{"id":"court_sdny_4236_1","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":4236,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2025-03-18","title":"SDNY ECF 4236","summary_zh":"上诉通知——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，康州破产法庭 22-50073 对抗诉讼 24-05117 ECF #4236（2025年3月18日立案）。被告 Meta Platforms, Inc 就法庭 2025年3月4日作出的《备忘录裁定与命令》（ECF #4189）提出上诉，该命令驳回了联合被告的动议及部分其他被告的驳回动议。","summary_en":"Notice of Appeal—United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui, Miles Guo), Bankruptcy Case 22-50073, Connecticut, Adversary Proceeding 24-05117, ECF No. 4236 (March 18, 2025). Defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. appealed the Memorandum of Decision and Order (ECF No. 4189, March 4, 2025) denying joint defendants' motions to dismiss and in-part denying other defendants' motions to dismiss.","body_en":"Case 22-50073 Doc 4229 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 1 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 1 of 107\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al*.,\n\nDebtors.\n\nLUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE,\n\nPlaintiff,\n\nv.\n\nMETA PLATFORMS, INC.,\n\nDefendant.\n\n# **NOTICE OF APPEAL**\n\n# **Part I: Identify the Appellant**\n\n1. Name of appellant: Meta Platforms, Inc.\n\n2. Position of appellant in the adversary proceeding or bankruptcy case that is the subject of this appeal: Defendant in the above-captioned adversary proceeding, No. 24-05117 (JAM).\n\n# **Part 2: Identify the Subject of This Appeal**\n\n1. Describe the judgment—or the appealable order or decree—from which the appeal is taken: *Memorandum of Decision and Order (I) Denying Joint Defendants' Motions to Dismiss or for Judgment on the Pleadings (II) Denying in Part Other Defendants' Motions to Dismiss; and (III) Overruling in Part Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.'s Objection to the Trustee's Motion for Judgment*\n\nChapter 11\n\nCase No. 22-50073 (JAM)\n\n(Jointly Administered)\n\nAdv. Proc. No. 24-05117\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 2 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 2 of 107\n\n*on the Pleadings*, entered in the bankruptcy case (ECF Dkt. No. 4189), a copy of which is attached\n\nas **Exhibit 1**.\n\n2. State the date on which the judgment—or the appealable order or decree—was\n\nentered: March 4, 2025.\n\n# **Part 3: Identify the Other Parties to the Appeal**\n\nList the names of all parties to the judgment—or the appealable order or decree—from which the appeal is taken and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of their attorneys:\n\n| Party | Attorneys |\n|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|\n| Meta Platforms, Inc. | George Angelich (ct27542) |\n| | Eric Roman (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| Appellant | Patrick Feeney (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| | ArentFox Schiff LLP |\n| | 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor |\n| | New York, NY 10019 |\n| | T: 212.457.5423 |\n| | E:
george.angelich@afslaw.com |\n| | eric.roman@afslaw.com |\n| | patrick.feeney@afslaw.com |\n| | - and - |\n| | |\n| | Jin Yan (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| | ArentFox Schiff LLP |\n| | 1717 K St. NW |\n| | Washington, DC 20006 |\n| | T: 202.778.6442 |\n| | E:
jin.yan@afslaw.com |\n| Luc A. Despins, as Chapter 11 Trustee | Douglas S. Skalka (ct00616) |\n| | Patrick R. Linsey (ct29437) |\n| Appellee | Neubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. |\n| | 195 Church St., 13th Fl. |\n| | New Haven, CT 06510 |\n| | T: (203) 821-2000 |\n| | E:
dskalka@npmlaw.com |\n| | plinsey@npmlaw.com |\n| | - and - |\n| | Douglass Barron (admitted pro hac vice) |\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 3 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 3 of 107\n\n| Party | Attorneys |\n|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------|\n| | Paul Hastings LLP |\n| | 200 Park Ave. |\n| | New York, NY 10166 |\n| | T: (212) 318-6000 |\n| | E:
douglassbarron@paulhastings.com |\n| | |\n| | - and - |\n| | |\n| | Nicholas A. Bassett (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| | Paul Hastings LLP |\n| | 2050 M St. NW |\n| | Washington, D.C. 20036 |\n| | T: (202) 551-1902 |\n| | E:
nicholasbassett@paulhastings.com |\n| | |\n| Dated: March 18, 2025 | /s/ George Angelich |\n| New York, New York | George Angelich (ct27542) |\n| | Eric Roman (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| | Patrick Feeney (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| | ArentFox Schiff LLP |\n| | 1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor |\n| | New York, NY 10019 |\n| | T: 212.457.5423 |\n| | E:
george.angelich@afslaw.com |\n| | eric.roman@afslaw.com |\n| | patrick.feeney@afslaw.com |\n| | - and - |\n| | Jin Yan (admitted pro hac vice) |\n| | ArentFox Schiff LLP |\n| | 1717 K St. NW |\n| | Washington, DC 20006 |\n| | T: 202.778.6442 |\n| | E:
jin.yan@afslaw.com |\n| | Counsel for Meta Platforms, Inc. |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 4 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 4 of 107\n\n# **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**\n\nI certify that on March 18, 2025, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be filed with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF filing system, which will send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record.\n\nDated: New York, New York March 18, 2025\n\n*/s/ George Angelich*\n\nGeorge Angelich\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 1 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 5 of 107\n\n# **EXHIBIT 1**\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4236-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 | Page 6 of |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4229-1 | 107
Filed 03/18/25
103 | Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 | Page 2 of |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 1 of 102\n\n| In re:
HO WAN KWOK, et al., | )
)
Chapter 11
)
Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)
)
(Jointly Administered)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Debtors. | )
Re: ECF Nos. 3577, 3713
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 24
)
) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| AGORA LAB, INC., | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21 |\n| Plaintiff, | ) |\n| v. | )
)
) |\n| AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC., | ) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 26 |\n| Plaintiff, | ) |\n| v. | )
) |\n| DIRECT PERSUASION LLC, | )
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| Case 22-50073
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)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23 |\n| Plaintiff,
v.
FOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| ARRI AMERICAS, INC.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
TERIS-PHOENIX, LLC, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 20
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n| Defendant. | )
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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Plaintiff,
v. | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18
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)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
)
) |\n| PHILLIPS NIZER LLP,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
) |\n| MARK GUNDERSON,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
)
) |\n| 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| FFP (BVI) LIMITED,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 42
) |\n| v.
AMAZON.COM, INC., HING CHI NGOK, ALEX
HADJICHARALAMBOUS, CHUNGUANG HAN, and
MEI GUO,
Defendants. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
) |\n| ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS, INC.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,
Defendant. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 20
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
DJD CREATIVE LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 35
) |\n\nv. )\n\nB&H FOTO & ELECTRONICS CORP., HING CHI ) NGOK, ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS, and ) CHUNGUANG HAN, ) )\n\n)\n\nDefendants. )\n\n)\n\n*Continued on next page*\n\n)\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4236-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 | Page 11 of |\n|---------------|------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4229-1 | 107
Filed 03/18/25 | Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 | Page 7 of |\n| | | 103 | | |\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4189 | Filed 03/04/25 | Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 | Page 6 of 102 |\n\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
)
)
) |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
) |\n| OHTZAR SHLOMO SOLOMON TREASURE LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
) |\n| ZETA GLOBAL CORP.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
)
) |\n| GROCYBER, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
)
) |\n| v.
CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TECHNOLOGY, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) |\n| ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
)
) |\n| AARON MITCHELL,
Defendant. | )
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 23
)
)
) |\n| ANTHEM HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.,
f/k/a EMPIRE HEALTHCHOICE ASSURANCE, INC.,
d/b/a EMPIRE BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM)
) |\n| Plaintiff,
v.
MODSQUAD INC., | )
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
)
)
) |\n| Defendant. | )
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 22
)
) |\n| v.
CLOUDFLARE, INC., | )
)
)
) |\n| Defendant. | )
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
3 COLUMBUS CIRCLE LLC, | | ) | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM)
)
Re: ECF No. 17
)
)
)
)
) | |\n| Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
INDIUM SOFTWARE, INC., | | )
) | )
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
)
) | |\n| Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
MILLER MOTORCARS INC., | | ) | )
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
)
)
)
)
)
) | |\n| Defendant. | | | )
) | |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
ON THE SPOT HOME IMPROVEMENT, INC.,
Defendant. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 16
)
)
) |\n| V.X. CERDA & ASSOCIATES P.A.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
) |\n| LIBERTY JET MANAGEMENT CORP.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
)
) |\n| TARGET ENTERPRISES, LLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
) |\n| FLAT RATE MOVERS, LTD.,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
)
) |\n| JAMESTOWN ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
)
) |\n| NARDELLO & CO., LLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 15
)
) |\n| v.
THE FRANCIS FIRM PLLC,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
)
) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM)
)
Re: ECF No. 35
)
)
) |\n| BERKELEY ROWE LIMITED,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
) |\n\n| Case 22-50073
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
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Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM)
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)
Re: ECF No. 11
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)
)
) |\n| WEDDLE LAW PLLC,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
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)
)
)
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Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 18
)
)
) |\n| MORVILLO ABRAMOWITZ GRAND IASON &
ANELLO P.C.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
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Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 21
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) |\n| LAWALL & MITCHELL, LLC, and
AARON MITCHELL,
Defendants. | )
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM)
)
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Re: ECF No. 28
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)
) |\n| CLAYMAN ROSENBERG KIRSHNER & LINDER LLP, )
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff, | )
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 19
)
) |\n| v.
G4S SECURITY SYSTEMS (HONG KONG) LTD.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK, | )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 17 |\n| Plaintiff,
v.
ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.,
Defendant. | )
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Plaintiff,
v.
PUTNAM'S LANDSCAPING LLC, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 18
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)
)
)
) |\n| Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
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)
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Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM)
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)
Re: ECF No. 23
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)
) |\n| JASON MILLER,
Defendant. | )
)
)
)
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) |\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM)
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Re: ECF No. 18
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) |\n| SEDGWICK REALTY CORP.,
Defendant. | )
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ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
CIRRUS DESIGN CORPORATION, and QIANG GUO, | )
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 21
)
)
)
)
)
) |\n| Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE
ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v. | )
)
)
)
Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM)
)
)
Re: ECF No. 26
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)
) |\n| ACASS CANADA LTD.,
Defendant.
LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE | )
)
)
)
)
)
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Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) |\n| ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARCUM LLP, | )
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Re: ECF No. 25
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) |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4236-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 | Page 22 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 18 of\n\n103\n\n107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 17 of 102\n\n# **APPEARANCES**\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglas S. Skalka James C. Graham Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\nand\n\nNicholas A. Bassett (argued) Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n*Counsel for Movant and Respondent Mr. Luc A. Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee for the Estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok, Plaintiff*\n\nBenjamin O. Gilbert Lindsay C. Stone Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, NY 10112\n\nand\n\nAlan H. Martin Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP 650 Town Center Drive, 10th Floor Costa Mesa, CA 92626\n\n*Counsel for Movant Agora Lab, Inc., Defendant*\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4236-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 | Page 23 of |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4229-1 | 107
Filed 03/18/25
103 | Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 | Page 19 of |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 18 of\n\n102\n\nLindsay Sampson Bishop K&L Gates LLP One Congress Street, Suite 2900 Boston, MA 02114\n\nand\n\nBrian T. Peterson (argued) Ruby A. Nagamine K&L Gates LLP 925 4th Ave, Suite 2900 Seattle, WA 98104\n\n*Counsel for Movants Amazon Web Services, Inc., and Amazon.com, Inc., Defendants*\n\nBenjamin Mintz Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 250 West 55th Street New York, NY 10019\n\nand\n\nand\n\nRyan M. Trombley Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 70 West Madison Street, Suite 4200 Chicago, IL 60602\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n# *Counsel for Movant Direct Persuasion LLC, Defendant*\n\nSteven G. Mintz Barry M. Kazan Philip Ian Tafet Mintz & Gold LLP 600 Third Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10016\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Fox News Network, LLC, and Marcum LLP, Defendants*\n\nMichael T. Conway Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP 747 Third Ave., 16th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n*Counsel for Movant Arri Americas Inc., Defendant*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 24 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 20 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 19 of\n\n102\n\nAndrea Chase Spencer Fane 1000 Walnut Street, Suite 1400 Kansas City, MO 64106\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Teris-Phoenix, LLC, Defendant*\n\nJared R. Clark Phillips Nizer LLP 485 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n# *Counsel for Movant Phillips Nizer LLP, Defendant*\n\nJeffrey Hellman Law Offices of Jeffrey Hellman, LLC 195 Church Street, 10th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n*Counsel for Movants Mr. Mark Gundersen, Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC, and Mr. Jason Miller, Defendants*\n\nRobert N. Sensale Bershtein, Volpe & McKeon, PC 900 Chapel Street, 11th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n*Counsel for Movant 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC, Defendant*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 20 of 102 Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 21 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 25 of 107\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movants FFP (BVI) Limited, Aaron A. Mitchell, V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A., The Francis Firm PLLC, Lawall & Mitchell, LLC, and G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd., Defendants*\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Anthem Health Plans, Inc., Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., f/k/a Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc., d/b/a Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, and Sedgwick Realty Corp., Defendants*\n\nMichael A. Siedband Federal Express Corporation 3620 Hacks Cross Road Building 2, 3rd Floor Memphis, TN 38125\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Nicole Lapenta Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Federal Express Corporation, Defendant*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 26 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 22 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 21 of 102\n\n103\n\n107\n\nBret Strong Zachary W. Doninger 1790 Hughes Landing, Suite 200 The Woodlands, TX 77380\n\nLouis Joseph Martocchio, III Martocchio & Oliveira, LLC 191 Main Street Southington, CT 06489\n\n# *Counsel for Movant DJD Creative LLC, Defendant*\n\nScott M. Kessler Akerman LLP 1251 Avenue of the Americas 37th Floor New York, NY 10020\n\nTracy Ellis Williams Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, 3rd Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n#### *Counsel for Movant B&H Foto & Electronics Corp., Defendant*\n\nDarryl S. Laddin Frank N. White Arnall Golden Gregory LLP 171 17th Street, N.W., Suite 2100 Atlanta, GA 30363\n\nRonald I. Chorches Law Offices of Ronald I. Chorches LLC 82 Wolcott Hill Road, Suite 203 Wethersfield, CT 06109\n\n# *Counsel for Movant American Express Company, Defendant*\n\nJohn J. Clarke, Jr. DLA Piper LLP (US) 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020\n\nand\n\nC. Kevin Kobbe DLA Piper LLP (US) 650 South Exter Street, Suite 1100 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n*Counsel for Movant Zeta Global Corp., Defendant*\n\nNicholas P. Vegliante Cohn Birnbaum & Shea CityPlace II, 15th Floor 185 Asylum Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Movant GroCyber, LLC, Defendant*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 23 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 27 of 107\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 22 of 102\n\nIlan Markus Barclay Damon LLP 545 Long Wharf Drive, 9th Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movant Conservative Campaign Technology LLC, Defendant*\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\nand\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n*Counsel for Movants ModSquad, Inc., and 3 Columbus Circle, LLC, Defendants*\n\nSabrina L. Streusand Streusand, Landon, Ozburn & Lemmon, LLP Spyglass Point 1801 South MoPac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746\n\nRoss G. Fingold Stokesbury, Shipman & Fingold 10 Waterside Drive, Suite 204 Farmington, CT 06032\n\n# *Counsel for Movant Cloudflare, Inc., Defendant*\n\nRichard J. Reding ASK LLP 2600 Eagan Woods Drive, Suite 400 St. Paul, MN 55121\n\nand\n\nEdward E. Neiger ASK LLP 60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor New York, NY 10165\n\nElizabeth N. Krasnow Eric R. Wilson Benjamin D. Feder Kelley Drye & Warren LLP Canterbury Green 201 Broad Street Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Indium Software, Inc., Defendant*\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4236-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 | Page 28 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 24 of\n\n103 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 23 of 102\n\nEric Seltzer Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane LLC 30 Brewster Lane Bellport, NY 11713\n\n# *Counsel for Movant Miller Motorcars Inc., Defendant*\n\nJustin S. Baumgartner Becker LLC 354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1500 Livingston, NJ 07039\n\nEric S. Goldstein (argued) Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n*Counsel for Movant On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc., Defendant*\n\nGerard R. Luckman Elbert F. Nasis Forchelli Deegan Terrana LLP 333 Earle Ovington Boulevard, Suite 1010 Uniondale, NY 11553\n\nPatrick Tomasiewicz Fazzano Tomasiewicz and Barall 96 Oak Street Harford, CT 06106\n\n*Counsel for Movant Liberty Jet Management Corp., Defendant*\n\nJohn F. Carberry Kara Anne Zarchin Cummings & Lockwood LLC Six Landmark Square Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movants Target Enterprises, LLC, and Jamestown Associates, LLC, Defendants*\n\nJames J. Costello, Jr. Norris McLaughlin PA 400 Crossing Blvd., 8th Floor Bridgewater, NJ 08807\n\n*Counsel for Flat Rate Movers, Ltd., Defendant*\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Nardello & Co., LLC, Defendant*\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4236-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 | Page 29 of |\n|---------------|------------|----------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| | | 107 | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 25 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 24 of\n\n102\n\nJulie Johnston-Ahlen Armstrong Teasdale LLP 100 North Riverside Plaza Chicago, IL 60606\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\nand\n\nJohn G. Willard Armstrong Teasdale LLP 7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800 St. Louis, MO 63105\n\n*Counsel for Movant Berkeley Rowe Limited, Defendant*\n\nRichard Corbi The Law Offices of Richard J. Corbi PLLC 104 West 40th Street, Suite 4th Floor New York, NY 10018\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n# *Counsel for Movant Weddle Law PLLC, Defendant*\n\nRowena A. Moffett Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP 271 Whitney Avenue New Haven, CT 06511\n\n# *Counsel for Movant Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., Defendant*\n\nBrian David Linder Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP 305 Madison Avenue, Suite 650 New York, NY 10165\n\nMatthew D. Valauri Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker 1010 Washington Boulevard, Suite 603 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n*Counsel for Movant Clayman Rosenberg Kirschner & Linder LLP, Defendant*\n\nStephen M. Kindseth (argued) James M. Moriarty Daniel A. Byrd Zeisler& Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604\n\n*Counsel for Movant Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., Defendant*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 26 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 30 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 25 of 102\n\nScott M. Charmoy Charmoy & Charmoy 1465 Post Road East, Suite 100 Westport, CT 06880\n\n# *Counsel for Movant Putnam's Landscaping, Defendant*\n\nRichard J. Bernard Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036\n\nand\n\nJosh Peterson Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 2200 Wells Fargo Center 90 S. 7th Street Minneapolis, MN 55402\n\nand\n\nJaclyn C. Marasco Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP 222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400 Wilmington, DE 19801\n\n*Counsel for Movant Cirrus Design Corporation, Defendant*\n\nRahman Connelly Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP 31 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz (argued) Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n*Counsel for Movant ACASS Canada LTD., Defendant*\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 27 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 31 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 26 of 102\n\n# **MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER (I) DENYING JOINT DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; (II) DENYING IN PART OTHER DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS; AND (III) OVERRULING IN PART ZEISLER & ZEISLER, P.C.'S OBJECTION TO THE TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS**\n\nJulie A. Manning, United States Bankruptcy Judge\n\nThis case involves an individual Chapter 11 debtor who is alleged to have been involved in an extensive shell game involving hundreds of corporate *alter egos.* The Chapter 11 trustee has filed more than 260 actions seeking to avoid transfers nominally made by these *alter egos*. Forty-eight avoidance action defendants, including many who are participating in mandatory mediation with the Chapter 11 trustee, have asked this Court to decide four common issues relating to the interaction of *alter ego* and avoidable transfer law. The sheer number of defendants, complaints, and alleged *alter egos* complicates the analysis. However, when analyzing the issues in light of the facts alleged in the complaints, which the Court must take as true, the result is clear. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that none of the four common issues raised by the avoidance action defendants merit dismissal of the avoidance actions.\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court are several motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings filed by avoidance action defendants. The avoidance actions were commenced by Mr. Luc A. Despins, the Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"). The Trustee seeks to avoid and recover alleged fraudulent transfers and unauthorized post-petition transfers pursuant to sections 544, 548, 549, and 550 of title 11 of the United States Code (the \"Bankruptcy Code\") and sections 273, 274, and 276 of New York's\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 28 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 32 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 27 of 102\n\nDebtor and Creditor Law, codifying New York's Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (\"NYUVTA\").\n\nThirty-seven motions (the \"Joint Motions\") have been filed by defendants (the \"Joint Defendants\")1 pursuant to the Order Further Amending Avoidance Action Procedures Order and Scheduling Joint Briefing of Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings (the \"Joint Briefing Order\"). (Main Case ECF No. 3577.)2 The Joint Defendants requested and proposed this omnibus process and prepared and submitted common legal issues they requested the Court address. (*See* Main Case ECF No. 3511.) The Trustee did not object to the Joint Defendants' request. In issuing the Joint Briefing Order, the Court adopted the Joint Defendants' process.\n\nAdditional motions (the \"Non-Joint Motions\") have been filed by defendants3 who, although they did not participate in the joint briefing, raised some or all the issues raised by the Joint Defendants and requested to have their motions be heard at the same time as the Joint Motions. Because it raised some of the issues in the Joint Briefing Order, Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (\"Z&Z\", and, together with the filers of the Non-Joint Motions, the \"Non-Joint Defendants\") also requested its objection to a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Trustee (the \"Z&Z Objection\")4 be heard at the same time as the Joint Motions.\n\n1 Due to the complexities of this omnibus proceeding, certain information that might appear in footnotes is contained in Appendices. The .pdf file of this decision contains bookmarks to facilitate access to the Appendices. A list of the Joint Motions, with a notation of the Joint Defendant that filed each Joint Motion, appears in **Appendix A**. 2\n\nReferences to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), will be styled \"Main Case ECF No. \\_\\_.\"\n\n3 A list of the Non-Joint Motions, with a notation of the defendant(s) that filed each Non-Joint Motion, appears in **Appendix B**. 4\n\nThe citation for Z&Z's objection appears in **Appendix C**.