{"id":"court_sdny_340_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":340,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"MOTION","filed_date":"2024-05-18","title":"DEFENDANT MILES GUO'S OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION *IN LIMINE* TO PRECLUDE INQUIRY ABOUT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION","summary_zh":"动议（反对状）—— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #340（2024-05-18 提交，部分内容封存）。被告 Miles Guo 由 Pryor Cashman LLP 律师 Sidhardha Kamaraju 及 Sabrina P. Shroff 代理，就政府依《涉密信息程序法》(CIPA) 提出的、拟排除其在对某证人（Witness-2）交叉询问中提及涉密信息的动议提出反对，主张其 CIPA 第 5 条通知程序符合时限要求，相关性问题应由政府依第 6 条另行申请听证解决，并请求法院驳回政府动议。","summary_en":"Opposition motion — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #340 (filed 2024-05-18, partially under seal). Defendant Miles Guo, represented by Sidhardha Kamaraju and Sabrina P. Shroff of Pryor Cashman LLP, opposes the government's motion in limine under the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) to preclude him from eliciting classified information while cross-examining a witness (\"Witness-2\"), arguing his CIPA Section 5 notice was timely and that any relevance dispute should instead be raised by the government through a Section 6 hearing; he asks the court to deny the government's motion.","body_en":"# DEFENDANT MILES GUO'S OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION *IN LIMINE* TO PRECLUDE INQUIRY ABOUT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION\n\n**Case No. 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)**\n**FILED PARTIALLY UNDER SEAL**\n**Filed 05/18/24 | Document 340 | 9 Pages**\n\n**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK**\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\nv.\nMILES GUO, *Defendant*.\n\n---\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju\nPRYOR CASHMAN LLP\n7 Times Square, New York, NY 10036\n(212) 421-4100 | skamaraju@pryorcashman.com\n\nSabrina P. Shroff\n80 Broad Street, 19th Floor, New York, NY 10004\n(646) 763-1490 | sabrinashroff@gmail.com\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant Miles Guo*\n\n---\n\nMiles Guo respectfully submits this memorandum in opposition to the government's motion to preclude him from eliciting classified information during cross-examination (the \"Govt. Mot.\" or the \"Motion\") (Dkt. 339). For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Guo respectfully submits that the Court should deny the government's motion in its entirety.\n\n## PRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\nThe government's motion should be denied because it misapprehends the procedures under the Classified Information Procedures Act (\"CIPA\").\n\n*First*, the government claims that Mr. Guo's notice under Section 5 of CIPA that he would elicit certain classified information from one of the government's witnesses (\"Witness-2\") is untimely because it was not served on the government 30 days before trial. CIPA's Section 5 notice period begins when the defense learns that it may need to disclose classified information at trial, and in this case, that did not occur until the government produced its § 3500 material for Witness-2. The government chose to make that disclosure just sixteen days before trial. As soon as it became apparent that the information was classified, Mr. Guo alerted the Court and the government.