{"id":"court_sdny_339_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":339,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"RESPONSE","filed_date":"2024-05-17","title":"S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK","summary_zh":"政府准备令 —— 美国诉 Miles Guo（Ho Wan Kwok）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #339（2024年5月17日提交）。政府要求法院禁止被告在庭审上询问涉称分类信息的材料，理由是被告未能按照《分类信息程序法》（CIPA）第五部分的要求提供及时且充分的书面通知。","summary_en":"Government Motion In Limine — United States v. Miles Guo (Ho Wan Kwok), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #339 (filed May 17, 2024). The Government moves to preclude cross-examination regarding information defendant claims to be classified, arguing that defendant failed to comply with timely and adequate written notice requirements under Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) Section 5.","body_en":"S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n-v.-\n\nMILES GUO, a/k/a \"Ho Wan Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Miles Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Guo Wengui,\"\n\n a/k/a \"Brother Seven,\" a/k/a \"The Principal,\"\n\na/k/a \"Boss,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\n**GOVERNMENT'S MOTION** *IN LIMINE* **TO PRECLUDE INQUIRY ABOUT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION**\n\n> DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York *Attorney for the United States of America*\n\nRyan B. Finkel Juliana N. Murray Micah F. Fergenson Justin Horton *Assistant United States Attorneys Of Counsel*\n\n| Overview                                                                   | 1 |\n|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|\n| Argument                                                                   | 2 |\n| I. CIPA Section 5                                                          | 2 |\n| II. The Defendant Failed to Comply with CIPA Section 5 Notice Requirements | 5 |\n| A. The Defendant Failed to Provide Timely Notice                           | 6 |\n| B. The Defendant's Notice is Plainly Insufficient                          | 7 |\n| Conclusion                                                                 | 8 |\n\n# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n-v.-\n\nMILES GUO, a/k/a \"Ho Wan Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Miles Kwok,\" a/k/a \"Guo Wengui,\" a/k/a \"Brother Seven,\" a/k/a \"The Principal,\" a/k/a \"The Boss,\"\n\nS3 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nDefendant.\n\n# **GOVERNMENT'S MOTION** *IN LIMINE* **TO PRECLUDE INQUIRY ABOUT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION**\n\nThe Government respectfully submits this motion in response to defendant Miles Guo's notice pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act (\"CIPA\") Section 5 (the \"Section 5 Notice\"), provided to the Government on May 14, 2024. The Government seeks a pretrial ruling precluding the defendant from eliciting the noticed information.\n\n# **OVERVIEW**\n\n<span id=\"page-2-0\"></span>The defendant should be precluded from inquiring about the information identified in the Section 5 Notice, which Guo seeks to elicit from an anticipated Government witness (\"Witness-2<sup>1</sup>”) at trial, because Guo failed to comply with the notice requirement of CIPA § 5 and because the sought-after evidence is not admissible. Specifically, defendant has noticed information that he alleges to be classified, and he has failed to provide proper notice of intent to elicit classified\n\n<span id=\"page-2-1\"></span><sup>1</sup> The Government will refer to the anticipated witness in question as “Witness-2” herein and in any other filings on this topic.