还旨在阻碍多起法院诉讼程序，而妨碍司法并不享有第一修正案权利。见United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990)（“第一修正案不保障对政府证人发出恐吓性威胁的权利”）；United States v. Dahda, No. 12 Cr. 20083 (DDC), 2023 WL 8113265, at *11 (D. Kan. Nov. 22, 2023)（“第一修正案的任何组成部分均不庇护被告免因妨碍司法的行为而受到起诉或加重刑罚。”（援引相关判例））。\n\n6 亦见United States v. Walters, 350 F. App'x 826, 829 (4th Cir. 2009)（“当一个人的关联关系提供了与犯罪活动的联系时，第一修正案并不禁止采纳关于该关联关系的证据”）；Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2001)（驳回被告关于证据采纳的第一修正案抗辩）；United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1527 (11th Cir. 1996)（“政府并未起诉雅威教（Yahweh religion），而仅将其列为敲诈勒索企业。第一修正案对信仰和结社的保护，并不排除在与审判争议点相关时采纳此类证据”）；United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 844 (9th Cir. 1982)（“第一修正案并不强求仅因证据由言论构成便予以排除。如果被告的言语或其沉默与证明案件中的某项争议点相关，则在符合证据规则的前提下具有可采性……”）；比较Dembele v. Decker, No. 18 Civ. 5070 (JPO), 2018 WL 4960234, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2018)（裁定移民法官考虑脸书（Facebook）帖子并不违反第一修正案）。\n\n7 G News、GTV和GETTR反过来由郭氏企业内部的其他实体所有或控制：Saraca、Hamilton和Freedom Media Ventures。\n\n8 抗议者经常身穿G|Fashion的服装，这表明了与郭氏企业中另一个实体的联系。\n\n郭文贵还断言此类证据不可采，因为其对被指控罪名的构成要件（包括郭氏企业成员实体之间的关系）不具有证明价值。见Kwok MIL第20-21页。该论点因两个原因而不能成立。首先，郭文贵的前提就是错误的。这些策略是郭氏企业的手段和方法，并不是因为它们展示了郭氏企业内部各实体之间的关系，而是因为采用这些策略是为了促进并维系郭氏企业及其投资欺诈行为。因此，这些策略对所指控的犯罪具有高度证明价值；事实上，如上所述，受害者证人将对其效果出庭作证。此外，无论如何，该证据确实显示了郭氏企业各成员之间的关系。郭文贵通过在其自己的媒体网站（如G News、GTV和GETTR）上发帖来煽动和推行其骚扰行动，7通过农场（Farms）组织抗议活动，并使用法治（Rule of Law）实体向抗议者支付报酬。8起诉书中无一例外指控这些实体属于郭氏企业内部。见起诉书第3(a)段。\n\n该证据的证明价值并未被不公偏见的风险实质性压倒。引入关于被告用以实施并维系其欺诈的关键手段的证据，不存在任何不公之处。被告用来延续该骗局的策略涉及“恐吓”和“人身攻击”（Kwok MIL第21页），这绝不能成为排除郭氏企业关键手段和方法的理由。并且，在可能存在关于被告是否被控犯有人身攻击罪或其他未指控罪名而产生潜在混淆的风险的限度内，法院可以发出限制性指示以消除任何产生混淆的可能性。见United States v. Tussa, 816 F.2d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 1987)（限制性指示足以排除偏见）；广义参见United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2006)（“法律承认陪审团遵循限制性指示的强有力推定”）。限制性指示将解决辩方提出的关切，同时允许陪审团听取关于郭氏企业运作的关键证据，受害者本人在解释其投资相关决定时亦将就此作证。\n\nIV. 与PAX案件及郭文贵破产相关的额外证据具有可采性\n\n法院应采纳关于PAX案件和郭文贵破产程序的某些额外证据。比较Kwok MIL第23-30页。正如政府在预先排除证据动议中所陈述的那样（见Gov't MIL第27-31页），PAX案件为本次审判中重要且显见可采的证据提供了背景和来龙去脉。首先，PAX诉讼导致郭文贵于2022年2月申请破产。见起诉书第20段（讨论破产）。其次，在郭文贵声称破产之后，PAX诉讼促成了郭文贵女儿控制的实体与被告Kin Ming Je（余建明）控制的Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）实体之一之间价值$37 million的“贷款”。见起诉书第19(g)段。以下将依次讨论这些主题的相关性。\n\nA. $37 Million转账的背景具有可采性\n\n首先谈到$37 million的贷款，与PAX诉讼相关的证据具有可采性，因为它为被指控的罪名（喜马拉雅交易所电信诈骗罪名项及相关共谋）提供了必要的背景，并证明了被告对喜马拉雅交易所资金的控制和滥用。这笔向郭文贵女儿提供喜马拉雅交易所资金的“贷款”是为郭文贵的利益而进行的——这一事实只有通过提供围绕PAX诉讼的背景才能予以证明——因此显示了郭文贵对喜马拉雅交易所所持资金的最终控制权。在辩称这一证明起诉书中所控具体指控和罪名项的证据以某种方式不可采时，郭文贵是在立稻草人进行攻击，声称$37 million的贷款是不可采的“动机”证据。见Kwok MIL第28页。但是，喜马拉雅交易所为郭文贵利益进行的$37 million转账并非用于证明“动机”。它证明了郭文贵能够——并且事实上确实——为了自己的利益而使用喜马拉雅交易所的资金。因此，它是证明（除其他事项外）郭文贵在对喜马拉雅交易所进行虚假陈述时具有欺诈意图的直接且高度证明性的证据。并且，它还证明了郭文贵通过中间人和代理人行事，包括作为郭氏企业成员的实体和个人。值得注意的是，尽管郭文贵在关于所谓“动机”证据的预先排除证据动议中进行了误导，但郭文贵在先前的提交文件中已经承认，“来自该交易所向郭先生的一位亲属所控制实体的$37 million贷款……是起诉书中与该交易所相关的罪名项的依据”。Dkt. 219（郭文贵关于中止破产程序的重新提起的动议）\n\n第 2 页（强调为原文所加）。因此，毫无疑问，与该笔转账相关的证据在本次审判中可作为直接证据采纳；用 Kwok（郭文贵）自己的话来说，且根据对指控的任何合理解读，这都是起诉书中指控的罪名项之一的“依据”。同上。最后，只要存在因郭文贵从这笔 3700 万美元转账中获益与 PAX 诉讼中针对郭文贵的罚款及藐视法庭命令有关而产生不公平偏见的任何风险，法院均可通过发布限制性指示来消除任何此类偏见。参见 Snype 案，441 F.3d at 129；Tussa 案，816 F.2d at 68。\n\nB. 某些破产证据具有可采性\n\n与破产相关的证据同样可作为被指控罪行的直接证据采纳。虽然郭文贵现在坚称其破产与本案“无关”，参见郭文贵预先排除证据动议第 3 页和第 10 页，但他此前曾向法院表示“本案标的事项与破产案件之间不存在丝毫差距”。Dkt. 219（郭文贵关于中止破产程序的更新动议）第 4 页。正如郭文贵在其早先提交的文件中正确指出的那样，\n\n起诉书……指控郭先生申请破产保护本身就是推进政府所指控方案的行为。此外，政府所依据的被指控“企业”是由众多公司实体组成的集合体，其中包括受托人迄今为止已对其提起对抗性诉讼的十二个实体，以及受托人主张为郭先生之“另我”（alter egos）的众多其他实体。\n\n同上。简而言之，毫无疑问，根据 Rule 401（《联邦证据规则》第 401 条），破产程序与本案“具有关联性”。唯一的问题是，根据 Rule 403（《联邦证据规则》第 403 条），必须对与破产相关的证据施加何种限制（如果有的话）。重要的是，政府并不打算提供有关破产诉讼的穷尽性证据，也不打算逐项审查冗长的破产案卷记录。相反，政府打算从破产程序中提供特别具有证明力的证据，如下所述。\n\n1. 郭文贵的破产申报\n\n首先，郭文贵于 2022 年 2 月宣告破产的基本事实，以及郭文贵声称破产的宣誓声明，显然可作为直接证据采纳，因为它们表明郭文贵在自身财富以及为投资者损失提供个人担保的能力方面故意向投资者撒谎。郭文贵将自己描绘成有能力为其受害者的投资提供个人担保的亿万富翁，从敲诈勒索阴谋的一开始直至郭文贵于 2023 年 3 月被捕，一直是欺诈投资者方案的关键部分。在 2020 年 4 月的 GTV 发售备忘录中，郭文贵首先且最核心地被描述为“一位亿万富翁”。9 然而不到两年后，在 PAX 诉讼中被处以不到 3 亿美元的罚款后，这位据称可以为超过 10 亿美元投资者资金提供个人担保的“亿万富翁”便宣告破产，声称拥有 10 万美元或以下的资产以及超过 3.74 亿美元的负债。因此，该证据与确立郭文贵对投资者的某些虚假陈述直接相关。\n\n郭文贵反对采纳破产证据的论点主要依赖于破产的时间节点，而这是郭文贵本人于 2022 年 2 月在实施被指控罪行的过程中自愿发起的。10 参见郭文贵预先排除证据动议第 27 页（“破产案件的提起及随后的程序发生在所指控犯罪活动之后”）；同上（“郭文贵在 2022 年 2 月据称对资金的需求并不能表明他在起诉书中所描述的某些早期示范性虚假陈述时同样需要资金”）；同上（“郭文贵在 2021 年 11 月和 2022 年 2 月偿还债务的能力存在巨大差异”）；同上第 28 页（“破产案件不能作为任何被指控罪行的‘背景’证据，因为其发生在被指控罪行开始之后”）。郭文贵的时间论点的主要问题在于，郭文贵对投资者的欺骗——以及起诉书中指控的欺诈罪行——一直持续“直至并包括至少在 2023 年 3 月左右”，即在郭文贵宣告破产后一年多。11 事实上，政府在审判中的证据将包括郭文贵在其破产后录制的视频广播，在这些广播中他继续为任何投资者的损失提供个人担保。同样，政府在审判中的证据将显示，郭文贵在宣告破产后挪用了投资者资金，包括使用 G|Fashion 的资金为自己购买奢华定制服装。被告人在 G|Fashion 内部文书上使用诸如“研发：专项”之类的委婉说法来描述为郭文贵定制奢华服装支付的款项，从而积极隐瞒了郭文贵是这些挪用公款行为的受益人这一事实。\n\n9 描述“GTV Media 的发起人与顾问”的第一句话为：“GTV Media 的发起人兼顾问 Wengui Guo 先生（又名 Miles Guo、Ho Wan Kwok 或 Miles Kwok），是一位亿万富翁、成功的商人和中国的异见人士。”\n\n10 郭文贵还推理称，由于他未被指控犯有破产欺诈罪，因此他的破产申请文件及其相关的自身陈述不能作为本案的直接证据。郭文贵预先排除证据动议第 25 页。当然，直接证据无需与被指控罪行结合得如此紧密才具有关联性和可采性。如果被告人虚假地告诉投资者他是亿万富翁并可以偿还投资者的任何损失，那么被告人在同一时间或前后宣告破产的事实显然就是被告人在撒谎的证据——这是任何欺诈指控的基本要素，因此在此类指控的审判中属于直接证据。