{"id":"court_sdny_4235_1","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":4235,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2025-03-18","title":"SDNY ECF 4235","summary_zh":"上诉通知——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，康州破产法庭 22-50073 对抗诉讼 24-05060 ECF #4235（2025年3月18日立案）。被告 Apple Inc 就法庭 2025年3月4日作出的《备忘录裁定与命令》（ECF #4189）提出上诉，该命令驳回了联合被告的动议及部分其他被告的驳回动议。","summary_en":"Notice of Appeal—United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui, Miles Guo), Bankruptcy Case 22-50073, Connecticut, Adversary Proceeding 24-05060, ECF No. 4235 (March 18, 2025). Defendant Apple Inc. appealed the Memorandum of Decision and Order (ECF No. 4189, March 4, 2025) denying joint defendants' motions to dismiss and in-part denying other defendants' motions to dismiss.","body_en":"Case 22-50073 Doc 4227 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 1 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 1 of 107\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| In re: | Chapter 11 |\n|-------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK, et al., | Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) |\n| Debtors. | (Jointly Administered) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11
TRUSTEE, | Adv. Proc. No. 24-05060 |\n| Plaintiff, | |\n| v. | |\n| APPLE INC., HING CHI NGOK,
ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS, | |\n\nDefendants.\n\n# **NOTICE OF APPEAL**\n\n# **Part I: Identify the Appellant**\n\nHAN, and MEI GUO,\n\n1. Name of appellant: Apple Inc.\n\nBERNARDO ENRIQUEZ, CHUNGUANG\n\n2. Position of appellant in the adversary proceeding or bankruptcy case that is the subject of this appeal: Defendant in the above-captioned adversary proceeding, No. 24-05060\n\n(JAM).\n\n# **Part 2: Identify the Subject of This Appeal**\n\n1. Describe the judgment—or the appealable order or decree—from which the appeal is taken: *Memorandum of Decision and Order (I) Denying Joint Defendants' Motions to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings (II) Denying in Part Other Defendants' Motions to Dismiss; and*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 2 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 2 of 107\n\n*(III) Overruling in Part Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.'s Objection to the Trustee's Motion for Judgment*\n\n*on the Pleadings*, entered in the bankruptcy case (ECF Dkt. No. 4189), a copy of which is attached\n\nas **Exhibit 1**.\n\n2. State the date on which the judgment—or the appealable order or decree—was\n\nentered: March 4, 2025.\n\n# **Part 3: Identify the Other Parties to the Appeal**\n\nList the names of all parties to the judgment—or the appealable order or decree—from which the appeal is taken and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of their attorneys:\n\n| Party | Attorneys |\n|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|\n| Apple Inc. | George Angelich (ct27542) |\n| | Eric Roman (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| Appellant | Patrick Feeney (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| | ArentFox Schiff LLP |\n| | 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor |\n| | New York, NY 10019 |\n| | T: 212.457.5423 |\n| | E:
george.angelich@afslaw.com |\n| | eric.roman@afslaw.com |\n| | patrick.feeney@afslaw.com |\n| | - and - |\n| | Jin Yan (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| | ArentFox Schiff LLP |\n| | 1717 K St. NW |\n| | Washington, DC 20006 |\n| | T: 202.778.6442 |\n| | E:
jin.yan@afslaw.com |\n| Luc A. Despins, as Chapter 11 Trustee | Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) |\n| | Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) |\n| Appellee | Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. |\n| | 195 Church St., 13th Fl. |\n| | New Haven, CT 06510 |\n| | T: (203) 821-2000 |\n| | E:
dskalka@npmlaw.com |\n| | plinsey@npmlaw.com |\n| | -
and - |\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 3 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 3 of 107\n\n| Party | Attorneys |\n|-------|---------------------------------------------|\n| | |\n| | |\n| | Douglass Barron (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| | Paul Hastings LLP |\n| | 200 Park Ave. |\n| | New York, NY 10166 |\n| | T: (212) 318-6000 |\n| | E:
douglassbarron@paulhastings.com |\n| | |\n| | |\n| | - and - |\n| | Nicholas A. Bassett (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| | Paul Hastings LLP |\n| | 2050 M St. NW |\n| | Washington, D.C. 20036 |\n| | T: (202) 551-1902 |\n| | E:
nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com |\n\nDated: March 18, 2025 New York, New York\n\n*/s/ George Angelich*\n\nGeorge Angelich (ct27542) Eric Roman (admitted *pro hac vice*) Patrick Feeney (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor New York, NY 10019 T: 212.457.5423 E: george.angelich@afslaw.com eric.roman@afslaw.com patrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- and -\n\nJin Yan (admitted *pro hac vice*) ArentFox Schiff LLP 1717 K St. NW Washington, DC 20006 T: 202.778.6442 E: jin.yan@afslaw.com\n\n*Counsel for Apple Inc.*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 4 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 4 of 107\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI certify that on March 18, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system, which will send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.\n\nDated: New York, New York March 18, 2025\n\n*/s/ George Angelich* George Angelich\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 1 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 5 of 107\n\n# **EXHIBIT 1**\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 6 of |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4227-1 | 107
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103 | Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 | Page 2 of |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 1 of 102\n\n| In re:
HO WAN KWOK, et al., | )
)
Chapter 11
)
Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)
)
(Jointly Administered) | |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| Debtors. | )
)
Re: ECF Nos. 3577, 3713
) | |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 24
)
) | |\n| v. | )
) | |\n| AGORA LAB, INC., | )
) | |\n| Defendant. | )
) | |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21 | |\n| Plaintiff, | ) | |\n| v. | )
)
) | |\n| AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC., | ) | |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) | |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM)
) | |\n| Plaintiff, | )
Re: ECF No. 26
) | |\n| v. | )
) | |\n| DIRECT PERSUASION LLC, | )
) | |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) | |\n\n#### **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| Case 22-50073
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) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
)
) |\n| FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| ARRI AMERICAS, INC.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 20
)
)
) |\n| TERIS-PHOENIX, LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
)
) |\n| PHILLIPS NIZER LLP,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
) |\n| MARK GUNDERSON,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
)
) |\n| 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| FFP (BVI) LIMITED,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) |\n| ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMAZON.COM, INC., HING CHI NGOK, ALEX | )
)
Re: ECF No. 42
)
)
)
)
) |\n| HADJICHARALAMBOUS, CHUNGUANG HAN, and
MEI GUO,
Defendants. | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
) |\n| ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS, INC.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 10 of |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4227-1 | 107
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 20
)
)
) |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
)
)
) |\n| DJD CREATIVE LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 35
)
)
) |\n| B&H FOTO & ELECTRONICS CORP., HING CHI
NGOK, ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS, and
CHUNGUANG HAN,
Defendants. | )
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 11 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| | | 107 | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 7 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 6 of 102\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| OHTZAR SHLOMO SOLOMON TREASURE LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
) |\n| ZETA GLOBAL CORP.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
)
) |\n| GROCYBER, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
)
)
) |\n| CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TECHNOLOGY, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) |\n| ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
AARON MITCHELL, | )
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
)
)
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANTHEM HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.,
f/k/a EMPIRE HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.,
d/b/a EMPIRE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
) |\n| v.
MODSQUAD INC.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLOUDFLARE, INC.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| 3 COLUMBUS CIRCLE LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
) |\n| v.
INDIUM SOFTWARE, INC.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
)
) |\n| v.
MILLER MOTORCARS INC., | )
)
) |\n\nDefendant. )\n\n)\n\n)\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
) |\n| ON THE SPOT HOME IMPROVEMENT, INC.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 16
) |\n| v.
V.X. CERDA & ASSOCIATES P.A.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n| Plaintiff,
v.
LIBERTY JET MANAGEMENT CORP.,
Defendant. | |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
) |\n| TARGET ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
) |\n| v.
FLAT RATE MOVERS, LTD.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
) |\n| v.
JAMESTOWN ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
) |\n| NARDELLO & CO., LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 15
)
) |\n| v.
THE FRANCIS FIRM PLLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM)
)
Re: ECF No. 35
)
)
) |\n| BERKELEY ROWE LIMITED,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
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) | Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM)
Re: ECF No. 11 | |\n| WEDDLE LAW PLLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
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Re: ECF No. 18 | |\n| MORVILLO ABRAMOWITZ GRAND IASON &
ANELLO P.C.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
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Re: ECF No. 21 | |\n| LAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC, and
AARON MITCHELL,
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Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 28
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Defendant. | )
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 19
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G4S SECURITY SYSTEMS (HONG KONG) LTD.,
Defendant. | )
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
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Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 17
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ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.,
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Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 18
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
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Re: ECF No. 23
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
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Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 18
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CIRRUS DESIGN CORPORATION, and QIANG GUO, | )
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Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 21
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) |\n| Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
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Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 26
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Defendant. | )
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
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Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 25
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Defendant. | )
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) |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 22 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| | | 107 | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 18 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 17 of 102\n\n#### **APPEARANCES**\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglas S. Skalka James C. Graham Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Counsel for Movant and Respondent Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, Plaintiff*\n\nBenjamin O. Gilbert Lindsay C. Stone Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, NY 10112\n\nand\n\nAlan H. Martin Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP 650 Town Center Drive, 10th Floor Costa Mesa, CA 92626\n\n*Counsel for Movant Agora Lab, Inc., Defendant*\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 23 of |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4227-1 | 107
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103 | Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 | Page 19 of |\n| | | | | |\n\n102\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 18 of\n\nLindsay Sampson Bishop K&L Gates LLP One Congress Street, Suite 2900 Boston, MA 02114\n\nand\n\nBrian T. Peterson (argued) Ruby A. Nagamine K&L Gates LLP 925 4th Ave, Suite 2900 Seattle, WA 98104\n\n*Counsel for Movants Amazon Web Services, Inc., and Amazon.com, Inc., Defendants*\n\nBenjamin Mintz Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 250 West 55th Street New York, NY 10019\n\nand\n\nand\n\nRyan M. Trombley Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 70 West Madison Street, Suite 4200 Chicago, IL 60602\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Direct Persuasion LLC, Defendant*\n\nSteven G. Mintz Barry M. Kazan Philip Ian Tafet Mintz & Gold LLP 600 Third Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10016\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Fox News Network, LLC, and Marcum LLP, Defendants*\n\nMichael T. Conway Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP 747 Third Ave., 16th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Movant Arri Americas Inc., Defendant*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 24 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 20 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 19 of 102\n\nAndrea Chase Spencer Fane 1000 Walnut Street, Suite 1400 Kansas City, MO 64106\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Teris-Phoenix, LLC, Defendant*\n\nJared R. Clark Phillips Nizer LLP 485 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Phillips Nizer LLP, Defendant*\n\nJeffrey Hellman Law Offices of Jeffrey Hellman, LLC 195 Church Street, 10th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n*Counsel for Movants Mr. Mark Gundersen, Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC, and Mr. Jason Miller, Defendants*\n\nRobert N. Sensale Bershtein, Volpe & McKeon, PC 900 Chapel Street, 11th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n*Counsel for Movant 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC, Defendant*\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 25 of |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4227-1 | 107
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102 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 | Page 20 of |\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movants FFP (BVI) Limited, Aaron A. Mitchell, V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A., The Francis Firm PLLC, Lawall & Mitchell, LLC, and G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd., Defendants*\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Anthem Health Plans, Inc., Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., f/k/a Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., d/b/a Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, and Sedgwick Realty Corp., Defendants*\n\nMichael A. Siedband Federal Express Corporation 3620 Hacks Cross Road Building 2, 3rd Floor Memphis, TN 38125\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Nicole Lapenta Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Federal Express Corporation, Defendant*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 26 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 22 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 21 of 102\n\n103\n\nBret Strong Zachary W. Doninger 1790 Hughes Landing, Suite 200 The Woodlands, TX 77380\n\nLouis Joseph Martocchio, III Martocchio & Oliveira, LLC 191 Main Street Southington, CT 06489\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant DJD Creative LLC, Defendant*\n\nScott M. Kessler Akerman LLP 1251 Avenue of the Americas 37th Floor New York, NY 10020\n\nTracy Ellis Williams Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, 3rd Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant B&H Foto & Electronics Corp., Defendant*\n\nDarryl S. Laddin Frank N. White Arnall Golden Gregory LLP 171 17th Street, N.W., Suite 2100 Atlanta, GA 30363\n\nRonald I. Chorches Law Offices of Ronald I. Chorches LLC 82 Wolcott Hill Road, Suite 203 Wethersfield, CT 06109\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant American Express Company, Defendant*\n\nJohn J. Clarke, Jr. DLA Piper LLP (US) 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020\n\nand\n\nC. Kevin Kobbe DLA Piper LLP (US) 650 South Exter Street, Suite 1100 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n*Counsel for Movant Zeta Global Corp., Defendant*\n\nNicholas P. Vegliante Cohn Birnbaum & Shea CityPlace II, 15th Floor 185 Asylum Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Movant GroCyber, LLC, Defendant*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 23 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 27 of 107\n\n103\n\n102\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 22 of\n\nIlan Markus Barclay Damon LLP 545 Long Wharf Drive, 9th Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movant Conservative Campaign Technology LLC, Defendant*\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n*Counsel for Movants ModSquad, Inc., and 3 Columbus Circle, LLC, Defendants*\n\nSabrina L. Streusand Streusand, Landon, Ozburn & Lemmon, LLP Spyglass Point 1801 South MoPac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746\n\nRoss G. Fingold Stokesbury, Shipman & Fingold 10 Waterside Drive, Suite 204 Farmington, CT 06032\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Cloudflare, Inc., Defendant*\n\nRichard J. Reding ASK LLP 2600 Eagan Woods Drive, Suite 400 St. Paul, MN 55121\n\nand\n\nEdward E. Neiger ASK LLP 60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor New York, NY 10165\n\nElizabeth N. Krasnow Eric R. Wilson Benjamin D. Feder Kelley Drye & Warren LLP Canterbury Green 201 Broad Street Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Indium Software, Inc., Defendant*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 28 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 24 of\n\n103 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 23 of 102\n\nEric Seltzer Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane LLC 30 Brewster Lane Bellport, NY 11713\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Miller Motorcars Inc., Defendant*\n\nJustin S. Baumgartner Becker LLC 354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1500 Livingston, NJ 07039\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Movant On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc., Defendant*\n\nGerard R. Luckman Elbert F. Nasis Forchelli Deegan Terrana LLP 333 Earle Ovington Boulevard, Suite 1010 Uniondale, NY 11553\n\nPatrick Tomasiewicz Fazzano Tomasiewicz and Barall 96 Oak Street Harford, CT 06106\n\n*Counsel for Movant Liberty Jet Management Corp., Defendant*\n\nJohn F. Carberry Kara Anne Zarchin Cummings & Lockwood LLC Six Landmark Square Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Target Enterprises, LLC, and Jamestown Associates, LLC, Defendants*\n\nJames J. Costello, Jr. Norris McLaughlin PA 400 Crossing Blvd., 8th Floor Bridgewater, NJ 08807\n\n*Counsel for Flat Rate Movers, Ltd., Defendant*\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Nardello & Co., LLC, Defendant*\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 29 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| | | 107 | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 25 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 24 of\n\n102\n\nJulie Johnston-Ahlen Armstrong Teasdale LLP 100 North Riverside Plaza Chicago, IL 60606\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\nand\n\nJohn G. Willard Armstrong Teasdale LLP 7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105\n\n*Counsel for Movant Berkeley Rowe Limited, Defendant*\n\nRichard Corbi The Law Offices of Richard J. Corbi PLLC 104 West 40th Street, Suite 4th Floor New York, NY 10018\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Weddle Law PLLC, Defendant*\n\nRowena A. Moffett Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP 271 Whitney Avenue New Haven, CT 06511\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., Defendant*\n\nBrian David Linder Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP 305 Madison Avenue, Suite 650 New York, NY 10165\n\nMatthew D. Valauri Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker 1010 Washington Boulevard, Suite 603 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Clayman Rosenberg Kirschner & Linder LLP, Defendant*\n\nStephen M. Kindseth (argued) James M. Moriarty Daniel A. Byrd Zeisler& Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n*Counsel for Movant Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., Defendant*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 26 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 30 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 25 of 102\n\nScott M. Charmoy Charmoy & Charmoy 1465 Post Road East, Suite 100 Westport, CT 06880\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant Putnam's Landscaping, Defendant*\n\nRichard J. Bernard Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036\n\nand\n\nJosh Peterson Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 2200 Wells Fargo Center 90 S. 7th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402\n\nand\n\nJaclyn C. Marasco Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400 Wilmington, DE 19801\n\n*Counsel for Movant Cirrus Design Corporation, Defendant*\n\nRahman Connelly Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movant ACASS Canada LTD., Defendant*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 27 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 31 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 26 of 102\n\n#### **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER (I) DENYING JOINT DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; (II) DENYING IN PART OTHER DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS; AND (III) OVERRULING IN PART ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.'S OBJECTION TO THE TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\nThis case involves an individual Chapter 11 debtor who is alleged to have been involved in an extensive shell game involving hundreds of corporate *alter egos.* The Chapter 11 trustee has filed more than 260 actions seeking to avoid transfers nominally made by these *alter egos*. Forty-eight avoidance action defendants, including many who are participating in mandatory mediation with the Chapter 11 trustee, have asked this Court to decide four common issues relating to the interaction of *alter ego* and avoidable transfer law. The sheer number of defendants, complaints, and alleged *alter egos* complicates the analysis. However, when analyzing the issues in light of the facts alleged in the complaints, which the Court must take as true, the result is clear. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that none of the four common issues raised by the avoidance action defendants merit dismissal of the avoidance actions.\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court are several motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings filed by avoidance action defendants. The avoidance actions were commenced by Mr. Luc A. Despins, the Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"). The Trustee seeks to avoid and recover alleged fraudulent transfers and unauthorized post-petition transfers pursuant to sections 544, 548, 549, and 550 of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\") and sections 273, 274, and 276 of New York's\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 28 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 32 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 27 of 102\n\nDebtor and Creditor Law, codifying New York's Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (\"NYUVTA\").\n\nThirty-seven motions (the \"Joint Motions\") have been filed by defendants (the \"Joint Defendants\")1 pursuant to the Order Further Amending Avoidance Action Procedures Order and Scheduling Joint Briefing of Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings (the \"Joint Briefing Order\"). (Main Case ECF No. 3577.)2 The Joint Defendants requested and proposed this omnibus process and prepared and submitted common legal issues they requested the Court address. (*See* Main Case ECF No. 3511.) The Trustee did not object to the Joint Defendants' request. In issuing the Joint Briefing Order, the Court adopted the Joint Defendants' process.\n\nAdditional motions (the \"Non-Joint Motions\") have been filed by defendants3 who, although they did not participate in the joint briefing, raised some or all the issues raised by the Joint Defendants and requested to have their motions be heard at the same time as the Joint Motions. Because it raised some of the issues in the Joint Briefing Order, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (\"Z&Z\", and, together with the filers of the Non-Joint Motions, the \"Non-Joint Defendants\") also requested its objection to a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Trustee (the \"Z&Z Objection\")4 be heard at the same time as the Joint Motions.\n\n1 Due to the complexities of this omnibus proceeding, certain information that might appear in footnotes is contained in Appendices. The .pdf file of this decision contains bookmarks to facilitate access to the Appendices. A list of the Joint Motions, with a notation of the Joint Defendant that filed each Joint Motion, appears in **Appendix A**. 2\n\nReferences to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), will be styled \"Main Case ECF No. \\_\\_.\"\n\n3 A list of the Non-Joint Motions, with a notation of the defendant(s) that filed each Non-Joint Motion, appears in **Appendix B**. 4\n\nThe citation for Z&Z's objection appears in **Appendix C**.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 29 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 33 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 28 of 102\n\nThis memorandum of decision sets forth the Court's conclusions of law on the four issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. Because (i) the issues of law raised are not dispositive of the sufficiency of the pleadings; (ii) the defendants do not prevail on the issues of law; and (iii) many of the issues raised are issues of fact, not law, the Joint Motions are **DENIED**. For these same reasons, the Non-Joint Motions are **DENIED IN PART** as to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order and the Z&Z Objection is **OVERRULED IN PART** to the same extent.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn February 15, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court. (Main Case ECF No. 1.) On June 15, 2022, presented with allegations related to the Individual Debtor's financial mismanagement and alleged shell game, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee to administer the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate. (Main Case ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 523.)\n\n#### *The Avoidance Action Procedures Order*\n\nOn January 29, 2024, the Trustee filed a motion to prospectively establish procedures for avoidance actions he intended to commence and in which he would bring claims only under sections 544, 547, 548, 549, and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Main Case ECF No. 2532.) The Trustee anticipated filing hundreds of avoidance actions in advance of the second anniversary of the petition date and also anticipated these filings would pose case management issues. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 546, 549. After a hearing held on February 5, 2024, the Court entered an order granting the motion (as amended and supplemented, the \"Avoidance Action Procedures Order\").\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 30 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 34 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 29 of 102\n\n(Main Case ECF No. 2578.) Between February 9, 2024, and February 15, 2024, the Trustee filed\n\n268 avoidance actions, including the actions that are the subject of this decision. (Main Case\n\nECF Nos. 2594–925.) The complaints each assert at least one or more among the following six\n\ncauses of action (as asserted, collectively the \"Avoidance Claims\")5 :\n\n> (i) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and 550(a), avoidance of an actual fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(ii) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a) and N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274, and 2766 , avoidance of an actual fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(iii) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 550(a), avoidance of a constructive fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(iv) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a) and N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274, and 276, avoidance of a constructive fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(v) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550(a), avoidance of an unauthorized postpetition transfer by the Individual Debtor of property of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate and recovery from the initial transferee; and\n\n(vi) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) and in connection with one of the above causes of action, recovery of an avoided transfer from a subsequent transferee.\n\n(*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.)\n\nEach complaint alleges at least (a) an actual fraudulent transfer under both federal and\n\nstate law; or (b) an unauthorized post-petition transfer. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Agora*\n\n5 A schedule setting forth the causes of action in each complaint at issue appears in **Appendix D**. The text of the statutory provisions pursuant to which the Avoidance Claims appears in **Appendix E** alongside certain relevant statutory definitions.\n\n6 In the relevant complaints, the Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor conducted business in New York, including in relation to the alleged fraudulent transfers.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 31 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 35 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 30 of 102\n\n*Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.) In addition to alleging an actual fraudulent transfer, some complaints allege a constructive fraudulent transfer under both federal and state law. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.) Finally, one of the complaints seeks recovery from a Non-Joint Defendant as a subsequent transferee of a fraudulent transfer or an unauthorized post-petition transfer. (Complaint, *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.)\n\nAll the complaints allege the Individual Debtor, through various *alter egos*, transferred property and those transfers were either fraudulent transfers or unauthorized post-petition transfers. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1; Complaint, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24- 05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1; Complaint, *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) Additional allegations regarding the Individual Debtor's dominion and control over the *alter egos* are made through incorporation of complaints filed against alleged *alter egos* seeking declaratory judgment of *alter ego* and/or beneficial ownership and turnover of assets and control.7\n\n7 The Avoidance Claims are stayed as to allegations involving certain alleged *alter egos*. (Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶¶ 2(e)(i), (ii), Main Case ECF No. 3163.) Accordingly, the Court has not considered any Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims (used herein as defined by Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶¶ 2(e)(i) and (ii)), to the extent such Avoidance Claims are stayed. **Appendix D**, *infra*, includes notations indicating whether an Avoidance\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 32 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 36 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 31 of 102\n\nOn February 27, 2024, a Status Conference was held to address the management of the myriad avoidance actions. During the Status Conference, the Trustee requested the implementation of mandatory mediation procedures. On May 2, 2024, after several pleadings were filed and hearings were held, an order entered amending the Avoidance Action Procedures Order to include mandatory mediation. (Main Case ECF No. 3163.)\n\n#### *The Joint Briefing Order*\n\nTwo features of the mediation procedures are particularly relevant to the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. First, certain defendants are automatically excluded from mandatory mediation (Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶ 2(j)(vi), Main Case ECF No. 3163) and defendants subject to mediation may move to be excluded from mediation (*Id.* ¶ 2(m)). Second, the mediation procedures include a litigation stay. (*Id.* ¶ 2(j)(iii).) Together, these features create the procedural context for the Joint Briefing Order.\n\nAs early as April 22, 2024, avoidance action defendants *not subject to the mediation stay* began filing motions to dismiss. (*See, e.g.*, Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024), ECF No. 11.) As these motions were being set for hearing, on September 6, 2024, certain avoidance action defendants *subject to the mediation stay* – the original Joint Defendants8 – requested the Court establish a process for the Joint Defendants to\n\nClaim is a Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claim. Litigation is not stayed as to the seven alleged *alter egos* who are discussed below. A schedule of these *alter egos*, listing the incorporated complaint, the allegation regarding state of formation, and causes of action, appears in **Appendix F**. 8\n\nAll these defendants remain Joint Defendants other than Bering Yachts, LLC (*compare* Main Case ECF No. 3511 *with* Main Case ECF No. 3713) and McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC (*see* Letter, *Despins v. McManimon, Scotland & Baumann LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05194 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2025), ECF No. 22 (announcing settlement with the Trustee)).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 33 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 37 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 32 of 102\n\nargue issues raised by the other avoidance action defendants' motions rather than requiring them to seek to be excluded from mediation. (Main Case ECF No. 3511.)\n\nOn September 24, 2024, a Status Conference was held. During the Status Conference, the Joint Defendants circulated their proposal for an amendment to the Avoidance Action Procedures Order and a joint briefing process. The Trustee did not oppose the Joint Defendants' proposal. Certain defendants not subject to the mediation stay did not oppose the hearings on their motions to dismiss being continued until a hearing on the prospective Joint Motions was held, but raised due process concerns should their motions be heard after the Joint Motions. At the end of the Status Conference, the Court took the matter under consideration.\n\nOn September 25, 2024, for the reasons set forth therein, the Court entered the Joint Briefing Order. (Main Case ECF No. 3577.) In pertinent part, the Joint Briefing Order provides the Joint Defendants shall collectively file a brief addressing only four issues the Joint Defendants argued were common legal issues. Those four issues, which were adopted almost verbatim from the Joint Defendants' proposal, are:\n\n(i) whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity;\n\n(ii) whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations;\n\n(iii) the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination; and\n\n(iv) whether a determination of reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* may be applied retroactively.\n\n(Joint Briefing Order ¶ 2(b)(i)–(iv), Main Case ECF No. 3577.) Under the Joint Briefing Order, (1) to the extent such Avoidance Claims are stayed, the Joint Motions shall not address Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order; and (2) the Joint Defendants reserve for future\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 34 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 38 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 33 of 102\n\npleadings all bases for a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings other than the four issues. (*Id.* ¶¶ 4, 5.)\n\nThe Joint Briefing Order also provided time for other avoidance action defendants to join the Joint Defendants. Several did, including some not subject to the mediation stay. (Main Case ECF Nos. 3588, 3591, 3605, 3608, 3615, 3617, 3618, 3623, 3624, 3626, 3627, 3629.) On October 18, 2024, the Joint Defendants filed their joint memorandum of law (the \"Joint Brief\") and the Joint Motions. (Main Case ECF No. 3713.) On November 8, 2024, the Trustee filed an opposition to the Joint Brief. (Main Case ECF No. 3803.) On November 22, 2024, the Joint Defendants filed a reply in support of the Joint Brief. (Main Case ECF No. 3848.) The Joint Motions are fully briefed. The Non-Joint Motions and the Trustee's motion for judgment on the pleadings against Z&Z are also fully briefed.9\n\nOn January 8, 2025, a Status Conference was held regarding the format of the hearing on the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. During the Status Conference, the Court, in consultation with the parties, established the format for the hearing. The Court also noted certain defendants did not raise any of the Joint Brief issues in their motions to dismiss. The parties agreed that the hearing on those defendants' motions should not be held at the same time. Accordingly, the Court adjourned without date the hearings on those motions.10 (*Despins v. Harcus Parker Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05163 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 32; *Despins v. Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 29.)\n\n9 A schedule of the briefing of the Non-Joint Motions and the Trustee's motion for judgment on the pleadings against Z&Z appears in **Appendix G**.\n\n10 Although Mr. Jason Miller joined the Joint Brief, by a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed on October 18, 2024, *see* **Appendix A**, *infra*, and was heard with respect to that motion, he was not heard on his previous, non-joint motion to dismiss filed on June 26, 2024.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 35 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 39 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 34 of 102\n\nDespite raising some or all the common issues, other defendants were unsure whether they wanted to be heard at the same time as the Joint Defendants. After the Status Conference, these defendants indicated they did not wish their motions to be heard at the same time. Accordingly, the Court also adjourned without date the hearings on their motions. (*Despins v. Apple Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05060 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 67; *Despins v. Meta Platforms Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05117 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 42.)\n\nOn January 15, 2025, a hearing was held on the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. This matter is ripe for decision.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (H), (O). The Court concludes its exercise of jurisdiction is not precluded by Article III of the Constitution. *Cf. Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n#### **IV. DISCUSSION**\n\n#### **A. Legal Standard**\n\nThe Joint Motions, Non-Joint Motions, and Z&Z Objection assert the Trustee has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c), *made applicable by* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b); *see also Lively v. Wafra Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc.*, 6\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 36 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 40 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 35 of 102\n\nF.4th 293, 302 (2d Cir. 2021) (motions for judgment on the pleadings are subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss). In determining whether the Avoidance Claims state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must take the well-pled allegations, including those in documents attached to the complaint, as true. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); *Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't*, 692 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2012); *Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.*, 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002); *Tatum v. Oberg*, 650 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D. Conn. 2009). The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in the Trustee's favor. *Warren v. Colvin*, 744 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 2014).\n\nTo be well-pled, the Avoidance Claims must contain \"a short and plain statement showing the pleader is entitled to relief\". Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), *made applicable by* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008. They must contain \"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'\". *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The \"plausibility standard\", while not a \"probability requirement\", requires more than a \"sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.\" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). Determining the plausibility of a claim is \"a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.\" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Nevertheless, \"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.\" *Id.* at 678.\n\nIn determining the sufficiency of the Avoidance Claims, the Court must also consider documents incorporated into the complaints by reference and matters of which it may take judicial notice. *Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Here, as noted above, the Trustee has incorporated by reference his complaints against (1) Golden Spring\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 37 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 41 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 36 of 102\n\n(New York) Limited (\"Golden Spring\"); (2) Lamp Capital LLC (\"Lamp Capital\"); (3) HCHK Technologies, Inc. (\"HCHK Tech\"); (4) HCHK Property Management, Inc (\"HCHK Property\"); (5) Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. (\"Lexington\", and, together with HCHK Tech and HCHK Property, each, an \"HCHK Entity\" and, collectively, the \"HCHK Entities\"); (6) Greenwich Land, LLC (\"Greenwich Land\"); and (7) Leading Shine NY Ltd. (\"Leading Shine\"). These complaints allege, under Delaware law, (i) the foregoing entities are the *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor; and (ii) they and/or their assets are beneficially owned by the Individual Debtor.11 None of the elements of these claims need to be pled with particularity. *See Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.*, 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Delaware law and holding there is no requirement to show fraud to establish *alter ego*).\n\n#### **B. Joint Motions**\n\nThe Court will first consider the Joint Defendants'12 arguments on the four issues:\n\n(i) whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity;\n\n(ii) whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations;\n\n(iii) the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination; and\n\n11 Each of the seven *alter egos* at issue were allegedly formed in Delaware. *See* **Appendix F**, *infra*. Taking these allegations as true, Delaware law applies to the Trustee's *alter ego* and beneficial ownership claims. *Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP)*, 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013) (forum state choice of law applies); *see Weber v. U.S. Sterling Secs., Inc.*, 924 A.2d 816, 822–23 (Conn. 2007) (applying local law of state of formation to *alter ego* action and other internal affairs regarding an LLC); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 303, 304. To be clear, \"Delaware courts use the terms 'piercing the corporate veil' and 'alter ego' theory interchangeably.\" *Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc.*, 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018).\n\n12 Regardless of usage of \"Joint Defendant\" or \"Non-Joint Defendant\", the determinations in sections B and C of the Discussion apply to all defendants that raise or join in the arguments addressed.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 38 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 42 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 37 of 102\n\n(iv) whether a determination of reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* may be applied retroactively.\n\nDuring the hearing, the Joint Defendants divided the four issues into two arguments. Regarding issues (i) and (iii), the Joint Defendants argue even if the Court were to hold certain entities are the Individual Debtor's *alter egos*, the Court must dismiss the complaints because an *alter ego* finding does not give the Trustee standing to sue on the *alter ego's* transfers of its property. As to issues (ii) and (iv), the Joint Defendants raise a series of arguments that *alter ego* determinations are improper under applicable state law or must be circumscribed in the bankruptcy context because of prejudice to the *alter egos'* transferees. The Court will address these arguments in turn.\n\n#### **1. Issues (i) and (iii): The effect of an** *alter ego* **determination in avoidable transfer actions**\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law would result only in the *alter egos* being vicariously liable for debts of the Individual Debtor. Such a determination, they argue, would *not* (i) accomplish the transfer of the *alter egos'* assets into the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate and allow the Trustee to assert an unauthorized post-petition transfer claim; or (ii) collapse the identity of the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos* to allow the Trustee to assert that an *alter ego's* transfer of its property is a fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of his property. On these bases, the Joint Defendants argue the Trustee lacks standing to bring the Avoidance Claims even assuming he prevails on his *alter ego* claims. Ultimately, the Joint Defendants assert the Trustee's only recovery is from the *alter egos* themselves.\n\nIn response, the Trustee makes two arguments. First, the Trustee argues that while an *alter ego* determination is made under applicable state law, the effect of an *alter ego*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 39 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 43 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 38 of 102\n\ndetermination is a matter of federal law. In particular, the Trustee asserts section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code controls whether an interest that exists at state law is property of the estate. Second, the Trustee argues even if state law controls the effect of an *alter ego* determination, Delaware law follows an identity theory of *alter ego.* Therefore, the Trustee argues an *alter ego* determination provides him with a basis to assert fraudulent transfer and unauthorized postpetition transfer claims. The Trustee contends that if the Court agrees with the Joint Defendants, the result will be to ignore the Individual Debtor's misconduct and inequitable dealings by cutting off the estate's recovery.\n\nAs discussed in greater detail below, the Court agrees with the Trustee. As a threshold matter, the Joint Defendants' argument focuses solely on the Avoidance Claims' *alter ego* allegations and fails to address the overlapping and alternative beneficial ownership allegations. The Avoidance Claims assert the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos* and their assets as a basis for the relief requested. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541; *Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv.*, 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990); *Orr v. Kinderhill Corp.*, 991 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993). Moreover, the substantive avoidable transfer law upon which the Avoidance Claims are pled controls the effect of an *alter ego* determination. Avoidable transfer law values substance over form and is, hence, amenable to piercing the corporate veil where applicable law would disregard the corporate form. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541; *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59; *United States v. Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1983); *Butner v. United States*, 440 U.S. 48, 54–57 (1979); *Stadtmauer v. Tulis (In re Nordlicht)*, 115 F.4th 90, 104–06 (2d Cir. 2024); *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *McNellis v. Raymond*, 420 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1970); *ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp.*, 382 B.R. 49, 66–68 (S.D. Tex. 2007).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 40 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 44 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 39 of 102\n\n#### **i. Issues (i) and (iii): Beneficial ownership alleged in connection with the transfers**\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the Trustee improperly uses Delaware *alter ego* law to satisfy two elements of the Avoidance Claims by collapsing the distinctions between (a) the alleged *alter ego* transferor and the Individual Debtor13; and (b) the *alter ego* transferor's *property* and the Individual Debtor's *property*14 and/or the estate's *property*15. However, as noted, the Trustee also alleges the Individual Debtor beneficially owns the *alter egos* and/or their assets. The Court cannot ignore the Trustee's allegations.\n\n#### **a. Beneficial ownership allegations are relevant to issue (i): whether Trustee alleges an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity or by the Individual Debtor**\n\nRegarding the first element, to plead actual fraudulent transfer or one sort of constructive fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee must plead the Individual Debtor made the transfer. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (B)(ii)(IV). Likewise, with respect to his NYUVTA claims, the Trustee must plead that the Individual Debtor or some other party liable on his debt made the transfer. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f). However, an unauthorized postpetition transfer and the other types of constructive fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Code do not require the Individual Debtor to have made the transfer. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III) (no requirement that the debtor made the transfer), 549(a) (same).\n\nUnder the Bankruptcy Code, \"transfers\" include, in pertinent part, \"each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with—(i) property; or (ii) an interest in property.\" 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D). Similarly, transfers under\n\n13 *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b).\n\n14 *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b).\n\n15 *See* 11 U.S.C. § 549(a).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 41 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 45 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 40 of 102\n\nNYUVTA include, in pertinent part, \"every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset\". N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p).\n\nIn keeping with the inclusion of \"indirect\" conveyances in the definition of transfer in both the Bankruptcy Code and NYUVTA, courts look to the substance, not the form, of a transfer. *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35 (\"In equity, 'substance will not give way to form, [and] technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done.' Thus, an allegedly fraudulent conveyance must be evaluated in context; '[w]here a transfer is only a step in a general plan, the plan \"must be viewed as a whole with all its composite implications.\"'\") (internal citations omitted; other alterations in original); *see* 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.03[6] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2025) (collecting cases). Courts must look at the \"economic reality\" of the transaction. *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 36 (citing *Salomon Inc. v. United States*, 976 F.2d 837, 842 (2d Cir. 1992)). Courts may, on appropriate facts, disregard corporate separateness in analyzing the economic reality of a transaction. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53 (in an action under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, affirming district court ruling insofar as it pierced the corporate veil to determine that principal received consideration – the loan to his company – for his personal payments to the lender and, hence, ruled the transaction was not a fraudulent conveyance); *see Cohen v. de la Cruz*, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (holding law under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, is not displaced unless there is a clear indication Congress intended to do so).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 41 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 42 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 46 of 107\n\n102\n\nThe Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims as alleging the following *series* of\n\ntransfers:16\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*\n\nAccepting the Joint Defendants' interpretation, the Trustee is wholly relying on an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos* to allege the Individual Debtor made the transfers. The Joint Defendants dispute this identity and argue the Trustee does not have standing to avoid the remaining transfer, **B**Æ**C**.\n\nHowever, the Court must assess the transfers as they are alleged. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.,*\n\n*LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.*, 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018). Contrary to the Joint Defendants'\n\ninterpretation of the complaints, the Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor made the transfers\n\n\"using\" the *alter egos*:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nThe Trustee is not relying solely on an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos*\n\n– he is alleging the *alter egos* are an *instrument* of the transfers.\n\nFor example, in the complaint against, among others, Amazon.com, Inc. (\"Amazon\"), a\n\nJoint Defendant, the Trustee alleges:\n\n44. Prior to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, using his alter ego shell companies Greenwich Land, G Club17, Lexington, HCHK Technologies, and Golden Spring, or otherwise, transferred the [Individual] Debtor's property to Amazon (collectively, the \"Prepetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE A** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n16 The diagrams below are reproduced in **Appendix H**. 17 The Avoidance Claims in this complaint are stayed with respect to transfers involving G Club Operations LLC. Thus, the Court will only discuss Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land herein.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 43 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 47 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 42 of 102\n\n> 45. Subsequent to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, through his shell companies, Greenwich Land, G Club, Lexington, and Golden Spring, or otherwise, transferred property of the estate to Amazon (collectively, the \"Postpetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE B** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n(Complaint ¶¶ 44–45, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) The Trustee alleges the transfers were part of the Individual Debtor's \"shell game\" involving \"(i) [Individual] Debtor-controlled shell companies held by close family members and/or subordinates, (ii) assets purchased with cash from other [Individual] Debtor-controlled entities and/or transferred to and among shell entities for no consideration, and (iii) the [Individual] Debtor benefitting from and having control and dominion over such assets\", (*id*. ¶ 22), with the purpose of the shell game being \"to conceal and dissipate millions of dollars in assets while falsely pleading poverty to his many creditors\", (*id.* ¶ 37). (*See id.* ¶¶ 20–43.) All the other complaints make the same allegations about the Individual Debtor's financial affairs.\n\nIn support of these arguments, the complaint against Amazon incorporates the *alter ego* complaints against Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land. (*Id.* ¶ 20 n. 4.) The *alter ego* complaints seek declaratory judgments of *alter ego* and beneficial ownership and, on the bases of these declaratory judgments, turnover of property of the estate. For example, the complaint against Golden Spring alleges\n\nGolden Spring is the alter ego of the [Individual] Debtor and the [Individual] Debtor is the equitable owner of Golden Spring and/or its assets.\n\n(Complaint ¶ 2, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 44 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 48 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 43 of 102\n\nThe complaint against Golden Spring alleges numerous facts about, *inter alia*, the Individual Debtor's control over Golden Spring's formation, funding, management, and operations as well as his use of Golden Spring as a shell company to hide assets, pay expenses, and, generally, serve his interests. (*Id.* ¶¶ 13–38.) Extensive exhibits are attached to the complaint in support of these allegations. The other *alter ego* complaints make similar allegations relating to the Individual Debtor's dominion and control over the alleged *alter egos*, his benefit from and use of their assets and/or services, and his use of their corporate form to shield assets from his creditors.\n\nThe Trustee's allegations connect the Individual Debtor to the nominal transferors through two overlapping legal theories: (i) *alter ego*, the focus of the Joint Defendants' argument; and (ii) beneficial ownership, which the Joint Defendants do not address. However, the Trustee's beneficial ownership allegations are relevant to whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor made the transfers. Assuming the Trustee has plausibly alleged the Individual Debtor beneficially owns the *alter egos*18, he has plausibly pled the *alter egos* are affiliates of the Individual Debtor, through which the Individual Debtor could indirectly transfer assets. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), (15), (41); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(a). In fact, courts have collapsed transactions involving affiliates. *See, e.g.*, *Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp.*, 919 F.2d 206, 208–210, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming district court where fraudulent transfer involved owners laundering the assets of one company they owned to another as part of an overall scheme to make assets unavailable to creditors); *accord* 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D) (transfers include *indirect* transfers); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p) (same).\n\n18 The Court does not reach the issue of whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos* because that is not among the four issues.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 44 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 45 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 49 of 107\n\n102\n\nTherefore, the Court finds the parties' argument regarding the effect of *alter ego* is not dispositive of the sufficiency of the Trustee's pleading the Individual Debtor is the transferor.\n\n### **b. Beneficial ownership allegations may render inconsequential issue (iii): the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determination**\n\nTurning to the second element at issue, Bankruptcy Code section 548 actual or constructive fraudulent transfer claims must plead a transfer of \"an interest of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code provides the Trustee standing to bring avoidance actions an actual creditor could bring under other applicable state or federal law to avoid transfers of \"an interest of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 544(b). The Trustee's New York law actual and constructive fraudulent transfer claims must additionally plead a transfer of \"property of the debtor\", where \"debtor\" is the Individual Debtor or another party liable on his debt. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (f), (l), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b). Finally, unauthorized post-petition transfer claims must plead a transfer of \"property of the estate\". 11 U.S.C. § 549(a).\n\nAn interest of the debtor in property is anything that would have been property of the estate but for the transfer to be avoided. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59 (\"Because the purpose of the avoidance provision is to preserve the property includable within the bankruptcy estate—the property available for distribution to creditors—'property of the debtor' subject to the preferential transfer provision is best understood as that property that would have been part of the estate had it not been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.\"). Therefore, the analysis of whether a transfer is of \"an interest of the debtor in property\", 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1), and the analysis of whether a transfer is of \"property of the estate\", 11 U.S.C. § 549(a), both center on section 541, which defines property of the estate. Property of\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 46 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 50 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 45 of 102\n\nthe estate includes, in pertinent part, \"wherever located and by whomever held[,] . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Indeed, the Avoidance Claims must plead the Individual Debtor has an *equitable* interest in property, as opposed to mere legal title. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 58; *accord* 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (excepting from property of the estate property to which the debtor has only a legal interest insofar as the debtor does not have an equitable interest).\n\nAs to whether a transfer is of property of a debtor under NYUVTA, New York law recognizes beneficial ownership in actions to collect on a debt. *See, e.g.*, *In re Gliklad v. Chernoi*, 12 N.Y.S.3d 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (affirming order requiring judgment debtor to turn over beneficial ownership of a business); *Guilder v. Corinth Constr. Corp.*, 651 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (remanding case to determine whether individual defendants equitably owned a corporate defendant and whether the plaintiff could pierce the corporate veil between the corporate defendant and its potential equitable owners); *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017, 2022 WL 406636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022) (determining judgment debtor beneficially owned yacht in action to collect on judgment). Therefore, an \"interest of the debtor in property\", \"property of the estate\", and \"property of the debtor\" all include the Individual Debtor's equitable interests in property.\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the Trustee seeks to avoid a transfer of the *alter egos'* property:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 47 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 51 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 46 of 102\n\nThe Joint Defendants interpret the complaints to be alleging an *alter ego* determination would *create* an interest of the Individual Debtor in the *alter egos'* property.19 The Joint Defendants argue the Trustee is mistaken – an *alter ego* determination cannot create an interest in property that did not previously exist – and, therefore, the Trustee does not have standing to assert the remaining **B**Æ**C** transfer of **B**'s property.\n\nOnce again, however, the Court must assess the transfers as alleged. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. In the complaints, the Trustee alleges the transfers are transfers of the Individual Debtor's property and/or property of the estate – *not* the *alter egos'* property:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nThe Trustee is alleging the Individual Debtor *always* had an interest in the *alter egos'* property – the interest is not created by an *alter ego* determination.\n\nThis can be seen in the paragraphs from the complaint against Amazon cited above. But to use another example, in the complaint against, among others, Joint Defendant B&H Foto & Electronics Corp. (\"B&H Foto\"), the Trustee makes the following allegations:\n\n43. Prior to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, using his alter ego shell companies including Greenwich Land, Golden Spring, HCHK Technologies, G Club Operations, Rule of Law20 and Lexington Property, or otherwise, transferred the [Individual] Debtor's property to B&H (collectively, the \"Prepetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE A** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n44. Subsequent to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, through shell companies including Greenwich Land, Lexington, Golden Spring, G Club Operations,\n\n19 Effectively, as the Joint Defendants see it, *alter ego* determinations are involuntary transfers, *see* 11 U.S.C. § 101(54), and **A=B**Æ**C** can also be written **A**Å**B**Æ**C**. 20 The Avoidance Claims in this complaint are stayed with respect to transfers involving G Club\n\nOperations and Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. Thus, the Court will only discuss Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land herein.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 48 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 52 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 47 of 102\n\nand HCHK Technologies, or otherwise, transferred property of the estate to B&H (collectively, the \"Postpetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE B** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n(Complaint ¶¶ 43–44, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) The complaint alleges the Individual Debtor was involved in a \"shell game\", whereby he hid *his* assets in *alter egos* – and after the petition date, the assets of the estate – to frustrate collection of those assets to pay his debts and avoid his duties under the Bankruptcy Code. (*Id.* ¶¶ 19–42.) These allegations are identical in form to those in all the other complaints.\n\nThe complaints against the alleged *alter egos* involved in the transfers at issue are incorporated by reference. (*Id.* ¶ 19 n. 4.) All the *alter ego* complaints contain extensive allegations that the Individual Debtor used, controlled, and benefitted from the assets of the *alter egos*. 21 One of those, the *alter ego* complaint against Golden Spring is discussed above. (*See* Complaint ¶¶ 10–38, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.) As another example, the complaint against the HCHK Entities makes similar allegations. (*See* Complaint ¶¶ 16–40, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23- 05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.)\n\nA review of the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints makes clear the Trustee is not solely relying on *alter ego* to assert the Individual Debtor or the estate has an equitable interest in the transferred property. As with the first element, to the extent the Trustee\n\n21 All the *alter ego* complaints except the complaint against Greenwich Land allege beneficial ownership of both the *alter ego* and its assets. *See* **Appendix F**, *infra*. The complaint against Greenwich Land nevertheless contains allegations about the Individual Debtor's use and control of and benefit from Greenwich Land's assets.