{"id":"court_sdny_319_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":319,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2024-04-29","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"证据准入令（二）——美国诉Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）及Yvette Wang案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #319（2024年5月2日）。法院就控方余下的证据准入动议作出裁决，涉及共谋者陈述、欺诈证据、虚假许诺、扣押资产等多项事项。","summary_en":"Motions in Limine Ruling (Part II)—United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo) and Yvette Wang, SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #319 (May 2, 2024). Court ruled on remaining Government motions regarding co-conspirator statements, fraud evidence, false promises, seized assets, and related evidentiary matters.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n-against-\n\nMILES GUO and YVETTE WANG,\n\nDefendants.\n\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge:\n\nThe Court has reviewed the remaining motions *in limine* filed by the Government.<sup>1</sup> Gov.\n\nMem., ECF No. 273.<sup>2</sup>\n\nThe Government makes the following requests:\n\n- 1. To admit statements of co-conspirators and agents of Defendants, Miles Guo and Yvette Wang, as not hearsay (\"Government Motion 1\"), Gov. Mem. at 2–12: **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART**;\n- 2. To admit evidence of \"evolving scams that the [D]efendants used to continue to defraud their victims, including the A10 Project\" (\"Government Motion 2\"), Gov. Mem. at 12–19: **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART**;\n- 3. To admit evidence of Guo's false promise to donate \\$100 million to Rule of Law charities (\"Government Motion 3\"), Gov. Mem. at 19–21: **GRANTED**;\n- 4. To admit evidence that Guo's assets were seized prior to his fundraising efforts (\"Government Motion 4\"), Gov. Mem. at 21–23: **GRANTED**;\n- 5. To admit \"evidence that the [D]efendants continued to direct the affairs of the [G] Enterprise following their arrests and detention\" (\"Government Motion 5\"), Gov. Mem. at 23–26: **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART**; 3\n\nUSDC SDNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ DATE FILED: 05/02/2024\n\n23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n**ORDER**\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Court addressed Government Motions 6 and 23, as well as Defendants' requests, by separate order dated April 29, 2024. ECF No. 311. The Court also ordered further briefing on Government Motion 7 on April 29, 2024. ECF No. 310.\n\n<sup>2</sup> A grand jury returned a third superseding indictment (\"S3\") in this matter on April 24, 2024. S3, ECF No. 307. S3 identifies Defendants as \"Miles Guo\" and \"Yvette Wang,\" the names by which they are primarily known, instead of \"Ho Wan Kwok\" and \"Yanping Wang.\" *Id.*; *see* ECF No. 308. This order refers to Defendants by those names.\n\n<sup>3</sup> In S3, the Government refers to the alleged criminal racketeering enterprise as the \"G Enterprise,\" instead of the \"Kwok Enterprise,\" the name used in S2. S3 ¶ 1; *see* ECF No. 308. This order uses the \"G Enterprise\" when referring to the alleged racketeering enterprise.\n\n- 6. To permit the authentication of certain records under Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11) (\"Government Motion 8\"), Gov. Mem. at 34–36: **DENIED**;\n- 7. To admit bank records from First Abu Dhabi Bank under Federal Rule of Evidence 807 (\"Government Motion 9\"), Gov. Mem. at 36–46: **DENIED**;\n- 8. To preclude Defendants from arguing that the prosecution is linked to the Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\") or malicious (\"Government Motion 10\"), Gov. Mem. at 46–47: **GRANTED**;\n- 9. To limit Defendants' evidence and claims related to CCP activities, including targeting (\"Government Motion 11\"), Gov. Mem. at 47–49: **DENIED**;\n- 10. To exclude extrinsic evidence of CCP targeting outside of Defendants' testimony (\"Government Motion 12\"), Gov. Mem. at 49–52: **DENIED**;\n- 11. To \"closely police Defendants' testimony to avoid impermissible bases for a verdict\" (\"Government Motion 13\"), Gov. Mem. at 52–56 (capitalization altered): **DENIED**;\n- 12. To preclude argument and evidence suggesting the alleged crimes were justified, necessary, or a result of duress (\"Government Motion 14\"), Gov. Mem. at 56–57: **GRANTED**;\n- 13. To preclude general evidence of contact between the Chinese police and victims (\"Government Motion 15\"), Gov. Mem. at 57–58: **DENIED**;\n- 14. To exclude evidence of Defendants' good acts, including dissident activity, to prove innocence (\"Government Motion 16\"), Gov. Mem. at 58–62: **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART**;\n- 15. To preclude Defendants from arguing they are not guilty because of disclaimers in transaction documents (\"Government Motion 17\"), Gov. Mem. at 62–65: **DENIED**;\n- 16. To exclude evidence and claims that the victims were negligent or failed to conduct adequate due diligence (\"Government Motion 18\"), Gov. Mem. at 65–66: **GRANTED**;\n- 17. To preclude Defendants from arguing that the Securities and Exchange Commission (\"SEC\") or the Government are responsible for victims' losses (\"Government Motion 19\"), Gov. Mem. at 67–68: **GRANTED**;\n- 18. To exclude evidence and claims that Defendants intended to repay victims (\"Government Motion 20\"), Gov. Mem. at 68–70: **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART**;\n- 19. To exclude evidence of Defendants' personal circumstances and potential punishment (\"Government Motion 21\"), Gov. Mem. at 70: **GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART**; and\n- 20. To preclude Defendants from offering their own statements for their truth (\"Government Motion 22\"), Gov. Mem. at 70–71: **DENIED**.\n\nUnless otherwise indicated, the Court's decisions on the motions *in limine* are without prejudice to renewal at trial if an appropriate basis for the motion or objection arises.\n\n# **DISCUSSION**\n\nI. Government Motion 1\n\nThe Government moves to admit out-of-court statements by Defendants' \"coconspirators, agents, and employees,\" and seeks a ruling that such statements are not hearsay if offered for their truth. Gov. Mem. at 2. Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) and (E) provide that an out-of-court statement offered against an opposing party is not hearsay if the statement \"was made by the party's co[-]conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy,\" or \"was made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed.\"\n\n## A. Co-Conspirator Statements\n\nFirst, the Government states that it intends to offer \"statements by [Guo's] and Wang's co-conspirators, including co-defendant Kin Ming Je and other co-conspirators, such as Qiang Guo, a/k/a \"Mileson\" ([Guo]'s son) and Haoran He (the purported beneficial owner of several of the [G] Enterprise entities, including G|CLUBS and G|FASHION).\" Gov. Mem. at 4. The Government seeks a preliminary ruling that the statements of Je, Mileson, and He are admissible, \"subject to the introduction of trial evidence (including the statements themselves) sufficient to show the existence of a conspiracy.\" *Id.*\n\n3\n\nThe Court may admit co-conspirator statements \"on a conditional basis, subject to the later submission of the necessary evidence\" to establish that the co-conspirator exception is applicable. *See United States v. Tracy*, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993). Specifically, the Government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that \"a conspiracy existed, that the defendant and declarant were members, and that the statements were made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.