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 29 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 33 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 28 of 102\n\nThis memorandum of decision sets forth the Court's conclusions of law on the four issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052. Because (i) the issues of law raised are not dispositive of the sufficiency of the pleadings; (ii) the defendants do not prevail on the issues of law; and (iii) many of the issues raised are issues of fact, not law, the Joint Motions are **DENIED**. For these same reasons, the Non-Joint Motions are **DENIED IN PART** as to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order and the Z&Z Objection is **OVERRULED IN PART** to the same extent.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn February 15, 2022, the Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court. (Main Case ECF No. 1.) On June 15, 2022, presented with allegations related to the Individual Debtor's financial mismanagement and alleged shell game, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee to administer the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate. (Main Case ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 523.)\n\n#### *The Avoidance Action Procedures Order*\n\nOn January 29, 2024, the Trustee filed a motion to prospectively establish procedures for avoidance actions he intended to commence and in which he would bring claims only under sections 544, 547, 548, 549, and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Main Case ECF No. 2532.) The Trustee anticipated filing hundreds of avoidance actions in advance of the second anniversary of the petition date and also anticipated these filings would pose case management issues. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 546, 549. After a hearing held on February 5, 2024, the Court entered an order granting the motion (as amended and supplemented, the \"Avoidance Action Procedures Order\").\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 30 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 34 of 107\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 29 of 102\n\n(Main Case ECF No. 2578.) Between February 9, 2024, and February 15, 2024, the Trustee filed\n\n268 avoidance actions, including the actions that are the subject of this decision. (Main Case\n\nECF Nos. 2594–925.) The complaints each assert at least one or more among the following six\n\ncauses of action (as asserted, collectively the \"Avoidance Claims\")5 :\n\n> (i) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and 550(a), avoidance of an actual fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(ii) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a) and N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274, and 2766 , avoidance of an actual fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(iii) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 550(a), avoidance of a constructive fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(iv) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a) and N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274, and 276, avoidance of a constructive fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property and recovery from the initial transferee;\n\n(v) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550(a), avoidance of an unauthorized postpetition transfer by the Individual Debtor of property of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate and recovery from the initial transferee; and\n\n(vi) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) and in connection with one of the above causes of action, recovery of an avoided transfer from a subsequent transferee.\n\n(*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.)\n\nEach complaint alleges at least (a) an actual fraudulent transfer under both federal and\n\nstate law; or (b) an unauthorized post-petition transfer. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Agora*\n\n5 A schedule setting forth the causes of action in each complaint at issue appears in **Appendix D**. The text of the statutory provisions pursuant to which the Avoidance Claims appears in **Appendix E** alongside certain relevant statutory definitions.\n\n6 In the relevant complaints, the Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor conducted business in New York, including in relation to the alleged fraudulent transfers.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 31 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 35 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 30 of 102\n\n*Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.) In addition to alleging an actual fraudulent transfer, some complaints allege a constructive fraudulent transfer under both federal and state law. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.) Finally, one of the complaints seeks recovery from a Non-Joint Defendant as a subsequent transferee of a fraudulent transfer or an unauthorized post-petition transfer. (Complaint, *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.)\n\nAll the complaints allege the Individual Debtor, through various *alter egos*, transferred property and those transfers were either fraudulent transfers or unauthorized post-petition transfers. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1; Complaint, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24- 05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1; Complaint, *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) Additional allegations regarding the Individual Debtor's dominion and control over the *alter egos* are made through incorporation of complaints filed against alleged *alter egos* seeking declaratory judgment of *alter ego* and/or beneficial ownership and turnover of assets and control.7\n\n7 The Avoidance Claims are stayed as to allegations involving certain alleged *alter egos*. (Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶¶ 2(e)(i), (ii), Main Case ECF No. 3163.) Accordingly, the Court has not considered any Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims (used herein as defined by Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶¶ 2(e)(i) and (ii)), to the extent such Avoidance Claims are stayed. **Appendix D**, *infra*, includes notations indicating whether an Avoidance\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 32 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 36 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 31 of 102\n\nOn February 27, 2024, a Status Conference was held to address the management of the myriad avoidance actions. During the Status Conference, the Trustee requested the implementation of mandatory mediation procedures. On May 2, 2024, after several pleadings were filed and hearings were held, an order entered amending the Avoidance Action Procedures Order to include mandatory mediation. (Main Case ECF No. 3163.)\n\n#### *The Joint Briefing Order*\n\nTwo features of the mediation procedures are particularly relevant to the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. First, certain defendants are automatically excluded from mandatory mediation (Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶ 2(j)(vi), Main Case ECF No. 3163) and defendants subject to mediation may move to be excluded from mediation (*Id.* ¶ 2(m)). Second, the mediation procedures include a litigation stay. (*Id.* ¶ 2(j)(iii).) Together, these features create the procedural context for the Joint Briefing Order.\n\nAs early as April 22, 2024, avoidance action defendants *not subject to the mediation stay* began filing motions to dismiss. (*See, e.g.*, Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024), ECF No. 11.) As these motions were being set for hearing, on September 6, 2024, certain avoidance action defendants *subject to the mediation stay* – the original Joint Defendants8 – requested the Court establish a process for the Joint Defendants to\n\nClaim is a Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claim. Litigation is not stayed as to the seven alleged *alter egos* who are discussed below. A schedule of these *alter egos*, listing the incorporated complaint, the allegation regarding state of formation, and causes of action, appears in **Appendix F**. 8\n\nAll these defendants remain Joint Defendants other than Bering Yachts, LLC (*compare* Main Case ECF No. 3511 *with* Main Case ECF No. 3713) and McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC (*see* Letter, *Despins v. McManimon, Scotland & Baumann LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05194 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2025), ECF No. 22 (announcing settlement with the Trustee)).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 33 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 37 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 32 of 102\n\nargue issues raised by the other avoidance action defendants' motions rather than requiring them to seek to be excluded from mediation. (Main Case ECF No. 3511.)\n\nOn September 24, 2024, a Status Conference was held. During the Status Conference, the Joint Defendants circulated their proposal for an amendment to the Avoidance Action Procedures Order and a joint briefing process. The Trustee did not oppose the Joint Defendants' proposal. Certain defendants not subject to the mediation stay did not oppose the hearings on their motions to dismiss being continued until a hearing on the prospective Joint Motions was held, but raised due process concerns should their motions be heard after the Joint Motions. At the end of the Status Conference, the Court took the matter under consideration.\n\nOn September 25, 2024, for the reasons set forth therein, the Court entered the Joint Briefing Order. (Main Case ECF No. 3577.) In pertinent part, the Joint Briefing Order provides the Joint Defendants shall collectively file a brief addressing only four issues the Joint Defendants argued were common legal issues. Those four issues, which were adopted almost verbatim from the Joint Defendants' proposal, are:\n\n(i) whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity;\n\n(ii) whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations;\n\n(iii) the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination; and\n\n(iv) whether a determination of reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* may be applied retroactively.\n\n(Joint Briefing Order ¶ 2(b)(i)–(iv), Main Case ECF No. 3577.) Under the Joint Briefing Order, (1) to the extent such Avoidance Claims are stayed, the Joint Motions shall not address Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order; and (2) the Joint Defendants reserve for future\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 34 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 38 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 33 of 102\n\npleadings all bases for a motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings other than the four issues. (*Id.* ¶¶ 4, 5.)\n\nThe Joint Briefing Order also provided time for other avoidance action defendants to join the Joint Defendants. Several did, including some not subject to the mediation stay. (Main Case ECF Nos. 3588, 3591, 3605, 3608, 3615, 3617, 3618, 3623, 3624, 3626, 3627, 3629.) On October 18, 2024, the Joint Defendants filed their joint memorandum of law (the \"Joint Brief\") and the Joint Motions. (Main Case ECF No. 3713.) On November 8, 2024, the Trustee filed an opposition to the Joint Brief. (Main Case ECF No. 3803.) On November 22, 2024, the Joint Defendants filed a reply in support of the Joint Brief. (Main Case ECF No. 3848.) The Joint Motions are fully briefed. The Non-Joint Motions and the Trustee's motion for judgment on the pleadings against Z&Z are also fully briefed.9\n\nOn January 8, 2025, a Status Conference was held regarding the format of the hearing on the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. During the Status Conference, the Court, in consultation with the parties, established the format for the hearing. The Court also noted certain defendants did not raise any of the Joint Brief issues in their motions to dismiss. The parties agreed that the hearing on those defendants' motions should not be held at the same time. Accordingly, the Court adjourned without date the hearings on those motions.10 (*Despins v. Harcus Parker Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05163 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 32; *Despins v. Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073, Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 29.)\n\n9 A schedule of the briefing of the Non-Joint Motions and the Trustee's motion for judgment on the pleadings against Z&Z appears in **Appendix G**.\n\n10 Although Mr. Jason Miller joined the Joint Brief, by a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed on October 18, 2024, *see* **Appendix A**, *infra*, and was heard with respect to that motion, he was not heard on his previous, non-joint motion to dismiss filed on June 26, 2024.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 35 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 39 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 34 of 102\n\nDespite raising some or all the common issues, other defendants were unsure whether they wanted to be heard at the same time as the Joint Defendants. After the Status Conference, these defendants indicated they did not wish their motions to be heard at the same time. Accordingly, the Court also adjourned without date the hearings on their motions. (*Despins v. Apple Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05060 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 67; *Despins v. Meta Platforms Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05117 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 14, 2025), ECF No. 42.)\n\nOn January 15, 2025, a hearing was held on the Joint Motions, the Non-Joint Motions, and the Z&Z Objection. This matter is ripe for decision.\n\n# **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (H), (O). The Court concludes its exercise of jurisdiction is not precluded by Article III of the Constitution. *Cf. Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n# **IV. DISCUSSION**\n\n#### **A. Legal Standard**\n\nThe Joint Motions, Non-Joint Motions, and Z&Z Objection assert the Trustee has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c), *made applicable by* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b); *see also Lively v. Wafra Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc.*, 6\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 36 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 40 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 35 of 102\n\nF.4th 293, 302 (2d Cir. 2021) (motions for judgment on the pleadings are subject to the same standard as a motion to dismiss). In determining whether the Avoidance Claims state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the Court must take the well-pled allegations, including those in documents attached to the complaint, as true. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980); *Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't*, 692 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2012); *Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc.*, 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002); *Tatum v. Oberg*, 650 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D. Conn. 2009). The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in the Trustee's favor. *Warren v. Colvin*, 744 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 2014).\n\nTo be well-pled, the Avoidance Claims must contain \"a short and plain statement showing the pleader is entitled to relief\". Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), *made applicable by* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008. They must contain \"sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face'\". *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The \"plausibility standard\", while not a \"probability requirement\", requires more than a \"sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.\" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). Determining the plausibility of a claim is \"a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.\" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Nevertheless, \"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.\" *Id.* at 678.\n\nIn determining the sufficiency of the Avoidance Claims, the Court must also consider documents incorporated into the complaints by reference and matters of which it may take judicial notice. *Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.*, 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). Here, as noted above, the Trustee has incorporated by reference his complaints against (1) Golden Spring\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 37 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 41 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 36 of 102\n\n(New York) Limited (\"Golden Spring\"); (2) Lamp Capital LLC (\"Lamp Capital\"); (3) HCHK Technologies, Inc. (\"HCHK Tech\"); (4) HCHK Property Management, Inc (\"HCHK Property\"); (5) Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. (\"Lexington\", and, together with HCHK Tech and HCHK Property, each, an \"HCHK Entity\" and, collectively, the \"HCHK Entities\"); (6) Greenwich Land, LLC (\"Greenwich Land\"); and (7) Leading Shine NY Ltd. (\"Leading Shine\"). These complaints allege, under Delaware law, (i) the foregoing entities are the *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor; and (ii) they and/or their assets are beneficially owned by the Individual Debtor.11 None of the elements of these claims need to be pled with particularity. *See Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.*, 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying Delaware law and holding there is no requirement to show fraud to establish *alter ego*).\n\n#### **B. Joint Motions**\n\nThe Court will first consider the Joint Defendants'12 arguments on the four issues:\n\n(i) whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity;\n\n(ii) whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations;\n\n(iii) the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination; and\n\n11 Each of the seven *alter egos* at issue were allegedly formed in Delaware. *See* **Appendix F**, *infra*. Taking these allegations as true, Delaware law applies to the Trustee's *alter ego* and beneficial ownership claims. *Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP)*, 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013) (forum state choice of law applies); *see Weber v. U.S. Sterling Secs., Inc.*, 924 A.2d 816, 822–23 (Conn. 2007) (applying local law of state of formation to *alter ego* action and other internal affairs regarding an LLC); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 303, 304. To be clear, \"Delaware courts use the terms 'piercing the corporate veil' and 'alter ego' theory interchangeably.\" *Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc.*, 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018).\n\n12 Regardless of usage of \"Joint Defendant\" or \"Non-Joint Defendant\", the determinations in sections B and C of the Discussion apply to all defendants that raise or join in the arguments addressed.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 38 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 42 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 37 of 102\n\n(iv) whether a determination of reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* may be applied retroactively.\n\nDuring the hearing, the Joint Defendants divided the four issues into two arguments. Regarding issues (i) and (iii), the Joint Defendants argue even if the Court were to hold certain entities are the Individual Debtor's *alter egos*, the Court must dismiss the complaints because an *alter ego* finding does not give the Trustee standing to sue on the *alter ego's* transfers of its property. As to issues (ii) and (iv), the Joint Defendants raise a series of arguments that *alter ego* determinations are improper under applicable state law or must be circumscribed in the bankruptcy context because of prejudice to the *alter egos'* transferees. The Court will address these arguments in turn.\n\n# **1. Issues (i) and (iii): The effect of an** *alter ego* **determination in avoidable transfer actions**\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law would result only in the *alter egos* being vicariously liable for debts of the Individual Debtor. Such a determination, they argue, would *not* (i) accomplish the transfer of the *alter egos'* assets into the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate and allow the Trustee to assert an unauthorized post-petition transfer claim; or (ii) collapse the identity of the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos* to allow the Trustee to assert that an *alter ego's* transfer of its property is a fraudulent transfer by the Individual Debtor of his property. On these bases, the Joint Defendants argue the Trustee lacks standing to bring the Avoidance Claims even assuming he prevails on his *alter ego* claims. Ultimately, the Joint Defendants assert the Trustee's only recovery is from the *alter egos* themselves.\n\nIn response, the Trustee makes two arguments. First, the Trustee argues that while an *alter ego* determination is made under applicable state law, the effect of an *alter ego*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 39 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 43 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 38 of 102\n\ndetermination is a matter of federal law. In particular, the Trustee asserts section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code controls whether an interest that exists at state law is property of the estate. Second, the Trustee argues even if state law controls the effect of an *alter ego* determination, Delaware law follows an identity theory of *alter ego.* Therefore, the Trustee argues an *alter ego* determination provides him with a basis to assert fraudulent transfer and unauthorized postpetition transfer claims. The Trustee contends that if the Court agrees with the Joint Defendants, the result will be to ignore the Individual Debtor's misconduct and inequitable dealings by cutting off the estate's recovery.\n\nAs discussed in greater detail below, the Court agrees with the Trustee. As a threshold matter, the Joint Defendants' argument focuses solely on the Avoidance Claims' *alter ego* allegations and fails to address the overlapping and alternative beneficial ownership allegations. The Avoidance Claims assert the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos* and their assets as a basis for the relief requested. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541; *Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv.*, 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990); *Orr v. Kinderhill Corp.*, 991 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993). Moreover, the substantive avoidable transfer law upon which the Avoidance Claims are pled controls the effect of an *alter ego* determination. Avoidable transfer law values substance over form and is, hence, amenable to piercing the corporate veil where applicable law would disregard the corporate form. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54); 541; *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59; *United States v. Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1983); *Butner v. United States*, 440 U.S. 48, 54–57 (1979); *Stadtmauer v. Tulis (In re Nordlicht)*, 115 F.4th 90, 104–06 (2d Cir. 2024); *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *McNellis v. Raymond*, 420 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1970); *ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp.*, 382 B.R. 49, 66–68 (S.D. Tex. 2007).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 40 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 44 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 39 of 102\n\n# **i. Issues (i) and (iii): Beneficial ownership alleged in connection with the transfers**\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the Trustee improperly uses Delaware *alter ego* law to satisfy two elements of the Avoidance Claims by collapsing the distinctions between (a) the alleged *alter ego* transferor and the Individual Debtor13; and (b) the *alter ego* transferor's *property* and the Individual Debtor's *property*14 and/or the estate's *property*15. However, as noted, the Trustee also alleges the Individual Debtor beneficially owns the *alter egos* and/or their assets. The Court cannot ignore the Trustee's allegations.\n\n# **a. Beneficial ownership allegations are relevant to issue (i): whether Trustee alleges an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity or by the Individual Debtor**\n\nRegarding the first element, to plead actual fraudulent transfer or one sort of constructive fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee must plead the Individual Debtor made the transfer. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (B)(ii)(IV). Likewise, with respect to his NYUVTA claims, the Trustee must plead that the Individual Debtor or some other party liable on his debt made the transfer. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f). However, an unauthorized postpetition transfer and the other types of constructive fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy Code do not require the Individual Debtor to have made the transfer. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III) (no requirement that the debtor made the transfer), 549(a) (same).\n\nUnder the Bankruptcy Code, \"transfers\" include, in pertinent part, \"each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with—(i) property; or (ii) an interest in property.\" 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D). Similarly, transfers under\n\n13 *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b).\n\n14 *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b).\n\n15 *See* 11 U.S.C. § 549(a).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 41 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 45 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 40 of 102\n\nNYUVTA include, in pertinent part, \"every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset\". N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p).\n\nIn keeping with the inclusion of \"indirect\" conveyances in the definition of transfer in both the Bankruptcy Code and NYUVTA, courts look to the substance, not the form, of a transfer. *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35 (\"In equity, 'substance will not give way to form, [and] technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from being done.' Thus, an allegedly fraudulent conveyance must be evaluated in context; '[w]here a transfer is only a step in a general plan, the plan \"must be viewed as a whole with all its composite implications.\"'\") (internal citations omitted; other alterations in original); *see* 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 548.03[6] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2025) (collecting cases). Courts must look at the \"economic reality\" of the transaction. *Orr*, 991 F.2d at 36 (citing *Salomon Inc. v. United States*, 976 F.2d 837, 842 (2d Cir. 1992)). Courts may, on appropriate facts, disregard corporate separateness in analyzing the economic reality of a transaction. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53 (in an action under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, affirming district court ruling insofar as it pierced the corporate veil to determine that principal received consideration – the loan to his company – for his personal payments to the lender and, hence, ruled the transaction was not a fraudulent conveyance); *see Cohen v. de la Cruz*, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998) (holding law under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, is not displaced unless there is a clear indication Congress intended to do so).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 42 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 46 of 107\n\n102\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 41 of\n\nThe Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims as alleging the following *series* of transfers:16\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*\n\nAccepting the Joint Defendants' interpretation, the Trustee is wholly relying on an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos* to allege the Individual Debtor made the transfers. The Joint Defendants dispute this identity and argue the Trustee does not have standing to avoid the remaining transfer, **B**Æ**C**.\n\nHowever, the Court must assess the transfers as they are alleged. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.,*\n\n*LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc.*, 583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018). Contrary to the Joint Defendants'\n\ninterpretation of the complaints, the Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor made the transfers\n\n\"using\" the *alter egos*:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nThe Trustee is not relying solely on an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter egos*\n\n– he is alleging the *alter egos* are an *instrument* of the transfers.\n\nFor example, in the complaint against, among others, Amazon.com, Inc. (\"Amazon\"), a\n\nJoint Defendant, the Trustee alleges:\n\n44. Prior to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, using his alter ego shell companies Greenwich Land, G Club17, Lexington, HCHK Technologies, and Golden Spring, or otherwise, transferred the [Individual] Debtor's property to Amazon (collectively, the \"Prepetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE A** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n16 The diagrams below are reproduced in **Appendix H**. 