\n\n此外，郭文贵辩称破产程序“属于其个人”，与郭氏企业无关。郭文贵预先排除证据动议第 25-26 页。郭文贵是错误的。破产不仅与郭文贵个人有关，因为郭文贵利用郭氏企业来掩饰和隐匿其控制并用于支付个人开支的资产（包括欺诈所得）。郭文贵先前的归档文件也驳斥了郭文贵的这一断言，该文件承认“政府所依据的‘企业’是由众多公司实体组成的集合体，其中包括受托人迄今为止已对其提起对抗性诉讼的十二个实体，以及受托人主张为郭先生之另我的众多其他实体。”Dkt. 219（郭文贵关于中止破产程序的更新动议）第 4 页。\n\n11 郭文贵一度承认了起诉书中指控的时间范围。参见郭文贵预先排除证据动议第 28 页。然而令人费解的是，郭文贵随后主张，由于破产申请及后续程序发生在被指控欺诈期间，“破产案件既不是被指控罪行的开始，也不是其结束，因此不能适当地被采纳用于‘完整交代受审罪行的全貌’”，同上第 28-29 页。这种推理是荒谬的。破产申请发生在被指控犯罪的过程中，而非开始或结束，这丝毫不会降低其关联性。\n\n除了作为被指控犯罪的直接证据外，郭文贵自愿宣告破产的行为根据 Rule 404(b)（《联邦证据规则》第 404 条 (b) 款）对于证明被告人的动机、知情、故意、无错误以及非意外显然具有可采性。关于动机，政府在其审前预先排除证据动议中解释了郭文贵在宣告破产时如何承认其资产自 2017 年开始被查封，包括通过一项在郭文贵开始向其追随者筹集资金前一个月生效的香港法院命令实施的查封。参见政府预先排除证据动议第 21-23 页（郭文贵开始向其追随者筹集资金前夕资产被查封的可采性）。郭文贵的资产在其开始向追随者索要资金之前即被查封，这表明了郭文贵实施其投资欺诈的动机。关于郭文贵的知情与故意，郭文贵在宣告破产的同时向投资者表示将为其损失提供个人担保，这表明郭文贵明知其陈述是虚假且具有误导性的。\n\n2. 企图阻碍破产程序\n\n其次，政府打算提供证据证明，被告人通过郭氏企业的代理人企图阻碍破产程序，因为受托人的调查有可能揭露郭文贵的欺诈行为，并使欺诈所得面临被没收的危险。如上所述，见前文第 13-17 页，关于郭文贵贬损和骚扰受托人及与其相关人员的证据具有可采性。这种骚扰只是被告人阻碍破产程序企图的一个方面。例如，Wang（王雁平）就 Mei Guo（郭美，“Mei”）对 Lady May 号游艇所有权的虚假主张对郭美进行辅导，以及郭美在受托人就该主题及 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）资金 3700 万美元“贷款”一事进行作证宣誓取证时发表的具有相同性质的伪证证言，也是可采的。王雁平和郭文贵还试图转移郭氏企业旗下实体的所有权，以使它们脱离受托人的管辖范围。12 这些证据表明了被告人企图通过阻碍和虚假证言来掩盖其犯罪行为，以及郭文贵对诸如 Lady May 号游艇、喜马拉雅交易所持有的资金以及郭氏企业旗下其他实体等资产的最终控制权。作为郭氏企业手段和方法的证据，这些事实是被指控的敲诈勒索阴谋的直接证据。或者，该证据根据 Rule 404(b) 具有可采性，因为它对被告人的故意、知情、无错误和非意外极具证明力。被告人企图阻碍可能揭露其罪行或导致欺诈所得被没收的法院程序，这表明了其作贼心虚（意识到了自身罪责）——并且表明被告人经营郭氏企业时具备必要的犯罪故意（mens rea），而非出于过失或善意。\n\n3. 受托人对 Mahwah Mansion 庄园的现场视察\n\n作为最后一个例子，政府打算提供源于受托人于 2023 年 9 月对 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦庄园）进行现场视察的证据。正如法院所知，在被告人被捕以及政府公开针对挪用 G|CLUBS 资金为郭文贵及其家人购买私人住宅的指控之后，郭文贵的追随者进入了马瓦庄园并对现场进行了改动，公然企图妨碍司法公正。\n\n12 在陪审团为了理解该证据而需要了解破产程序中所发生事件之背景的范围内，政府打算提供有关破产诉讼的充分证据以提供该背景。然而需要明确的是，政府并不打算为了证明其真实性而提供破产程序中的任何命令或任何司法事实认定。因此，王雁平关于以传闻证据为由排除引入“其他司法程序中的认定”的动议是建立在错误前提之上的。参见王雁平预先排除证据动议第 14 页。政府并不打算为了证明其真实性而提供“认定”或来自“其他司法程序”的任何其他证据，而是在必要时用以解释并提供被告人及其同谋为推进被指控犯罪所采取行动的基本背景。参见例如前文第 17-19 页（PAX 诉讼及藐视法庭命令作为为郭文贵利益转移 3700 万美元喜马拉雅交易所资金的基本背景具有可采性）。在采纳此类证据时，法院可以通过发布限制性指示来消除任何偏见或混淆的风险。\n\n具体而言，Kwok（郭文贵）的追随者放置了写有“NFSC / G|CLUBS”的标语牌——试图在审判中支持郭文贵关于 Mahwah Mansion（马鞍豪宅）是一个秘密“基地”的辩解。13 这一妨碍行为是在破产管理人巡视期间被发现的，并由当时拍摄的照片和视频记录在案。在出示这组证据时，政府有权为破产管理人的巡视提供至少一些基本背景。\n\n4. 规则 403 并不禁止出示该高度具证明力的证据\n\n因为上述与破产相关的证据对审判的核心争议问题具有高度证明力，所以它具有可采性。郭文贵根据规则 403 提出的相反论点（声称存在不公平偏见）并不具说服力。参见郭文贵 MIL 第 29 页。在 HTC Corp. v. Tech. Properties Ltd. 案中，案号 No. 08 Civ. 00882 (PSG), 2013 WL 4782598, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013)（加利福尼亚北区联邦地区法院 2013 年 9 月 6 日），治安法官排除了当事人破产的证据，因为对方当事人“未能将 TPL 的破产与”审判中的相关问题即“MMP 投资组合许可未能成功”联系起来。同上，第 *2 页。这一失败“让法院只能去猜测 TPL 破产的原因”，而该原因可能与相关问题无关。同上，第 *2 页及注 2。但本案并非如此，郭文贵的自愿破产直接能证明数个相关问题，例如郭文贵就其财富以及偿还受害投资者损失的能力向受害投资者所作的陈述。郭文贵所依赖的另一个判例同样不适用。Pedroza v. Lomas Auto Mall, Inc. 案，案号 Civ. No. 07 Civ. 0591 (JB) (RHS), 2009 WL 1325440 (D.N.M. Apr. 6, 2009)（新墨西哥区联邦地区法院 2009 年 4 月 6 日）涉及一起关于二手车的纠纷，法院排除了关于原告先前且无关的破产的“关联性微不足道”的证据。同上，第 *7 页。与 Pedroza 案中原告的破产不同，郭文贵的破产发生在涉案投资欺诈过程中，与 Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）不可分割地交织在一起，并且对于本案指控的基本构成要件（例如向投资者作出欺诈性陈述）具有高度证明力。\n\n13 在被捕后的监狱录音通话中，各被告人似乎正在与追随者讨论这个所谓的“基地”。\n\n如果说有什么需要处理的，法院完全可以通过向陪审团发布限制性指示来消除破产相关证据可能带来的任何不公平偏见风险。与直接全盘排除这种与被控罪行同时自愿启动的破产程序相关、且具有高度证明力的证据相比，这显然是妥当的处理结果，特别是当“本案标的物与破产案件之间没有任何一丝缝隙”时更是如此。Dkt. 219（郭文贵关于中止破产程序的更新动议）第 4 页。14\n\nV. 关于 Wang（王雁平）薪酬的证据具有可采性\n\n关于王雁平薪酬的证据能证明其犯下被控罪行的故意。该证据表明她因在郭氏企业中所扮演的角色而获得了经济回报。王雁平试图排除这一证据，仅辩称其经济报酬并未与欺诈收益相挂钩，也不是源于欺诈收益。王雁平 MIL 第 10 页。事实并非如此。首先，支付给王雁平的薪水是对其在郭氏企业中所起角色的报酬。政府打算出示反映这一点的 W2 表格和工资单信息。这使得该证据具有关联性——它表明王雁平参与该企业具有经济动机，并且表明王雁平事实上确实参与了该企业。关于薪酬的证据也与王雁平的认知和故意相关——它表明王雁平在郭氏企业中的某些实体领取工资，但在另一些实体（如 G|CLUBS）中却没有，尽管她是其实际首席执行官（de facto CEO）。这一证据表明王雁平试图隐瞒自己对 G|CLUBS 的参与，这证明了她的故意。任何偏见都是极微小的，\n\n14 郭文贵还就破产法院关于其援引第五修正案所作出的藐视法庭命令提出了规则 403 方面的关切。郭文贵 MIL 第 29-30 页。政府不会就该藐视法庭命令或相关诉讼出示任何证据。\n\n并且不会超过该重要的证明价值。\n\n王雁平当然可以自由地辩称该报酬与犯罪行为无关。但这些论点涉及的是该证据的证明力大小（weight），而非其可采性（admissibility）。王雁平所依据的先例并非得出相反结论。在 United States v. Ferguson 案中，District of Connecticut（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）部分准许了被告排除向其支付奖金证据的动议，因为这些奖金与被控行为“不具有关联性”。但法院认定，被告“延期补偿计划的证据与证明动机相关”，因为它显示了他试图操纵股票的原因。2007 WL 4240782, at *1 (D. Conn. Nov. 30, 2007)。本案的情况并无二致——证明王雁平因其在郭氏企业中的角色而获得报酬的证据显然具有关联性，且不会造成不当偏见。15 因此，该证据具有可采性。16\n\nVI. 关于王雁平与郭文贵个人关系的证据具有可采性\n\n王雁平根据规则 403 试图排除有关王雁平与郭文贵的证据。参见王雁平 MIL 第 16-17 页。王雁平的动议\n\n15 王雁平对 United States v. Stahl 案的引用同样是不恰当的。出示王雁平薪酬的证据并不是为了“诉诸阶级偏见”——它只是反映出王雁平因其犯罪行为而获得了报酬。616 F.2d 30, 31-33 (2d Cir. 1980)。至于 United States v. Shapiro, No. 15 Cr. 155 (RNC) (D. Conn. Apr. 24, 2017), ECF No. 372 一案，看起来涉案报酬金额相当巨大（尽管从王雁平向法院提供的副本中尚不明确，金额已被涂黑隐匿）。在某种程度上若那是该法院排除薪酬证据的原因，本案则不存在类似关切。王雁平并未获得过高的金额。但她通过郭氏企业获得了可观的薪水，这对于她参与其中的动机具有高度证明力。\n\n16 王雁平还试图排除与其名义下购买共管公寓（condominium apartment）相关的证据。王雁平 MIL 第 10-11 页。政府目前不打算在审判中出示有关王雁平购买共管公寓的证据。如果情况发生变化，政府将在审判中引入任何此类证据之前提请王雁平的辩护律师注意，并在必要时提请法院注意。\n\n应予驳回。\n\n王雁平似乎并不对该证据具有关联性提出异议。相反，王雁平的反对理由完全取决于规则 403。即该证据以及王雁平与郭文贵之间相关的个人关系是否“被不公平偏见的危险所实质性压倒”。Fed. R. Evid. 403。事实并非如此。\n\n“不公平”偏见是指“除倾向于证明证明其可采性的事实或争议问题之外，往往会对被告产生某种不利影响”的偏见。