\" *Id.* (citing *United States v. Geaney*, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969)). The Court may consider the hearsay statements themselves to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to deem the declarant a co-conspirator. *Bourjaily v. United States*, 483 U.S. 171, 179 & n.2 (1987).\n\nThe Government provides \"examples\" of Je, Mileson, and He's statements. Gov. Mem. at 5, 6, 8. \"[A]s is the practice in this [C]ircuit,\" the statements \"will be admitted in the Government's case 'subject to connection' and without the need for a pretrial hearing on the sufficiency of the evidence concerning each defendant's participation in the alleged conspiracy.\" *United States v. Giovanelli*, 747 F. Supp. 875, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (citation omitted). The Government's motion as to the co-conspirators is, therefore, GRANTED. Should the Government intend to offer statements of Je, Mileson, and He beyond those quoted in its papers, or statements by other purported co-conspirators, the Government shall provide the statements to the Court and move for their conditional admission before presenting them to the jury. The Court will make the required *Geaney* findings outside the presence of the jury at the close of the Government's case and, if necessary, give an appropriate limiting instruction. *See Tracy*, 12 F.3d at 1200.\n\n4\n\n### B. Statements by G Enterprise Agents and Employees\n\nSecond, the Government seeks to admit statements of unnamed \"[G] Enterprise [a]gents and [e]mployees,\" including employees of \"the [Guo] family office entities, GTV, the Himalaya Farm entities, G|CLUBS, G|FASHION, G News, the HCHK entities, and the Himalaya Exchange\" and the \"attorneys, consultants, and translators working on behalf of the [D]efendants or the [G] Enterprise companies.\" Gov. Mem. at 9–10. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) \"cannot be applied in the abstract. Admissibility ultimately must turn on characteristics of the particular items of evidence and the purposes for which they are offered.\" *United States v. Bankman-Fried*, No. 22 Cr. 673, 2023 WL 6283509, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2023). The Government's request to admit for their truth \"statements [made] by *all* of the [D]efendants' agents and employees,\" Gov. Mem. at 10 (emphasis in original), without offering any specific statements or any details about the purported agency and employment relationships, is DENIED.\n\n### C. Statements on Guo's Media Platforms\n\nThird, the Government moves to admit \"videos, posts, and articles that were made by [Guo] or [Guo's] agents and often hosted on [Guo's] media platforms.\" Gov. Mem. at 11. Defendants do not contest that their own statements are admissible. *See generally* Guo Opp., ECF No. 287; Wang Opp., ECF No. 291; Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (a statement made by an opposing party \"in an individual or representative capacity\" is not hearsay). The Government's motion to admit Guo's and Wang's own statements is, therefore, GRANTED. Its motion to admit the statements of Guo's \"agents\" is DENIED for the reasons described above: the Government has not shown that an agency relationship existed between Defendants and the\n\nunnamed declarants, nor that the statements concern a \"matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed.\"<sup>4</sup> Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D).\n\n### II. Government Motion 2\n\nThe Government moves to admit \"[e]vidence of the [D]efendants' evolving investment schemes,\" beyond the \"four principal schemes\" charged in the indictment, \"as evidence of the charged offenses.\" Gov. Mem. at 15. In particular, the Government asks to admit evidence about the \"A10 Project,\" a fundraising scheme that initially promised investors ownership of \"5% of G|CLUBS, 5% of GETTR, and 5% of the Himalaya Exchange—all entities listed as members of the [G] Enterprise\" in the indictment. Gov. Mem. at 16; *see also id.* at 16–18 (quoting a February 17, 2023 post about the A10 Project on Guo's G News platform).\n\nEvidence about the A10 Project, if offered in non-hearsay form, is admissible as direct evidence of the charged offenses. *See United States v. Thai*, 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir. 1994) (\"When the indictment contains a conspiracy charge, uncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself.\"). The Government explains that the A10 Project is \"directly connected to earlier and ongoing schemes\" charged in the indictment; the G News article, for example, references the GTV Private Placement, \"GClubs cards,\" and \"H Coin\" and \"HDO [H Dollar].\" Gov. Mem. at 19. The Government also \"expects that victim witnesses will testify [that] they were defrauded across multiple of the [D]efendants' investment 'projects.'\" *Id.* Guo argues that because the \"A10 program [came] long after the alleged misrepresentations\" concerning the four principal fraud schemes, it should be excluded. Guo Opp. at 8. However, the indictment alleges that the conspiracy continued \"through at least in or about March 2023,\"\n\n<sup>4</sup> As Wang notes, moreover, \"a declarant who is an agent of [] [Guo] is not necessarily an agent of [] Wang (and vice versa).\" *See* Wang Opp. at 4 & n.5.\n\nS3 ¶ 1, ECF No. 307, so the A10 Project falls within the relevant period. Accordingly, the Government's motion is GRANTED.\n\nTo the extent that the Government moves to admit evidence about other unspecified \"interconnected scams,\" the motion is DENIED. Gov. Mem. at 19. Again, the Court cannot determine admissibility \"in the abstract.\" *Bankman-Fried*, 2023 WL 6283509, at \\*3.\n\n### III. Government Motion 3\n\nThe Government moves to admit evidence that Guo \"falsely represented that he would be donating \\$100 million to the Rule of Law organizations.\" Gov. Mem. at 19–20. The Government argues that the promise is relevant to the charged offenses in at least two ways. First, it argues that Guo's promise is \"inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses\" because \"victim investors in GTV and subsequent . . . 'projects' were required to donate to the Rule of Law entities as a prerequisite to be eligible to invest.\" *Id.* at 20. Second, the Government argues, Guo's promise \"supplied false reassurance to investors that he would have no inclination to steal their money.\" *Id.* at 21.\n\nThe Court agrees that the evidence is relevant: a jury could find that Guo \"used his [Rule of Law] investors as a source of\" future funds, and used his donation promise \"to burnish his reputation for respectability so as to recruit and reassure potential investors.\" *United States v. Hsu*, 669 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2012). Although Guo argues that evidence of the unfulfilled promise is unfairly prejudicial, Guo Opp. at 12, it is not more inflammatory than the conduct with which he is charged. *See United States v. Mercado*, 573 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the Government's motion is GRANTED.\n\n### IV. Government Motion 4\n\nThe Government moves to admit evidence that Guo's \"assets were seized by Chinese and Hong Kong authorities prior to his fundraising.\" Gov. Mem. at 22. It caveats that it does not intend to introduce in its case-in-chief \"any evidence regarding what underlies the asset seizures, such as proving up the conduct that violated money laundering statutes in Hong Kong and led to the seizure order\"—only the fact that the seizure occurred. *Id.