17 The Avoidance Claims in this complaint are stayed with respect to transfers involving G Club Operations LLC. Thus, the Court will only discuss Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land herein.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 43 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 47 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 42 of 102\n\n> 45. Subsequent to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, through his shell companies, Greenwich Land, G Club, Lexington, and Golden Spring, or otherwise, transferred property of the estate to Amazon (collectively, the \"Postpetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE B** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n(Complaint ¶¶ 44–45, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM),\n\nAdv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) The Trustee alleges the transfers were part of the Individual Debtor's \"shell game\" involving \"(i) [Individual] Debtor-controlled shell companies held by close family members and/or subordinates, (ii) assets purchased with cash from other [Individual] Debtor-controlled entities and/or transferred to and among shell entities for no consideration, and (iii) the [Individual] Debtor benefitting from and having control and dominion over such assets\", (*id*. ¶ 22), with the purpose of the shell game being \"to conceal and dissipate millions of dollars in assets while falsely pleading poverty to his many creditors\", (*id.* ¶ 37). (*See id.* ¶¶ 20–43.) All the other complaints make the same allegations about the Individual Debtor's financial affairs.\n\nIn support of these arguments, the complaint against Amazon incorporates the *alter ego* complaints against Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land. (*Id.* ¶ 20 n. 4.) The *alter ego* complaints seek declaratory judgments of *alter ego* and beneficial ownership and, on the bases of these declaratory judgments, turnover of property of the estate. For example, the complaint against Golden Spring alleges\n\nGolden Spring is the alter ego of the [Individual] Debtor and the [Individual] Debtor is the equitable owner of Golden Spring and/or its assets.\n\n(Complaint ¶ 2, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 44 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 48 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 43 of 102\n\nThe complaint against Golden Spring alleges numerous facts about, *inter alia*, the Individual Debtor's control over Golden Spring's formation, funding, management, and operations as well as his use of Golden Spring as a shell company to hide assets, pay expenses, and, generally, serve his interests. (*Id.* ¶¶ 13–38.) Extensive exhibits are attached to the complaint in support of these allegations. The other *alter ego* complaints make similar allegations relating to the Individual Debtor's dominion and control over the alleged *alter egos*, his benefit from and use of their assets and/or services, and his use of their corporate form to shield assets from his creditors.\n\nThe Trustee's allegations connect the Individual Debtor to the nominal transferors through two overlapping legal theories: (i) *alter ego*, the focus of the Joint Defendants' argument; and (ii) beneficial ownership, which the Joint Defendants do not address. However, the Trustee's beneficial ownership allegations are relevant to whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor made the transfers. Assuming the Trustee has plausibly alleged the Individual Debtor beneficially owns the *alter egos*18, he has plausibly pled the *alter egos* are affiliates of the Individual Debtor, through which the Individual Debtor could indirectly transfer assets. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), (15), (41); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(a). In fact, courts have collapsed transactions involving affiliates. *See, e.g.*, *Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp.*, 919 F.2d 206, 208–210, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming district court where fraudulent transfer involved owners laundering the assets of one company they owned to another as part of an overall scheme to make assets unavailable to creditors); *accord* 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D) (transfers include *indirect* transfers); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p) (same).\n\n18 The Court does not reach the issue of whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos* because that is not among the four issues.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 45 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 49 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 44 of\n\n102\n\nTherefore, the Court finds the parties' argument regarding the effect of *alter ego* is not dispositive of the sufficiency of the Trustee's pleading the Individual Debtor is the transferor.\n\n# **b. Beneficial ownership allegations may render inconsequential issue (iii): the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determination**\n\nTurning to the second element at issue, Bankruptcy Code section 548 actual or constructive fraudulent transfer claims must plead a transfer of \"an interest of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1). Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code provides the Trustee standing to bring avoidance actions an actual creditor could bring under other applicable state or federal law to avoid transfers of \"an interest of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 544(b). The Trustee's New York law actual and constructive fraudulent transfer claims must additionally plead a transfer of \"property of the debtor\", where \"debtor\" is the Individual Debtor or another party liable on his debt. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (f), (l), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b). Finally, unauthorized post-petition transfer claims must plead a transfer of \"property of the estate\". 11 U.S.C. § 549(a).\n\nAn interest of the debtor in property is anything that would have been property of the estate but for the transfer to be avoided. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59 (\"Because the purpose of the avoidance provision is to preserve the property includable within the bankruptcy estate—the property available for distribution to creditors—'property of the debtor' subject to the preferential transfer provision is best understood as that property that would have been part of the estate had it not been transferred before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.\"). Therefore, the analysis of whether a transfer is of \"an interest of the debtor in property\", 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1), and the analysis of whether a transfer is of \"property of the estate\", 11 U.S.C. § 549(a), both center on section 541, which defines property of the estate. Property of\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 46 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 50 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 45 of 102\n\nthe estate includes, in pertinent part, \"wherever located and by whomever held[,] . . . all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property\". 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). Indeed, the Avoidance Claims must plead the Individual Debtor has an *equitable* interest in property, as opposed to mere legal title. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 58; *accord* 11 U.S.C. § 541(d) (excepting from property of the estate property to which the debtor has only a legal interest insofar as the debtor does not have an equitable interest).\n\nAs to whether a transfer is of property of a debtor under NYUVTA, New York law recognizes beneficial ownership in actions to collect on a debt. *See, e.g.*, *In re Gliklad v. Chernoi*, 12 N.Y.S.3d 65 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (affirming order requiring judgment debtor to turn over beneficial ownership of a business); *Guilder v. Corinth Constr. Corp.*, 651 N.Y.S.2d 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (remanding case to determine whether individual defendants equitably owned a corporate defendant and whether the plaintiff could pierce the corporate veil between the corporate defendant and its potential equitable owners); *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan*, Index No. 652077/2017, 2022 WL 406636 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022) (determining judgment debtor beneficially owned yacht in action to collect on judgment). Therefore, an \"interest of the debtor in property\", \"property of the estate\", and \"property of the debtor\" all include the Individual Debtor's equitable interests in property.\n\nThe Joint Defendants argue the Trustee seeks to avoid a transfer of the *alter egos'* property:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 47 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 51 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 46 of 102\n\nThe Joint Defendants interpret the complaints to be alleging an *alter ego* determination would *create* an interest of the Individual Debtor in the *alter egos'* property.19 The Joint Defendants argue the Trustee is mistaken – an *alter ego* determination cannot create an interest in property that did not previously exist – and, therefore, the Trustee does not have standing to assert the remaining **B**Æ**C** transfer of **B**'s property.\n\nOnce again, however, the Court must assess the transfers as alleged. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. In the complaints, the Trustee alleges the transfers are transfers of the Individual Debtor's property and/or property of the estate – *not* the *alter egos'* property:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nThe Trustee is alleging the Individual Debtor *always* had an interest in the *alter egos'* property – the interest is not created by an *alter ego* determination.\n\nThis can be seen in the paragraphs from the complaint against Amazon cited above. But to use another example, in the complaint against, among others, Joint Defendant B&H Foto & Electronics Corp. (\"B&H Foto\"), the Trustee makes the following allegations:\n\n43. Prior to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, using his alter ego shell companies including Greenwich Land, Golden Spring, HCHK Technologies, G Club Operations, Rule of Law20 and Lexington Property, or otherwise, transferred the [Individual] Debtor's property to B&H (collectively, the \"Prepetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE A** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n44. Subsequent to the Petition Date, the [Individual] Debtor, through shell companies including Greenwich Land, Lexington, Golden Spring, G Club Operations,\n\n19 Effectively, as the Joint Defendants see it, *alter ego* determinations are involuntary transfers, *see* 11 U.S.C. § 101(54), and **A=B**Æ**C** can also be written **A**Å**B**Æ**C**. 20 The Avoidance Claims in this complaint are stayed with respect to transfers involving G Club\n\nOperations and Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc. Thus, the Court will only discuss Golden Spring, HCHK Tech, Lexington, and Greenwich Land herein.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 48 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 52 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 47 of 102\n\nand HCHK Technologies, or otherwise, transferred property of the estate to B&H (collectively, the \"Postpetition Transfers\"), including, without limitation, as follows:\n\nSee **SCHEDULE B** attached hereto and made a part hereof.\n\n(Complaint ¶¶ 43–44, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.) The complaint alleges the Individual Debtor was involved in a \"shell game\", whereby he hid *his* assets in *alter egos* – and after the petition date, the assets of the estate – to frustrate collection of those assets to pay his debts and avoid his duties under the Bankruptcy Code. (*Id.* ¶¶ 19–42.) These allegations are identical in form to those in all the other complaints.\n\nThe complaints against the alleged *alter egos* involved in the transfers at issue are incorporated by reference. (*Id.* ¶ 19 n. 4.) All the *alter ego* complaints contain extensive allegations that the Individual Debtor used, controlled, and benefitted from the assets of the *alter egos*. 21 One of those, the *alter ego* complaint against Golden Spring is discussed above. (*See* Complaint ¶¶ 10–38, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.) As another example, the complaint against the HCHK Entities makes similar allegations. (*See* Complaint ¶¶ 16–40, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23- 05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.)\n\nA review of the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints makes clear the Trustee is not solely relying on *alter ego* to assert the Individual Debtor or the estate has an equitable interest in the transferred property. As with the first element, to the extent the Trustee\n\n21 All the *alter ego* complaints except the complaint against Greenwich Land allege beneficial ownership of both the *alter ego* and its assets. *See* **Appendix F**, *infra*. The complaint against Greenwich Land nevertheless contains allegations about the Individual Debtor's use and control of and benefit from Greenwich Land's assets.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 49 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 53 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 48 of 102\n\nhas plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of an *alter ego's* assets22, he has plausibly pled a transfer of his property and/or property that is or, but for the transfer, would have been property of the estate. Hence, the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law is also not dispositive of this element.\n\n# **ii. Avoidable transfer law controls issue (i): whether the Individual Debtor is the transferor; and issue (iii): whether the** *alter egos'* **property is the Individual Debtor's property and/or property of the estate**\n\nNotwithstanding the foregoing, the Court will discuss the parties' arguments regarding the effect of *alter ego* and avoidable transfer actions in bankruptcy proceedings. In *McNellis*, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court both in piercing the corporate veil with respect to a trustee's fraudulent transfer action and in refusing to pierce the same corporate veil with respect to the trustee's usury action. 420 F.2d at 53–54. The Second Circuit concluded, while fraudulent conveyance law allowed courts to pierce form in favor of substance, New York's usury law had developed to allow individuals to use a corporate *alter ego* to take out an otherwise usurious loan. *Id.* That is, the Second Circuit looked to the substantive law governing the trustee's causes of actions to determine whether the corporate veil could be pierced to establish an element or defense. *Id.*\n\nAccordingly, the Trustee is correct that the effect of an *alter ego* determination under Delaware law is not dispositive. The relevant avoidable transfer statutes – here, the Bankruptcy Code and NYUVTA – determine whether and to what effect corporate veils may be pierced for the purposes of fraudulent transfer or unauthorized post-petition transfer. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53–54. The standard governing veil piercing is determined by applicable choice of law rules –\n\n22 The Court does not reach the issue of whether the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor's beneficial ownership of the *alter egos'* assets because that is not among the four issues.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 50 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 54 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 49 of 102\n\nwhich may or may not be different than the law governing the overall cause of action. *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 66–68 (denying motion to dismiss because debtor had sufficiently alleged standing to allege fraudulent transfer, under Delaware law, standing in shoes of its subsidiary through reverse veil-piercing, under Delaware law); *accord Spring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC*, C.A. No. 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016) (acknowledging that under Delaware fraudulent transfer law, where reverse veil piercing is available under applicable law, a creditor of a parent may argue *alter ego* for the purposes of pursuing the fraudulent transfer of a subsidiary's assets).\n\nThe Joint Defendants assert the relief the Trustee seeks is novel. It is not. *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 66–68 (applying Delaware *alter ego* law); *see Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.)*, Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594-DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2020 WL 6821721, at \\*4–6 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2020) (applying Nevada *alter ego* law); *Searcy v. Knight (In re Am. Int'l Refinery)*, 402 B.R. 728, 743–48 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2008) (same); *Kendall v. Turner (In re Turner)*, 335 B.R. 140, 145–47 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005) (applying California *alter ego* law), *upheld in pertinent part on reconsideration* 345 B.R. 674, 676–77 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (upholding *alter ego* determination).\n\n# **a. Issues (i) and (iii): State law allows avoidance of an** *alter ego's* **transfer of its property**\n\nFurthermore, the relief the Trustee is seeking is certainly not novel under state law. Under NYUVTA, actual and constructive fraudulent transfers can be established by an *alter ego's* transfer of its property. \"'Debtor' means a person that is liable on a claim.\" N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f). Therefore, even assuming *alter ego* only creates vicarious *liability*, an *alter ego* is a \"debtor\" even if it is not a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. Because it is a debtor, an *alter ego* can make an avoidable transfer. *See* N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274. Moreover, property\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 51 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 55 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 50 of 102\n\nof an *alter ego* is property of a debtor. N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (l), (p). Therefore, in a state law action, *alter ego* can be used in conjunction with NYUVTA. *See Bravia Cap. H.K. Ltd. v. SL Green Realty Corp.*, No. 24-cv-2296 (JGK), 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025) (applying NYUVTA and Delaware *alter ego* law) (citing *JSC Foreign Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc.*, 295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 379–80 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (applying the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (\"UFTA\"), predecessor of Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (\"UVTA\")).\n\nThis is not only the law in New York; it is the law of most if not all jurisdictions within the United States. *See* Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552b (6) (Connecticut has adopted UFTA which has same definition of \"debtor\" as UVTA); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06[2] (forty-six states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UFTA or UVTA); *see, e.g.*, *Magliarditi v. TransFirst Grp., Inc.*, 450 P.3d 911, 2019 WL 5390470, at \\*4–5 (Nev. 2019) (table disposition); *Thompson Props. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow Co., Inc.*, 839 So. 2d 629, 633–34 (Ala. 2002); *Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3; *Dwyer v. Meramec Venture Assocs., L.L.C.*, 75 S.W.3d 291, 294–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); *U.S. Cap. Funding VI, Ltd. v. Patterson Bankshares, Inc.*, 137 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1367–68 (S.D. Ga. 2015). Avoidable transfer and *alter ego* law both seek to thwart judgment evasion and can, unsurprisingly, be used together in collection actions outside of bankruptcy.\n\nIf the Trustee has standing under section 544(b) to bring his NYUVTA claims and has plausibly pled *alter ego*23, he has plausibly pled a debtor transferred its property.\n\n23 The Court will discuss the plausibility of the Trustee's *alter ego* allegations in section D below, after discussing the defendants' arguments regarding the sufficiency of his pleading.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 52 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 56 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 51 of 102\n\n# **b. Issues (i) and (iii): Bankruptcy law allows avoidance of an** *alter ego's* **transfer of its property**\n\nThe Court must determine whether the normal rule applicable outside of bankruptcy also applies in bankruptcy. As in the beneficial ownership discussion above, two elements are at issue. First, it must be determined whether *alter ego* allegations may be used to assert the Individual Debtor is the transferor. The Bankruptcy Code only controls this element with respect to actual fraudulent transfer and one of the four types of constructive fraudulent transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV). Section 544(b) does not apply this element to the Trustee's NYUVTA claims and it is not an element of three of the four types of constructive fraudulent transfer or unauthorized post-petition transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III), 549(a).\n\nSecond, it must be determined whether *alter ego* allegations may be used to assert the *alter ego's* property is or would have been, but for the transfer, property of the estate. *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59. This is an element of all the Avoidance Claims, including the Trustee's NYUVTA claims. As discussed above, the Trustee only has standing to bring claims under NYUVTA if he alleges a transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b).\n\n# *Issue (i): Does the Trustee allege an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity?*\n\nWith respect to the first element, the Court concludes *alter ego* can be used to establish the Individual Debtor was the transferor because the definition of \"transfer\" includes indirect conveyances. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54). Indeed, in *McNellis*, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to pierce the corporate veil and to hold the individual rather than his corporation took out the loan he later repaid. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53–54; *see Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *Voest-*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 53 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 57 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 52 of 102\n\n*Alpine*, 919 F.2d at 212–13. Therefore, *alter ego* allegations may support allegations that the Individual Debtor – not a non-debtor entity – is the transferor.\n\n# *Issue (iii): What is the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or alter ego determination?*\n\nAs to the second element, where the Bankruptcy Code is silent, state law determines what interests parties have in property. *Butner*, 440 U.S. at 54–57. However, *Butner* also holds Congress has authority under Article I, section 8, clause 4 of the Constitution to define property interests contrary to state law for the purposes of bankruptcy. *Id.* at 54–57 (holding it is a matter of state law whether, when, and how a mortgagee obtains a security interest in rents because the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, did not include a provision providing or denying mortgagees such a security interest).\n\nCongress defined property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541. \"Congress intended a broad range of property to be included in the estate\", including \"property in which the debtor did not have a possessory interest at the time the bankruptcy proceedings commenced.\" *Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. at 204–05 (affirming Second Circuit determination that property of the estate included property seized by the Internal Revenue Service to enforce a tax lien prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition). Therefore, consistent with *Butner* and *Whiting Pools*, courts have generally held that while state law determines what interests a debtor has in property, federal law determines whether those interests in property are included in property of the estate. *Lowe v. Bowers (In re Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.)*, 916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019); *Abboud v. Ground Round, Inc. (In re The Ground Round, Inc.)*, 482 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2007); *In re Nejberger*, 934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991); *N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis (In re N.S. Garrott & Sons)*, 772 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1985).\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 54 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 58 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 53 of 102\n\nAn *alter ego* claim is property of the estate. *Nordlicht*,115 F.4th at 104–06 (holding *alter ego* claim under New York law is property of the estate), because such claims \"'inure[] to the benefit of all creditors' by enlarging the estate\", *Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105 (alteration in original); *see In re Emoral, Inc.*, 740 F.3d 875 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that successor liability claims are property of the estate because, like *alter ego* claims, they are general claims of creditors). This is true even if at state law *alter ego* is a claim for the imposition of vicarious liability, not an independent cause of action. *Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 109–111. *Nordlicht* determined that\n\nalter-ego theories of liability neatly fall[] within the Bankruptcy Code's definition of 'claim':\n\n(A) *right to payment*, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or\n\n(B) *right to an equitable remedy* for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.\"\n\n115 F.4th at 110 (emphasis in original).\n\nUnder *Nordlicht*, a trustee's right to payment or an equitable remedy (such as turnover) from an *alter ego* is property of the estate. 115 F.4th at 105. A trustee may seek recovery from the *alter ego* to the full extent of claims asserted against the estate. *See Moore v. Bay (In re Est. of Sassard & Kimball, Inc.)*, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931) (holding, with respect to predecessors of section 544(b) claims, the trustee could recover on an avoided transfer for the estate's creditors at large). Property recoverable by a trustee is property of the estate. *Whiting Pools*, 462 U.S. at 204–07. Moreover, under *Begier*, the Individual Debtor had an interest in any such property prepetition. 496 U.S. at 59. Hence, if the Trustee prevails on his *alter ego* claims, the *alter egos'*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 55 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 59 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 54 of 102\n\nproperty is property of the estate and the Individual Debtor had an interest in that property prepetition. *See Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105 (*alter ego* claims \"'inure[] to the benefit of all creditors' by enlarging the estate\"); *718 Arch St. Assocs., Ltd. v. Blatstein (In re Blatstein)*, 192 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding court had jurisdiction to determine appeal of a ruling on, among other things, creditor's claim that certain corporations were *alter egos* of the debtor because a determination that they were his *alter egos* \"would result in the inclusion in his bankruptcy estate of substantial assets which then would be available to satisfy, at least in part, his creditors' claims.\"); *Green v. Bate Recs., Inc. (In re 10th Ave. Rec. Distribs., Inc.)*, 97 B.R. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding trustee had standing to bring *alter ego* claim because it was \"an attempt to collect property of the estate for the benefit of *all* creditors and is not personal to any particular creditor\") (emphasis in original).\n\n# *Contrary authority is unpersuasive*\n\nIn coming to this conclusion, the Court respectfully disagrees with the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in *In re Howland*. 674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017); *accord Lippe v. Bairnco Corp.*, 230 B.R. 906, 914–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); *Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle)*, BAP No. NV-05-1000-KMB, Bankruptcy No. S-01-21542-BAM, Adversary No. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006); *Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels L.P. (In re DuMouchelle)*, Case No. 19-54531, Adv. Pro. No. 21- 04041-lsg, \\_\\_\\_ B.R. \\_\\_\\_, 2023 WL 8100234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023) (applying *Howland*); *Evangelista v. Silver (In re Silver)*, 647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022) (same). In *Howland*, the Sixth Circuit held property of an *alter ego* is not property of the estate and cannot be recovered where, at state law, *alter ego* merely imposes vicarious liability. 674 F.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 56 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 60 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 55 of 102\n\nApp'x at 487. *Lippe* and *Wardle* held the same. *DuMouchelle* and *Silver*, decisions from courts within the sixth circuit, applied *Howland*.