United States v. Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1993)（引自 United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980)）。通常情况下，不公平偏见是指“促使在不当基础上（通常但未必一定是情绪化的基础）做出裁决的不当倾向”。Fed. R. Evid. 403, Advisory Comm. Note；另见 Weinstein, § 403.04(1)(c) at 403-42-403-47（不公平偏见的传统例子包括诉诸陪审团同情心的证据、唤起陪审员恐惧感的证据以及激发陪审团惩罚本能的证据）。\n\n王雁平关于王雁平 MIL 第 17 页的说法，并没有确立足以排除此证据的偏见。即使对某些陪审员来说确实存在这种情况，陪审团也会被指示在评议时将任何此类情绪搁置一旁。并且任何可能的偏见都可以通过适当的限制性指示或在陪审员预先审查（voir dire）期间提出针对性的提问来消除。\n\n此外，王雁平的论点忽略了法院经常采纳两名共同被告人之间先前的犯罪行为证据，因为这对于共同被告人之间的信任程度具有证明力。Second Circuit（第二巡回区联邦上诉法院）多次重申，在未受指控的犯罪“未涉及比被控罪行更为严重的行为”的情况下，规则 403 有利于证据的可采性。Williams, 205 F.3d at 33-34。此处拟出示的证据并非恶劣行为（bad act）——它对被告人不具有不公平偏见，因为它并没有比被控行为“更为耸人听闻或令人不安”。参见例如 United States v. Sanpedro, 352 Fed. App'x 482, 485 (2d Cir. 2009)（简要命令）（指出“偏见是由被告人被指控的罪名所决定的”）；United States v. Taylor, 767 F. Supp. 2d 428, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)（裁定在 Hobbs Act（霍布斯法案）抢劫案中，其他抢劫的证据具有可采性且不具偏见性）。\n\n王雁平辩称该证据具有不当偏见，因为王雁平和郭文贵拥有密切关系“不太可能有任何严重争议”。王雁平 MIL 第 16 页（强调为原文所加）。当然，证明被控罪名以及就本案而言确立郭文贵与王雁平关系的密切程度，属于政府的举证责任。王雁平可能不争辩该密切关系的事实，并不能为确立该关系提供证据基础，而政府必须确立这一点。郭文贵与王雁平关系的性质与陪审团对被控罪行的审议相关。郭文贵让王雁平掌管其庞大的犯罪机构。陪审团可能会质疑郭文贵为何信任她——以及王雁平为何同意承担这一角色。郭文贵与王雁平是陪审团据以得出可能回答这些问题的推论的证据。17 鉴于王雁平曾辩称\n\n17 如果王雁平和郭文贵希望就其亲密和个人关系作出约定（stipulate），政府欢迎就此类约定的范围和措辞进行对话。然而，迄今为止，两名被告人均未就此类约定与政府接洽。\n\n自己没有因参与犯罪行为而获得经济回报，情况尤其如此。王雁平 MIL 第 9 页（“政府针对王女士提起的原始起诉书中没有指控投资者的钱流向了王女士，也没有指控她以任何方式从被指控的计划中个人获益。”）。事实上，王雁平获得的经济回报在程度上不同于郭文贵、Je 或某些郭氏家族成员；政府被允许主张，她参与这些计划的部分动机不仅是经济上的，而且是个人层面的，这一论点得到了郭文贵与王雁平个人关系证据的支持。\n\n王雁平主张，如果采纳这组证据，她“反驳政府指控”的唯一方法就是就王雁平 MIL 第 17 页作证。如果王雁平希望提出可采证据来反驳政府关于两名共同被告人拥有某种关系的指控，无论是通过证人证言还是出示物证，她都可以这样做；事实上，本案的证据开示包括例如郭文贵对王雁平大吼大叫的录音，这可能表明他们的关系破裂。无论王雁平选择如何提出这一论点，政府都必须能够证明两名共同被告人拥有足以共同运营庞大的 RICO（诈骗及腐败组织犯罪）企业的信任度，包括通过引入该证据。\n\n因此，该证据具有可采性。\n\nVII. 准许准确提及“马鞍豪宅”以及郭氏企业的“壳公司”和“傀儡高管”\n\n法院应准许准确提及郭氏企业对壳公司和傀儡高管的使用，以及准许将郭文贵位于新泽西州的住所准确提及为位于马鞍的一处豪宅。\n\n马瓦（Mahwah）。参见 Kwok MIL 第 33-36 页；Wang MIL 第 4-6 页。Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）和 Wang（王雁平）提出动议，请求先发制人地排除对“空壳公司（shell companies）”及相关术语的提及，且郭文贵提出动议请求排除将其位于 New Jersey（新泽西州）的住所称为“马瓦豪宅（Mahwah Mansion）”，这些动议的前提主张是认为这些术语具有固有的且不公平的偏见性。但一个术语是否被允许使用，必须结合上下文语境进行评估。比照例如 United States v. Banki, 685 F.3d 99, 120 (2d Cir. 2012)（辩论的适切性必须“在整个审判的语境中”进行评估）。出于这一原因，如果这些被指具有偏见性的术语在证据中有一定依据，法院通常不会禁止使用。参见例如 United States v. Runner, No. 18 Cr. 578 (JS), 2023 WL 3727532, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2023)（在欺诈和洗钱案中驳回排除提及“空壳公司”的动议）。不应禁止政府（the Government）或其证人提及准确描述郭氏企业（Kwok Enterprise）某些实体以及郭文贵新泽西州住所的术语。\n\nA. 应当允许准确提及空壳公司及相关术语\n\n郭文贵和王雁平请求排除提及“空壳公司”及相关术语18的动议，依赖于单一的一起指控存在实质差异的刑事案件。Kwok MIL 第 33-35 页（引用 United States v. Watts, 934 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)）；Wang MIL 第 4-5 页（引用同一判例）。但全面考察判例法可以得出不同的标准：这些术语被推定为是“中性的”，并且在“有事实依据……显示在使用该描述性术语之前，目标实体即为空壳公司”的情况下应当予以允许。Runner, 2023 WL 3727532,\n\n18 郭文贵的动议还寻求排除相关术语“空壳法人（shell corporation）”和“另一个人格/替身（alter ego）”，Kwok MIL 第 33-35 页；王雁平的动议还寻求排除相关术语“挂名高管（figurehead executives）”和“稻草人所有者/傀儡所有者（straw owners）”，Wang MIL 第 4-5 页。\n\nat *5（在起诉书中指控被告利用各种实体实施欺诈和洗钱共谋的类似动议被驳回）。\n\n尽管郭文贵将这些术语与更具口语化贬义色彩的词汇如“秃鹫基金（vulture funds）”相提并论（Kwok MIL 第 35 页），但“空壳法人”是对仅为或主要为他人或另一实体的目的而存在的公司实体的常见描述。参见例如 SHELL CORPORATION, Black's Law Dictionary（布莱克法律词典）（第 11 版，2019 年）（将该术语中性地定义为“没有实际业务，通常仅以名称形式存在、作为另一家公司业务运营工具的公司”）。出于该原因，“空壳法人”及类似术语在涉及资金转移和隐匿指控的案件中通常发挥着有益的解释功能。参见例如 United States v. Abdullaev, 761 F. App'x 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2019)（简略裁定）（描述庭审证据表明证人“担任过[某一相关实体的]法人空壳的董事”，并观察到“[某一相关实体的]俄罗斯客户如何利用空壳公司来支付其发票”）；U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3), cmt. n.5（建议在确定是否适用“复杂洗钱”加重处罚时考虑“空壳法人”的使用）。王雁平的额外论点——即这些术语“显然具有偏见性，因为[它们]向陪审团传达了结论”（Wang MIL 第 5 页）——是对法律的曲解。《联邦证据规则》（Federal Rules of Evidence）仅禁止具有不公平偏见性的证据，而“向陪审团传达结论”正是辩护方辩论以及他们试图引出的证词和证据的根本目的所在。参见 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180（“在其语境下的‘不公平偏见’是指基于不当依据而倾向于促成判决的不当倾向……”（引用 Fed. R. Evid. 403 顾问委员会说明）（强调为后加））；并参见 Fed. R. Evid. 704(a)（“意见不得仅仅因为涵盖了最终争点而不可采纳。”）。\n\n此外，在 Watts 案中——即郭文贵和王雁平唯一引用的判例——无论是动议方的辩论还是法院的裁定均表明，将诸如郭文贵名下那些用于“规避破产规则并实施邮件和电信欺诈”的实体称为“空壳法人”是恰当的。Watts, 934 F. Supp. 2d at 482（引用 United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1535-36 (7th Cir. 1996)）；Watts, No. 10 Cr. 627 (KAM), Dkt. 610-1 at 19-20（同上）。Watts 案涉及一个相对简单的通过伪造财务报表为公司获取贷款的计划。参见 United States v. Dupree (Watts), 781 F.Supp.2d 115, 121-22 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)（提供背景情况）。拥有各家债务人公司的控股公司的结构与案件无关，且并未指控利用公司结构的任何特征来隐瞒或促进犯罪。出处同上。换言之，Watts 案关于排除提及“空壳公司”的决定，是在公司的这些特征与指控无关的语境下作出的。与之形成鲜明对比的是，本案起诉书指控被告“通过一系列复杂的虚假和虚构业务以及连接数十个相互关联实体的投资机会来运营郭氏企业”。起诉书第 1 段。起诉书进一步指控犯罪的手段和方法包括“多年来企图掩盖由郭文贵使用和控制的资金”，“通过将资金流动伪装成‘贷款’或‘投资’，在郭氏企业内部并为了郭文贵、其家庭及其关联人的利益转移资金”，以及“在郭氏企业内部实体中安置挂名高管和/或稻草人所有者，而郭氏企业内部的实体实际上由被告所有和/或控制”。出处同上，第 20 段。所有这些行为都涉及利用被准确描述为“空壳公司”的实体的设计，从而赋予了该术语在 Watts 案中所缺乏的事实依据（在该案中这些特征是无关的）。\n\n根据判例的主流意见，法院应当驳回郭文贵和王雁平的动议，并认定“空壳公司”、“挂名高管”及类似术语被推定为中性，若与案中其他证据相符，则可在庭审中恰当地予以提及。