*\n\nThe Court agrees that the asset seizure is admissible \"to provide the jury with the complete story of the crimes charged by demonstrating the context of certain events,\" *United States v. Inserra*, 34 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1994), and as evidence of [Guo's] alleged \"motive\" to fundraise, *see* Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). The motion is, therefore, GRANTED. The Court will afford Guo the same opportunity to complete the story by, for example, \"explain[ing] the circumstances around that seizure and its role in the larger CCP efforts.\" Guo Opp. at 15–16.\n\n### V. Government Motion 5\n\nThe Government moves to admit evidence that Defendants \"continued to direct the affairs of the [G] Enterprise following their arrests and detention.\" Gov. Mem. at 23. Specifically, the Government intends to offer (1) certified translations of \"recorded jail calls made by [Guo] following his arrest,\" and (2) evidence that Defendants \"have been having attorney meetings with a co-conspirator who is a licensed attorney . . . and using that attorney to ferry messages between the [D]efendants and the [G] Enterprise.\" *Id.* at 23–24.\n\n\"Courts frequently allow the government to introduce statements by defendants made during recorded jail phone calls.\" *United States v. Donovan*, 577 F. Supp. 3d 107, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing *United States v. Goolsby*, 820 F. App'x 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2020), and *United States v. Dowdell*, 737 F. App'x 577, 581 (2d Cir. 2018)). Here, the calls appear relevant\n\nto proving Guo's degree of control over the alleged criminal enterprise. *See* Gov. Mem. at 23– 24 (describing, among other things, a broadcast in which Guo declared Qidong Xia \"the new leader of the Himalaya Alliance\" and a phone call in which Guo \"instructed his team to follow Qidong's lead unconditionally\"). The Government's motion to admit the recorded calls is, therefore, GRANTED. To minimize the risk of prejudice from the jury being made aware that Defendants were incarcerated pretrial, the Government is directed to omit from the recordings any references to Defendants' detention. *See United States v. Hillard*, 546 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), *aff'd*, 701 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that a defendant has a \"legitimate concern with concealing\" his custodial status from the jury, as \"it is possible that some jurors will not be aware of the limited purposes of pretrial custody\").\n\nThe Government's motion to admit evidence of Defendants using an attorney to \"ferry messages\" to others is, however, DENIED. The Government has not established that the evidence is sufficiently probative to overcome the prejudicial effect of revealing Defendants' detention to the jury. Nor can the Court determine, without a fuller factual proffer, that the Defendants' communications with counsel were not privileged.\n\n### VI. Government Motion 8\n\nThe Government requests that the Court \"[p]ermit\" the Government to authenticate, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 902(11), \"bank records, bank transaction information, IP logs, call detail records, subscriber information, emails from search warrant returns, and business records\" from \"certain third parties.\" Gov. Mem. at 34, 36. The Government's request is insufficiently specific as to which records it seeks to authenticate. *Id.* at 36; *see* Fed. R. Evid. 902(11). Accordingly, the request is DENIED. If the parties fail to agree upon an appropriate stipulation, the Court will consider these issues at trial.\n\n### VII. Government Motion 9\n\nThe Government next moves to admit \"a series of bank records, emails, and documents, from First Abu Dhabi Bank, which is a bank in the United Arab Emirates,\" pertaining to a bank account opened by co-defendant Kin Ming Je (the \"Bank Records\"). Gov. Mem. at 36. The Government invokes Rule 807's residual hearsay exception, which is used \"very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.\" *Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc.*, 929 F.2d 901, 907 (2d Cir. 1991).\n\nThe residual hearsay exception provides that hearsay is admissible even if the statement is not admissible under a hearsay exception when \"(1) the statement is supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness—after considering the totality of circumstances under which it was made and evidence, if any, corroborating the statement; and (2) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.\" Fed. R. Evid. 807(a). The \"determination of whether a document is sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Rule 807 is a highly fact-specific inquiry.\" *United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd.*, 319 F.R.D. 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting *United States v. Turner*, 718 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2013)). Relevant factors include the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the records, the appearance of the records, including their internal consistency, and the contents of the records. *Id.* at 466.\n\nIn support of its motion, the Government attaches to two sets of documents that it claims are examples of the Bank Records. First, the Government offers an \"excel file[] containing transactional information.\" Gov. Mem. at 39; Gov. Mem. Ex. G (spreadsheet on file). The Government claims that the spreadsheet contains a ledger of Je's account transactions:\n\n| STATEMENT ENTRY DATED ENQUIRY                        |                          |                                     |                    |             |                      |\n|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------|----------------------|\n| Intellect/T24 IBAN:<br>IBAN: AE870357771201996490026 |                          |                                     |                    |             |                      |\n| Account :771201996490026                             |                          |                                     |                    |             |                      |\n| Customer : 1996490<br>ACA CAPITAL GROUP LTD          |                          |                                     |                    |             |                      |\n| Currency :USD                                        |                          |                                     |                    |             |                      |\n| Balance at Period Start                              |                          | 2.590.90                            |                    |             |                      |\n| VALDATE<br>V                                         | ▼   TRANS REF NO         | ▼ DESCRIPTION                       | ▼ POST.DA1▼ AMOUNT |             | ▼   CLOSING BALANO ▼ |\n| 26 JAN 20                                            | TT20026V022H BNK         | Credit Card Direct Debit  26 JAN 20 |                    | -91.09      | 2.499.81             |\n|                                                      |                          | 4572210000012539                    |                    |             |                      |\n| 29 JAN 20                                            | FT2002970575             | Inward Telex Transfer               | 29 JAN 20          | 119.990.00  | 122.489.81           |\n|                                                      |                          |                                     |                    |             |                      |\n| 30 JAN 20                                            | FT2003070745             | Transfer                            | 30 JAN 20          | -105,500.00 | 16.989.81            |\n|                                                      |                          | 30012020                            |                    |             |                      |\n| 01 FEB 20                                            | 771201996490026-20200131 | Credit Interest                     | 31 JAN 20          | 0.32        | 16.990.13            |\n\nGov. Mem. Ex. G.