\n\nIn addition to the statutory analysis above, the Court respectfully disagrees with *Howland* for several reasons. First, courts \"do not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure\". *Cohen*, 523 U.S. at 221. In interpreting the Code, courts presume Congress's \"familiarity with the prevailing understanding\" of the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898. *Johnson v. Home State Bank*, 501 U.S. 78, 86 (1991). There is no clear indication that Congress intended to overrule *McNellis*. *Compare* 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54), 541(a), 544(b), 548(a), 549(a) *with* 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(30) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 1) (repealed 1978), 107(d) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 67) (repealed 1978), 110(a), (d), (e) (former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, section 70) (repealed 1978). *McNellis* – which upheld the use of *alter ego* to prove a defense to a trustee's fraudulent transfer action brought under federal bankruptcy law and New York law – is binding on this Court. 420 F.2d at 53–54.\n\nSecond, the Sixth Circuit's approach to *alter ego* claims in avoidance actions is contrary to the Second Circuit's directive that courts must consider the substance, rather than the form, of a fraudulent transfer. *See Orr*, 991 F.2d at 35; *see also Boyer v. Crown Stock Dist., Inc.*, 587 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009); *Voest-Alpine*, 919 F.2d at 211–12. There is capacity in fraudulent transfer law to look past the nominal parties to a transaction where state law allows the corporate form to be disregarded. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53; *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 65–68. This capacity to recognize the economic reality is reflected in the expansive definitions of transfer and property of the estate in the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)(D), 541.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 57 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 61 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 56 of 102\n\nThird, *Howland* is contrary to how *alter ego* and avoidance claims interact under state law. As outlined above, *alter ego* can be used in NYUVTA claims outside of bankruptcy to target transactions where the *alter ego* is both the nominal transferor and the nominal owner of the transferred property. *Bravia Cap.*, 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9; *Technostroyexport*, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; *see Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3.\n\nThe result should be no different in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is, among other things, a collective collection proceeding. *Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 370–71. That is *why* the Trustee has standing to assert (i) general claims for the benefit of creditors at large, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a); *see Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 105; and (ii) particular avoidance claims of actual creditors, 11 U.S.C. § 544(b), to the full extent of the transfer – even if the actual creditors' debt is less than the transferred amount, *Moore*, 284 U.S. at 5. Bankruptcy \"shields creditors from one another by replacing 'race' and other preferential systems of debt collection with a more equitable and orderly distribution of assets.\" *In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.*, 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (discussing purpose of the automatic stay) (citing *Fidelity Mortg. Invs. v. Camelia Builders, Inc.*, 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976) (case under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended)). It would undermine the collective nature of bankruptcy to send creditors on a race to the courthouse to pursue *alter ego* and fraudulent transfer remedies – remedies they may have no standing to pursue during the pendency of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy. *See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc.*, 884 F.2d 688, 704–05 (2d Cir. 1989).\n\nEven if creditors *could* bring these actions outside of bankruptcy, the costs to do so would be high: the Trustee's investigation into the Individual Debtor's financial affairs has been highly litigated and time consuming. Forcing creditors to pursue these avoidance actions outside of bankruptcy or forego their prosecution would promote an inequitable and uneven recovery for\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 58 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 62 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 57 of 102\n\nthe Individual Debtor's creditors, many of whom likely could not pay the fees and costs associated with such an effort. *See Union Bank v. Wolas*, 502 U.S. 151, 160–61 (1991) (section 547 is designed to balance related goals of preventing a race to the courthouse and providing for an equitable distribution to all creditors); *Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.)*, 78 F.3d 30, 40–41 (2d Cir. 1996) (same). The Trustee is the person to pool the creditors' interests in the estate and bring the avoidance actions for their collective benefit. 11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541–50*.*\n\nFinally, *Howland* also runs contrary to Delaware *alter ego* law. It is an accident of our legal system that, generally, *alter ego* results in vicarious liability – the *alter ego* doctrine is about disregarding the corporate form where it is abused and causes fraud or injustice. *See Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co.*, 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1968) (\"There is, of course, no doubt that upon a proper showing corporate entities as between parent and subsidiary may be disregarded and the ultimate party in interest, the parent, be regarded in law and fact as the sole party in a particular transaction.\"). As the Delaware Court of Chancery observed \"[a]t its most basic level, reverse veil-piercing involves the imposition of liability on a business organization for the liabilities of its owners\", *Manichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc.*, 251 A.3d 694, 710 (Del. Ch. 2021) (action to collect on appraisal judgment), *because* \"where the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent . . . the Court [will] treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent\", *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 710 (alteration in the original).\n\nMost relief in the common law takes the form of money damages. The primary use of an *alter ego* claim is to spread liability from a defendant liable at law for money damages on, *e.g.*, tort or contract to a defendant with deeper pockets. *See NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC*, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2008) (\"Nonetheless, in appropriate circumstances,\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 59 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 63 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 58 of 102\n\nthe distinction between the entity and its owner 'may be disregarded' to require an owner to answer for the entity's debts.\") (action on contract); *Wilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC*, 787 F. Supp. 2d 286, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (\"A plaintiff seeking to hold the owners of a corporation liable for the corporation's debts 'faces a difficult task.'\") (action on fraud); *Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.)*, 549 B.R. 21, 43–44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016) (\"Under Delaware law, veil piercing is a doctrine of equity. . . . Veil piercing is thus not a purely independent cause of action. Instead, piercing the corporate veil *effectively* amounts to the imposition of joint and several liability between a direct actor and its corporate affiliate for some underlying wrong committed by the direct actor.\") (action on tort) (emphasis added).\n\nHowever, the avoidance of a transfer is not money damages. \"[T]he purpose of the avoidance provision is to preserve the property includable within the bankruptcy estate\". *Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59 (discussing section 547 and the avoidance of preferential transfers); *see In re PWS Holding Corp.*, 303 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2002) (\"Fraudulent conveyance law aims 'to make available to creditors those assets of the debtor that are rightfully a part of the bankruptcy estate, even if they have been transferred away.'\"); *Sapir v. C.P.Q. Colorchrome Corp. (In re Photo Promotion Assocs., Inc.)*, 881 F.2d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that allowing an administrative claim holder to keep unauthorized post-petition transfers would be inequitable to other creditors who have similar claims). To this end, the relief provided by sections 548 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code and section 273 and 274 of NYUVTA is *avoidance* of the subject transfer – not money damages. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 549; N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274.\n\nUpon avoidance of the transfer, section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and section 276(b) of NYUVTA allow recovery of the *specific property* transferred, the value thereof, or the proceeds thereof. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 276(b). It is, therefore, entirely\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 60 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 64 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 59 of 102\n\nunsurprising that disregarding the corporate form and treating the assets of the *alter ego* as the assets of the debtor operates differently with regard to avoidance actions than it does with regard to other actions. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 710 (\"In the parent/subsidiary context, 'where the subsidiary is a mere alter ego of the parent . . . the Court [will] treat the assets of the subsidiary as those of the parent.'\").\n\n\"Delaware will not countenance the use of the corporate form as a means to facilitate fraud or injustice.\" *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714. Fraudulent and unauthorized postpetition transfer law align with this purpose. They exist to prevent inequitable results arising from the dissipation of assets. *See Begier*, 496 U.S. at 59; *PWS Holding Corp.*, 303 F.3d at 313; *Photo Promotion Assocs.*, 881 F.2d at 9–10. It would be fundamentally absurd and contrary to the purpose of the doctrine, if *alter ego* could not be used to prevent fraud or injustice resulting from a fraudulent or unauthorized post-petition transfer. These two bodies of law can be used together. *McNellis*, 420 F.2d at 53; *ASARCO*, 382 B.R. at 65–68; *see Bravia Cap.*, 2025 WL 552046, at \\*9; *Technostroyexport*, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80; *see also Spring Real Est.*, 2016 WL 769586, at \\*3.\n\n\\* \\* \\*\n\nFor all these reasons, the Court concludes a debtor may make a transfer through an *alter ego* and an *alter ego's* property is property of the debtor's estate. To the extent the Trustee has plausibly pled *alter ego*, the Trustee has plausibly pled the Individual Debtor transferred property that is, or would have been but for the transfers, property of the estate. To this same extent, the Trustee therefore has standing to bring his NYUVTA claims and, for the reasons stated above, has plausibly pled those claims. *Alter ego* can be used to support an avoidable transfer claim under the Bankruptcy Code or NYUVTA.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 60 of 102\n\n# **2. Issues (ii) and (iv): Prejudice to** *alter egos'* **trade creditors and substantive consolidation**\n\nThe Court turns to the Joint Defendants' remaining arguments. The Joint Defendants argue the Trustee has failed to plead a cognizable reverse veil piercing claim under Delaware law because (a) the Trustee has failed to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of the alleged *alter ego*; and (b) the Joint Defendants would, as a matter of law, be prejudiced by reverse veil-piercing. The Joint Defendants also argue (c) the Trustee is seeking impermissible *nunc pro tunc* relief; and (d) even if the relief were otherwise permissible under state law, the relief sought could also be achieved by substantive consolidation and therefore it is inequitable to allow the Trustee that relief without meeting the test required for *nunc pro tunc* substantive consolidation. Woven throughout the Joint Defendants' arguments is the contention that the relief the Trustee seeks is deeply inequitable to them as innocent trade creditors of the alleged *alter egos*.\n\nThe Trustee argues (a) the caselaw is clear a plaintiff is not required to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of an alleged *alter ego*; (b) prejudice is a fact intensive inquiry not resolvable on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings and, in any event, the Bankruptcy Code provides the Joint Defendants protections unavailable outside of bankruptcy; (c) he is not seeking *nunc pro tunc* relief with his *alter ego* claims but rather seeking to conform legal reality to factual reality; and (d) while the relief *alter ego* provides in bankruptcy proceedings may be similar to substantive consolidation, the factual and legal predicates for the two remedies differ and the Trustee has pled *alter ego*. The Trustee also disputes the contention that the Joint Defendants are all innocent trade creditors and that the relief he seeks is fundamentally unfair.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 62 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 66 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 61 of 102\n\n# **i. Issue (ii): Does applicable law allow for reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determinations?**\n\nAs stated above, the Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims to allege transfers:\n\n$$\\begin{array}{c} \\mathbf{A}\\_{\\text{(Indidual Deftor)}} = \\mathbf{B}\\_{\\text{(Alter ergo)}} \\xrightarrow[\\text{(Transfer elimination)}]{} \\mathbf{C}\\_{\\text{(Join Defretadant)}} \\\\ \\text{(Alter ergo determination)} \\end{array}$$\n\nWith respect to issue (ii), the Joint Defendants argue that even if an *alter ego* determination would create an identity between the Individual Debtor and the alleged *alter egos*, avoiding the **B**Æ**C** transfer is prejudicial because the Joint Defendants did not know **A=B**, and, hence, the Court cannot *as a matter of law* make an *alter ego* determination.\n\nThe Court disagrees. First, the Trustee is not required to plead a lack of prejudice to the *alter egos'* creditors. In adopting reverse veil-piercing, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that courts must consider the traditional *alter ego* factors and additionally consider a series of other factors that, essentially, relate to prejudice to the alleged *alter ego's* creditors, owners, and other stakeholders. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15. Nevertheless, the Court of Chancery rejected a defendant's argument the complaint should be dismissed for failure to plead a lack of prejudice to certain creditors of the alleged *alter ego*. *Id.* at 718. Instead, the Court of Chancery held \"[t]here is no basis in the Complaint to infer that reverse veil-piercing will cause harm to innocent third-party creditors. . . . To be clear, factual allegations related to . . . third-party creditors are not in the Complaint, and for now at least, my analysis is confined to the 'four corners' of that pleading.\" *Id.* The Court has been provided no reason to believe the Delaware Supreme Court would disagree with the Court of Chancery on this issue. Prejudice is an issue that requires factual development.\n\nSecond, the Trustee may plead the Joint Defendants are the initial transferees; it does not matter that subsequent transferees have different defenses. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 63 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 67 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 62 of 102\n\n382–86 (holding plaintiff could plead transfer in a way that a safe harbor defense was inapplicable); *cf. Covey v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. (In re Duckworth)*, Bankruptcy No. 10- 83603, Adversary No. 11-8104, 2012 WL 4434681, at \\*8 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012) (holding trustee's use of *alter ego* was impermissible in part because it would deprive defendant of subsequent transferee defenses it would have if trustee pled a different fraudulent transfer). The Joint Defendants can argue the Trustee has not pled a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code or NYUVTA. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. Indeed, the Joint Defendants have done so, as discussed above. They can continue to do so as these proceedings move beyond the pleading stage.\n\nIn support of their argument, the Joint Defendants urge the Court to adopt the holding of *Duckworth*, but their reliance is misplaced. The court in *Duckworth* was not faced with motions to dismiss – it was faced with motions for summary judgment. *Duckworth*, 2012 WL 4434681, at \\*2. The *Duckworth* court determined on the undisputed facts that it would be inequitable and contrary to applicable state law to allow the trustee to recover from a trade creditor of the alleged *alter ego*. *Id.* at \\*7. Here, the Joint Motions are motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. At this stage, the standard is whether the Trustee's well-pled allegations, taken as true, support a determination of impermissible prejudice. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 718. A review of the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints does not support such a determination.\n\nThe Joint Defendants do not have a right to the Trustee pleading that they are subsequent transferees. *See Merit Mgmt. Grp.*, 583 U.S. at 382. The Trustee pleads transfers:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 64 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 68 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 63 of 102\n\nHe is not required to plead an **A**Æ**B**Æ**C** transfer, treating the *alter ego* determination as a transfer, such that he alleges the Individual Debtor transferred his property to the *alter egos* as the initial transferees and the Joint Defendants are subsequent transferees of the *alter egos*.\n\n# **ii. Issue (iv): May a determination of reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **be applied retroactively?**\n\nTurning to issue (iv), the Court concludes the Trustee is not seeking *nunc pro tunc* relief. Adjudging an entity to be and have been an *alter ego* of another entity is not affording *nunc pro tunc* relief – it is adjudging that the corporate form is and has been a façade. Under the Joint Defendants' theory of *alter ego*, there would be no remedy available for a prevailing party. The Joint Defendants argue under Delaware law an *alter ego* determination merely imposes vicarious liability for a companion claim reducible to money damages. If an *alter ego* determination could only *prospectively* spread liability as the Joint Defendants assert, the *alter ego* would not be liable on the prevailing party's companion claim based on *already existing* facts. This is not how Delaware law operates. *Alter ego* may be brought *alongside* the companion claim, *see Tronox*, 549 B.R. at 27 (personal injury plaintiffs seek to impose vicarious liability through various theories, including *alter ego*, where original defendant is not amendable to suit), or even *after* judgment is entered on the companion claim, *see Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 699–701 (*alter ego* claim was brought *after* appraisal judgment), without any analysis as to whether *nunc pro tunc* relief is appropriate. This is because *nunc pro tunc* relief is not being sought. *See Reid v. Wolf (In re Wolf)*, 644 B.R. 725, 749 n. 9 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (rejecting \"confusing\" argument that an *alter ego* determination would be impermissibly retroactive in a bankruptcy case). *Alter ego* seeks a remedy based on existing facts, just as a breach of contract claim seeks a remedy on existing facts.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 65 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 69 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 64 of 102\n\nAn *alter ego* determination is *not* a transfer – it does not *create* an interest in property, but rather *recognizes* an interest in property. This is a fundamental flaw in the Joint Defendants' interpretation of the Avoidance Claims. As depicted above, the Joint Defendants interpret the Avoidance Claims to be alleging transfers:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*\n\nAssuming *arguendo* that an *alter ego* determination creates an identity between the Individual Debtor and the *alter ego*, the Joint Defendants argue an *alter ego* determination would change the nature of the **B**Æ**C** transfer *after the fact*. Therefore, the Joint Defendants argue the Court cannot treat the *alter ego* determination – **A=B**, which could be stated **A**Å**B** – as having occurred at the time of the **B**Æ**C** transfer.\n\nThe Trustee is not, however, alleging the **A=B** transfer, but rather alleging the *alter egos* have always been a mere instrumentality of the Individual Debtor. He alleges transfers:\n\n> *A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nand asserts such transfers through the *alter egos* are the Individual Debtor's *modus operandi* to obtain goods and services for himself, his family, his associates, and his businesses and to move assets.\n\nThe Court declines to adopt a prudential limitation on the use of *alter ego* in bankruptcy\n\ncases. The Delaware Court of Chancery held in *Manichaean Capital* that\n\nThe risks that reverse veil-piercing may be used as a blunt instrument to harm innocent parties, and to disrupt the expectations of arms-length bargaining, while real, do not, in my view, justify the rejection of reverse veil-piercing outright. Rather, the recognition of the risks creates an opportunity to manage them, and to do so in a manner that serves the interests of equity.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 66 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 70 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 65 of 102\n\n251 A.3d at 712. The Court sees no reason why courts sitting in bankruptcy are unable or illequipped to take up the \"opportunity to manage [the risks of reverse veil-piercing]\" in the interests of equity as the Court of Chancery directs. Indeed, one of the overriding purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a single forum for the adjustment and final, equitable resolution of claims, including by collective collection proceedings. *See* 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 *et seq*. The balancing of the traditional *alter ego* factors and prejudice to the *alter ego's* creditors and other stakeholders, *see Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15, is within the purview of a bankruptcy court.\n\nThe Joint Defendants urge the Court to view the Trustee's *alter ego* allegations as *sub rosa* substantive consolidation allegations and to, hence, apply restrictions on the retroactive effect of any *alter ego* determination – regardless of whether such restrictions apply at state law. Substantive consolidation \"results in, *inter alia*¸ pooling the assets of, and claims against, the two entities; satisfying liabilities from the resultant common fund; eliminating inter-company claims; and combining the creditors of the two companies for purposes of voting on reorganization plans.\" *Union Savs. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.)*, 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988). \"The sole purpose of substantive consolidation is to ensure the equitable treatment of all creditors.\" *Augie/Restivo*, 860 F.2d at 518. Substantive consolidation requires (i) creditors to have \"dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and 'did not rely on their separate identity in extending credit'\"; and (ii) the debtors' affairs to be \"so entangled that consolidation will benefit all creditors.\" *Id.* In *Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.)*, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that substantive consolidation orders should be issued *nunc pro tunc* where the proponent can show its benefits outweigh the harms to potential avoidance defendants. 810 F.2d 270, 277\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 67 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 71 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 66 of 102\n\n(D.C. Cir. 1987). The Joint Defendants urge the Court to apply *Auto-Train* to any *alter ego* determination.\n\nAs the Trustee acknowledges, the effect of an *alter ego* determination in bankruptcy is similar to the effect of substantive consolidation – assets and liabilities of the *alter egos* are merged. However, the availability of substantive consolidation – which the Joint Defendants appear to doubt – does not mean *alter ego* cannot be pled in bankruptcy cases. *In re Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d 195, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2005) (\"Prior to substantive consolidation, other remedies for corporate disregard were (and remain) in place. For example, where a subsidiary is so dominated by its corporate parent as to be the parent's 'alter ego,' the 'corporate veil' of the subsidiary can be ignored (or 'pierced') under state law.\").\n\nMoreover, the elements and the purposes of the doctrines differ. Under Delaware law, traditional *alter ego* or piercing the corporate veil has two elements: (i) the corporate entity whose form is to be disregarded is so dominated and controlled by its alleged *alter ego* that the corporate entity and its *alter ego* are, in fact, a single economic unit; and (ii) the corporate form to be disregarded causes fraud or some similar injustice. *Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633; *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 706; *Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc. v. Wood*, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999); *Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co.*, 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992). Reverse veil-piercing requires a court additionally consider prejudice to creditors, owners, and other stakeholders of the alleged *alter ego*. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 714–15. *Alter ego* provides a remedy for abuse of the corporate form. In contrast, provided there is no outweighing harm, substantive consolidation provides a remedy for overly complicated financial affairs that could be treated much more simply.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 68 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 72 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 67 of 102\n\nThis is a distinction with a difference. \"Substantive consolidation is better thought of as an economic remedy, the primary goal being the equitable treatment of all creditors. Conversely, a state law alter ego claim is an equitable remedy focused on preventing 'fraud or injustice.'\" *Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.)*, Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594- DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2022 WL 2294175, at \\*8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022). Substantive consolidation does not seek to remedy any fraud or injustice. *Augie/Restivo*, 860 F.2d at 518. The corporate form need not have been abused, the entities need not have been shams, and no creditor needs to have been harmed by the corporate form. *Id.* All that is necessary is that creditors would benefit from substantive consolidation. *Id.* In substantively consolidating estates, a court is solving a practical problem – the management of highly intertwined estates with the prospect of high administrative costs spent untangling the estates – by prospectively simplifying the facts before it, where doing so does more good than harm. *See id.* In piercing the corporate veil, a court is recognizing an existing reality of abuse of the corporate form to the detriment of creditors and, as a matter of equity, not allowing that abuse to persist. *See Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633. Substantive consolidation may involve a transfer; an *alter ego* determination does not.\n\nBankruptcy is about, among other things, the equitable spreading of loss. In seeking to have the Court apply *Auto-Train* to *alter ego* claims, the Joint Defendants try to shift the focus of the analysis to the **B**Æ**C** transfer and away from **A**. In so doing, the Joint Defendants ignore the shell game alleged in the complaints involving numerous *alter egos* perpetrated by and for the benefit of the Individual Debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors – which allegations are central to an *alter ego* analysis. *See Pauley Petroleum*, 239 A.2d at 633. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint ¶¶ 15–34, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 69 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 73 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 68 of 102\n\n05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.) These allegations, taken as true, are relevant to the balancing of the reverse veil-piercing factors. *Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 715–16 (stating courts will balance \"the social value of upholding the legitimate expectations of the affected corporate creditors or debtors, applying a rebuttable presumption in favor of assuring such expectations, against the importance of the policies served by allowing a reverse pierce under the particular circumstances involved.