参见例如 Wherevertv, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC, No. 18 Civ. 0529 (WJF) (NPM), 2023 WL 2664200, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2023)（在不损害权利的前提下驳回排除提及“空壳公司”的动议）；H&L Farms LLC v. Silicon Ranch Corp., No. 21 Cv. 0134 (CDL), 2023 WL 1795705, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 7, 2023)（“如果有证据表明任何被告为空壳法人……则不应禁止原告使用‘空壳公司’一词。”）；DNT, LLC v. Sprint Spectrum, LP, No. 09 Cv. 0021 (JRS), 2010 WL 582164, at *4-5 (E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2010)（认定“空壳公司”为“中性术语”，并在该术语“准确”的情况下允许提及）。\n\nB. 应当允许准确提及马瓦豪宅\n\n郭文贵请求排除提及“马瓦豪宅”——并要求使用两个在实际操作中过于冗长且具体的替代名称——的动议也应当被驳回。参见 Kwok MIL 第 35 页（请求法院强制使用“拉马波山谷路 675 号（675 Ramapo Valley Road）”或“拉马波 675 号（675 Ramapo）”）。如下文更详尽所述，使用“豪宅（mansion）”一词并不具有不公平的偏见性。事实上，郭文贵自己的媒体机构 G News（G 时代/G新闻）在描述郭文贵于 2021 年为其自身及其家庭购买的住所时就使用了该词。这是因为该物业无可争议地是一座豪宅。因此，没有任何依据来禁止使用一个准确且完全恰当的术语，也没有依据来强制要求使用一个笨拙的替代名称。\n\n郭文贵没有引用任何权威判例来支持“豪宅”是一个具有不公平偏见性术语的主张。事实上，即使在陪审团面前审理的刑事案件中，法院也经常将异常庞大的住宅称为“豪宅”。参见例如 United States v. Al Kasser, 660 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2011)\n\n（提到庭审证据显示被告发出邀请“前往其在西班牙的豪宅以进一步讨论尼加拉瓜军火交易”）；United States v. Trupin, 119 F. App'x 323, 326 (2d Cir. 2005)（简略裁定）（提到庭审证据显示被告逃避其“出售拥有 63 间房间的海滨豪宅所得收益”所欠缴的税款）；United States v. Monaco, 194 F.3d 381, 384-85 (2d Cir. 1999)（提到庭审证据显示被告“利用[其父母的]豪宅与其毒贩同伙会面，并存放现金、设备、车辆及其游艇”）。而且第二巡回区内至少有一家地区法院驳回了相关论点，即认为“将各被告的住宅称为‘豪宅’”是不当地“引发了阶级偏见”并造成了“具有偏见性和煽动性的”审前宣传。United States v. Sabhnani, No. 07 Cr. 429 (TCP), 2007 WL 2769487, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2007)。\n\n鉴于该住宅无可争议地继续被其历史名称所称呼（其中包括“克罗克豪宅（Crocker Mansion）”和“达灵顿豪宅（Darlington Mansion）”），禁止将郭文贵的马瓦住所称为“豪宅”尤其毫无道理。参见例如 Crocker-McMillin Mansion, Wikipedia, http（最后访问日期：2024 年 4 月 17 日）。甚至连郭文贵自己的媒体机构也将该住所称为“豪宅”。在郭文贵因引发本次审判的指控被捕后，G News19 将马瓦物业称为曾经的“达灵顿豪宅”。参见 乱世天堂:新中国联邦基地, GNEWS, 2023 年 4 月 11 日，可查阅于 http（最后访问日期：2024 年 4 月 16 日）（原文中以英文提及）。20 此外，涉及使用投资者资金翻修马瓦豪宅的商业记录——政府打算在审判中将其作为证据出示——同样将该物业称为“克罗克豪宅”或“豪宅”。\n\n19 在郭文贵于 2020 年 4 月在 G News 发布的一篇帖子中（使用已认证账号“Miles”），在总结郭文贵的一期广播时，郭文贵陈述道：“战友们，我给你们办了 G-TV，办了 G-News，对不对？”郭文贵还接着说：“大家看到我们这么忙，G-TV、G-News、王雁平还有我们法治基金的所有员工。”参见 http\n\n20 此外，郭文贵的代理人于 2021 年从前业主处购买了马瓦豪宅，\n\n没有任何依据禁止在审判中提及该马瓦住所最常用的名称之一。郭文贵的动议应当被驳回。\n\nVIII. 为证明重大性而提出假设性问题是恰当的\n\n法院应当允许政府向诸如受害投资者或银行代表等事实证人提出假设性问题——以此证明虚假和误导性陈述以及遗漏的重大性。比照 Wang MIL 第 12-14 页（涉及假设性问题）。\n\n此类提问的正当性早已确立。在 United States v. Cuti 案，720 F.3d 453 (2d Cir. 2013) 中，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）在一场针对两名合谋虚增公司报告收益的被告人的证券欺诈起诉案中，确认了可以使用“假如你当时知情”类提问。参见该案判决，第 455-57 页。在该案中，两名会计师在庭审中就“他们当时如何对欺诈性交易的收益进行会计核算；如果他们知悉全部事实，他们又会如何对这些交易进行会计核算；以及对他们隐瞒的重要信息如何导致了公司财务报表中的虚假陈述”作证。同上，第 456 页。法院裁定，此类证言“作为事实性证言被适当采纳”，且“在备选意义上裁定其可作为非专家意见被采纳”。同上，第 459 页。法院阐理认为，当“由事实认定者裁决的问题归结为影响——即证人若知晓额外信息是否会有不同作为——如此作证的证人所从事的即为‘日常生活中所熟知的推理过程’”，并被合理解读为提供非专家意见证言。同上（援引 Fed. R. Evid. 701, advisory committee's note, 2000 amend.）。归根结底，第二巡回上诉法院得出结论认为：\n\n证人可以就其所不知晓的事实，以及假如其知晓该独立确立的事实后该事实会如何影响其行为或举止进行作证。正如本案所表明的，向证人呈现被隐瞒事实的“假如你当时知情”类提问，对于引出关于欺诈之影响的证言尤为有用。\n\n同上。21\n\n（脚注 21：正如第二巡回上诉法院在 Cuti 案中所指出，其裁定与审理过该问题的其他巡回法院相一致。参见 United States v. Musselwhite 案, 709 F. App'x 958, 972 (11th Cir. 2017)（“允许银行代表就各自银行的抵押贷款审批程序作证，并回答有关如果银行知悉买方的收入、工作经历、资产、诚意购房定金及结算款被虚假陈述，各自银行是否还会批准贷款的假设性问题”并非错误）；United States v. Hill 案, 643 F.3d 807, 841-42 (11th Cir. 2011)（驳回了“不应允许贷款机构代表就其机构在知悉多份贷款申请中的若干陈述系伪造的情况下会采取何种作为进行作证”的论点）；United States v. Orr 案, 692 F.3d 1079, 1095-97 (10th Cir. 2012)（确认假设性提问的正当性——“问：如果当时有人告诉你，针对 Orr 先生自身燃料所做的全部测试均未显示那些文件所披露的优势，这对你会有什么影响（如果有的话）？”——因为“检察官的提问针对的是 Orr 陈述的重大性”）；United States v. Laurienti 案, 611 F.3d 530, 549-50 (9th Cir. 2010)（确认假设性提问的正当性——“如果你在购买［自营股票］前知悉 Hampton Porter 阻止或劝阻其经纪人允许客户出售其持有的［该自营股票］份额，你还会购买［该自营股票的份额］吗？”——以证明重大性）；United States v. Jennings 案, 487 F.3d 564, 581–82 (8th Cir. 2007)（裁定与品格证人不同，对事实证人进行推定有罪的假设性提问以证明重大性通常是允许的，并指出“如果不询问未披露的信息是否会影响决策者的分析，政府将很难证明该要件［即重大性］”）；United States v. Dukes 案, 242 F. App'x 37, 45 (4th Cir. 2007)（确认假设性提问的正当性：“如果他当时告诉了你［被隐瞒的事实］，这是否会影响你投资 Financial Warfare Club 的决定？”）。）\n\n据此，只要遵循 Cuti 案所确立的框架，本法院就应允许政府方提出“假如你当时知情”类问题，以证明重大性。参见例如 United States v. Velissaris 案, No. 22 Cr. 105 (DLC), 2022 WL 17076747, at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2022)（阐述“确立已久的法律原则”，包括“当要求事实证人回答有关记录中已有事实基础的假设性问题，且在回答该问题时同样要求其适用与该证人平时所从事的类似的推理过程时，此类证言可作为事实证人的证言被采纳，或根据具体提问作为非专家意见证言被采纳。”（援引 Cuti 案））；亦参见 United States v. Patel 案, No. 21 Cr. 220 (VAB), 2023 WL 2643815, at *44 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2023)（遵循 Cuti 案并得出结论认为“政府方可以就符合该框架且具备适当基础的假设性问题征询回答”）。\n\n政府方在审判中的证据将奠定如下事实基础：正如起诉书中所述，各被告人将投资者的资金不当地用于 Kwok（郭文贵）及其家人的个人开支，且这些款项是在 Wang（王雁平）的协助和批准下支付的。此外，郭文贵向投资者作出了大量陈述，虚假地陈述了他将如何使用投资者的资金，并误导性地隐瞒了他意图将投资者资金用于其本人及家人的个人利益。参见例如前文第 2-3 页（郭文贵向投资者陈述：“你们投资 GTV，绝不可能损失一半，因为你投资的每一分钱都必须经过美国法定会计师的审计。我今天不能用你们投资的钱去买一顿日本料理，否则我就会被直接逮捕。美国真的会逮捕你。然后你们想要……战友们投资的钱都会在战友们的公司里……”（强调为后加））。因此，依据 Cuti 案，政府方有权询问投资者：如果他们当时知悉郭文贵会将投资者资金用于支付个人开销，他们是否还会投资 GTV 及其他投资项目。