\n\nThe spreadsheet is not sufficiently trustworthy. As described in a declaration from Marlee Miller, an attorney for the SEC, the Government received the Bank Records from the SEC, which in turn received them from the Securities and Commodities Authority of the United Arab Emirates (the \"SCA\"), which obtained them from the bank. Gov. Mem. at 36–37; *see* Miller Decl. ¶¶ 3–10, ECF No. 273-1. The Government offers no information as to how the Bank Records \"were prepared or maintained by the First Abu Dhabi Bank.\" Guo Opp. at 37. Miller has no firsthand knowledge of how the SCA obtained the Bank Records from First Abu Dhabi, stating only that it \"use[d] its domestic procedures to obtain the requested records.\"<sup>5</sup> Miller Decl. ¶ 5. Further, the SCA \"declined to provide bank statements\" to the SEC, instead providing the spreadsheet. Gov. Mem. at 39 & n.16. And, neither the bank nor the SCA provided a certification statement. Gov. Mem. at 38; *cf.* Fed. R. Evid. 902(12) (permitting the authentication of a foreign business record in a civil case based on the custodian's certification only where it, \"if falsely made, would subject the maker to a criminal penalty in the country where the certification is signed\"). A spreadsheet can be easily modified by \"even an innocent\n\n<sup>5</sup> The Government claims that it obtained the records pursuant to a \"reliable and routine\" process under an international treaty, Gov. Mem. at 38, but also states that \"the United Arab Emirates['] provision of records pursuant to a [m]utual [l]egal [a]ssistance [t]reaty is irregular, at best.\" *Id.* at 44.\n\nmistake,\" which would alter the nature of the document. Guo Opp. at 42. Without insight into \"the exact circumstances by which the [spreadsheet] was prepared,\" it cannot fulfill the residual hearsay exception's trustworthiness requirement. *See United States v. Hill*, 658 F. App'x 600, 603 (2d Cir. 2016).<sup>6</sup>\n\nSecond, the Government seeks to admit a set of documents that it claims are the \"account opening documentation [and] signature documents.\" Gov. Mem. at 39; *see* Gov. Mem. Ex. F, ECF No. 273-6. The Government states that the documents \"are visually unremarkable,\" \"bear the insignia of First Abu Dhabi Bank,\" and contain Je's signature and passport number. Gov. Mem. at 39, 43. The Government cites *Prevezon*, in which a court in this District admitted, under the residual exception, a Russian lawyer's pictures of a Russian criminal case file that included Russian bank records. 319 F.R.D. at 461–62. The *Prevezon* court relied in part on the bank records \"appear[ing] to be what the Government says they are,\" including the \"banks' identification of requested accounts on official letterhead.\" *Id.* at 465. In admitting the documents, the *Prevezon* court also relied on the Russian lawyer's testimony as to how he took pictures of the criminal case file, evidence that the Russian government seized the bank records from the banks, and evidence of the \"intricate form through which\" the Russian government seized the records—namely, that they were \"bound together with twine.\" *Id.* at 462, 466–67 (cleaned up). The Government has not offered similar chain of custody evidence for the Bank Records.<sup>7</sup> Nor does the Government indicate that the information in the Bank Records is so\n\n<sup>6</sup> The Government contends that other bank records in its possession corroborate the Bank Records. But, \"[t]o be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.\" *Idaho v. Wright*, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990).\n\n<sup>7</sup> That the records were in the SCA's possession neither authenticates the evidence nor renders it admissible. *See United States v. Doyle*, 130 F.3d 523, 547 (2d Cir. 1997) (\"[T]he admission of privately-generated, business records without further foundation, even though the records were found in the possession of a foreign government agency,\n\n\"distinctive\" as to support its trustworthiness, or that Je's account opening forms resemble the routine documentation required to open an account at First Abu Dhabi Bank. *See United States v. Vayner*, 769 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2014). The Court finds, therefore, that the Bank Records are insufficiently trustworthy for admission under the residual exception. The Government's motion is DENIED.\n\n### VIII. Government Motion 10\n\nThe Government moves to preclude Defendants from arguing that the prosecution team is \"improperly linked to the CCP or in any way malicious.\" Gov. Mem. at 46–47 (capitalization altered). Wang states that she has \"no intention of arguing . . . that the prosecutors are agents of the CCP.\" Wang Opp. at 38. It is less clear whether Guo makes the same concession. *See* Guo Mem. at 51–52.\n\n\"In this Circuit, a defendant who advances a claim of selective prosecution must do so in pretrial proceedings\" before the Court—not the jury—\"because it raises an issue that is independent of the question of the defendants' guilt or innocence.\" *United States v. Stewart*, No. 03 Cr. 717, 2004 WL 113506, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2004) (quoting *United States v. Sun Myung Moon*, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983)). Because neither Guo nor Wang have raised a malicious or selective prosecution argument, the Government's motion is GRANTED.\n\n### IX. Government Motions 11, 12, and 13\n\nThe Government moves to broadly exclude \"evidence regarding CCP activities . . . beyond the defendants' own testimony as to their state of mind,\" arguing that the \"probative value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by a danger of confusing the issues and\n\nwould in all probability be an abuse of the discretion by the trial court.\"); *Lakah v. UBS AG*, 996 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (declining to use the residual exception to \"create an end-run around the holding of *Doyle*\").\n\nmisleading the jury.\" Gov. Mem. at 47. It contends that the Court should only permit evidence of CCP targeting that \"could have affected [Defendants'] state of mind\"—for example, \"public reports that they read at that time.\" *Id.* at 50.\n\nIn effect, the Government asks that the Court reconsider its previous order, which held that evidence showing that Guo, \"his family, his co-defendants, or the corporate entities relevant to the indictment have been targeted by the CCP\" is \"material\" under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.<sup>8</sup> ECF No. 243 at 6. The Court declines to do so. Contrary to the Government's arguments, evidence showing that Defendants' fears of CCP targeting were objectively legitimate—even if they were not aware of the specific pieces of evidence—gives credence to certain nonculpable explanations for their actions. Put simply, a jury could find that the targeting evidence elevates Defendants' alternative narrative beyond mere paranoia.\n\nCertainly, presentation of the CCP-related evidence might risk \"confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.