{"id":"court_sdny_311_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":311,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2024-04-29","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"证据准入令（一）——美国诉Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）及Yvette Wang案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #311（2024年4月29日）。法院就控方与被告的多项证据准入动议作出裁决，涉及社交媒体证据、破产诉讼、虚假许诺等事项；第三次修订起诉书已提交。","summary_en":"Motions in Limine Ruling (Part I)—United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo) and Yvette Wang, SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #311 (April 29, 2024). Court ruled on multiple evidentiary motions from Government and Defendants regarding social media evidence, bankruptcy litigation, false promises, and related matters; Third Superseding Indictment had been filed.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n-against-\n\nMILES GUO and YVETTE WANG,\n\nDefendants.\n\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge:\n\nThe Court has reviewed the motions *in limine* filed by the Government and Defendants,\n\nMiles Guo and Yvette Wang.<sup>1</sup> This order addresses all but one of Guo and Wang’s requests, and\n\ntwo of the Government’s motions that overlap with Guo and Wang’s requests.<sup>2</sup> Guo Mem., ECF\n\nNo. 269; Wang Mem., ECF No. 266; Gov. Mem., ECF No. 273. The Court shall rule on the\n\nremaining motions by separate order.\n\nGuo makes the following requests:\n\n- 1. To exclude evidence of Guo and his followers' responses to his critics (\"Guo Motion 1\"), Guo Mem. at 17, ECF No. 271: **DENIED**.\n- 2. To exclude evidence concerning the contempt order issued in *Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan et al.*, No. 652077/2017 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2017) (the \"PAX Litigation\") (\"Guo Motion 2\"), Guo Mem. at 23: **DENIED**. 3\n- 3. To exclude evidence related to his bankruptcy cases (\"Guo Motion 3\"), Guo Mem. at 25: **DENIED**. 4\n- 4. To exclude evidence related to allegations of against Guo (\"Guo Motion 4\"), Guo Mem. at 30: **DENIED AS MOOT**.\n\nUSDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ DATE FILED: 04/29/2024\n\n# 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n## **ORDER**\n\n<sup>1</sup> A grand jury returned a third superseding indictment (\"S3\") in this matter on April 24, 2024. S3, ECF No. 307. S3 identifies Defendants as \"Miles Guo\" and \"Yvette Wang,\" the names by which they are primarily known, instead of \"Ho Wan Kwok\" and \"Yanping Wang.\" *Id.*; see ECF No. 308. This order refers to Defendants by those names.\n\n<sup>2</sup> The Court shall address Guo's request to exclude the Government's cryptocurrency expert by separate order.\n\n<sup>3</sup> Conversely, the Government moves to introduce certain evidence related to the PAX Litigation and Guo's bankruptcy cases (\"Government Motion 6\"), Gov. Mem. at 27–28, 31. The motion is **GRANTED.**\n\n<sup>4</sup> *See supra* n.3.\n\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n\nWang makes the following requests:\n\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n-\n\nUnless otherwise indicated, the Court's decisions on the motions *in limine* are without prejudice to renewal at trial if an appropriate basis for the objection arises.\n\n#### **DISCUSSION**\n\n#### I. Guo Motion 1\n\nGuo moves to preclude the Government from introducing evidence about his and his followers' responses to his critics. Guo Mem. at 17. Specifically, Guo objects to the use of his social media posts, protests organized by him, and a lawsuit filed by a \"Farm\" against a critic of Guo. *Id*.\n\nFirst, Guo contends that permitting the Government to introduce his statements condemning political adversaries would impermissibly allow protected First Amendment activity to \"form the basis of [his] criminal prosecution.\" *Id*. The Court disagrees. The lawfulness of the statements is not at issue, and \"the First Amendment does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent.\" *United States v. Salameh*, 152 F.3d 88, 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting *Wisconsin v. Mitchell*, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) (cleaned up)); *see id.* (distinguishing between an impermissible prosecution for reading terrorist materials and a permissible prosecution that relied on the reading materials \"to prove the existence of the bombing conspiracy and its motive\").\n\nSecond, Guo argues that this information is irrelevant. Guo Mem. at 19–22. The Government seeks to offer the social media statements, protests, and lawsuit to show that \"[Guo] labeled those who posed a threat to [the G Enterprise<sup>6</sup>] as ‘traitors’ and CCP ‘spies’ or ‘agents’ and directed his followers to harass those individuals.