\n\ninformation, despite being represented by sophisticated counsel and being on notice of CIPA § 5's notice requirement for more than a year.[2](#page-3-2)\n\n### **ARGUMENT**\n\n### <span id=\"page-3-1\"></span><span id=\"page-3-0\"></span>**I. CIPA Section 5**\n\nPrior to the enactment of CIPA in 1980, the Supreme Court had \"long recognized\" the existence of a classified information privilege. *United States v. Yunis*, 867 F.2d 617, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing *C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp.*, 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948), and *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)). \"It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.\" *Haig v. Agee*, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981). As a result, \"[t]he government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service.\" *Snepp v*. *United States*, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (quoted by *Yunis*, 867 F.2d at 623, and *CIA v. Sims*, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985)). Following this long-established precedent, courts have recognized the importance of the classified information privilege. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Abu Ali*, 528 F.3d 210, 245 (4th Cir. 2008); *United States v*. *Smith*, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107-09 (4th Cir. 1985); *see also Yunis*, 867 F.2d at 622-23.\n\nTo protect classified information, Congress enacted CIPA. *United States v. Mejia*, 448 F.3d 436, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting *Yunis*, 867 F.2d at 623). CIPA, which establishes procedures for handling classified information in criminal cases, was \"meant to 'protect[] and restrict[] the discovery of classified information in a way that does not impair the defendant's right to a fair trial.'\" *United States v. Aref*, 533 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting *United States v*.\n\n<span id=\"page-3-2\"></span><sup>2</sup> The Government can neither confirm nor deny the existence of classified intelligence information. Nothing herein should be construed as such a confirmation or denial.\n\n*O'Hara*, 301 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2002)); *see also Abu Ali*, 528 F.3d at 245 (CIPA safeguards \"the government's privilege to protect classified information from public disclosure\"). If a defendant expects to disclose or cause the disclosure of classified information in pretrial proceedings or at trial, Section 5 of CIPA requires the defendant to provide written notice to the Government. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5. That is true whether or not the classified information was previously known to the defendant through his own interactions or experiences. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Wilson*, 750 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1984) (limiting the scope of defendant's testimony where the defendant was aware of certain classified information and noting that \"this is the kind of situation that Congress had in mind when it enacted the Classified Information Procedures Act\").\n\nSpecifically, CIPA lays out a framework to resolve assertions by the defense that it intends to disclose or cause the disclosure of classified information. Accordingly, any defendant who reasonably expects to disclose (or cause the disclosure of) classified information *in any manner* is required to file notice of such intention under Section 5 of CIPA. The default requirement for \"timely pretrial notice\" is thirty days before trial.