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 49 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 53 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 48 of 102\n\nhas plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of an *alter ego's* assets22, he has plausibly pled a transfer of his property and/or property that is or, but for the transfer, would have been property of the estate. Hence, the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law is also not dispositive of this element.\n\n#### **ii. Avoidable transfer law controls issue (i): whether the Individual Debtor is the transferor; and issue (iii): whether the** *alter egos'* **property is the Individual Debtor's property and/or property of the estate**\n\nNotwithstanding the foregoing, the Court will discuss the parties' arguments regarding the effect of *alter ego* and avoidable transfer actions in bankruptcy proceedings. In *McNellis*, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court both in piercing the corporate veil with respect to a trustee's fraudulent transfer action and in refusing to pierce the same corporate veil with respect to the trustee's usury action. 420 F.2d at 53–54. The Second Circuit concluded, while fraudulent conveyance law allowed courts to pierce form in favor of substance, New York's usury law had developed to allow individuals to use a corporate *alter ego* to take out an otherwise usurious loan. *Id.* That is, the Second Circuit looked to the substantive law governing the trustee's causes of actions to determine whether the corporate veil could be pierced to establish an element or defense. *Id.*\n\nAccordingly, the Trustee is correct that the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law is not dispositive. The relevant avoidable transfer statutes – here, the Bankruptcy Code and NYUVTA – determine whether and to what effect corporate veils may be pierced for the purposes of fraudulent transfer or unauthorized post-petition transfer. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53–54. The standard governing veil piercing is determined by applicable choice of law rules –\n\n22 The Court does not reach the issue of whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos'* assets because that is not among the four issues.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 50 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 54 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 49 of 102\n\nwhich may or may not be different than the law governing the overall cause of action. *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 66–68 (denying motion to dismiss because debtor had sufficiently alleged standing to allege fraudulent transfer, under Delaware law, standing in shoes of its subsidiary through reverse veil-piercing, under Delaware law); *accord Spring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC*, C.A. No. 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016) (acknowledging that under Delaware fraudulent transfer law, where reverse veil piercing is available under applicable law, a creditor of a parent may argue *alter ego* for the purposes of pursuing the fraudulent transfer of a subsidiary's assets).\n\nThe Joint Defendants assert the relief the Trustee seeks is novel. It is not. *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 66–68 (applying Delaware *alter ego* law); *see Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.)*, Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594-DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2020 WL 6821721, at \\*4–6 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2020) (applying Nevada *alter ego* law); *Searcy v. Knight (In re Am. Int'l Refinery)*, 402 B.R. 728, 743–48 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008) (same); *Kendall v. Turner (In re Turner)*, 335 B.R. 140, 145–47 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005) (applying California *alter ego* law), *upheld in pertinent part on reconsideration* 345 B.R. 674, 676–77 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (upholding *alter ego* determination).\n\n#### **a. Issues (i) and (iii): State law allows avoidance of an** *alter ego's* **transfer of its property**\n\nFurthermore, the relief the Trustee is seeking is certainly not novel under state law. Under NYUVTA, actual and constructive fraudulent transfers can be established by an *alter ego's* transfer of its property. \"'Debtor' means a person that is liable on a claim.\" N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f). Therefore, even assuming *alter ego* only creates vicarious *liability*, an *alter ego* is a \"debtor\" even if it is not a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. Because it is a debtor, an *alter ego* can make an avoidable transfer. *See* N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274. Moreover, property\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 51 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 55 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 50 of 102\n\nof an *alter ego* is property of a debtor. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (l), (p). Therefore, in a state law action, *alter ego* can be used in conjunction with NYUVTA. *See Bravia Cap. H.K. Ltd. v. SL Green Realty Corp.*, No. 24-cv-2296 (JGK), 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025) (applying NYUVTA and Delaware *alter ego* law) (citing *JSC Foreign Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc.*, 295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 379–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (\"UFTA\"), predecessor of Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (\"UVTA\")).\n\nThis is not only the law in New York; it is the law of most if not all jurisdictions within the United States. *See* Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552b (6) (Connecticut has adopted UFTA which has same definition of \"debtor\" as UVTA); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06[2] (forty-six states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UFTA or UVTA); *see, e.g.*, *Magliarditi v. TransFirst Grp., Inc.*, 450 P.3d 911, 2019 WL 5390470, at \\*4–5 (Nev. 2019) (table disposition); *Thompson Props. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow Co., Inc.*, 839 So. 2d 629, 633–34 (Ala. 2002); *Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3; *Dwyer v. Meramec Venture Assocs., L.L.C.*, 75 S.W.3d 291, 294–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); *U.S. Cap. Funding VI, Ltd. v. Patterson Bankshares, Inc.*, 137 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1367–68 (S.D. Ga. 2015). Avoidable transfer and *alter ego* law both seek to thwart judgment evasion and can, unsurprisingly, be used together in collection actions outside of bankruptcy.\n\nIf the Trustee has standing under section 544(b) to bring his NYUVTA claims and has plausibly pled *alter ego*23, he has plausibly pled a debtor transferred its property.\n\n23 The Court will discuss the plausibility of the Trustee's *alter ego* allegations in section D below, after discussing the defendants' arguments regarding the sufficiency of his pleading.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 52 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 56 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 51 of 102\n\n#### **b. Issues (i) and (iii): Bankruptcy law allows avoidance of an** *alter ego's* **transfer of its property**\n\nThe Court must determine whether the normal rule applicable outside of bankruptcy also applies in bankruptcy. As in the beneficial ownership discussion above, two elements are at issue. First, it must be determined whether *alter ego* allegations may be used to assert the Individual Debtor is the transferor. The Bankruptcy Code only controls this element with respect to actual fraudulent transfer and one of the four types of constructive fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV). Section 544(b) does not apply this element to the Trustee's NYUVTA claims and it is not an element of three of the four types of constructive fraudulent transfer or unauthorized post-petition transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III), 549(a).\n\nSecond, it must be determined whether *alter ego* allegations may be used to assert the *alter ego's* property is or would have been, but for the transfer, property of the estate. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59. This is an element of all the Avoidance Claims, including the Trustee's NYUVTA claims. As discussed above, the Trustee only has standing to bring claims under NYUVTA if he alleges a transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).\n\n#### *Issue (i): Does the Trustee allege an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity?*\n\nWith respect to the first element, the Court concludes *alter ego* can be used to establish the Individual Debtor was the transferor because the definition of \"transfer\" includes indirect conveyances. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). Indeed, in *McNellis*, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to pierce the corporate veil and to hold the individual rather than his corporation took out the loan he later repaid. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53–54; *see Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *Voest-*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 53 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 57 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 52 of 102\n\n*Alpine*, 919 F.2d at 212–13. Therefore, *alter ego* allegations may support allegations that the Individual Debtor – not a non-debtor entity – is the transferor.\n\n#### *Issue (iii): What is the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or alter ego determination?*\n\nAs to the second element, where the Bankruptcy Code is silent, state law determines what interests parties have in property. *Butner*, 440 U.S. at 54–57. However, *Butner* also holds Congress has authority under Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution to define property interests contrary to state law for the purposes of bankruptcy. *Id.* at 54–57 (holding it is a matter of state law whether, when, and how a mortgagee obtains a security interest in rents because the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, did not include a provision providing or denying mortgagees such a security interest).\n\nCongress defined property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541. \"Congress intended a broad range of property to be included in the estate\", including \"property in which the debtor did not have a possessory interest at the time the bankruptcy proceedings commenced.\" *Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. at 204–05 (affirming Second Circuit determination that property of the estate included property seized by the Internal Revenue Service to enforce a tax lien prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition). Therefore, consistent with *Butner* and *Whiting Pools*, courts have generally held that while state law determines what interests a debtor has in property, federal law determines whether those interests in property are included in property of the estate. *Lowe v. Bowers (In re Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.)*, 916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019); *Abboud v. Ground Round, Inc. (In re The Ground Round, Inc.)*, 482 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2007); *In re Nejberger*, 934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991); *N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis (In re N.S. Garrott & Sons)*, 772 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1985).\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 54 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 58 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 53 of 102\n\nAn *alter ego* claim is property of the estate. *Nordlicht*,115 F.4th at 104–06 (holding *alter ego* claim under New York law is property of the estate), because such claims \"'inure[] to the benefit of all creditors' by enlarging the estate\", *Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105 (alteration in original); *see In re Emoral, Inc.*, 740 F.3d 875 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that successor liability claims are property of the estate because, like *alter ego* claims, they are general claims of creditors). This is true even if at state law *alter ego* is a claim for the imposition of vicarious liability, not an independent cause of action. *Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 109–111. *Nordlicht* determined that\n\nalter-ego theories of liability neatly fall[] within the Bankruptcy Code's definition of 'claim':\n\n(A) *right to payment*, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or\n\n(B) *right to an equitable remedy* for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.\"\n\n115 F.4th at 110 (emphasis in original).\n\nUnder *Nordlicht*, a trustee's right to payment or an equitable remedy (such as turnover) from an *alter ego* is property of the estate. 115 F.4th at 105. A trustee may seek recovery from the *alter ego* to the full extent of claims asserted against the estate. *See Moore v. Bay (In re Est. of Sassard & Kimball, Inc.)*, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931) (holding, with respect to predecessors of section 544(b) claims, the trustee could recover on an avoided transfer for the estate's creditors at large). Property recoverable by a trustee is property of the estate. *Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. at 204–07. Moreover, under *Begier*, the Individual Debtor had an interest in any such property prepetition. 496 U.S. at 59. Hence, if the Trustee prevails on his *alter ego* claims, the *alter egos'*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 55 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 59 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 54 of 102\n\nproperty is property of the estate and the Individual Debtor had an interest in that property prepetition. *See Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105 (*alter ego* claims \"'inure[] to the benefit of all creditors' by enlarging the estate\"); *718 Arch St. Assocs., Ltd. v. Blatstein (In re Blatstein)*, 192 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding court had jurisdiction to determine appeal of a ruling on, among other things, creditor's claim that certain corporations were *alter egos* of the debtor because a determination that they were his *alter egos* \"would result in the inclusion in his bankruptcy estate of substantial assets which then would be available to satisfy, at least in part, his creditors' claims.\"); *Green v. Bate Recs., Inc. (In re 10th Ave. Rec. Distribs., Inc.)*, 97 B.R. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding trustee had standing to bring *alter ego* claim because it was \"an attempt to collect property of the estate for the benefit of *all* creditors and is not personal to any particular creditor\") (emphasis in original).\n\n#### *Contrary authority is unpersuasive*\n\nIn coming to this conclusion, the Court respectfully disagrees with the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in *In re Howland*. 674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017); *accord Lippe v. Bairnco Corp.*, 230 B.R. 906, 914–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); *Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle)*, BAP No. NV-05-1000-KMB, Bankruptcy No. S-01-21542-BAM, Adversary No. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006); *Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels L.P. (In re DuMouchelle)*, Case No. 19-54531, Adv. Pro. No. 21- 04041-lsg, \\_\\_\\_ B.R. \\_\\_\\_, 2023 WL 8100234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023) (applying *Howland*); *Evangelista v. Silver (In re Silver)*, 647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022) (same). In *Howland*, the Sixth Circuit held property of an *alter ego* is not property of the estate and cannot be recovered where, at state law, *alter ego* merely imposes vicarious liability. 674 F.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 56 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 60 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 55 of 102\n\nApp'x at 487. *Lippe* and *Wardle* held the same. *DuMouchelle* and *Silver*, decisions from courts within the sixth circuit, applied *Howland*.\n\nIn addition to the statutory analysis above, the Court respectfully disagrees with *Howland* for several reasons. First, courts \"do not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\". *Cohen*, 523 U.S. at 221. In interpreting the Code, courts presume Congress's \"familiarity with the prevailing understanding\" of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898. *Johnson v. Home State Bank*, 501 U.S. 78, 86 (1991). There is no clear indication that Congress intended to overrule *McNellis*. *Compare* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54), 541(a), 544(b), 548(a), 549(a) *with* 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(30) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 1) (repealed 1978), 107(d) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 67) (repealed 1978), 110(a), (d), (e) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 70) (repealed 1978). *McNellis* – which upheld the use of *alter ego* to prove a defense to a trustee's fraudulent transfer action brought under federal bankruptcy law and New York law – is binding on this Court. 420 F.2d at 53–54.\n\nSecond, the Sixth Circuit's approach to *alter ego* claims in avoidance actions is contrary to the Second Circuit's directive that courts must consider the substance, rather than the form, of a fraudulent transfer. *See Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *see also Boyer v. Crown Stock Dist., Inc.*, 587 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009); *Voest-Alpine*, 919 F.2d at 211–12. There is capacity in fraudulent transfer law to look past the nominal parties to a transaction where state law allows the corporate form to be disregarded. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53; *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 65–68. This capacity to recognize the economic reality is reflected in the expansive definitions of transfer and property of the estate in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)(D), 541.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 57 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 61 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 56 of 102\n\nThird, *Howland* is contrary to how *alter ego* and avoidance claims interact under state law. As outlined above, *alter ego* can be used in NYUVTA claims outside of bankruptcy to target transactions where the *alter ego* is both the nominal transferor and the nominal owner of the transferred property. *Bravia Cap.*, 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9; *Technostroyexport*, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; *see Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3.\n\nThe result should be no different in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is, among other things, a collective collection proceeding. *Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 370–71. That is *why* the Trustee has standing to assert (i) general claims for the benefit of creditors at large, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a); *see Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105; and (ii) particular avoidance claims of actual creditors, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), to the full extent of the transfer – even if the actual creditors' debt is less than the transferred amount, *Moore*, 284 U.S. at 5. Bankruptcy \"shields creditors from one another by replacing 'race' and other preferential systems of debt collection with a more equitable and orderly distribution of assets.\" *In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.*, 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (discussing purpose of the automatic stay) (citing *Fidelity Mortg. Invs. v. Camelia Builders, Inc.*, 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976) (case under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended)). It would undermine the collective nature of bankruptcy to send creditors on a race to the courthouse to pursue *alter ego* and fraudulent transfer remedies – remedies they may have no standing to pursue during the pendency of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy. *See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc.*, 884 F.2d 688, 704–05 (2d Cir. 1989).\n\nEven if creditors *could* bring these actions outside of bankruptcy, the costs to do so would be high: the Trustee's investigation into the Individual Debtor's financial affairs has been highly litigated and time consuming. Forcing creditors to pursue these avoidance actions outside of bankruptcy or forego their prosecution would promote an inequitable and uneven recovery for\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 58 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 62 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 57 of 102\n\nthe Individual Debtor's creditors, many of whom likely could not pay the fees and costs associated with such an effort. *See Union Bank v. Wolas*, 502 U.S. 151, 160–61 (1991) (section 547 is designed to balance related goals of preventing a race to the courthouse and providing for an equitable distribution to all creditors); *Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.)*, 78 F.3d 30, 40–41 (2d Cir. 1996) (same). The Trustee is the person to pool the creditors' interests in the estate and bring the avoidance actions for their collective benefit. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541–50*.*\n\nFinally, *Howland* also runs contrary to Delaware *alter ego* law. It is an accident of our legal system that, generally, *alter ego* results in vicarious liability – the *alter ego* doctrine is about disregarding the corporate form where it is abused and causes fraud or injustice. *See Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.*, 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1968) (\"There is, of course, no doubt that upon a proper showing corporate entities as between parent and subsidiary may be disregarded and the ultimate party in interest, the parent, be regarded in law and fact as the sole party in a particular transaction.\"). As the Delaware Court of Chancery observed \"[a]t its most basic level, reverse veil-piercing involves the imposition of liability on a business organization for the liabilities of its owners\", *Manichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc.*, 251 A.3d 694, 710 (Del. Ch. 2021) (action to collect on appraisal judgment), *because* \"where the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent . . . the Court [will] treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent\", *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 710 (alteration in the original).\n\nMost relief in the common law takes the form of money damages. The primary use of an *alter ego* claim is to spread liability from a defendant liable at law for money damages on, *e.g.*, tort or contract to a defendant with deeper pockets. *See NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC*, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2008) (\"Nonetheless, in appropriate circumstances,\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 59 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 63 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 58 of 102\n\nthe distinction between the entity and its owner 'may be disregarded' to require an owner to answer for the entity's debts.\") (action on contract); *Wilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC*, 787 F. Supp. 2d 286, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (\"A plaintiff seeking to hold the owners of a corporation liable for the corporation's debts 'faces a difficult task.'\") (action on fraud); *Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.)*, 549 B.R. 21, 43–44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"Under Delaware law, veil piercing is a doctrine of equity. . . . Veil piercing is thus not a purely independent cause of action. Instead, piercing the corporate veil *effectively* amounts to the imposition of joint and several liability between a direct actor and its corporate affiliate for some underlying wrong committed by the direct actor.\") (action on tort) (emphasis added).\n\nHowever, the avoidance of a transfer is not money damages. \"[T]he purpose of the avoidance provision is to preserve the property includable within the bankruptcy estate\". *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59 (discussing section 547 and the avoidance of preferential transfers); *see In re PWS Holding Corp.*, 303 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2002) (\"Fraudulent conveyance law aims 'to make available to creditors those assets of the debtor that are rightfully a part of the bankruptcy estate, even if they have been transferred away.'\"); *Sapir v. C.P.Q. Colorchrome Corp. (In re Photo Promotion Assocs., Inc.)*, 881 F.2d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that allowing an administrative claim holder to keep unauthorized post-petition transfers would be inequitable to other creditors who have similar claims). To this end, the relief provided by sections 548 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code and section 273 and 274 of NYUVTA is *avoidance* of the subject transfer – not money damages. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 549; N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274.\n\nUpon avoidance of the transfer, section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and section 276(b) of NYUVTA allow recovery of the *specific property* transferred, the value thereof, or the proceeds thereof. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 276(b). It is, therefore, entirely\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 60 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 64 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 59 of 102\n\nunsurprising that disregarding the corporate form and treating the assets of the *alter ego* as the assets of the debtor operates differently with regard to avoidance actions than it does with regard to other actions. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 710 (\"In the parent/subsidiary context, 'where the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent . . . the Court [will] treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent.'\").\n\n\"Delaware will not countenance the use of the corporate form as a means to facilitate fraud or injustice.\" *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714. Fraudulent and unauthorized postpetition transfer law align with this purpose. They exist to prevent inequitable results arising from the dissipation of assets. *See Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59; *PWS Holding Corp.*, 303 F.3d at 313; *Photo Promotion Assocs.*, 881 F.2d at 9–10. It would be fundamentally absurd and contrary to the purpose of the doctrine, if *alter ego* could not be used to prevent fraud or injustice resulting from a fraudulent or unauthorized post-petition transfer. These two bodies of law can be used together. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53; *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 65–68; *see Bravia Cap.*, 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9; *Technostroyexport*, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; *see also Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3.\n\n\\* \\* \\*\n\nFor all these reasons, the Court concludes a debtor may make a transfer through an *alter ego* and an *alter ego's* property is property of the debtor's estate. To the extent the Trustee has plausibly pled *alter ego*, the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor transferred property that is, or would have been but for the transfers, property of the estate. To this same extent, the Trustee therefore has standing to bring his NYUVTA claims and, for the reasons stated above, has plausibly pled those claims. *Alter ego* can be used to support an avoidable transfer claim under the Bankruptcy Code or NYUVTA.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 60 of 102\n\n#### **2. Issues (ii) and (iv): Prejudice to** *alter egos'* **trade creditors and substantive consolidation**\n\nThe Court turns to the Joint Defendants' remaining arguments. The Joint Defendants argue the Trustee has failed to plead a cognizable reverse veil piercing claim under Delaware law because (a) the Trustee has failed to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of the alleged *alter ego*; and (b) the Joint Defendants would, as a matter of law, be prejudiced by reverse veil-piercing. The Joint Defendants also argue (c) the Trustee is seeking impermissible *nunc pro tunc* relief; and (d) even if the relief were otherwise permissible under state law, the relief sought could also be achieved by substantive consolidation and therefore it is inequitable to allow the Trustee that relief without meeting the test required for *nunc pro tunc* substantive consolidation. Woven throughout the Joint Defendants' arguments is the contention that the relief the Trustee seeks is deeply inequitable to them as innocent trade creditors of the alleged *alter egos*.\n\nThe Trustee argues (a) the caselaw is clear a plaintiff is not required to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of an alleged *alter ego*; (b) prejudice is a fact intensive inquiry not resolvable on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and, in any event, the Bankruptcy Code provides the Joint Defendants protections unavailable outside of bankruptcy; (c) he is not seeking *nunc pro tunc* relief with his *alter ego* claims but rather seeking to conform legal reality to factual reality; and (d) while the relief *alter ego* provides in bankruptcy proceedings may be similar to substantive consolidation, the factual and legal predicates for the two remedies differ and the Trustee has pled *alter ego*. The Trustee also disputes the contention that the Joint Defendants are all innocent trade creditors and that the relief he seeks is fundamentally unfair.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 62 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 66 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 61 of 102\n\n#### **i. Issue (ii): Does applicable law allow for reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determinations?**\n\nAs stated above, the Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims to allege transfers:\n\n$$\\begin{array}{c} \\mathbf{A}\\_{\\text{(Indidual Deftor)}} = \\mathbf{B}\\_{\\text{(Alter ergo)}} \\xrightarrow[\\text{(Transfer elimination)}]{} \\mathbf{C}\\_{\\text{(Join Defretadant)}} \\\\ \\text{(Alter ergo determination)} \\end{array}$$\n\nWith respect to issue (ii), the Joint Defendants argue that even if an *alter ego* determination would create an identity between the Individual Debtor and the alleged *alter egos*, avoiding the **B**Æ**C** transfer is prejudicial because the Joint Defendants did not know **A=B**, and, hence, the Court cannot *as a matter of law* make an *alter ego* determination.\n\nThe Court disagrees. First, the Trustee is not required to plead a lack of prejudice to the *alter egos'* creditors. In adopting reverse veil-piercing, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that courts must consider the traditional *alter ego* factors and additionally consider a series of other factors that, essentially, relate to prejudice to the alleged *alter ego's* creditors, owners, and other stakeholders. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15. Nevertheless, the Court of Chancery rejected a defendant's argument the complaint should be dismissed for failure to plead a lack of prejudice to certain creditors of the alleged *alter ego*. *Id.* at 718. Instead, the Court of Chancery held \"[t]here is no basis in the Complaint to infer that reverse veil-piercing will cause harm to innocent third-party creditors. . . . To be clear, factual allegations related to . . . third-party creditors are not in the Complaint, and for now at least, my analysis is confined to the 'four corners' of that pleading.\" *Id.* The Court has been provided no reason to believe the Delaware Supreme Court would disagree with the Court of Chancery on this issue. Prejudice is an issue that requires factual development.\n\nSecond, the Trustee may plead the Joint Defendants are the initial transferees; it does not matter that subsequent transferees have different defenses. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 63 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 67 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 62 of 102\n\n382–86 (holding plaintiff could plead transfer in a way that a safe harbor defense was inapplicable); *cf. Covey v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. (In re Duckworth)*, Bankruptcy No. 10- 83603, Adversary No. 11-8104, 2012 WL 4434681, at \\*8 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012) (holding trustee's use of *alter ego* was impermissible in part because it would deprive defendant of subsequent transferee defenses it would have if trustee pled a different fraudulent transfer). The Joint Defendants can argue the Trustee has not pled a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code or NYUVTA. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. Indeed, the Joint Defendants have done so, as discussed above. They can continue to do so as these proceedings move beyond the pleading stage.\n\nIn support of their argument, the Joint Defendants urge the Court to adopt the holding of *Duckworth*, but their reliance is misplaced. The court in *Duckworth* was not faced with motions to dismiss – it was faced with motions for summary judgment. *Duckworth*, 2012 WL 4434681, at \\*2. The *Duckworth* court determined on the undisputed facts that it would be inequitable and contrary to applicable state law to allow the trustee to recover from a trade creditor of the alleged *alter ego*. *Id.* at \\*7. Here, the Joint Motions are motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. At this stage, the standard is whether the Trustee's well-pled allegations, taken as true, support a determination of impermissible prejudice. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 718. A review of the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints does not support such a determination.\n\nThe Joint Defendants do not have a right to the Trustee pleading that they are subsequent transferees. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. The Trustee pleads transfers:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 64 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 68 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 63 of 102\n\nHe is not required to plead an **A**Æ**B**Æ**C** transfer, treating the *alter ego* determination as a transfer, such that he alleges the Individual Debtor transferred his property to the *alter egos* as the initial transferees and the Joint Defendants are subsequent transferees of the *alter egos*.\n\n#### **ii. Issue (iv): May a determination of reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **be applied retroactively?**\n\nTurning to issue (iv), the Court concludes the Trustee is not seeking *nunc pro tunc* relief. Adjudging an entity to be and have been an *alter ego* of another entity is not affording *nunc pro tunc* relief – it is adjudging that the corporate form is and has been a façade. Under the Joint Defendants' theory of *alter ego*, there would be no remedy available for a prevailing party. The Joint Defendants argue under Delaware law an *alter ego* determination merely imposes vicarious liability for a companion claim reducible to money damages. If an *alter ego* determination could only *prospectively* spread liability as the Joint Defendants assert, the *alter ego* would not be liable on the prevailing party's companion claim based on *already existing* facts. This is not how Delaware law operates. *Alter ego* may be brought *alongside* the companion claim, *see Tronox*, 549 B.R. at 27 (personal injury plaintiffs seek to impose vicarious liability through various theories, including *alter ego*, where original defendant is not amendable to suit), or even *after* judgment is entered on the companion claim, *see Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 699–701 (*alter ego* claim was brought *after* appraisal judgment), without any analysis as to whether *nunc pro tunc* relief is appropriate. This is because *nunc pro tunc* relief is not being sought. *See Reid v. Wolf (In re Wolf)*, 644 B.R. 725, 749 n. 9 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (rejecting \"confusing\" argument that an *alter ego* determination would be impermissibly retroactive in a bankruptcy case). *Alter ego* seeks a remedy based on existing facts, just as a breach of contract claim seeks a remedy on existing facts.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 65 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 69 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 64 of 102\n\nAn *alter ego* determination is *not* a transfer – it does not *create* an interest in property, but rather *recognizes* an interest in property. This is a fundamental flaw in the Joint Defendants' interpretation of the Avoidance Claims. As depicted above, the Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims to be alleging transfers:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*\n\nAssuming *arguendo* that an *alter ego* determination creates an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter ego*, the Joint Defendants argue an *alter ego* determination would change the nature of the **B**Æ**C** transfer *after the fact*. Therefore, the Joint Defendants argue the Court cannot treat the *alter ego* determination – **A=B**, which could be stated **A**Å**B** – as having occurred at the time of the **B**Æ**C** transfer.\n\nThe Trustee is not, however, alleging the **A=B** transfer, but rather alleging the *alter egos* have always been a mere instrumentality of the Individual Debtor. He alleges transfers:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nand asserts such transfers through the *alter egos* are the Individual Debtor's *modus operandi* to obtain goods and services for himself, his family, his associates, and his businesses and to move assets.\n\nThe Court declines to adopt a prudential limitation on the use of *alter ego* in bankruptcy\n\ncases. The Delaware Court of Chancery held in *Manichaean Capital* that\n\nThe risks that reverse veil-piercing may be used as a blunt instrument to harm innocent parties, and to disrupt the expectations of arms-length bargaining, while real, do not, in my view, justify the rejection of reverse veil-piercing outright. Rather, the recognition of the risks creates an opportunity to manage them, and to do so in a manner that serves the interests of equity.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 66 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 70 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 65 of 102\n\n251 A.3d at 712. The Court sees no reason why courts sitting in bankruptcy are unable or illequipped to take up the \"opportunity to manage [the risks of reverse veil-piercing]\" in the interests of equity as the Court of Chancery directs. Indeed, one of the overriding purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a single forum for the adjustment and final, equitable resolution of claims, including by collective collection proceedings. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 *et seq*. The balancing of the traditional *alter ego* factors and prejudice to the *alter ego's* creditors and other stakeholders, *see Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15, is within the purview of a bankruptcy court.\n\nThe Joint Defendants urge the Court to view the Trustee's *alter ego* allegations as *sub rosa* substantive consolidation allegations and to, hence, apply restrictions on the retroactive effect of any *alter ego* determination – regardless of whether such restrictions apply at state law. Substantive consolidation \"results in, *inter alia*¸ pooling the assets of, and claims against, the two entities; satisfying liabilities from the resultant common fund; eliminating inter-company claims; and combining the creditors of the two companies for purposes of voting on reorganization plans.\" *Union Savs. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.)*, 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988). \"The sole purpose of substantive consolidation is to ensure the equitable treatment of all creditors.\" *Augie/Restivo*, 860 F.2d at 518. Substantive consolidation requires (i) creditors to have \"dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and 'did not rely on their separate identity in extending credit'\"; and (ii) the debtors' affairs to be \"so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.\" *Id.* In *Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.)*, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that substantive consolidation orders should be issued *nunc pro tunc* where the proponent can show its benefits outweigh the harms to potential avoidance defendants. 810 F.2d 270, 277\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 67 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 71 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 66 of 102\n\n(D.C. Cir. 1987). The Joint Defendants urge the Court to apply *Auto-Train* to any *alter ego* determination.\n\nAs the Trustee acknowledges, the effect of an *alter ego* determination in bankruptcy is similar to the effect of substantive consolidation – assets and liabilities of the *alter egos* are merged. However, the availability of substantive consolidation – which the Joint Defendants appear to doubt – does not mean *alter ego* cannot be pled in bankruptcy cases. *In re Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d 195, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2005) (\"Prior to substantive consolidation, other remedies for corporate disregard were (and remain) in place. For example, where a subsidiary is so dominated by its corporate parent as to be the parent's 'alter ego,' the 'corporate veil' of the subsidiary can be ignored (or 'pierced') under state law.\").\n\nMoreover, the elements and the purposes of the doctrines differ. Under Delaware law, traditional *alter ego* or piercing the corporate veil has two elements: (i) the corporate entity whose form is to be disregarded is so dominated and controlled by its alleged *alter ego* that the corporate entity and its *alter ego* are, in fact, a single economic unit; and (ii) the corporate form to be disregarded causes fraud or some similar injustice. *Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633; *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 706; *Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc. v. Wood*, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999); *Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co.*, 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992). Reverse veil-piercing requires a court additionally consider prejudice to creditors, owners, and other stakeholders of the alleged *alter ego*. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15. *Alter ego* provides a remedy for abuse of the corporate form. In contrast, provided there is no outweighing harm, substantive consolidation provides a remedy for overly complicated financial affairs that could be treated much more simply.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 68 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 72 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 67 of 102\n\nThis is a distinction with a difference. \"Substantive consolidation is better thought of as an economic remedy, the primary goal being the equitable treatment of all creditors. Conversely, a state law alter ego claim is an equitable remedy focused on preventing 'fraud or injustice.'\" *Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.)*, Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594- DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2022 WL 2294175, at \\*8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022). Substantive consolidation does not seek to remedy any fraud or injustice. *Augie/Restivo*, 860 F.2d at 518. The corporate form need not have been abused, the entities need not have been shams, and no creditor needs to have been harmed by the corporate form. *Id.* All that is necessary is that creditors would benefit from substantive consolidation. *Id.* In substantively consolidating estates, a court is solving a practical problem – the management of highly intertwined estates with the prospect of high administrative costs spent untangling the estates – by prospectively simplifying the facts before it, where doing so does more good than harm. *See id.* In piercing the corporate veil, a court is recognizing an existing reality of abuse of the corporate form to the detriment of creditors and, as a matter of equity, not allowing that abuse to persist. *See Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633. Substantive consolidation may involve a transfer; an *alter ego* determination does not.\n\nBankruptcy is about, among other things, the equitable spreading of loss. In seeking to have the Court apply *Auto-Train* to *alter ego* claims, the Joint Defendants try to shift the focus of the analysis to the **B**Æ**C** transfer and away from **A**. In so doing, the Joint Defendants ignore the shell game alleged in the complaints involving numerous *alter egos* perpetrated by and for the benefit of the Individual Debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors – which allegations are central to an *alter ego* analysis. *See Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint ¶¶ 15–34, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 69 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 73 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 68 of 102\n\n05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.) These allegations, taken as true, are relevant to the balancing of the reverse veil-piercing factors. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 715–16 (stating courts will balance \"the social value of upholding the legitimate expectations of the affected corporate creditors or debtors, applying a rebuttable presumption in favor of assuring such expectations, against the importance of the policies served by allowing a reverse pierce under the particular circumstances involved.\") (citing Gregory S. Crespi, *The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards*, 16 J. CORP. L. 33, 51 (1990)).\n\nAlthough the Joint Defendants ask the Court to apply the *Auto-Train nunc pro tunc* analysis to the *alter ego* claims, the Court concludes there is no reason or basis to depart from Delaware *alter ego* law. It remains available to trustees notwithstanding the advent of substantive consolidation. *Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d at 205–06.\n\n\\* \\* \\*\n\nFor all these reasons, the Joint Defendants' arguments on issues (ii) and (iv) are not persuasive. The Court will not balance prejudice to the Joint Defendants and the factors supporting *alter ego* on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. Similarly, the Court will not impose prudential limits on the use of *alter ego* beyond the elements of the doctrine.\n\n#### **C. Non-Joint Motions and Z&Z Objection**24\n\nThe Court will address only the distinct arguments made by the Non-Joint Defendants on the four issues. The following Non-Joint Defendants: (1) FFP (BVI) Limited; (2) Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell; (3) V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.; (4) The Francis Firm PLLC; (5) Berkeley Rowe Ltd.; (6) Weddle Law PLLC; (7) Lawall & Mitchell, LLC; (8) G4S Security Systems (Hong\n\n24 *See* n. 12, *supra*.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 70 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 74 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 69 of 102\n\nKong) Ltd.; and (9) ACASS Canada LTD, (collectively, the \"Assorted Non-Joint Defendants\") are represented by the same counsel who argued their Non-Joint Motions as a single argument.\n\nThere are two other Non-Joint Defendants: (10) Liberty Jet Management Corp. (\"Liberty Jet\") and (11) Z&Z. Liberty Jet and Z&Z raise no distinct arguments that are not also raised by the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants. Moreover, neither Liberty Jet nor Z&Z advanced independent arguments during the hearing. The Court will, therefore, only discuss the arguments of the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants. To the extent Liberty Jet or Z&Z raised or joined in the arguments discussed below, this discussion also applies to Liberty Jet and Z&Z.\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants raise two distinct arguments. First, with respect to issue (ii) – whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations – the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee lacks standing to bring an *alter ego* claim because he stands in the shoes of the Individual Debtor who, accepting the Trustee's allegations as true, is *in pari delicto* with the alleged *alter egos*. Second, with respect to issues (i), whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity, and (iii), the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue that the Trustee is improperly asserting claims of the *alter egos'* bankruptcy estates without the *alter egos* having filed for bankruptcy and without the substantive consolidation of the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case and the not-filed *alter ego* bankruptcy cases. In doing so, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants assert the Trustee is bypassing disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\nIn response, the Trustee argues he has standing under either section 541 or section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code because he stands in the shoes of the Individual Debtor's creditors and, even if he did not, the insider exception to *in pari delicto* would apply. The Trustee argues he\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 71 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 75 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 70 of 102\n\nhas properly asserted claims of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate, has properly asserted *alter ego* claims, and that, in any event, he will be seeking a new claims bar date to allow creditors of the *alter egos* to assert claims against the estate.\n\n#### **1. Issue (ii): Standing**\n\nThe Bankruptcy Code provides a bankruptcy trustee standing to bring certain claims on behalf of creditors. *PepsiCo, Inc.*, 884 F.2d at 700. Absent such statutory authority, \"a bankruptcy trustee has no standing generally to sue third parties on behalf of the estate's creditors, but may only assert claims held by the bankrupt corporation itself.\" *Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner*, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991); *see Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.*, 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1995); *Sobchack v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.)*, 17 F.3d 600, 607 (2d Cir. 1994).\n\nWhere a trustee is not asserting a claim on behalf of creditors, *Wagoner* directs courts to determine (i) whether the debtor could have brought the claim and (ii) if so, whether the trustee is *in pari delicto* by imputation of the debtor's conduct. *Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 119–20. Although an assertion of *in pari delicto* is typically considered an affirmative equitable defense, the *Wagoner* doctrine, including its consideration of *in pari delicto*, \"functions as a prudential standing limitation.\" *Carney ex rel. Highview Point Partners, LLC v. Horion Invs. Ltd.*, 107 F. Supp. 3d 216, 228 (D. Conn. 2015).\n\nThe Second Circuit has held trustees have standing to bring *alter ego* claims on behalf of creditors at large. In *PepsiCo*, the Second Circuit adopted the approach of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in *Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc.*, 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987). *PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 697–98, 700–01, 704–05. In *Koch Refining*, the Seventh Circuit held that, pursuant to section 544(a), a bankruptcy trustee is \"the\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 72 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 76 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 71 of 102\n\nrepresentative of the general creditors\" and could pursue *alter ego* claims because they address generalized rather than particularized harm to creditors. 831 F.2d at 1351–54; *see Titan Real Est. Ventures, LLC v. MJCC Realty Ltd. P'ship (In re Flanagan)*, 415 B.R. 29, 47 (D. Conn. 2009). This accords with the statutory text of section 544(a): any judgment creditor could bring an *alter ego* claim to collect on their debt; it does not depend on its particular claim. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).\n\nWhile the Second Circuit distinguished *PepsiCo* in *Picard v. JPMorgan Chase Bank & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC)*, 721 F.3d 54, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2013), it did so on facts where the Securities Investor Protection Act trustee sought to bring particularized claims of defrauded creditors – even if such claims were very commonly held on the particular facts of the Madoff Ponzi scheme25, *JPMorgan*¸721 F.3d at 58–59. The claims in *JPMorgan* closely resemble those in *Wagoner*. *Compare JPMorgan*, 721 F.3d at 58–59 *with Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 116–17. Moreover, consistent with *PespiCo*, the Second Circuit has recently reiterated that trustees have standing to bring *alter ego* on behalf of creditors at large and that *alter ego* claims are property of the estate. *Compare Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 104–06, 107–11 *with PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 701.\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue *Nordlicht* follows a line of cases starting with *Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co.)*, 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987), which, unlike *Koch*, held that section 544(a) does not provide the trustee standing to bring general claims of creditors at large. *See PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 698–99. The Assorted Non-Joint Defendants assert\n\n25 Indeed, section 544(a) avoids this sort of accidentally general claim because it does not give a trustee standing to bring claims of particular creditors but rather the standing to bring claims a hypothetical judgment creditor – without a particular underlying claim – could bring, that is, section 544(a) introduces a creditor external to the particular facts surrounding the debtor and its debts.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 73 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 77 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 72 of 102\n\nthis means the Trustee's *alter ego* claims are subject to *Wagoner*. While *Nordlicht* itself is silent on section 544(a), it is completely consistent with holding a trustee has the rights and powers of certain hypothetical creditors to hold his claims derived from those rights and powers are property of the estate. Moreover, even if it is only pursuant to section 541 that a trustee has standing to bring an *alter ego* claim, such standing is derived from the general claims of creditors at large.\n\nHence, the *Wagoner* doctrine is not applicable. It does not apply where a trustee brings an action standing in the shoes of a creditor. *Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 118 (\"The trustee insists he is not asserting the claims of the noteholders, so it is unnecessary for us to delve deeply into when, if ever, a trustee may sue a third party on behalf of the bankrupt's creditors.\"); *see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. First Republic Bank (In re Salander)*, 503 B.R. 559, 569 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (\"neither the *Wagoner* rule nor the *in pari delicto* doctrine apply to a trustee's statutory standing under Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code.\"); *Arnold v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Cornerstone Homes, Inc.)*, 567 B.R. 37, 52–53 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2017). The Court does not reach the parties' arguments regarding exceptions to *in pari delicto*. The Trustee has standing to bring the *alter ego* claims.\n\n#### **2. Issue (i) and (iii):** *Alter ego***, substantive consolidation, and disclosure**\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants raise largely the same argument as the Joint Defendants, which argument the Court has rejected above, as to why the Trustee cannot use *alter ego* to plead that the Individual Debtor is the transferor or that property of the debtor and/or property that is or would be, but for the transfer, property of the estate was transferred. The Court will not discuss that argument again. The distinction arises from what the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee should have instead done. While the Joint Defendants argue\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 74 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 78 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 73 of 102\n\nthe Trustee can only recover from the alleged *alter egos* themselves and that is the extent of his potential recovery, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee should have seized control over the Individual Debtor's businesses, placed them into bankruptcy, and then sought *nunc pro tunc* substantive consolidation.\n\nThe Court has also already ruled above that, notwithstanding the existence of substantive consolidation, trustees may assert *alter ego* claims. As to the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants' notice concerns, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants do not represent the creditors of the alleged *alter egos* at large. The Assorted Non-Joint Defendants themselves have notice of the Trustee's *alter ego* claims. The Trustee has stated multiple times that he will seek a new bar date for the creditors of adjudged *alter egos*. The Court will consider proper notice and service of such a bar date should such a request be made.\n\n#### **D. Issue (ii): plausibility of** *Alter Ego* **allegations**\n\nThe Court has addressed the Joint Defendants' and Non-Joint Defendants' arguments as to why the Trustee has not plausibly pled *alter ego*. The Court has found the Trustee has standing to bring his reverse veil-piercing claims, he is not required to plead a lack of prejudice to the alleged *alter egos'* creditors, and prejudice does not exist as a matter of law. This discussion, however, leaves issue (ii) – whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations – less than completely resolved.\n\nOn the basis of the allegations in the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints, the Court concludes the Trustee has plausibly alleged (1) Golden Spring; (2) Lamp Capital; (3) HCHK Tech; (4) HCHK Property; (5) Lexington; (6) Greenwich Land; and (7) Leading Shine are *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor and their corporate veils should be pierced in reverse. The Trustee has plausibly pled (i) the Individual Debtor dominated and controlled the\n\n## Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 75 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 79 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 74 of 102\n\n*alter egos* such that they have no independent economic existence and serve only as a façade for the Individual Debtor; and (ii) the corporate form of the *alter egos* serves to hinder, delay, or defraud the Individual Debtor's creditors as part of a large shell game designed to effectively judgment proof the Individual Debtor. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 706. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint ¶¶ 13–38, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.) Furthermore, the allegations in the complaints and the *alter ego* complaints, taken as true, do not establish prejudice to the creditors of the *alter egos*. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 718.\n\n#### **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nCertain issues before the Court are legal issues – but they are narrowly drawn and, in essence, ask the Court to look past or recharacterize the allegations in the complaints. The Court will not do so in ruling on motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. The defendants present the Trustee's transfer allegations as a series, **A=B**Æ**C**: an *alter ego* determination creating an identity between **A**, the Individual Debtor, and **B**, an alleged *alter ego*, and then a transfer of **B's** property to **C**, a Joint Defendant. The Trustee, however, alleges **A**Æ**C** transfers, transfers of **A**'s property to **C** *using* **B**. Other issues before the Court are drawn in an attempt to make them amenable to adjudication on a motion to dismiss. In doing so, the defendants focus on the unalleged **B**Æ**C** transfer and argue adding another transfer, **A=B**, to this transfer prejudices **C**. The defendants ask the Court to go beyond the pleadings and rule on the facts, which the Court will not do.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 76 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 80 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 75 of 102\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes as follows regarding the four issues:\n\n#### **(i) Can the Trustee avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity?**\n\nThe Trustee does not seek to avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity. The Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor made the transfers. Transfer is defined to include indirect transfers. Hence, the nominal transferor is not controlling. The Trustee advances *alter ego* and beneficial ownership allegations to assert the Individual Debtor is the transferor.\n\n#### **(ii) Does applicable law allow for reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determinations?**\n\nReverse veil-piercing is recognized by Delaware law. The Court has considered the parties' arguments regarding the sufficiency of the Trustee's pleading of *alter ego*. The Trustee has standing to bring a reverse veil-piercing claim. The Trustee is not required to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of the alleged *alter ego*. The Trustee has plausibly pled *alter ego*.\n\n### **(iii) What is the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determination?**\n\nThe Trustee does not solely rely on *alter ego* allegations – he also pleads beneficial ownership. Nevertheless, the effect of reverse veil-piercing under Delaware law is that the corporate form is disregarded. Disregard of the corporate form has different results depending on the substantive law of the companion cause of action. Typically, it results in the imposition of vicarious liability. It may also be asserted to prove some claim or defense. Under the Bankruptcy Code, an *alter ego* determination can be used to establish a debtor made an indirect transfer and renders the property of the debtor's *alter ego* property of the estate. Under NYUVTA, an *alter ego* determination can be used to avoid transfers by the *alter ego* of the *alter ego's* property.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 77 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 81 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 76 of 102\n\n#### **(iv) May a determination of reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **be applied retroactively?**\n\nThe Trustee is not seeking retroactive relief. *Alter ego* is a remedy for past and present abuse of the corporate form. It brings legal reality in line with factual reality. *Alter ego* survives the advent of substantive consolidation in bankruptcy proceedings. There is no basis to reinterpret the complaints as seeking substantive consolidation rather than *alter ego*.\n\nAccordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED:**\n\n- 1. The Joint Motions, listed on Appendix A, are **DENIED**.\n- 2. The Non-Joint Motions, listed on Appendix B, are **DENIED IN PART** with respect to any and all arguments raised therein relating to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this decision shall not apply to Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order, insofar as those Avoidance Claims are stayed. Notations appear on Appendix D appended to this Order indicating which Avoidance Claims are Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims.\n- 3. The Z&Z Objection, listed on Appendix C to this Order, is **OVERRULED IN PART** with respect to any and all arguments raised therein relating to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this decision shall not apply to Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order, insofar as those Avoidance Claims are stayed. Notations appear on Appendix D appended to this Order indicating which Avoidance Claims are Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims.\n- 4. On or before March 28, 2025, each Non-Joint Defendant shall file a joint statement with the Trustee in their respective avoidance actions stating the issues that remain to\n\n\n\n102\n\nbe determined with respect to their Non-Joint Motions or the motion for judgment on the pleadings to which Z&Z objected. The statements must delineate with specificity where in the pleadings the issues are raised. Upon review of the statements, the Court will determine with respect to each matter whether a hearing is necessary or the matter may be decided on the submissions of the parties.\n\n**\\*5\\*44003%&3&%**BU#SJEHFQPSU\n\\$POOFDUJDVUUIJT4th day of March, 2025.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 83 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 79 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 78 of 102\n\n# **APPENDIX A Joint Motions**\n\n- 1. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 24 (filed by Agora Lab, Inc., defendant).\n- 2. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Amazon Web Services, Inc., defendant).\n- 3. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Direct Persuasion LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 26 (filed by Direct Persuasion LLC, defendant).\n- 4. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Fox News Network, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Fox News Network, LLC, defendant).\n- 5. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Arri Americas Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 27, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by Arri Americas Inc., defendant).\n- 6. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Teris-Phoenix, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 20 (filed by Teris-Phoenix, LLC, defendant).\n- 7. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Phillips Nizer LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Phillips Nizer LLP, defendant).\n- 8. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Gunderson (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Mr. Mark Gundersen, defendant).\n- 9. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC, defendant).\n- 10. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 42 (filed by Amazon.com, Inc., defendant).\n- 11. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Anthem Health Plans, Inc., defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 80 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 84 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 79 of 102\n\n- 12. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Fed. Express Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 20 (filed by Federal Express Corporation, defendant).\n- 13. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. DJD Creative LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by DJD Creative, LLC, defendant).\n- 14. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 35 (filed by B&H Foto & Electronics Corp., defendant).\n- 15. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Am. Express Co. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by American Express Company, defendant).\n- 16. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC, defendant).\n- 17. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Zeta Glob. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Zeta Global Corp., defendant).\n- 18. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. GroCyber LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by GroCyber LLC, defendant).\n- 19. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by Conservative Campaign Technology, LLC, defendant).\n- 20. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Anthem HealthChoice Assurance Inc., defendant).\n- 21. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. ModSquad Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by ModSquad Inc., defendant).\n- 22. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Cloudflare, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by Cloudfare, Inc., defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 81 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 85 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 80 of 102\n\n- 23. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. 3 Columbus Circle LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by 3 Columbus Circle LLC, defendant).\n- 24. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Indium Software Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Indium Software Inc., defendant).\n- 25. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Miller Motorcars Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Miller Motorcars Inc., defendant).\n- 26. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc., defendant).\n- 27. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Target Enters., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Target Enterprises, LLC, defendant).\n- 28. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Flat Rate Movers, Ltd., defendant).\n- 29. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Jamestown Assocs., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Jamestown Associates, LLC, defendant).\n- 30. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Nardello & Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Nardello & Co., LLC, defendant).\n- 31. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., defendant).\n- 32. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 28 (filed by Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP, defendant).\n- 33. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Putnam's Landscaping LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Putnam's Landscaping LLC, defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 81 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 82 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 86 of 107\n\n- 34. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Jason Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Mr. Jason Miller, defendant).\n- 35. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Sedgwick Realty Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Sedgwick Realty Corp., defendant).\n- 36. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Cirrus Design Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Cirrus Design Corp., defendant).\n- 37. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 25 (filed by Marcum LLP, defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 87 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 83 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 82 of\n\n102\n\n#### **APPENDIX B Non-Joint Motions**\n\n- 1. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by FFP (BVI) Ltd., defendant).\n- 2. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell, defendant).\n- 3. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 5, 2024), ECF No. 16 (filed by V.X. Cerda & Associates P.A., defendant).\n- 4. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 20, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Liberty Jet Management Corp., defendant).\n- 5. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Francis Firm PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 29, 2024), ECF No. 15 (filed by The Francis Firm PLLC, defendant).\n- 6. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Berkeley Rowe Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 12, 2024), ECF No. 35 (filed by Berkeley Rowe Ltd., defendant).\n- 7. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024), ECF No. 11 (filed by Weddle Law PLLC, defendant).\n- 8. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Lawall & Mitchell, LLC and Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell, defendants).\n- 9. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd., defendant).\n- 10. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. ACASS Canada LTD. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 12, 2024), ECF No. 26 (filed by ACASS Canada LTD., defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 84 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 88 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 83 of 102\n\n#### **APPENDIX C Z&Z Objection**\n\n1. Memorandum of Law in Opposition, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., defendant, in opposition to the Trustee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2024), ECF No. 17).\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 89 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| | | 107 | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 85 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 84 of 102\n\n### **APPENDIX D Complaints Against Joint and Non-Joint Defendants**\n\nLegend\n\n#### **Complaints against Non-Joint Defendant are bolded**\n\nAvoidance Claims\n\nAFT (BC) – Actual Fraudulent Transfer (Bankruptcy Code)\n\nAvoidance and recovery of an actual fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and550(a).\n\nAFT (NY) – Actual Fraudulent Transfer (New York law) Avoidance and recovery of an actual fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a).\n\nCFT (BC) – Constructive Fraudulent Transfer (Bankruptcy Code) Avoidance and recovery of a constructive fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 550(a).\n\n- CFT (NY) Constructive Fraudulent Transfer (New York law) Avoidance and recovery of a constructive fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a).\n- UPT Unauthorized Post-petition Transfer Avoidance and recovery of an unauthorized post-petition transfer of property of the estate from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550(a).\n- ST Recovery from Subsequent Transferee Recovery of an avoided transfer from a subsequent transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).\n\n\\* Partially Stayed Claim\n\n\\*\\* Stayed Claim\n\n(Claims against neither Joint Defendant nor Non-Joint Defendant appear in parentheses)\n\n#### *Alter Egos*\n\nGSNY – Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. LC – Lamp Capital LLC HCHKT – HCHK Technologies, Inc. HCHKP – HCHK Property Management, Inc. LPS – Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. GL – Greenwich Land, LLC LSNY – Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\n[*Alter egos* involved in Avoidance Claim insofar as it is not stayed by Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶ 2(e) appear in brackets]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 86 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 90 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 85 of 102\n\n1. Complaint, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT] |\n\n2. Amended Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024), ECF No. 4.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n\n3. Complaint, *Despins v. Direct Persuasion LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n4. Complaint, *Despins v. Fox News Network, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n5. Complaint, *Despins v. Arri Americas Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n6. Complaint, *Despins v. Teris-Phoenix, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [LPS]\n\n7. Complaint, *Despins v. Phillips Nizer LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|-------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LPS] |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 87 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 91 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 86 of 102\n\n8. Complaint, *Despins v. Gunderson (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n9. Complaint, *Despins v. 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LPS]\n\n10. **Complaint,** *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|--------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT** | |\n\n11. Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, LPS, GL] |\n| Sixth Claim: | (ST*) | |\n| | | |\n\n12. Complaint, *Despins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [HCHKP]\n\n13. Complaint, *Despins v. Fed. Express Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [LPS]\n\n14. Complaint, *Despins v. DJD Creative LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 88 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 92 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 87 of 102\n\n15. Complaint, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, HCHKT, GL] |\n| Sixth Claim: | (ST*) | |\n\n16. Amended Complaint, *Despins v. Am. Express Co. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2025), ECF No. 30.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n17. Complaint, *Despins v. Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n18. Complaint, *Despins v. Zeta Glob. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n\n19. Complaint, *Despins v. GroCyber LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n20. Complaint, *Despins v. Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n21. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LPS] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LPS] |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 89 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 93 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 88 of 102\n\n22. Complaint, *Despins v. Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n23. Complaint, *Despins v. ModSquad Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n\n24. Complaint, *Despins v. Cloudflare, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT* | [LPS] |\n\n25. Complaint, *Despins v. 3 Columbus Circle LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n26. Complaint, *Despins v. Indium Software Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT] |\n\n27. Complaint, *Despins v. Miller Motorcars Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n\n28. Complaint, *Despins v. On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 89 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 90 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 94 of 107\n\n102\n\n- 29. **Complaint,** *Despins v. V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073**\n\t- **(JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [GSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [GSNY] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, HCHKP, LPS, GL] |\n\n30. **Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024), ECF No. 2.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC] |\n\n31. Complaint, *Despins v. Target Enters., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: AFT (BC) [HCHKT] Second Claim: AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n32. Complaint, *Despins v. Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [GSNY]\n\n33. Complaint, *Despins v. Jamestown Assocs., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n34. Complaint, *Despins v. Nardello & Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, LPS] |\n\n- Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 90 of 102 Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 91 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 95 of 107\n\t- 35. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Francis Firm PLLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LC] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT | [LC, LPS] |\n\n36. **Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. Berkeley Rowe Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2024), ECF No. 23.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n\n37. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | UPT* | [HCHKT, HCHKP] |\n|--------------|------|----------------|\n| | | |\n\n38. Complaint, *Despins v. Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP, LPS]\n\n39. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n|-----------|-----------------------|\n| AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| UPT* | [GSNY, LPS, GL] |\n| ST* | |\n| | |\n\n40. Complaint, *Despins v. Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, LC] |\n|---------------|----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LC] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC] |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 92 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 96 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 91 of 102\n\n41. **Complaint,** *Despins v. G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC] |\n\n42. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LC, GL]\n\n43. Complaint, *Despins v. Putnam's Landscaping LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, GL] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC, HCHKP, GL] |\n\n44. Complaint, *Despins v. Jason Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n\n45. Complaint, *Despins v. Sedgwick Realty Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LC]\n\n46. Complaint, *Despins v. Cirrus Design Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Fifth Claim: | (ST) | |\n\n- Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 92 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 93 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 97 of 107\n\t- 102\n\t- 47. **Second Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. ACASS Canada LTD. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2024), ECF No. 22.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n|---------------|-----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [GSNY, LC] |\n\n48. Complaint, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT | [HCHKP, LPS] |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 98 of |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4227-1 | 107
Filed 03/18/25
103 | Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 | Page 94 of |\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4189 | Filed 03/04/25 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 | Page 93 of |\n\n102\n\n**APPENDIX E Selected Statutory Provisions**\n\n(D) each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with—\n\n- (i) property; or\n- (ii) an interest in property.\n\n(B) the retention of title as a security interest;\n\n(C) the foreclosure of a debtor's equity of redemption; or\n\n11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)\n\n**Bankruptcy Code Provisions**\n\n(54) The term \"transfer\" means—\n\n(A) the creation of a lien;\n\nDefinitions\n\n11 U.S.C. § 101(54)\n\n(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held:\n\n(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.\n\nAvoidance Provisions\n\n11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1)\n\n(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 94 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 95 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 99 of 107\n\n102\n\n11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)\n\n(a) (1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation (including any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—\n\n(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or\n\n(B) (i) received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and\n\n(ii) (I) was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;\n\n (II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital;\n\n (III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured; or\n\n (IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of business.\n\n11 U.S.C. § 549(a)\n\n(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate—\n\n- (1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and\n- (2) (A) that is authorized only under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title; or\n- (B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 96 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 100 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 95 of 102\n\n11 U.S.C. § 550(a)\n\n(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, If the court so orders, the value of such property, from—\n\n(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or\n\n(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.\n\n#### **NYUVTA Provisions**\n\nDefinitions\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 270(b), (f), (p)\n\n(b) \"Asset\" means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:\n\n- (1) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;\n- (2) property to the extent it is generally exempt under non-bankruptcy law; or\n\n(3) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entirety to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.\n\n. . .\n\n(f) \"Debtor\" means a person that is liable on a claim.\n\n. . .\n\n(p) \"Transfer\" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, license, and the creation of a lien or other encumbrance.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 97 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 101 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 96 of 102\n\nAvoidance Provisions\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 273(a)\n\n(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:\n\n(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or\n\n(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:\n\n(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or\n\n(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due.\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 274(a), (b)\n\n(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.\n\n(b) A transfer made by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 97 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 98 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 102 of 107\n\n102\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 276(a)\n\n(a) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this article, a creditor, subject to the limitations in section two hundred seventy-seven of this article, may obtain:\n\n(1) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim;\n\n(2) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee if available under applicable law; and\n\n(3) subject to principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure:\n\n(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;\n\n(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or\n\n(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 99 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 103 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 98 of 102\n\n#### **APPENDIX F Incorporated Complaints Against** *Alter Egos*\n\n1. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (\"Golden Spring\")\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claims: Avoidance and recovery of actual fraudulent transfer.\n\nDisposition: Order Granting Motion for Default Judgment, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2023), ECF No. 35.\n\n2. Lamp Capital LLC\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* (Lamp Capital LLC). Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of Lamp Capital LLC and/or its assets. Third Claim: *Alter ego* (Hudson Diamond NY LLC). Fourth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Hudson Diamond NY LLC and/or its assets. Fifth Claim: *Alter ego* (Leading Shine NY Ltd.) Sixth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Leading Shine NY Ltd. and/or its assets.\n\nDisposition: Default Judgment, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2024), ECF No. 66.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 100 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 104 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 99 of 102\n\n3. HCHK Technologies, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\n4. HCHK Property Management, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\n5. Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 101 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 105 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 100 of 102\n\n6. Greenwich Land LLC\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity\n\nDisposition: Summary Judgment, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 2, 2024), ECF No. 134.\n\n7. Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* (Lamp Capital LLC). Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of Lamp Capital LLC and/or its assets. Third Claim: *Alter ego* (Hudson Diamond NY LLC) Fourth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Hudson Diamond NY LLC and/or its assets. Fifth Claim: *Alter ego* (Leading Shine NY Ltd.) Sixth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Leading Shine NY Ltd. and/or its assets.\n\nDisposition: Pending.\n\n#### Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 102 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 106 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 101 of 102\n\n| Adv. P. | Mot. ECF | Filed | Obj. ECF | Filed | Rep. ECF | Filed |\n|-------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|\n| 24-05056 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. FFP (BVI) | 17 | 8/12/24 | 20 | 10/11/24 | 22 | 11/11/24 |\n| Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05110 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Mitchell | 19 | 5/24/24 | 23 | 7/23/24 | 24 | 8/22/24 |\n| 24-05134 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. V.X. Cerda | 16 | 6/5/24 | 20 | 8/5/24 | 21 | 9/3/24 |\n| & Assocs. P.A. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05135 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Liberty Jet | 19 | 6/20/24 | 24 | 9/16/24 | 27 | 10/16/24 |\n| Mgmt. Corp. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05168 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Francis Firm | 15 | 5/29/24 | 19 | 7/29/24 | 20 | 8/28/24 |\n| PLLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05186 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Berkeley | 35 | 10/12/24 | 42 | 12/11/24 | 51 | 1/10/25 |\n| Rowe Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05188 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Weddle Law | 11 | 4/22/24 | 17 | 6/21/24 | 27 | 8/2/24 |\n| PLLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05199 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Lawall & | 21 | 5/24/24 | 26 | 7/23/24 | 27 | 8/22/24 |\n| Mitchell, LLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05204 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. G4S Sec. | 19 | 8/22/24 | 23 | 10/21/24 | 25 | 11/20/24 |\n| Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05208 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Zeisler & | 17 | 8/2/24 | 21 | 9/6/24 | 22 | 9/20/24 |\n| Zeisler, P.C. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05226 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. ACASS | 26 | 9/12/24 | 33 | 11/12/24 | 41 | 12/20/24 |\n| Canada LTD. | | | | | | |\n\n**APPENDIX G Briefing of Non-Joint Motions and Z&Z Objection**\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4235-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 | Page 107 |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4227-1 | of 107
Filed 03/18/25
of 103 | Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 | Page 103 |\n| | | | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 102 of 102\n\n#### **APPENDIX H Transfer Diagrams**\n\nAlleged Form of Transfers:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nJoint Defendants' Interpretation of Form of Transfers:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*","body_zh":"Case 22-50073 Doc 4227 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 1 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 1 of 107\nUnited States Bankruptcy Court District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格区破产法院）\n\n关于：\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等，\n债务人。\n第11章\n案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)\n（合并审理）\n\nLuc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nApple Inc.（苹果公司）、Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝）、Alex Hadjicharalambous、Bernardo Enriquez、Chunguang Han（韩春光）及 Mei Guo（郭美），\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05060 (JAM)\n\n上诉通知书\n\n第1部分：确定上诉人\n\n1. 上诉人名称：Apple Inc.\n\n2. 上诉人在作为本上诉标的的对抗程序或破产案件中的地位：上述标题对抗程序 No. 24-05060 (JAM) 中的被告。\n\n第2部分：确定本上诉的标的\n\n1. 描述提出上诉的判决书——或可上诉的裁定或法令：《关于 (I) 驳回共同被告驳回起诉或请求依诉状判决动议；(II) 部分驳回其他被告驳回起诉动议；以及 (III) 部分驳回 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 对受托人请求依诉状判决动议之异议的决定与裁定备忘录》，已在破产案件中录入（ECF Dkt. No. 4189），其副本作为附件1附后。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 2 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 2 of 107\n\n2. 说明判决书——或可上诉的裁定或法令——录入的日期：2025年3月4日。\n\n第3部分：确定上诉的其他当事人\n\n列出提出上诉的判决书——或可上诉的裁定或法令——的所有当事人姓名/名称，以及其律师的姓名、地址和电话号码：\n\n当事人：\nApple Inc.\n上诉人\n\n律师：\nGeorge Angelich (ct27542)\nEric Roman (admitted pro hac vice)\nPatrick Feeney (admitted pro hac vice)\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212.457.5423\n电子邮箱：\ngeorge.angelich@afslaw.com\neric.roman@afslaw.com\npatrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n- 以及 -\nJin Yan (admitted pro hac vice)\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1717 K St. NW\nWashington, DC 20006\n电话：202.778.6442\n电子邮箱：\njin.yan@afslaw.com\n\n当事人：\nLuc A. Despins，以第11章受托人身份\n被上诉人\n\n律师：\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616)\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNeubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C.\n195 Church St., 13th Fl.\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n电话：(203) 821-2000\n电子邮箱：\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n- 以及 -\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 3 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 3 of 107\n\n当事人：\n律师：\nDouglass Barron (admitted pro hac vice)\nPaul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n200 Park Ave.\nNew York, NY 10166\n电话：(212) 318-6000\n电子邮箱：\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n- 以及 -\nNicholas A. Bassett (admitted pro hac vice)\nPaul Hastings LLP\n2050 M St. NW\nWashington, D.C. 20036\n电话：(202) 551-1902\n电子邮箱：\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n日期：2025年3月18日 纽约州纽约市\n\n/s/ George Angelich\n\nGeorge Angelich (ct27542)\nEric Roman (admitted pro hac vice)\nPatrick Feeney (admitted pro hac vice)\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212.457.5423\n电子邮箱：george.angelich@afslaw.com\neric.roman@afslaw.com\npatrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n\n- 以及 -\n\nJin Yan (admitted pro hac vice)\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1717 K St. NW\nWashington, DC 20006\n电话：202.778.6442\n电子邮箱：jin.yan@afslaw.com\n\nApple Inc. 代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 4 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 4 of 107\n\n送达证书\n\n我证明，于2025年3月18日，我促使通过使用 CM/ECF 归档系统向法院书记官归档了前述文件的真实且正确的副本，该系统将向所有记录在案的律师发送该归档通知。\n\n日期：纽约州纽约市 2025年3月18日\n\n/s/ George Angelich\nGeorge Angelich\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 1 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 5 of 107\n\n附件 1\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 6 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 2 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 1 of 102\n\n关于：\nHo Wan Kwok 等，\n债务人。\n第11章\n案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)\n（合并审理）\n涉及：ECF Nos. 3577, 3713\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nAgora Lab, Inc.，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05005 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 24\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nAmazon Web Services, Inc.（亚马逊网络服务公司），\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05006 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 21\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nDirect Persuasion LLC，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05010 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 26\n\n美国康涅狄格区破产法院\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 7 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 3 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 2 of 102\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nFox News Network, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司），\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05015 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 23\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nARRI Americas, Inc.，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05031 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 17\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nTeris-Phoenix, LLC，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05044 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 20\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 8 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 4 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 3 of 102\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nPhillips Nizer LLP，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05047 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 23\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nMark Gunderson，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05048 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 21\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\n270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05055 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 17\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 9 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 5 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 4 of 102\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nFFP (BVI) Limited，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05056 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 17\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nAmazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）、Hing Chi Ngok、Alex Hadjicharalambous、Chunguang Han 及 Mei Guo，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05057 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 42\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nAnthem Health Plans, Inc.，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05058 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 21\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 10 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 6 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 5 of 102\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nFederal Express Corporation（联邦快递公司），\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05059 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 20\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nDJD Creative LLC，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05063 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 22\n\nLuc A. Despins，Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n对\nB&H Foto & Electronics Corp.、Hing Chi Ngok、Alex Hadjicharalambous 及 Chunguang Han，\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05069 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 35\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 11 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 7 of 103\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 入卷于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 6 页，共 102 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）破产财产 Chapter 11（第11章）受托人 Luc A. Despins（卢克·A·德斯平斯），\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05077 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 18\nAmerican Express Company（美国运通公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05082 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 17\nOhtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC（Ohtzar Shlomo 所罗门宝藏有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05092 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 21\nZeta Global Corp.（Zeta 全球公司），\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4235-1 提交于 03/19/25 入卷于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 12 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4227-1 提交于 03/18/25 入卷于 03/18/25 23:50:37 第 8 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 入卷于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 7 页，共 102 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05100 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 17\nGrocyber, LLC（Grocyber 有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05108 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 22\nConservative Campaign Technology, LLC（保守派竞选技术有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05110 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 19\nAaron Mitchell（亚伦·米切尔），\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4235-1 提交于 03/19/25 入卷于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 13 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4227-1 提交于 03/18/25 入卷于 03/18/25 23:50:37 第 9 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 入卷于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 8 页，共 102 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\nAnthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（Anthem HealthChoice 保险公司），曾用名 Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（帝国 HealthChoice 保险公司），商号为 Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield（帝国蓝十字蓝盾），\n被告。\n对抗程序案号 24-05112 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 23\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05114 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 21\nModSquad Inc.（ModSquad 公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05115 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 22\nCloudflare, Inc.（Cloudflare 公司），\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4235-1 提交于 03/19/25 入卷于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 14 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4227-1 提交于 03/18/25 入卷于 03/18/25 23:50:37 第 10 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 入卷于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 9 页，共 102 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05120 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 17\n3 Columbus Circle LLC（哥伦布圆环3号有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05122 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 19\nIndium Software, Inc.（Indium 软件公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05128 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 18\nMiller Motorcars Inc.（米勒汽车公司），\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4235-1 提交于 03/19/25 入卷于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 15 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4227-1 提交于 03/18/25 入卷于 03/18/25 23:50:37 第 11 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 入卷于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 10 页，共 102 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05130 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 21\nOn the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.（On the Spot 家居改善公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05134 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 16\nV.X. Cerda & Associates P.A.（V.X. Cerda 律师事务所），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05135 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 19\nLiberty Jet Management Corp.（自由公务机管理公司），\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4235-1 提交于 03/19/25 入卷于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 16 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4227-1 提交于 03/18/25 入卷于 03/18/25 23:50:37 第 12 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 入卷于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 11 页，共 102 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05138 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 19\nTarget Enterprises, LLC（目标企业有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05141 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 19\nFlat Rate Movers, Ltd.