\" Gov. Opp. at 13, ECF No. 290. As such,\n\n<sup>6</sup> In S3, the Government refers to the alleged criminal racketeering enterprise as the \"G Enterprise,\" instead of the \"Kwok Enterprise,\" the name used in S2. S3 ¶ 1; *see* ECF No. 308. This order, therefore, uses the \"G Enterprise\" when referring to the alleged racketeering enterprise.\n\nthe evidence directly bears upon the indictment's allegation that one of the means and methods used by the purported RICO enterprise was \"[h]arassing, threatening, and silencing critics\" of Guo.<sup>7</sup> S3 ¶ 8(e), ECF No. 307; *see United States v. Diaz*, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (\"[U]ncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself.\"). To the extent that the harassing conduct introduced at trial includes physical violence, the parties may propose a limiting instruction. *See United States v. Frank*, 749 F. App'x 5, 9 (2d Cir. 2018). Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.\n\n#### II. Guo Motion 2 and Government Motion 6\n\nIn 2017, a New York state court found Guo liable for breach of contract in an action brought by Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (\"PAX\") and \"ordered him to pay \\$116,402,016.57.\" Guo Mem. at 10. To satisfy the judgment, the state court ordered Guo to transport \"a yacht . . . to the jurisdiction of the court.\" *Id.* at 10–11. \"When the vessel was not returned on time,\" the state court found Guo in contempt in February 2022 \"and imposed mounting fines\" (the \"PAX Contempt Order\"). *Id.* at 11 (citing *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok*, No. 652077/2017, NYSCEF No. 1181 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Feb. 9, 2022)).\n\nThe Government seeks to offer evidence pertaining to the PAX Litigation and PAX Contempt Order as (1) background to Guo's February 15, 2022 bankruptcy filing, (2) background to the existence of the charged RICO enterprise, and (3) evidence of \"the intent with which certain acts were performed—including, for example, [codefendant Kin Ming] Je's transfer of \\$37 million in Himalaya Exchange fraud proceeds to [Guo]'s daughter to avoid [Guo]'s being assessed substantial civil penalties for his obstructive conduct in transferring the\n\n<sup>7</sup> Guo claims that the social media statements, protests, and lawsuit are part of the \"Chinese pro-democracy movement,\" and therefore cannot demonstrate the existence of the G Enterprise. Guo Mem. at 20. That is a fact issue for the jury to decide.\n\n[yacht] outside the jurisdiction\" of the New York court. Gov. Mem. at 31; *see id.* at 27–28; Gov. Opp. at 17–19. Guo moves to preclude the Government from introducing the PAX Contempt Order into evidence, contending that it is irrelevant, risks confusing the jury, and is unfairly prejudicial. Guo Mem. at 23.\n\nThe \\$37 million transfer is direct evidence of Guo's ability to \"use the Himalaya Exchange funds for his benefit.\" Gov. Opp. at 18. Moreover, as discussed in Section III *infra*, certain evidence from Guo's bankruptcy is admissible as direct evidence. Because the PAX Litigation prompted the \\$37 million transfer, and the PAX Contempt Order precipitated the bankruptcy filing, they are \"inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense\" such that they are \"necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial.\" *United States v. Quinones*, 511 F.3d 289, 309 (2d Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).\n\nGuo argues that this evidence is unfairly prejudicial because the jury will be tempted to \"simply defer to the [s]tate [c]ourt's view.\" Guo Opp. at 22, ECF No. 287; *see* Guo Mem. at 24. A court may admit court rulings into evidence \"for the fact that they were rendered.\" *Chevron Corp. v. Donziger*, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 605–06 & n.1560 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), *aff'd*, 833 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2016). However, \"statements and conclusions in court rulings and documents\" are hearsay and cannot be offered for the truth of the matter asserted \"absent a relevant exception.\" *Id.* The Government does not seek to offer this evidence of the truth of the matter, Gov. Opp. at 23 n.12, and any risk of prejudice can be cured by a limiting instruction. *See United States v. Snype*, 441 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 2006).\n\nAccordingly, the Government's motion is GRANTED, and Guo's is DENIED.\n\n#### III. Guo Motion 3, Wang Motion 6, and Government Motion 6\n\nOn February 15, 2022, Guo filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut. *See* ECF Nos. 204, 250 (summarizing procedural history). Guo moves to exclude evidence pertaining to his bankruptcy. Guo Mem. at 11, 25. The Government, conversely, moves to introduce \"particularly probative evidence from the bankruptcy proceedings\": (1) the fact that Guo declared bankruptcy, and (2) evidence of Guo's \"obstructive behavior\" in connection with his bankruptcy proceedings. Gov. Opp. at 19–24; Gov. Mem. at 29–31.