22\n\n（脚注 22：正如法院允许在以待后续审判证据确立陈述者为共谋人为连接条件的前提下采纳共谋人陈述，参见例如 United States v. Vidal 案, No. 22 Cr. 2857, 2024 WL 397630, at *4 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2024)（确认 Cote 法官在辩方反对下采用此类程序的做法）；United States v. Tracy 案, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993)（“作为共谋人陈述提出的陈述可有条件地作为证据采纳，但须以随后提交证明那些……先决条件的必要证据为条件”）；United States v. Geaney 案, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969)（“共谋罪审判的实际情况可能要求在所有证据提交完毕时‘以待关联性确立为条件’采纳传闻证据”），本法院应当允许政府方在此漫长审判的早期向作证的受害者提出这些假设性问题，但须以待确立郭文贵将投资者资金用于其本人及家人的证据相关联为条件。）\n\n就王雁平的动议所关切的与郭文贵的虚假或误导性陈述无关的假设性问题，或暗示无限制的“开放式披露义务”的假设性问题而言，参见 Wang MIL 第 14 页，政府方无意提出此类问题。据此，法院应允许政府方提出正当的假设性问题，并应以已无实际争议为由驳回王雁平的动议。\n\nIX. 郭文贵关于元数据证据的动议为时尚早\n\n郭文贵的各项动议中包含一项声明，称其“保留反对”引入“元数据作为证据”的权利。Kwok MIL 第 58 页。他概述了元数据的若干潜在特征，包括它“不一定准确”且“也可能被篡改”。同上。当然，这些几乎是所有书证的特征——而政府方同样保留反对引入未经鉴真或被篡改的证据的权利。但正如郭文贵的动议同样明确指出的，元数据能够提供关于“谁撰写了［某份］文件、谁访问了［某份］文件、该文件最初创建于何时、该文件最后于何时被何人编辑”的相关且具证明力的信息——所有这些对于确立处于欺诈案件核心的认知与故意事项都具有潜在的关键作用。Kwok MIL 第 58 页。事实上，郭文贵所引用的《塞多纳原则》（Sedona Principles）本身就建议在元数据能提供相关事实时予以出示和采纳。参见 The Sedona Principles, Third Edition: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 19 Sedona Conf. J. 1, 212 (2018)（元数据通常对于确保“公平展现按照正常业务过程保存和使用的文件”是必需的）；同上，第 211 页（“有时需要元数据来鉴真有争议的文件或确立对争议重大的事实……”）。因此，法院应当驳回将元数据一律定性为可疑证据的任何企图，而是应当将《联邦证据规则》（Federal Rules of Evidence）适用于在审判中按正常程序作为证据提交的任何元数据。参见例如 Sexton v. Lecavalier 案, 11 F. Supp. 3d 439, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（“正如尊敬的 Shira A. Scheindlin 最近指出的，电子邮件可能包含具有重大证据价值的元数据”）（Torres 法官）（援引 Sekisui Am. Corp. v. Hart 案, 945 F. Supp. 2d 494, 506 n.71 (S.D.N.Y.2013)）；United States v. Shea 案, No. 20 Cr. 412 (AT), 2022 WL 1598189, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2022)（批准各方就“与某些文件相关的元数据”提供证言的协议）；亦参见例如 Swearngin v. Rowell 案, 846 S.E.2d 263, 266-67 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020)（关于元数据具有被篡改潜在可能性的主张“关涉的是证据所应被赋予的证明力权重，而非其可采性”）。\n\n据此，郭文贵关于元数据的预先排除动议应以为时尚早为由予以驳回。\n\nX. 郭文贵排除有关 Crocker Mansion Estate LLC 证据的动议已无实际争议\n\n政府方无意提交有关 Crocker Mansion Estate LLC 的证据。参见契据，Despins v. Taurus Fund LLC et al. 案, Adv. P. No. 23-05017 (JAM), Dkt. 23-2 at 2 (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 23, 2023)。据此，郭文贵排除该证据的动议应以已无实际争议为由予以驳回。参见 Kwok MIL 第 30-33 页。\n\nXI. Shams 教授的证言具有可采性\n\n基于下文阐述的理由，郭文贵排除 Amin Shams 教授证言的动议应予驳回。参见 Kwok MIL 第 38-57 页。\n\nAmin Shams 教授拥有 University of Texas（得克萨斯大学）博士学位，现任 The Ohio State University（俄亥俄州立大学）Fisher College of Business（费舍尔商学院）助理教授。在俄亥俄州立大学，Shams 教授讲授金融科技（通常称为“FinTech”）课程，包括区块链和金融研究中的机器学习。凭借其广泛的经验，Shams 教授获得了有关加密货币的专门知识。Shams 教授对 Himalaya Dollar（“HDO”，喜马拉雅美元）和 Himalaya Coin（“HCN”，喜马拉雅币）进行了一系列分析。基于这些分析，Shams 教授拟在庭审中提供“将协助陪审团”认定争议事实的意见——即 HCN 和 HDO 是否属于真实的加密货币。United States v. Mostafa 案, No. 04 Cr. 356 (KBF), 2014 WL 1744717, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2014)（援引 United States v. Locascio 案, 6 F.3d 924, 936 (2d Cir.1993)）。\n\n本案审理中的一个核心问题将是 HCN（据称是一种浮动价格的加密货币）、HDO（据称是一种稳定币）以及 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）是否构成欺诈。政府方获准通过专家分析与意见来应对该问题，以协助陪审团理解需要专门知识的证据。Shams 教授利用其在加密货币领域的专门知识，通过严谨的客观分析对 HCN 和 HDO 进行了分析，并将向陪审团提供一系列意见，说明 HCN 和 HDO 的表现是否类似于加密货币，或者是否具备真实加密货币普遍具有的特征。\n\nKwok（郭文贵）对 Shams 教授的挑剔主要涉及其证言的证明力，而非可采性。在郭文贵不同意 Shams 教授意见的限度内，其辩护律师将能够通过严格的交叉询问来检验 Shams 教授的结论和分析。归根结底，将由陪审团决定赋予 Shams 教授的意见和分析何种证明力（若有）。就本案而言，郭文贵未提供排除其证言的任何法律依据。\n\nA. Shams 教授的披露材料\n\nShams 教授详尽的披露材料（郭文贵对其充分性未提出质疑）概述了其证言的主题，解释了他所进行的分析以及采用的方法论，并详述了他的意见。从宏观层面而言，Shams 教授对 HCN 和 HDO 进行了分析。见《郭文贵审前动议》（Kwok MIL）附件 D（《Shams 披露材料》）第 1 页。具体而言，Shams 教授检验了 HCN 和 HDO 的表现是否类似于加密货币、是否具备与加密货币相符的特征，以及就 HDO 而言，其担保方式是否与其他稳定币相符。Shams 教授的披露材料将其拟出具的证言分为六个部分以及一个总体结论，下文将依次进行讨论。《Shams 披露材料》第 2 页。\n\n第一，Shams 拟向陪审团简要介绍加密货币的总体背景。该信息基于 Shams 教授的经验和研究，构成了超出普通陪审员知识储备的信息。例如，虽然部分陪审员可能听说过比特币（Bitcoin）和泛指的加密货币，但很少有人会理解什么是加密货币——区块链技术如何运作、加密货币如何以去中心化方式管理、什么是“智能合约”以及什么是稳定币。《Shams 披露材料》第 4-9 页。该背景信息为陪审团提供了理解 Shams 教授的分析以及一般性理解加密货币所必需的信息。\n\n第二，Shams 教授对 HCN 的市值和交易量进行了严谨且客观的分析，并将 HCN 的表现与加密货币市场进行了比较，以确定 HCN 的行为是否与其他加密货币相似。《Shams 披露材料》第 14-16 页；同上，第 15 页（描述“方法论”）。随后，Shams 教授依据与其他代币相关的公开数据23——该领域常用的此类数据——将 HCN 的定价、交易量和市值与那些其他类似代币进行了比较。《Shams 披露材料》第 21-22 页。Shams 教授解释称，\n\n23 就本案而言，交易所代币是由加密货币交易所发行的一种加密货币。\n\n他之所以选择某些代币作为与 HCN 比较的基准，是因为这些代币是“头部中心化交易所代币”——即它们在地位上与 HCN 所宣称的情况类似。《Shams 披露材料》第 15 页。Shams 教授随后分析了 HCN 随时间变化的市值，并得出结论认为其平均市值为 320 亿美元，日均交易量为 410 万美元。《Shams 披露材料》第 23 页。Shams 教授随后将这些平均值与其他基准进行了比较。基于该基准比较，Shams 教授发表意见认为，HCN 的价格、日交易量和市值与基准高度不符。《Shams 披露材料》第 24 页（“HCN 的交易量似乎与其市值规模不相称。”）。Shams 教授进一步提出，HCN 的高市值（320 亿美元）与其交易量“不成比例”。同上。\n\n第三，Shams 教授考察了 HCN 相对于更广泛加密货币市场的价格波动。《Shams 披露材料》第 25 页。Shams 教授解释称，该领域的研究得出的结论是，加密货币价格与比特币价格相关。《Shams 披露材料》第 26 页（“关于加密货币的学术文献表明，加密货币的回报率呈正相关……加密货币价格通常与比特币同向波动”（引用已发表的研究））。Shams 教授随后在 HCN 上检验了该假设。正如他在“方法论”部分所解释的，Shams 教授分析了“HCN 与各种市场指数之间的相关系数和判定系数（调整后 R2，或 R²）[随后]将其与 100 种规模相似的代币进行了比较。”24 《Shams 披露材料》第 27-28 页。\n\n24 Shams 教授解释了为何选择这些代币作为其分析的基准：“100 种规模相似的代币的选择标准是：在 2021 年 11 月 2 日市值与 HCN 最接近、非稳定币，且在样本期（2021 年 11 月 2 日至 2023 年 3 月 14 日）期初和期末市值均不为零。”《Shams 披露材料》第 27 页。\n\nR² 分析是一种常见的统计检验，用于考察一个变量相对于基线的变异比例。参见《Shams 披露材料》第 27-29 页。在进行了这些客观检验后，参见《Shams 披露材料》第 29-35 页，Shams 教授得出结论认为，与整个加密货币市场的定价不同，“HCN 的价格走势相对独立于更广泛的市场趋势。”《Shams 披露材料》第 29 页。事实上，Shams 教授得出结论，HCN 的价格与比特币价格以及以太坊（Ethereum，另一种极受欢迎的加密货币）价格的相关性非常低。