\n\n*Second*, the government argues that Mr. Guo's Section 5 notice is deficient because it does not set forth the relevance or need for this information. Again, however, the government's contention misunderstands CIPA's framework—Section 5 requires that the defense disclose what classified information it intends to elicit, not how that information is relevant. Upon receiving such notice, it is incumbent *on the government* to seek a hearing concerning relevance under Section 6 of CIPA. Here, Mr. Guo has specifically described the narrow category of classified information that he intends to elicit from Witness-2, and if the government disagrees as to its relevance, it should have sought relief under Section 6. Accordingly, the Court should deny the government's motion.\n\n## ARGUMENT\n\n### I. CIPA'S STATUTORY FRAMEWORK\n\nCIPA's fundamental purpose is to \"harmonize a defendant's right to obtain and present exculpatory material [at] trial and the government's right to protect classified material in the national interest.\" *United States v. Pappas*, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996). CIPA, codified at 18 U.S.C. App. III, thus sets forth procedures by which federal district courts rule on pretrial matters concerning the discovery, admissibility, and use of classified information in criminal cases. *See Pappas*, 91 F.3d at 799. As a procedural statute, CIPA neither adds nor detracts from the substantive rights of the defendant. *See United States v. El-Hanafi*, No. S5 10 CR 162 KMW, 2012 WL 603649, at \\*2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012) (\"CIPA does not expand or restrict established principles of discovery.\").\n\nWhen the defense learns of and intends to use classified information at trial or during a hearing, CIPA's framework under Sections 5 and 6 is triggered. First, the defendant must give notice to the government pursuant to Section 5 by providing a \"a brief description of the classified information\" that the defendant intends to elicit. 18 U.S.C. App. III § 5. \"The Section 5(a) notice requires that the defendant state, with particularity, which items of classified information entrusted to him he reasonably expects will be revealed by his defense in this particular case.\" *United States v. Schulte*, No. 17-CR-548 (JMF), 2022 WL 1639282, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2022) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Such notice must occur, absent a separate deadline set by the Court, either 30 days before trial, or, \"[w]henever a defendant learns of additional classified information he reasonably expects to disclose at any such proceeding, he shall notify the attorney for the United States and the court in writing as soon as possible thereafter.\" 18 U.S.C. App. III § 5.\n\nAfter the defense files its Section 5 notice, then the burden turns to the government to move under Section 6(a) of CIPA for a hearing to determine the \"'use, relevance, or admissibility'\" of the classified information identified in the defendant's Section 5 notice. *See Schulte*, 2022 WL 1639282, at \\*1. If the Court decides that the information sought to be elicited by the defense is relevant and admissible, then the government can move under Section 6(c) of CIPA for substitution of the information.\n\n### II. MR. GUO'S SECTION 5 NOTICE IS TIMELY\n\nThe government's contention that Mr. Guo's Section 5 notice is untimely misconstrues the timeline of events. The government argues that CIPA requires disclosure of classified information that the defense intends to use 30 days before trial. The government ignores, however, that the same provision of Section 5 states that \"[w]henever a defendant learns of additional classified information he reasonably expects to disclose at any such proceeding, he shall notify the attorney for the United States and the court in writing as soon as possible thereafter.\" 18 U.S.C. App. III § 5.