\n\n#### A. Guo's Bankruptcy Declaration\n\nFirst, Guo's declaration of bankruptcy is direct evidence of the charged fraud conduct. The Government argues that Guo's \"portrayal of himself as a billionaire in a position to personally guarantee his victims' investments was a critical part of the scheme to defraud investors.\" Gov. Opp. at 20. The reality of Guo's finances, therefore, bears on whether he knew his representations to investors were false. *See United States v. Reifler*, 446 F.3d 65, 95 (2d Cir. 2006) (\"The scheme-to-defraud element [of wire fraud] is construed broadly to encompass everything designed to defraud by representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future.\" (cleaned up)).\n\nGuo contends that the bankruptcy postdates the charged conduct and is, therefore, irrelevant. Guo Mem. at 26–27. He is incorrect. The indictment alleges unlawful conduct through March 2023. *See, e.g.*, S3 ¶¶ 1, 24, 28, 32, 37. Guo's declaration of bankruptcy in 2022 and the subsequent proceedings fall within the relevant time period. *See* Gov. Opp. at 21 (\"[T]he Government's evidence at trial will include video-recorded broadcasts by [Guo] which post-date his bankruptcy, in which he continued to personally guarantee any investor losses.\").\n\nGuo also argues that the bankruptcy is personal to him and, therefore, cannot be introduced as uncharged conduct of the G Enterprise's existence, means, or methods. Guo Mem. at 25–26. The Government disputes that Guo's bankruptcy was personal to him and alleges that Guo used the G Enterprise \"to obscure and conceal the assets, including fraud proceeds.\" Gov. Opp. at 20 n.10; *see* S3. Indeed, Guo's bankruptcy has precipitated adversary proceedings by the bankruptcy trustee against twelve entities that the Government alleges comprise the G Enterprise and were used to launder money. *See* ECF No. 219 at 4, 9; S3 ¶ 3(a). Accordingly, the Court shall not bar the Government from arguing that Guo's bankruptcy filing was part of the G Enterprise's means and methods.<sup>8</sup>\n\nGuo further contends that the bankruptcy evidence \"run[s] afoul of Rule 403\" because of the stigma attached to filing for bankruptcy. Guo Mem. at 29. The Court finds that the potential prejudice is outweighed by the highly probative value of the evidence.\n\n### B. Obstruction of Bankruptcy Proceedings\n\nSecond, the Government moves to offer evidence of Guo and his followers' harassment of the bankruptcy trustee and obstruction of the bankruptcy proceedings. *See* Gov. Opp. at 22– 23. For example, as part of the obstruction evidence, the Government seeks to demonstrate that Guo's followers modified the Mahwah property after his arrest, which was discovered during the bankruptcy trustee's September 2023 walkthrough of the Mahwah property*. Id.* at 23–24. Guo claims that the Government has neither laid a proper foundation for this evidence nor tied the purported conduct to Guo. Guo Opp. at 22–23. The harassment and obstruction evidence is\n\n<sup>8</sup> As the Court previously stated in denying Guo's request to stay the bankruptcy proceedings, \"determinations in the Bankruptcy Court . . . are not dispositive in [Guo]'s criminal case, which requires a higher burden of proof.\" ECF No. 204 at 8. And, the fact that the bankruptcy trustee initiated adversary proceedings against an entity that he alleges to be an alter ego of Guo—if offered for the truth of the matter—is inadmissible as hearsay. *Chevron Corp.*, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 605–06 & n.1560.\n\nrelevant to the Government's allegations about the means and methods of the G Enterprise, *see* S3 ¶ 8(b), and the Court shall not preclude its use at this time. However, Guo may raise any valid foundation objections at trial.\n\nAccordingly, the Government's motion to offer certain evidence pertaining to the bankruptcy proceedings is GRANTED, and Guo's motion to exclude such evidence is DENIED.\n\nC. Wang Motion 6\n\nWang, for her part, requests that the Court \"prohibit the government from introducing findings in other judicial proceedings,\" including Guo's bankruptcy proceedings, arguing that this is inadmissible hearsay. Wang Mem. at 14–15. The Court interprets Wang's motion as seeking to preclude the Government from offering judicial findings from other proceedings for their truth. As discussed above, the Government states that it does not seek to offer such evidence for the truth of the matter. Gov. Opp. at 23 n.12. Therefore, Wang's motion is DENIED as moot.\n\n#### IV. Guo Motion 4\n\nGuo moves to preclude evidence related to allegations of against him. Guo Mem. at 30. Because the Government does not intend to offer such evidence, Gov. Opp. at 39, the motion is DENIED as moot.