（一口价搬家有限公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05147 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 19\nJamestown Associates, LLC（詹姆斯敦联合有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4235-1 提交于 03/19/25 入卷于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 17 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4227-1 提交于 03/18/25 入卷于 03/18/25 23:50:37 第 13 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 入卷于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 12 页，共 102 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05162 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 19\nNardello & Co., LLC（纳德罗有限责任公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05168 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 15\nThe Francis Firm PLLC（弗朗西斯专业有限责任律师事务所），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05186 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 35\nBerkeley Rowe Limited（伯克利罗有限公司），\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4235-1 提交于 03/19/25 入卷于 03/19/25 15:59:16 第 18 页，共 107 页（共 103 页）\n案号 22-50073 文件 4227-1 提交于 03/18/25 入卷于 03/18/25 23:50:37 第 14 页，共 103 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 入卷于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 13 页，共 102 页\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05188 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 11\nWeddle Law PLLC（韦德尔专业有限责任律师事务所），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05196 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 18\nMorvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.（Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello 专业公司），\n被告。\n\nHo Wan Kwok 破产财产第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins，\n原告，\n诉\n对抗程序案号 24-05199 (JAM)\n关联：ECF No. 21\nLawall & Mitchell, LLC（Lawall & Mitchell 有限责任公司），及\nAaron Mitchell，\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4235-1 提交于 03/19/25\n\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4227-1\nFiled 03/18/25\nEntered 03/19/25 15:59:16\nPage 19 of 103\nEntered 03/18/25 23:50:37\nPage 15 of\nCase 22-50073\nDoc 4189\nFiled 03/04/25\nEntered 03/04/25 14:45:18\nPage 14 of 102\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）破产财产的第 11 章破产受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nAdv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 28\nCLAYMAN ROSENBERG KIRSHNER & LINDER LLP，\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章破产受托人，\n原告，\nAdv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 19\n诉\nG4S SECURITY SYSTEMS (HONG KONG) LTD.，\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章破产受托人，\n原告，\nAdv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 17\n诉\nZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.，\n被告。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 20 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 16 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 15 of 102\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章破产受托人，\nAdv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM)\n原告，\n涉及：ECF No. 18\n诉\nPUTNAM'S LANDSCAPING LLC，\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章破产受托人，\nAdv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM)\n原告，\n涉及：ECF No. 23\n诉\nJASON MILLER，\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章破产受托人，\nAdv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM)\n原告，\n涉及：ECF No. 18\n诉\nSEDGWICK REALTY CORP.，\n被告。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 21 of 103 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 17 of\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 16 of 102\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章破产受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nCIRRUS DESIGN CORPORATION 及 QIANG GUO，\nAdv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 21\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章破产受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nAdv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 26\nACASS CANADA LTD.，\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第 11 章破产受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nAdv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 25\nMARCUM LLP，\n被告。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 22 of\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 18 of\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 17 of 102\n\n出庭律师名单\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglas S. Skalka James C. Graham Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（出庭口头辩论） Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n动议人兼被答辩人、原告、Ho Wan Kwok 破产财产第 11 章破产受托人 Luc A. Despins 先生之代理律师\n\nBenjamin O. Gilbert Lindsay C. Stone Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, NY 10112\n\n以及\n\nAlan H. Martin Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP 650 Town Center Drive, 10th Floor Costa Mesa, CA 92626\n\n动议人、被告 Agora Lab, Inc. 之代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 23 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 19 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 18 of\n\nLindsay Sampson Bishop K&L Gates LLP One Congress Street, Suite 2900 Boston, MA 02114\n\n以及\n\nBrian T. Peterson（出庭口头辩论） Ruby A. Nagamine K&L Gates LLP 925 4th Ave, Suite 2900 Seattle, WA 98104\n\n动议人、被告 Amazon Web Services, Inc. 及 Amazon.com, Inc. 之代理律师\n\nBenjamin Mintz Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 250 West 55th Street New York, NY 10019\n\n以及\n\n以及\n\nRyan M. Trombley Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 70 West Madison Street, Suite 4200 Chicago, IL 60602\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\nEric S. Goldstein（出庭口头辩论） Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n动议人、被告 Direct Persuasion LLC 之代理律师\n\nSteven G. Mintz Barry M. Kazan Philip Ian Tafet Mintz & Gold LLP 600 Third Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10016\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人、被告 Fox News Network, LLC 及 Marcum LLP 之代理律师\n\nMichael T. Conway Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP 747 Third Ave., 16th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n动议人、被告 Arri Americas Inc. 之代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 24 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 20 of\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 19 of 102\n\nAndrea Chase Spencer Fane 1000 Walnut Street, Suite 1400 Kansas City, MO 64106\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人、被告 Teris-Phoenix, LLC 之代理律师\n\nJared R. Clark Phillips Nizer LLP 485 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n以及\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n动议人、被告 Phillips Nizer LLP 之代理律师\n\nJeffrey Hellman Law Offices of Jeffrey Hellman, LLC 195 Church Street, 10th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n动议人、被告 Mark Gundersen 先生、Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC 及 Jason Miller 先生之代理律师\n\nRobert N. Sensale Bershtein, Volpe & McKeon, PC 900 Chapel Street, 11th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n动议人、被告 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC 之代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 25 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 21 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 20 of 102\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（出庭口头辩论） Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议人、被告 FFP (BVI) Limited、Aaron A. Mitchell、V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.、The Francis Firm PLLC、Lawall & Mitchell, LLC 及 G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd. 之代理律师\n\nEric S. Goldstein（出庭口头辩论） Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n以及\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人、被告 Anthem Health Plans, Inc.、Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（前称 Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.，营业名 Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield）及 Sedgwick Realty Corp. 之代理律师\n\nMichael A. Siedband Federal Express Corporation 3620 Hacks Cross Road Building 2, 3rd Floor Memphis, TN 38125\n\nEric S. Goldstein（出庭口头辩论） Nicole Lapenta Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n以及\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人、被告 Federal Express Corporation 之代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 26 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 22 of\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 21 of 102\n\nBret Strong Zachary W. Doninger 1790 Hughes Landing, Suite 200 The Woodlands, TX 77380\n\nLouis Joseph Martocchio, III Martocchio & Oliveira, LLC 191 Main Street Southington, CT 06489\n\n动议人、被告 DJD Creative LLC 之代理律师\n\nScott M. Kessler Akerman LLP 1251 Avenue of the Americas 37th Floor New York, NY 10020\n\nTracy Ellis Williams Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, 3rd Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人、被告 B&H Foto & Electronics Corp. 之代理律师\n\nDarryl S. Laddin Frank N. White Arnall Golden Gregory LLP 171 17th Street, N.W., Suite 2100 Atlanta, GA 30363\n\nRonald I. Chorches Law Offices of Ronald I. Chorches LLC 82 Wolcott Hill Road, Suite 203 Wethersfield, CT 06109\n\n动议人、被告 American Express Company 之代理律师\n\nJohn J. Clarke, Jr. DLA Piper LLP (US) 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020\n\n以及\n\nC. Kevin Kobbe DLA Piper LLP (US) 650 South Exter Street, Suite 1100 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n动议人、被告 Zeta Global Corp. 之代理律师\n\nNicholas P. Vegliante Cohn Birnbaum & Shea CityPlace II, 15th Floor 185 Asylum Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n动议人、被告 GroCyber, LLC 之代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 23 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 27 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 22 of\n\nIlan Markus Barclay Damon LLP 545 Long Wharf Drive, 9th Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议人、被告 Conservative Campaign Technology LLC 之代理律师\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n以及\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n动议人、被告 ModSquad, Inc. 及 3 Columbus Circle, LLC 之代理律师\n\nSabrina L. Streusand Streusand, Landon, Ozburn & Lemmon, LLP Spyglass Point 1801 South MoPac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746\n\nRoss G. Fingold Stokesbury, Shipman & Fingold 10 Waterside Drive, Suite 204 Farmington, CT 06032\n\n动议人、被告 Cloudflare, Inc. 之代理律师\n\nRichard J. Reding ASK LLP 2600 Eagan Woods Drive, Suite 400 St. Paul, MN 55121\n\n以及\n\nEdward E. Neiger ASK LLP 60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor New York, NY 10165\n\nElizabeth N. Krasnow Eric R. Wilson Benjamin D. Feder Kelley Drye & Warren LLP Canterbury Green 201 Broad Street Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人、被告 Indium Software, Inc. 之代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 28 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 24 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 23 of 102\n\nEric Seltzer Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane LLC 30 Brewster Lane Bellport, NY 11713\n\n动议人、被告 Miller Motorcars Inc. 之代理律师\n\nJustin S. Baumgartner\nBecker LLC\n354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1500\nLivingston, NJ 07039\n\nEric S. Goldstein（出庭辩护律师）\nShipman & Goodwin LLP\nOne Constitution Plaza\nHartford, CT 06103\n\n动议人兼被告 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. 的代理律师\n\nGerard R. Luckman\nElbert F. Nasis\nForchelli Deegan Terrana LLP\n333 Earle Ovington Boulevard, Suite 1010\nUniondale, NY 11553\n\nPatrick Tomasiewicz\nFazzano Tomasiewicz and Barall\n96 Oak Street\nHarford, CT 06106\n\n动议人兼被告 Liberty Jet Management Corp. 的代理律师\n\nJohn F. Carberry\nKara Anne Zarchin\nCummings & Lockwood LLC\nSix Landmark Square\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人兼被告 Target Enterprises, LLC 及 Jamestown Associates, LLC 的代理律师\n\nJames J. Costello, Jr.\nNorris McLaughlin PA\n400 Crossing Blvd., 8th Floor\nBridgewater, NJ 08807\n\n被告 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. 的代理律师\n\nHenry P. Baer\nEilis A. Meagher\nFinn Dixon & Herling LLP\nSix Landmark Square, Suite 600\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人兼被告 Nardello & Co., LLC 的代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 29 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 25 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 24 of\n\nJulie Johnston-Ahlen\nArmstrong Teasdale LLP\n100 North Riverside Plaza\nChicago, IL 60606\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（出庭辩护律师）\nKellianne Baranowsky\nMichelle Amanda Antao\nGreen & Sklarz LLC\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n\n以及\n\nJohn G. Willard\nArmstrong Teasdale LLP\n7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800\nSt. Louis, MO 63105\n\n动议人兼被告 Berkeley Rowe Limited 的代理律师\n\nRichard Corbi\nThe Law Offices of Richard J. Corbi PLLC\n104 West 40th Street, Suite 4th Floor\nNew York, NY 10018\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（出庭辩护律师）\nKellianne Baranowsky\nMichelle Amanda Antao\nGreen & Sklarz LLC\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议人兼被告 Weddle Law PLLC 的代理律师\n\nRowena A. Moffett\nBrenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP\n271 Whitney Avenue\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议人兼被告 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. 的代理律师\n\nBrian David Linder\nClayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP\n305 Madison Avenue, Suite 650\nNew York, NY 10165\n\nMatthew D. Valauri\nWilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker\n1010 Washington Boulevard, Suite 603\nStamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人兼被告 Clayman Rosenberg Kirschner & Linder LLP 的代理律师\n\nStephen M. Kindseth（出庭辩护律师）\nJames M. Moriarty\nDaniel A. Byrd\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n\n动议人兼被告 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 的代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 26 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 30 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 25 of 102\n\nScott M. Charmoy\nCharmoy & Charmoy\n1465 Post Road East, Suite 100\nWestport, CT 06880\n\n动议人兼被告 Putnam's Landscaping 的代理律师\n\nRichard J. Bernard\nFaegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP\n1177 Avenue of the Americas\nNew York, NY 10036\n\n以及\n\nJosh Peterson\nFaegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP\n2200 Wells Fargo Center\n90 S. 7th Street\nMinneapolis, MN 55402\n\n以及\n\nJaclyn C. Marasco\nFaegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP\n222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400\nWilmington, DE 19801\n\n动议人兼被告 Cirrus Design Corporation 的代理律师\n\nRahman Connelly\nPillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（出庭辩护律师）\nKellianne Baranowsky\nMichelle Amanda Antao\nGreen & Sklarz LLC\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议人兼被告 ACASS Canada LTD. 的代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 27 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 31 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 26 of 102\n\n判决备忘录及裁定：(I) 驳回联合被告的驳回起诉或依案卷材料作出判决之动议；(II) 部分驳回其他被告的驳回起诉动议；以及 (III) 部分驳回 ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C. 对受托人依案卷材料作出判决之动议所提出的异议\n\nJulie A. Manning，美国破产法官\n\n本案涉及一名个人第 11 章（Chapter 11）债务人，该债务人被指控参与了一场涉及数百个公司另我（alter ego）的广泛骗局。第 11 章受托人已提起 260 多起诉讼，请求撤销这些名义上由此类“另我”做出的转让。四十八名撤销之诉的被告（其中包括许多正在与第 11 章受托人进行强制调解的被告）请求本法院就涉及另我原则与可撤销转让法之间相互作用的四个共同争议问题作出裁决。被告、起诉状以及涉嫌“另我”的庞大数量使得分析变得复杂。然而，结合起诉状中指控的事实（本法院必须将其推定为真实）对这些问题进行分析时，结论是显而易见的。基于下述理由，本法院认定，撤销之诉被告提出的四个共同争议问题均不足以支持驳回撤销之诉。\n\nI. 引言\n\n提交给本法院审理的是撤销之诉被告提起的若干项驳回起诉或依案卷材料作出判决的动议。这些撤销之诉是由 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“个人债务人”）破产财产的第 11 章受托人（以下简称“受托人”）Luc A. Despins 先生提起的。受托人依据《美国法典》（United States Code）第 11 编（以下简称《破产法典》/Bankruptcy Code）第 544、548、549 和 550 条以及纽约州《债务人与债权人法》（Debtor and Creditor Law，编纂了纽约州《统一可撤销交易法》/NYUVTA）第 273、274 和 276 条，请求撤销并追回涉嫌的欺诈性转让以及未经授权的申请后转让。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 28 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 32 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 27 of 102\n\n根据《进一步修改撤销之诉程序令及安排驳回起诉动议与依案卷材料作出判决动议联合简报日程的裁定》（以下简称《联合简报裁定》），相关被告（以下简称“联合被告”）1 提交了三十七份动议（以下简称“联合动议”）。（主案 ECF No. 3577。）2 联合被告请求并提议了这一综合程序，并准备和提交了他们请求法院审理的共同法律争议问题。（参见主案 ECF No. 3511。）受托人对联合被告的请求未提出异议。在发布《联合简报裁定》时，法院采纳了联合被告的这一程序。\n\n其他动议（以下简称“非联合动议”）由未参与联合简报的被告 3 提出，但他们提出了联合被告所提的全部或部分争议问题，并请求其动议与联合动议一同审理。由于提出了《联合简报裁定》中的部分争议问题，Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（以下简称“Z&Z”，与非联合动议的提出人合称为“非联合被告”）亦请求将其对受托人依案卷材料作出判决之动议提出的异议（以下简称“Z&Z 异议”）4 与联合动议一同审理。\n\n1 鉴于本综合程序的复杂性，某些可能出现在脚注中的信息已包含在附录中。本裁定书的 .pdf 文件包含书签以方便查阅附录。联合动议的清单以及对提交每项联合动议的联合被告的说明载于附录 A。 2\n\n主案 In re Kwok，案号 22-50073 (JAM) 的案件卷宗引用格式将统一为“主案 ECF No. __”。\n\n3 非联合动议的清单以及对提交每项非联合动议的被告的说明载于附录 B。 4\n\nZ&Z 异议的出处引用载于附录 C。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 29 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 33 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 28 of 102\n\n本判决备忘录载明了法院就《联合简报裁定》中所列四个争议问题作出的法律结论。Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052。由于 (i) 所提出的法律争议问题对诉答文书的充分性不具决定性；(ii) 被告在法律争议问题上未占优；以及 (iii) 所提出的许多问题属于事实问题而非法律问题，故联合动议被驳回（DENIED）。基于同样的原因，非联合动议就《联合简报裁定》中所列的争议问题被部分驳回（DENIED IN PART），且 Z&Z 异议在相同范围内被部分驳回（OVERRULED IN PART）。\n\nII. 背景\n\n2022 年 2 月 15 日，个人债务人向本法院提交了自愿第 11 章破产申请。（主案 ECF No. 1。）2022 年 6 月 15 日，针对关于个人债务人财务管理不善及涉嫌骗局的指控，法院作出了任命第 11 章受托人管理个人债务人破产财产的判决备忘录及裁定。（主案 ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。2022 年 7 月 8 日，Despins 先生被任命为受托人。（主案 ECF No. 523。）\n\n《撤销之诉程序令》\n\n2024 年 1 月 29 日，受托人提交了一项动议，请求为其拟提起的撤销之诉前瞻性地确立程序，其在这些诉讼中将仅根据《破产法典》第 544、547、548、549 和 550 条提出索赔主张。（主案 ECF No. 2532。）受托人预计在申请日届满两周年之前将提起数百起撤销之诉，并预计这些立案将带来案件管理方面的问题。参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 546, 549。在 2024 年 2 月 5 日举行听证会后，法院作出了准许该动议的裁定（经修改和补充后，统称为《撤销之诉程序令》）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 30 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 34 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 29 of 102\n\n（主案 ECF No. 2578。）在 2024 年 2 月 9 日至 2024 年 2 月 15 日期间，受托人共提起了 268 起撤销之诉，其中包括作为本裁定标的的诉讼。（主案 ECF Nos. 2594–925。）每份起诉状均主张了以下六项诉由中的至少一项或多项（按其主张，统称为“撤销主张”）5 ：\n\n(i) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) 及 550(a)，撤销个人债务人对该个人债务人享有财产权益的实际欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追回；\n\n(ii) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) 及 550(a) 以及纽约州《债务人与债权人法》§§ 273(a)(1)、274 和 276 6，撤销个人债务人对该个人债务人享有财产权益的实际欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追回；\n\n(iii) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) 及 550(a)，撤销个人债务人对该个人债务人享有财产权益的推定欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追回；\n\n(iv) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) 及 550(a) 以及纽约州《债务人与债权人法》§§ 273(a)(2)、274 和 276，撤销个人债务人对该个人债务人享有财产权益的推定欺诈性转让，并向初始受让人追回；\n\n(v) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 及 550(a)，撤销个人债务人对该个人债务人破产财产未经授权的申请后转让，并向初始受让人追回；以及\n\n(vi) 根据 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) 并结合上述诉由之一，向后手受让人追回已被撤销的转让财产。\n\n（参见，例如，起诉书，Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc.（In re Kwok（郭文贵）），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格区联邦破产法院）2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。）\n\n每份起诉书均至少主张了以下两项之一：(a) 根据联邦法和州法均构成的实际欺诈性转让；或 (b) 未经授权的申请后转让。（参见，例如，起诉书，Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，\n\n5 列明所涉各起诉书中诉由的附表载于附录 D。据以提起撤销诉求的法律条文文本与若干相关法定定义一并载于附录 E。\n\n6 在相关起诉书中，破产受托人主张个人债务人在纽约开展了业务活动，包括与涉嫌欺诈性转让相关的活动。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 31 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 35 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 30 of 102\n\n对抗程序案号 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月9日)，ECF No. 1。）除主张实际欺诈性转让外，部分起诉书还根据联邦法和州法主张了推定欺诈性转让。（参见，例如，起诉书，Despins v. Mitchell（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。）最后，其中一份起诉书寻求向作为欺诈性转让或未经授权申请后转让之后手受让人的非共同被告追回财产。（起诉书，Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日)，ECF No. 1。）\n\n所有起诉书均主张个人债务人通过各个另我实体转让了财产，且该等转让构成欺诈性转让或未经授权的申请后转让。（参见，例如，起诉书，Despins v. Marcum LLP（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月14日)，ECF No. 1；起诉书，Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日)，ECF No. 1；起诉书，Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。）关于个人债务人对另我实体拥有支配与控制权的进一步指控，是通过并入针对涉嫌另我实体提起的寻求另我和/或受益所有权宣告性判决以及移交资产和控制权的起诉书而作出的。7\n\n7 涉及若干涉嫌另我实体的撤销诉求已被中止诉讼程序。（《撤销诉讼程序裁定》第 2(e)(i)、(ii) 段，主案 ECF No. 3163。）因此，在该等撤销诉求被中止的范围内，法院未审理任何已中止或部分中止的撤销诉求（在此按《撤销诉讼程序裁定》第 2(e)(i) 和 (ii) 段的定义使用）。下文附录 D 载有指明某项撤销诉求是否属于已中止或部分中止撤销诉求的标注。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 32 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 36 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 31 of 102\n\n下文讨论的七个涉嫌另我实体并未中止诉讼。该等另我实体的附表载于附录 F，其中列出了所并入的起诉书、关于设立地所在州的指控以及诉由。8\n\n8 除 Bering Yachts, LLC（对比主案 ECF No. 3511 与主案 ECF No. 3713）以及 McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC（参见信函，Despins v. McManimon, Scotland & Baumann LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05194 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年1月13日)，ECF No. 22（宣布与受托人达成和解））之外，所有该等被告仍为共同被告。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 33 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 37 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 32 of 102\n\n2024年2月27日，法院举行了案件进展听证会以处理大量撤销诉讼的审判管理问题。在进展听证会期间，受托人请求实施强制调解程序。2024年5月2日，在多份诉状提交且听证会举行之后，法院作出一项裁定，修改了《撤销诉讼程序裁定》以纳入强制调解。（主案 ECF No. 3163。）\n\n《联合书面意见裁定》\n\n调解程序的两个特点与共同动议、非共同动议以及 Z&Z（Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.）异议尤为相关。首先，特定被告自动被排除在强制调解之外（《撤销诉讼程序裁定》第 2(j)(vi) 段，主案 ECF No. 3163），而受调解约束的被告可提请动议要求免于调解（同前引，第 2(m) 段）。其次，调解程序包含诉讼中止。（同前引，第 2(j)(iii) 段。）这些特点共同构成了《联合书面意见裁定》的程序背景。\n\n早在2024年4月22日，不受调解中止约束的撤销诉讼被告便开始提交驳回起诉动议。（参见，例如，驳回对抗程序起诉动议，Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年4月22日)，ECF No. 11。）随着这些动议被安排听证，2024年9月6日，若干受调解中止约束的撤销诉讼被告——即最初的共同被告8——请求法院为共同被告确立一套程序，以便就其他撤销诉讼被告动议所提出的争议问题进行辩论，而无需强求他们申请免于调解。（主案 ECF No. 3511。）\n\n2024年9月24日，法院举行了案件进展听证会。在进展听证会期间，共同被告传阅了他们关于修改《撤销诉讼程序裁定》及联合书面辩论程序的提议。受托人未对共同被告的提议提出反对。不受调解中止约束的某些被告不反对将其驳回起诉动议的听证顺延至预期共同动议听证举行之时，但提出若其动议在共同动议之后审理可能引发正当程序问题。在进展听证会结束时，法院宣布对该事项进行斟酌裁定。\n\n2024年9月25日，基于其中载明的理由，法院作出了《联合书面意见裁定》。（主案 ECF No. 3577。）《联合书面意见裁定》的相关要点规定，共同被告应共同提交一份书面意见，仅针对共同被告主张为共同法律争议的四个问题进行阐述。这四个问题几乎逐字采纳了共同被告的提议，分别为：\n\n(i) 受托人是否可撤销非债务人实体的初始转让；\n\n(ii) 适用法律是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或认定另我；\n\n(iii) 适用法律下反向揭开公司面纱或认定另我的法律效力；以及\n\n(iv) 反向揭开公司面纱或认定另我的裁决是否可具溯及力。\n\n（《联合书面意见裁定》第 2(b)(i)–(iv) 段，主案 ECF No. 3577。）根据《联合书面意见裁定》，(1) 在该等撤销诉求被中止的范围内，共同动议不得涉及《撤销诉讼程序裁定》第 2(e)(i) 和 (ii) 段所定义的已中止或部分中止撤销诉求；以及 (2) 共同被告在后续诉状中保留除该四个争议问题之外提出驳回起诉动议或根据答辩状请求判决动议的所有理由。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 34 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 38 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 33 of 102\n\n（同前引，第 4、5 段。）\n\n《联合书面意见裁定》还为其他撤销诉讼被告加入共同被告预留了时间。若干被告加入了进来，其中包括部分不受调解中止约束的被告。（主案 ECF Nos. 3588, 3591, 3605, 3608, 3615, 3617, 3618, 3623, 3624, 3626, 3627, 3629。）2024年10月18日，共同被告提交了联合法律备忘录（下称“《联合书面意见》”）及共同动议。（主案 ECF No. 3713。）2024年11月8日，受托人提交了针对《联合书面意见》的异议书。（主案 ECF No. 3803。）2024年11月22日，共同被告提交了支持《联合书面意见》的答复意见。（主案 ECF No. 3848。）共同动议的书面陈述已完备。非共同动议以及受托人针对 Z&Z 作出根据答辩状请求判决的动议的书面陈述亦已完备。9\n\n2025年1月8日，法院就共同动议、非共同动议以及 Z&Z 异议的听证形式举行了进展听证会。在进展听证会期间，法院经与各方协商，确定了听证形式。法院亦注意到某些被告在其驳回起诉动议中并未提出《联合书面意见》所涉的任何争议。各方同意对该等被告动议的听证不应同时举行。因此，法院将对该等动议的听证无限期延期。10（Despins v. Harcus Parker Ltd.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05163 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年1月14日)，ECF No. 32；Despins v. Miller（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073，对抗程序案号 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年1月14日)，ECF No. 29。）\n\n9 非共同动议及受托人针对 Z&Z 提起的根据答辩状请求判决动议的书面辩论附表载于附录 G。\n\n10 尽管 Jason Miller 先生通过2024年10月18日提交的根据答辩状请求判决的动议加入了《联合书面意见》（参见下文附录 A），并就该动议接受了听审，但法院并未就其此前于2024年6月26日提交的非联合驳回起诉动议对其进行听审。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 35 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 39 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 34 of 102\n\n尽管提出了部分或全部共同争议问题，其他被告仍不确定是否希望与共同被告同时接受听审。进展听证会后，该等被告表示不希望其动议被同时听审。因此，法院亦将对其动议的听证无限期延期。（Despins v. Apple Inc.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05060 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年1月14日)，ECF No. 67；Despins v. Meta Platforms Inc.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05117 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年1月14日)，ECF No. 42。）\n\n2025年1月15日，法院就共同动议、非共同动议以及 Z&Z 异议举行了听证会。本案已审理终结，适于作出裁决。\n\n三、管辖权\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)，United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（康涅狄格区美国联邦地区法院）对本案具有管辖权。根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及康涅狄格区美国联邦地区法院于 1984 年 9 月 21 日作出的移送命令（Order of Reference），本法院有权审理并对本案作出裁决。本案诉讼属于法定核心诉讼程序。28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A)、(E)、(H)、(O)。本法院认定，其行使管辖权不受宪法第三条（Article III）之限制。Cf. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，本司法管辖区的审判地（Venue）适当。\n\nIV. 讨论\n\nA. 法律标准\n\n联合动议、非联合动议以及 Z&Z 异议主张，受托人未能提出可获得救济的请求（failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted）。参见 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)、(c)，依据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b) 予以适用；亦参见 Lively v. Wafra Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc., 6 F.4th 293, 302 (2d Cir. 2021)（根据诉状判决的动议与驳回动议适用相同标准）。在判定撤销权诉请（Avoidance Claims）是否构成可获得救济的请求时，法院必须将充分主张的指控（包括起诉状所附文件中的指控）视为真实。参见 Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980)；Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 692 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2012)；Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002)；Tatum v. Oberg, 650 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D. Conn. 2009)。法院必须作出对受托人最有利的全部合理推论。Warren v. Colvin, 744 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 2014)。\n\n要构成充分主张，撤销权诉请必须包含“说明请求人有权获得救济的简短且平实的陈述”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)，依据 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008 予以适用。它们必须包含“在被采信为真实的情况下足以‘提出表面上合理的救济请求’的充分事实依据”。Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)（援引 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)）。“合理性标准”（plausibility standard）虽然不是“概率要求”（probability requirement），但要求的不仅仅是“被告存在非法行为的纯粹可能性”。Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678（援引 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556）。判定诉请的合理性是“一项结合具体案情上下文的任务，要求审查法院利用其司法经验和常识”。Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679。尽管如此，“仅凭结论性陈述支持的对诉讼请求要件的空洞罗列，并不足以为凭。”Id. at 678。\n\n在判定撤销权诉请的充分性时，法院还必须考量通过引用纳入起诉状的文件以及法院可依职权进行司法认知（judicial notice）的事项。Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)。在此，如上所述，受托人已通过引用将其针对以下各方提起的起诉状纳入：(1) Golden Spring (New York) Limited（“Golden Spring”）；(2) Lamp Capital LLC（“Lamp Capital”）；(3) HCHK Technologies, Inc.（“HCHK Tech”）；(4) HCHK Property Management, Inc（“HCHK Property”）；(5) Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（“Lexington”，并与 HCHK Tech 及 HCHK Property 各自统称为“HCHK 实体”，合称为“各 HCHK 实体”）；(6) Greenwich Land, LLC（“Greenwich Land”）；以及 (7) Leading Shine NY Ltd.（“Leading Shine”）。这些起诉状根据特拉华州法律主张：(i) 上述实体是个人债务人的另我（alter ego）；以及 (ii) 它们及/或其资产由个人债务人实际拥有（beneficially owned）。11 这些诉请的任何要件均无需进行详尽细节陈述（pled with particularity）。参见 Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995)（适用特拉华州法并认定确立另我无需证明欺诈）。\n\nB. 联合动议\n\n法院将首先审议联合被告12关于以下四个争议焦点的论点：\n\n(i) 受托人是否可以撤销非债务人实体的初始转让；\n\n(ii) 适用法律是否允许进行反向揭开公司面纱（reverse veil piercing）或另我认定；\n\n(iii) 适用法律下反向揭开公司面纱或另我认定的效力；以及\n\n11 涉案的七个另我据称均在特拉华州设立。参见下文附录 F（Appendix F）。采信这些指控为真实，特拉华州法适用于受托人的另我及实际所有权主张。Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013)（适用受案法院地法冲突规范）；参见 Weber v. U.S. Sterling Secs., Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 822–23 (Conn. 2007)（对另我诉讼及其他涉及有限责任公司的内部事务适用设立地州实体法）；RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 303, 304。明确而言，“特拉华州法院将‘揭开公司面纱’和‘另我’理论互换使用”。Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018)。\n\n12 无论使用“联合被告”还是“非联合被告”的表述，本讨论中 B 节和 C 节的裁定均适用于提出或加入所涉及论点的所有被告。\n\n(iv) 反向揭开公司面纱或另我的认定是否可以追溯适用。\n\n在听证会期间，联合被告将这四个争议焦点分为两项论点。关于焦点 (i) 和 (iii)，联合被告主张，即使法院认定某些实体是个人债务人的另我，法院也必须驳回起诉状，因为另我认定并不能赋予受托人就另我转让其自身财产提起诉讼的原告资格（standing）。关于焦点 (ii) 和 (iv)，联合被告提出了一系列论点，主张另我认定在适用州法下是不正当的，或者由于对另我的受让人造成损害而必须在破产语境下予以限制。法院将依次审议这些论点。\n\n1. 焦点 (i) 与 (iii)：另我认定在可撤销转让诉讼中的效力\n\n联合被告主张，根据特拉华州法，另我认定的效力仅会导致另我对个人债务人的债务承担替代责任（vicariously liable）。他们主张，此类认定并不会 (i) 实现将另我的资产转入个人债务人的破产财产中并允许受托人主张未经授权的申请后转让（post-petition transfer）诉请；或 (ii) 合并个人债务人与另我的人格，以允许受托人主张另我转让其财产构成个人债务人对其财产的欺诈性转让。基于这些理由，联合被告主张，即便假定受托人在其另我诉请中胜诉，受托人亦缺乏提起撤销权诉请的原告资格。归根结底，联合被告坚称受托人唯一的追偿途径是直接针对各另我本身。\n\n作为回应，受托人提出了两项论点。首先，受托人主张，虽然另我认定是根据适用州法作出的，但另我认定的效力属于联邦法事项。特别是，受托人坚称《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）第 541 条决定了州法下存在的权益是否属于破产财产。其次，受托人主张，即使由州法决定另我认定的效力，特拉华州法采纳的也是另我的人格同一理论（identity theory of alter ego）。因此，受托人主张，另我认定为其主张欺诈性转让和未经授权的申请后转让诉请提供了依据。受托人认为，如果法院支持联合被告的观点，其结果将是通过切断破产财产的追偿途径，放任个人债务人的不当行为和不公平交易。\n\n如下文更详细所述，法院赞同受托人的意见。作为首要问题，联合被告的论点仅聚焦于撤销权诉请中的另我指控，未能回应重叠且备位的实际所有权（beneficial ownership）指控。撤销权诉请将个人债务人对另我及其资产的实际所有权作为请求获得救济的依据。参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)；541；Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990)；Orr v. Kinderhill Corp., 991 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993)。此外，作为撤销权诉请依据的可撤销转让实体法决定了另我认定的效力。可撤销转让法重实质而轻形式，因此，在适用法律会无视公司形式的情况下，该法适于揭开公司面纱。参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)；541；Begier, 496 U.S. at 59；United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1983)；Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–57 (1979)；Stadtmauer v. Tulis (In re Nordlicht), 115 F.4th 90, 104–06 (2d Cir. 2024)；Orr, 991 F.2d at 35；McNellis v. Raymond, 420 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1970)；ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 382 B.R. 49, 66–68 (S.D. Tex. 2007)。\n\ni. 焦点 (i) 与 (iii)：就转让指控的实际所有权\n\n联合被告主张，受托人不正当地利用特拉华州另我法，通过消解以下两方面的区别来满足撤销权诉请的两项要件：(a) 被指控的另我转让人与个人债务人之间的区别13；以及 (b) 另我转让人的财产与个人债务人的财产14及/或破产财产15之间的区别。然而，如前所述，受托人还指控个人债务人实际拥有各另我及/或其资产。法院不能忽视受托人的指控。\n\na. 实际所有权指控与焦点 (i) 相关：即受托人指控的是由非债务人实体还是由个人债务人进行的初始转让\n\n关于第一项要件，为了在《破产法典》下主张实际欺诈性转让（actual fraudulent transfer）或某种推定欺诈性转让（constructive fraudulent transfer），受托人必须主张该转让是由个人债务人作出的。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A)、(B)(ii)(IV)。同样，关于其 NYUVTA（纽约州统一可撤销转让法）诉请，受托人必须主张转让是由个人债务人或对其债务承担责任的其他方作出的。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f)。然而，未经授权的申请后转让以及《破产法典》下的其他类型的推定欺诈性转让并不要求转让必须由个人债务人作出。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III)（无转让须由债务人作出之要求）、549(a)（同上）。\n\n根据《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code），在相关部分，“转让”（transfers）包括“以直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿的各种方式处置或放弃——(i) 财产；或 (ii) 财产中的权益。”11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D)。同样地，根据\n\n13 参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV)；N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。\n\n14 参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)；N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。\n\n15 参见 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 41 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 45 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 40 of 102\n\n《纽约州统一可撤销转让法》（NYUVTA），转让在相关部分包括“以直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿的各种方式处置或放弃资产或资产中的权益”。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p)。\n\n与《破产法典》和 NYUVTA 在转让定义中均包含“间接”转让保持一致，法院着眼于转让的实质而非形式。Orr 案，991 F.2d at 35（“在衡平法中，‘实质不屈从于形式，[且]技术性考量不会妨碍实现实质正义。’因此，涉嫌欺诈性的财产转让必须在具体背景下进行评估；‘当一次转让仅为总体计划中的一个步骤时，该计划“必须作为一个整体连同其所有综合含义一并审视”。’”)（引文省略；其他改动见原文）；参见 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.03[6] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer 编，第 16 版 2025)（案例汇编）。法院必须审视交易的“经济实质”（economic reality）。Orr 案，991 F.2d at 36（引用 Salomon Inc. v. United States 案，976 F.2d 837, 842 (2d Cir. 1992)）。在具备适当事实依据的情况下，法院在分析交易的经济实质时可以否定公司独立人格。McNellis 案，420 F.2d at 53（在依据经修订的前《1898年破产法》提起的诉讼中，维持地方法院裁决，该裁决揭开公司面纱，认定委托人向贷款人支付个人款项获得了相应对价——即向其公司发放的贷款——并因此裁定该交易不构成欺诈性转让）；参见 Cohen v. de la Cruz 案，523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998)（认定除非有明确迹象表明国会有此意图，否则经修订的前《1898年破产法》下的法律不被取代）。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 41 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 42 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 46 of 107\n\n共同被告（Joint Defendants）将撤销权主张（Avoidance Claims）解释为主张了以下一系列转让：16\n\nA(个人债务人) = B(另我/Alter ego) C(共同被告) (另我认定) (B 的财产转让)\n\n按照共同被告的解释，受托人（Trustee）完全依赖于个人债务人（Individual Debtor）与另我（alter egos）之间的同一性来主张个人债务人实施了转让。共同被告对这种同一性提出异议，并主张受托人没有原告资格撤销剩余的转让 B -> C。\n\n然而，法院必须依据指控的本身来评估转让。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. 案，583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018)。与共同被告对起诉书的解释相反，受托人主张个人债务人是“利用”另我进行了转让：\n\nA(个人债务人) C(共同被告) (通过另我 B 转让 A 的财产)\n\n受托人并非仅依赖个人债务人与另我之间的同一性——他主张另我是转让的工具（instrument）。\n\n例如，在针对包括共同被告 Amazon.com, Inc.（“Amazon（亚马逊）”）等在内的起诉书中，受托人指控：\n\n44. 在申请日（Petition Date）之前，[个人]债务人利用其另我空壳公司 Greenwich Land、G Club17、Lexington、HCHK Technologies 以及 Golden Spring，或以其他方式，将[个人]债务人的财产转让给亚马逊（合称“申请前转让”），包括但不限于以下内容：\n\n参见随附于此并作为其一部分的附件 A（SCHEDULE A）。\n\n16 下图见附录 H（Appendix H）。 17 本起诉书中的撤销权主张在涉及 G Club Operations LLC 的转让方面已被中止诉讼。因此，本法院在此仅讨论 Golden Spring、HCHK Tech、Lexington 以及 Greenwich Land。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 43 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 47 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 42 of 102\n\n45. 在申请日之后，[个人]债务人通过其空壳公司 Greenwich Land、G Club、Lexington 以及 Golden Spring，或以其他方式，将破产财产转让给亚马逊（合称“申请后转让”），包括但不限于以下内容：\n\n参见随附于此并作为其一部分的附件 B（SCHEDULE B）。\n\n（起诉书 ¶¶ 44–45，Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok（郭案）)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，衍生诉讼案号 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格区破产法院）2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。）受托人指控这些转让是个人债务人“空壳骗局”（shell game）的一部分，该骗局涉及“(i) 由近亲属和/或下属持有的、受[个人]债务人控制的空壳公司，(ii) 使用来自其他受[个人]债务人控制实体的现金购买的资产，和/或在没有对价的情况下向空壳实体及在空壳实体之间转让的资产，以及 (iii) [个人]债务人从此类资产中获益并对该等资产拥有控制权与支配权”，（同上，¶ 22），该空壳骗局的目的是“隐匿和转移数以百万美元计的资产，同时向其众多债权人虚假宣称贫困”，（同上，¶ 37）。（参见同上，¶¶ 20–43。）所有其他起诉书均对个人债务人的财务状况作出了相同的指控。\n\n为支持这些论点，针对亚马逊的起诉书并入了针对 Golden Spring、HCHK Tech、Lexington 以及 Greenwich Land 的另我起诉书。（同上，¶ 20 附注 4。）另我起诉书请求作出另我和实际所有人（beneficial ownership）的确认判决，并在此等确认判决的基础上要求移交（turnover）破产财产。例如，针对 Golden Spring 的起诉书指控\n\nGolden Spring 是[个人]债务人的另我，且[个人]债务人是 Golden Spring 和/或其资产的衡平法所有权人（equitable owner）。\n\n（起诉书 ¶ 2，Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，衍生诉讼案号 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2023年7月25日)，ECF No. 1）。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 44 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 48 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 43 of 102\n\n针对 Golden Spring 的起诉书指控了诸多事实，除其他事项外（inter alia），包括个人债务人对 Golden Spring 的设立、注资、管理和运营的控制，以及他利用 Golden Spring 作为空壳公司隐匿资产、支付开支并在总体上服务于其自身利益。（同上，¶¶ 13–38。）起诉书后附有大量证据附件以支持这些指控。其他另我起诉书也作出了类似的指控，涉及个人债务人对涉嫌另我的支配与控制、他从此类资产和/或服务中获益并加以使用，以及他利用其公司形式对债权人屏蔽资产。\n\n受托人的指控通过两种重叠的法律理论将个人债务人与名义转让人联系起来：(i) 另我，即共同被告辩论的焦点；以及 (ii) 实际所有权，共同被告未予涉及。然而，受托人关于实际所有权的指控与受托人是否合理阐述了个人债务人实施转让的诉答主张相关。假定受托人合理指控了个人债务人实际拥有另我18，则其已合理主张另我是个人债务人的关联方（affiliates），个人债务人可通过其实施间接资产转让。11 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), (15), (41)；N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(a)。事实上，法院曾合并审视（collapsed）涉及关联方的交易。参见例如 Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp. 案，919 F.2d 206, 208–210, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1990)（维持地方法院判决，其中欺诈性转让涉及所有权人将其拥有的一家公司的资产洗白转移至另一家公司，作为使债权人无法取得资产的总体计划的一部分）；符合 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D)（转让包括间接转让）；N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p)（同前）。