\" Fed. R. Evid. 403. If so, the Government may raise these objections at the appropriate times. The Court—as the Government requests—will \"closely police Defendants' testimony to avoid impermissible bases for a verdict.\" Gov. Mem. at 52 (capitalization altered). But, the Court will not preclude an entire category of relevant evidence before Defendants begin to present their case. The motions are, therefore, DENIED.\n\n### X. Government Motion 14\n\nThe Government moves to preclude Defendants from arguing, or introducing evidence to\n\n<sup>8</sup> Although materiality under Rule 16 is a \"low bar,\" Gov. Mem. at 50, so is relevance under Federal Rule of Evidence 401. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Ray*, 585 F. Supp. 3d 445, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); *see also* Fed. R. Evid. 401 (evidence is relevant if it \"has *any tendency* to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and [] the fact is of consequence in determining the action.\" (emphasis added)).\n\nsuggest, that \"their actions were justified or necessary as a result of targeting by the CCP . . . or that they operated under duress.\" Gov. Mem. at 56. Defendants state that they do not intend to raise duress or justification defenses. *See* Guo Mem. at 63 (\"[Guo] has not argued in any pleading or paper that this [targeting] evidence supports a defense of duress or justification\"); Wang Mem. at 40 (\"Wang does not intend to rely on any argument that . . . the alleged fraud was somehow the result of duress or necessity.\"). The Government's motion is, therefore, GRANTED, and Defendants shall not raise these defenses at trial. As explained above, however, the Court will not preclude Defendants at this juncture from introducing evidence of CCP targeting for other permissible purposes.\n\n### XI. Government Motion 15\n\nThe Government moves to preclude Defendants from introducing \"general evidence of contact between the Chinese police and witnesses.\" Gov. Mem. at 57 (capitalization altered). \"The law is well settled in this Circuit, as in others, that bias of a witness is not a collateral issue and extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that a witness has a motive to testify falsely.\" *United States v. Harvey*, 547 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1976). The parties agree that Defendants are \"entitled to cross-examine . . . victim-witnesses\" about whether they have been contacted or coerced by the CCP. Guo Opp. at 67; *see* Gov. Mem. at 57; Wang Opp. at 41. To the extent that Defendants intend to introduce other evidence showing that non-testifying victims \"may have been approached by the CCP or its agents,\" Wang Opp. at 41, the Government's motion to exclude such evidence is DENIED. The Government does not identify specific evidence on the subject that it expects Defendants to introduce, and the Court cannot evaluate relevance in the abstract.\n\n15\n\n### XII. Government Motion 16\n\nThe Government moves to preclude Defendants from introducing \"evidence or argument concerning their prior commission of 'good acts' . . . [and other] evidence of non-criminal activities to disprove guilt of the crimes charged.\" Gov. Mem. at 58. It is well established that a defendant \"may not seek to establish his innocence . . . through proof of the absence of criminal acts on specific occasions.\" *United States v. Scarpa*, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1990). Defendants state that they do not intend to introduce any good-acts evidence to disprove their guilt of the charged offenses. Guo Opp. at 64; Wang Opp. at 44. The Government's motion is GRANTED as to this narrow, impermissible use of good-acts evidence. The Court will not, however, categorically bar Defendants from presenting evidence of nonculpable acts for permissible purposes.\n\n### XIII. Government Motion 17\n\nThe Government next moves to preclude Defendants from \"in any manner suggest[ing] that disclaimers in transactional documents render the [D]efendants innocen[t] of the charges.\" Gov. Mem. at 62. The Government argues that the disclaimers bear on reliance, which is not an element of criminal wire fraud, and do not affect whether Defendants' misrepresentations were material. *See id.* at 64–65 (citing *United States v. Weaver*, 860 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2017)). Defendants do not contest the first point or seek to argue that the disclaimers render their misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law. *See* Guo Opp. at 70; Wang Opp. at 45–46 (citing *Weaver*, 860 F.3d at 95).\n\nThe Court disagrees with the Government that the disclaimers are wholly irrelevant to materiality. *See* Gov. Mem. at 64–65. To determine whether a misrepresentation is material, the jury must decide if there is a \"substantial likelihood\" that the alleged misrepresentation \"would\n\nhave been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of information made available.\" *United States v. Landesman*, 17 F.4th 298, 341 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). The transactional disclaimers are part of the \"total mix\" of information for the jury to consider. *See Weaver*, 860 F.3d at 97 (noting that \"contractual disclaimers were relevant to the jury's determination of [the defendant's] guilt\"); *SEC v. Am. Growth Funding II, LLC*, No. 16 Civ. 828, 2019 WL 1748186, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2019) (permitting SEC to renew objections about purportedly boilerplate risk disclosures at trial). Accordingly, the Government's motion is DENIED.\n\n### XIV. Government Motion 18\n\nThe Government next seeks to bar Defendants from arguing \"that victims were negligent, gullible, or insufficiently vigilant.\" Gov. Mem. at 66. The Second Circuit \"routinely has rejected a gullible victim defense for wire-fraud charges.\" *United States v. Adelekan*, 567 F. Supp. 3d 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (collecting cases).\n\nNeither Defendant seeks to pursue such a defense. Guo Opp. at 73; Wang Opp. at 47. But, Guo argues that the \"level of sophistication of investors (including the due diligence they conducted) is relevant to the materiality of the alleged misstatements.\" Guo Opp. at 73. And, Wang contends that \"what alleged victims knew or understood about [Guo] (or [] Wang)\" is relevant to the total mix of information available to the person. Wang Opp. at 47.\n\nThe Court does not interpret the Government's motion as seeking to prohibit Defendants from questioning witnesses about either topic. Indeed, the \"reasonable investor\" is an objective standard and may vary \"with the nature of the traders involved in the particular market.\" *United States v. Litvak*, 889 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2018). But, there is a fine line between properly asking about an investor's sophistication and improperly implying to the jury that the investor should\n\nhave found out the truth about the alleged misrepresentations. Accordingly, the Government's motion is GRANTED. The Government may object at the appropriate time if Defendants' questioning verges toward the latter.\n\n### XV. Government Motion 19\n\nThe Government moves to preclude argument that the SEC or the Government are responsible for the victims' financial losses. Gov. Mem. at 67–68. Guo argues that the SEC's investigation and the Government's seizure of funds from the Himalaya Exchange are necessary to complete the story: for example, the SEC investigation explains why banks froze GTV accounts, which the Government alleges is the reason that Guo began the Farm Loans program, and the Himalaya Exchange seizures are relevant if the Government argues that the seizures did not affect the price of H Coin. Guo Opp. at 74–75.