\n\nThat is precisely what occurred here. Mr. Guo's counsel did not know that any classified information was at issue with respect to Witness-2 until after they reviewed Witness-2's § 3500 material, and then, within days after that, defense counsel provided notice to the government, the CISO and the Court. In other words, Mr. Guo did provide Section 5 notice \"as soon as possible\" after he learned that there was classified information that he may need to elicit at trial.\n\nContrary to the government's contention, the chronology makes clear that the defense acted as soon as it became aware of the need to disclose classified information at trial. In particular, the information discussed in Mr. Guo's Section 5 notice pertains specifically to cross-examination of Witness-2, not any other witness. As a result, Mr. Guo could not have been aware of the potential that this information would be relevant until the defense knew that Witness-2 would testify at trial. That did not occur, however, until April 17, 2024, when the government filed its opposition to Mr. Guo's motions *in limine* indicating as much. After learning that, defense counsel met with Mr. Guo to debrief him about his interactions with Witness-2, which entailed defense counsel learning certain information that Witness-2 disclosed to Mr. Guo several years ago.\n\nAt that time, however, neither Mr. Guo nor defense counsel could know that the specific interaction entailed classified information – a fact learned only after review of Witness-2's § 3500 material, which the government did not produce until approximately midnight on May 6, 2024. Specifically, Witness-2's § 3500 material contained [REDACTED]. On May 9, 2024, merely three days after receiving § 3500 material for Witness-2, among more than 70 other witnesses, defense counsel wrote to the Court explaining the issue and seeking an *ex parte* CIPA Section 2 conference, which the Court held on May 14, 2024. After that conference, that same day, defense counsel provided Section 5 notice to the government, through delivery by the CISO with a copy for the Court. Indeed, defense counsel moved so quickly that they handwrote the notice immediately after the conference, rather than delay it by waiting to be able to access a SCIF to type it. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. El Gammal*, No. 15 Cr. 588 (ER) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. 182 (Section 5 notice given after trial started when classified information was disclosed).\n\nThe timeline described above demonstrates that defense counsel moved to provide Section 5 notice \"as soon as possible\" after learning that classified information about Witness-2 would be relevant at trial. The government's arguments to the contrary are meritless. The government claims that the defense has long known this information and thus should have disclosed it a month before trial because the defendant may have testified about it. That claim is a red herring. The information at issue in the Section 5 notice pertains specifically to *cross-examination* of Witness-2—thus the defense could not have known that any cross-examination material about Witness-2 would be relevant until it learned that the government intended to call Witness-2 at trial. And even after learning of the information, the defense had no way of knowing that the information was classified: [REDACTED] the defense had no way of knowing that what Witness-2 disclosed to Mr. Guo was true or that, even if it were true, that the information was classified. [REDACTED] But within days of learning that this might be an issue, defense counsel provided Section 5 notice to the government.