《Shams 披露材料》第 29-34 页。因此，Shams 教授发表意见认为，HCN 的价格表现不像真正的加密货币。参见《Shams 披露材料》第 32 页（“HCN 的价格波动几乎完全无法由 BTC 价格波动来解释”）；同上，第 34 页（“与加密货币的回报率在很大程度上由 ETH 回报率解释形成鲜明对比的是，HCN 的价格波动几乎完全无法由 ETH 价格波动来解释”）。“这表明 HCN 的价格与加密货币的价格脱节”，根据 Shams 教授引用的学术研究，这与加密货币的表现形式相悖。《Shams 披露材料》第 36 页。25\n\n第四，Shams 教授分析了 HCN 和 HDO 的所有权集中度。作为背景，加密货币在公开区块链上追踪其交易历史以及单个代币/币的所有权。通过这种方式，真正的加密货币是“去中心化”的，不受单一管理实体的肆意支配。Shams 教授在其“方法论”中解释称，他根据公开的区块链记录审查了 HCN 和 HDO 的“‘链上’交易”。《Shams 披露材料》第 38 页。Shams 教授随后将 HCN/HDO 的链上交易与\n\n25 Shams 教授还提供了 HCN 价格表现极度异常的一个例子。Shams 教授考察了 2022 年 5 月 9 日的 TerraUSD 稳定币崩盘事件，该事件通常导致全市场范围内的加密货币价格下跌。然而，在此期间 HCN 的价格“几乎没有变化”，Shams 教授发表意见认为，这进一步证明“HCN 的价格表现与加密货币不同，且似乎与市场力量脱节。”《Shams 披露材料》第 35 页。\n\n比特币、以太坊以及“因其属于与加密货币交易所相关的代币而被选作基准的其他加密货币”进行了比较。26 同上。\n\n在审查了 HCN 和 HDO 的公开区块链后，Shams 教授发表意见认为，从 2021 年 11 月 2 日至 2023 年 3 月 14 日，27 HCN 和 HDO 分别发生了 206 笔和 251 笔链上交易。《Shams 披露材料》第 39-40 页。前 5 笔（针对 HCN）和前 8 笔（针对 HDO）交易占所有转账代币总量的 99.9999% 以上。同上。此外，Shams 教授发表意见认为，HCN 的第一大持有者拥有所有 HCN 的 99.9994%，且该代币总共只有 12 名持有者。《Shams 披露材料》第 46 页。HDO 仅有 16 名持有者，且 99.999997% 的供应量由一名所有者持有。《Shams 披露材料》第 47 页。与基准加密货币的比较表明，这些指标高度异常。参见《Shams 披露材料》第 54 页。Shams 教授分析了该分析的结果，并发表意见认为这些指标并非加密货币的典型特征。参见《Shams 披露材料》第 55 页。\n\n第五，Shams 教授分析了 HCN 和 HDO 底层“智能合约”中的软件代码。即，Shams 教授利用其专门知识审查并分析了管理 HCN 和 HDO 在互联网上如何运作的软件。《Shams 披露材料》第 57-58 页（“HCN 的实现[智能]合约由 14 个文件组成，以 solidity 编程语言编写。”）。基于对编程语言的审查，Shams 教授发表意见认为，HCN 和 HDO 的智能合约是“可变的，这意味着有人可以更改底层代码。”《Shams 披露材料》第 61 页。这种可变性与其他与加密货币交易所相关的\n\n26 与基准代币一样，HCN 和 HDO 与一家加密货币交易所——Himalaya Exchange——相关联。\n\n27 这是 Shams 教授进行的所有分析的相关时间范围，涵盖自 HCN/HDO 成立起至本刑事案件解封前一天止的期间。\n\n代币不符。同上。Shams 教授发表意见认为，这些可变性特征提供了额外的信息，表明 HCN 和 HDO 不像加密货币，因为加密货币是“去中心化的，[以]确保[ ]没有单一实体可以支配或控制数据或网络，使其能够抵御审查、合谋和单点故障。”《Shams 披露材料》第 4 页；参见同上，第 61 页。\n\n第六，Shams 教授对 HDO 据称持有的储备金进行了客观分析。作为背景，HDO 声称是一种“稳定币”，需要储备金或某种资产支持。正如 Shams 教授所解释的那样，“[储备金]对稳定币至关重要，因为它们充当抵押品或后盾，确保[其]持有者可以随时将其稳定币兑换为标的资产，从而维持稳定性。”28 《Shams 披露材料》第 67 页。29 Shams 教授审查了 Armanino 所作的一份审计报告，该审计此前曾被 Himalaya Exchange 大肆宣扬，并声称 Himalaya Exchange 为 HDO 持有 4.01 亿美元的储备金。Shams 教授发表意见认为，这 4.01 亿美元的储备金是不充分的。《Shams 披露材料》第 69 页。这是因为在进行审计时，已发行的 HDO 达到 15 亿美元。同上。此外，Shams 教授发表意见认为，根据其审查，他无法找到 HDO 具有黄金支持的任何证据，而这\n\n28 事实上，正如起诉书所指控的那样，郭文贵大肆宣扬 HDO 有黄金支持。参见《起诉书》第 19(a)(i) 段（“[它]具有货币的属性，为什么？它有 20% 的黄金。太棒了[。] [它]从第一天起就作为货币诞生，所以它具有价值，并且与黄金挂钩……直接对应实物黄金。无论它筹集多少资金，20% 都会变成黄金。”）；第 19(a)(ii) 段（“如果 H 币毫无价值，[H 币的发行方]可以卖掉全部 20% 的黄金，兑换给你，成为你的钱。或者把 20% 黄金的全部价值拿出来，要求大家统一起来，把它变成你的。”）。\n\n29 Shams 教授指出，在加密货币领域，储备金与运营资产的混同一直是欺诈的一个指标，并援引了 FTX 案和纽约州总检察长对 USDT 的调查。政府方无意让 Shams 教授就 FTX 或 USDT 调查提供证言。在 Shams 教授的披露材料中包含这些例子，是为了全面说明其所在领域的人员以及 Shams 教授在开展分析时所获悉并依赖的信息。\n\n正是郭文贵曾多次声称的内容。同上。\n\n最后，Shams 教授综合了这些单独的分析，就 HCN 和 HDO 的表现是否类似于典型的加密货币发表意见。Shams 教授得出的结论是它们并非如此。见《Shams 披露书》（Shams Disclosure）第 73 页（“结论摘要”）。也就是说，Shams 教授利用其在金融科技（FinTech）领域的专业知识，对 HCN 和 HDO 进行了多项可靠且可检验的分析。基于这些分析，Shams 教授提出了若干意见，包括 HCN 和 HDO 的表现不类似于加密货币，亦不具备与加密货币相一致的特征。同上。这些分析和意见将协助普通陪审员评估 HCN 和 HDO 究竟是加密货币，抑或仅仅是各被告人欺诈行为的一个组成部分。\n\nB. 适用法律\n\n根据《联邦证据规则》（Federal Rules of Evidence）第 702 条，在“专业知识将有助于事实审理者”的情况下，如果满足以下条件，专家证人可以提供意见证言：“[1] 该证言基于充足的事实或数据；[2] 该证言是可靠原理和方法的产物；以及 [3] 专家已将这些原理和方法可靠地应用于本案事实。” Fed. R. Evid. 702。提供专家证言的一方承担举证责任，须以优势证据证明该专家证言具有可采性。参见 United States v. Williams，506 F.3d 151, 160 (2d Cir. 2007)；Fed. R. Evid. 702 咨询委员会附注（2000 年）。初审法院必须“确保专家的证言既建立在可靠的基础之上，又与手头任务具有相关性。” Daubert v. Merrell Dow，509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)；亦见 Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.，303 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir. 2002)。“基于科学有效原理的相关证据将满足这些要求。” Daubert，509 U.S. at 597。为确定专家证言是否可靠，“地区法院应当考量第 702 条所确定的可靠性特征。” Amorgianos，303 F.3d at 265。具体而言，地区法院“必须侧重于专家所采用的原理和方法，\n\n而不考虑专家所达成的结论。” 同上，第 266 页。\n\n为了评估专家证言是否具有相关性，地区法院必须考量该证据是否具有“使对该诉讼的裁决具有重大影响的任何事实证据的存在比没有该证据时更具有可能性或更不具有可能性的任何倾向。” 同上，第 265 页。\n\nC. 论证理由\n\n在试图排除 Shams 教授的证言时，Kwok（郭文贵）攻击了其相关性以及 Shams 教授所采用的方法，并提出了第 403 条项下的问题。郭的所有主张均应予以驳回。事实上，其绝大多数主张都是基于一个错误的前提，即认为 Shams 教授拟提供的证言“未能提供专家意见”，而仅提供了“不具有相关性”的“事实陈述或观察”。见《郭的预审动议》（Kwok MIL）第 43 页。基于下述理由，郭的主张是错误的。\n\n1. Shams 教授的证言属于具有可采性的专家意见\n\n郭对 Shams 教授的首个攻击是其证言根本不是专家意见。《郭的预审动议》第 43 页。在提出该主张时，郭对 Shams 教授分析中的某些组成部分吹毛求疵，生造出一个概念，称 Shams 教授“仅仅提供了一系列事实陈述”。同上。往好里说，郭是只见树木不见森林。正如上文所述以及在《Shams 披露书》中所详述的那样，Shams 教授利用其专业知识，基于事实和数据进行了可靠的分析，并就此发表了意见。\n\na. Shams 教授关于 HCN 市值及价格走势的意见具有可采性\n\n首先，郭断言 Shams 教授关于 HCN 市值与其交易量比率的分析并非意见。《郭的预审动议》第 43 页。郭忽视了以下事实：将加密货币的市值作为一段时间内的平均值并与其交易量进行比较分析，需要普通陪审员所不具备的专业知识，但有助于其考量\n\n证据。参见 Jacobs v. Verizon Commc'ns Inc.，No. 16. Cv. 1082 (PGG) (RWL), 2023 WL 3027311, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2023)（在“关于该基金业绩的基础事实将呈现在事实审理者面前，[该专家]总结了将不同指标应用于事实时所显示的内容……从而将有助于事实审理者”的情况下，准许专家证言）；亦见 In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prod. Liab. Litig.，643 F. Supp. 2d 482, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)（“当此类陪审员的普通经验不足以理解案件的具体事实时，专家证人为外行人提供关键知识。”）。市值分析本身即具有可采性。但更切中要害的是，与郭的主张相反，Shams 教授利用市值分析的结果提出了一个意见：“HCN 的交易量似乎与其市值规模不相符。”《Shams 披露书》第 24 页（列出基于市值分析的意见）。这无疑是一项意见，且有助于陪审员评估 HCN 是否为合法的加密货币。30\n\n郭关于 Shams 教授市值意见及其关于 HCN 定价意见的其余论点均站不住脚。