\n\nGuo's argument does not respond to the Government's motion, which is GRANTED. Guo may not imply that the SEC or the Government are responsible for the victims' financial losses, or that the failure of GTV and the Himalaya Exchange was the fault of the SEC or the Government, because such argument has a substantial danger of confusing the issues and misleading the jury. *See* Fed. R. Evid. 403. Neither party is categorically barred from referencing SEC or Government actions, and specific relevance objections shall be addressed at trial.\n\n### XVI. Government Motion 20\n\nThe Government next moves to bar Defendants from \"arguing that they intended to return or repay victims' funds\"—including by pointing to evidence of the amount of money seized by the Government—as a defense to the fraud charges. Gov. Mem. at 68. Wire fraud \"does not require that [the defendant] intended to permanently deprive the victim's money or property.\" *United States v. Males*, 459 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2006) (cleaned up); *see United States v. Bankman-Fried*, 680 F. Supp. 3d 289, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (\"[T]he [wire fraud] offense is complete where . . . there is an immediate intent to misapply and defraud.\" (quotation marks and citation omitted)).\n\nAlthough Guo and Wang disclaim this argument, Wang Opp. at 48; Guo Opp. at 77, Guo argues that he should be allowed to point to the amount of money and assets seized by the Government to show that \"the *purported* loans at issue in this case, were in fact loans.\" Guo Opp. at 77 (emphasis in original). The Court agrees. Accordingly, the Government's motion is GRANTED, except that Guo will be allowed to introduce evidence on the narrow factual issue of whether the Farm Loans and the \\$37 million Himalaya Exchange loan were fictitious.\n\n### XVII. Government Motion 21\n\nThe Government moves to preclude Defendants from offering evidence \"concerning family background, health, age, pretrial detention, or any other similar factors,\" as well as the \"punishment or consequences they face if convicted.\" Gov. Mem. at 70.\n\nA jury should reach its verdict \"without regard to what sentence might be imposed,\" and information about sentencing \"distracts [jurors] from their factfinding responsibilities.\" *Shannon v. United States*, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (citations omitted). Although Guo states that he will not point to his potential sentence, Guo Opp. at 78, Wang does not explicitly disclaim this argument. *See* Wang Opp. at 44–45. Accordingly, this portion of the Government's motion is GRANTED.\n\nThe rest of the Government's motion is overbroad. The Court has discretion to exclude evidence that could \" cause the jury to be influenced by sympathies having no bearing on the merits of the case.\" *United States v. Paccione*, 949 F.2d 1183, 1201 (2d Cir. 1991); *see* Fed. R.\n\nEvid. 403. But, elements of Defendants' family backgrounds or health could be relevant to the merits of the case, and the Government does not identify specific evidence that it seeks to exclude. Accordingly, the balance of the motion is DENIED. The Government may make specific relevance objections at trial.\n\n## XVIII. Government Motion 22\n\nThe Government seeks to broadly preclude Defendants from \"offering any of their own statements from emails, mobile chat threads, text messages, voicemails, public statements, or videos,\" arguing that they are inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 801(d)(2). Gov. Mem. at 70–71. Again, however, admissibility ultimately turns on the characteristics of the particular item of evidence and the purpose for which it is offered. These statements may be admissible if Defendants are subject to cross-examination about them and the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(1) are met, or if a hearsay exception applies. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as both premature and overbroad.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nDated: May 2, 2024 New York, New York\n\nOS","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）UNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国），\n\n-诉-\n\nMILES GUO（郭文贵）及 YVETTE WANG（王雁平），\n\n被告。\n\nANALISA TORRES，地区法官：\n\n本院已审理 Government（政府方）提交的其余预先排除证据动议（motions in limine）1。Gov.\n\nMem., ECF No. 273.2\n\n政府方提出以下请求：\n\n- 1. 采纳被告 Miles Guo 及 Yvette Wang 的同谋及代理人的陈述作为非传闻证据（“政府方动议 1”），Gov. Mem. 第 2–12 页：部分准许，部分驳回；\n- 2. 采纳被告“用于继续诈骗其受害人的不断演变的骗局，包括 A10 项目”的证据（“政府方动议 2”），Gov. Mem. 第 12–19 页：部分准许，部分驳回；\n- 3. 采纳关于 Guo 虚假承诺向法治慈善机构捐款 1 亿美元的证据（“政府方动议 3”），Gov. Mem. 第 19–21 页：准许；\n- 4. 采纳关于 Guo 的资产在其募资活动之前已被扣押的证据（“政府方动议 4”），Gov. Mem. 第 21–23 页：准许；\n- 5. 采纳“被告在被捕及拘留后继续指挥 G Enterprise 事务的证据”（“政府方动议 5”），Gov. Mem. 第 23–26 页：部分准许，部分驳回；3\n\nUSDC SDNY 电子归档文件 文号 #: __________________ 归档日期：05/02/2024\n\n23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n裁定\n\n1 本院已于 2024 年 4 月 29 日通过单独裁定处理了政府方动议 6 和 23 以及被告方的请求。ECF No. 311。本院亦于 2024 年 4 月 29 日命令就政府方动议 7 作进一步书面申辩。ECF No. 310。\n\n2 大陪审团于 2024 年 4 月 24 日在本案中作出了第三份替代起诉书（“S3”）。S3, ECF No. 307。S3 将被告指称为“Miles Guo”和“Yvette Wang”，即他们主要为人所知的名字，而非“Ho Wan Kwok”和“Yanping Wang”。同上；参见 ECF No. 308。本裁定以这些名称指称被告。\n\n3 在 S3 中，政府方将涉嫌的犯罪敲诈勒索企业称为“G Enterprise”，而非 S2 中使用的名称“Kwok Enterprise”。S3 第 1 段；参见 ECF No. 308。本裁定在指称涉嫌的敲诈勒索企业时使用“G Enterprise”。\n\n- 6. 允许根据 Federal Rule of Evidence（联邦证据规则）902(11) 鉴真特定记录（“政府方动议 8”），Gov. Mem. 第 34–36 页：驳回；\n- 7. 根据 Federal Rule of Evidence 807 采纳来自 First Abu Dhabi Bank（阿布扎比第一银行）的银行记录（“政府方动议 9”），Gov. Mem. 第 36–46 页：驳回；\n- 8. 阻止被告主张本起控诉与 Chinese Communist Party（中国共产党，简称“CCP”）有关联或具有恶意（“政府方动议 10”），Gov. Mem. 第 46–47 页：准许；\n- 9. 限制被告与 CCP 活动（包括针对性打压）相关的证据和主张（“政府方动议 11”），Gov. Mem. 第 47–49 页：驳回；\n- 10. 排除除被告证词以外关于 CCP 针对性打压的外部证据（“政府方动议 12”），Gov. Mem. 第 49–52 页：驳回；\n- 11. “严密监督被告的证词以避免裁决基于不可采纳的依据”（“政府方动议 13”），Gov. Mem. 第 52–56 页（大小写已改动）：驳回；\n- 12. 阻止暗示涉嫌犯罪具有正当理由、必要性或系受胁迫所致的争辩与证据（“政府方动议 14”），Gov. Mem. 第 56–57 页：准许；\n- 13. 阻止关于中国警方与受害人之间接触的一般证据（“政府方动议 15”），Gov. Mem. 第 57–58 页：驳回；\n- 14. 排除关于被告良好行为（包括异见人士活动）用以证明无罪的证据（“政府方动议 16”），Gov. Mem. 第 58–62 页：部分准许，部分驳回；\n- 15. 阻止被告因交易文件中的免责声明而主张其无罪（“政府方动议 17”），Gov. Mem. 第 62–65 页：驳回；\n- 16. 排除关于受害人存在过失或未能进行充分尽职调查的证据及主张（“政府方动议 18”），Gov. Mem. 第 65–66 页：准许；\n- 17. 阻止被告主张 Securities and Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会，简称“SEC”）或政府方应对受害人的损失负责（“政府方动议 19”），Gov. Mem. 第 67–68 页：准许；\n- 18. 排除关于被告意图偿还受害人的证据及主张（“政府方动议 20”），Gov. Mem. 第 68–70 页：部分准许，部分驳回；\n- 19. 排除关于被告个人情况及可能面临的处罚的证据（“政府方动议 21”），Gov. Mem. 第 70 页：部分准许，部分驳回；以及\n- 20. 阻止被告为证明其真实性而提出其自身的陈述（“政府方动议 22”），Gov. Mem. 第 70–71 页：驳回。\n\n除另有说明外，本院对预先排除证据动议的决定均不影响在审判过程中若出现动议或异议的适当依据时重新提出。\n\n讨论\n\nI. 政府方动议 1\n\n政府方提请采纳被告的“同谋、代理人及雇员”的庭外陈述，并请求作出裁定，即若为证明其真实性而提出此类陈述，则其不属于传闻证据。Gov. Mem. 第 2 页。Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) 和 (E) 规定，针对相对方提出的庭外陈述，如果该陈述是“由该方的同谋在共谋期间且为推进共谋而作出的”，或“由该方的代理人或雇员在代理或雇佣关系范围内且在该关系存续期间就相关事项作出的”，则不属于传闻证据。\n\nA. 同谋陈述\n\n首先，政府方声明其打算提出“Guo 和 Wang 的同谋的陈述，包括共同被告 Kin Ming Je（余建明）以及其他同谋，例如 Qiang Guo，又名‘Mileson’（Guo 之子）和 Haoran He（G Enterprise 旗下数家实体的据称实益拥有人，包括 G|CLUBS 和 G|FASHION）”。Gov. Mem. 第 4 页。政府方请求作出初步裁定，认定 Je、Mileson 和 He 的陈述具有可采性，“前提是引入足以证明共谋存在的审判证据（包括陈述本身）”。同上。\n\n本院可“在有条件的基础上采纳同谋陈述，前提是随后提交必要证据”以确立同谋例外条款适用。参见 United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir. 1993)。具体而言，政府方必须以优势证据确立“存在共谋，被告与陈述者为该共谋的成员，且这些陈述是在共谋过程中为推进共谋而作出的”。同上（援引 United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969)）。本院可考虑传闻陈述本身，以确定是否有充分证据认定陈述者为同谋。Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179 & n.2 (1987)。\n\n政府方提供了 Je、Mileson 和 He 陈述的“示例”。Gov. Mem. 第 5、6、8 页。“正如本巡回区的惯例”，这些陈述“将在政府方举证中‘视后续关联证明情况’予以采纳，而无需在审前就涉及每名被告参与涉嫌共谋的证据充分性举行听证会”。