\n\nSection 5 provides, in pertinent part:\n\nIf a defendant reasonably expects to disclose or to cause the disclosure of classified information in any manner in connection with any trial or pretrial proceeding involving the criminal prosecution of such defendant, the defendant, shall, within the time specified by the court, or where no time is specified, within thirty days prior to trial, notify the attorney for the United States and the court in writing. Such notice shall include a brief description of the classified information.\n\n18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a). Courts have strictly enforced the time limitations in the Act. *See generally United States v. Badia*, 827 F.2d 1458, 1465 (11th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court's decision to disallow defendant's presentation at trial of certain evidence because he did not provide timely notice under CIPA Section 5).\n\nSection 5(a) expressly requires that such notice \"include a brief description of the classified information.\" The case law holds that such notice \"must be *particularized*, setting forth *specifically* the classified information which the defendant reasonably believes to be necessary to his defense.\" *United States v*. *Collins*, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added); *see also Smith*, 780 F.2d at 1105. This requirement applies both to documentary exhibits and to oral testimony, whether the evidence is expected to be admitted on direct or cross-examination. *See, e.g.*, *Wilson*, 750 F.2d 7 (testimony); *Collins*, 720 F.2d at 1199 (same).\n\nCIPA was intended to \"'minimize the problem of so-called graymail—a threat by the defendant to disclose classified information in the course of trial—by requiring a ruling on the admissibility of the classified information before trial.'\" *United States v. Pappas*, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting S. Rep. No. 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S.S.C.A.N. 4294, 4295). If a defendant fails to provide a sufficiently detailed notice far enough in advance of trial to permit the implementation of CIPA procedures for the use, relevance, and admissibility of classified evidence, Section 5(b) provides for preclusion of that evidence. *United States v. Badia*, 827 F.2d 1458, 1465 (11th Cir. 1987). Similarly, if a defendant attempts to disclose at trial classified information that is not identified in his Section 5(a) notice, preclusion is the appropriate remedy prescribed by Section 5(b) of the statute. *See Smith*, 780 F.2d at 1105 (\"A defendant is forbidden from disclosing any such information absent the giving of notice.\").\n\nIndeed, it is based upon a defendant's Section 5 proffer that a court, under Section 6(a) of CIPA, must \"make all determinations concerning the use, relevance or admissibility of classified information that would otherwise be made during the trial or pretrial proceedings\" pursuant to the standards of the Federal Rules of Evidence, with the defendant bearing the burden of establishing that the evidence is relevant, material, and otherwise admissible. *See United States v. Miller*, 874\n\nF.2d 1255, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1989); *see also United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563, 1571 (S.D. Fla. 1995). The Section 5 notice requirement is designed to allow a court to determine how a defendant intends to use the classified information and ensure that a defendant is not allowed to \"cloak his intentions and leave the government subject to surprise at what may be revealed in the defense.