\n\nThe government argues that \"if the Court does not preclude the classified information pursuant to CIPA Section 5(b), the Government will request additional briefing regarding additional bases for precluding the classified information—specifically, that the information contained in the Section 5 Notice is inadmissible hearsay, irrelevant, and/or fails Rule 403's balancing test—and then will move for a CIPA Section 6 hearing.\" (Govt. Mot. at 9). The government then claims that if it has to engage in this motion practice, that would delay the trial. As an initial matter, the government's threatened motion practice is squarely at odds with CIPA. A motion for a Section 6 hearing *is* the government's vehicle to challenge classified information as \"inadmissible hearsay, irrelevant, and/or fails Rule 403's balancing test,\" *Schulte*, 2022 WL 1639282, at \\*1. Thus it makes no sense to say that the government will litigate those issues first, and then only seek a Section 6 hearing.\n\nBut in any event, to the extent the government contends that Mr. Guo's Section 5 notice has created time pressure, that is the government's fault, not the defense's. The government has been investigating this case for almost four years now, and has been in contact with Witness-2 since close to the inception of the investigation, and thus must have known about his interactions with the U.S. government. At the time it charged this case—more than a year ago—the government must have been aware that it may need Witness-2's testimony at trial. Nevertheless, despite knowing all of this, the government did not disclose the substitution that triggered Mr. Guo's Section 5 notice until approximately two weeks before trial. Now that Mr. Guo has that information and has properly sought to use it, the government cannot reasonably complain that he should be precluded from doing so simply because the government chose to wait so long to disclose it to him.\n\nThe Court should reject the government's untimeliness argument.\n\n### III. MR. GUO'S SECTION 5 NOTICE IS SUFFICIENT\n\nThe government's claim that Mr. Guo's Section 5 notice is insufficiently particularized also misses the mark. First, the government's position that Mr. Guo does not explain the relevance or need for this information in his Section 5 notice turns CIPA's framework on its head. Nothing in Section 5 requires the defense to articulate the relevance of classified information that it seeks to elicit at trial. All that is required is that the defense describe the classified information that it seeks to introduce at trial, so that the government and the Court can assess it. *See Schulte*, 2022 WL 1639282, at \\*1 (describing requirements for Section 5 notice). Indeed, *United States v. Collins*, the authority on which the government relies, states explicitly that the required Section 5 \"'brief description' is to be of the *classified information* expected to be disclosed.\" 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983) (\"The Section 5(a) notice requires that the defendant state, with particularity, *which items of classified information* entrusted to him he reasonably expects will be revealed by his defense in this particular case.\") (emphasis added). That is what Mr. Guo has done—described what classified information he believes will be elicited through Witness-2's cross-examination.\n\nThe government cites no authority—and there is none—for the proposition that the defense must outline the relevance of the classified information to the issues at trial in its Section 5. Rather, if the government believes that there is an issue with the relevance or admissibility of the proffered classified evidence, then it should have made a Section 6(a) motion. *See Schulte*, 2022 WL 1639282, at \\*1 (describing Section 6 process in detail in case involving large-scale leak of CIA classified information). What the government has no authority to do, however, is to shift its Section 6 burden to the defense—if the government thinks this material is irrelevant, then it should put forth that argument.