\n\n#### V. Guo Motion 5 and Wang Motion 2\n\nGuo and Wang move to preclude the Government from using the terms \"shell company/corporation,\" \"figurehead executives,\" \"straw owners,\" \"alter ego,\" and similar terms at trial, arguing that the terms are unfairly pejorative and prejudicial. Guo Mem. at 34; Wang Mem. at 4.\n\nIt is true that at least one court in this Circuit has found that the terms \"'shell company' and 'shell corporation' could be perceived to have a pejorative meaning.\" *United States v. Watts*, 934 F. Supp. 2d 451, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). But, to the extent that the terms accurately describe entities and individuals at issue, the Court cannot agree that they are unfairly prejudicial. *See United States v. Runner*, No. 18 Cr. 578, 2023 WL 3727532, at \\*5 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2023) (ruling that the term \"shell company,\" if accurate, is \"neutral\"); *Shell corporation*, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining the term as \"[a] corporation that has no active business and usu[ally] exists only in name as a vehicle for another company's business operations\"). The Government shall not be precluded from using the challenged terms at trial, provided that it lays a sufficient factual predicate beforehand showing that the terms are appropriate. Accordingly, Guo and Wang's motions are DENIED.\n\n#### VI. Guo Motion 6\n\nGuo moves to preclude the Government from referring to the property at 675 Ramapo Valley Road, Mahwah, New Jersey, as the \"Mahwah Mansion.\" Guo Mem. at 35. Instead, he proposes that the Court order the parties to refer to the property by its street address. *Id.*\n\n\"While evidence of . . . wealth . . . can unduly prejudice jury deliberations,\" there is no *per se* rule against the introduction of such evidence. *United States v. Quattrone*, 441 F.3d 153, 187 (2d Cir. 2006). Given the property's historic names—the \"Crocker Mansion\" and the \"Darlington Mansion\"—the Court does not find referring to the property as the \"Mahwah Mansion\" unduly prejudicial or inflammatory. Gov. Opp. at 34. The motion is DENIED.\n\n#### VII. Guo Motion 7\n\nGuo moves to exclude evidence related to his invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights in the bankruptcy proceedings. Guo Mem. at 36. The motion is DENIED as moot as the Government does not intend to offer such evidence. Gov. Opp. at 25 n.14.\n\n#### VIII. Guo Motion 8\n\nGuo moves for an order compelling the Government to produce any orally communicated *Brady* information in its possession. He claims that the Government's productions indicate that it has been in contact with \"individuals associated with entities of the alleged [G] Enterprise\" that may have *Brady* material. Guo Mem. at 36–37. The Government represents that it has disclosed all *Brady* material in its possession through \"letters or by producing notes of [orally communicated] statements.\" Gov. Opp. at 56. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as moot.\n\n#### IX. Guo Motion 9\n\nGuo moves to reserve his right to challenge the introduction of document metadata, which he states the Government may seek to use to prove he \"authored, accessed, edited or reviewed a particular document.\" Guo Mem. at 58. The motion is GRANTED. The Government's request to similarly reserve its right with regard to unauthenticated metadata is also GRANTED. *See* Gov. Opp. at 38.\n\n### X. Wang Motion 1\n\nWang moves to exclude evidence that Fund-1, the alleged recipient of funds from the GTV Private Placement, \"ultimately . . . lost approximately \\$30 million in value.\" Wang Mem. at 1 (cleaned up). She contends that loss is not an element of the substantive mail or wire fraud charges, that there are no allegations she benefited from the transfer, and that the evidence risks confusing the issues and distracting the jury. *Id.* at 2–3.\n\nThe motion is DENIED. As the Second Circuit has explained, evidence of financial loss may be relevant to show that a defendant \"acted with corrupt intent to steer\" funds toward a \"risky investment in order to enrich himself.\" *United States v. Seabrook*, 814 F. App'x 661, 662 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding \"loss evidence\" relevant in honest services fraud case). \"Fraudulent intent is essential to a scheme to defraud,\" an element of the mail and wire fraud offenses. *United States v. Dinome*, 86 F.3d 277, 283 (2d Cir. 1996) (cleaned up). And, the Government intends to introduce Guo's \"video-recorded false statements regarding the losses,\" which were purportedly made to con investors \"into continuing to make investments in GTV.\" Gov. Opp. at 4. The fact of the losses is necessary to complete that narrative. *See Old Chief v. United States*, 519 U.S. 172, 188–89 (1997).