\") (citing Gregory S. Crespi, *The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards*, 16 J. CORP. L. 33, 51 (1990)).\n\nAlthough the Joint Defendants ask the Court to apply the *Auto-Train nunc pro tunc* analysis to the *alter ego* claims, the Court concludes there is no reason or basis to depart from Delaware *alter ego* law. It remains available to trustees notwithstanding the advent of substantive consolidation. *Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d at 205–06.\n\n\\* \\* \\*\n\nFor all these reasons, the Joint Defendants' arguments on issues (ii) and (iv) are not persuasive. The Court will not balance prejudice to the Joint Defendants and the factors supporting *alter ego* on a motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. Similarly, the Court will not impose prudential limits on the use of *alter ego* beyond the elements of the doctrine.\n\n# **C. Non-Joint Motions and Z&Z Objection**24\n\nThe Court will address only the distinct arguments made by the Non-Joint Defendants on the four issues. The following Non-Joint Defendants: (1) FFP (BVI) Limited; (2) Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell; (3) V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.; (4) The Francis Firm PLLC; (5) Berkeley Rowe Ltd.; (6) Weddle Law PLLC; (7) Lawall & Mitchell, LLC; (8) G4S Security Systems (Hong\n\n24 *See* n. 12, *supra*.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 70 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 74 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 69 of 102\n\nKong) Ltd.; and (9) ACASS Canada LTD, (collectively, the \"Assorted Non-Joint Defendants\") are represented by the same counsel who argued their Non-Joint Motions as a single argument.\n\nThere are two other Non-Joint Defendants: (10) Liberty Jet Management Corp. (\"Liberty Jet\") and (11) Z&Z. Liberty Jet and Z&Z raise no distinct arguments that are not also raised by the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants. Moreover, neither Liberty Jet nor Z&Z advanced independent arguments during the hearing. The Court will, therefore, only discuss the arguments of the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants. To the extent Liberty Jet or Z&Z raised or joined in the arguments discussed below, this discussion also applies to Liberty Jet and Z&Z.\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants raise two distinct arguments. First, with respect to issue (ii) – whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations – the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee lacks standing to bring an *alter ego* claim because he stands in the shoes of the Individual Debtor who, accepting the Trustee's allegations as true, is *in pari delicto* with the alleged *alter egos*. Second, with respect to issues (i), whether the Trustee can avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity, and (iii), the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determination, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue that the Trustee is improperly asserting claims of the *alter egos'* bankruptcy estates without the *alter egos* having filed for bankruptcy and without the substantive consolidation of the Individual Debtor's Chapter 11 case and the not-filed *alter ego* bankruptcy cases. In doing so, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants assert the Trustee is bypassing disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Code.\n\nIn response, the Trustee argues he has standing under either section 541 or section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code because he stands in the shoes of the Individual Debtor's creditors and, even if he did not, the insider exception to *in pari delicto* would apply. The Trustee argues he\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 71 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 75 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 70 of 102\n\nhas properly asserted claims of the Individual Debtor's bankruptcy estate, has properly asserted *alter ego* claims, and that, in any event, he will be seeking a new claims bar date to allow creditors of the *alter egos* to assert claims against the estate.\n\n# **1. Issue (ii): Standing**\n\nThe Bankruptcy Code provides a bankruptcy trustee standing to bring certain claims on behalf of creditors. *PepsiCo, Inc.*, 884 F.2d at 700. Absent such statutory authority, \"a bankruptcy trustee has no standing generally to sue third parties on behalf of the estate's creditors, but may only assert claims held by the bankrupt corporation itself.\" *Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner*, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991); *see Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.*, 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1995); *Sobchack v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.)*, 17 F.3d 600, 607 (2d Cir. 1994).\n\nWhere a trustee is not asserting a claim on behalf of creditors, *Wagoner* directs courts to determine (i) whether the debtor could have brought the claim and (ii) if so, whether the trustee is *in pari delicto* by imputation of the debtor's conduct. *Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 119–20. Although an assertion of *in pari delicto* is typically considered an affirmative equitable defense, the *Wagoner* doctrine, including its consideration of *in pari delicto*, \"functions as a prudential standing limitation.\" *Carney ex rel. Highview Point Partners, LLC v. Horion Invs. Ltd.*, 107 F. Supp. 3d 216, 228 (D. Conn. 2015).\n\nThe Second Circuit has held trustees have standing to bring *alter ego* claims on behalf of creditors at large. In *PepsiCo*, the Second Circuit adopted the approach of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in *Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc.*, 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987). *PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 697–98, 700–01, 704–05. In *Koch Refining*, the Seventh Circuit held that, pursuant to section 544(a), a bankruptcy trustee is \"the\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 72 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 76 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 71 of 102\n\nrepresentative of the general creditors\" and could pursue *alter ego* claims because they address generalized rather than particularized harm to creditors. 831 F.2d at 1351–54; *see Titan Real Est. Ventures, LLC v. MJCC Realty Ltd. P'ship (In re Flanagan)*, 415 B.R. 29, 47 (D. Conn. 2009). This accords with the statutory text of section 544(a): any judgment creditor could bring an *alter ego* claim to collect on their debt; it does not depend on its particular claim. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).\n\nWhile the Second Circuit distinguished *PepsiCo* in *Picard v. JPMorgan Chase Bank & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC)*, 721 F.3d 54, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2013), it did so on facts where the Securities Investor Protection Act trustee sought to bring particularized claims of defrauded creditors – even if such claims were very commonly held on the particular facts of the Madoff Ponzi scheme25, *JPMorgan*¸721 F.3d at 58–59. The claims in *JPMorgan* closely resemble those in *Wagoner*. *Compare JPMorgan*, 721 F.3d at 58–59 *with Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 116–17. Moreover, consistent with *PespiCo*, the Second Circuit has recently reiterated that trustees have standing to bring *alter ego* on behalf of creditors at large and that *alter ego* claims are property of the estate. *Compare Nordlicht*, 115 F.4th at 104–06, 107–11 *with PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 701.\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue *Nordlicht* follows a line of cases starting with *Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co.)*, 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987), which, unlike *Koch*, held that section 544(a) does not provide the trustee standing to bring general claims of creditors at large. *See PepsiCo*, 884 F.2d at 698–99. The Assorted Non-Joint Defendants assert\n\n25 Indeed, section 544(a) avoids this sort of accidentally general claim because it does not give a trustee standing to bring claims of particular creditors but rather the standing to bring claims a hypothetical judgment creditor – without a particular underlying claim – could bring, that is, section 544(a) introduces a creditor external to the particular facts surrounding the debtor and its debts.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 73 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 77 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 72 of 102\n\nthis means the Trustee's *alter ego* claims are subject to *Wagoner*. While *Nordlicht* itself is silent on section 544(a), it is completely consistent with holding a trustee has the rights and powers of certain hypothetical creditors to hold his claims derived from those rights and powers are property of the estate. Moreover, even if it is only pursuant to section 541 that a trustee has standing to bring an *alter ego* claim, such standing is derived from the general claims of creditors at large.\n\nHence, the *Wagoner* doctrine is not applicable. It does not apply where a trustee brings an action standing in the shoes of a creditor. *Wagoner*, 944 F.2d at 118 (\"The trustee insists he is not asserting the claims of the noteholders, so it is unnecessary for us to delve deeply into when, if ever, a trustee may sue a third party on behalf of the bankrupt's creditors.\"); *see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. First Republic Bank (In re Salander)*, 503 B.R. 559, 569 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (\"neither the *Wagoner* rule nor the *in pari delicto* doctrine apply to a trustee's statutory standing under Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code.\"); *Arnold v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Cornerstone Homes, Inc.)*, 567 B.R. 37, 52–53 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2017). The Court does not reach the parties' arguments regarding exceptions to *in pari delicto*. The Trustee has standing to bring the *alter ego* claims.\n\n# **2. Issue (i) and (iii):** *Alter ego***, substantive consolidation, and disclosure**\n\nThe Assorted Non-Joint Defendants raise largely the same argument as the Joint Defendants, which argument the Court has rejected above, as to why the Trustee cannot use *alter ego* to plead that the Individual Debtor is the transferor or that property of the debtor and/or property that is or would be, but for the transfer, property of the estate was transferred. The Court will not discuss that argument again. The distinction arises from what the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee should have instead done. While the Joint Defendants argue\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 74 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 78 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 73 of 102\n\nthe Trustee can only recover from the alleged *alter egos* themselves and that is the extent of his potential recovery, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants argue the Trustee should have seized control over the Individual Debtor's businesses, placed them into bankruptcy, and then sought *nunc pro tunc* substantive consolidation.\n\nThe Court has also already ruled above that, notwithstanding the existence of substantive consolidation, trustees may assert *alter ego* claims. As to the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants' notice concerns, the Assorted Non-Joint Defendants do not represent the creditors of the alleged *alter egos* at large. The Assorted Non-Joint Defendants themselves have notice of the Trustee's *alter ego* claims. The Trustee has stated multiple times that he will seek a new bar date for the creditors of adjudged *alter egos*. The Court will consider proper notice and service of such a bar date should such a request be made.\n\n# **D. Issue (ii): plausibility of** *Alter Ego* **allegations**\n\nThe Court has addressed the Joint Defendants' and Non-Joint Defendants' arguments as to why the Trustee has not plausibly pled *alter ego*. The Court has found the Trustee has standing to bring his reverse veil-piercing claims, he is not required to plead a lack of prejudice to the alleged *alter egos'* creditors, and prejudice does not exist as a matter of law. This discussion, however, leaves issue (ii) – whether applicable law allows for reverse veil piercing or *alter ego* determinations – less than completely resolved.\n\nOn the basis of the allegations in the complaints and the incorporated *alter ego* complaints, the Court concludes the Trustee has plausibly alleged (1) Golden Spring; (2) Lamp Capital; (3) HCHK Tech; (4) HCHK Property; (5) Lexington; (6) Greenwich Land; and (7) Leading Shine are *alter egos* of the Individual Debtor and their corporate veils should be pierced in reverse. The Trustee has plausibly pled (i) the Individual Debtor dominated and controlled the\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 75 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 79 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 74 of 102\n\n*alter egos* such that they have no independent economic existence and serve only as a façade for the Individual Debtor; and (ii) the corporate form of the *alter egos* serves to hinder, delay, or defraud the Individual Debtor's creditors as part of a large shell game designed to effectively judgment proof the Individual Debtor. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 706. (*See, e.g.*, Complaint ¶¶ 13–38, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.) Furthermore, the allegations in the complaints and the *alter ego* complaints, taken as true, do not establish prejudice to the creditors of the *alter egos*. *See Manichaean Cap.*, 251 A.3d at 718.\n\n# **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nCertain issues before the Court are legal issues – but they are narrowly drawn and, in essence, ask the Court to look past or recharacterize the allegations in the complaints. The Court will not do so in ruling on motions to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings. The defendants present the Trustee's transfer allegations as a series, **A=B**Æ**C**: an *alter ego* determination creating an identity between **A**, the Individual Debtor, and **B**, an alleged *alter ego*, and then a transfer of **B's** property to **C**, a Joint Defendant. The Trustee, however, alleges **A**Æ**C** transfers, transfers of **A**'s property to **C** *using* **B**. Other issues before the Court are drawn in an attempt to make them amenable to adjudication on a motion to dismiss. In doing so, the defendants focus on the unalleged **B**Æ**C** transfer and argue adding another transfer, **A=B**, to this transfer prejudices **C**. The defendants ask the Court to go beyond the pleadings and rule on the facts, which the Court will not do.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 76 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 80 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 75 of 102\n\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes as follows regarding the four issues:\n\n#### **(i) Can the Trustee avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity?**\n\nThe Trustee does not seek to avoid an initial transfer by a non-debtor entity. The Trustee alleges the Individual Debtor made the transfers. Transfer is defined to include indirect transfers. Hence, the nominal transferor is not controlling. The Trustee advances *alter ego* and beneficial ownership allegations to assert the Individual Debtor is the transferor.\n\n# **(ii) Does applicable law allow for reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determinations?**\n\nReverse veil-piercing is recognized by Delaware law. The Court has considered the parties' arguments regarding the sufficiency of the Trustee's pleading of *alter ego*. The Trustee has standing to bring a reverse veil-piercing claim. The Trustee is not required to plead lack of prejudice to creditors of the alleged *alter ego*. The Trustee has plausibly pled *alter ego*.\n\n# **(iii) What is the effect under applicable law of a reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **determination?**\n\nThe Trustee does not solely rely on *alter ego* allegations – he also pleads beneficial ownership. Nevertheless, the effect of reverse veil-piercing under Delaware law is that the corporate form is disregarded. Disregard of the corporate form has different results depending on the substantive law of the companion cause of action. Typically, it results in the imposition of vicarious liability. It may also be asserted to prove some claim or defense. Under the Bankruptcy Code, an *alter ego* determination can be used to establish a debtor made an indirect transfer and renders the property of the debtor's *alter ego* property of the estate. Under NYUVTA, an *alter ego* determination can be used to avoid transfers by the *alter ego* of the *alter ego's* property.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 77 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 81 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 76 of 102\n\n# **(iv) May a determination of reverse veil piercing or** *alter ego* **be applied retroactively?**\n\nThe Trustee is not seeking retroactive relief. *Alter ego* is a remedy for past and present abuse of the corporate form. It brings legal reality in line with factual reality. *Alter ego* survives the advent of substantive consolidation in bankruptcy proceedings. There is no basis to reinterpret the complaints as seeking substantive consolidation rather than *alter ego*.\n\nAccordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED:**\n\n- 1. The Joint Motions, listed on Appendix A, are **DENIED**.\n- 2. The Non-Joint Motions, listed on Appendix B, are **DENIED IN PART** with respect to any and all arguments raised therein relating to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this decision shall not apply to Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order, insofar as those Avoidance Claims are stayed. Notations appear on Appendix D appended to this Order indicating which Avoidance Claims are Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims.\n- 3. The Z&Z Objection, listed on Appendix C to this Order, is **OVERRULED IN PART** with respect to any and all arguments raised therein relating to the issues set forth in the Joint Briefing Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this decision shall not apply to Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims, as those terms are defined in paragraphs 2(e)(i) and (ii) of the Avoidance Action Procedures Order, insofar as those Avoidance Claims are stayed. Notations appear on Appendix D appended to this Order indicating which Avoidance Claims are Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims.\n- 4. On or before March 28, 2025, each Non-Joint Defendant shall file a joint statement with the Trustee in their respective avoidance actions stating the issues that remain to\n\n\n\n102\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 77 of\n\nbe determined with respect to their Non-Joint Motions or the motion for judgment on the pleadings to which Z&Z objected. The statements must delineate with specificity where in the pleadings the issues are raised. Upon review of the statements, the Court will determine with respect to each matter whether a hearing is necessary or the matter may be decided on the submissions of the parties.\n\n**\\*5\\*44003%&3&%**BU#SJEHFQPSU\n\\$POOFDUJDVUUIJT4th day of March, 2025.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 83 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 79 of\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 78 of\n\n102\n\n# **APPENDIX A Joint Motions**\n\n- 1. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 24 (filed by Agora Lab, Inc., defendant).\n- 2. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Amazon Web Services, Inc., defendant).\n- 3. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Direct Persuasion LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 26 (filed by Direct Persuasion LLC, defendant).\n- 4. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Fox News Network, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Fox News Network, LLC, defendant).\n- 5. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Arri Americas Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Nov. 27, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by Arri Americas Inc., defendant).\n- 6. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Teris-Phoenix, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 20 (filed by Teris-Phoenix, LLC, defendant).\n- 7. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Phillips Nizer LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Phillips Nizer LLP, defendant).\n- 8. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Gunderson (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Mr. Mark Gundersen, defendant).\n- 9. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC, defendant).\n- 10. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 42 (filed by Amazon.com, Inc., defendant).\n- 11. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Anthem Health Plans, Inc., defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 80 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 84 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 79 of 102\n\n- 12. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Fed. Express Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 20 (filed by Federal Express Corporation, defendant).\n- 13. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. DJD Creative LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by DJD Creative, LLC, defendant).\n- 14. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 35 (filed by B&H Foto & Electronics Corp., defendant).\n- 15. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Am. Express Co. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by American Express Company, defendant).\n- 16. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC, defendant).\n- 17. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Zeta Glob. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Zeta Global Corp., defendant).\n- 18. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. GroCyber LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by GroCyber LLC, defendant).\n- 19. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by Conservative Campaign Technology, LLC, defendant).\n- 20. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Anthem HealthChoice Assurance Inc., defendant).\n- 21. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. ModSquad Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by ModSquad Inc., defendant).\n- 22. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Cloudflare, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 22 (filed by Cloudfare, Inc., defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 81 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 85 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 80 of 102\n\n- 23. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. 3 Columbus Circle LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by 3 Columbus Circle LLC, defendant).\n- 24. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Indium Software Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Indium Software Inc., defendant).\n- 25. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Miller Motorcars Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Miller Motorcars Inc., defendant).\n- 26. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc., defendant).\n- 27. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Target Enters., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Target Enterprises, LLC, defendant).\n- 28. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Flat Rate Movers, Ltd., defendant).\n- 29. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Jamestown Assocs., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Jamestown Associates, LLC, defendant).\n- 30. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Nardello & Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Nardello & Co., LLC, defendant).\n- 31. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C., defendant).\n- 32. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 28 (filed by Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP, defendant).\n- 33. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Putnam's Landscaping LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Putnam's Landscaping LLC, defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 82 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 86 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 81 of 102\n\n- 34. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Jason Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 23 (filed by Mr. Jason Miller, defendant).\n- 35. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Sedgwick Realty Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 18 (filed by Sedgwick Realty Corp., defendant).\n- 36. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Cirrus Design Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Cirrus Design Corp., defendant).\n- 37. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024), ECF No. 25 (filed by Marcum LLP, defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 83 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 87 of 107\n\n103\n\n102\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 82 of\n\n# **APPENDIX B Non-Joint Motions**\n\n- 1. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2024), ECF No. 17 (filed by FFP (BVI) Ltd., defendant).\n- 2. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell, defendant).\n- 3. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 5, 2024), ECF No. 16 (filed by V.X. Cerda & Associates P.A., defendant).\n- 4. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 20, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by Liberty Jet Management Corp., defendant).\n- 5. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Francis Firm PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 29, 2024), ECF No. 15 (filed by The Francis Firm PLLC, defendant).\n- 6. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Berkeley Rowe Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 12, 2024), ECF No. 35 (filed by Berkeley Rowe Ltd., defendant).\n- 7. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. April 22, 2024), ECF No. 11 (filed by Weddle Law PLLC, defendant).\n- 8. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. May 24, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Lawall & Mitchell, LLC and Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell, defendants).\n- 9. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 22, 2024), ECF No. 19 (filed by G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd., defendant).\n- 10. Motion to Dismiss Adversary Proceeding, *Despins v. ACASS Canada LTD. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 12, 2024), ECF No. 26 (filed by ACASS Canada LTD., defendant).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 84 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 88 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 83 of 102\n\n# **APPENDIX C Z&Z Objection**\n\n1. Memorandum of Law in Opposition, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2024), ECF No. 21 (filed by Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C., defendant, in opposition to the Trustee's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2024), ECF No. 17).\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4236-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 | Page 89 of |\n|---------------|------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4229-1 | 107