\n\nFinally, while the government summarily claims that Mr. Guo's Section 5 notice does not particularize the classified information he seeks to introduce, it does not point to any actual deficiency in Mr. Guo's notice. Even if it had tried, however, the government would be unable to do so. [REDACTED] Mr. Guo's Section 5 notice made clear that he intends to elicit two specific and narrow facts about those interactions. The government thus has all the information it needs to evaluate its options under Section 6, which is what the statute requires.\n\n## CONCLUSION\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, Mr. Guo respectfully submits that the Court should deny the government's motion to preclude Mr. Guo from eliciting classified information through cross-examination of Witness-2 in its entirety.\n\nDated: New York, New York\nMay 18, 2024\n\nPRYOR CASHMAN LLP\n\nBy: Sidhardha Kamaraju\n7 Times Square, New York, NY 10036\n(212) 421-4100 | skamaraju@pryorcashman.com\n\nSabrina P. Shroff\n80 Broad Street, 19th Floor, New York, NY 10004\n(646) 763-1490 | sabrinashroff@gmail.com\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant Miles Guo*","body_zh":"被告 Miles Guo（郭文贵）反对政府排除涉及机密信息质证之预先动议的答辩状\n\n案号：1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)\n部分密封提交\n提交日期：05/18/24 | 文件编号：340 | 共 9 页\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n诉\nMILES GUO（郭文贵），被告。\n\n---\n\nSidhardha Kamaraju\nPRYOR CASHMAN LLP\n7 Times Square, New York, NY 10036\n(212) 421-4100 | skamaraju@pryorcashman.com\n\nSabrina P. Shroff\n80 Broad Street, 19th Floor, New York, NY 10004\n(646) 763-1490 | sabrinashroff@gmail.com\n\n被告 Miles Guo 的辩护律师\n\n---\n\n郭文贵谨此提交本答辩备忘录，反对政府旨在禁止其在交叉询问中引出机密信息的动议（以下简称“政府动议”或“该动议”）（Dkt. 339）。基于下文所述理由，郭先生谨提请法院全面驳回政府的动议。\n\n初步陈述\n\n政府的动议应当予以驳回，因为其对《Classified Information Procedures Act（机密信息程序法）》（简称“CIPA”）规定的程序存在错误理解。\n\n第一，政府声称，郭先生依据 CIPA 第 5 条发出的拟从政府证人之一（以下简称“证人-2”）处引出某些机密信息的通知不具备时效性，因为该通知未在审判前 30 天送达政府。CIPA 第 5 条的通知期自辩方获悉其可能需要在审判中披露机密信息之时起算，而在本案中，直到政府出示针对证人-2 的 § 3500 材料后，辩方才获悉此事。政府选择在开庭前仅仅十六天时才进行该项披露。一旦显明该信息属于机密信息，郭先生便立即提请法院和政府注意。\n\n第二，政府辩称，郭先生依据第 5 条发出的通知存在瑕疵，因为该通知未阐明该信息的相关性或必要性。然而，政府的主张再次误解了 CIPA 的框架体系——第 5 条要求辩方披露其拟引出哪些机密信息，而非阐明该信息具有何种相关性。在收到此类通知后，应由政府负责依据 CIPA 第 6 条申请就相关性问题举行听证会。在本案中，郭先生已明确具体地说明了他拟从证人-2 处引出的机密信息的狭窄范围，如果政府对其相关性有异议，本应依据第 6 条寻求救济。因此，法院应驳回政府的动议。\n\n辩论意见\n\nI. CIPA 的法定框架\n\nCIPA 的根本宗旨在于“协调被告在审判中获取并出示开脱罪责材料的权利与政府基于国家利益保护机密材料的权利”。United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996)。编入 18 U.S.C. App. III 的 CIPA 由此确立了相关程序，联邦地区法院据此就刑事案件中涉及机密信息的证据开示、可采性及使用的审前事项作出裁定。参见 Pappas, 91 F.3d at 799。作为一项程序性法规，CIPA 既未增加亦未减损被告的实体权利。参见 United States v. El-Hanafi, No. S5 10 CR 162 KMW, 2012 WL 603649, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012)（“CIPA 并未扩大或限制既定的证据开示原则”）。\n\n当辩方获悉并打算在审判或听证会期间使用机密信息时，即触发 CIPA 第 5 条和第 6 条项下的框架机制。首先，被告必须依据第 5 条向政府发出通知，提供被告拟引出的“机密信息的简要描述”。18 U.S.C. App. III § 5。“第 5(a) 条通知要求被告具体明确地说明，他合理预期其辩方在本案中将揭露托付给他的哪些机密信息项。”United States v. Schulte, No. 17-CR-548 (JMF), 2022 WL 1639282, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2022)（内部引文及引号省略）。除非法院另行设定截止期限，否则此类通知必须在审判前 30 天发出，或者，“每当被告获悉其合理预期将在任何此类诉讼程序中披露的额外机密信息时，其应在此后尽快以书面形式通知美国检察官及法院。”18 U.S.C. App. III § 5。\n\n在辩方提交第 5 条通知后，举证责任即转移至政府，由政府依据 CIPA 第 6(a) 条提出动议，要求举行听证会以确定被告第 5 条通知中所指明之机密信息的“‘使用、相关性或可采性’”。参见 Schulte, 2022 WL 1639282, at *1。如果法院认定辩方拟引出的信息具有相关性且具有可采性，则政府可依据 CIPA 第 6(c) 条提出动议，申请对该信息进行替代处理。\n\nII. 郭先生依据第 5 条发出的通知具备时效性\n\n政府关于郭先生第 5 条通知不具备时效性的主张曲解了事件的时间线。政府辩称，CIPA 要求在审判前 30 天披露辩方拟使用的机密信息。然而，政府忽视了第 5 条同一条款所规定的：“每当被告获悉其合理预期将在任何此类诉讼程序中披露的额外机密信息时，其应在此后尽快以书面形式通知美国检察官及法院。”18 U.S.C. App. III § 5。\n\n这正是本案中发生的情况。