\n\n#### XI. Wang Motion 3\n\nWang moves to prohibit the Government from arguing that the GTV Private Placement is an improper unregistered offering, contending that \"doing so risks a constructive amendment to the [i]ndictment, a prejudicial variance, and confusion of the issues.\" Wang Mem. at 7. She argues that the indictment alleges securities fraud related to Defendants' \"false statements and misrepresentations\" about \"the purpose and use of victims' money\"—not their noncompliance with the relevant registration rules. *Id.*\n\nA constructive amendment of the indictment occurs when \"the presentation of evidence . . . so modif[ies] essential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment.\" *United States v. D'Amelio*, 683 F.3d 412, 415 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting *United States v. Mollica*, 849 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir. 1988)) (emphasis omitted). A variance occurs \"when the charging terms of the indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence at trial proves\n\nfacts materially different from those alleged in the indictment.\" *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Salmonese*, 352 F.3d 608, 621 (2d Cir. 2003)). Constructive amendments are considered prejudicial per se, while variances require a showing of prejudice to the defendants in order to constitute reversible error. *Mollica*, 849 F.2d at 730 (citation omitted).\n\nStill, the Circuit has \"consistently permitted significant flexibility in proof, provided that the defendant was given notice of the core of criminality to be proven at trial.\" *United States v. Rigas*, 490 F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis and citation omitted). \"The 'core of criminality' of an offense involves the essence of a crime, in general terms; the particulars of how a defendant effected the crime falls outside that purview.\" *D'Amelio*, 683 F.3d at 418.\n\nThe Government has provided the necessary notice here. Contrary to Wang's concerns, the Government does not seek to prosecute Defendants only for \"engaging in an unregistered, non-exempt offering.\" Wang Mem. at 7; *see* Gov. Opp. at 12. Instead, the indictment states that, to \"evade\" limitations on the types of investors who may be solicited for such an offering, \"Guo and others under his control used at least one intermediary entity to purchase GTV stock\" on behalf of ineligible individuals. S3 ¶ 16(g). As the Government explains, the alleged \"core of criminality\" \"boil[s] down to conning inexperienced and unsophisticated investors out of their money,\" and the decision not to register the GTV offering was one means of achieving that end. Gov. Opp. at 7. The motion is DENIED.\n\n#### XII. Wang Motion 4\n\nWang moves to exclude evidence of her compensation or the condominium allegedly gifted to her. Wang Mem. at 9; *see* S3 ¶ 5. Contrary to Wang's contentions, the Government need not show that her salary was \"derived from fraud proceeds\" for the evidence to be relevant. Wang Mem. at 11. \"Evidence that links a defendant's financial compensation to [her] possible\n\nmotives for participating in an alleged fraud is relevant to proving the fraud.\" *United States v. Ferguson*, No. 06 Cr. 137, 2007 WL 4240782, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Nov. 30, 2007); *see United States v. Quattrone*, 441 F.3d 153, 187 (2d Cir. 2006). The Government intends to introduce evidence showing that \"Wang's salary was paid to compensate her for her role in the [G] Enterprise,\" giving her a \"financial motive to participate in the Enterprise.\" Gov. Opp. at 25.\n\nAs to the condominium, the Government states that it \"does not presently intend to offer evidence regarding Wang's condominium purchase at trial.\" *Id.* at 26 n.16. The motion is, therefore, DENIED as to Wang's salary and DENIED AS MOOT as to her condominium.\n\n#### XIII. Wang Motion 5\n\nWang moves to preclude the Government from \"asking investors or other witnesses general hypothetical questions, such as 'would you have liked to know [x]' or 'would [x] have been important to you,' without reference to alleged promises or statements that were actually made to investors or others in connection with alleged investments at issue.\" Wang Mem. at 14. In a securities fraud case, investor testimony can be relevant to whether a defendant's alleged misstatements or omissions were material. *See United States v. Gramins*, 939 F.3d 429, 446 –47 (2d Cir. 2019). The Second Circuit has expressly held that, when \"hypothetical questions utilize[] facts that ha[ve] been independently established in the record,\" \"[a] witness may testify to the fact of what he did not know and how, if he had known that independently established fact, it would have affected his conduct or behavior.\" *United States v. Cuti*, 720 F.3d 453, 459 (2d Cir. 2013). The defense is free to \"challeng[e] the factual accuracy of the disputed testimony\" at trial. *Id.