\" *Collins*, 720 F.2d at 1199-1200. The Court's consideration of the use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information \"should not be conducted on the fly. The constitutional, evidentiary, and national security concerns raised by a desire to admit classified evidence should be resolved before trial if possible, not in the middle of it.\" *United States v. Barrack*, 21 Cr. 371 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2022), Dkt. 224 (Mem. and Order) at 7 (citing *United States v*. *Collins*, 720 F.2d 1195, 1196-97 (11th Cir. 1983)).\n\n### <span id=\"page-6-0\"></span>**II. The Defendant Failed to Comply with CIPA Section 5 Notice Requirements**\n\nAs set forth above, CIPA was intended to \"'minimize the problem of so-called graymail . . . by requiring a ruling on the admissibility of the classified information before trial.\" *Pappas*, 94 F.3d at 799 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted). Guo's Section 5 Notice makes apparent on its face that \"graymail,\" not the introduction of relevant information that supports any legally viable defense, appears to be his goal.\n\nThrough the Section 5 Notice, Guo indicates that he seeks to elicit certain testimony from Witness-2 on cross-examination. The Court should preclude this classified information pursuant to CIPA Section 5(b). *First*, the defendant failed to comply with the notice requirement of CIPA Section 5. *See* 18 U.S.C. App. 3, § 5(b). *Second*, even if it were timely, the defendant's Section <span id=\"page-7-0\"></span>5 Notice fails to satisfy the requirements of CIPA Section 5(a).\n\n### **A. The Defendant Failed to Provide Timely Notice**\n\nSection 5 of CIPA clearly states that a defendant must provide notice if he \"reasonably expects to disclose or to cause the disclosure of classified information in any manner in connection with any trial or pretrial proceeding\" within thirty days of trial. 18 U.S.C. App. 3, § 5(a). Trial is scheduled to begin on May 22, 2024, and the defendant filed his Section 5 Notice on May 14, 2024—a mere eight days prior to the scheduled start. The defendant has offered no excuse or explanation as to why he failed to file timely notice, despite being represented by sophisticated counsel and being reminded of his duty to provide notice through the Government's CIPA Section 2 Notice on April 20, 2023, *see* Dkt. No. 52, the Government's filing of a motion in support of a protective order pursuant to CIPA § 4 on December 22, 2023, *see* Dkt. No. 220, and the Court's April 18, 2024 issuance of a Protective Order pursuant to CIPA § 4.<sup>3</sup> *See* Dkt. No. 294. The consequences of this failure are clear, as CIPA Section 5(b) authorizes the district court to preclude disclosure of classified information at trial if a defendant fails to provide proper notice. *See Barrack*, 21 Cr. 371 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2022), Dkt. 224 (precluding defendants from inquiring about classified information at trial because, among other reasons, the defendant's Section 5 notice, which was provided less than two weeks before trial, was untimely); *Badia*, 827 F.2d at 1464-66 (upholding preclusion of disclosure of classified information at trial because defendant failed to comply with notice requirements of CIPA Section 5); *United States v. North*,\n\n<span id=\"page-7-1\"></span><sup>3</sup> Regarding timing: the Government produced its witness list and its § 3500 materials, including for Witness-2, on May 6, 2024 (*i.e.