郭先生的律师直到审查了证人-2 的 § 3500 材料后，才获悉证人-2 涉及任何机密信息，随后在此后数日之内，辩护律师便向政府、机密信息安全官（CISO）及法院发出了通知。换言之，郭先生在其获悉存在审判中可能需要引出的机密信息之后，确实“尽快”提供了第 5 条通知。\n\n与政府的主张相反，时间线清楚地表明，辩方在知晓审判中需要披露机密信息后立即采取了行动。具体而言，郭先生第 5 条通知中讨论的信息专门针对证人-2 的交叉询问，而非任何其他证人。因此，在辩方知晓证人-2 将在审判中作证之前，郭先生不可能意识到该信息可能具有相关性。然而，这一知晓直到 2024 年 4 月 17 日政府提交反对郭先生预先动议的答辩状并表明此意图时才发生。获悉此事后，辩护律师与郭先生会面，了解其与证人-2 接触的情况，在此过程中辩护律师获悉了证人-2 数年前向郭先生透露的某些信息。\n\n然而在当时，郭先生和辩护律师都无法知晓该特定接触牵涉机密信息——这一事实是在审查了证人-2 的 § 3500 材料之后才获悉的，而政府直到 2024 年 5 月 6 日午夜左右才出示该材料。具体而言，证人-2 的 § 3500 材料包含 [REDACTED]（已涂黑删除）。2024 年 5 月 9 日，即在收到包括证人-2 在内的 70 多名证人的 § 3500 材料仅仅三天后，辩护律师致信法院解释了该问题并申请依据 CIPA 第 2 条举行单方会议，法院于 2024 年 5 月 14 日举行了该会议。在该会议结束后，辩护律师于当天通过 CISO 递交向政府提供了第 5 条通知，并附送一份抄送法院。事实上，辩护律师行动极其迅速，以至于他们在会议结束后立即手写了该通知，而没有为了等待进入敏感隔离信息设施（SCIF）打印而拖延时间。参见例如 United States v. El Gammal, No. 15 Cr. 588 (ER) (S.D.N.Y.), Dkt. 182（在机密信息被披露后，于审判开始后发出第 5 条通知）。\n\n上述时间线表明，辩护律师在获悉有关证人-2 的机密信息将在审判中具有相关性之后，已“尽快”采取行动提供第 5 条通知。政府提出的相反论点毫无依据。政府声称辩方早就知道该信息，因此应该在审判前一个月予以披露，因为被告可能就此作证。这一主张纯属转移视线的遁词。第 5 条通知所涉信息专门针对证人-2 的交叉询问——因此，在知晓政府打算传唤证人-2 在审判中作证之前，辩方不可能知晓有关证人-2 的任何交叉询问材料会具有相关性。而且即使获悉了该信息，辩方也无法知晓该信息属于机密：[REDACTED]（已涂黑删除）辩方无法知晓证人-2 向郭先生披露的内容是否属实，或者即使属实，辩方也无法知晓该信息是否属于机密。[REDACTED]（已涂黑删除）但是在获悉这可能成为一个问题之后的数天之内，辩护律师便向政府提供了第 5 条通知。\n\n政府辩称，“如果法院不依据 CIPA 第 5(b) 条排除该机密信息，政府将请求就排除该机密信息的其他依据进行补充简报陈述——具体而言，第 5 条通知中包含的信息属于不可采的传闻、不具有相关性、以及/或者未通过联邦证据规则第 403 条的利益权衡测试——然后再提请举行 CIPA 第 6 条听证会。”（政府动议第 9 页）。随后政府声称，如果不得不进行这一动议程序，将导致审判延期。首先，政府所扬言的动议程序完全与 CIPA 背道而驰。申请举行第 6 条听证会的动议本身就是政府用来以“属于不可采的传闻、不具有相关性、以及/或者未通过第 403 条权衡测试”为由对机密信息提出异议的工具，Schulte, 2022 WL 1639282, at *1。因此，声称政府将首先对这些问题进行诉辩，然后才寻求举行第 6 条听证会，是完全不合逻辑的。\n\n但无论如何，就政府主张郭先生的第 5 条通知造成了时间压力而言，这完全是政府的过错，而非辩方的过错。政府调查本案至今已近四年，且自调查之初便与证人-2 保持接触，因此必定知晓其与美国政府的互动接触。在对本案提起指控时——距今已有一年多——政府必定已经意识到在审判中可能需要证人-2 的证词。然而，尽管知晓这一切，政府直到开庭前约两周才披露触发郭先生第 5 条通知的替代信息。既然郭先生掌握了该信息并正当地寻求使用该信息，政府就不能仅因其自身选择拖延如此之久才向郭先生披露该信息，便无理抱怨应当禁止郭先生使用该信息。\n\n法院应驳回政府关于不具备时效性的主张。\n\nIII. 郭先生依据第 5 条发出的通知已足够充分\n\n政府关于郭先生（Mr. Guo）的第 5 条通知（Section 5 notice）不够具体的主张同样未能切中要害。首先，政府关于郭先生在其第 5 条通知中未解释该信息的关联性或必要性的立场，完全颠倒了《机密信息程序法》（Classified Information Procedures Act，简称 CIPA）的框架体系。第 5 条中没有任何规定要求辩方阐明其试图在审判中引出的机密信息的关联性。所要求的仅仅是辩方对其试图在审判中引入的机密信息进行描述，以便政府和法院进行评估。参见 Schulte 案，2022 WL 1639282，第 *1 页（描述对第 5 条通知的要求）。事实上，政府所依据的判例 United States v. Collins 案中明确指出，第 5 条所要求的“简要描述”是针对“预期将被披露的机密信息”。720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983)（“第 5(a) 条通知要求被告具体说明，在这一特定案件中，其合理预期辩方将揭示哪些托付给他的机密信息事项。”）（强调为后加）。这正是郭先生所做的——描述了他认为通过对证人-2（Witness-2）的交叉询问将被引出的机密信息。\n\n政府没有引用任何先例——事实上也不存在任何先例——来支持“辩方必须在其第 5 条通知中概述机密信息与审判争议焦点的关联性”这一主张。相反，如果政府认为拟提交的机密证据的关联性或可采性存在问题，那么它本应提出第 6(a) 条动议（Section 6(a) motion）。参见 Schulte 案，2022 WL 1639282，第 *1 页（在涉及中央情报局［CIA］机密信息大规模泄露的案件中详细描述了第 6 条程序）。然而，政府无权将其在第 6 条项下的举证责任转嫁给辩方——如果政府认为这些材料不具关联性，那么它应当提出该抗辩理由。\n\n最后，虽然政府概括性地声称郭先生的第 5 条通知没有具体说明其试图引入的机密信息，但它并未指出郭先生的通知中存在任何实际缺陷。即使政府曾试图指出，它也无法做到。[已涂黑] 郭先生的第 5 条通知明确表示，他打算引出关于这些互动的两个具体且狭窄的事实。因此，政府拥有评估其在第 6 条项下各种选择所需的全部信息，这正是该法规所要求的。\n\n结论\n\n基于上述理由，郭先生谨提请法院应完全驳回政府关于排除郭先生通过对证人-2的交叉询问引出机密信息的动议。\n\n日期：纽约州纽约市\n2024年5月18日\n\nPRYOR CASHMAN LLP（普莱尔卡什曼律师事务所）\n\n签署人：Sidhardha Kamaraju\n7 Times Square, New York, NY 10036\n(212) 421-4100 | skamaraju@pryorcashman.com\n\nSabrina P. Shroff\n80 Broad Street, 19th Floor, New York, NY 10004\n(646) 763-1490 | sabrinashroff@gmail.com\n\n被告 Miles Guo（郭文贵）的代理律师","key_entities":["Guo","Classified Information","CIPA","Miles Guo","Kamaraju","Shroff","Pryor Cashman","Je"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":182,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":339,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":2263,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-05-18 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-05-18","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:29:25"}