\n\n18 法院并未就受托人是否合理主张了个人债务人对另我的实际所有权这一问题作出认定，因为这不属于四项争议焦点之一。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 44 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 45 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 49 of 107\n\n因此，法院认定双方当事人关于另我效力的争辩，对于受托人关于个人债务人是转让人的诉答是否充分不具有决定性。\nb. 实际所有权指控可能使争议焦点 (iii) 变得无关紧要：即根据适用法律，反向揭开公司面纱或另我认定的效力\n\n转到有争议的第二个要件，《破产法典》第 548 条项下的实际或推定欺诈性转让主张必须指控转让了“债务人在财产中的权益”。11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)。同样，《破产法典》赋予受托人提起撤销权诉讼的原告资格，该诉讼是实际债权人根据其他适用的州法或联邦法可以提起的，以撤销关于“债务人在财产中的权益”的转让。11 U.S.C. § 544(b)。受托人根据纽约州法提出的实际和推定欺诈性转让主张还必须指控转让了“债务人的财产”，其中“债务人”是指个人债务人或对其债务承担责任的另一方当事人。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (f), (l), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。最后，未经授权的申请后转让主张必须指控转让了“破产财产”。11 U.S.C. § 549(a)。\n\n债务人在财产中的权益是指若非待撤销的转让发生本应属于破产财产的任何财产。Begier 案，496 U.S. at 59（“由于撤销权条款的目的是保全应纳入破产财产的财产——即可供分配给债权人的财产——受偏颇转让（preferential transfer）条款约束的‘债务人的财产’最好被理解为若未在破产程序开始前被转让本应成为破产财产一部分的该等财产。”）。因此，关于转让是否属于“债务人在财产中的权益”的分析（11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)）以及关于转让是否属于“破产财产”的分析（11 U.S.C. § 549(a)），均围绕界定破产财产的第 541 条展开。财产\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 46 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 50 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 45 of 102\n\n破产财产在相关部分包括“无论位于何处且由何人持有……债务人在财产中的所有普通法或衡平法权益”。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)。事实上，撤销权诉求必须主张个人债务人对财产拥有衡平法权益，而非仅仅拥有法定所有权。Begier 案，496 U.S. at 58；另见 11 U.S.C. § 541(d)（如果债务人不享有衡平法权益，则将债务人仅享有法定权益的财产排除在破产财产之外）。\n\n关于依据 NYUVTA（《纽约州统一可撤销转让法》）某项转让是否属于债务人的财产，纽约州法律在追讨债务的诉讼中承认实益所有权。参见如 In re Gliklad v. Chernoi 案，12 N.Y.S.3d 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)（维持要求判决债务人交出某企业实益所有权的命令）；Guilder v. Corinth Constr. Corp. 案，651 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)（发回重审以确定个人被告是否在衡平法上拥有公司被告，以及原告是否可以刺破公司被告与其潜在衡平法所有权人之间的公司面纱）；Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan（郭文贵）案，Index No. 652077/2017，2022 WL 406636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022)（在追讨判决债权的诉讼中认定判决债务人实益拥有游艇）。因此，“债务人在财产中的权益”、“破产财产”以及“债务人的财产”均包括个人债务人在财产中的衡平法权益。\n\n共同被告主张受托人试图撤销另我主体的财产转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）= B（另我主体） C（共同被告）（另我主体认定）（B 的财产转让）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 47 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 51 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 46 of 102\n\n共同被告将起诉状理解为主张另我主体认定将在另我主体的财产中为个人债务人创设一项权益。19 共同被告主张受托人理解有误——另我主体认定无法创设先前并不存在的财产权益——因此，受托人没有诉讼资格就余下的 B 向 C 转让 B 的财产主张权利。\n\n然而，法院必须再次根据所指控的情况对转让进行评估。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp. 案，583 U.S. at 382。在起诉状中，受托人指控这些转让属于个人债务人的财产和/或破产财产的转让——而非另我主体的财产：\n\nA（个人债务人） C（共同被告）（通过另我主体 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n受托人指控的是，个人债务人始终在另我主体的财产中享有权益——该权益并非通过另我主体认定而创设。\n\n这一点可以从上文引述的针对 Amazon（亚马逊）的起诉状段落中看出。但举另一个例子，在针对共同被告 B&H Foto & Electronics Corp.（“B&H Foto”）等主体的起诉状中，受托人提出了如下指控：\n\n43. 在申请日之前，[个人]债务人利用其包括 Greenwich Land、Golden Spring、HCHK Technologies、G Club Operations、Rule of Law20 以及 Lexington Property 在内的另我壳公司，或以其他方式，将[个人]债务人的财产转让给 B&H（统称“申请前转让”），包括但不限于如下内容：\n\n见随附于此并作为其一部分的附表 A。\n\n44. 在申请日之后，[个人]债务人通过包括 Greenwich Land、Lexington、Golden Spring、G Club Operations、\n\n19 实质上，按照共同被告的理解，另我主体认定属于非自愿转让，参见 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)，且 A=B→C 亦可写作 A←B→C。 20 本起诉状中的撤销权诉求就涉及 G Club Operations 以及 Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. 的转让部分予以中止。因此，法院在此仅讨论 Golden Spring、HCHK Tech、Lexington 以及 Greenwich Land。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 48 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 52 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 47 of 102\n\n以及 HCHK Technologies 在内的壳公司，或以其他方式，将破产财产转让给 B&H（统称“申请后转让”），包括但不限于如下内容：\n\n见随附于此并作为其一部分的附表 B。\n\n（起诉状第 43–44 段，Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok) 案，Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024)，ECF No. 1。）起诉状指控个人债务人参与了一场“壳牌游戏”，他将其资产——以及在申请日之后的破产财产资产——隐匿在另我主体中，以阻碍追讨这些资产来清偿其债务，并逃避其在《破产法典》下的义务。（同上，第 19–42 段。）这些指控在形式上与所有其他起诉状中的指控完全一致。\n\n针对涉案转让中所涉及的被指控另我主体的起诉状已通过引用并入本案。（同上，第 19 段注 4。）所有另我主体起诉状均包含大量指控，指称个人债务人使用、控制另我主体的资产并从中获益。21 其中之一，即针对 Golden Spring 的另我主体起诉状已在上文讨论。（参见起诉状第 10–38 段，Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok) 案，Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023)，ECF No. 1。）作为另一个例子，针对 HCHK 实体（HCHK Entities）的起诉状也提出了类似的指控。（参见起诉状第 16–40 段，Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok) 案，Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023)，ECF No. 1。）\n\n对起诉状以及并入的另我主体起诉状的审查表明，受托人并非仅仅依据另我理论来主张个人债务人或破产财产对被转让财产享有衡平法权益。与第一个要件相同，只要受托人\n\n21 除针对 Greenwich Land 的起诉状外，所有另我主体起诉状均指控对另我主体及其资产拥有实益所有权。参见下文附录 F。尽管如此，针对 Greenwich Land 的起诉状仍包含关于个人债务人使用、控制 Greenwich Land 的资产并从中获益的指控。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 49 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 53 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 48 of 102\n\n合理阐述了个人债务人对另我主体资产的实益所有权22，他就合理阐述了其财产的转让，和/或属于破产财产的财产（或若非该转让本应属于破产财产的财产）的转让。因此，特拉华州法律下另我主体认定的效力对该要件也不具有决定性。\nii. 可撤销转让法律管辖争议点 (i)：个人债务人是否为转让人；以及争议点 (iii)：另我主体的财产是否为个人债务人的财产和/或破产财产\n\n尽管有前述情况，法院仍将讨论当事人关于破产程序中另我主体及可撤销转让诉讼效力的主张。在 McNellis 案中，United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）维持了地区法院在受托人的欺诈性转让诉讼中刺破公司面纱的判决，同时也维持了地区法院在受托人的高利贷诉讼中拒绝刺破同一公司面纱的判决。420 F.2d at 53–54。第二巡回法院得出结论认为，虽然欺诈性转让法律允许法院刺破形式以注重实质，但纽约州的高利贷法律发展至今允许个人利用公司另我主体来借取在其他情况下构成高利贷的贷款。同上。也就是说，第二巡回法院根据管辖受托人诉讼事由的实体法来确定是否可以通过刺破公司面纱来确立某一要件或抗辩。同上。\n\n因此，受托人关于特拉华州法律下另我主体认定的效力不具有决定性的主张是正确的。相关的可撤销转让法规——此处为《破产法典》和 NYUVTA——决定了是否可以为了欺诈性转让或未经授权的申请后转让之目的刺破公司面纱，以及刺破公司面纱具有何种效力。McNellis 案，420 F.2d at 53–54。管辖刺破面纱的标准由适用的法律适用规则确定——\n\n22 法院未就受托人是否已合理阐述个人债务人对另我主体资产的实益所有权这一问题作出认定，因为该问题不属于四项争议点之一。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 50 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 54 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 49 of 102\n\n该法律适用规则所指向的法律可能与管辖整体诉讼事由的法律相同，也可能不同。ASARCO 案，382 B.R. at 66–68（驳回驳回起诉动议，因为债务人已充分主张其具有原告资格，可根据特拉华州法律，通过反向刺破面纱代表其子公司就欺诈性转让提起主张）；另见 Spring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC 案，C.A. No. 7994-VCN，2016 WL 769586, at *3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016)（承认在特拉华州欺诈性转让法律下，若适用法律允许反向刺破面纱，母公司的债权人可以为了追究子公司资产的欺诈性转让而主张另我主体）。\n\n共同被告声称受托人所寻求的救济是新奇的。事实并非如此。ASARCO 案，382 B.R. at 66–68（适用特拉华州另我主体法律）；参见 Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.) 案，Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594-DPC，Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC，2020 WL 6821721, at *4–6 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2020)（适用内华达州另我主体法律）；Searcy v. Knight (In re Am. Int'l Refinery) 案，402 B.R. 728, 743–48 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008)（同上）；Kendall v. Turner (In re Turner) 案，335 B.R. 140, 145–47 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005)（适用加利福尼亚州另我主体法律），经重新审议后在相关部分予以维持，345 B.R. 674, 676–77 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006)（维持另我主体认定）。\na. 争议点 (i) 与 (iii)：州法律允许撤销另我主体对其自身财产的转让\n\n此外，受托人所寻求的救济在州法律下当然并非新奇。在 NYUVTA 下，可以通过另我主体对其自身财产的转让来确立实际欺诈性转让和推定欺诈性转让。“‘债务人’指对债权主张承担责任的人。”N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f)。因此，即使假定另我主体仅创设替代责任，另我主体也是“债务人”，即便其不是《破产法典》下的债务人。因为其属于债务人，另我主体便可以做出可撤销的转让。参见 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274。此外，财产\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 51 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 55 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 50 of 102\n\nalter ego（另我/第二自我）的财产属于债务人的财产。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (l), (p)。因此，在州法诉讼中，alter ego 可以与 NYUVTA（《纽约可撤销交易法》）结合使用。参见 Bravia Cap. H.K. Ltd. v. SL Green Realty Corp. 案，No. 24-cv-2296 (JGK), 2025 WL 552046, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025)（适用 NYUVTA 及特拉华州 alter ego 法律）（引用 JSC Foreign Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc. 案，295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 379–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)（适用《统一欺诈性转让法》（\"UFTA\"），即《统一可撤销交易法》（\"UVTA\"）的前身））。\n\n这不仅是纽约州的法律；也是美国境内大多数（如果不是全部的话）司法管辖区的法律。参见 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552b (6)（康涅狄格州已通过 UFTA，其对“债务人”的定义与 UVTA 相同）；5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06[2]（四十六个州及哥伦比亚特区已通过 UFTA 或 UVTA）；并参见例如 Magliarditi v. TransFirst Grp., Inc. 案，450 P.3d 911, 2019 WL 5390470, at *4–5 (Nev. 2019)（附表裁决）；Thompson Props. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow Co., Inc. 案，839 So. 2d 629, 633–34 (Ala. 2002)；Spring Real Est. 案，2016 WL 769586, at *3；Dwyer v. Meramec Venture Assocs., L.L.C. 案，75 S.W.3d 291, 294–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)；U.S. Cap. Funding VI, Ltd. v. Patterson Bankshares, Inc. 案，137 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1367–68 (S.D. Ga. 2015)。可撤销转让与 alter ego 法律均旨在挫败逃避判决的行为，并且不出所料地可以在破产程序之外的追讨诉讼中结合使用。\n\n如果受托人根据第 544(b) 条具有提起其 NYUVTA 主张的诉讼资格，并且已合理阐明 alter ego23 主张，则其已合理阐明债务人转让了其财产。\n\n23 本法院将在下文 D 节讨论被告关于其诉状充分性的抗辩后，再行讨论受托人的 alter ego 主张的合理性。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 52 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 56 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 51 of 102\nb. 争议点 (i) 与 (iii)：破产法允许撤销 alter ego 对其自身财产的转让\n\n本法院必须确定适用于破产之外的通常规则是否同样适用于破产程序中。正如上文关于实益所有权的讨论一样，争议涉及两个要件。首先，必须确定是否可以使用 alter ego 主张来主张个人债务人是转让人。《破产法典》仅就实际欺诈性转让以及《破产法典》规定的四种推定欺诈性转让之一控制该要件。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV)。第 544(b) 条并未将该要件适用于受托人的 NYUVTA 主张，且该要件不是《破产法典》规定的四种推定欺诈性转让中的三种或申请后未经授权的转让的要件。11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III), 549(a)。\n\n其次，必须确定是否可以使用 alter ego 主张来主张 alter ego 的财产是破产财产，或者若非发生该转让本应属于破产财产。Begier 案，496 U.S. at 59。这是所有撤销诉求（包括受托人的 NYUVTA 诉求）的要件。如上所述，受托人仅在其主张转让了个人债务人在财产中的权益时，才有资格根据 NYUVTA 提起诉求。11 U.S.C. § 544(b)。\n争议点 (i)：受托人是否主张由非债务人实体进行了初始转让？\n\n关于第一项要件，本法院认定 alter ego 可以用于确立个人债务人是转让人，因为“转让”的定义包括间接让与。11 U.S.C. § 101(54)。事实上，在 McNellis 案中，第二巡回法院维持了地区法院刺破公司面纱并认定由个人而非其公司借入其随后偿还的贷款的决定。McNellis 案，420 F.2d at 53–54；参见 Orr 案，991 F.2d at 35；Voest-\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 53 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 57 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 52 of 102\n\nAlpine 案，919 F.2d at 212–13。因此，alter ego 主张可以支持个人债务人（而非某一非债务人实体）是转让人的指控。\n争议点 (iii)：根据适用法律，反向刺破公司面纱或 alter ego 认定具有何种效力？\n\n至于第二项要件，在《破产法典》未作规定的情况下，州法决定当事人在财产中拥有何种权益。Butner 案，440 U.S. at 54–57。然而，Butner 案亦认定，国会根据宪法第一条第 8 款第 4 项有权为破产之目的定义与州法相反的财产权益。同上，at 54–57（认定抵押权人是否、何时以及如何取得租金担保权益属于州法事项，因为经修正的 1898 年前《破产法》未包含赋予或剥夺抵押权人此类担保权益的规定）。\n\n国会对破产财产进行了定义。11 U.S.C. § 541。“国会意图将范围广泛的财产纳入破产财产”，包括“在破产程序开始时债务人不享有占有权益的财产”。Whiting Pools 案，462 U.S. at 204–05（维持第二巡回法院的认定，即破产财产包括美国国税局在提交破产申请前为执行税收留置权而查封的财产）。因此，与 Butner 案和 Whiting Pools 案相一致，法院普遍认为，虽然州法决定债务人在财产中拥有何种权益，但联邦法决定这些财产权益是否纳入破产财产。Lowe v. Bowers (In re Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.) 案，916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019)；Abboud v. Ground Round, Inc. (In re The Ground Round, Inc.) 案，482 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2007)；In re Nejberger 案，934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991)；N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis (In re N.S. Garrott & Sons) 案，772 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1985)。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 54 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 58 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 53 of 102\n\nalter ego 诉求属于破产财产。Nordlicht 案，115 F.4th at 104–06（认定纽约州法下的 alter ego 诉求属于破产财产），因为此类诉求通过“扩大破产财产而‘使全体债权人受益’”，Nordlicht 案，115 F.4th at 105（修改见原文）；参见 In re Emoral, Inc. 案，740 F.3d 875 (3d Cir. 2014)（认定继承人责任诉求属于破产财产，因为与 alter ego 诉求一样，它们属于全体债权人的概括性诉求）。即便在州法下 alter ego 属于主张追究替代责任的诉求而非独立的诉由，情况亦是如此。Nordlicht 案，115 F.4th at 109–111。Nordlicht 案判定：\n\nalter-ego 责任理论恰好属于《破产法典》对“债权/请求权”的定义范畴：\n\n(A) 付款请求权，无论该权利是否已折算为判决、已清算、未清算、确定、未定、到期、未到期、有争议、无争议、法定、衡平法上、有担保或无担保；或\n\n(B) 因违约而获得衡平救济的权利，如果该违约引发了付款请求权，无论此类获得衡平救济的权利是否已折算为判决、确定、未定、到期、未到期、有争议、无争议、有担保或无担保。\n\n115 F.4th at 110（强调见原文）。\n\n根据 Nordlicht 案，受托人向 alter ego 要求付款或获得衡平救济（例如返还财产）的权利属于破产财产。115 F.4th at 105。受托人可以就针对破产财产主张的债权的全部范围向 alter ego 寻求追偿。参见 Moore v. Bay (In re Est. of Sassard & Kimball, Inc.) 案，284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931)（就第 544(b) 条诉求的前身认定，受托人可以为破产财产的全体债权人就已撤销的转让进行追偿）。受托人可追回的财产属于破产财产。Whiting Pools 案，462 U.S. at 204–07。此外，根据 Begier 案，个人债务人在申请前对此类任何财产均享有权益。496 U.S. at 59。因此，如果受托人在其 alter ego 诉求中胜诉，则各 alter ego 的\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 55 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 59 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 54 of 102\n\n财产即为破产财产，且个人债务人在申请前对该财产享有权益。参见 Nordlicht 案，115 F.4th at 105（alter ego 诉求通过“扩大破产财产而‘使全体债权人受益’”）；718 Arch St. Assocs., Ltd. v. Blatstein (In re Blatstein) 案，192 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1999)（认定法院具有管辖权对一项裁定的上诉作出裁判，该裁定涉及（除其他事项外）债权人关于某些公司是债务人的 alter ego 的主张，因为认定它们是其 alter ego “将导致大量资产被纳入其破产财产中，进而可用于至少部分清偿其债权人的债权”）；Green v. Bate Recs., Inc. (In re 10th Ave. Rec. Distribs., Inc.) 案，97 B.R. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)（认定受托人有资格提起 alter ego 诉求，因为这是“为全体债权人的利益追收破产财产的企图，并非专门针对任何特定债权人”）（强调见原文）。\n相反判例不具说服力\n\n在得出此结论时，本法院谨不同意美国联邦第六巡回上诉法院在 In re Howland 案中的判决。674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017)；一致意见见 Lippe v. Bairnco Corp. 案，230 B.R. 906, 914–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)；Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle) 案，BAP No. NV-05-1000-KMB, Bankruptcy No. S-01-21542-BAM, Adversary No. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006)；Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels L.P. (In re DuMouchelle) 案，Case No. 19-54531, Adv. Pro. No. 21- 04041-lsg, ___ B.R. ___, 2023 WL 8100234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023)（适用 Howland 案）；Evangelista v. Silver (In re Silver) 案，647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022)（同上）。在 Howland 案中，第六巡回法院认为，在州法下 alter ego 仅产生替代责任的情况下，alter ego 的财产不属于破产财产且无法追回。674 F.\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 56 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 60 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 55 of 102\n\nApp'x at 487。Lippe 案与 Wardle 案作出了相同认定。DuMouchelle 案与 Silver 案作为第六巡回区内法院的裁决，适用了 Howland 案。\n\n除上述成文法分析外，本法院基于若干理由，恕难认同 Howland 案的观点。首先，法院“在国会未明确表明有意改变的情况下，不会将《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）解释为侵蚀以往的破产司法实践”。Cohen 案，523 U.S. at 221。在解释《法典》时，法院推定国会“熟知对前《1898年破产法》（Bankruptcy Act of 1898）的普遍理解”。Johnson v. Home State Bank 案，501 U.S. 78, 86 (1991)。并无明确迹象表明国会有意推翻 McNellis 案。对比 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)、541(a)、544(b)、548(a)、549(a) 与 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(30)（前《1898年破产法》第 1 条）（1978年废止）、107(d)（前《1898年破产法》第 67 条）（1978年废止）、110(a)、(d)、(e)（前《1898年破产法》第 70 条）（1978年废止）。McNellis 案——该案维持了利用“另我”（alter ego）原则来证明对破产受托人依据联邦破产法及纽约州法提起的欺诈性转让诉讼所作抗辩的主张——对本法院具有约束力。420 F.2d at 53–54。\n\n其次，第六巡回法院（Sixth Circuit）在撤销权诉讼中处理“另我”主张的方式，违背了第二巡回法院（Second Circuit）关于法院必须审视欺诈性转让的实质而非形式的指示。参见 Orr 案，991 F.2d at 35；亦参见 Boyer v. Crown Stock Dist., Inc. 案，587 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009)；Voest-Alpine 案，919 F.2d at 211–12。欺诈性转让法有能力在州法允许否定公司法人资格的情况下，穿透交易的名义各方进行实质审查。McNellis 案，420 F.2d at 53；ASARCO 案，382 B.R. at 65–68。这种认定经济实质的能力，体现在《破产法典》中关于“转让”和“破产财产”的宽泛定义中。11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)(D)、541。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 57 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 61 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 56 of 102\n\n第三，Howland 案违背了州法层面“另我”主张与撤销权主张之间的相互作用机制。如上所述，在破产程序之外，NYUVTA（《纽约州统一可撤销转让法》）主张中可运用“另我”原则来针对那些“另我”既是名义转让人又是受转让财产的名义所有人的交易。Bravia Cap. 案，2025 WL 552046, at *9；Technostroyexport 案，295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80；参见 Spring Real Est. 案，2016 WL 769586, at *3。\n\n在破产程序中，处理结果不应有所不同。破产程序除其他性质外，是一种集体的债权追索程序。Merit Mgmt. Grp. 案，583 U.S. at 370–71。这就是受托人有诉讼资格就以下事项提起诉求的原因所在：(i) 为全体债权人的利益主张一般性诉求，11 U.S.C. § 544(a)；参见 Nordlicht 案，115 F.4th at 105；以及 (ii) 就转让的全部范围主张实际债权人的特定撤销权诉求，11 U.S.C. § 544(b)——即使实际债权人的债权金额少于被转让的金额，Moore 案，284 U.S. at 5。破产程序“通过以更公平、更有序的财产分配方式取代‘赛跑’及其他优先追索债权的制度，从而保护债权人免受彼此侵害”。In re Alyucan Interstate Corp. 案，12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)（讨论自动中止的目的）（援引 Fidelity Mortg. Invs. v. Camelia Builders, Inc. 案，550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976)（经修订的前《1898年破产法》项下的判例））。如果迫使债权人竞相前往法院寻求“另我”及欺诈性转让救济——而在个人债务人破产未决期间，债权人可能根本无权寻求这些救济——将破坏破产程序的集体性质。参见 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc. 案，884 F.2d 688, 704–05 (2d Cir. 1989)。\n\n即便债权人能够在破产程序之外提起上述诉讼，其成本也将极其高昂：受托人对个人债务人财务状况的调查历经了激烈的诉讼交锋且耗时巨大。强迫债权人在破产程序之外提起此类撤销权诉讼或放弃追诉，将导致个人债务人的债权人获得不公平且不均衡的清偿，\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 58 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 62 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 57 of 102\n\n而这些债权人中的许多人很可能无力承担与此项努力相关的费用和开支。参见 Union Bank v. Wolas 案，502 U.S. 151, 160–61 (1991)（第 547 条旨在平衡防止诉讼赛跑与向全体债权人提供公平分配这两个相关目标）；Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.) 案，78 F.3d 30, 40–41 (2d Cir. 1996)（同上）。受托人正是将债权人在破产财产中的利益汇集起来并为了他们的集体利益提起撤销权诉讼的适当人选。11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541–50。\n\n最后，Howland 案亦有违特拉华州（Delaware）的“另我”法律。在我们的法律体系中，“另我”通常导致替代责任这一现象纯属巧合——“另我”法理的核心在于当公司法人形式遭到滥用并导致欺诈或不公时，否定该法人形式。参见 Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co. 案，239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1968)（“毫无疑问，在作出适当证明的情况下，母公司与子公司之间的公司实体可以被否定，而最终的利害关系方即母公司，在法律和事实上均被视为特定交易中的唯一当事方。”）。正如特拉华州衡平法院（Delaware Court of Chancery）所指出的，“在最基本的层面上，反向刺破公司面纱涉及就企业所有人的债务向该企业组织施加责任”，Manichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc. 案，251 A.3d 694, 710 (Del. Ch. 2021)（为执行估价判决而提起的诉讼），因为“在子公司仅是母公司的另我的情况下……法院将把子公司的资产视为母公司的资产”，Manichaean Cap. 案，251 A.3d at 710（原文如此改动）。\n\n普通法中的大多数救济均采取损害赔偿金的形式。“另我”诉求的主要用途是将依法需就侵权或合同等承担金钱损害赔偿责任的被告的责任，扩散至赔偿能力更强的被告。参见 NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC 案，537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2008)（“然而，在适当情形下，\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 59 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 63 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 58 of 102\n\n可以‘不考虑’实体与其所有人之间的区别，要求所有人对实体的债务承担责任。”）（合同诉讼）；Wilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC 案，787 F. Supp. 2d 286, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)（“寻求让公司所有人对公司债务承担责任的原告‘面临着艰巨的任务’。”）（欺诈诉讼）；Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.) 案，549 B.R. 21, 43–44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（“根据特拉华州法，刺破公司面纱是一项衡平法原则。……因此，刺破公司面纱并非纯粹独立的诉因。相反，刺破公司面纱实质上等同于就直接行为人所犯的某种根本性过错，在直接行为人与其关联公司之间施加连带责任。”）（侵权诉讼）（后加强调）。\n\n然而，转让的撤销并非金钱损害赔偿。“撤销条款的目的是保全应计入破产财产的财产”。Begier 案，496 U.S. at 59（讨论第 547 条及偏颇性转让的撤销）；参见 In re PWS Holding Corp. 案，303 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2002)（“欺诈性转让法的宗旨是‘向债权人提供债务人依法属于破产财产一部分的资产，即使这些资产已被转让出去。’”）；Sapir v. C.P.Q. Colorchrome Corp. (In re Photo Promotion Assocs., Inc.) 案，881 F.2d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1989)（认定允许行政破产费用债权人保留未经授权的申请后转让，对于持有类似诉求的其他债权人而言是不公平的）。为此，《破产法典》第 548 条和第 549 条以及 NYUVTA 第 273 条和第 274 条所规定的救济是对标的转让予以撤销——而非金钱损害赔偿。11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 549; N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274。\n\n一旦转让被撤销，《破产法典》第 550(a) 条和 NYUVTA 第 276(b) 条允许追回被转让的特定财产、其价值或其收益。11 U.S.C. § 550(a); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 276(b)。因此，完全\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 60 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 64 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 59 of 102\n\n不足为奇的是，否定公司法人形式并将“另我”的资产视为债务人的资产，在撤销权诉讼中所起的作用不同于其在其他诉讼中所起的作用。参见 Manichaean Cap. 案，251 A.3d at 710（“在母公司/子公司语境下，‘在子公司仅是母公司的另我的情况下……法院将把子公司的资产视为母公司的资产’。”）。\n\n“特拉华州绝不容许将公司法人形式用作便利欺诈或不公的手段。”Manichaean Cap. 案，251 A.3d at 714。欺诈性转让法和未经授权的申请后转让法与这一宗旨相契合。它们的存在是为了防止因资产流失而产生的不公平结果。参见 Begier 案，496 U.S. at 59；PWS Holding Corp. 案，303 F.3d at 313；Photo Promotion Assocs. 案，881 F.2d at 9–10。如果不能利用“另我”原则来防止因欺诈性转让或未经授权的申请后转让而造成的欺诈或不公，这将从根本上陷入荒谬，并违背该原则的宗旨。这两个法律体系可以结合使用。McNellis 案，420 F.2d at 53；ASARCO 案，382 B.R. at 65–68；参见 Bravia Cap. 案，2025 WL 552046, at *9；Technostroyexport 案，295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80；亦参见 Spring Real Est. 案，2016 WL 769586, at *3。\n\n* * *\n\n基于所有上述理由，本法院认定债务人可以通过“另我”进行转让，且“另我”的财产属于债务人的破产财产。在受托人已合理申诉“另我”主张的限度内，受托人亦已合理申诉个人债务人转让了属于（或若非发生转让即本应属于）破产财产的财产。同样在此限度内，受托人因此具有提起其 NYUVTA 诉求的诉讼资格，且基于上述理由，已合理申诉了这些诉求。“另我”原则可用于支持依据《破产法典》或 NYUVTA 提出的可撤销转让诉求。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 60 of 102\n2. 争点 (ii) 和 (iv)：“另我”的商业债权人所受损害与实质合并\n\n本法院进而审理联合被告人的其余抗辩主张。联合被告人主张，受托人未能根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法律主张一项可成立的反向刺破公司面纱请求权，因为：(a) 受托人未能就对被指控的 alter ego（另一自我/分身）的债权人缺乏损害进行诉辩；以及 (b) 作为法律问题，联合被告人将因反向刺破公司面纱而受到损害。联合被告人还主张：(c) 受托人正在寻求不允许的 nunc pro tunc（溯及既往）救济；以及 (d) 即使该项救济在州法下在其他情况下是被允许的，所寻求的救济也可以通过实质合并来实现，因此在未满足 nunc pro tunc（溯及既往）实质合并所需检验标准的情况下允许受托人获得该项救济是不公平的。贯穿联合被告人各项抗辩主张的核心论点是，受托人所寻求的救济对他们作为被指控 alter ego（另一自我）的无辜商业债权人而言是极不公平的。\n\n受托人主张：(a) 判例法明确表明，原告无须就对被指控 alter ego 的债权人缺乏损害进行诉辩；(b) 损害属于高度依赖事实的调查事项，无法在驳回起诉动议或根据诉状作出判决的动议中予以解决，且无论如何，《破产法典》向联合被告人提供了破产程序之外所无法获得的保护；(c) 其通过 alter ego 主张所寻求的并非 nunc pro tunc 救济，而是寻求使法律现实与客观事实相一致；以及 (d) 尽管 alter ego 在破产程序中所提供的救济可能与实质合并类似，但这两种救济手段的事实和法律依据不同，且受托人已就 alter ego 进行了诉辩。受托人亦对联合被告人均为无辜商业债权人以及其所寻求的救济从根本上不公平的主张提出异议。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 62 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 66 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 61 of 102\ni. 争点 (ii)：适用法律是否允许进行反向刺破公司面纱或 alter ego 认定？\n\n如上所述，联合被告人将撤销权主张解读为指控下列转让：\n\nA（个人债务人） = B（另一自我） —(消除转让)→ C（联合被告人）\n（另一自我认定）\n\n关于争点 (ii)，联合被告人主张，即使 alter ego 认定会在个人债务人与被指控的 alter ego 之间产生同一性，撤销 B→C 的转让也是具有损害性的，因为联合被告人并不知道 A=B，因此，本法院作为法律问题不能作出 alter ego 认定。\n\n本法院不予认同。首先，受托人无须就对 alter ego 的债权人缺乏损害进行诉辩。Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）在采纳反向刺破公司面纱原则时裁定，法院必须考虑传统的 alter ego 因素，并额外考虑一系列实质上与对被指控 alter ego 的债权人、所有权人及其他利害关系人造成的损害相关的其他因素。见 Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 714–15。尽管如此，衡平法院驳回了被告关于因原告未能就对被指控 alter ego 的某些债权人缺乏损害进行诉辩而应驳回起诉的主张。同上，第 718 页。相反，衡平法院裁定：“起诉书中没有任何依据可推断出反向刺破公司面纱会对无辜的第三方债权人造成损害。……需要明确的是，与……第三方债权人相关的事实指控并未包含在起诉书中，至少就目前而言，我的分析仅限于该诉状的‘四角范围’之内。”同上。本法院未获悉任何理由表明 Delaware Supreme Court（特拉华州最高法院）会在该问题上与衡平法院持不同意见。损害属于需要事实展开调查的问题。\n\n其次，受托人可以将联合被告人诉辩为初始受让人；后手受让人享有不同的抗辩事由并不影响这一点。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp.，583 U.S. at\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 63 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 67 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 62 of 102\n\n382–86（裁定原告可以以使安全港抗辩不适用的方式对转让进行诉辩）；并比较 Covey v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. (In re Duckworth)，破产案号 10-83603，对抗诉讼案号 11-8104，2012 WL 4434681，at *8 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012)（裁定受托人对 alter ego 的运用是不允许的，部分原因在于这将剥夺被告在受托人诉辩不同欺诈性转让时本应享有的后手受让人抗辩权）。联合被告人可以主张受托人未根据《破产法典》或 NYUVTA（纽约州统一可撤销转让法）就转让进行诉辩。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp.，583 U.S. at 382。事实上，如上所述，联合被告人已经提出了该主张。随着本诉讼程序推进至诉辩阶段之后，他们可以继续提出该主张。\n\n为支持其主张，联合被告人敦促本法院采纳 Duckworth 案的裁决，但他们的信赖是不恰当的。Duckworth 案的法院所面临的并非驳回起诉动议——其面临的是即决判决动议。Duckworth，2012 WL 4434681，at *2。Duckworth 案法院根据无可争议的事实认定，允许受托人向被指控 alter ego 的商业债权人追偿将是不公平的，且与适用的州法相悖。同上，第 *7 页。在本案中，联合动议为驳回起诉动议或根据诉状作出判决的动议。在此阶段，审理标准在于受托人经充分诉辩的指控（按其属实推定）是否支持存在不允许之损害的认定。Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 718。对起诉书以及所并入的 alter ego 起诉书的审查并不支持作出此类认定。\n\n联合被告人无权要求受托人必须将他们诉辩为后手受让人。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp.，583 U.S. at 382。受托人诉辩的转让为：\n\nA（个人债务人） → C（联合被告人）（通过 alter ego B 转让 A 的财产）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 64 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 68 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 63 of 102\n\n受托人无须将 alter ego 认定视为一项转让，进而诉辩 A→B→C 的转让，即指控个人债务人将其财产转让给作为初始受让人的各 alter ego，而联合被告人则是各 alter ego 的后手受让人。\nii. 争点 (iv)：反向刺破公司面纱或 alter ego 的认定是否可溯及适用？\n\n转向争点 (iv)，本法院得出结论，受托人并未寻求 nunc pro tunc（溯及既往）救济。判定一个实体现在是且一直是另一个实体的 alter ego（另一自我），并非赋予 nunc pro tunc 救济——而是判定该法人形式现在是且一直是一个空壳/幌子。在联合被告人关于 alter ego 的理论下，胜诉当事人将无法获得任何救济。联合被告人主张，根据特拉华州法律，alter ego 认定仅对可折算为金钱损害赔偿的附属请求权施加替代责任。若如联合被告人所主张的那样，alter ego 认定只能向后延展责任，则 alter ego 将无须基于既有事实对胜诉当事人的附属请求权承担责任。特拉华州法律并非如此运作。alter ego 可以与附属请求权一并提起，参见 Tronox，549 B.R. at 27（在原被告无法被起诉的情况下，人身伤害索赔原告试图通过包括 alter ego 在内的各种理论来施加替代责任），甚至可以在对附属请求权作出判决之后提起，参见 Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 699–701（alter ego 主张系在估价判决之后提起），而无须分析 nunc pro tunc 救济是否适当。这是因为原告所寻求的并非 nunc pro tunc 救济。参见 Reid v. Wolf (In re Wolf)，644 B.R. 725, 749 n. 9 (N.D. Ill. 2022)（驳回了关于 alter ego 认定在破产案件中构成不允许之溯及既往的“令人困惑的”主张）。alter ego 是基于既有事实寻求救济，正如违约索赔是基于既有事实寻求救济一样。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 65 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 69 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 64 of 102\n\nalter ego 认定并非一项转让——它并不创设财产权益，而是确认一项财产权益。这是联合被告人对撤销权主张的解读中所存在的根本性缺陷。如上所述，联合被告人将撤销权主张解读为指控下列转让：\n\nA（个人债务人） = B（另一自我） → C（联合被告人）\n（另一自我认定） （转让 B 的财产）\n\n退一步设想，即便 alter ego 认定在个人债务人与 alter ego 之间确立了同一性，联合被告人亦主张 alter ego 认定会在事后改变 B→C 转让的性质。因此，联合被告人主张，本法院不能将 alter ego 认定——即 A=B（亦可表述为 A←B）——视为在 B→C 转让发生时就已经发生。\n\n然而，受托人指控的并非 A=B 的转让，而是指控各 alter ego 一直以来都仅仅是个人债务人的工具。其指控的转让为：\n\nA（个人债务人） → C（联合被告人）（通过 alter ego B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n并坚称通过各 alter ego 进行的此类转让是个人债务人为其本人、其家族、其关联人士及其企业获取商品与服务以及转移资产的惯常作法（modus operandi）。\n\n本法院拒绝对破产案件中 alter ego 的运用采取审慎性限制。Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）在 Manichaean Capital 案中裁定：\n\n反向刺破公司面纱可能被用作伤害无辜当事人并扰乱正常商业交易预期的生硬工具，这种风险固然真实存在，但依我之见，并不足以成为径行全盘否定反向刺破公司面纱的理由。相反，对这些风险的认识创造了一个对其进行管控的机会，并以此种符合衡平法利益的方式加以管控。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 66 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 70 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 65 of 102\n\n251 A.3d at 712。本法院看不出有任何理由认为，行使破产管辖权的法院没有能力或不具备条件按照衡平法院的指示，为了衡平法的利益而把握“管控［反向刺破公司面纱的风险］的机会”。事实上，《破产法典》的首要目的之一就是提供一个单一的审判地，以便对各项债权请求进行调整并作出最终、公平的解决，包括通过集体清收程序予以解决。参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 et seq.。对传统的 alter ego 因素与对 alter ego 的债权人及其他利害关系人造成的损害进行权衡（参见 Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 714–15），属于破产法院的管辖权与职责范围之内。\n\n联合被告促请本法院将受托人（Trustee）的另我（alter ego）指控视为隐秘的（sub rosa）实质性合并（substantive consolidation）指控，并因此对任何另我认定的追溯效力适用限制——无论该等限制在州法下是否适用。实质性合并“除其他外，导致将两家实体的资产和针对两家实体的债权进行合并；从由此产生的共同基金中清偿债务；消除公司间债权；以及为就重组计划进行表决之目的将两家公司的债权人合并”。Union Savs. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.)，860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988)。“实质性合并的唯一目的是确保所有债权人获得公平待遇。”Augie/Restivo，860 F.2d at 518。实质性合并要求：(i) 债权人“已将这些实体作为一个单一经济实体进行交易，且‘在发放信贷时并未依赖其独立身份’”；以及 (ii) 债务人的事务“高度纠缠，以至于合并将使所有债权人受益”。同上。在 Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.) 案中，United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit（美国哥伦比亚特区联邦巡回上诉法院）裁定，在支持者能够证明其利益超过对潜在撤销诉讼被告的损害的情况下，实质性合并命令应当具有溯及既往的效力（nunc pro tunc）。810 F.2d 270, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1987)。联合被告促请本法院将 Auto-Train 案规则适用于任何另我认定。\n\n正如受托人所承认的，破产程序中另我认定的效果与实质性合并的效果相似——另我实体的资产和负债发生合并。然而，实质性合并的可行性——联合被告似乎对此表示怀疑——并不意味着在破产案件中不能主张另我。In re Owens Corning，419 F.3d 195, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2005)（“在实质性合并出现之前，漠视公司形式的其他救济措施就已经存在（且依然存在）。例如，当子公司被其母公司完全控制以至于成为母公司的‘另我’时，在州法下可以不予考虑（或‘刺破’）子公司的‘公司面纱’。”）。\n\n此外，这两项原则的构成要件和目的各不相同。根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法律，传统的另我或刺破公司面纱具有两个要件：(i) 拟被漠视其形式的公司实体受到其所指称另我的极大控制和支配，以至于该实体与其另我实际上是一个单一经济实体；以及 (ii) 拟被漠视的公司形式造成了欺诈或某种类似的不公正。Pauley Petroleum，239 A.2d at 633；Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 706；Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc. v. Wood，752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999)；Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co.，621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992)。反向刺破公司面纱要求法院额外考虑对所指称另我的债权人、所有者和其他利益相关者的损害。Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 714–15。另我原则为滥用公司形式提供了救济。相比之下，在不存在无法被利益抵消的损害的前提下，实质性合并为本可以更简单处理的过度复杂的财务事务提供了救济。\n\n这是一个具有实质意义的区别。“实质性合并更适合被视为一种经济救济，其首要目标是公平对待所有债权人。相反，州法下的另我诉求是一种侧重于防止‘欺诈或不公正’的衡平救济。”Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.)，案号：2:18-bk-01594-DPC，对抗程序号：2:19-ap-00412-DPC，2022 WL 2294175, at *8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022)。实质性合并并不旨在救济任何欺诈或不公正。Augie/Restivo，860 F.2d at 518。公司形式无需曾被滥用，各实体无需曾是皮包公司，也无需有任何债权人曾受到公司形式的损害。同上。所必需的仅仅是债权人能从实质性合并中受益。同上。在对破产财产进行实质性合并时，法院是在通过前瞻性地简化其面前的事实（在此举利大于弊的情况下），来解决一个实际问题——即管理高度交织的破产财产，以及理清这些财产所需支出的高额行政管理费用前景。见同上。在刺破公司面纱时，法院是在确认已经存在的滥用公司形式损害债权人利益的客观现实，并在衡平法上不允许该等滥用行为继续存在。见 Pauley Petroleum，239 A.2d at 633。实质性合并可能涉及转让；而另我认定则不涉及。\n\n破产程序的核心之一在于公平分摊损失。在寻求促使本法院将 Auto-Train 案规则适用于另我诉求时，联合被告试图将分析焦点转移至 B 到 C 的转让，并从 A 身上移开。在此过程中，联合被告无视了起诉书中所指控的、由个人债务人（Individual Debtor）为自身利益实施的涉及众多另我实体的骗局（shell game），其目的是阻碍、拖延或欺诈其债权人——这些指控对另我分析至关重要。见 Pauley Petroleum，239 A.2d at 633。（例如，参见 Complaint ¶¶ 15–34, Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024)，ECF No. 1。）这些指控若被认定属实，则与反向刺破公司面纱各项考量因素的权衡相关。Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 715–16（指出法院将权衡“维护受影响的公司债权人或债务人的合理预期的社会价值——适用有利于保障该等预期的可反驳推定——与在所涉特定情况下允许反向刺破所服务政策的重要性”）（援引 Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16 J. CORP. L. 33, 51 (1990)）。\n\n尽管联合被告请求本法院对另我诉求适用 Auto-Train 案的溯及既往分析，但本法院认定，没有任何理由或依据偏离特拉华州另我法律。尽管出现了实质性合并，受托人仍可适用该法律。Owens Corning，419 F.3d at 205–06。\n\n* * *\n\n基于所有上述理由，联合被告在争议焦点 (ii) 和 (iv) 上的主张不具说服力。在驳回起诉动议或根据诉状请求判决的动议中，本法院不会权衡对联合被告的损害与支持另我的各项因素。同样，本法院不会在该原则的构成要件之外对另我的适用施加审慎性限制。\n\nC. 非联合动议及 Z&Z 异议 24\n\n本法院将仅就非联合被告就四个争议焦点提出的独特主张进行论述。以下非联合被告：(1) FFP (BVI) Limited；(2) Aaron A. Mitchell 先生；(3) V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.；(4) The Francis Firm PLLC；(5) Berkeley Rowe Ltd.；(6) Weddle Law PLLC；(7) Lawall & Mitchell, LLC；(8) G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd.；以及 (9) ACASS Canada LTD（统称为“各类非联合被告”），均由同一位代理律师代表，该律师将其非联合动议作为一个统一论点进行了辩论。\n\n24 见上文注 12。\n\n另有两名非联合被告：(10) Liberty Jet Management Corp.（“Liberty Jet”）和 (11) Z&Z。Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z 均未提出任何未被各类非联合被告提出的独特主张。此外，Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z 在听证会期间均未提出独立的主张。因此，本法院将仅讨论各类非联合被告的主张。在 Liberty Jet 或 Z&Z 提出或加入下文所讨论主张的范围内，本讨论同样适用于 Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z。\n\n各类非联合被告提出了两个独特的主张。首先，关于争议焦点 (ii)——适用法律是否允许反向刺破公司面纱或作出另我认定——各类非联合被告主张受托人缺乏提起另我诉求的诉讼资格，因为受托人代位承受了个人债务人的地位，而在采信受托人的指控为真实的情况下，个人债务人与其所指称的另我实体同属同等过错（in pari delicto）。其次，关于争议焦点 (i)（受托人是否可以撤销非债务人实体的初始转让）和 (iii)（适用法律下反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定的效力），各类非联合被告主张受托人在另我实体尚未申请破产且个人债务人的 Chapter 11（第 11 章）案件与尚未申请破产的另我实体破产案件未进行实质性合并的情况下，不当地主张了另我实体破产财产的债权。在此过程中，各类非联合被告主张受托人规避了 Bankruptcy Code（《破产法典》）的信息披露要求。\n\n作为回应，受托人主张根据《破产法典》第 541 条或第 544(a) 条其均具有诉讼资格，因为他代位承受了个人债务人债权人的地位，且即使并非如此，同等过错原则的内部人例外（insider exception）亦将适用。受托人主张其已正当地主张了个人债务人破产财产的权利，正当地主张了另我诉求，并且无论如何，他将寻求设定一个新的债权申报截止日期（claims bar date），以允许另我实体的债权人对破产财产主张债权。\n\n1. 争议焦点 (ii)：诉讼资格\n\n《破产法典》赋予破产受托人代表债权人提起某些诉求的诉讼资格。PepsiCo, Inc.，884 F.2d at 700。在缺乏该等法定授权的情况下，“破产受托人一般无权代表破产财产的债权人起诉第三方，而只能主张破产公司本身所拥有的诉求。”Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner，944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991)；见 Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.，72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1995)；Sobchack v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.)，17 F.3d 600, 607 (2d Cir. 1994)。\n\n在受托人并非代表债权人主张请求权的情况下，*Wagoner* 案指引法院确定：(i) 债务人本身是否本可提起该请求权；以及 (ii) 若可提起，受托人是否因债务人行为的归责而构成 *in pari delicto*（同等过错）。*Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 119–20。尽管主张 *in pari delicto*（同等过错）通常被视为一种衡平法上的积极抗辩，但 *Wagoner* 原则（包括其对同等过错的考量）“起到了审慎当事人适格限制的作用”。*Carney ex rel. Highview Point Partners, LLC v. Horion Invs. Ltd.*, 107 F. Supp. 3d 216, 228 (D. Conn. 2015)（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院 2015 年）。\n\nSecond Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）裁定，受托人具有代表全体债权人提起 *alter ego*（另我/分身）请求权的当事人适格。在 *PepsiCo* 案中，第二巡回上诉法院采纳了 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit（美国第七巡回上诉法院）在 *Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc.*, 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987) 一案中的做法。*PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 697–98, 700–01, 704–05。在 *Koch Refining* 案中，第七巡回上诉法院裁定，依据第 544(a) 条，破产受托人是“全体普通债权人的代表”，并且可以追索 *alter ego*（另我）请求权，因为此类请求权针对的是债权人所遭受的普遍性损害而非个别化损害。831 F.2d at 1351–54；*参见 Titan Real Est. Ventures, LLC v. MJCC Realty Ltd. P'ship (In re Flanagan)*, 415 B.R. 29, 47 (D. Conn. 2009)。这符合第 544(a) 条的法定文本：任何判决债权人均可提起 *alter ego*（另我）请求权以追收其债权；该权利并不取决于其特定的个别请求权。11 U.S.C. § 544(a)。\n\n虽然第二巡回上诉法院在 *Picard v. JPMorgan Chase Bank & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC)*, 721 F.3d 54, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2013) 一案中对 *PepsiCo* 案作出了区分，但该案所基于的事实是，Securities Investor Protection Act（《证券投资者保护法》）受托人试图代表受欺诈的债权人提起个别化的特定请求权——即使此类请求权在 Madoff（麦道夫）庞氏骗局的特定事实中极为普遍持有（脚注 25），*JPMorgan*, 721 F.3d at 58–59。*JPMorgan* 案中的请求权与 *Wagoner* 案中的请求权极为相似。*比较 JPMorgan*, 721 F.3d at 58–59 *与 Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 116–17。此外，与 *PepsiCo* 案相一致，第二巡回上诉法院近期重申，受托人具有代表全体债权人提起 *alter ego*（另我）请求权的当事人适格，且 *alter ego* 请求权属于破产财团财产。*比较 Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 104–06, 107–11 *与 PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 701。\n\nAssorted Non-Joint Defendants（非联合被告各方）辩称，*Nordlicht* 案遵循了始于 *Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co.)*, 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987) 的一系列判例，该案不同于 *Koch* 案，裁定第 544(a) 条并未赋予受托人代表全体债权人提起一般性请求权的当事人适格。*参见 PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 698–99。非联合被告各方主张，这意味着受托人的 *alter ego*（另我）请求权受制于 *Wagoner* 原则。虽然 *Nordlicht* 案本身对第 544(a) 条未作表述，但在裁定受托人享有特定拟制债权人的权利和权力的情况下，裁定其源自这些权利和权力的请求权属于破产财团财产，两者是完全一致的。此外，即使仅依据第 541 条受托人才具有提起 *alter ego* 请求权的当事人适格，此类当事人适格亦派生自全体债权人的一般性请求权。\n\n脚注 25：实际上，第 544(a) 条避免了这种偶然的一般性请求权，因为它赋予受托人的并非代表特定债权人提起请求权的当事人适格，而是拟制判决债权人——在没有特定基础请求权的情况下——所能提起的请求权的当事人适格，也就是说，第 544(a) 条引入了一个独立于围绕债务人及其债务之具体事实的外部债权人。\n\n因此，*Wagoner* 原则不适用。当受托人代位债权人提起诉讼时，该原则并不适用。*Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 118（“受托人坚称其并未主张票据持有人的请求权，因此我们无需深入探究受托人何时（若有可能的话）可以代表破产人的债权人起诉第三方”）；*参见 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. First Republic Bank (In re Salander)*, 503 B.R. 559, 569 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)（“无论是 *Wagoner* 规则还是 *in pari delicto* 原则，均不适用于受托人依据《破产法典》第 544 条享有的法定当事人适格”）；*Arnold v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Cornerstone Homes, Inc.)*, 567 B.R. 37, 52–53 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2017)。本院不对各方关于 *in pari delicto*（同等过错）例外的抗辩主张作出认定。受托人具有提起 *alter ego*（另我）请求权的当事人适格。\n\n2. 争点 (i) 与 (iii)：另我、实质合并及披露\n\n非联合被告各方提出的关于受托人为何不能利用 *alter ego*（另我）来主张 Individual Debtor（个人债务人）为转让人、或主张债务人的财产及/或属于或若非转让即会属于破产财团的财产已被转让的理由，与 Joint Defendants（联合被告）的论点基本相同，本院已在上方驳回了该论点。本院不再赘述该论点。双方的分歧在于非联合被告各方主张受托人本应采取的替代做法。联合被告辩称受托人只能向被指控的另我主体本身追偿，且这就是其潜在追偿的全部范围；而与之不同的是，非联合被告各方辩称受托人本应接管个人债务人各企业的控制权，将其置于破产程序中，随后寻求 *nunc pro tunc*（溯及既往的）实质合并。\n\n本院亦在上方裁定，尽管存在实质合并程序，受托人仍可主张 *alter ego*（另我）请求权。针对非联合被告各方对通知问题的担忧，非联合被告各方并不代表被指控另我主体的全体债权人。非联合被告各方自身已收到受托人关于另我请求权的通知。受托人已多次声明，其将针对被判定为另我主体的债权人寻求设定新的申报截止日（bar date）。若提出该项请求，本院届时将审议该申报截止日之适当通知与送达问题。\n\nD. 争点 (ii)：另我主张的合理可信性\n\n本院已审理了联合被告和非联合被告关于受托人未合理可信地诉称 *alter ego*（另我）的抗辩理由。本院已认定受托人具有提起反向揭开公司面纱请求权的当事人适格，其无需诉称对被指控另我主体的债权人不存在损害，且在法律上并不存在损害。然而，此项讨论使得争点 (ii)——即准据法是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或作出另我认定——尚未得到完全解决。\n\n根据起诉书及所并入的 *alter ego*（另我）起诉书中的指控，本院认定受托人已合理可信地诉称：(1) Golden Spring；(2) Lamp Capital；(3) HCHK Tech；(4) HCHK Property；(5) Lexington；(6) Greenwich Land；以及 (7) Leading Shine 是个人债务人的另我主体，其公司面纱应予以反向揭开。受托人已合理可信地诉称：(i) 个人债务人对各另我主体实施绝对控制与支配，致使其不具有独立的经济实体地位，仅充当个人债务人的外壳幌子；以及 (ii) 各另我主体的公司形式旨在阻碍、迟延或欺诈个人债务人的债权人，作为旨在使个人债务人实质上免于执行（judgment proof）的大规模空壳骗局的一部分。