他抱怨 Shams 教授“并未表明他将作证或解释为何所谓的低‘市值比率’至关重要。”《郭的预审动议》第 44 页。并抱怨 Shams 教授没有解释 HCN 与 100 个规模相近的代币指数之间缺乏相关性有何“异常”之处。《郭的预审动议》第 45 页。但是 Shams 教授对\n\n30 如果郭是在抱怨专家不能就其据以提出意见的“事实”作证，那么这种主张是荒谬的，且与法律相悖。参见 Fed. R. Evid. 703（准许专家将其意见建立在“该特定领域的专家合理依赖的类型”的任何事实或数据之上）；U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. PHL Variable Life Ins. Co.，112 F. Supp. 3d 122, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)（裁定专家“获准依赖并非由专家自身作出的事实、意见和数据——包括本案中另一位专家进行的分析或作出的发现——即使这些事实、意见和数据在其他情况下不具有可采性”）。\n\n这两点都作出了解释。他的披露书指出，“学术研究发现加密货币与比特币[以及]整体加密市场之间存在强烈的正相关关系”。《Shams 披露书》第 36 页；同上，第 26 页（“关于加密货币的学术文献表明，加密货币的收益率呈正相关”）。然而，HCN 的价格走势结合其交易量等其他观察表明，“根据市场力量，HCN 的价格和市值似乎并不符合实际。”《Shams 披露书》第 74 页。也就是说，在 Shams 教授看来，HCN 较低的市值比率表明 HCN 的表现并不像典型的、合法的加密货币。同样，Shams 教授进行了严格的 R² 分析，以评估 HCN 与 100 个规模相近的代币之间的相关性。基于该测试，Shams 教授得出结论，HCN 与比特币以及一般的加密货币价格具有低相关性。《Shams 披露书》第 29-35 页。他进一步发表意见认为，HCN 与比特币定价之间缺乏相关性是“异常的”，并且“表明 HCN 的价格与交易中的加密货币价格脱节。”《Shams 披露书》第 36 页。也就是说，HCN 的价格表现与典型加密货币的表现不同，这与 HCN 是否为加密货币这一问题具有相关性。31\n\n31 郭还通过辩称 Shams 教授的证言涉及起诉书未指控的事项（如价格操纵）等理由，来攻击这些分析的相关性。《郭的预审动议》第 55 页。政府在庭审中并不受限于起诉书中的指控。United States v. Rigas，490 F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 2007)（“庭审中的证明无需、事实上也绝不可能与起诉书中包含的指控完全一致”（引文省略））；United States v. LaSpina，299 F.3d 165, 182 (2d Cir. 2002)（“只要属于共谋范围内，政府即可就未包含在起诉书中的行为提供证据。”（引文省略））。但是，即便政府受到此类限制，HCN 的价格不受市场力量支配这一事实也无疑与它是否为真正的加密货币这一问题具有相关性，因为真正的加密货币的定价与加密货币市场的走势高度相关。正如本法院所写，“相关性的门槛是‘低’的，而[提供]‘有助于陪审团确定案件争议事实的专业知识’的[专家]证言”具有可采性。Ripple Labs，2023 WL 5670711, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2023)（援引 United States v. Jones，No. 16 Cr. 553, 2018 WL 1115778, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2018)）。Shams 教授可靠、客观且可检验的分析表明，HCN 的定价与更广泛的经济力量脱节；这些分析\n\n市值分析和价格分析并非如郭所希望的那样是“对事实叙述的复述”。相反，它们是基于公认命题（即加密货币价格与比特币相关）的严格、客观的分析，且 Shams 教授据此提出了有助于事实审理者的意见。32\n\nb. Shams 教授关于 HCN 和 HDO 区块链的分析和意见具有可采性\n\n郭接下来攻击 Shams 教授对 HCN 和 HDO 区块链的分析，声称\n\n它们仅仅是来自公开记录的“技术观察”。《郭的预审动议》第 46-47 页。在此，郭\n\n同样忽视了 Shams 教授对 HDO 和 HCN 区块链数据的分析已被 Shams 教授用于\n\n形成一项意见，即“HCN 和 HDO 表现出的链上活动显著低于”\n\n越过了这道较低的相关性门槛。参见 Amorgianos，303 F.3d at 266（如果证据“具有使对该诉讼的裁决具有重大影响的任何事实证据的存在比没有该证据时更具有可能性或更不具有可能性的任何倾向”，则专家证言具有相关性）；亦见 Ripple Labs，2023 WL 5670711, at *17（即使某项意见“对本案的核心法律问题并非决定性的”，其亦可能具有相关性）。\n\n32 郭还对 Shams 选取的基准提出了异议。“专家经常使用基准作为对受审查证据进行比较的参照。” In re Digital Music Antitrust Litig.，321 F.R.D. 64, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)。Shams 教授在此这样做并无不同寻常之处。事实上，Shams 教授在其披露书中解释了基准是如何选取的。参见《Shams 披露书》第 15 页（“根据 CoinMarketCap 截至 2023 年 3 月 14 日按市值排名前列的中心化交易所代币”）；同上，第 27 页（“100 个规模相近的代币是根据在 2021 年 11 月 2 日市值与 HCN 最接近、非稳定币、且在样本期（2021 年 11 月 2 日至 2023 年 3 月 14 日）开始和结束时市值均非零而选出的”）；同上，第 38 页（“选定基准加密货币是因为它们是与加密货币交易所相关的代币”）。郭声称 Shams 教授对基准的选取是“道听途说的”，这种说法是错误的。《郭的预审动议》第 43-44 页。郭当然可以自由地不同意 Shams 教授所选择的基准，并且可以就这些选择对 Shams 教授进行交叉询问，但郭没有提出任何以此为由排除 Shams 教授的理由。参见 Gem Fin. Serv., Inc. v. City of New York，No. 13 Civ. 1686 (RPK) (RER), 2023 WL 4850523, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2023)（“对[专家]所使用的衡量标准的类比性争议关乎证明力，而非可采性”）；AngioDynamics, Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc.，No. 117 Civ. 00598 (BKS) (CFH), 2021 WL 2403107, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. June 11, 2021)（“通常的规则是类比性问题关乎证明力，而非可采性”）（汇总案例）。\n\n适用基准。Shams Disclosure 第 55 页；同上（将 HCN/HDO 区块链信息与基准进行比较）。因此，该区块链分析揭示了一种意见，但即使并非如此，陪审员也不具备审查 HCN/HDO 区块链并理解其含义所必需的专门知识，因此对区块链的技术分析具有可采性。Fed. R. Evid. 702(a)（允许专家提供“技术……知识”）；参见 United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001)（“地区法院不应采纳‘纯粹针对外行事项且陪审团无需专家协助即可理解和决定的’证言”）。\nc. Shams（沙姆斯）教授关于 HCN 和 HDO 智能合约的分析具有可采性。\n\n专家获准分析 HCN 和 HDO 的特征，特别是其底层软件代码，以对这些特征做出评估并向陪审团传达关于上述特征的意见。参见 Ripple Labs, 2023 WL 5670711, at *4（允许专家“就 [数字资产及其组成部分] XRP、XRP Ledger 和 ODL 的设计特征发表意见”）。而且，当然不能指望非专业的普通陪审员能够阅读并理解 HCN 或 HDO 智能合约的软件代码，因此 Shams 教授对此进行的技术分析理应具有可采性。同样，Shams 教授关于 HCN 和 HDO 与其他类似代币不同的意见也具有可采性，因为它们的智能合约是可更改的。参见 Shams Disclosure 第 61 页（“这与通常不可更改的典型交易所代币不同”）。同样，Kwok（郭文贵）充其量只是不同意 Shams 教授用来对比 HCN 和 HDO 的基准。United States v. Romano, 859 F. Supp. 2d 445, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd, 794 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2015)（即使意见包含“主观成分”，当意见依赖于“成熟的行业标准、出版物和市场趋势”时，允许专家作证）。郭文贵的不同意见适合留待交叉询问。如果存在具有可更改智能合约的类似代币，这完全可以通过交叉询问进行检验，而非予以排除。参见 Washington v. Kellwood Co., 105 F. Supp. 3d 293, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)（“尽管在被告看来，[专家的] 标尺分析 [一种基准对比形式] 的基础证据可能单薄、可疑或出于自利而具有选择性，但我们作为看门人的角色并不是剥夺被告在事实审理者面前质疑此类证据证明力的任务”）。\n\n郭文贵接下来声称，Shams 教授“仅凭他的一面之词”就认定典型的加密货币所有权是多元化的——而 HCN 和 HDO 则由单一实体持有。Kwok MIL 第 49 页。该论点忽视了 Shams 教授所进行的分析。参见 Shams Disclosure 第 39-54 页。Shams 教授评估了 HCN/HDO 与其他类似代币相比的所有权集中度，以客观地表明 HCN 和 HDO 的所有权集中度属于非典型情况。（Shams Disclosure 第 39-54 页。）此外，Shams 教授能够提出意见，认为 HCN 和 HDO 的所有权集中度（经他分析大于 99.999%）与 Shams 教授深入研究过的广泛加密货币相比是一个显著的离群值。这种评估属于适当且可采的专家证言。参见 Fort Worth Emps. Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 301 F.R.D. 116, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（当专家“将其证言建立在实际经验而非科学分析的基础上时，法院承认各类专家都是通过利用……从专业经验中得出的普遍真理将观察与结论联系起来”）（改动和内部引号省略）。