*\n\nThe Government may ask witnesses hypothetical questions that fall within the *Cuti* framework if the proper foundation is established. The motion is DENIED.\n\n#### XIV. Wang Motion 7 and Government Motion 23\n\nThe Government moves to admit evidence that Guo and Wang\n\n. Gov. Mem. at 71–72. Wang, who moves to exclude the evidence, argues that the record contains abundant evidence of her close relationship with Guo, and that the is \"highly sensitive\" and touches on a \"complicated moral issue.\" Wang Mem. at 16–17.\n\nUnder Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of a criminal defendant's other acts may be admissible \"for any purpose except to show criminal propensity.\" *United States v. Germosen*, 139 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1998). In conspiracy cases, prior acts may be admissible \"to explain the mutual trust that existed between coconspirators.\" *United States v. Rosa*, 11 F.3d 315, 334 (2d Cir. 1993).\n\nThe Government offers the evidence of Guo and Wang's\n\n(\n\nfor a proper non-propensity purpose: \"to prove the two co-defendants had a level of trust significant enough to operate a vast RICO enterprise with each other.\" Gov. Opp. at 29. The question, therefore, is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to Wang. Fed. R. Evid. 403.\n\nThe probative value of the , while not substantial, is nonzero. *Cf. United States v. Stanley*, No. 09 Cr. 141, 2010 WL 1633459, at \\*1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2010)\n\n). The same is true of the risk of prejudice: although some jurors may have opinions about the , it is not \"more inflammatory than the charged crime[s].\" *United States v. Livoti*, 196 F.3d 322, 326 (2d\n\nCir. 1999). Because the probative value and risk of prejudice are roughly in equipoise, the Court\n\neclines to exclude the [REDACTED] evidence under Rule 403.\n\nAccordingly, the motion is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.\n\nXV. Wang Motion 8\n\nFinally, Wang reserves the right to make further motions in limine. The request is\n\nGRANTED.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nDated: April 29, 2024\\nNew York, New York\n\n[Signature]","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国），\n-诉-\nMILES GUO（郭文贵）及 YVETTE WANG（王雁平），\n被告。\n\n地区法官 ANALISA TORRES（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯）：\n\n本院已审阅 Government（政府方）与被告 Miles Guo（郭文贵）及 Yvette Wang（王雁平）提交的预先排除证据动议（motions in limine）。1 本裁定对郭与王除一项之外的所有请求，以及政府方与郭和王的请求相重叠的两项动议作出处理。2 郭案备忘录，ECF No. 269；王案备忘录，ECF No. 266；政府方备忘录，ECF No. 273。本院将另行下达裁定对剩余动议作出裁决。\n\n郭提出以下请求：\n\n- 1. 排除郭及其追随者对批评者作出回应的证据（“郭之动议 1”），郭案备忘录第 17 页，ECF No. 271：驳回。\n- 2. 排除涉及在 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan et al.，No. 652077/2017 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2017)（“PAX 诉讼案”）中所作出的藐视法庭裁定的证据（“郭之动议 2”），郭案备忘录第 23 页：驳回。3\n- 3. 排除与其破产案件相关的证据（“郭之动议 3”），郭案备忘录第 25 页：驳回。4\n- 4. 排除与针对郭的指控相关的证据（“郭之动议 4”），郭案备忘录第 30 页：因已失去实际意义而驳回。\n\nUSDC SDNY 电子归档文件 文件编号：__________________ 归档日期：04/29/2024\n\n23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n裁定\n\n1 大陪审团于 2024 年 4 月 24 日就本案提交了第三份替代起诉书（“S3”）。S3，ECF No. 307。S3 将被告载明为其主要为人所知的姓名“Miles Guo”和“Yvette Wang”，而非“Ho Wan Kwok”和“Yanping Wang”。同上；见 ECF No. 308。本裁定以这些名称指称各被告。\n\n2 本院将另行下达裁定处理郭关于排除政府方加密货币专家的请求。\n\n3 相反，政府方提议引入与 PAX 诉讼案及郭的破产案件相关的某些证据（“政府方动议 6”），政府方备忘录第 27–28、31 页。该动议予以准许。\n\n4 见上文脚注 3。\n\n王提出以下请求：\n\n除非另有说明，本院对预先排除证据动议所作的裁决，均不妨碍在庭审中一旦出现适当的异议依据时重新提出。\n\n讨论\n\nI. 郭之动议 1\n\n郭提议禁止政府方引入关于其本人及其追随者对批评者作出回应的证据。郭案备忘录第 17 页。具体而言，郭反对使用其社交媒体发帖、由其组织的抗议活动，以及某个“农场”针对郭的一名批评者提起的诉讼。同上。\n\n首先，郭主张，允许政府方引入其谴责政治对手的言论，将不可容许地使受 First Amendment（第一修正案）保护的行为“构成对[其]刑事起诉的基础”。同上。本院不予认同。相关言论的合法性并非争议焦点，且“第一修正案并不禁止在证据上使用言论来确立犯罪要件或证明动机或意图。”United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 112 (2d Cir. 1998)（援引 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993)（格式略去））；见同上（区分了因阅读恐怖主义材料而受到的不可容许的起诉，与依靠阅读材料“证明爆炸阴谋的存在及其动机”的可容许的起诉）。\n\n其次，郭辩称该信息不具有关联性。郭案备忘录第 19–22 页。政府方力求提交社交媒体言论、抗议和诉讼，以证明“[郭]将那些对[G Enterprise（G 企业）6]构成威胁的人定性为‘叛徒’以及中共‘间谍’或‘特工’，并指使他的追随者去骚扰这些人。”政府方反对意见书第 13 页，ECF No. 290。因此，\n\n6 在 S3 中，政府方将涉嫌的刑事诈骗勒索企业称为“G Enterprise”，而非 S2 中所使用的名称“Kwok Enterprise”。S3 第 1 段；见 ECF No. 308。因此，本裁定在提及涉嫌的诈骗勒索企业时均使用“G Enterprise”。\n\n该证据直接关系到起诉书中所指控的事实，即声称的 RICO（反勒索与受贿组织法）企业所使用的手段和方法之一就是对郭的批评者“[进行]骚扰、威胁并使其噤声”。7 S3 第 8(e) 段，ECF No. 307；见 United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir. 1999)（“[未]起诉的行为可作为共谋本身的直接证据被采纳。”）。若庭审中引入的骚扰行为包含人身暴力，双方当事人可提议作出限制性指示。见 United States v. Frank, 749 F. App'x 5, 9 (2d Cir. 2018)。据此，该动议予以驳回。\n\nII. 郭之动议 2 与政府方动议 6\n\n2017 年，纽约州法院在 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（“PAX”）提起的一项诉讼中判定郭构成违约责任，并“命令其支付 116,402,016.57 美元”。郭案备忘录第 10 页。为履行该判决，州法院命令郭将“一艘游艇……运送至该法院的管辖范围内”。同上，第 10–11 页。“当该船只未按时返回时”，州法院于 2022 年 2 月判定郭构成藐视法庭“并施加了累加罚款”（即“PAX 藐视法庭裁定”）。同上，第 11 页（引自 Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok, No. 652077/2017, NYSCEF No. 1181 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Feb. 9, 2022)）。