Filed 03/18/25 | Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 | Page 85 of |\n\n103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 84 of 102\n\n# **APPENDIX D Complaints Against Joint and Non-Joint Defendants**\n\nLegend\n\n# **Complaints against Non-Joint Defendant are bolded**\n\nAvoidance Claims\n\nAFT (BC) – Actual Fraudulent Transfer (Bankruptcy Code)\n\nAvoidance and recovery of an actual fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) and550(a).\n\nAFT (NY) – Actual Fraudulent Transfer (New York law) Avoidance and recovery of an actual fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a).\n\nCFT (BC) – Constructive Fraudulent Transfer (Bankruptcy Code) Avoidance and recovery of a constructive fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) and 550(a).\n\n- CFT (NY) Constructive Fraudulent Transfer (New York law) Avoidance and recovery of a constructive fraudulent transfer of an interest of the Individual Debtor in property from initial transferee pursuant to N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274, and 276 and 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) and 550(a).\n- UPT Unauthorized Post-petition Transfer Avoidance and recovery of an unauthorized post-petition transfer of property of the estate from initial transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 and 550(a).\n- ST Recovery from Subsequent Transferee Recovery of an avoided transfer from a subsequent transferee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).\n\n\\* Partially Stayed Claim\n\n\\*\\* Stayed Claim\n\n(Claims against neither Joint Defendant nor Non-Joint Defendant appear in parentheses)\n\n# *Alter Egos*\n\nGSNY – Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. LC – Lamp Capital LLC HCHKT – HCHK Technologies, Inc. HCHKP – HCHK Property Management, Inc. LPS – Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. GL – Greenwich Land, LLC LSNY – Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\n[*Alter egos* involved in Avoidance Claim insofar as it is not stayed by Avoidance Action Procedures Order ¶ 2(e) appear in brackets]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 86 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 90 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 85 of 102\n\n1. Complaint, *Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT] |\n\n2. Amended Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05006 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024), ECF No. 4.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n\n3. Complaint, *Despins v. Direct Persuasion LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05010 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n4. Complaint, *Despins v. Fox News Network, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05015 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n5. Complaint, *Despins v. Arri Americas Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05031 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n6. Complaint, *Despins v. Teris-Phoenix, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05044 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [LPS]\n\n7. Complaint, *Despins v. Phillips Nizer LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05047 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|-------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LPS] |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 87 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 91 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 86 of 102\n\n8. Complaint, *Despins v. Gunderson (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05048 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n9. Complaint, *Despins v. 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05055 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LPS]\n\n10. **Complaint,** *Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|--------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT** | |\n\n11. Complaint, *Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, LPS, GL] |\n| Sixth Claim: | (ST*) | |\n| | | |\n\n12. Complaint, *Despins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [HCHKP]\n\n13. Complaint, *Despins v. Fed. Express Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05059 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [LPS]\n\n14. Complaint, *Despins v. DJD Creative LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05063 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 88 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 92 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 87 of 102\n\n15. Complaint, *Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, HCHKT, GL] |\n| Sixth Claim: | (ST*) | |\n\n16. Amended Complaint, *Despins v. Am. Express Co. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05077 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2025), ECF No. 30.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT\\* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n17. Complaint, *Despins v. Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05082 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n18. Complaint, *Despins v. Zeta Glob. Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05092 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n\n19. Complaint, *Despins v. GroCyber LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05100 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n20. Complaint, *Despins v. Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05108 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n21. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LPS] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LPS] |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 89 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 93 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 88 of 102\n\n22. Complaint, *Despins v. Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05112 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n23. Complaint, *Despins v. ModSquad Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05114 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n\n24. Complaint, *Despins v. Cloudflare, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05115 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT* | [LPS] |\n\n25. Complaint, *Despins v. 3 Columbus Circle LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\n26. Complaint, *Despins v. Indium Software Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|-----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [HCHKT] |\n\n27. Complaint, *Despins v. Miller Motorcars Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n\n28. Complaint, *Despins v. On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 89 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 90 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 94 of 107\n\n102\n\n-\n- 29. **Complaint,** *Despins v. V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|------------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [GSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [GSNY] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT* | [GSNY, HCHKP, LPS, GL] |\n\n30. **Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 15, 2024), ECF No. 2.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC] |\n|---------------|-----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC] |\n\n31. Complaint, *Despins v. Target Enters., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: AFT (BC) [HCHKT] Second Claim: AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n32. Complaint, *Despins v. Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [GSNY]\n\n33. Complaint, *Despins v. Jamestown Assocs., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT] |\n|---------------|----------|---------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT] |\n\n34. Complaint, *Despins v. Nardello & Co., LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, LPS] |\n\n- Case 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 90 of 102 Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 91 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 95 of 107\n\t- 35. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Francis Firm PLLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 12, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LC] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LC] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT | [LC, LPS] |\n\n36. **Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. Berkeley Rowe Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 15, 2024), ECF No. 23.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [GSNY, LSNY] |\n\n37. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | UPT* | [HCHKT, HCHKP] |\n|--------------|------|----------------|\n| | | |\n\n38. Complaint, *Despins v. Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [HCHKP, LPS]\n\n39. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n|-----------|-----------------------|\n| AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| CFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| CFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY] |\n| UPT* | [GSNY, LPS, GL] |\n| ST* | |\n| | |\n\n40. Complaint, *Despins v. Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [GSNY, LC] |\n|---------------|----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [GSNY, LC] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC] |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 92 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 96 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 91 of 102\n\n41. **Complaint,** *Despins v. G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC] |\n\n42. **Complaint,** *Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.**\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LC, GL]\n\n43. Complaint, *Despins v. Putnam's Landscaping LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, GL] |\n|---------------|----------|-----------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, GL] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [LC, HCHKP, GL] |\n\n44. Complaint, *Despins v. Jason Miller (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n\n45. Complaint, *Despins v. Sedgwick Realty Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\nFirst Claim: UPT [LC]\n\n46. Complaint, *Despins v. Cirrus Design Corp. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n|---------------|----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [LC, HCHKT, LSNY] |\n| Fifth Claim: | (ST) | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 92 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 93 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 97 of 107\n\n102\n\n47. **Second Amended Complaint,** *Despins v. ACASS Canada LTD. (In re Kwok)***, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2024), ECF No. 22.**\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC)* | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n|---------------|-----------|-------------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY)* | [GSNY, LC, HCHKT] |\n| Third Claim: | UPT | [GSNY, LC] |\n\n48. Complaint, *Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 14, 2024), ECF No. 1.\n\n| First Claim: | AFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n|---------------|----------|--------------|\n| Second Claim: | AFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Third Claim: | CFT (BC) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Fourth Claim: | CFT (NY) | [HCHKT, LPS] |\n| Fifth Claim: | UPT | [HCHKP, LPS] |\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4236-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 | Page 98 of |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4229-1 | 107
Filed 03/18/25
103 | Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 | Page 94 of |\n| | | | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 93 of 102\n\n# **APPENDIX E Selected Statutory Provisions**\n\n# **Bankruptcy Code Provisions**\n\nDefinitions\n\n11 U.S.C. § 101(54)\n\n(54) The term \"transfer\" means—\n\n(A) the creation of a lien;\n\n(B) the retention of title as a security interest;\n\n(C) the foreclosure of a debtor's equity of redemption; or\n\n(D) each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with—\n\n(i) property; or\n\n(ii) an interest in property.\n\n11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)\n\n(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held:\n\n(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable interest of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.\n\nAvoidance Provisions\n\n11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1)\n\n(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 95 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 99 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 94 of 102\n\n11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)\n\n(a) (1) The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) of an interest of the debtor in property, or any obligation (including any obligation to or for the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily—\n\n(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or\n\n(B) (i) received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and\n\n(ii) (I) was insolvent on the date such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;\n\n (II) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an unreasonably small capital;\n\n (III) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured; or\n\n (IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an employment contract and not in the ordinary course of business.\n\n11 U.S.C. § 549(a)\n\n(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid a transfer of property of the estate—\n\n- (1) that occurs after the commencement of the case; and\n- (2) (A) that is authorized only under section 303(f) or 542(c) of this title; or\n- (B) that is not authorized under this title or by the court.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 96 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 100 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 95 of 102\n\n11 U.S.C. § 550(a)\n\n(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, If the court so orders, the value of such property, from—\n\n(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or\n\n(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.\n\n# **NYUVTA Provisions**\n\nDefinitions\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 270(b), (f), (p)\n\n(b) \"Asset\" means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:\n\n- (1) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;\n- (2) property to the extent it is generally exempt under non-bankruptcy law; or\n\n(3) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entirety to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.\n\n. . .\n\n(f) \"Debtor\" means a person that is liable on a claim.\n\n. . .\n\n(p) \"Transfer\" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, license, and the creation of a lien or other encumbrance.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 97 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 101 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 96 of 102\n\nAvoidance Provisions\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 273(a)\n\n(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:\n\n(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or\n\n(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:\n\n(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or\n\n(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due.\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 274(a), (b)\n\n(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.\n\n(b) A transfer made by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 97 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 98 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 102 of 107\n\n102\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 276(a)\n\n(a) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this article, a creditor, subject to the limitations in section two hundred seventy-seven of this article, may obtain:\n\n(1) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim;\n\n(2) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee if available under applicable law; and\n\n(3) subject to principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure:\n\n(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;\n\n(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or\n\n(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 99 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 103 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 98 of 102\n\n# **APPENDIX F Incorporated Complaints Against** *Alter Egos*\n\n1. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (\"Golden Spring\")\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claims: Avoidance and recovery of actual fraudulent transfer.\n\nDisposition: Order Granting Motion for Default Judgment, *Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2023), ECF No. 35.\n\n2. Lamp Capital LLC\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* (Lamp Capital LLC). Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of Lamp Capital LLC and/or its assets. Third Claim: *Alter ego* (Hudson Diamond NY LLC). Fourth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Hudson Diamond NY LLC and/or its assets. Fifth Claim: *Alter ego* (Leading Shine NY Ltd.) Sixth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Leading Shine NY Ltd. and/or its assets.\n\nDisposition: Default Judgment, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2024), ECF No. 66.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 100 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 104 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 99 of 102\n\n3. HCHK Technologies, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\n4. HCHK Property Management, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\n5. Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego.* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity and/or its assets. Third Claim: Permanent injunction.\n\nDisposition: Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, *Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 101 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 105 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 100 of 102\n\n6. Greenwich Land LLC\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of entity\n\nDisposition: Summary Judgment, *Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 2, 2024), ECF No. 134.\n\n7. Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\nIncorporated Complaint: Complaint, *Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\nAlleged State of Formation: Delaware. First Claim: *Alter ego* (Lamp Capital LLC). Second Claim: Beneficial ownership of Lamp Capital LLC and/or its assets. Third Claim: *Alter ego* (Hudson Diamond NY LLC) Fourth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Hudson Diamond NY LLC and/or its assets. Fifth Claim: *Alter ego* (Leading Shine NY Ltd.) Sixth Claim: Beneficial ownership of Leading Shine NY Ltd. and/or its assets.\n\nDisposition: Pending.\n\n# Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 102 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 106 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 101 of 102\n\n| Adv. P. | Mot. ECF | Filed | Obj. ECF | Filed | Rep. ECF | Filed |\n|-------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|\n| 24-05056 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. FFP (BVI) | 17 | 8/12/24 | 20 | 10/11/24 | 22 | 11/11/24 |\n| Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05110 | 19 | 5/24/24 | 23 | 7/23/24 | 24 | 8/22/24 |\n| Despins v. Mitchell | | | | | | |\n| 24-05134 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. V.X. Cerda | 16 | 6/5/24 | 20 | 8/5/24 | 21 | 9/3/24 |\n| & Assocs. P.A. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05135 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Liberty Jet | 19 | 6/20/24 | 24 | 9/16/24 | 27 | 10/16/24 |\n| Mgmt. Corp. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05168 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Francis Firm | 15 | 5/29/24 | 19 | 7/29/24 | 20 | 8/28/24 |\n| PLLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05186 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Berkeley | 35 | 10/12/24 | 42 | 12/11/24 | 51 | 1/10/25 |\n| Rowe Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05188 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Weddle Law | 11 | 4/22/24 | 17 | 6/21/24 | 27 | 8/2/24 |\n| PLLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05199 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Lawall & | 21 | 5/24/24 | 26 | 7/23/24 | 27 | 8/22/24 |\n| Mitchell, LLC | | | | | | |\n| 24-05204 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. G4S Sec. | 19 | 8/22/24 | 23 | 10/21/24 | 25 | 11/20/24 |\n| Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05208 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. Zeisler & | 17 | 8/2/24 | 21 | 9/6/24 | 22 | 9/20/24 |\n| Zeisler, P.C. | | | | | | |\n| 24-05226 | | | | | | |\n| Despins v. ACASS | 26 | 9/12/24 | 33 | 11/12/24 | 41 | 12/20/24 |\n| Canada LTD. | | | | | | |\n\n**APPENDIX G Briefing of Non-Joint Motions and Z&Z Objection**\n\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4236-1 | Filed 03/19/25 | Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 | Page 107 |\n|---------------|------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------|\n| Case 22-50073 | Doc 4229-1 | of 107
Filed 03/18/25
of 103 | Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 | Page 103 |\n| | | | | |\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 102 of 102\n\n# **APPENDIX H Transfer Diagrams**\n\nAlleged Form of Transfers:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) C(Joint Defendant) (Transfer of A's property through* **alter ego** *B)*\n\nJoint Defendants' Interpretation of Form of Transfers:\n\n*A(Individual Debtor) = B(***Alter ego***) C(Joint Defendant) (***Alter ego** *determination) (Transfer of B's property)*","body_zh":"Case 22-50073 Doc 4229 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 1 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 1 of 107\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（美国康涅狄格区联邦破产法院）\n\n关于：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等，\n\n债务人。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），第11章受托人，\n\n原告，\n\n诉\n\nMETA PLATFORMS, INC.，\n\n被告。\n\n上诉通知书\n\n第一部分：指明上诉人\n\n1. 上诉人名称：Meta Platforms, Inc.\n\n2. 上诉人在作为本上诉标的的对抗性程序或破产案件中的地位：上述标题所示第 24-05117 (JAM) 号对抗性程序中的被告。\n\n第二部分：指明本上诉标的\n\n1. 描述提起上诉所针对的判决——或具有可上诉性的裁定或法令：《关于 (I) 驳回共同被告驳回起诉或根据诉答文书作出判决的动议；(II) 部分驳回其他被告驳回起诉的动议；以及 (III) 部分驳回 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 对受托人根据诉答文书作出判决动议之异议的判决备忘录与裁定》\n\n第11章\n\n案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)\n\n（合并审理）\n\n对抗性程序编号：24-05117\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 2 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 2 of 107\n\n已录入破产案件（ECF Dkt. No. 4189），其副本作为证物 1 附后。\n\n2. 说明判决——或具有可上诉性的裁定或法令——录入的日期：2025年3月4日。\n\n第三部分：指明上诉的其他当事人\n\n列出提起上诉所针对的判决——或具有可上诉性的裁定或法令——的所有当事人姓名/名称，及其律师的姓名、地址和电话号码：\n\n当事人 律师\nMeta Platforms, Inc.\n上诉人\nGeorge Angelich (ct27542)\nEric Roman（获准准入代理）\nPatrick Feeney（获准准入代理）\nArentFox Schiff LLP（ArentFox Schiff 律师事务所）\n1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212.457.5423\n电邮：\ngeorge.angelich@afslaw.com\neric.roman@afslaw.com\npatrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n- 以及 -\nJin Yan（获准准入代理）\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1717 K St. NW\nWashington, DC 20006\n电话：202.778.6442\n电邮：\njin.yan@afslaw.com\n\nLuc A. Despins，以第11章受托人身份\n被上诉人\nDouglas S. Skalka (ct00616)\nPatrick R. Linsey (ct29437)\nNeubert, Pepe & Monteith, P.C. 律师事务所\n195 Church St., 13th Fl.\nNew Haven, CT 06510\n电话：(203) 821-2000\n电邮：\ndskalka@npmlaw.com\nplinsey@npmlaw.com\n- 以及 -\nDouglass Barron（获准准入代理）\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 3 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 3 of 107\n\n当事人 律师\nPaul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）\n200 Park Ave.\nNew York, NY 10166\n电话：(212) 318-6000\n电邮：\ndouglassbarron@paulhastings.com\n- 以及 -\nNicholas A. Bassett（获准准入代理）\nPaul Hastings LLP\n2050 M St. NW\nWashington, D.C. 20036\n电话：(202) 551-1902\n电邮：\nnicholasbassett@paulhastings.com\n\n日期：2025年3月18日\n纽约州纽约市\n/s/ George Angelich\nGeorge Angelich (ct27542)\nEric Roman（获准准入代理）\nPatrick Feeney（获准准入代理）\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1301 Avenue of the Americas, 42nd Floor\nNew York, NY 10019\n电话：212.457.5423\n电邮：\ngeorge.angelich@afslaw.com\neric.roman@afslaw.com\npatrick.feeney@afslaw.com\n- 以及 -\nJin Yan（获准准入代理）\nArentFox Schiff LLP\n1717 K St. NW\nWashington, DC 20006\n电话：202.778.6442\n电邮：\njin.yan@afslaw.com\nMeta Platforms, Inc. 的代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 4 of 4 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 4 of 107\n送达证明\n\n本人证明，于2025年3月18日，本人已促使上述文件的真实且正确的副本通过 CM/ECF 电子归档系统提交给法庭书记官，该系统将向所有记录在案的律师发送该归档通知。\n\n日期：纽约州纽约市 2025年3月18日\n\n/s/ George Angelich\n\nGeorge Angelich\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 1 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 5 of 107\n证物 1\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 6 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 2 of 103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 1 of 102\n\n关于：\nHO WAN KWOK 等，\n债务人。\n第11章\n案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)\n（合并审理）\n涉及：ECF Nos. 3577, 3713\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nAGORA LAB, INC.（声网实验室公司），\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05005 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 24\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nAMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.（亚马逊网络服务公司），\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05006 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 21\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nDIRECT PERSUASION LLC，\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05010 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 26\n\nUNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 7 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 3 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nFOX NEWS NETWORK, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司），\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05015 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 23\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nARRI AMERICAS, INC.（阿莱美洲公司），\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05031 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 17\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nTERIS-PHOENIX, LLC，\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05044 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 20\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 8 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 4 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nPHILLIPS NIZER LLP，\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05047 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 23\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nMARK GUNDERSON，\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05048 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 21\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\n270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC，\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05055 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 17\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 9 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 5 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 4 of 102\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nFFP (BVI) LIMITED，\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05056 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 17\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nAMAZON.COM, INC.（亚马逊公司）、HING CHI NGOK（岳庆芝）、ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS、CHUNGUANG HAN（韩春光）及 MEI GUO（郭美），\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05057 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 42\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nANTHEM HEALTH PLANS, INC.，\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05058 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 21\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 10 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 6 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 5 of 102\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nFEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION（联邦快递公司），\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05059 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 20\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nDJD CREATIVE LLC，\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05063 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 22\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nB&H FOTO & ELECTRONICS CORP.、HING CHI NGOK、ALEX HADJICHARALAMBOUS 及 CHUNGUANG HAN，\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05069 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 35\n\n接下一页\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 11 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 7 of 103\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 6 of 102\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nAMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY（美国运通公司），\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05077 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 18\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nOHTZAR SHLOMO SOLOMON TREASURE LLC，\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05082 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 17\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，HO WAN KWOK 破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\n诉\nZETA GLOBAL CORP.，\n被告。\n对抗性程序编号：24-05092 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 21\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 12 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 8 of 103\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4189\n提交于 03/04/25\n录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 7 页，共 102 页\n\nLuc A. Despins（吕克·A·德斯平斯），作为 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05100 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 17\nGrocyber, LLC，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05108 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 22\nv.\nConservative Campaign Technology, LLC，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05110 (JAM)\n原告，\nv.\n涉及：ECF 编号 19\nAaron Mitchell（亚伦·米切尔），\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4236-1\n提交于 03/19/25\n录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06\n第 13 页，共 103 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4229-1\n提交于 03/18/25\n录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29\n第 9 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4189\n提交于 03/04/25\n录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 8 页，共 102 页\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05112 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 23\nAnthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.，\n曾用名 Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.，\n对外营业名 Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05114 (JAM)\n原告，\nv.