郭文贵指责 Shams 教授关于这种高度集中的所有权“背离了区块链的去中心化本质”的意见，这也是错误的。Kwok MIL 第 50 页（引用 Shams Disclosure 第 64 页）。HCN 和 HDO 超过 99.999% 由单一实体拥有是一个独特因素，与 Shams 教授分析的任何基准都不同，根据 Rule 702，Shams 教授获准就高度集中所有权的意义发表意见。情况尤其如此，因为该意见有助于为 Shams 教授关于 HCN 和 HDO 是否像真实加密货币的总体结论提供依据。Shams Disclosure 第 73-74 页。再次强调，如果郭文贵希望质疑或削弱 Shams 教授关于 99.999% 的所有权集中度在其他加密货币中属于非典型的意见，那完全适于作为交叉询问的主题。United States v. Jones, 965 F.3d 149, 160 (2d Cir. 2020)（维持初审法院的裁决，初审法院认定关于 DNA 工具的“潜在假设”问题“最好由陪审团听取，陪审团可以据此调整其赋予此类证据的证明力”）。\n\n郭文贵声称 Shams 教授不能分析 HCN 和 HDO 所提供或缺乏的特征，这一论点也是错误的。Kwok MIL 第 50 页。此类证言没有任何不当之处。参见 In re Celsius Network LLC, 655 B.R. 301, 310 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2023)（采纳关于“没有内在价值”的加密货币价值的专家证言）。此外，HCN 和 HDO 缺乏特征和创新技术的情况，为 Shams 教授关于 HCN 异常价格行为的意见提供了依据。Shams 教授在庭审期间不会提供 HCN/HDO 智能合约的可更改性“将”导致投资者损失的证言，参见 Kwok MIL 第 51 页；相反，他只是表明该特征意味着 HCN 和 HDO 最终由单一实体——Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）——所控制，而这应该削弱其价值而非导致其暴涨。33\n2. Shams 教授的证言具有可靠性\n\n郭文贵接下来主张 Shams 教授的总体方法不可靠。郭文贵是错误的。在\n\n33 在庭审中，政府不会要求 Shams 教授提供将 HCN/HDO 与其他欺诈性加密货币进行比较的证言，除非辩方主动开启此类证言的大门。披露中包含与 Squid Game（鱿鱼游戏币）和 CP3R 的比较，是为了证明 Shams 教授对智能合约可更改性的看法并非推测，而是基于记录在案的实际发生事件。\n\nDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) 一案中，最高法院解释称，初审法院必须确定“[专家] 证言所依据的推理或方法是否……有效，以及……该推理或方法是否可以正确应用于争议事实。”同上，第 592-93 页；另见 United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir. 1995)。法院审查受到质疑的专家证言时，应符合“联邦证据规则宽松的可采性标准，并承认我们的对抗制为质疑可靠但可辩驳的专家证言提供了必要的工具”。Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 267。即使“专家推理中的微小瑕疵，或对原本可靠方法的轻微修改，也不会使专家的意见本身不可采。”同上。事实上，法院“不应仅仅因为 [地区法院] 认为专家的调查过程中存在瑕疵导致专家的结论不正确而排除证据。法官只有在该瑕疵重大到导致专家对其结论缺乏‘充分理由’时，才应排除该证据。”In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 746 (3d Cir. 1994)。\n\nShams 教授的各项分析均具有可靠性、客观性和可检验性。34 Shams 教授方法的可靠性得到了分析本身的佐证——他的基准提供了充分的支持，以证明 HCN/HDO 与加密货币截然不同，并且该信息对非专业陪审员是有帮助的。Shams 教授将 HCN 的市值和交易量与其他类似代币进行了比较——HCN 是一个离群值。接着，Shams 教授将 HCN 的价格走势与更广泛的加密货币市场进行了比较——HCN 是一个离群值。随后，Shams 教授分析了 HCN 和 HDO 区块链上的交易量和所有权集中度，并将其与其他交易所代币进行了比较——HCN 和 HDO 是离群值。Shams 教授还分析了\n\n34 郭文贵完全可以自行进行这些分析，因为政府已经向被告提供了 Shams 教授用于形成其意见的所有底层数据。\n\n控制 HCN 和 HDO 的软件代码，并将其特征与处于类似地位的代币进行了比较——HCN 和 HDO 再次成为离群值。因此，这些分析是针对一方面为 HCN 和 HDO、另一方面为其他具有可比性的数字资产所进行的若干不同对比。每一次，HCN 和 HDO 都表现异常，并且不像真正的加密货币。\n3. Shams 教授关于 HDO 储备的证言具有可采性\n\n郭文贵主张 Shams 教授不应被允许就 HDO 的储备作证。郭文贵抱怨称 Shams 教授就此问题的意见不当地基于传闻，因为 Shams 教授分析了 HDO 的白皮书。但 HDO 的白皮书属于郭文贵的代理人和同谋者的陈述，因此不属于传闻。参见 Gov't MIL 第 2-11 页；另见 Scott v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 315 F.R.D. 33, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)（“专家证言……在以精简向陪审团展示数据的方式‘综合’或‘总结’数据，从而为陪审团节省时间并避免不必要混淆的情况下，具有可采性”（改动和引文省略））。郭文贵还抱怨称 Shams 教授不应就数据“未”显示的内容发表意见——具体而言，即他没有观察到黄金支持 HDO 的证据。参见 Kwok MIL 第 54 页。但 Rule 702 并不妨碍专家就证据“不支持”的论题发表意见。参见 In re Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 638 F. Supp. 3d 227, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2022)（如果属于其专业领域，允许专家就“证据未显示”的内容发表意见）。同样，如果郭文贵试图质疑 Shams 教授的意见——例如，如果他认为存在黄金支持 HDO 的证据——那么他完全可以通过有力的交叉询问来检验 Shams 教授在此问题上的意见。\n\n最后，郭文贵依据 Rule 403 提出抗辩，认为 Shams 教授将 HCN 和 HDO 的特征与其他缺乏技术进步或适销性的代币进行比较，应作为具有不当偏见的内容予以排除。Kwok MIL 第 55-56 页。这些比较并不具有不当偏见。它们恰当地为 HCN 和 HDO 提供了背景，并进一步解释了为什么 HCN 的定价和市值并不表明 HCN 和 HDO 的表现类似于典型的加密货币。\nXII. 政府遵守了其在 Brady 规则下的义务\n\n郭文贵请求法院下令要求政府披露其占有的任何“口头传达”的 Brady 材料。政府承认并认真对待其在 Brady 规则下的义务。在政府已确定属于 Brady 材料或其他应予披露材料的范围内，政府均已予以披露。这包括口头传达的陈述——政府已通过信函或出具关于这些陈述的记录向辩护律师披露了这些陈述。因此，郭文贵关于强制出示口头传达的 Brady 材料的命令请求应作为无实际意义（moot）予以驳回。参见例如 United States v. Sezanayev, No. 17 Cr. 262 (LGS), 2018 WL 2324077, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2018)（“政府关于其持续遵守 Brady 披露义务的善意声明即已足够”）。\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，法院应驳回被告的预先排除证据动议（motions in limine），并批准政府的预先排除证据动议。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯）\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区）联邦检察官\n\n签署人：/s/\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\nRyan B. Finkel\nJustin Horton\nJuliana N. Murray\n助理联邦检察官\n(212) 637-2190 / 6612 / 2276 / 2314\n\n日期：April 17, 2024 New York, New York（纽约州纽约市）","key_entities":["Kwok","GTV","Je","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","CIPA","Saraca","Farm Loan","Guo","Brady","CCP","RICO","Miles Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Horton","Fergenson","Murray","Finkel","GETTR","Despins","Wang Yanping","Yanping Wang","Kin Ming Je","Torres","MSS"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":23,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":219,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":255,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":267,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":273,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":372,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":610,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":19411,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-04-17 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-04-17","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:27:29"}