*参见 Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 706。（*例如参见* 起诉书第 13–38 段，*Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023)，ECF No. 1）。此外，起诉书及另我起诉书中的指控在被推定为真实的情况下，并未证明对各另我主体的债权人造成了损害。*参见 Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 718。\n\nV. 结论与命令\n\n提交本院审理的某些争点属于法律争点——但它们界定狭窄，实质上是在要求本院忽视或重新定性起诉书中的指控。本院在对驳回起诉动议或根据诉状作出判决的动议作出裁定时不会这样做。被告将受托人的转让指控描绘为一个序列，即 A=B -> C：通过另我认定确立 A（个人债务人）与 B（被指控的另我主体）之间的人格同一，随后将 B 的财产转让给 C（联合被告）。然而，受托人指控的是 A -> C 的转让，即利用 B 将 A 的财产转让给 C。提交本院审理的其他争点在设计上试图使其适于在驳回起诉动议中予以裁判。在此过程中，被告聚焦于未被指控的 B -> C 转让，并辩称在此转让之外增加另一项转让 A=B 会对 C 造成损害。被告要求本院超越诉状范围对事实作出认定，本院将不予采纳。\n\n基于上述理由，本院就四项争点得出如下结论：\n\n(i) 受托人能否撤销非债务人实体的初始转让？\n\n受托人并非寻求撤销非债务人实体的初始转让。受托人指控转让系由个人债务人作出。转让的定义包括间接转让。因此，名义转让人并不具有决定性。受托人提出另我和实际受益所有权指控，以主张个人债务人即为转让人。\n\n(ii) 准据法是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或作出另我认定？\n\nDelaware（特拉华州）法律承认反向揭开公司面纱。本院已审议各方关于受托人对另我事实陈述是否充分的论点。受托人具有提起反向揭开公司面纱请求权的当事人适格。受托人无需诉称对被指控另我主体的债权人缺乏损害。受托人已合理可信地诉称了另我事实。\n\n(iii) 根据准据法，反向揭开公司面纱或另我认定的效力为何？\n\n受托人并非仅仅依赖关于另我（alter ego）的主张——其亦主张了实益所有权（beneficial ownership）。然而，依据特拉华州（Delaware）法律，反向揭开公司面纱的效力在于公司形式被否认。对公司形式的否认会根据伴随诉由的实体法而产生不同的结果。通常情况下，这会导致替代责任（vicarious liability）的施加。其亦可被主张用于证明某项主张或抗辩。根据《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code），对另我的认定可用于确立债务人进行了间接转让，并使债务人之另我的财产成为破产财产。根据《纽约州统一可撤销转让法》（NYUVTA），对另我的认定可用于撤销另我就另我自身财产所进行的转让。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 77 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 81 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 76 of 102\n(iv) 反向揭开公司面纱或另我的认定是否具有追溯力？\n\n受托人并未寻求具有追溯力的救济。另我系针对过去及当下滥用公司形式行为的救济手段。其使法律事实与客观事实相一致。另我制度在破产程序中引入实质合并（substantive consolidation）之后依然存续。没有任何依据将起诉状重新解释为寻求实质合并而非另我。\n\n据此，特此裁定：\n\n1. 附录 A 所列的联合动议被驳回（DENIED）。\n2. 附录 B 所列的非联合动议，就其中所提出的与《联合简报命令》（Joint Briefing Order）载明问题相关联的任何及所有论点，被部分驳回（DENIED IN PART）。尽管有前述规定，但就处于中止状态的撤销权主张而言，本裁决不适用于《撤销权诉讼程序命令》（Avoidance Action Procedures Order）第 2(e)(i) 及 (ii) 款所定义的处于中止或部分中止状态的撤销权主张（Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims）。本裁定后附的附录 D 中已作批注，标明哪些撤销权主张系处于中止或部分中止状态的撤销权主张。\n3. 本裁定附录 C 所列的 Z&Z 异议，就其中所提出的与《联合简报命令》载明问题相关联的任何及所有论点，被部分不予支持（OVERRULED IN PART）。尽管有前述规定，但就处于中止状态的撤销权主张而言，本裁决不适用于《撤销权诉讼程序命令》第 2(e)(i) 及 (ii) 款所定义的处于中止或部分中止状态的撤销权主张。本裁定后附的附录 D 中已作批注，标明哪些撤销权主张系处于中止或部分中止状态的撤销权主张。\n4. 在 2025年3月28日或之前，各非联合被告应在其各自的撤销权诉讼中与受托人共同提交一份联合声明，说明就其非联合动议或 Z&Z 提出异议的根据答辩状作出判决的动议而言，仍有待\n\n决定的问题。该等声明必须具体指明在答辩状的何处提出了该等问题。在审阅该等声明后，法院将就每一事项决定是否有必要举行听证会，抑或可根据当事人提交的材料作出裁决。\n\n2025年3月4日裁定于康涅狄格州布里奇波特（Bridgeport, Connecticut）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 83 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 79 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 78 of 102\n附录 A 联合动议\n\n1. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Agora Lab, Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05005 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 24（由被告 Agora Lab, Inc. 提交）。\n2. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Amazon Web Servs., Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05006 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 21（由被告 Amazon Web Services, Inc. 提交）。\n3. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Direct Persuasion LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05010 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 26（由被告 Direct Persuasion LLC 提交）。\n4. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Fox News Network, LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05015 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 23（由被告 Fox News Network, LLC 提交）。\n5. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Arri Americas Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05031 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年11月27日），ECF 编号 17（由被告 Arri Americas Inc. 提交）。\n6. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Teris-Phoenix, LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05044 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 20（由被告 Teris-Phoenix, LLC 提交）。\n7. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Phillips Nizer LLP（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05047 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 23（由被告 Phillips Nizer LLP 提交）。\n8. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Gunderson（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05048 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 21（由被告 Mark Gundersen 先生提交）。\n9. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05055 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 17（由被告 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC 提交）。\n10. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Amazon.com, Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05057 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 42（由被告 Amazon.com, Inc. 提交）。\n11. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Anthem Health Plans, Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05058 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 21（由被告 Anthem Health Plans, Inc. 提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 80 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 84 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 79 of 102\n\n12. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Fed. Express Corp.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05059 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 20（由被告 Federal Express Corporation 提交）。\n13. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 DJD Creative LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05063 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年12月4日），ECF 编号 22（由被告 DJD Creative, LLC 提交）。\n14. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05069 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 35（由被告 B&H Foto & Electronics Corp. 提交）。\n15. 根据答辩状作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Am. Express Co.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05077 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 18（由被告 American Express Company 提交）。\n16. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05082 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 17（由被告 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC 提交）。\n17. 根据答辩状作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Zeta Glob. Corp.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05092 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 21（由被告 Zeta Global Corp. 提交）。\n18. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 GroCyber LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05100 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 17（由被告 GroCyber LLC 提交）。\n19. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05108 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 22（由被告 Conservative Campaign Technology, LLC 提交）。\n20. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05112 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 23（由被告 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance Inc. 提交）。\n21. 驳回对抗辩诉程序的动议，Despins 诉 ModSquad Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05114 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 21（由被告 ModSquad Inc. 提交）。\n22. 根据答辩状作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Cloudflare, Inc.（In re Kwok），案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序编号 24-05115 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF 编号 22（由被告 Cloudfare, Inc. 提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 81 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 85 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 80 of 102\n\n- 23. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 3 Columbus Circle LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 17（由被告 3 Columbus Circle LLC 提交）。\n- 24. 依诉答文书判决动议，Despins 诉 Indium Software Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 19（由被告 Indium Software Inc. 提交）。\n- 25. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Miller Motorcars Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 18（由被告 Miller Motorcars Inc. 提交）。\n- 26. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 21（由被告 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. 提交）。\n- 27. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Target Enters., LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 19（由被告 Target Enterprises, LLC 提交）。\n- 28. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 19（由被告 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. 提交）。\n- 29. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Jamestown Assocs., LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 19（由被告 Jamestown Associates, LLC 提交）。\n- 30. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Nardello & Co., LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 19（由被告 Nardello & Co., LLC 提交）。\n- 31. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 18（由被告 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. 提交）。\n- 32. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 28（由被告 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP 提交）。\n- 33. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Putnam's Landscaping LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 18（由被告 Putnam's Landscaping LLC 提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 81 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 82 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 86 of 107\n\n- 34. 依诉答文书判决动议，Despins 诉 Jason Miller (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 23（由被告 Jason Miller 先生提交）。\n- 35. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Sedgwick Realty Corp. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 18（由被告 Sedgwick Realty Corp. 提交）。\n- 36. 依诉答文书判决动议，Despins 诉 Cirrus Design Corp. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 21（由被告 Cirrus Design Corp. 提交）。\n- 37. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日)，ECF No. 25（由被告 Marcum LLP 提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 87 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 83 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 82 of\n\n附录 B 非联名动议\n\n- 1. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年8月12日)，ECF No. 17（由被告 FFP (BVI) Ltd. 提交）。\n- 2. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Mitchell (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年5月24日)，ECF No. 19（由被告 Aaron A. Mitchell 先生提交）。\n- 3. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年6月5日)，ECF No. 16（由被告 V.X. Cerda & Associates P.A. 提交）。\n- 4. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年6月20日)，ECF No. 19（由被告 Liberty Jet Management Corp. 提交）。\n- 5. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Francis Firm PLLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年5月29日)，ECF No. 15（由被告 The Francis Firm PLLC 提交）。\n- 6. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Berkeley Rowe Ltd. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月12日)，ECF No. 35（由被告 Berkeley Rowe Ltd. 提交）。\n- 7. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年4月22日)，ECF No. 11（由被告 Weddle Law PLLC 提交）。\n- 8. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年5月24日)，ECF No. 21（由被告 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC 及 Aaron A. Mitchell 先生提交）。\n- 9. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年8月22日)，ECF No. 19（由被告 G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd. 提交）。\n- 10. 驳回对抗性诉讼动议，Despins 诉 ACASS Canada LTD. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年9月12日)，ECF No. 26（由被告 ACASS Canada LTD. 提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 84 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 88 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 83 of 102\n附录 C Z&Z 异议\n\n1. 反对法律备忘录，Despins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年9月6日)，ECF No. 21（由被告 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 提交，用以反对受托人的依诉答文书判决动议，Despins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年8月2日)，ECF No. 17）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 89 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 85 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 84 of 102\n附录 D 针对联名及非联名被告的起诉状\n\n图例\n针对非联名被告的起诉状以粗体显示\n\n撤销权主张\n\nAFT (BC) – 实际欺诈性转让（《破产法典》）\n\n根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) 及 550(a)，撤销并向最初受让人追回个人债务人在财产中的权益的实际欺诈性转让。\n\nAFT (NY) – 实际欺诈性转让（纽约州法）根据《纽约州债务人与债权人法》（N.Y. DEBT. & CRED.）§§ 273(a)(1)、274 和 276 以及 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) 和 550(a)，撤销并向最初受让人追回个人债务人在财产中的权益的实际欺诈性转让。\n\nCFT (BC) – 推定欺诈性转让（《破产法典》）根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) 及 550(a)，撤销并向最初受让人追回个人债务人在财产中的权益的推定欺诈性转让。\n\n- CFT (NY) 推定欺诈性转让（纽约州法）根据《纽约州债务人与债权人法》（N.Y. DEBT. & CRED.）§§ 273(a)(2)、274 和 276 以及 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) 和 550(a)，撤销并向最初受让人追回个人债务人在财产中的权益的推定欺诈性转让。\n- UPT 未经授权的申请后转让 根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 及 550(a)，撤销并向最初受让人追回破产财产中未经授权的申请后转让。\n- ST 向后续受让人追回 根据 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)，向后续受让人追回已被撤销的转让。\n\n* 部分中止审理之请求\n\n** 中止审理之请求\n\n（既非针对联名被告亦非针对非联名被告的主张在括号内列出）\n另我实体\n\nGSNY – Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. LC – Lamp Capital LLC HCHKT – HCHK Technologies, Inc. HCHKP – HCHK Property Management, Inc. LPS – Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. GL – Greenwich Land, LLC LSNY – Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\n[在未被《撤销诉讼程序令》第 2(e) 段中止审理的范围内，撤销权主张中涉及的另我实体在方括号内列出]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 86 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 90 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 85 of 102\n\n1. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月9日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项请求：UPT [HCHKT]\n\n2. 修正起诉状，Despins 诉 Amazon Web Servs., Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05006 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月15日)，ECF No. 4。\n第一项请求：AFT (BC)* [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY]\n第二项请求：AFT (NY)* [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY]\n第三项请求：UPT [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n3. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Direct Persuasion LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05010 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月9日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n4. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Fox News Network, LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月9日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n5. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Arri Americas Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n6. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Teris-Phoenix, LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT* [LPS]\n\n7. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Phillips Nizer LLP (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [LC]\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [LC]\n第三项请求：UPT [LPS]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 87 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 91 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 86 of 102\n\n8. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Gunderson (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项请求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项请求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n9. 起诉状，Despins 诉 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼案号 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求：UPT [LPS]\n\n10. 起诉状，Despins 诉 FFP (BVI) Ltd.（In re Kwok［郭文贵案］），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05056 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn.［康涅狄格区破产法院］2024年2月10日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [LSNY]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [LSNY]\n第三项诉求：UPT\n\n11. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05057 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第三项诉求：CFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第四项诉求：CFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第五项诉求：UPT* [GSNY, LPS, GL]\n第六项诉求：(ST*)\n\n12. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Anthem Health Plans, Inc.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05058 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项诉求：UPT* [HCHKP]\n\n13. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Fed. Express Corp.（联邦快递公司）（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05059 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项诉求：UPT* [LPS]\n\n14. 起诉状，Despins 诉 DJD Creative LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05063 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 88 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 92 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 87 of 102\n\n15. 起诉状，Despins 诉 B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05069 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第三项诉求：CFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第四项诉求：CFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第五项诉求：UPT* [GSNY, HCHKT, GL]\n第六项诉求：(ST*)\n\n16. 修正起诉状，Despins 诉 Am. Express Co.（美国运通公司）（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05077 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年2月14日），ECF No. 30。\n\n第一项诉求：UPT* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n17. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05082 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项诉求：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n18. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Zeta Glob. Corp.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05092 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n19. 起诉状，Despins 诉 GroCyber LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05100 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n20. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05108 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n21. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Mitchell（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05110 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [LPS]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [LPS]\n第三项诉求：CFT (BC) [LPS]\n第四项诉求：CFT (NY) [LPS]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 89 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 93 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 88 of 102\n\n22. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05112 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项诉求：UPT [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n23. 起诉状，Despins 诉 ModSquad Inc.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05114 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n24. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Cloudflare, Inc.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05115 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项诉求：UPT* [LPS]\n\n25. 起诉状，Despins 诉 3 Columbus Circle LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05120 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项诉求：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n26. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Indium Software Inc.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05122 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC)* [HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY)* [HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项诉求：UPT [HCHKT]\n\n27. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Miller Motorcars Inc.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05128 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [LC]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [LC]\n\n28. 起诉状，Despins 诉 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05130 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项诉求：UPT [HCHKP]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 89 of 102 Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 90 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 94 of 107\n\n29. 起诉状，Despins 诉 V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05134 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [GSNY]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [GSNY]\n第三项诉求：CFT (BC) [GSNY]\n第四项诉求：CFT (NY) [GSNY]\n第五项诉求：UPT* [GSNY, HCHKP, LPS, GL]\n\n30. 修正起诉状，Despins 诉 Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05135 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月15日），ECF No. 2。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC]\n\n31. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Target Enters., LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05138 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT] 第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n32. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05141 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项诉求：UPT [GSNY]\n\n33. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Jamestown Assocs., LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05147 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n34. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Nardello & Co., LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05162 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [LC, LPS]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [LC, LPS]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 90 of 102 Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 91 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 95 of 107\n\n35. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Francis Firm PLLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05168 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [LC]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [LC]\n第三项诉求：CFT (BC) [LC]\n第四项诉求：CFT (NY) [LC]\n第五项诉求：UPT [LC, LPS]\n\n36. 修正起诉状，Despins 诉 Berkeley Rowe Ltd.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05186 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年8月15日），ECF No. 23。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [GSNY, LSNY]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LSNY]\n第三项诉求：CFT (BC) [GSNY, LSNY]\n第四项诉求：CFT (NY) [GSNY, LSNY]\n\n37. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Weddle Law PLLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05188 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：UPT* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n38. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05196 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项诉求：UPT [HCHKP, LPS]\n\n39. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05199 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日），ECF No. 1。\nAFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\nAFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\nCFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\nCFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\nUPT* [GSNY, LPS, GL]\nST*\n\n40. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05202 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [GSNY, LC]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LC]\n第三项诉求：UPT [LC]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 92 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 96 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 91 of 102\n\n41. 起诉状，Despins 诉 G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05204 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [LC, LSNY]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [LC, LSNY]\n第三项诉求：UPT [LC]\n\n42. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05208 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项诉求：UPT [LC, GL]\n\n43. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Putnam's Landscaping LLC（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05211 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [LC, GL]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [LC, GL]\n第三项诉求：UPT [LC, HCHKP, GL]\n\n44. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Jason Miller（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05219 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月14日），ECF No 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项诉求：CFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第四项诉求：CFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n45. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Sedgwick Realty Corp.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05222 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月14日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项诉求：UPT [LC]\n\n46. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Cirrus Design Corp.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05225 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月14日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n第三项诉求：CFT (BC) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n第四项诉求：CFT (NY) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n第五项诉求：(ST)\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 92 of 102 Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 93 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 97 of 107\n\n47. 第二次修正起诉状，Despins 诉 ACASS Canada LTD.（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05226 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年8月29日），ECF No. 22。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n第三项诉求：UPT [GSNY, LC]\n\n48. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Marcum LLP（In re Kwok），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05229 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月14日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项诉求：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项诉求：AFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项诉求：CFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第四项诉求：CFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第五项诉求：UPT [HCHKP, LPS]\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 98 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 94 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 93 of 102\n\n附录 E 节选法定条款\n\n(D) 处分或放弃以下各项的直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿的各种方式——\n\n(i) 财产；或\n(ii) 财产中的权益。\n\n(B) 作为担保权益的所有权保留；\n\n(C) 债务人赎回权的取消；或\n\n11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)\n\n《破产法典》条款\n\n(54) 术语“转让”（transfer）指——\n\n(A) 设定留置权；\n\n定义\n\n11 U.S.C. § 101(54)\n\n(a) 根据本篇第 301 条、第 302 条或第 303 条提起案件，即创设破产财产。该破产财产由以下所有财产组成，无论其位于何处且由何人持有：\n\n(1) 除本条第 (b) 款和第 (c)(2) 款另有规定外，债务人在案件开始时对财产享有的所有法律上或衡平法上的权益。\n\n撤销权条款\n\n11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1)\n\n(b) (1) 除第 (2) 款另有规定外，受托人可以撤销债务人在财产中权益的任何转让，或债务人所承担的任何债务，只要该等转让或债务根据适用法律可由持有根据本篇第 502 条被允许的无担保债权或仅根据本篇第 502(e) 条不被允许的无担保债权的债权人撤销。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 94 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 95 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 99 of 107\n\n11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)\n\n(a) (1) 如果债务人自愿或非自愿地发生下列情形，受托人可以撤销在提交破产申请之日或该日之前 2 年内作出的债务人财产权益的任何转让（包括根据雇佣合同向内部人或为内部人的利益作出的任何转让），或由债务人承担的任何债务（包括根据雇佣合同向内部人或为内部人的利益承担的任何债务）：\n\n(A) 作出该等转让或承担该等债务时，具有阻碍、拖延或欺诈债务人在该等转让作出或该等债务承担之日或之后对其负有或将负有债务的任何实体的实际意图；或\n\n(B) (i) 作出该等转让或承担该等债务作为交换所获得的对价低于合理等值价值；且\n\n(ii) (I) 在作出该等转让或承担该等债务之日已无力偿债，或因该等转让或债务而陷入无力偿债状态；\n\n (II) 正在从事或即将从事某项业务或交易，而债务人所保留的任何财产相对于该业务或交易而言资本过小；\n\n (III) 意图承担或确信债务人将承担超出债务人到期偿付能力的债务；或\n\n (IV) 根据雇佣合同且非在正常业务过程中，向内部人或为内部人的利益作出该等转让，或向内部人或为内部人的利益承担该等债务。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 549(a)\n\n(a) 除本条第 (b) 款或第 (c) 款另有规定外，受托人可以撤销对破产财产的转让，如果该转让——\n\n- (1) 发生在案件开始之后；且\n- (2) (A) 仅根据本篇第 303(f) 条或第 542(c) 条获得授权；或\n- (B) 未根据本篇或法院授权。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 96 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 100 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 95 of 102\n\n11 U.S.C. § 550(a)\n\n(a) 除本条另有规定外，在转让根据本篇第 544 条、第 545 条、第 547 条、第 548 条、第 549 条、第 553(b) 条或第 724(a) 条被撤销的范围内，受托人为了破产财产的利益，可向下列各方追回被转让的财产，或者在法院作出命令的情况下追回该等财产的价值：\n\n(1) 该等转让的最初受让人或该等转让为其利益而作出的实体；或\n\n(2) 该最初受让人的任何直接或间接受让人。\n\nNYUVTA（《纽约州统一虚假转让法》）条款\n\n定义\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 270(b), (f), (p)\n\n(b) “资产”系指债务人的财产，但该术语不包括：\n\n- (1) 附带有有效留置权范围内的财产；\n- (2) 根据非破产法普遍豁免范围内的财产；或\n\n(3) 以不可分割共有形式持有的财产权益，且仅对其中一名共有共有权人持有债权的债权人无法对其采取法律程序的范围内的财产。\n\n. . .\n\n(f) “债务人”系指对债权承担责任的人。\n\n. . .\n\n(p) “转让”系指处置或放弃资产或资产权益的每一种方式，不论直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿，并包括支付金钱、免除、租赁、许可，以及创设留置权或其他权利负担。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 97 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 101 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 96 of 102\n\n撤销权条款\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 273(a)\n\n(a) 债务人作出的转让或承担的债务，在下列情况下对债权人而言是可撤销的，不论债权人的债权是在转让作出或债务承担之前还是之后产生的：\n\n(1) 具有阻碍、拖延或欺诈债务人的任何债权人的实际意图；或\n\n(2) 未获得合理等值价值作为该转让或债务的交换，且债务人：\n\n(i) 正在从事或即将从事某项业务或交易，而债务人剩余的资产相对于该业务或交易而言过小；或\n\n(ii) 意图承担，或确信或应当合理确信债务人将承担超出其到期偿还能力的债务。\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 274(a), (b)\n\n(a) 如果债务人作出转让或承担债务时未获得合理等值价值作为该转让或债务的交换，且债务人当时已无力偿债或债务人因该转让或债务而陷入无力偿债状态，则债务人作出的转让或承担的债务对于在作出转让或承担债务之前已产生债权的债权人而言是可撤销的。\n\n(b) 债务人向内部人就先存债务作出的转让，如果债务人当时已无力偿债，且该内部人有合理理由相信债务人已无力偿债，则对于在作出该转让前已产生债权的债权人而言是可撤销的。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 97 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 98 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 102 of 107\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 276(a)\n\n(a) 在根据本条针对转让或债务寻求救济的诉讼中，债权人在受本条第 277 条限制的前提下，可获得：\n\n(1) 在清偿债权人债权所必需的限度内撤销该转让或债务；\n\n(2) 若适用法律允许，对被转让的资产或受让人的其他财产采取扣押或其他临时救济措施；以及\n\n(3) 在符合衡平法原则并依据适用的民事诉讼规则的前提下：\n\n(i) 禁止债务人或受让人，或双方进一步处置被转让资产或其他财产的禁令；\n\n(ii) 指定接管人接管被转让资产或受让人的其他财产；或\n\n(iii) 视情况所需的任何其他救济。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 99 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 103 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 98 of 102\n附录 F 针对 Alter Egos（另我/第二自我）的并入起诉书\n\n1. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（“Golden Spring”）\n\n并入起诉书：起诉书，Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05018 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格区破产法院）2023 年 7 月 25 日），ECF No. 1。\n\n指称设立州：Delaware（特拉华州）。第一项主张：Alter ego（另我）。第二项主张：对实体和/或其资产的实益所有权。第三项主张：实际欺诈性转让的撤销与追回。\n\n处置结果：准予缺席判决动议的裁定，Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05018 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院 2023 年 12 月 4 日），ECF No. 35。\n\n2. Lamp Capital LLC\n\n并入起诉书：起诉书，Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05023 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院 2023 年 10 月 26 日），ECF No. 1。\n\n指称设立州：特拉华州。第一项主张：Alter ego（另我）（Lamp Capital LLC）。第二项主张：对 Lamp Capital LLC 和/或其资产的实益所有权。第三项主张：Alter ego（另我）（Hudson Diamond NY LLC）。第四项主张：对 Hudson Diamond NY LLC 和/或其资产的实益所有权。第五项主张：Alter ego（另我）（Leading Shine NY Ltd.）。第六项主张：对 Leading Shine NY Ltd. 和/或其资产的实益所有权。\n\n处置结果：缺席判决，Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05023 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院 2024 年 2 月 1 日），ECF No. 66。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 100 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 104 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 99 of 102\n\n3. HCHK Technologies, Inc.\n\n并入起诉书：起诉书，Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院 2023 年 6 月 8 日），ECF No. 1。\n\n指称设立州：特拉华州。第一项主张：Alter ego（另我）。第二项主张：对实体和/或其资产的实益所有权。第三项主张：永久禁令。\n\n处置结果：修改后的缺席判决与永久禁令，Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院 2024 年 6 月 24 日），ECF No. 297。\n\n4. HCHK Property Management, Inc.\n\n并入起诉书：起诉书，Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院 2023 年 6 月 8 日），ECF No. 1。\n\n指称设立州：特拉华州。第一项主张：Alter ego（另我）。第二项主张：对实体和/或其资产的实益所有权。第三项主张：永久禁令。\n\n处置结果：修改后的缺席判决与永久禁令，Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院 2024 年 6 月 24 日），ECF No. 297。\n\n5. Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.\n\n并入起诉书：起诉书，Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院 2023 年 6 月 8 日），ECF No. 1。\n\n指称设立州：特拉华州。第一项主张：Alter ego（另我）。第二项主张：对实体和/或其资产的实益所有权。第三项主张：永久禁令。\n\n处置结果：修改后的缺席判决与永久禁令，Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05013 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院 2024 年 6 月 24 日），ECF No. 297。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4227-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:50:37 Page 101 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4235-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 15:59:16 Page 105 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 100 of 102\n\n6. Greenwich Land LLC\n\n并入起诉书：起诉书，Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05005 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院 2023 年 3 月 27 日），ECF No. 1。\n\n指称设立州：特拉华州。第一项主张：Alter ego（另我） 第二项主张：对实体的实益所有权\n\n处置结果：即决判决，Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok)（郭案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序号 23-05005 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院 2024 年 7 月 2 日），ECF No. 134。\n\n7. Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\n所并入的起诉状：起诉状，《Despins 诉 Lamp Cap. LLC（涉及 Kwok 破产案）》[Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)]，案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 23-05023 (JAM)（康涅狄格区联邦破产法院 [Bankr. D. Conn.] 2023年10月26日），ECF 编号 1。\n\n指称设立地所在州：特拉华州（Delaware）。第一项权利主张：人格混同／另我（alter ego）（Lamp Capital LLC）。第二项权利主张：对 Lamp Capital LLC 及／或其资产的实益所有权。第三项权利主张：人格混同／另我（Hudson Diamond NY LLC）。第四项权利主张：对 Hudson Diamond NY LLC 及／或其资产的实益所有权。第五项权利主张：人格混同／另我（Leading Shine NY Ltd.）。第六项权利主张：对 Leading Shine NY Ltd. 及／或其资产的实益所有权。\n\n处理结果：待决。\n案件编号 22-50073 文件 4227-1 于 03/18/25 提交 于 03/18/25 23:50:37 录入 第 102 页，共 103 页 案件编号 22-50073 文件 4235-1 于 03/19/25 提交 于 03/19/25 15:59:16 录入 第 106 页，共 107 页\n\n案件编号 22-50073 文件 4189 于 03/04/25 提交 于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入 第 101 页，共 102 页\n对抗性程序编号 动议 ECF 编号 提交日期 异议 ECF 编号 提交日期 答辩 ECF 编号 提交日期\n24-05056\nDespins 诉 FFP (BVI) Ltd. 17 8/12/24 20 10/11/24 22 11/11/24\n24-05110\nDespins 诉 Mitchell 19 5/24/24 23 7/23/24 24 8/22/24\n24-05134\nDespins 诉 V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. 16 6/5/24 20 8/5/24 21 9/3/24\n24-05135\nDespins 诉 Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. 19 6/20/24 24 9/16/24 27 10/16/24\n24-05168\nDespins 诉 Francis Firm PLLC 15 5/29/24 19 7/29/24 20 8/28/24\n24-05186\nDespins 诉 Berkeley Rowe Ltd. 35 10/12/24 42 12/11/24 51 1/10/25\n24-05188\nDespins 诉 Weddle Law PLLC 11 4/22/24 17 6/21/24 27 8/2/24\n24-05199\nDespins 诉 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC 21 5/24/24 26 7/23/24 27 8/22/24\n24-05204\nDespins 诉 G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. 19 8/22/24 23 10/21/24 25 11/20/24\n24-05208\nDespins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 17 8/2/24 21 9/6/24 22 9/20/24\n24-05226\nDespins 诉 ACASS Canada LTD. 26 9/12/24 33 11/12/24 41 12/20/24\n\n附录 G 非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议的简要案情陈述书\n案件编号 22-50073 文件 4235-1 于 03/19/25 提交 于 03/19/25 15:59:16 录入 第 107 页，共 107 页\n案件编号 22-50073 文件 4227-1 于 03/18/25 提交 于 03/18/25 23:50:37 录入 第 103 页，共 103 页\n\n案件编号 22-50073 文件 4189 于 03/04/25 提交 于 03/04/25 14:45:18 录入 第 102 页，共 102 页\n附录 H 转让图解\n\n指称的转让形式：\n\nA（个人债务人） C（共同被告）（通过人格混同主体／另我 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n共同被告对转让形式的理解：\n\nA（个人债务人） = B（人格混同主体／另我） C（共同被告）（人格混同主体／另我认定）（转让 B 的财产）","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":31558,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-03-18 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-03-18","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:36:53"}