*, 16 days before the scheduled start of trial). However, the Government presumes that the defendant has long known the classified information contained in his Section 5 Notice, and further notes that, even if it were relevant (which it is not), that information would have been relevant, regardless whether the Government calls Witness-2 to testify at trial, through the defendant's own testimony or otherwise.\n\n708 F.Supp. 389, 392 (D.D.C. 1988) (precluding use of classified information for failure to adequately comply with Section 5 notice requirements).\n\nThe defendant's untimely Section 5 Notice does not give the Government sufficient time to weigh the costs of, or consider alternatives to, disclosure. *See Badia*, 827 F.2d at 1465. Moreover, if the Court does not preclude the classified information pursuant to CIPA Section 5(b), the Government will request additional briefing regarding additional bases for precluding the classified information—specifically, that the information contained in the Section 5 Notice is inadmissible hearsay, irrelevant, and/or fails Rule 403's balancing test—and then will move for a CIPA Section 6 hearing. Given that trial is scheduled to commence on May 22, 2024 (*i.e.*, in five days), those additional steps would necessarily delay trial in this case.\n\n### **B. The Defendant's Notice is Plainly Insufficient**\n\n<span id=\"page-8-0\"></span>The Section 5 Notice does not set forth the classified information that Guo reasonably believes to be necessary to his defense with specificity, nor does it explain how the noticed information would be relevant (much less necessary).<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, the Section 5 Notice fails to satisfy the clear requirements of CIPA Section 5(a), and the Court should preclude the defendant from eliciting the noticed information from Witness-2 on cross-examination at trial. *See Collins*, 720 F.2d at 1199 (CIPA Section 5(a) notice \"must be *particularized*, setting forth *specifically* the classified information which the defendant reasonably believes to be necessary to his defense\") (emphasis added); *see also Smith*, 780 F.2d at 1105; *Wilson*, 750 F.2d 7.\n\n<span id=\"page-8-1\"></span><sup>4</sup> The Government notes that, although the information in the Section 5 Notice is not material to Guo's defense, Guo has substantially the same ability to make his defense using unclassified materials in his possession.\n\n### **CONCLUSION**\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span>For the foregoing reasons, the Court should preclude cross-examination of Witness-2 that\n\nseeks to elicit the evidence referenced in the Section 5 Notice, pursuant to CIPA Section 5(b).\n\nDated: New York, New York May 17, 2024\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney\n\nBy: /s/\n\nRyan B. Finkel Juliana N. Murray Micah F. Fergenson Justin Horton Assistant United States Attorneys 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278 212-637-6612 / -2314 / -2190 / -2276","body_zh":"S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n-v.-（诉）\n\nMILES GUO（郭文贵），又名“Ho Wan Kwok”，又名“Miles Kwok”，又名“Guo Wengui”，又名“Brother Seven”，又名“The Principal”，又名“Boss”，\n\n被告。\n\n政府请求排除对涉密信息进行调查的预审动议\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS，纽约南区联邦检察官，美利坚合众国诉讼代理人\n\nRyan B. Finkel、Juliana N. Murray、Micah F. Fergenson、Justin Horton，助理联邦检察官，特别辩护律师\n\n概述 1\n论证 2\nI. CIPA 第 5 条 2\nII. 被告未能遵守 CIPA 第 5 条的通知要求 5\nA. 被告未能提供及时的通知 6\nB. 被告的通知明显不充分 7\n结论 8\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n-v.