\n\n政府方力求提交有关 PAX 诉讼案及 PAX 藐视法庭裁定的证据，用作 (1) 郭于 2022 年 2 月 15 日提出破产申请的背景，(2) 指控的 RICO 企业存在的背景，以及 (3) 证明“实施某些行为时的意图——例如，包括[共同被告 Kin Ming] Je（余建明）将 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）诈骗所得中的 3700 万美元转账给[郭]的女儿，以避免[郭]因其将[游艇]转移至纽约法院管辖范围之外的妨碍行为而被处以巨额民事罚款”的证据。\n\n7 郭声称社交媒体言论、抗议和诉讼属于“中国民运”的一部分，因此不能证明 G Enterprise 的存在。郭案备忘录第 20 页。这是一个应由陪审团裁决的事实问题。\n\n政府方备忘录第 31 页；见同上，第 27–28 页；政府方反对意见书第 17–19 页。郭提议禁止政府方将 PAX 藐视法庭裁定作为证据引入，主张其不具关联性、存在混淆陪审团的风险，且具有不公正的偏见性。郭案备忘录第 23 页。\n\n该笔 3700 万美元的转账是证明郭有能力“为自身利益使用喜马拉雅交易所资金”的直接证据。政府方反对意见书第 18 页。此外，按下文第 III 节所述，郭之破产案件中的某些证据可作为直接证据采纳。由于 PAX 诉讼案促成了该笔 3700 万美元的转账，而 PAX 藐视法庭裁定直接引发了破产申请，它们与“有关被指控罪行的证据密不可分”，以至于它们“对于完整呈现受审罪行前因后果是必要的”。United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 309 (2d Cir. 2007)（格式略去）。\n\n郭辩称该证据具有不公正的偏见性，因为陪审团会倾向于“直接遵从州法院的观点”。郭案反对意见书第 22 页，ECF No. 287；见郭案备忘录第 24 页。法院可以“为证明法院裁决已被作出这一事实”而将该裁决采纳为证据。Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 605–06 及 n.1560 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff'd, 833 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2016)。然而，“法院裁决及文书中的陈述和结论”属于传闻证据，在“缺乏相关例外情形的情况下”不得为了证明所主张事项的真实性而提出。同上。政府方并非为了证明实质事项的真实性而寻求提交该证据，政府方反对意见书第 23 页 n.12，且任何产生偏见的风险均可通过限制性指示予以救济。见 United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 2006)。\n\n据此，政府方的动议予以准许，郭的动议予以驳回。\n\nIII. 郭之动议 3、王之动议 6 与政府方动议 6\n\n2022 年 2 月 15 日，郭在 Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格区破产法院）申请 Chapter 11（第 11 章）破产。见 ECF Nos. 204, 250（总结诉讼程序历史）。郭提议排除与其破产相关的证据。郭案备忘录第 11、25 页。相反，政府方提议引入“来自破产程序中特别具有证明力的证据”：(1) 郭宣告破产的事实，以及 (2) 郭与其破产程序相关的“妨碍行为”的证据。政府方反对意见书第 19–24 页；政府方备忘录第 29–31 页。\n\nA. 郭的破产宣告\n\n首先，郭宣告破产是被指控欺诈行为的直接证据。政府方主张，郭“将自己塑造成有能力为受害者投资提供个人担保的亿万富翁，这是欺诈投资者计划的关键组成部分”。政府方反对意见书第 20 页。因此，郭财务状况的现实情况关系到他是否明知自己对投资者所作的陈述不实。见 United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65, 95 (2d Cir. 2006)（“[电汇欺诈的]欺诈计划要件作广义解释，涵盖旨在通过对过去或现在的陈述，或对未来的暗示和承诺进行欺诈的一切情形。”（格式略去））。\n\n郭主张破产发生在被指控行为之后，因此不具关联性。郭案备忘录第 26–27 页。其说法是不正确的。起诉书指控直至 2023 年 3 月的违法行为。见，例如，S3 第 1、24、28、32、37 段。郭在 2022 年宣告破产以及随后的程序均落在相关时间段内。见政府方反对意见书第 21 页（“[政]府方在庭审中的证据将包括[郭]在其破产后录制的视频广播，在其中他继续为任何投资者的损失提供个人担保。”）。\n\n郭还主张，破产纯属其个人事务，因此不得作为 G Enterprise 存在、手段或方法的未起诉行为引入。郭案备忘录第 25–26 页。政府方否认郭的破产纯属其个人事务，并指控郭利用 G Enterprise“掩盖和隐匿资产，包括欺诈所得”。政府方反对意见书第 20 页 n.10；见 S3。事实上，郭的破产引发了破产信托人对十二家实体的对抗性诉讼程序，政府方指控这些实体构成了 G Enterprise 并被用于洗钱。见 ECF No. 219 第 4、9 页；S3 第 3(a) 段。据此，本院不禁止政府方主张郭申请破产是 G Enterprise 手段和方法的一部分。8\n\n郭进一步主张，由于申请破产所带有的污名，破产证据“违反了 Rule 403（证据规则第 403 条）”。郭案备忘录第 29 页。本院认为，该证据的高度证明价值超过了潜在的偏见。\n\nB. 对破产程序的妨碍\n\n其次，政府方提议提供郭及其追随者骚扰破产信托人并妨碍破产程序的证据。见政府方反对意见书第 22–23 页。例如，作为妨碍行为证据的一部分，政府方力求证明郭的追随者在其被捕后对 Mahwah（马赫瓦）物业进行了改造，这是在破产信托人 2023 年 9 月对马赫瓦物业进行实地查勘时发现的。同上，第 23–24 页。郭声称，政府方既没有为该证据奠定适当的证明基础，也没有将所声称的行为与郭联系起来。郭案反对意见书第 22–23 页。该骚扰和妨碍证据\n\n8 正如本法院此前在驳回郭文贵中止破产程序请求时所指出的，“破产法院的裁定……在郭文贵的刑事案件中不具有决定性，刑事案件适用更高的举证责任标准。”ECF No. 204 第 8 页。而且，破产受托人针对其声称是郭文贵另一个自我（alter ego）的实体提起对抗性诉讼这一事实——如果被提出是为了证明所述事项的真实性——作为传闻证据不具可采性。Chevron Corp. 案，974 F. Supp. 2d 第 605–06 页及附注 1560。\n\n与政府关于 G 集团（G Enterprise）手段和方法的指控相关，见 S3 第 8(b) 段，法院目前不得阻止其使用。然而，郭文贵可在审理时提出任何有效的立论基础异议。\n\n因此，政府提出的采纳与破产程序相关的特定证据的动议予以准许（GRANTED），郭文贵提出的排除该等证据的动议予以驳回（DENIED）。\n\nC. 王动议 6\n\n王艳萍（Wang）方面请求法院“禁止政府引入其他司法程序中的认定事实”，包括郭文贵的破产程序，理由是这属于不可采信的传闻证据。王动议备忘录第 14–15 页。法院将王的动议理解为寻求阻止政府为证明其真实性而提供来自其他程序的司法认定。如上所述，政府表示其并非为了证明事项的真实性而提供该等证据。政府反对备忘录第 23 页附注 12。因此，王的动议因失去实际意义而予以驳回（DENIED as moot）。\n\nIV. 郭动议 4\n\n郭文贵动议排除与其所受指控相关的证据。郭动议备忘录第 30 页。由于政府无意提供此类证据，政府反对备忘录第 39 页，该动议因失去实际意义而予以驳回（DENIED as moot）。\n\nV. 郭动议 5 及王动议 2\n\n郭文贵和王艳萍动议阻止政府在审理时使用“空壳公司/企业”、“傀儡高管”、“名义持有人/稻草所有人”、“另一个自我”及类似术语，辩称这些术语具有不当贬损性和偏见性。郭动议备忘录第 34 页；王动议备忘录第 4 页。\n\n诚然，本巡回区内至少有一家法院认定，“‘空壳公司’和‘空壳企业’可能被理解为具有贬义”。United States v. Watts 案，934 F. Supp. 2d 451, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)。但是，只要这些术语准确描述了涉案的实体和个人，法院就不能认同它们具有不当的偏见性。参见 United States v. Runner 案，No. 18 Cr. 578, 2023 WL 3727532，第 *5 页 (E.D.N.Y. 2023年5月30日)（裁定“空壳公司”一词若属实，则为“中性”）；《布莱克法律词典》（Black's Law Dictionary，第 11 版，2019年）中的“空壳公司（Shell corporation）”（将该术语定义为“没有实际业务活动，通常仅具虚名以作为另一家公司业务运营工具的公司”）。不得阻止政府在审判中使用被质疑的术语，前提是政府事先奠定充分的事实基础证明该等术语是适当的。因此，郭和王的动议予以驳回（DENIED）。\n\nVI. 郭动议 6\n\n郭文贵动议阻止政府将位于新泽西州马瓦（Mahwah）拉马波山谷路 675 号（675 Ramapo Valley Road）的房产称为“马瓦庄园（Mahwah Mansion）”。郭动议备忘录第 35 页。相反，他建议法院命令各方以其街道地址指称该房产。同上。\n\n“虽然……财富……的证据可能会对陪审团的评议造成不当的偏见，”但并不存在绝对禁止引入此类证据的规则。United States v. Quattrone 案，441 F.3d 153, 187 (2d Cir. 2006)。鉴于该房产的历史名称——“克罗克庄园（Crocker Mansion）”和“达灵顿庄园（Darlington Mansion）”——法院不认为将该房产称为“马瓦庄园”具有不当的偏见性或煽动性。政府反对备忘录第 34 页。该动议予以驳回（DENIED）。\n\nVII. 郭动议 7\n\n郭文贵动议排除与其在破产程序中援引宪法第五修正案权利相关的证据。郭动议备忘录第 36 页。鉴于政府无意提供此类证据，该动议因失去实际意义而予以驳回（DENIED as moot）。政府反对备忘录第 25 页附注 14。\n\nVIII. 郭动议 8\n\n郭文贵动议请求下达命令，强制作出披露，要求政府出示其持有的任何通过口头传达的布拉迪（Brady）信息。他声称政府出示的材料表明，政府已与“涉嫌 G 集团相关实体的关联人员”取得联系，这些人可能掌握布拉迪材料。郭动议备忘录第 36–37 页。政府声明其已通过“信函或提供[口头传达]陈述的记录”披露了其持有的所有布拉迪材料。政府反对备忘录第 56 页。因此，该动议因失去实际意义而予以驳回（DENIED as moot）。\n\nIX. 郭动议 9\n\n郭文贵动议保留其对引入文件元数据提出异议的权利，他指出政府可能会寻求使用元数据来证明他“撰写、访问、编辑或审阅了特定文件”。郭动议备忘录第 58 页。该动议予以准许（GRANTED）。政府就未经核证的元数据同样保留其权利的请求亦予以准许（GRANTED）。