\nModSquad Inc.，\n涉及：ECF 编号 21\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05115 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 22\nv.\nCloudflare, Inc.，\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4236-1\n提交于 03/19/25\n录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06\n第 14 页，共 103 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4229-1\n提交于 03/18/25\n录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29\n第 10 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4189\n提交于 03/04/25\n录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 9 页，共 102 页\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n3 Columbus Circle LLC，\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05120 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 17\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\nIndium Software, Inc.，\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05122 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 19\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\nMiller Motorcars Inc.，\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05128 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 18\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4236-1\n提交于 03/19/25\n录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06\n第 15 页，共 103 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4229-1\n提交于 03/18/25\n录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29\n第 11 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4189\n提交于 03/04/25\n录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 10 页，共 102 页\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\nOn The Spot Home Improvement, Inc.，\n被告。\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05130 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 21\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05134 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 16\nV.X. Cerda & Associates P.A.，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05135 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 19\nLiberty Jet Management Corp.，\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4236-1\n提交于 03/19/25\n录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06\n第 16 页，共 103 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4229-1\n提交于 03/18/25\n录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29\n第 12 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4189\n提交于 03/04/25\n录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 11 页，共 102 页\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05138 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 19\nTarget Enterprises, LLC，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05141 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 19\nFlat Rate Movers, Ltd.，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05147 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 19\nJamestown Associates, LLC，\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4236-1\n提交于 03/19/25\n录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06\n第 17 页，共 103 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4229-1\n提交于 03/18/25\n录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29\n第 13 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4189\n提交于 03/04/25\n录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 12 页，共 102 页\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05162 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 19\nNardello & Co., LLC，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05168 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 15\nv.\nThe Francis Firm PLLC，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05186 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 35\nBerkeley Rowe Limited，\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4236-1\n提交于 03/19/25\n录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06\n第 18 页，共 103 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4229-1\n提交于 03/18/25\n录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29\n第 14 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4189\n提交于 03/04/25\n录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 13 页，共 102 页\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05188 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 11\nWeddle Law PLLC，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05196 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 18\nMorvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05199 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 21\nLawall & Mitchell, LLC，以及\nAaron Mitchell，\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4236-1\n提交于 03/19/25\n录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06\n第 19 页，共 103 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4229-1\n提交于 03/18/25\n录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29\n第 15 页\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4189\n提交于 03/04/25\n录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 14 页，共 102 页\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05202 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 28\nClayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n原告，\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05204 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 19\nv.\nG4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd.，\n被告。\n\nLuc A. Despins，作为郭文贵破产财产的第 11 章受托人，\n对手方诉讼案号 24-05208 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 17\n原告，\nv.\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.，\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4236-1\n提交于 03/19/25\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4229-1\n提交日期 03/18/25\n录入日期 03/19/25 16:06:06\n第 20 页，共 103 页\n录入日期 03/18/25 23:57:29\n第 16 页\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4189\n提交日期 03/04/25\n录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 15 页，共 102 页\nLUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK（卢克·A·德斯平斯，作为郭文贵破产财产的第11章受托人），\n原告，\nv.\nPUTNAM'S LANDSCAPING LLC，\n对席诉讼案号 24-05211 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 18\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为郭文贵破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对席诉讼案号 24-05219 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 23\nJASON MILLER（杰森·米勒），\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为郭文贵破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对席诉讼案号 24-05222 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 18\nSEDGWICK REALTY CORP.，\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4236-1\n提交日期 03/19/25\n\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4229-1\n提交日期 03/18/25\n录入日期 03/19/25 16:06:06\n第 21 页，共 103 页\n录入日期 03/18/25 23:57:29\n第 17 页\n案号 22-50073\n文件 4189\n提交日期 03/04/25\n录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18\n第 16 页，共 102 页\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为郭文贵破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\nCIRRUS DESIGN CORPORATION（西锐设计公司），以及 QIANG GUO（郭强），\n对席诉讼案号 24-05225 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 21\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为郭文贵破产财产的第11章受托人，\n原告，\nv.\n对席诉讼案号 24-05226 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF 编号 26\nACASS CANADA LTD.，\n被告。\n\nLUC A. DESPINS，作为郭文贵破产财产的第11章受托人，\n对席诉讼案号 24-05229 (JAM)\n原告，\nv.\nMARCUM LLP，\n涉及：ECF 编号 25\n被告。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 22 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 18 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 17 页，共 102 页\n出庭律师\n\nG. Alexander Bongartz Douglass Barron Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所） 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166\n\nDouglas S. Skalka James C. Graham Patrick R. Linsey Neubert, Pepe & Montieth 195 Church Street, 13th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n以及\n\nNicholas A. Bassett（参与口头辩论） Paul Hastings LLP 2050 M Street NW Washington, D.C. 20036\n\n动议人兼被答辩人 Luc A. Despins 先生（作为原告郭文贵先生破产财产的第11章受托人）的代理律师\n\nBenjamin O. Gilbert Lindsay C. Stone Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP（盛智律师事务所） 30 Rockefeller Plaza New York, NY 10112\n\n以及\n\nAlan H. Martin Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, LLP 650 Town Center Drive, 10th Floor Costa Mesa, CA 92626\n\n动议人 Agora Lab, Inc.（被告）的代理律师\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 23 页，共 107 页\n案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 19 页，共 103 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 18 页\n\nLindsay Sampson Bishop K&L Gates LLP（高盖茨律师事务所） One Congress Street, Suite 2900 Boston, MA 02114\n\n以及\n\nBrian T. Peterson（参与口头辩论） Ruby A. Nagamine K&L Gates LLP 925 4th Ave, Suite 2900 Seattle, WA 98104\n\n动议人 Amazon Web Services, Inc.（亚马逊网络服务公司）及 Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nBenjamin Mintz Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP（安诺律师事务所） 250 West 55th Street New York, NY 10019\n\n以及\n\n以及\n\nRyan M. Trombley Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP 70 West Madison Street, Suite 4200 Chicago, IL 60602\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\nEric S. Goldstein（参与口头辩论） Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n动议人 Direct Persuasion LLC（被告）的代理律师\n\nSteven G. Mintz Barry M. Kazan Philip Ian Tafet Mintz & Gold LLP 600 Third Avenue, 25th Floor New York, NY 10016\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人 Fox News Network, LLC（福克斯新闻网络有限责任公司）及 Marcum LLP（被告）的代理律师\n\nMichael T. Conway Lazare Potter Giacovas & Moyle LLP 747 Third Ave., 16th Floor New York, NY 10017\n\n动议人 Arri Americas Inc.（被告）的代理律师\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 24 页，共 107 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 20 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 19 页\n\nAndrea Chase Spencer Fane 1000 Walnut Street, Suite 1400 Kansas City, MO 64106\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人 Teris-Phoenix, LLC（被告）的代理律师\n\nJared R. Clark Phillips Nizer LLP 485 Lexington Avenue New York, NY 10017\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n以及\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n动议人 Phillips Nizer LLP（被告）的代理律师\n\nJeffrey Hellman Law Offices of Jeffrey Hellman, LLC 195 Church Street, 10th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n动议人 Mark Gundersen 先生、Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC 以及 Jason Miller 先生（被告）的代理律师\n\nRobert N. Sensale Bershtein, Volpe & McKeon, PC 900 Chapel Street, 11th Floor New Haven, CT 06510\n\n动议人 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（被告）的代理律师\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 20 页，共 102 页 案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 21 页，共 103 页 案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 25 页，共 107 页\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（参与口头辩论） Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议人 FFP (BVI) Limited、Aaron A. Mitchell、V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.、The Francis Firm PLLC、Lawall & Mitchell, LLC 以及 G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd.（被告）的代理律师\n\nEric S. Goldstein（参与口头辩论） Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n以及\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人 Anthem Health Plans, Inc.、Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（曾用名 Empire HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.，以 Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield 之名开展业务）以及 Sedgwick Realty Corp.（被告）的代理律师\n\nMichael A. Siedband Federal Express Corporation（联邦快递公司） 3620 Hacks Cross Road Building 2, 3rd Floor Memphis, TN 38125\n\nEric S. Goldstein（参与口头辩论） Nicole Lapenta Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n以及\n\nJessica Signor Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, Third Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人 Federal Express Corporation（被告）的代理律师\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 26 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 22 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 21 页，共 102 页\n\nBret Strong Zachary W. Doninger 1790 Hughes Landing, Suite 200 The Woodlands, TX 77380\n\nLouis Joseph Martocchio, III Martocchio & Oliveira, LLC 191 Main Street Southington, CT 06489\n动议人 DJD Creative LLC（被告）的代理律师\n\nScott M. Kessler Akerman LLP 1251 Avenue of the Americas 37th Floor New York, NY 10020\n\nTracy Ellis Williams Shipman & Goodwin LLP 300 Atlantic Street, 3rd Floor Stamford, CT 06901\n动议人 B&H Foto & Electronics Corp.（被告）的代理律师\n\nDarryl S. Laddin Frank N. White Arnall Golden Gregory LLP 171 17th Street, N.W., Suite 2100 Atlanta, GA 30363\n\nRonald I. Chorches Law Offices of Ronald I. Chorches LLC 82 Wolcott Hill Road, Suite 203 Wethersfield, CT 06109\n动议人 American Express Company（美国运通公司）（被告）的代理律师\n\nJohn J. Clarke, Jr. DLA Piper LLP (US)（欧华律师事务所） 1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020\n\n以及\n\nC. Kevin Kobbe DLA Piper LLP (US) 650 South Exter Street, Suite 1100 Baltimore, MD 21202\n\n动议人 Zeta Global Corp.（被告）的代理律师\n\nNicholas P. Vegliante Cohn Birnbaum & Shea CityPlace II, 15th Floor 185 Asylum Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n动议人 GroCyber, LLC（被告）的代理律师\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 23 页 案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 27 页，共 107 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 22 页，共 102 页\n\nIlan Markus Barclay Damon LLP 545 Long Wharf Drive, 9th Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n动议人 Conservative Campaign Technology LLC（被告）的代理律师\n\nRobert E. Kaelin Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 280 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103\n\n以及\n\nMatthew Pesce Harris Beach Murtha Cullina PLLC 1 Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06106\n\n动议人 ModSquad, Inc. 及 3 Columbus Circle, LLC（被告）的代理律师\n\nSabrina L. Streusand Streusand, Landon, Ozburn & Lemmon, LLP Spyglass Point 1801 South MoPac Expressway, Suite 320 Austin, TX 78746\n\nRoss G. Fingold Stokesbury, Shipman & Fingold 10 Waterside Drive, Suite 204 Farmington, CT 06032\n动议人 Cloudflare, Inc.（被告）的代理律师\n\nRichard J. Reding ASK LLP 2600 Eagan Woods Drive, Suite 400 St. Paul, MN 55121\n\n以及\n\nEdward E. Neiger ASK LLP 60 East 42nd Street, 46th Floor New York, NY 10165\n\nElizabeth N. Krasnow Eric R. Wilson Benjamin D. Feder Kelley Drye & Warren LLP Canterbury Green 201 Broad Street Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人 Indium Software, Inc.（被告）的代理律师\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 28 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 24 页，共 103 页，共 107 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 23 页，共 102 页\n\nEric Seltzer Gilbride, Tusa, Last & Spellane LLC 30 Brewster Lane Bellport, NY 11713\n动议人 Miller Motorcars Inc.（被告）的代理律师\n\nJustin S. Baumgartner Becker LLC 354 Eisenhower Parkway, Suite 1500 Livingston, NJ 07039\n\nEric S. Goldstein（参与口头辩论） Shipman & Goodwin LLP One Constitution Plaza Hartford, CT 06103\n\n动议人 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.（被告）的代理律师\n\nGerard R. Luckman Elbert F. Nasis Forchelli Deegan Terrana LLP 333 Earle Ovington Boulevard, Suite 1010 Uniondale, NY 11553\n\nPatrick Tomasiewicz Fazzano Tomasiewicz and Barall 96 Oak Street Harford, CT 06106\n\n动议人 Liberty Jet Management Corp.（被告）的代理律师\n\nJohn F. Carberry Kara Anne Zarchin Cummings & Lockwood LLC Six Landmark Square Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人 Target Enterprises, LLC 及 Jamestown Associates, LLC（被告）的代理律师\n\nJames J. Costello, Jr. Norris McLaughlin PA 400 Crossing Blvd., 8th Floor Bridgewater, NJ 08807\n\nFlat Rate Movers, Ltd.（被告）的代理律师\n\nHenry P. Baer Eilis A. Meagher Finn Dixon & Herling LLP Six Landmark Square, Suite 600 Stamford, CT 06901\n\n动议人 Nardello & Co., LLC（被告）的代理律师\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交日期 03/19/25 录入日期 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 29 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交日期 03/18/25 录入日期 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 25 页\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交日期 03/04/25 录入日期 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 24 页\n\nJulie Johnston-Ahlen Armstrong Teasdale LLP 100 North Riverside Plaza Chicago, IL 60606\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（参与口头辩论） Kellianne Baranowsky Michelle Amanda Antao Green & Sklarz LLC One Audubon Street, 3rd Floor New Haven, CT 06511\n\n以及\n\nJohn G. Willard\nArmstrong Teasdale LLP（阿姆斯特朗·蒂斯代尔有限责任合伙）\n7700 Forsyth Blvd., Suite 1800\nSt. Louis, MO 63105\n动议人及被告 Berkeley Rowe Limited（伯克利罗有限责任公司）之代理律师\n\nRichard Corbi\nThe Law Offices of Richard J. Corbi PLLC（理查德·J·科尔比专业有限责任公司律师事务所）\n104 West 40th Street, Suite 4th Floor\nNew York, NY 10018\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（出庭辩论）\nKellianne Baranowsky\nMichelle Amanda Antao\nGreen & Sklarz LLC（格林与斯克拉茨有限责任公司）\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n动议人及被告 Weddle Law PLLC（韦德尔法律专业有限责任公司）之代理律师\n\nRowena A. Moffett\nBrenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP（布伦纳·萨尔茨曼与沃尔曼有限责任合伙）\n271 Whitney Avenue\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n动议人及被告 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.（莫维罗·阿布拉莫维茨·格兰德·亚松与阿内洛专业公司）之代理律师\n\nBrian David Linder\nClayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（克莱曼·罗森伯格·基什纳与林德有限责任合伙）\n305 Madison Avenue, Suite 650\nNew York, NY 10165\n\nMatthew D. Valauri\nWilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker（威尔逊·埃尔瑟·莫斯科维茨·埃德尔曼与迪克）\n1010 Washington Boulevard, Suite 603\nStamford, CT 06901\n动议人及被告 Clayman Rosenberg Kirschner & Linder LLP（克莱曼·罗森伯格·基什纳与林德有限责任合伙）之代理律师\n\nStephen M. Kindseth（出庭辩论）\nJames M. Moriarty\nDaniel A. Byrd\nZeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒专业公司）\n10 Middle Street, 15th Floor\nBridgeport, CT 06604\n动议人及被告 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒专业公司）之代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 26 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 30 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 25 of 102\n\nScott M. Charmoy\nCharmoy & Charmoy（查莫伊与查莫伊）\n1465 Post Road East, Suite 100\nWestport, CT 06880\n动议人及被告 Putnam's Landscaping（普特南景观美化）之代理律师\n\nRichard J. Bernard\nFaegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP（飞格·德林克·比德尔与里斯有限责任合伙）\n1177 Avenue of the Americas\nNew York, NY 10036\n\n以及\n\nJosh Peterson\nFaegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP\n2200 Wells Fargo Center\n90 S. 7th Street\nMinneapolis, MN 55402\n\n以及\n\nJaclyn C. Marasco\nFaegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP\n222 Delaware Avenue, Suite 1400\nWilmington, DE 19801\n动议人及被告 Cirrus Design Corporation（西锐设计公司）之代理律师\n\nRahman Connelly\nPillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP（品诚梅森·温思罗普·肖·皮特曼有限责任合伙）\n31 West 52nd Street\nNew York, NY 10019\n\nJeffrey M. Sklarz（出庭辩论）\nKellianne Baranowsky\nMichelle Amanda Antao\nGreen & Sklarz LLC\nOne Audubon Street, 3rd Floor\nNew Haven, CT 06511\n动议人及被告 ACASS Canada LTD.（加拿大ACASS有限公司）之代理律师\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 27 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 31 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 26 of 102\n\n关于以下事项的判决备忘录及裁定：(I) 驳回联合被告的驳回起诉动议或根据诉状作出判决的动议；(II) 部分驳回其他被告的驳回起诉动议；以及 (III) 部分驳回蔡斯勒与蔡斯勒专业公司对受托人根据诉状作出判决的动议所提出的异议\n\nJulie A. Manning（朱莉·A·曼宁），United States Bankruptcy Judge（美国破产法官）\n\n本案涉及一名个人 Chapter 11（第11章）债务人，据称其卷入了一场涉及数百家公司 alter egos（另我/替身实体）的广泛骗局。第11章受托人已提起 260 多起诉讼，旨在撤销名义上由这些另我实体进行的转让。48 名撤销之诉被告（其中包括许多正在与第11章受托人进行强制调解的被告）已请求本法院对涉及另我制度与可撤销转让法相互作用的四个共同问题作出裁决。被告、诉状以及所指控的另我实体的庞大数量使得分析变得复杂。然而，结合诉状中所指控的事实（本法院必须推定这些事实属实）对这些问题进行分析时，结果是明确的。基于下述理由，本法院认定撤销之诉被告提出的四个共同问题均不构成驳回撤销之诉的充分理由。\n\nI. 导言\n\n提交给本法院的是由撤销之诉被告提起的数项驳回起诉动议或根据诉状作出判决的动议。撤销之诉由 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）（以下简称“个人债务人”）破产财产的第11章受托人 Luc A. Despins 先生（以下简称“受托人”）提起。受托人依据 United States Code（《美国法典》）第 11 编（以下简称“《破产法典》”）第 544、548、549 和 550 条以及纽约州《债务人与债权人法》第 273、274 和 276 条（该法编纂了纽约州的 Uniform Voidable Transactions Act（《统一可撤销交易法》），即“NYUVTA”），寻求撤销并追回涉嫌的欺诈性转让及未经授权的申请后转让。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 28 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 32 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 27 of 102\n\n被告（以下简称“联合被告”）1 依据《关于进一步修订撤销之诉程序令及安排驳回起诉动议与根据诉状作出判决的动议联合书面答辩的裁定》（以下简称“《联合答辩裁定》”）提交了 37 项动议（以下简称“联合动议”）。（主案 ECF No. 3577。）2 联合被告请求并提议了该综合程序，并准备且提交了其请求法院审理的共同法律问题。（见主案 ECF No. 3511。）受托人对联合被告的请求未提出异议。本法院在作出《联合答辩裁定》时采纳了联合被告的程序。\n\n其他动议（以下简称“非联合动议”）由被告 3 提交，该等被告虽未参与联合书面答辩，但提出了联合被告所提出的部分或全部问题，并请求将其动议与联合动议一同审理。由于其提出了《联合答辩裁定》中的部分问题，Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（以下简称“Z&Z”，与非联合动议的提交人合称为“非联合被告”）亦请求将其对受托人提交的根据诉状作出判决的动议所提出的异议（以下简称“Z&Z 异议”）4 与联合动议一同审理。\n\n1 鉴于本综合程序的复杂性，本可能在脚注中出现的某些信息收录于附录中。本判决的 .pdf 文件包含书签以方便查阅附录。联合动议清单以及提交各项联合动议的联合被告的标注见附录 A。\n\n2 主案 In re Kwok 案号 22-50073 (JAM) 的案卷索引格式将表述为“主案 ECF No. __”。\n\n3 非联合动议清单以及提交各项非联合动议的被告标注见附录 B。\n\n4 Z&Z 异议的引注见附录 C。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 29 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 33 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 28 of 102\n\n本判决备忘录载明了本法院对《联合答辩裁定》中提出的四个问题的法律结论。Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052（《联邦破产诉讼规则》第 7052 条）。基于以下原因：(i) 所提出的法律问题对诉状的充分性不具决定性；(ii) 被告在法律问题上未胜诉；以及 (iii) 提出的许多问题属于事实问题而非法律问题，联合动议予以驳回。基于同样的原因，非联合动议就《联合答辩裁定》中所述问题予以部分驳回，Z&Z 异议在相同范围内予以部分驳回。\n\nII. 背景\n\n2022年2月15日，个人债务人向本法院提出了自愿性第11章破产申请。（主案 ECF No. 1。）2022年6月15日，面对与个人债务人的财务不善管理及涉嫌的骗局有关的指控，本法院作出了判决备忘录及裁定，任命一名第11章受托人来管理个人债务人的破产财产。（主案 ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。2022年7月8日，Despins 先生被任命为受托人。（主案 ECF No. 523。）\n\n《撤销之诉程序令》\n\n2024年1月29日，受托人提出动议，请求就其打算提起且仅根据《破产法典》第 544、547、548、549 和 550 条提出主张的撤销之诉预先确立程序。（主案 ECF No. 2532。）受托人预计在申请日届满两周年之前提起数百起撤销之诉，并预计这些立案将带来案件管理问题。见 11 U.S.C. §§ 108, 546, 549。在2024年2月5日举行听证会后，本法院作出了批准该动议的裁定（经修订和补充后统称为《撤销之诉程序令》）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 30 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 34 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 29 of 102\n\n（主案 ECF No. 2578。）在2024年2月9日至2024年2月15日期间，受托人提起了 268 起撤销之诉，包括属于本判决标的的诉讼。（主案 ECF Nos. 2594–925。）各项诉状均主张了以下六项诉由中的至少一项或多项（按主张统称为“撤销主张”）5：\n\n(i) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) 和 550(a)，撤销个人债务人对其财产权益进行的实际欺诈性转让，并向首位受让人追回；\n\n(ii) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) 和 550(a) 以及 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1), 274 和 276 6，撤销个人债务人对其财产权益进行的实际欺诈性转让，并向首位受让人追回；\n\n(iii) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) 和 550(a)，撤销个人债务人对其财产权益进行的推定欺诈性转让，并向首位受让人追回；\n\n(iv) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) 和 550(a) 以及 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2), 274 和 276，撤销个人债务人对其财产权益进行的推定欺诈性转让，并向首位受让人追回；\n\n(v) 依据 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 和 550(a)，撤销个人债务人对个人债务人破产财产进行的未经授权的申请后转让，并向首位受让人追回；以及\n\n(vi) 依据 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) 并结合上述诉由之一，向后续受让人追回被撤销的转让。\n\n（例如参见诉状，Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，附带诉讼号 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。）\n\n每份诉状均指控了至少：(a) 依据联邦法和州法构成的实际欺诈性转让；或 (b) 未经授权的申请后转让。（例如参见诉状，Despins v. Agora\n\n5 载明涉案各诉状中诉由的附表见附录 D。撤销主张所依据的法定条款文本与某些相关法定定义一并列于附录 E。\n\n6 在相关诉状中，受托人指控个人债务人在纽约州开展了业务，包括与涉嫌的欺诈性转让相关的业务。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 31 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 35 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 30 of 102\n\n*Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月9日)，ECF No. 1。）除主张实际欺诈性转让外，部分起诉状还根据联邦法和州法主张了推定欺诈性转让。（*参见，例如*，起诉状，*Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。）最后，其中一份起诉状作为欺诈性转让或未经授权的申请后转让的后续受让人，寻求向一名非联合被告追偿。（起诉状，*Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日)，ECF No. 1。）\n\n所有起诉状均指控个人债务人通过各种*alter egos*（另我/化身）转让了财产，且这些转让要么是欺诈性转让，要么是未经授权的申请后转让。（*参见，例如*，起诉状，*Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月14日)，ECF No. 1；起诉状，*Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日)，ECF No. 1；起诉状，*Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。）有关个人债务人对*alter egos*拥有支配和控制权的其他指控，是通过并入针对涉嫌*alter egos*提起的起诉状作出的，该等起诉状寻求作出*alter ego*和/或实益所有权以及资产与控制权移交的宣告性判决。7\n\n7 就涉及某些涉嫌*alter egos*的指控而言，撤销权主张已被中止。（《撤销诉讼程序命令》第 2(e)(i)、(ii)段，主案 ECF No. 3163。）据此，在相关撤销权主张被中止的范围内，本法院未考虑任何被中止或部分被中止的撤销权主张（本处使用该词依《撤销诉讼程序命令》第 2(e)(i)和(ii)段之定义）。*下文*附录 D 包括注明某项撤销权主张是否为被中止或部分被中止的撤销权主张的批注。针对下文讨论的七个涉嫌*alter egos*的诉讼未被中止。列出被并入之起诉状、关于设立州的指控以及诉由的该等*alter egos*明细表载于附录 F。8\n\n除 Bering Yachts, LLC（*比对*主案 ECF No. 3511 与主案 ECF No. 3713）以及 McManimon, Scotland & Baumann, LLC（*参见*信函，*Despins v. McManimon, Scotland & Baumann LLC (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05194 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年1月13日)，ECF No. 22（宣布与受托人达成和解））外，所有上述被告仍为联合被告。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 32 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 36 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 31 of 102\n\n2024年2月27日，举行了状况听证会以处理对大量撤销诉讼的管理问题。在状况听证会期间，Trustee（受托人）请求实施强制调解程序。在提交了若干答辩状并举行了听证会后，2024年5月2日下达了一项裁定，修改《撤销诉讼程序命令》以纳入强制调解。（主案 ECF No. 3163。）\n《联合书面意见命令》\n\n调解程序的两个特征与联合动议、非联合动议以及 Z&Z 异议尤其相关。第一，某些被告被自动排除在强制调解之外（《撤销诉讼程序命令》第 2(j)(vi)段，主案 ECF No. 3163），且受调解管辖的被告可申请排除在调解之外（*同上*第 2(m)段）。第二，调解程序包括诉讼中止。（*同上*第 2(j)(iii)段。）这两项特征共同构成了《联合书面意见命令》的程序背景。\n\n早在2024年4月22日，*不受调解中止约束*的撤销诉讼被告就开始提出驳回动议。（*参见，例如*，驳回对抗性程序动议，*Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年4月22日)，ECF No. 11。）随着这些动议被安排听证，2024年9月6日，某些*受调解中止约束*的撤销诉讼被告——即最初的联合被告8——请求法院为联合被告建立一套程序，以便\n\n辩论其他撤销诉讼被告的动议所提出的问题，而不是要求他们申请被排除在调解之外。（主案 ECF No. 3511。）\n\n2024年9月24日，举行了状况听证会。在状况听证会期间，联合被告传阅了其关于修改《撤销诉讼程序命令》和联合提交书面意见程序的提案。受托人未对联合被告的提案提出反对。某些不受调解中止约束的被告不反对将其驳回动议的听证会延期至就预期的联合动议举行听证会为止，但对如果其动议在联合动议之后听审可能存在的正当程序问题提出了关切。在状况听证会结束时，法院对该事项予以审议。\n\n2024年9月25日，基于其中阐述的理由，法院下达了《联合书面意见命令》。（主案 ECF No. 3577。）在相关部分，《联合书面意见命令》规定联合被告应共同提交一份仅针对联合被告主张为共同法律问题的四个问题的书面意见。这四个问题几乎逐字采纳了联合被告的提案，分别为：\n\n(i) 受托人是否可撤销非债务人实体的初始转让；\n\n(ii) 适用法律是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或认定*alter ego*；\n\n(iii) 适用法律下反向揭开公司面纱或认定*alter ego*的效力；以及\n\n(iv) 反向揭开公司面纱或*alter ego*的认定是否具有追溯力。\n\n（《联合书面意见命令》第 2(b)(i)–(iv)段，主案 ECF No. 3577。）根据《联合书面意见命令》，(1) 在该等撤销权主张被中止的范围内，联合动议不得涉及被中止或部分被中止的撤销权主张（按《撤销诉讼程序命令》第 2(e)(i)和(ii)段对这些术语的定义）；以及 (2) 联合被告在未来的\n\n答辩状中保留除这四个问题之外提出驳回动议或依据答辩状请求判决的动议的所有依据。（*同上*第 4、5 段。）\n\n《联合书面意见命令》还为其他撤销诉讼被告加入联合被告提供了时间。有数名被告加入了联合被告，包括一些不受调解中止约束的被告。（主案 ECF Nos. 3588, 3591, 3605, 3608, 3615, 3617, 3618, 3623, 3624, 3626, 3627, 3629。）2024年10月18日，联合被告提交了其联合法律备忘录（下称“《联合书面意见》”）和联合动议。（主案 ECF No. 3713。）2024年11月8日，受托人提交了对《联合书面意见》的反对意见。（主案 ECF No. 3803。）2024年11月22日，联合被告提交了支持《联合书面意见》的答复意见。（主案 ECF No. 3848。）联合动议的书面意见已全部提交完毕。非联合动议以及受托人针对 Z&Z 依据答辩状请求判决的动议的书面意见亦已全部提交完毕。9\n\n2025年1月8日，就联合动议、非联合动议和 Z&Z 异议的听证会形式举行了状况听证会。在状况听证会期间，法院在与各方协商后确定了听证会的形式。法院还指出，某些被告在其驳回动议中并未提出《联合书面意见》中的任何问题。各方同意，对这些被告的动议的听证不应同时举行。据此，法院将对这些动议的听证无限期延期。10（*Despins v. Harcus Parker Ltd. (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05163 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年1月14日)，ECF No. 32；*Despins v. Miller (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073，对抗性程序编号 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年1月14日)，ECF No. 29。）\n\n9 非联合动议及受托人针对 Z&Z 依据答辩状请求判决的动议的书面意见提交明细表载于附录 G。\n\n10 尽管 Jason Miller 先生通过2024年10月18日提交的依据答辩状请求判决的动议加入了《联合书面意见》，*参见下文*附录 A，并就该动议接受了听审，但他此前于2024年6月26日提交的非联合驳回动议未予听审。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 35 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 39 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 34 of 102\n\n尽管提出了部分或全部共同问题，其他被告仍不确定是否希望与联合被告同时接受听审。状况听证会后，这些被告表示不希望其动议同时接受听审。据此，法院亦将对其动议的听证无限期延期。（*Despins v. Apple Inc. (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05060 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年1月14日)，ECF No. 67；*Despins v. Meta Platforms Inc. (In re Kwok)*，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05117 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年1月14日)，ECF No. 42。）\n\n2025年1月15日，就联合动议、非联合动议和 Z&Z 异议举行了听证会。该事项已具备作出裁判的条件。\nIII. 管辖权\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)，United States District Court for the District of Connecticut（美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）对本案具有管辖权。根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 及美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院于1984年9月21日作出的《移交命令》，本法院有权审理并裁判本案。本程序在法定意义上属于核心程序。28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (H), (O)。本法院认定，其行使管辖权不受《宪法》第三条的阻碍。*比对 Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，本司法管辖区的审判地是适当的。\nIV. 讨论\nA. 法律标准\n\n联合动议、非联合动议以及 Z&Z 异议主张，受托人未能陈述可以据以获得救济的请求标的。*参见* Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (c)，*由* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012(b) *规定适用*；*亦见 Lively v. Wafra Inv. Advisory Grp., Inc.*, 6\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 36 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 40 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 35 of 102\n\nF.4th 293, 302 (2d Cir. 2021)（依据诉答文书作出判决的动议适用与驳回起诉动议相同的标准）。在判定撤销之诉主张（Avoidance Claims）是否构成了可据以获得救济的主张时，法院必须将充分主张的事实指控（包括起诉状所附文件中的指控）推定为真实。参见 Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980)；Bryant v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 692 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2012)；Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2002)；Tatum v. Oberg, 650 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D. Conn. 2009)。法院必须作出所有有利于受托人（Trustee）的合理推定。Warren v. Colvin, 744 F.3d 841, 843 (2d Cir. 2014)。\n\n要构成充分主张，撤销之诉主张必须包含“表明起诉人有权获得救济的简短且平实的陈述”。Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)，经 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008 适用。它们必须包含“在被推定为真实的情况下，‘陈述了在表面上合理可信的救济主张’的充分事实依据”。Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)（援引 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)）。“合理可信性标准”（plausibility standard）虽然不是“盖然性要求”，但所要求的必须超过“被告存在非法行为的纯粹可能性”。Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678（援引 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556）。判定一项主张是否具有合理可信性是“一项结合具体案情背景的任务，需要审理法院运用其司法经验和常识”。Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679。尽管如此，“仅由纯粹结论性陈述所支持的、对诉由构成要件的空洞背诵，是不充分的”。同上，第 678 页。\n\n在判定撤销之诉主张是否充分时，法院还必须考虑通过引用并入起诉状的文件以及法院可进行司法认知的事项。Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)。