-（诉）\n\nMILES GUO（郭文贵），又名“Ho Wan Kwok”，又名“Miles Kwok”，又名“Guo Wengui”，又名“Brother Seven”，又名“The Principal”，又名“The Boss”，\n\nS3 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n被告。\n\n政府请求排除对涉密信息进行调查的预审动议\n\n针对被告郭文贵于 2024 年 5 月 14 日依据 Classified Information Procedures Act（《机密信息程序法》，简称“CIPA”）第 5 条向政府提供的通知（下称“《第 5 条通知》”），政府谨此提交本动议。政府请求法院作出预审裁定，排除被告引出该通知中所述信息的行为。\n\n概述\n\n应当排除被告对《第 5 条通知》中所确定信息的调查，郭文贵试图在审理中从预期出庭的政府证人（下称“证人-2”1）处引出该等信息，因为郭文贵未能遵守 CIPA § 5 的通知要求，且所寻求的证据不具有可采性。具体而言，被告已通报了他声称属于涉密的信息，且尽管有经验丰富的律师代理，并且获悉 CIPA § 5 的通知要求已超过一年，但他仍未能就引出涉密信息的意图提供适当的通知。2\n\n1 政府在本文件中及就此主题的任何其他文件中，将把涉案的预期证人称为“证人-2”。\n\n2 政府对涉密情报信息的存在既不能证实也不能否认。本文件中的任何内容均不应被解释为此类证实或否认。\n\n论证\n\nI. CIPA 第 5 条\n\n在 1980 年颁布 CIPA 之前，最高法院就“早已承认”涉密信息特权的存在。United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1989)（引用 C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) 以及 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974)）。“‘显而易见且无可争议的是’，没有任何政府利益比国家安全更为迫切。”Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)。因此，“政府在保护对我们国家安全至关重要的信息的保密性，以及保护对我们外国情报机构有效运作至关重要的机密性表象方面，均拥有压倒一切的重大利益。”Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980)（被 Yunis, 867 F.2d at 623 及 CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) 引用）。遵循这一历史悠久的先例，法院已经承认了涉密信息特权的重要性。参见，例如，United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 245 (4th Cir. 2008)；United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1107-09 (4th Cir. 1985)；亦见 Yunis, 867 F.2d at 622-23。\n\n为保护涉密信息，国会颁布了 CIPA。United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2006)（引用 Yunis, 867 F.2d at 623）。确立了刑事案件中处理涉密信息程序的 CIPA，“旨在‘以不损害被告获得公正审判之权利的方式，保护并限制涉密信息的证据开示’”。United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2008)（引用 United States v. O'Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2002)）；亦见 Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 245（CIPA 保障“政府保护涉密信息免于公开披露的特权”）。如果被告预计在预审程序或审理中披露或促成披露涉密信息，CIPA 第 5 条要求被告向政府提供书面通知。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5。无论该涉密信息此前是否已通过被告自身的交往或经历为其所知悉，情况均是如此。参见，例如，United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1984)（在被告了解某些涉密信息的情况下限制被告证词的范围，并指出“这正是国会在颁布《机密信息程序法》时所考虑的情形”）。\n\n具体而言，CIPA 确立了一个框架，以解决辩方声称其意图披露或促成披露涉密信息的主张。因此，任何合理预期以任何方式披露（或促成披露）涉密信息的被告，均须根据 CIPA 第 5 条提交此类意图的通知。“及时的预审通知”的默认要求是在审理前三十天。\n\n第 5 条相关部分规定：\n\n如果被告在涉及对该被告提起刑事起诉的任何审理或预审程序中，合理预期以任何方式披露或促成披露涉密信息，被告应在法院指定的时间内，或者在未指定时间的情况下，在审理前三十天内，以书面形式通知美国检察官及法院。该通知应包括对涉密信息的简要描述。\n\n18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a)。法院严格执行了该法案中的时间限制。大体参见 United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1465 (11th Cir. 1987)（维持地区法院因被告未根据 CIPA 第 5 条提供及时通知而裁定不准其在审理中出示某些证据的决定）。\n\n第 5(a) 条明确要求此类通知“包括对涉密信息的简要描述”。判例法认为，此类通知“必须是具体明确的，具体列出被告合理认为对其辩护所必需的涉密信息”。United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983)（强调为原文所加）；亦见 Smith, 780 F.2d at 1105。无论证据预计是在主询问还是交叉询问中引入，该要求既适用于书证物证，也适用于口头证言。参见，例如，Wilson, 750 F.2d 7（证词）；Collins, 720 F.2d at 1199（同上）。\n\nCIPA 旨在“‘通过要求在审理前对涉密信息的可采性作出裁定，以尽量减少所谓的灰色敲诈（即被告以在审理过程中披露涉密信息相威胁）问题。’”United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996)（引用 S. Rep. No. 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S.S.C.A.N. 4294, 4295）。如果被告未能在审理前足够早地提供充分详细的通知以允许执行关于涉密证据的使用、关联性及可采性的 CIPA 程序，第 5(b) 条规定对该证据予以排除。United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1465 (11th Cir. 1987)。同样，如果被告试图在审理中披露其在第 5(a) 条通知中未指明的涉密信息，依该成文法第 5(b) 条规定，排除证据即为适当的救济措施。参见 Smith, 780 F.2d at 1105（“在未发出通知的情况下，禁止被告披露任何此类信息。”）。\n\n事实上，正是基于被告在第 5 条下的提存证明，法院根据 CIPA 第 6(a) 条，必须依据《联邦证据规则》的标准，“作出在审理或预审程序期间本应作出的关于涉密信息的使用、关联性或可采性的所有决定”，并由被告承担证明该证据具有关联性、实质性且符合其他可采性条件的举证责任。参见 United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 1255, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1989)；亦见 United States v. Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. 1563, 1571 (S.D. Fla. 1995)。第 5 条的通知要求旨在允许法院确定被告打算如何使用涉密信息，并确保不允许被告“隐瞒其意图并使政府对辩方可能透露的内容感到措手不及”。Collins, 720 F.2d at 1199-1200。法院对涉密信息的使用、关联性或可采性的考量“不应仓促草率进行。因意图引入涉密证据而引发的宪法、证据及国家安全方面的关切，如有可能应在审理前解决，而不是在审理中途解决。”United States v. Barrack, 21 Cr. 371 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2022), Dkt. 224 (Mem. and Order) at 7（引用 United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1196-97 (11th Cir. 1983)）。\n\nII. 被告未能遵守 CIPA 第 5 条的通知要求\n\n如上所述，CIPA 旨在“‘通过要求在审理前对涉密信息的可采性作出裁定……尽量减少所谓的灰色敲诈问题。’”Pappas, 94 F.3d at 799 (2d Cir. 1996)（内部引用省略）。郭文贵的《第 5 条通知》从表面上即可看出，“灰色敲诈”似乎才是其目的，而非引入支持任何具有法律可行性辩护的关联信息。\n\n通过《第 5 条通知》，郭文贵表明他试图在交叉询问中从证人-2 处引出某些证言。法院应根据 CIPA 第 5(b) 条排除此项涉密信息。第一，被告未能遵守 CIPA 第 5 条的通知要求。参见 18 U.S.C. App. 3, § 5(b)。第二，即使具有时效性，被告的《第 5 条通知》也未能满足 CIPA 第 5(a) 条的要求。\n\nA. 被告未能提供及时的通知\n\nCIPA（《机密信息程序法》，Classified Information Procedures Act）第 5 条明确规定，如果被告「合理预期将以任何方式披露或导致披露与任何审判或审前程序有关的机密信息」，则必须在审判前三十日内发出通知。18 U.S.C. App. 3, § 5(a)。审判原定于 2024 年 5 月 22 日开始，而被告于 2024 年 5 月 14 日提交了其第 5 条通知——距离预定开庭仅有短短八天。尽管被告由经验丰富的资深律师代理，并且政府已于 2023 年 4 月 20 日通过政府的 CIPA 第 2 条通知（见 Dkt. No. 52）、政府于 2023 年 12 月 22 日根据 CIPA § 4 提交的支持保护令的动议（见 Dkt. No. 220）以及法院于 2024 年 4 月 18 日根据 CIPA § 4 签发的保护令（见 Dkt. No. 294）提醒其履行提供通知的义务，但被告仍未就其为何未能按时提交通知提供任何借口或解释。3 未能履行该义务的后果是明确的，因为 CIPA 第 5(b) 条授权地区法院在被告未能提供适当通知的情况下，在审判中排除机密信息的披露。参见 Barrack 案，21 Cr. 371 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2022)，Dkt. 224（在审判中排除被告对机密信息进行调查质询，原因包括被告在审判前不到两周才提供第 5 条通知，属于逾期提交）；Badia 案，827 F.2d at 1464-66（维持在审判中排除机密信息披露的裁定，因被告未能遵守 CIPA 第 5 条的通知要求）；United States v. North 案，708 F.Supp. 389, 392 (D.D.C. 1988)（因未能充分遵守第 5 条通知要求而排除机密信息的使用）。\n\n3 关于时间节点：政府于 2024 年 5 月 6 日（即原定开庭前 16 天）提供了其证人名单及其第 3500 条材料，包括涉及 Witness-2（证人-2）的材料。然而，政府推定被告早已知晓其第 5 条通知中所包含的机密信息，并进一步指出，即使该信息具有相关性（实则不然），无论政府是否传唤 Witness-2 在审判中出庭作证，该信息也本可以通过被告本人的证词或其他方式显现出相关性。\n\n被告逾期提交的第 5 条通知并未给政府留出足够的时间来权衡披露的代价或考虑披露的替代方案。参见 Badia 案，827 F.2d at 1465。此外，如果法院不根据 CIPA 第 5(b) 条排除该机密信息，政府将请求就排除机密信息的其他依据进行补充辩论——具体而言，即第 5 条通知中所包含的信息属于不可采信的传闻、不具相关性、且/或未能通过《联邦证据规则》第 403 条的权衡检验——随后将提请举行 CIPA 第 6 条听证会。鉴于审判原定于 2024 年 5 月 22 日（即五天后）开始，这些额外步骤必然会延误本案的审判。\n\nB. 被告的通知明显不充分\n\n第 5 条通知并未具体指明 Guo（郭）合理认为对其辩护所必需的机密信息，也未解释通知中所述信息将如何具有相关性（更谈不上必要性）。4 因此，第 5 条通知未能满足 CIPA 第 5(a) 条的明确要求，法院应依据 CIPA 第 5(b) 条，排除被告在审判交叉询问中从 Witness-2 处引出通知中所述信息的行为。参见 Collins 案，720 F.2d at 1199（CIPA 第 5(a) 条通知「必须具体化，明确列出被告合理认为对其辩护所必需的机密信息」）（强调为原文所加）；亦参见 Smith 案，780 F.2d at 1105；Wilson 案，750 F.2d 7。\n\n4 政府指出，尽管第 5 条通知中的信息对 Guo 的辩护并不重要，但 Guo 完全有能力利用其掌握的非机密材料进行实质相同的辩护。\n\n结论\n\n基于前述理由，法院应根据 CIPA 第 5(b) 条，排除旨在引出第 5 条通知中所提及证据的对 Witness-2 的交叉询问。\n\n日期：纽约州纽约市 2024 年 5 月 17 日\n\n谨此呈递，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯）\nUnited States Attorney（联邦检察官）\n\n签署人：/s/\n\nRyan B. Finkel（莱恩·B·芬克尔）\nJuliana N. Murray（朱莉安娜·N·默里）\nMicah F. Fergenson（米卡·F·弗根森）\nJustin Horton（贾斯汀·霍顿）\nAssistant United States Attorneys（联邦助理检察官）\n26 Federal Plaza\nNew York, New York 10278\n212-637-6612 / -2314 / -2190 / -2276","key_entities":["CIPA","Classified Information","Guo","Kwok","Miles Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Horton","Fergenson","Murray","Finkel","Je"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":52,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":220,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":224,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":294,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":2399,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-05-17 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-05-17","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:30:41"}