参见政府反对备忘录第 38 页。\n\nX. 王动议 1\n\n王艳萍动议排除关于基金-1（Fund-1，据称是 GTV 私募资金的接收方）“最终……价值损失了约 3000 万美元”的证据。王动议备忘录第 1 页（已整理）。她主张，损失并非实体邮政或电汇欺诈指控的构成要件，没有任何关于她从该转账中获益的指控，且该证据存在混淆争议焦点和分散陪审团注意力的风险。同上，第 2–3 页。\n\n该动议予以驳回（DENIED）。正如第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）所阐释的，财务损失的证据可用于证明被告“出于腐败意图引导”资金流向“高风险投资以使自己致富”。United States v. Seabrook 案，814 F. App'x 661, 662 (2d Cir. 2020)（认定“损失证据”在诚实服务欺诈案件中具有相关性）。“欺诈意图是欺诈计划的核心要素”，也是邮政和电汇欺诈犯罪的构成要件之一。United States v. Dinome 案，86 F.3d 277, 283 (2d Cir. 1996)（已整理）。而且，政府打算引入郭文贵“关于损失的录像虚假陈述”，据称这些陈述是为了诱骗投资者“继续向 GTV 投资”而作出的。政府反对备忘录第 4 页。损失的事实对于构建该叙事的完整性是必要的。参见 Old Chief v. United States 案，519 U.S. 172, 188–89 (1997)。\n\nXI. 王动议 3\n\n王艳萍动议禁止政府主张 GTV 私募属于不当的未注册发行，理由是“这样做存在推定修改起诉书、造成偏见性差异以及混淆争议焦点的风险”。王动议备忘录第 7 页。她辩称，起诉书指控的是与被告关于“受害者资金的目的和用途”的“虚假陈述和误导性陈述”相关的证券欺诈——而非其不遵守相关注册规则的行为。同上。\n\n当“证据的出示……严重改变了被指控罪名的基本要件，以至于存在相当大的可能性使被告被判犯有起诉书所指控之外的罪行”时，即构成起诉书的推定修改（constructive amendment）。United States v. D'Amelio 案，683 F.3d 412, 415 (2d Cir. 2012)（引用 United States v. Mollica 案，849 F.2d 723, 729 (2d Cir. 1988)）（强调省略）。当“起诉书的指控条款未作改动，但审判中的证据证明了\n\n与起诉书中所指控的事实存在实质性不同的事实”时，即构成事实差异（variance）。同上（引用 United States v. Salmonese 案，352 F.3d 608, 621 (2d Cir. 2003)）。推定修改本身即被视为具有偏见性，而事实差异则需要证明对被告造成了实质损害才构成可撤销的错误。Mollica 案，849 F.2d 第 730 页（引用省略）。\n\n尽管如此，巡回法院“一贯允许在举证方面保持相当大的灵活性，前提是被告已收到关于审理中将要证明的犯罪核心的告知”。United States v. Rigas 案，490 F.3d 208, 228 (2d Cir. 2007)（强调和引用省略）。“一项罪名的‘犯罪核心’涉及犯罪的概括实质；被告如何实施该犯罪的具体细节则不属于该范畴。”D'Amelio 案，683 F.3d 第 418 页。\n\n政府在此已提供了必要的告知。与王的担忧相反，政府并非仅因被告“参与未注册且非豁免的发行”而寻求对其提起公诉。王动议备忘录第 7 页；参见政府反对备忘录第 12 页。相反，起诉书指出，为了“规避”对此类发行可招揽投资者类型的限制，“郭文贵及其控制下的其他人利用了至少一个中间实体代表不符合资格的个人购买 GTV 股票”。S3 第 16(g) 段。正如政府所解释的那样，涉嫌的“犯罪核心”“归结为骗取缺乏经验和不成熟投资者的钱财”，而不对 GTV 发行进行注册的决定只是达到该目的的一种手段。政府反对备忘录第 7 页。该动议予以驳回（DENIED）。\n\nXII. 王动议 4\n\n王艳萍动议排除有关她的报酬或据称赠予她的共管公寓的证据。王动议备忘录第 9 页；参见 S3 第 5 段。与王的主张相反，政府无需证明她的薪酬“源自欺诈收益”即可使该证据具有相关性。王动议备忘录第 11 页。“将涉案被告的经济报酬与其可能\n\n参与指控欺诈的动机联系起来的证据，对于证明该欺诈具有相关性。”United States v. Ferguson 案，No. 06 Cr. 137, 2007 WL 4240782，第 *1 页 (D. Conn. 2007年11月30日)；参见 United States v. Quattrone 案，441 F.3d 153, 187 (2d Cir. 2006)。政府打算出示证据证明“支付王的薪水是为了补偿她在 G 集团中的角色”，从而使她具有“参与该集团的经济动机”。政府反对备忘录第 25 页。\n\n至于共管公寓，政府表示其“目前无意在审理时提供关于王购买共管公寓的证据”。同上，第 26 页附注 16。因此，关于王的薪水的动议予以驳回（DENIED），关于其共管公寓的动议因失去实际意义而予以驳回（DENIED AS MOOT）。\n\nXIII. 王动议 5\n\n王艳萍动议阻止政府“在未指明涉案投资实际向投资者或其他人作出的承诺或陈述的情况下，向投资者或其他证人提出一般的假设性问题，例如‘您是否希望知道[x]’或‘[x]对您是否重要’”。王动议备忘录第 14 页。在证券欺诈案件中，投资者的证词可能与被告涉嫌的虚假陈述或遗漏是否具有重要性相关。参见 United States v. Gramins 案，939 F.3d 429, 446–47 (2d Cir. 2019)。第二巡回法院明确认定，当“假设性问题利用了记录中独立确立的事实”时，“证人可以就其所不知道的事实作证，以及如果他知道了该独立确立的事实，该事实将如何影响他的行为或举止”。United States v. Cuti 案，720 F.3d 453, 459 (2d Cir. 2013)。辩方在审理时可自由“对有争议证词的事实准确性提出质疑”。同上。\n\n如果确立了适当的基础，政府可以向证人提出属于 Cuti 框架范围内的假设性问题。该动议予以驳回（DENIED）。\n\nXIV. 王动议 7 及政府动议 23\n\n政府动议采纳关于郭文贵与王艳萍\n\n的证据。政府动议备忘录第 71–72 页。动议排除该证据的王辩称，记录中包含大量关于她与郭文贵亲密关系的证据，并且该\n\n“高度敏感”且触及“复杂的道德问题”。王动议备忘录第 16–17 页。\n\n根据 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)（《联邦证据规则》第 404(b) 条），刑事被告人其他行为的证据“除用于表明犯罪倾向外，可出于任何目的”被采纳。United States v. Germosen, 139 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 1998)。在共谋案件中，先前的行为可被采纳“以解释共谋者之间存在的相互信任”。United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 334 (2d Cir. 1993)。\n\nGovernment（政府方）提出关于 Guo（郭）与 Wang（王）的 [已涂黑] 证据是出于合法的非倾向性目的：“证明两名共同被告人之间的信任程度足以使他们彼此合作运营一个庞大的 RICO（《反勒索及受贿组织法》）企业”。Gov. Opp. at 29。因此，问题在于该证据的证明价值是否被对 Wang 造成不公偏见的危险所实质性压倒。Fed. R. Evid. 403。\n\n[已涂黑] 的证明价值虽非重大，但绝非为零。Cf. United States v. Stanley, No. 09 Cr. 141, 2010 WL 1633459, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2010)。偏见风险亦是如此：尽管某些陪审员可能对 [已涂黑] 存有看法，但它并不“比所指控的犯罪更具煽动性”。United States v. Livoti, 196 F.3d 322, 326 (2d Cir. 1999)。由于证明价值与偏见风险大致相当，Court（本法院）拒绝根据第 403 条排除 [REDACTED（已涂黑）] 证据。\n\n据此，该动议被部分驳回（DENIED IN PART）并部分准许（GRANTED IN PART）。\n\nXV. Wang 动议 8\n\n最后，Wang 保留提出进一步 motions in limine（审前排除证据动议）的权利。该请求予以准许（GRANTED）。\n\n特此裁定（SO ORDERED）。\n\n日期：April 29, 2024\nNew York, New York（纽约州纽约市）\n\n[签名]","key_entities":["Guo","Je","GTV","Kwok","Miles Guo","RICO","Brady","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","CIPA","Ho Wan Kwok","Yanping Wang","Torres","Analisa Torres","CCP"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":204,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":219,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":266,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":269,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":271,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":273,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":287,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":290,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":307,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":308,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":4031,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-04-29 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-04-29","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:35:42"}