United States v. Giovanelli, 747 F. Supp. 875, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)（引用省略）。因此，政府方针对同谋的动议予以准许。若政府方打算提出其文书中所引用内容之外的 Je、Mileson 和 He 的陈述，或提出其他据称同谋的陈述，政府方应在向陪审团出示之前将这些陈述提交本院并提请有条件采纳。本院将在政府方举证结束时，在陪审团不在场的情况下作出必要的 Geaney 认定，并在必要时作出适当的限制性指示。参见 Tracy, 12 F.3d at 1200。\n\nB. G Enterprise 代理人及雇员的陈述\n\n其次，政府方提请采纳未具名的“G Enterprise 代理人及雇员”的陈述，包括“Guo 家族办公室实体、GTV、Himalaya Farm（喜马拉雅农场）实体、G|CLUBS、G|FASHION、G News、HCHK 实体及 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）”的雇员，以及“代表被告或 G Enterprise 各公司工作的律师、顾问和翻译人员”。Gov. Mem. 第 9–10 页。Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D)“不能抽象适用。可采性最终必须取决于特定证据项的特征及其提出的目的”。United States v. Bankman-Fried, No. 22 Cr. 673, 2023 WL 6283509, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2023)。政府方在未提出任何具体陈述或未提供关于据称代理和雇佣关系的任何细节的情况下，请求为证明其真实性而采纳“被告的所有代理人和雇员所作出的陈述”，Gov. Mem. 第 10 页（原文强调），该请求予以驳回。\n\nC. Guo 旗下媒体平台上的陈述\n\n第三，政府方提请采纳“由 Guo 或 Guo 的代理人制作且通常发布在 Guo 旗下媒体平台上的视频、帖子和文章”。Gov. Mem. 第 11 页。被告方对其自身陈述具有可采性不持异议。参见郭反对意见书，ECF No. 287 全文；王反对意见书，ECF No. 291 全文；Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)（相对方“以个人或代表身份”作出的陈述不属于传闻证据）。因此，政府方采纳 Guo 和 Wang 自身陈述的动议予以准许。基于上述理由，其采纳 Guo 的“代理人”陈述的动议予以驳回：政府方未能证明被告与\n\n未具名陈述者之间存在代理关系，亦未能证明这些陈述涉及“在该关系存续期间属于该关系范围内的事项”。4 Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D)。\n\nII. 政府方动议 2\n\n政府方提请采纳除起诉书指控的“四起主要骗局”之外的“被告不断演变的投资骗局的证据，作为所指控罪行的证据”。Gov. Mem. 第 15 页。特别是，政府方请求采纳有关“A10 项目”的证据，这是一项最初向投资者承诺拥有“G|CLUBS 的 5%、GETTR 的 5% 以及 Himalaya Exchange 的 5%——所有这些实体均在起诉书中被列为 G Enterprise 的成员”所有权的募资计划。Gov. Mem. 第 16 页；亦参见同上第 16–18 页（引用 2023 年 2 月 17 日在 Guo 的 G News 平台上发布的关于 A10 项目的帖子）。\n\n有关 A10 项目的证据，如果以非传闻形式提出，可作为所指控罪行的直接证据采纳。参见 United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir. 1994)（“当起诉书包含共谋指控时，未被指控的指控外行为可作为共谋本身的直接证据被采纳。”）。政府方解释称，A10 项目与起诉书指控的“早期及正在进行的骗局直接相关”；例如，G News 的文章提到了 GTV 募集私募股权、“GClubs 会员卡”以及“喜币（H Coin）”和“喜金（HDO [H Dollar]）”。Gov. Mem. 第 19 页。政府方还“预期受害人证人将作证证明他们在被告的多个投资‘项目’中被骗”。同上。Guo 主张，由于“A10 计划是在涉及四起主要欺诈骗局的涉嫌虚假陈述很久之后出现的”，因此应予排除。Guo Opp. 第 8 页。然而，起诉书指控共谋持续“至少至 2023 年 3 月前后”，\n\n4 此外，正如 Wang 所指出，“作为 Guo 代理人的陈述者并不必然是 Wang 的代理人（反之亦然）”。参见 Wang Opp. 第 4 页及注 5。\n\nS3 第 1 段，ECF No. 307，因此 A10 项目属于相关期间内。据此，政府方的动议予以准许。\n\n在政府方动议采纳关于其他未具体说明的“相互关联的骗局”的证据的范围内，该动议予以驳回（DENIED）。Gov. Mem. at 19。法院再次重申，无法“抽象地”确定可采性。*Bankman-Fried*，2023 WL 6283509，at *3。\n\nIII. 政府方动议 3\n\n政府方动议采纳关于 Guo（郭文贵）“虚假陈述其将向 Rule of Law（法治）组织捐赠 100,000,000 美元”的证据。Gov. Mem. at 19–20。政府方主张，该承诺至少在两个方面与被指控的罪行具有关联性。首先，政府方主张郭文贵的承诺与“被指控的罪行密不可分”，因为“GTV 及后续……‘项目’的受害投资者必须向法治实体捐款，方有资格进行投资”。*Id.* at 20。其次，政府方主张，郭文贵的承诺“向投资者提供了虚假的定心丸，使其误以为郭文贵绝无侵吞其资金的企图”。*Id.* at 21。\n\n本法院同意该证据具有关联性：陪审团可以认定郭文贵“将其[法治]投资者用作”未来资金的“来源”，并利用其捐款承诺“粉饰其体面声誉，从而招募潜在投资者并打消其顾虑”。*United States v. Hsu*，669 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2012)。尽管郭文贵主张关于未兑现承诺的证据具有不公正的偏见性，Guo Opp. at 12，但该证据并不比其被指控的行为更具煽动性。*See United States v. Mercado*，573 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2009)。据此，政府方的动议予以准许（GRANTED）。\n\nIV. 政府方动议 4\n\n政府方动议采纳关于郭文贵的“资产在其筹资前已被中国和香港当局查封”的证据。Gov. Mem. at 22。政府方附带说明，其并不打算在其主要举证阶段引入“关于资产查封背后原因的任何证据，例如证明其违反香港反洗钱法规并导致查封令的行为”——而仅引入查封确实发生这一事实。*Id.*\n\n本法院同意该资产查封可予采纳，“以通过展示某些事件的背景向陪审团提供所指控罪行的完整经过”，*United States v. Inserra*，34 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 1994)，并作为[郭文贵]被指控的筹资“动机”的证据，*see* Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2)。因此，该动议予以准许（GRANTED）。本法院将给予郭文贵同样的机会来完善整个经过，例如“解释该查封发生的相关情况及其在中共更大范围行动中的作用”。Guo Opp. at 15–16。\n\nV. 政府方动议 5\n\n政府方动议采纳关于被告“在被捕和羁押后继续指导[G] Enterprise（G 集团）事务”的证据。Gov. Mem. at 23。具体而言，政府方打算提交：(1)“[郭文贵]被捕后在狱中拨打的通话录音”的经认证翻译件，以及 (2) 被告“一直在与一名身为执业律师的同谋进行律师会见……并利用该律师在[各被告]与[G]集团之间传递消息”的证据。*Id.* at 23–24。\n\n“法院经常允许政府方引入被告在监狱录音电话中所作的陈述。”*United States v. Donovan*，577 F. Supp. 3d 107, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)（援引 *United States v. Goolsby*，820 F. App'x 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2020) 以及 *United States v. Dowdell*，737 F. App'x 577, 581 (2d Cir. 2018)）。在本案中，这些通话与证明郭文贵对所指控的犯罪集团的控制程度似乎具有关联性。*See* Gov. Mem. at 23–24（除其他内容外，还描述了一次直播，郭文贵在直播中宣布 Qidong Xia（夏齐东）为“喜马拉雅联盟的新领导人”，以及一次电话通话，郭文贵在通话中“指示其团队无条件服从齐东的领导”）。因此，政府方采纳录音通话的动议予以准许（GRANTED）。为最大程度降低陪审团因得知被告在审前被关押而产生偏见的风险，责令政府方从录音中删除任何提及被告被羁押的内容。*See United States v. Hillard*，546 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)，*aff'd*，701 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1983)（指出被告对其向陪审团“隐瞒”其被羁押状态具有“正当关切”，因为“部分陪审员可能不了解审前拘留的有限目的”）。\n\n然而，政府方采纳关于被告利用律师向他人“传递消息”的证据的动议予以驳回（DENIED）。政府方尚未证明该证据具有足够的证明力以压倒向陪审团披露被告羁押状态所带来的偏见性影响。在缺乏更充分的事实证明的情况下，本法院亦无法确定被告与律师的通信不享有保密特权。\n\nVI. 政府方动议 8\n\n政府方请求本法院依据《联邦证据规则》第 902(11) 条，“准许”政府方对来自“某些第三方”的“银行记录、银行交易信息、IP 日志、通话详单记录、订户信息、搜查令调取返回的电子邮件以及业务记录”进行鉴真。Gov. Mem. at 34, 36。政府方关于其寻求鉴真哪些记录的请求不够具体。*Id.* at 36；*see* Fed. R. Evid. 902(11)。据此，该请求予以驳回（DENIED）。若各方未能达成适当的约定，本法院将在庭审中审议这些问题。\n\nVII. 政府方动议 9\n\n政府方接下来动议采纳与共同被告 Kin Ming Je（余建明）开设的银行账户相关的“来自阿联酋的一家银行 First Abu Dhabi Bank（第一阿布扎比银行）的一系列银行记录、电子邮件和文件”（即“银行记录”）。Gov. Mem. at 36。政府方援引了第 807 条的剩余传闻例外，该例外“极少适用，且仅在特殊情况下适用”。*Parsons v. Honeywell, Inc.*，929 F.2d 901, 907 (2d Cir. 1991)。\n\n剩余传闻例外规定，即便陈述在传闻例外规则下不可采，若满足下列条件，该传闻仍可采纳：“(1) 在综合考量作出该陈述时的全部情况以及佐证该陈述的证据（如有）后，该陈述具有充分的可信性保障；且 (2) 就其所要证明的要点而言，该陈述比主张采纳方通过合理努力所能获得的任何其他证据更具证明力。”Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)。“关于一份文件是否具有足够的可信度以依据第 807 条予以采纳的认定，是一项高度依赖个案事实的审查。”*United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd.*，319 F.R.D. 459, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)（引自 *United States v. Turner*，718 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2013)）。相关考量因素包括发现记录时的相关情况、记录的外观（包括其内部一致性）以及记录的内容。*Id.* at 466。\n\n为支持其动议，政府方附上了两组声称属于该银行记录范例的文件。首先，政府方提交了一份“包含交易信息的 excel 文件”。Gov. Mem. at 39；Gov. Mem. Ex. G（附卷电子表格）。政府方声称该电子表格包含余建明账户交易的分类账：\n\n对账单录入日期查询\nIntellect/T24 国际银行账户号码（IBAN）：\nIBAN：AE870357771201996490026\n账户：771201996490026\n客户：1996490\nACA CAPITAL GROUP LTD\n币种：美元（USD）\n期初余额 2,590.90\n起息日（VALDATE）\n交易参考号（TRANS REF NO）\n说明（DESCRIPTION）\n入账日期（POST.DATE）\n金额（AMOUNT）\n期末余额（CLOSING BALANCE）\n2020年1月26日 TT20026V022H BNK 信用卡直接借记 2020年1月26日 -91.09 2,499.81\n2020年1月29日 FT2002970575 入账电汇 2020年1月29日 119,990.00 122,489.81\n2020年1月30日 FT2003070745 转账 2020年1月30日 -105,500.00 16,989.81\n2020年2月1日 771201996490026-20200131 贷记利息 2020年1月31日 0.32 16,990.13\n\nGov. Mem. Ex. G。\n\n该电子表格不具备充分的可信性。正如 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）律师 Marlee Miller 的书面声明中所述，政府方系从 SEC 处获取该银行记录，而 SEC 又是从阿联酋的 Securities and Commodities Authority（证券和商品管理局，简称“SCA”）处获取，SCA 则系从该银行处调取。Gov. Mem. at 36–37；*see* Miller 声明第 3–10 段，ECF No. 273-1。政府方未提供关于第一阿布扎比银行如何“编制或维护该银行记录”的任何信息。Guo Opp. at 37。Miller 对 SCA 如何从第一阿布扎比银行获取该银行记录并无第一手直接知情，仅表示其“利用其国内程序获取了所请求的记录”。5 Miller 声明第 5 段。此外，SCA“拒绝向 SEC 提供银行对账单”，而是提供了该电子表格。Gov. Mem. at 39 & n.16。而且，无论是该银行还是 SCA 均未提供认证声明。Gov. Mem. at 38；*cf.* Fed. R. Evid. 902(12)（在民事案件中，仅在保管人的证明“若作虚假陈述，将使证明签署人受到签署地国家刑事处罚”的情况下，方允许基于保管人的证明对外国业务记录进行鉴真）。电子表格极易被“哪怕是无意的错误”所修改，从而改变文件的性质。Guo Opp. at 42。在不了解“编制该[电子表格]的具体情况”的前提下，它无法满足剩余传闻例外的可信性要求。*See United States v. Hill*，658 F. App'x 600, 603 (2d Cir. 2016)。6\n\n5 政府方声称其系依据国际条约下的“可靠且常规”程序获取这些记录，Gov. Mem. at 38，但同时又指出“阿拉伯联合酋长国依据《司法协助条约》提供记录往好里说也是反常的”。*Id.* at 44。\n\n其次，政府方寻求采纳一组声称是“开户文件[及]签名文件”的文件。Gov. Mem. at 39；*see* Gov. Mem. Ex. F，ECF No. 273-6。政府方表示，这些文件“外观上无异样”、“带有第一阿布扎比银行的标志”，并包含余建明的签名和护照号码。Gov. Mem. at 39, 43。政府方援引了 *Prevezon* 案，在该案中，本地区法院依据剩余例外采纳了一名俄罗斯律师拍摄的包含俄罗斯银行记录的俄罗斯刑事卷宗照片。319 F.R.D. at 461–62。*Prevezon* 案法院部分依赖于银行记录“表面上与政府方所声称的相符”，包括“银行在官方信笺上对所请求账户的确认”。*Id.* at 465。在采纳这些文件时，*Prevezon* 案法院还依赖于该俄罗斯律师关于其如何拍摄刑事卷宗照片的证言、俄罗斯政府从银行查封该银行记录的证据，以及俄罗斯政府查封记录所采用的“精细形式”的证据——即这些记录是“用麻绳绑在一起的”。*Id.* at 462, 466–67 (cleaned up)。政府方并未就涉案银行记录提供类似的证据链保管链证据。7 政府方亦未表明涉案银行记录中的信息是如此\n\n6 政府方主张其持有的其他银行记录佐证了涉案银行记录。但是，“为了根据《对质条款》具有可采性，用于定罪被告的传闻证据必须凭借其固有的可信性而具备可靠性迹象，而非参照庭审中的其他证据。”*Idaho v. Wright*，497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990)。\n\n7 这些记录由 SCA（Securities and Commodities Authority，证券和商品管理局）占有这一事实，既不能证明该证据的真实性，也不能使其具备可采性。参见 United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 547 (2d Cir. 1997)（“[在缺乏进一步证据基础的情况下采信私自生成的业务记录，即使这些记录是在外国政府机构的占有下被发现，\n\n“具有独特性”以佐证其可信度，亦无法证明 Je（余建明）的开户表格类似于在 First Abu Dhabi Bank（第一阿布扎比银行）开立账户所需的常规文件。参见 United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2014)。因此，本院认定，这些银行记录的可信度不足，无法根据剩余例外条款予以采信。政府的动议被驳回（DENIED）。\n\nVIII. 政府动议 10\n\n政府动议请求禁止被告主张检控团队“与 CCP（中共）存在不当关联或存在任何恶意”。Gov. Mem. 第 46–47 页（大小写有改动）。Wang（王雁平）声明她“无意主张……检察官是中共的代理人”。Wang Opp. 第 38 页。Guo（郭文贵）是否作出了同样的让步则不太明确。参见 Guo Mem. 第 51–52 页。\n\n“在本巡回区，提出选择性起诉主张的被告必须在审前程序中”向法院——而非陪审团——提出，“因为这提出了一个独立于被告有罪或无罪问题的事项。”United States v. Stewart, No. 03 Cr. 717, 2004 WL 113506, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）Jan. 26, 2004)（引自 United States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983)）。由于郭文贵和王雁平均未提出恶意起诉或选择性起诉的主张，政府的动议获得准许（GRANTED）。\n\nIX. 政府动议 11、12 和 13\n\n政府动议请求概括性地排除“关于中共活动的证据……超出被告自身就其心态所作证词的范围”，并主张“此类证据的证明价值因存在混淆争议焦点以及\n\n也极有可能构成初审法院对裁量权的滥用。”）；Lakah v. UBS AG, 996 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)（拒绝使用剩余例外条款来“变相规避 Doyle 案的裁定”）。\n\n误导陪审团的危险而被实质性压倒。”Gov. Mem. 第 47 页。政府主张，法院应仅允许提出“可能影响了［被告］心态”的关于中共针对行为的证据——例如，“他们当时阅读的公开报道”。同上，第 50 页。\n\n实质上，政府是在请求法院重新考虑其先前的裁定，该裁定认定显示郭文贵、“其家人、其同案被告或与起诉书相关的公司实体曾受到中共针对”的证据根据 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16（《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 16 条）具有“重要性”8。ECF No. 243 第 6 页。法院拒绝重新考虑。与政府的主张相反，显示被告对中共针对行为的恐惧在客观上具有合理性的证据——即便他们当时并不知道具体的证据材料——为其行为的某些无过错解释提供了可信度。简而言之，陪审团可以认定，针对行为的证据将被告的另一套叙事提升到了不仅仅是偏执猜想的程度。\n\n当然，提出与中共相关的证据可能会带来“混淆争议焦点、误导陪审团、不当拖延、浪费时间或不必要地提出累赘证据”的风险。Fed. R. Evid. 403（《联邦证据规则》第 403 条）。若出现此种情况，政府可在适当时候提出这些异议。正如政府所请求的，法院将“严密监督被告的证词，以避免出现不允许的裁决依据”。Gov. Mem. 第 52 页（大小写有改动）。但是，法院不会在被告开始进行案情陈述之前就预先排除整整一类相关证据。因此，这些动议被驳回（DENIED）。\n\nX. 政府动议 14\n\n政府动议请求禁止被告辩论或提出证据以\n\n8 尽管根据第 16 条的重要性是一个“较低门槛”，Gov. Mem. 第 50 页，但根据 Federal Rule of Evidence 401（《联邦证据规则》第 401 条）的相关性同样如此。参见，例如，United States v. Ray, 585 F. Supp. 3d 445, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)；亦参见 Fed. R. Evid. 401（如果证据“具有使某项事实比没有该证据时更有可能或更不可能发生的任何倾向；且该事实对确定诉讼具有实质意义”，则该证据具有相关性。（强调为原文后加））。\n\n表明，“由于受到中共的针对……其行为是正当的或有必要的，或者他们是在胁迫下行事。”Gov. Mem. 第 56 页。被告声明他们无意提出胁迫或正当防卫/紧急避险抗辩。参见 Guo Mem. 第 63 页（“[郭文贵]在任何诉状或书面文件中均未主张此项［针对行为］证据支持胁迫或正当防卫/紧急避险的抗辩”）；Wang Mem. 第 40 页（“王雁平无意依赖任何关于……被指控的欺诈在某种程度上是胁迫或必要性导致的论点。”）。因此，政府的动议获得准许（GRANTED），被告不得在庭审中提出这些抗辩。然而，正如上文所解释的，法院在此阶段不会禁止被告为其他允许的目的提出中共针对行为的证据。\n\nXI. 政府动议 15\n\n政府动议请求禁止被告提出“关于中国警方与证人之间接触的概括性证据”。Gov. Mem. 第 57 页（大小写有改动）。“在本巡回区及其他巡回区，法律已明确确立：证人的偏见并非附带问题，且外部证据可采信用于证明证人具有作伪证的动机。”United States v. Harvey, 547 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1976)。双方均同意，被告“有权就……受害人证人”是否曾受到中共的接触或胁迫对其进行交叉盘问。Guo Opp. 第 67 页；参见 Gov. Mem. 第 57 页；Wang Opp. 第 41 页。在被告意图提出其他证据以证明未出庭作证的受害人“可能曾被中共或其代理人接触”的范围内，Wang Opp. 第 41 页，政府排除此类证据的动议被驳回（DENIED）。政府未指明其预期被告将提出的关于该事项的具体证据，且法院无法抽象地评估相关性。\n\nXII. 政府动议 16\n\n政府动议请求禁止被告提出“关于其先前实施‘善行’的证据或辩论……［以及其他］非犯罪活动的证据，以反驳被指控罪名的罪责”。Gov. Mem. 第 58 页。众所周知，被告“不得试图通过证明在特定场合不存在犯罪行为……来确立其无罪”。United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1990)。被告声明他们无意提出任何善行证据来反驳其在被指控罪名下的罪责。Guo Opp. 第 64 页；Wang Opp. 第 44 页。就善行证据的这种狭隘且不被允许的用途而言，政府的动议获得准许（GRANTED）。然而，法院不会概括性地禁止被告为了允许的目的提交无过错行为的证据。\n\nXIII. 政府动议 17\n\n政府接着动议请求禁止被告“以任何方式暗示交易文件中的免责声明使被告在指控中无罪”。Gov. Mem. 第 62 页。政府主张，免责声明涉及信赖问题，而信赖并非刑事电信欺诈罪的构成要件，且不影响被告的虚假陈述是否具有重大性。参见同上，第 64–65 页（引自 United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2017)）。被告对第一点不持异议，亦不寻求主张免责声明在法律上使得其虚假陈述不具有重大性。参见 Guo Opp. 第 70 页；Wang Opp. 第 45–46 页（引自 Weaver, 860 F.3d at 95）。\n\n法院不同意政府关于免责声明与重大性完全无关的主张。参见 Gov. Mem. 第 64–65 页。为了确定一项虚假陈述是否具有重大性，陪审团必须判定是否存在“实质可能性”，即被指控的虚假陈述“会\n\n被理性投资者视为严重改变了可获取信息的整体组合”。United States v. Landesman, 17 F.4th 298, 341 (2d Cir. 2021)（引文省略）。交易免责声明是供陪审团考量的“整体组合”信息的一部分。参见 Weaver, 860 F.3d at 97（指出“合同免责声明与陪审团对［被告］罪责的判定具有相关性”）；SEC（美国证券交易委员会）v. Am. Growth Funding II, LLC, No. 16 Civ. 828, 2019 WL 1748186, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2019)（准许 SEC 在庭审中重新就据称属于格式化的风险披露提出异议）。因此，政府的动议被驳回（DENIED）。\n\nXIV. 政府动议 18\n\n政府接着请求禁止被告辩论“受害人存在过失、轻信或警惕性不足”。Gov. Mem. 第 66 页。第二巡回法院“向来驳回针对电信欺诈指控的受害人轻信抗辩”。United States v. Adelekan, 567 F. Supp. 3d 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)（汇总判例）。\n\n两名被告均未寻求进行此类抗辩。Guo Opp. 第 73 页；Wang Opp. 第 47 页。但是，郭文贵主张，“投资者的成熟度水平（包括其进行的尽职调查）与被指控虚假陈述的重大性相关”。Guo Opp. 第 73 页。并且，王雁平主张，“被指控受害人对［郭文贵］（或［］王雁平）的了解或理解”与该人可获取信息的整体组合相关。Wang Opp. 第 47 页。\n\n法院并不认为政府的动议旨在禁止被告就上述任一主题向证人发问。事实上，“理性投资者”是一个客观标准，并且可能“随着特定市场所涉及交易者的性质而发生变化”。United States v. Litvak, 889 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2018)。但是，在正当地询问投资者的成熟度与不当向陪审团暗示该投资者本应\n\n查明有关被指控虚假陈述的真相之间，存在着一条微妙的界线。因此，政府的动议获得准许（GRANTED）。若被告的发问倾向于后者，政府可在适当时候提出异议。\n\nXV. 政府动议 19\n\n政府动议请求禁止辩论 SEC 或政府对受害人的财务损失负有责任。Gov. Mem. 第 67–68 页。郭文贵主张，SEC 的调查以及政府对 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）资金的扣押对于交代完整的案件事实是必要的：例如，SEC 的调查解释了银行冻结 GTV 账户的原因，而政府指控该冻结是郭文贵启动农场贷款（Farm Loans）计划的原因；若政府主张扣押并未影响 H Coin（喜币）的价格，则对喜马拉雅交易所的扣押具有相关性。Guo Opp. 第 74–75 页。\n\n郭文贵的论点并未回应政府的动议，该动议获得准许（GRANTED）。郭文贵不得暗示 SEC 或政府对受害人的财务损失负有责任，亦不得暗示 GTV 和喜马拉雅交易所的失败是 SEC 或政府的过错，因为此类论点存在混淆争议焦点和误导陪审团的实质危险。参见 Fed. R. Evid. 403。双方均未被绝对禁止提及 SEC 或政府的行动，具体的关联性异议应在庭审中予以处理。\n\nXVI. 政府动议 20\n\n政府接下来提请禁止被告“主张其有意归还或偿还受害人的资金”——包括通过援引政府扣押的款项金额作为证据——以作为对欺诈指控的抗辩。Gov. Mem. 第 68 页。电汇欺诈“不要求［被告］具有永久剥夺受害人金钱或财产的意图”。United States v. Males, 459 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2006)（已清理格式）；见 United States v. Bankman-Fried, 680 F. Supp. 3d 289, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)（“只要……存在挪用和欺诈的直接意图，［电汇欺诈］犯罪即告成立。”（省略引号及引文））。\n\n尽管 Guo（郭文贵）和 Wang（王雁平）放弃了这一主张，Wang Opp. 第 48 页；Guo Opp. 第 77 页，但郭文贵主张，应允许其援引政府扣押的款项和资产金额，以证明“本案中涉案的所谓借款，实际上确为借款”。Guo Opp. 第 77 页（原文强调）。法院表示同意。因此，政府的动议获得准许（GRANTED），但郭文贵获准就农场借款（Farm Loans）及 3700 万美元的 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）借款是否系虚构这一狭窄的事实问题提出证据。\n\n十七、政府动议 21\n\n政府提请排除被告提出“关于家庭背景、健康状况、年龄、审前羁押或任何其他类似因素”的证据，以及“其若被定罪所面临的惩罚或后果”。Gov. Mem. 第 70 页。\n\n陪审团应在“不考虑可能适用的量刑”的情况下作出裁决，关于量刑的信息会“分散［陪审员］对其事实认定职责的注意力”。Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994)（省略引文）。尽管郭文贵声明其不会提及潜在刑期，Guo Opp. 第 78 页，但王雁平并未明确放弃该主张。见 Wang Opp. 第 44–45 页。因此，政府动议的该部分获得准许（GRANTED）。\n\n政府动议的其余部分过于宽泛。法院有权排除可能“导致陪审团受到与本案实体争议无关的同情心影响”的证据。United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1201 (2d Cir. 1991)；见 Fed. R. Evid. 403。但是，被告家庭背景或健康状况的某些要素可能与本案的实体争议具有相关性，且政府并未指明其寻求排除的具体证据。因此，该动议的其余部分予以驳回（DENIED）。政府可在庭审时提出具体的相关性异议。\n\n十八、政府动议 22\n\n政府寻求广泛地排除被告“提出其自身在电子邮件、移动聊天记录、短信、语音留言、公开声明或视频中的任何陈述”，理由是根据《联邦证据规则》第 801(d)(2) 条，这些陈述不具可采性。Gov. Mem. 第 70–71 页。然而，证据的可采性最终仍取决于具体证据项目的特征及其被提出的目的。如果被告就这些陈述接受交叉询问且满足第 801(d)(1) 条的其他要求，或者适用传闻证据例外规则，则这些陈述可能具有可采性。因此，该动议因过早提出且过于宽泛而予以驳回（DENIED）。\n\n特此裁定。\n\n日期：2024 年 5 月 2 日 纽约州纽约市\n\nOS","key_entities":["Guo","Je","CCP","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","GTV","Miles Guo","CIPA","Kwok","Kin Ming Je","Farm Loan","Ho Wan Kwok","Yanping Wang","Torres","Analisa Torres","HCHK","GETTR","Himalaya Alliance","Chinese Communist Party"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":243,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":273,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":287,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":291,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":307,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":308,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":310,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":311,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":6164,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-04-29 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-04-29","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:04:23"}