在本案中，如上所述，受托人已通过引用并入其针对以下主体的起诉状：(1) Golden Spring (New York) Limited（金泉（纽约）有限公司，简称“Golden Spring”）；\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 37 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 41 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 36 of 102\n\n(2) Lamp Capital LLC（Lamp 资本有限责任公司，简称“Lamp Capital”）；(3) HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK 科技有限公司，简称“HCHK Tech”）；(4) HCHK Property Management, Inc（HCHK 物业管理有限公司，简称“HCHK Property”）；(5) Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（列克星敦物业与人事服务有限公司，简称“Lexington”，并与 HCHK Tech 及 HCHK Property 统称为“HCHK 实体”，个别称为“HCHK 实体”）；(6) Greenwich Land, LLC（格林威治土地有限责任公司，简称“Greenwich Land”）；以及 (7) Leading Shine NY Ltd.（领耀纽约有限公司，简称“Leading Shine”）。这些起诉状根据特拉华州法律主张：(i) 前述实体是个人债务人（Individual Debtor）的另我（alter ego）；以及 (ii) 它们和/或其资产由个人债务人实际拥有（beneficially owned）。11 这些主张的任何构成要件均无需进行详尽具体的陈述。参见 Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995)（适用特拉华州法并裁定确立另我关系无需证明欺诈）。\n\nB. 共同动议\n\n法院将首先审议共同被告12就以下四个问题提出的抗辩主张：\n\n(i) 受托人是否可以撤销非债务人实体的初始转让；\n\n(ii) 准据法是否允许反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定；\n\n(iii) 依据准据法进行反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定的效力；以及\n\n11 涉案的七个另我实体据指控均成立于特拉华州。参见下文附录 F。将这些指控推定为真，特拉华州法律适用于受托人的另我及实际所有权主张。Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013)（适用法院地州法律冲突规则）；参见 Weber v. U.S. Sterling Secs., Inc., 924 A.2d 816, 822–23 (Conn. 2007)（对涉及有限责任公司的另我诉讼及其他内部事务适用设立地州的当地法律）；RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 303, 304。需要澄清的是，“特拉华州法院将‘刺破公司面纱’与‘另我’理论互换使用”。Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018)。\n\n12 无论使用“共同被告”还是“非共同被告”，本意见书论述部分 B 节和 C 节中的裁定均适用于提出或加入所讨论主张的所有被告。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 38 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 42 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 37 of 102\n\n(iv) 反向刺破公司面纱或另我的认定是否可以具有溯及力地适用。\n\n在听证会期间，共同被告将这四个问题归纳为两项抗辩主张。关于问题 (i) 和 (iii)，共同被告辩称，即使法院认定某些实体是个人债务人的另我，法院也必须驳回起诉，因为另我认定并不能赋予受托人就另我实体处分自身财产的转让行为提起诉讼的原告资格。关于问题 (ii) 和 (iv)，共同被告提出了一系列论点，主张在适用的州法下作出另我认定是不当的，或者由于会对另我实体的受让人造成损害而在破产背景下必须受到限制。法院将依次审理这些抗辩主张。\n\n1. 问题 (i) 和 (iii)：在可撤销转让诉讼中作出另我认定的效力\n\n共同被告辩称，在特拉华州法下作出另我认定的效力仅会导致另我实体对个人债务人的债务承担连带替代责任。他们辩称，这种认定将不会：(i) 实现将另我实体的资产转移至个人债务人的破产财产中并允许受托人主张未经授权的申请后转让诉求；或者 (ii) 使得个人债务人与另我实体的人格发生混同以允许受托人主张另我实体处分自身财产的转让构成个人债务人对其财产的欺诈性转让。基于这些理由，共同被告辩称，即使假定受托人在其另我主张上胜诉，受托人也缺乏提起撤销之诉主张的原告资格。归根结底，共同被告主张受托人唯一的求偿途径只能针对另我实体本身。\n\n作为回应，受托人提出了两点主张。首先，受托人辩称，虽然另我认定是依据适用的州法律作出的，但另我认定的效力\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 39 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 43 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 38 of 102\n\n属于联邦法律问题。特别是，受托人主张《美国破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）第 541 条决定了州法下存在的权益是否属于破产财产。其次，受托人辩称，即使州法管辖另我认定的效力，特拉华州法采纳的也是另我同一性理论（identity theory）。因此，受托人辩称，另我认定为其主张欺诈性转让及未经授权的申请后转让请求提供了依据。受托人主张，如果法院支持共同被告的观点，其结果将是通过切断破产财产的求偿途径而对个人债务人的不当行为和不公正交易听之任之。\n\n如下文更详细论述的，法院同意受托人的意见。作为先决事项，共同被告的抗辩仅关注撤销之诉主张中的另我指控，而未能应对重叠且作为备位的实际所有权指控。撤销之诉主张将个人债务人对另我实体及其资产的实际所有权作为所请求救济的依据。参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)；541；Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53, 59 (1990)；Orr v. Kinderhill Corp., 991 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993)。此外，撤销之诉主张所依据的可撤销转让实体法管辖着另我认定的效力。可撤销转让法重实质而轻形式，因此，在适用法律会否定公司形式的情况下，该法适宜于刺破公司面纱。参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)；541；Begier, 496 U.S. at 59；United States v. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198, 204–05 (1983)；Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54–57 (1979)；Stadtmauer v. Tulis (In re Nordlicht), 115 F.4th 90, 104–06 (2d Cir. 2024)；Orr, 991 F.2d at 35；McNellis v. Raymond, 420 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1970)；ASARCO LLC v. Ams. Mining Corp., 382 B.R. 49, 66–68 (S.D. Tex. 2007)。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 40 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 44 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 39 of 102\n\ni. 问题 (i) 和 (iii)：就转让行为所指控的实际所有权\n\n共同被告辩称，受托人通过混淆以下两方面的界限而不当利用特拉华州另我法律来满足撤销之诉主张的两项构成要件：(a) 被指控的另我转让人与个人债务人13；以及 (b) 另我转让人的财产与个人债务人的财产14和/或破产财产15。然而，如前所述，受托人还指控个人债务人实际拥有另我实体和/或其资产。法院不能忽视受托人的这些指控。\n\na. 实际所有权指控与问题 (i) 相关：受托人指控的是非债务人实体的初始转让还是个人债务人的初始转让\n\n关于第一项要件，为了在《破产法典》下主张实际欺诈性转让或某一类推定欺诈性转让，受托人必须主张系个人债务人进行了该项转让。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (B)(ii)(IV)。同样，关于其依据《纽约统一可撤销转让法》（NYUVTA）提出的主张，受托人必须主张系个人债务人或对其债务承担责任的其他方进行了该项转让。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f)。但是，《破产法典》下的未经授权的申请后转让以及其他类型的推定欺诈性转让并不要求转让必须由个人债务人作出。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III)（不要求由债务人作出转让），549(a)（同上）。\n\n依据《破产法典》，“转让”在相关部分包括“以直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿的任何方式处分或放弃——(i) 财产；或 (ii) 财产中的权益”。11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D)。类似地，依据\n\n13 参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV)；N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。\n\n14 参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)；N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。\n\n15 参见 11 U.S.C. § 549(a)。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 41 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 45 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 40 of 102\n\nNYUVTA，“转让”在相关部分包括“以直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿的任何方式处分或放弃一项资产或资产中的权益”。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p)。\n\n与《Bankruptcy Code（美国破产法典）》和 NYUVTA（《纽约州统一虚假转让法》）中关于转让定义包含“间接”转让相一致，法院关注的是转让的实质而非形式。见 Orr 案，991 F.2d 附页 35（“在衡平法上，‘实质不屈从于形式，技术层面的考量亦不妨碍实现实质正义。’因此，涉嫌虚假转让的行为必须结合上下文语境进行评估；‘如果一项转让仅仅是一项总体方案中的一个步骤，则该方案“必须作为一个整体连同其所有综合影响一同被审视。”’）（内部引用省略；原文其他修改保留）；另见 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY（《科利尔论破产》）¶ 548.03[6]（Alan N. Resnick 与 Henry J. Sommer 编，第16版 2025）（汇编案例）。法院必须考察该交易的“经济实质”。Orr 案，991 F.2d 附页 36（援引 Salomon Inc. v. United States 案，976 F.2d 837, 842 (2d Cir. 1992)）。在符合事实的情况下，法院可以在分析交易的经济实质时否定法人独立地位。McNellis 案，420 F.2d 附页 53（在依据经修订的1898年旧破产法提起的诉讼中，维持地区法院的裁定，只要该裁定刺破公司面纱并认定主事人就其向出借人支付的个人款项获得了对价——即向其公司提供的贷款——并据此裁定该交易不构成虚假转让）；另见 Cohen v. de la Cruz 案，523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998)（认定经修订的1898年旧破产法项下的法律未被废除，除非有明确迹象表明国会有意如此）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 42 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 47 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 41 of\n\n联合被告将撤销权主张解释为指控了以下一系列转让：16\n\nA(个人债务人) = B(另我) C(联合被告) (另我认定) (B的财产转让)\n\n采纳联合被告的解释，受托人完全依赖个人债务人与另我之间的同一性来指控个人债务人进行了转让。联合被告对这种同一性提出异议，并主张受托人没有资格撤销余下的转让，即 B 到 C。\n\n然而，法院必须按其所被指控的原样来评估这些转让。见 Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. 案，583 U.S. 366, 382 (2018)。与联合被告对诉状的解释相反，受托人指控个人债务人是“使用”另我进行了转让：\n\nA(个人债务人) C(联合被告) (通过另我 B 转让 A 的财产)\n\n受托人并非仅仅依赖个人债务人与另我之间的同一性——他指控另我是转让的工具。\n\n例如，在针对包括联合被告 Amazon.com, Inc.（亚马逊公司，简称“Amazon”）在内的诉状中，受托人指控：\n\n44. 在申请日之前，[个人]债务人使用其另我壳公司 Greenwich Land、G Club17、Lexington、HCHK Technologies 以及 Golden Spring，或以其他方式，将[个人]债务人的财产转让给了 Amazon（统称为“申请前转让”），包括但不限于如下情形：\n\n见随附于此并构成其一部分的附表 A。\n\n16 下图重印于附录 H。 17 本诉状中的撤销权主张就涉及 G Club Operations LLC 的转让而言已被中止。因此，法院在此仅讨论 Golden Spring、HCHK Tech、Lexington 和 Greenwich Land。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 43 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 48 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 42 of 102\n\n45. 在申请日之后，[个人]债务人通过其壳公司 Greenwich Land、G Club、Lexington 和 Golden Spring，或以其他方式，将破产财产转让给了 Amazon（统称为“申请后转让”），包括但不限于如下情形：\n\n见随附于此并构成其一部分的附表 B。\n\n（诉状 ¶¶ 44–45，Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok) 案，案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，兼涉诉讼编号 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024)，ECF No. 1。）受托人指控这些转让是个人债务人“空壳把戏”的一部分，涉及“(i) 由近亲属和/或下属持有的[个人]债务人控制的壳公司，(ii) 使用来自其他[个人]债务人控制实体的现金购买的和/或无对价转让给壳实体并在其间转移的资产，以及 (iii) [个人]债务人从此类资产中获益并对其拥有控制权和支配权”（同上 ¶ 22），该空壳把戏的目的在于“隐匿和挥霍数百万美元资产，同时对其众多债权人虚假哭穷”（同上 ¶ 37）。（见同上 ¶¶ 20–43。）所有其他诉状均就个人债务人的财务状况提出了相同指控。\n\n为支持这些主张，针对 Amazon 的诉状并入了针对 Golden Spring、HCHK Tech、Lexington 和 Greenwich Land 的另我诉状。（同上 ¶ 20 附注 4。）这些另我诉状请求作出另我和实益所有权的宣告性判决，并基于这些宣告性判决请求交出破产财产。例如，针对 Golden Spring 的诉状指控\n\nGolden Spring 是[个人]债务人的另我，且[个人]债务人是 Golden Spring 和/或其资产的衡平法所有权人。\n\n（诉状 ¶ 2，Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok) 案，案件编号 22-50073 (JAM)，兼涉诉讼编号 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023)，ECF No. 1）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 44 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 49 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 43 of 102\n\n针对 Golden Spring 的诉状指控了大量事实，除其他事项外，涉及个人债务人对 Golden Spring 的设立、注资、管理和运营的控制，以及他利用 Golden Spring 作为壳公司来隐匿资产、支付开支并大体上服务于其个人利益。（同上 ¶¶ 13–38。）诉状附有大量证据附件以支持这些指控。其他另我诉状也提出了类似指控，涉及个人债务人对涉嫌另我的支配和控制、他从此类实体的资产和/或服务中获益和使用，以及他利用此类实体的法人形式向其债权人屏蔽资产。\n\n受托人的指控通过两个重叠的法律理论将个人债务人与名义转让人联系起来：(i) 另我，这是联合被告论点的焦点；以及 (ii) 实益所有权，联合被告未予论述。然而，受托人的实益所有权指控与受托人是否合理主张了个人债务人进行了转让相关。假定受托人已合理指控个人债务人实益拥有这些另我18，他便合理主张了这些另我是个人债务人的关联方，个人债务人可以通过它们间接转让资产。11 U.S.C. §§ 101(2), (15), (41); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(a)。事实上，法院曾将涉及关联方的交易予以合并审视。见例如 Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp. 案，919 F.2d 206, 208–210, 212–13 (3d Cir. 1990)（维持地区法院判决，其中虚假转让涉及所有权人将其拥有的一家公司的资产转移清洗到另一家公司，作为使债权人无法获得资产的整体方案的一部分）；符合 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D)（转让包括间接转让）；N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(p)（同前）。\n\n18 法院不触及受托人是否已合理指控个人债务人对另我享有实益所有权的问题，因为该问题不属于四项争议焦点之一。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 45 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 50 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 44 of\n\n因此，法院认定，双方关于另我效力的争辩对于受托人指控个人债务人是转让人的充分性而言并非决定性的。\n\nb. 实益所有权指控可能使第(iii)项争议焦点变得无足轻重：即反向刺破公司面纱或另我认定在适用法律下的效力\n\n转向有争议的第二个要件，《破产法典》第548条实际或推定虚假转让主张必须指控“债务人在财产中的权益”的转让。11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)。同样，《破产法典》赋予受托人提起撤销诉讼的原告资格，该诉讼是实际债权人根据其他适用的州法或联邦法可以提起以撤销“债务人在财产中的权益”之转让的诉讼。11 U.S.C. § 544(b)。受托人依据纽约州法提出的实际和推定虚假转让主张还必须额外指控“债务人财产”的转让，其中“债务人”为个人债务人或对其债务承担责任的另一方当事人。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (f), (l), (p), 273(a)(1)–(2), 274(a)–(b)。最后，未经授权的申请后转让主张必须指控“破产财产”的转让。11 U.S.C. § 549(a)。\n\n债务人在财产中的权益是指若非该待撤销的转让本应属于破产财产的任何权益。Begier 案，496 U.S. 附页 59（“因为撤销权条款的目的是保护可计入破产财产内的财产——即供分配给债权人的财产——因此受偏颇性转让条款约束的‘债务人财产’最合理地应当理解为若非在破产程序开始前被转让本应成为破产财产一部分的财产。”）。因此，关于一项转让是否属于“债务人在财产中的权益”的分析（11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)）以及关于一项转让是否属于“破产财产”的分析（11 U.S.C. § 549(a)），均集中在定义破产财产的第541条上。破产\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 46 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 50 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 45 of 102\n\n财产的相关部分包括“无论位于何处且由何人持有[,] . . . 债务人在财产中的所有法律或衡平法权益”。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)。事实上，撤销权主张必须指控个人债务人对财产享有衡平法权益，而不仅仅是法定所有权。Begier 案，496 U.S. 附页 58；符合 11 U.S.C. § 541(d)（从破产财产中排除债务人仅享有法定权益而并无衡平法权益的财产）。\n\n关于根据 NYUVTA（《纽约州可撤销交易法》），某项转让是否属于债务人财产的转让，纽约州法律在追讨债务的诉讼中承认实益所有权。参见，例如，In re Gliklad v. Chernoi，12 N.Y.S.3d 65（N.Y. App. Div. 2015）（维持要求判决债务人移交某企业实益所有权的裁定）；Guilder v. Corinth Constr. Corp.，651 N.Y.S.2d 706（N.Y. App. Div. 1997）（发回重审以确定个人被告是否在衡平法上拥有某法人被告，以及原告是否可以刺破该法人被告与其潜在衡平法所有人之间的公司面纱）；Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok Ho Wan（郭文贵），Index No. 652077/2017，2022 WL 406636（N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022）（在追讨判决债务的诉讼中认定判决债务人实益拥有游艇）。因此，“债务人在财产中的权益”、“破产财团财产”以及“债务人财产”均包含个人债务人在财产中的衡平法权益。\n\n共同被告主张，受托人试图撤销另我实体（alter egos）财产的转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）= B（另我实体） C（共同被告）（另我实体认定）（B 的财产转让）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 47 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 51 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 46 of 102\n\n共同被告将起诉状解读为主张：另我实体认定将创设个人债务人在另我实体财产中的权益。19 共同被告主张受托人理解有误——另我实体认定无法创设此前并不存在的财产权益——因此，受托人无原告资格主张剩余的 B 转让至 C 的 B 财产转让。\n\n然而，法院必须再次依所指控的内容评估转让。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp.，583 U.S. at 382。在起诉状中，受托人指控这些转让属于个人债务人财产和/或破产财团财产的转让——而非另我实体的财产：\n\nA（个人债务人） C（共同被告）（通过另我实体 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n受托人指控的是，个人债务人一向在另我实体财产中享有权益——该权益并非由另我实体认定所创设。\n\n这一点可从上文引用的针对 Amazon（亚马逊）的起诉状段落中看出。但再举一例，在针对共同被告 B&H Foto & Electronics Corp.（“B&H Foto”）等主体的起诉状中，受托人提出了如下指控：\n\n43. 在申请日之前，[个人]债务人利用包括 Greenwich Land、Golden Spring、HCHK Technologies、G Club Operations、Rule of Law20 和 Lexington Property 在内的另我空壳公司，或以其他方式，将[个人]债务人的财产转让给 B&H（统称“申请日前转让”），包括但不限于如下：\n\n见随附并构成本文一部分的附表 A。\n\n44. 在申请日之后，[个人]债务人通过包括 Greenwich Land、Lexington、Golden Spring、G Club Operations\n\n19 实际上，正如共同被告所认为的那样，另我实体认定属于非自愿转让，参见 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)，且 A=B 转让至 C 也可写作 A 受让自 B 转让至 C。20 本起诉状中的撤销请求权就涉及 G Club\n\nOperations 和 Rule of Law Foundation III, Inc.（法治基金三期有限公司）的转让中止审理。因此，法院在此仅讨论 Golden Spring、HCHK Tech、Lexington 和 Greenwich Land。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 48 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 52 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 47 of 102\n\n及 HCHK Technologies 在内的空壳公司，或以其他方式，将破产财团财产转让给 B&H（统称“申请日后转让”），包括但不限于如下：\n\n见随附并构成本文一部分的附表 B。\n\n（起诉状第 43–44 段，Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)，Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 10, 2024)，ECF No. 1。）起诉状指控个人债务人参与了一场“空壳骗局”（shell game），藉此将其资产——以及申请日后的破产财团资产——隐匿于另我实体中，以阻碍收取这些资产用于偿还其债务，并逃避其在《破产法典》下的义务。（同上，第 19–42 段。）这些指控在形式上与所有其他起诉状中的指控完全相同。\n\n针对涉案转让所涉及的被指控另我实体的起诉状已通过引用并入本文。（同上，第 19 段脚注 4。）所有另我实体起诉状均包含大量指控，证明个人债务人使用、控制了另我实体的资产并从中获益。21 其中之一，即针对 Golden Spring 的另我实体起诉状已在上文讨论。（参见起诉状第 10–38 段，Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)，Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023)，ECF No. 1。）再如，针对 HCHK 实体（HCHK Entities）的起诉状也提出了类似指控。（参见起诉状第 16–40 段，Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok)，Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)，Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023)，ECF No. 1。）\n\n对起诉状以及并入其中的另我实体起诉状的审查清楚地表明，受托人并非单纯依靠另我实体理论来主张个人债务人或破产财团对被转让财产享有衡平法权益。与第一个要件相同，只要受托人\n\n21 除针对 Greenwich Land 的起诉状外，所有另我实体起诉状均指控对另我实体及其资产享有实益所有权。参见下文附录 F。不过，针对 Greenwich Land 的起诉状仍包含有关个人债务人对 Greenwich Land 资产的使用、控制及获益的指控。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 49 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 53 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 48 of 102\n\n已合理阐述了个人债务人对另我实体资产享有实益所有权22，他就合理阐述了其财产的转让和/或属于（或若无该转让本应属于）破产财团财产的财产转让。因此，Delaware（特拉华州）法律下另我实体认定的效力对于该要件亦非决定性的。\n\nii. 可撤销转让法律管辖争议焦点 (i)：个人债务人是否为转让人；以及争议焦点 (iii)：另我实体的财产是否属于个人债务人的财产和/或破产财团的财产\n\n尽管有上述说明，法院仍将讨论双方当事人关于破产程序中另我实体及可撤销转让诉讼效力的主张。在 McNellis 案中，United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit（美国联邦第二巡回上诉法院）维持了地区法院关于在受托人的欺诈性转让诉讼中刺破公司面纱的裁判，同时也维持了其在受托人的高利贷诉讼中拒绝刺破同一公司面纱的裁判。420 F.2d at 53–54。第二巡回法院得出结论认为，虽然欺诈性转让法律允许法院刺破形式以注重实质，但纽约州的高利贷法律发展至今已允许个人利用公司另我实体来借入在其他情况下构成高利贷的贷款。同上。也就是说，第二巡回法院根据管辖受托人诉讼事由的实体法来确定是否可以刺破公司面纱以确立某一要件或抗辩事由。同上。\n\n据此，受托人关于特拉华州法律下另我实体认定的效力并非决定性的这一主张是正确的。相关的可撤销转让成文法——在此指《破产法典》和 NYUVTA——决定了出于欺诈性转让或未经授权的申请日后转让之目的，是否可以刺破公司面纱以及产生何种效力。McNellis，420 F.2d at 53–54。管辖刺破面纱的标准由适用的法律适用规则决定——\n\n22 法院未就受托人是否已合理阐述个人债务人对另我实体资产享有实益所有权这一问题作出认定，因为这不属于四项争议焦点之一。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 50 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 54 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 49 of 102\n\n该规则可能与管辖整体诉讼事由的法律不同，也可能相同。ASARCO，382 B.R. at 66–68（驳回驳回起诉动议，因债务人根据特拉华州法律已充分指控其具有原告资格，可根据特拉华州法律通过反向刺破面纱代位其子公司主张欺诈性转让）；一致意见参见 Spring Real Est., LLC v. Echo/RT Holdings, LLC，C.A. No. 7994-VCN，2016 WL 769586, at *3（Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016）（承认在特拉华州欺诈性转让法下，当适用法律允许反向刺破面纱时，母公司的债权人可以出于追讨子公司资产的欺诈性转让之目的主张另我实体）。\n\n共同被告声称受托人所寻求的救济是前所未有的。实则不然。ASARCO，382 B.R. at 66–68（适用特拉华州另我实体法律）；参见 Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.)，Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594-DPC，Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC，2020 WL 6821721, at *4–6（Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2020）（适用 Nevada（内华达州）另我实体法律）；Searcy v. Knight (In re Am. Int'l Refinery)，402 B.R. 728, 743–48（Bankr. W.D. La. 2008）（同上）；Kendall v. Turner (In re Turner)，335 B.R. 140, 145–47（Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2005）（适用 California（加利福尼亚州）另我实体法律），相关部分在重审中予以维持 345 B.R. 674, 676–77（Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006）（维持另我实体认定）。\n\na. 争议焦点 (i) 和 (iii)：州法律允许撤销另我实体对其财产的转让\n\n此外，受托人所寻求的救济在州法律下显然也非前所未有。根据 NYUVTA，实际和推定欺诈性转让均可通过另我实体对其财产的转让而确立。“‘债务人’指对债权请求负有责任的人。”N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 270(f)。因此，即使假设另我实体仅产生替代责任（vicarious liability），另我实体即便不属于《破产法典》下的债务人，也依然是“债务人”。因为它是债务人，所以另我实体可以作出可撤销转让。参见 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274。此外，另我实体的财产\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 51 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 55 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 50 of 102\n\n即为债务人的财产。N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270(b), (l), (p)。因此，在州法律诉讼中，另我实体理论可与 NYUVTA 结合使用。参见 Bravia Cap. H.K. Ltd. v. SL Green Realty Corp.，No. 24-cv-2296 (JGK)，2025 WL 552046, at *9（S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区）Feb. 18, 2025）（适用 NYUVTA 和特拉华州另我实体法律）（引用 JSC Foreign Ass'n Technostroyexport v. Int'l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc.，295 F. Supp. 2d 366, 379–80（S.D.N.Y. 2003）（适用《统一欺诈性转让法》（“UFTA”），即《统一可撤销交易法》（“UVTA”）的前身））。\n\n这不仅是 New York（纽约州）的法律；这也是 United States（美国）境内绝大多数（如果不是全部）司法管辖区的法律。参见 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-552b (6)（Connecticut（康涅狄格州）已采纳 UFTA，其对“debtor”（债务人）的定义与 UVTA 相同）；5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 544.06[2]（四十六个州及 District of Columbia（哥伦比亚特区）已采纳 UFTA 或 UVTA）；参见例如 Magliarditi v. TransFirst Grp., Inc., 450 P.3d 911, 2019 WL 5390470, at *4–5 (Nev. 2019) (table disposition)；Thompson Props. v. Birmingham Hide & Tallow Co., Inc., 839 So. 2d 629, 633–34 (Ala. 2002)；Spring Real Est., 2016 WL 769586, at *3；Dwyer v. Meramec Venture Assocs., L.L.C., 75 S.W.3d 291, 294–95 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002)；U.S. Cap. Funding VI, Ltd. v. Patterson Bankshares, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 3d 1340, 1367–68 (S.D. Ga. 2015)。可撤销转让法与 alter ego（另我/第二自我）法均旨在阻止逃避判决执行，不足为奇的是，两者可以在破产程序之外的追索诉讼中结合使用。\n\n如果 Trustee（受托人）根据第 544(b) 条具备提起其 NYUVTA 主张的诉讼资格，并且合理充分地指控了 alter ego23，那么他就合理充分地指控了债务人转让了其财产。\n\n23 本法院将在讨论被告关于其诉状充分性的抗辩之后，在下文 D 节中讨论受托人的 alter ego 指控的合理可信性。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 52 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 56 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 51 of 102\nb. 争点 (i) 与 (iii)：破产法允许撤销 alter ego 转让其财产的行为\n\n本法院必须确定破产之外适用的常规规则是否同样适用于破产之中。正如在上述实益所有权讨论中一样，涉及两个要件。首先，必须确定是否可以使用 alter ego 指控来主张 Individual Debtor（个人债务人）为转让人。《破产法典》仅就实际欺诈性转让以及《破产法典》下四种推定欺诈性转让中的一种对该要件进行规制。11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV)。第 544(b) 条并未将该要件适用于受托人的 NYUVTA 主张，且其不是《破产法典》下四种推定欺诈性转让中的其余三种或未经授权的申请后转让的要件。11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(III), 549(a)。\n\n其次，必须确定是否可以使用 alter ego 指控来主张 alter ego 的财产若非因该转让即属于或本应属于破产财产。Begier, 496 U.S. at 59。这是所有 Avoidance Claims（撤销权主张）的要件，包括受托人的 NYUVTA 主张。如上所述，受托人唯有在指控个人债务人对财产中的权益进行了转让时，方具备根据 NYUVTA 提起主张的诉讼资格。11 U.S.C. § 544(b)。\n争点 (i)：受托人是否指控了由非债务人实体进行的最初转让？\n\n关于第一项要件，本法院认定可以使用 alter ego 来确立个人债务人为转让人，因为“transfer”（转让）的定义包括间接转让。11 U.S.C. § 101(54)。事实上，在 McNellis 案中，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）维持了地区法院刺破公司面纱并认定由该个人而非其公司借入其随后偿还的贷款的裁决。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53–54；参见 Orr, 991 F.2d at 35；Voest-\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 53 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 57 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 52 of 102\n\nAlpine, 919 F.2d at 212–13。因此，alter ego 指控可以支持有关个人债务人（而非某一非债务人实体）系转让人的指控。\n争点 (iii)：根据适用法律，反向刺破公司面纱或 alter ego 认定具有何种效力？\n\n至于第二项要件，在《破产法典》未作规定之处，州法决定当事人在财产中拥有何种权益。Butner, 440 U.S. at 54–57。然而，Butner 案亦认定，国会有权根据《宪法》第一条第八款第四项，出于破产目的对有悖于州法的财产权益作出界定。同上，at 54–57（认定抵押权人是否、何时以及如何取得租金担保权益属于州法问题，因为经修正的 1898 年旧《破产法》未包含赋予或剥夺抵押权人此类担保权益的规定）。\n\n国会对破产财产作出了界定。11 U.S.C. § 541。“国会旨在将广泛的财产纳入破产财产中”，包括“在破产程序开始时债务人并不享有占有性权益的财产”。Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204–05（维持第二巡回上诉法院关于破产财产包括 Internal Revenue Service（美国国税局）在提交破产申请前为执行税收留置权而扣押的财产的认定）。因此，与 Butner 和 Whiting Pools 保持一致，各法院普遍认定，虽然州法决定债务人在财产中享有何种权益，但联邦法决定这些财产权益是否属于破产财产。Lowe v. Bowers (In re Nicole Gas Prod., Ltd.), 916 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2019)；Abboud v. Ground Round, Inc. (In re The Ground Round, Inc.), 482 F.3d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 2007)；In re Nejberger, 934 F.2d 1300, 1302 (3d Cir. 1991)；N.S. Garrott & Sons v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis (In re N.S. Garrott & Sons), 772 F.2d 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1985)。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 54 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 58 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 53 of 102\n\nalter ego 主张属于破产财产。Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 104–06（认定纽约州法下的 alter ego 主张属于破产财产），因为此类主张“通过扩大破产财产而‘使全体债权人受益’”，Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 105（更改见原文）；参见 In re Emoral, Inc., 740 F.3d 875 (3d Cir. 2014)（认定继承者责任主张属于破产财产，因为与 alter ego 主张一样，它们属于全体债权人的一般性主张）。即便在州法层面上 alter ego 属于主张施加替代责任而非独立的诉由，情况亦是如此。Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 109–111。Nordlicht 案判定：\n\nalter ego 责任理论完全契合《破产法典》对“claim”（债权/主张）的定义：\n\n(A) 受偿权，无论该权利是否已折算为判决、是否已确定数额、未确定数额、固定、附条件、到期、未到期、有争议、无争议、法定、衡平法上、有担保或无担保；或\n\n(B) 因违约行为产生受偿权而享有获得衡平法救济的权利，无论该获得衡平法救济的权利是否已折算为判决、固定、附条件、到期、未到期、有争议、无争议、有担保或无担保。\n\n115 F.4th at 110（强调见原文）。\n\n根据 Nordlicht 案，受托人要求 alter ego 付款或给予衡平法救济（例如返还财产）的权利属于破产财产。115 F.4th at 105。受托人可向 alter ego 寻求追偿，直至针对破产财产所主张的全部债权范围。参见 Moore v. Bay (In re Est. of Sassard & Kimball, Inc.), 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931)（就第 544(b) 条主张的前身条款认定，受托人可就一项被撤销的转让为广大破产财产债权人进行追偿）。受托人可追回的财产属于破产财产。Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 204–07。此外，根据 Begier 案，个人债务人在申请前对任何此类财产享有权益。496 U.S. at 59。因此，如果受托人在其 alter ego 主张上胜诉，则 alter ego 的\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 55 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 59 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 54 of 102\n\n财产即为破产财产，且个人债务人在申请前对该财产享有权益。参见 Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 105（alter ego 主张“通过扩大破产财产而‘使全体债权人受益’”）；718 Arch St. Assocs., Ltd. v. Blatstein (In re Blatstein), 192 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 1999)（认定法院具有管辖权裁决针对某项裁定的上诉，该裁定涉及债权人关于若干公司系债务人之 alter ego 的主张等内容，因为认定这些公司系其 alter ego“将导致大量资产被纳入其破产财产中，从而可用于至少部分清偿其债权人的主张。”）；Green v. Bate Recs., Inc. (In re 10th Ave. Rec. Distribs., Inc.), 97 B.R. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)（认定受托人具备提起 alter ego 主张的诉讼资格，因为这是“为全体债权人的利益收取破产财产的企图，并非任何特定债权人所独有”）（强调见原文）。\n相反的权威判例不具说服力\n\n在得出此结论时，本法院谨不同意 United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit（美国第六巡回上诉法院）在 In re Howland 案中作出的裁决。674 F. App'x 482 (6th Cir. 2017)；一致意见见 Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 230 B.R. 906, 914–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)；Grimmett v. McCloskey (In re Wardle), BAP No. NV-05-1000-KMB, Bankruptcy No. S-01-21542-BAM, Adversary No. S-03-01467, 2006 WL 6811026 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006)；Stevenson v. William Noble Rare Jewels L.P. (In re DuMouchelle), Case No. 19-54531, Adv. Pro. No. 21-04041-lsg, ___ B.R. ___, 2023 WL 8100234 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 21, 2023)（适用 Howland 案）；Evangelista v. Silver (In re Silver), 647 B.R. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2022)（同上）。在 Howland 案中，第六巡回法院认定，在州法层面上 alter ego 仅施加替代责任的情况下，alter ego 的财产不属于破产财产且无法被追回。674 F.\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 56 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 60 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 55 of 102\n\nApp'x at 487。Lippe 案和 Wardle 案作出了相同认定。来自第六巡回区内法院的裁决 DuMouchelle 案和 Silver 案适用了 Howland 案。\n\n除上述法定分析外，本法院基于数项理由谨不同意 Howland 案。首先，法院“在没有明确迹象表明国会意图背离的情况下，不会将《破产法典》解释为对以往破产实践的削弱”。Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221。在解释《法典》时，法院推定国会“熟知 1898 年旧《破产法》的普遍理解”。Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 86 (1991)。没有明确迹象表明国会意图推翻 McNellis 案。对比 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54), 541(a), 544(b), 548(a), 549(a) 与 11 U.S.C. §§ 1(30)（1898 年旧《破产法》第 1 条）（1978 年废止）, 107(d)（1898 年旧《破产法》第 67 条）（1978 年废止）, 110(a), (d), (e)（1898 年旧《破产法》第 70 条）（1978 年废止）。McNellis 案——该案支持使用 alter ego 来针对受托人根据联邦破产法和纽约州法提起的欺诈性转让诉讼进行抗辩——对本法院具有约束力。420 F.2d at 53–54。\n\n其次，Sixth Circuit（第六巡回上诉法院）在撤销诉讼中处理另我（alter ego）主张的方法，违背了Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）关于法院必须审视欺诈性转让的实质而非形式的指示。参见 Orr, 991 F.2d at 35；亦见 Boyer v. Crown Stock Dist., Inc., 587 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009)；Voest-Alpine, 919 F.2d at 211–12。在州法允许忽视公司形式的情况下，欺诈性转让法有能力透过交易的名义当事人看清本质。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53；ASARCO, 382 B.R. at 65–68。这种确认经济实质的能力，体现在《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）对转让和破产财产的广泛定义中。11 U.S.C. §§ 101(54)(D), 541。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 57 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 61 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 56 of 102\n\n第三，Howland 案与州法下另我主张与撤销权主张的相互作用方式相悖。如上所述，在破产程序之外，另我理论可用于 NYUVTA（《纽约州统一可撤销交易法》）主张中，以针对另我既是被转让财产的名义转让人又是名义所有人的交易。Bravia Cap., 2025 WL 552046, at *9；Technostroyexport, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80；参见 Spring Real Est., 2016 WL 769586, at *3。\n\n在破产程序中，结果不应有所不同。破产程序除其他性质外，是一种集体追索程序。Merit Mgmt. Grp., 583 U.S. at 370–71。这就是受托人（Trustee）有诉讼资格主张以下权利的原因：(i) 为全体债权人的利益主张一般性权利请求，11 U.S.C. § 544(a)；参见 Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 105；以及 (ii) 在转让的全部范围内主张实际债权人的特定撤销请求，11 U.S.C. § 544(b)——即使实际债权人的债权金额少于转让金额，Moore, 284 U.S. at 5。破产“通过以更公平、更有序的资产分配方式取代‘赛跑’和其他优先受偿的追债体系，从而在债权人之间提供保护。”In re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)（讨论自动中止的目的）（引用 Fidelity Mortg. Invs. v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976)（根据经修订的1898年旧《破产法》审理的案件））。让债权人竞相向法院提起诉讼以寻求另我和欺诈性转让救济——而在个人债务人（Individual Debtor）破产未决期间，债权人可能根本没有起诉资格去寻求这些救济——将破坏破产的集体性质。参见 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 704–05 (2d Cir. 1989)。\n\n即便债权人可以在破产程序之外提起这些诉讼，其成本也将是高昂的：受托人对个人债务人财务状况的调查经历了高度争议且耗时漫长。迫使债权人在破产程序之外提起这些撤销诉讼或放弃追诉，将导致个人债务人的债权人获得不公平且不均等的清偿，\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 58 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 62 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 57 of 102\n\n而其中许多债权人很可能无法支付与此类行动相关的费用和成本。参见 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 160–61 (1991)（第547条旨在平衡防止向法院争先起诉以及向所有债权人提供公平分配的相辅相成的目标）；Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78 F.3d 30, 40–41 (2d Cir. 1996)（同上）。受托人正是将债权人在破产财产中的利益集中起来并为了他们的集体利益提起撤销诉讼的人选。11 U.S.C. §§ 323, 541–50。\n\n最后，Howland 案亦与Delaware（特拉华州）的另我法律相悖。通常情况下另我导致替代责任，这只是我们法律体系的一个偶然现象——另我原则的本质是在公司形式被滥用并导致欺诈或不公时对其不予考虑。参见 Pauley Petroleum Inc. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 239 A.2d 629, 633 (Del. 1968)（“毫无疑问，在提供充分证明的情况下，母公司与子公司之间的公司实体可以不予考虑，而在法律和事实上将最终利益方即母公司视为特定交易中的唯一当事方。”）。正如 Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）所指出的，“在最基本的层面上，反向刺破面纱涉及就企业所有人的债务向企业组织施加责任”，Manichaean Cap., LLC v. Exela Techs., Inc., 251 A.3d 694, 710 (Del. Ch. 2021)（为执行估价判决提起的诉讼），因为“在子公司仅仅是母公司的另我的情况下……法院将把子公司的资产视为母公司的资产”，Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 710（原文带改动）。\n\n普通法中的大多数救济均采取金钱损害赔偿的形式。另我主张的主要用途，是将依法承担金钱损害赔偿责任（例如侵权或合同）的被告的责任分摊给资金更雄厚的被告。参见 NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. LHC Commc'ns, LLC, 537 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2008)（“然而，在适当的情况下，\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 59 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 63 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 58 of 102\n\n实体与其所有人之间的区别‘可以不予考虑’，以要求所有人对实体的债务承担责任。”）（合同之诉）；Wilson v. Thorn Energy, LLC, 787 F. Supp. 2d 286, 294 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）2011)（“寻求让公司所有人对公司债务承担责任的原告‘面临艰巨的任务’。”）（欺诈之诉）；Tronox Inc. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (In re Tronox Inc.), 549 B.R. 21, 43–44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)（“根据特拉华州法律，刺破面纱是一项衡平法原则。……因此，刺破面纱并非纯粹独立的诉由。相反，刺破公司面纱实质上等于直接行为人与其关联公司就直接行为人所犯的某种基础不法行为承担连带责任。”）（侵权之诉）（强调为后加）。\n\n然而，转让的撤销并非金钱损害赔偿。“撤销条款的目的是保全可计入破产财产的财产”。Begier, 496 U.S. at 59（讨论第547条及偏颇性转让的撤销）；参见 In re PWS Holding Corp., 303 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir.（第三巡回上诉法院）2002)（“欺诈性转让法旨在‘使债务人的那些理应属于破产财产的资产可供债权人受偿，即使这些资产已被转让出去。’”）；Sapir v. C.P.Q. Colorchrome Corp. (In re Photo Promotion Assocs., Inc.), 881 F.2d 6, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1989)（裁定允许行政费用债权持有人保留未经授权的申请后转让对拥有类似债权的其他债权人是不公平的）。为此，《破产法典》第548条和第549条以及 NYUVTA 第273条和第274条所提供的救济是撤销标的转让——而非金钱损害赔偿。11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 549；N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273, 274。\n\n一旦转让被撤销，《破产法典》第550(a)条和 NYUVTA 第276(b)条允许追回被转让的特定财产、其价值或其收益。11 U.S.C. § 550(a)；N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. § 276(b)。因此，\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 60 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 64 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 59 of 102\n\n忽视公司形式并将另我的资产视为债务人的资产在撤销诉讼中的运作方式不同于其在其他诉讼中的运作方式，是完全不足为奇的。参见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 710（“在母公司/子公司背景下，‘在子公司仅仅是母公司的另我的情况下……法院将把子公司的资产视为母公司的资产’。”）。\n\n“特拉华州不会容许利用公司形式作为促进欺诈或不公的手段。”Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 714。欺诈性及未经授权的申请后转让法律均契合这一目的。它们的存在是为了防止因资产流失而产生不公平的结果。参见 Begier, 496 U.S. at 59；PWS Holding Corp., 303 F.3d at 313；Photo Promotion Assocs., 881 F.2d at 9–10。如果另我不能用于防止因欺诈性或未经授权的申请后转让所导致的欺诈或不公，那将是根本荒谬且违背该原则宗旨的。这两个法律体系可以结合使用。McNellis, 420 F.2d at 53；ASARCO, 382 B.R. at 65–68；参见 Bravia Cap., 2025 WL 552046, at *9；Technostroyexport, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 379–80；亦见 Spring Real Est., 2016 WL 769586, at *3。\n\n* * *\n\n基于所有这些理由，法院认定债务人可以通过另我进行转让，且另我的财产属于债务人的破产财产。在受托人已合理申明另我主张的范围内，受托人已合理申明个人债务人转让了属于破产财产的财产，或者若非发生该等转让则本应属于破产财产的财产。同理，受托人因此具有提起 NYUVTA 主张的诉讼资格，且基于上述理由已合理申明了这些主张。另我可用于支持《破产法典》或 NYUVTA 项下的可撤销转让主张。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 60 of 102\n2. 争点 (ii) 与 (iv)：对另我商业债权人的损害与实质合并\n\n法院转而审理共同被告（Joint Defendants）的其余主张。共同被告辩称，受托人未能根据特拉华州法律提出可成立的反向刺破面纱主张，因为 (a) 受托人未能申明不存在对所指控另我的债权人的损害；以及 (b) 作为法律问题，共同被告将因反向刺破面纱而受到损害。共同被告还辩称 (c) 受托人正在寻求不被允许的溯及既往（nunc pro tunc）救济；以及 (d) 即使该救济在州法下在其他方面是被允许的，所寻求的救济也可以通过实质合并来实现，因此在未满足溯及既往实质合并所需检验标准的情况下允许受托人获得该救济是不公平的。贯穿共同被告抗辩始终的主张是，受托人所寻求的救济对于他们作为所指控另我的无辜商业债权人而言是极其不公平的。\n\n受托人主张：(a) 判例法明确表明，原告无须就主张的 alter ego（另一自我/替身）的债权人未受损害进行抗辩主张；(b) 损害属于事实密集型审查，无法在驳回动议或依据附随答辩状作出的判决动议中予以解决，且无论如何，Bankruptcy Code（《破产法典》）为联合被告提供了在破产程序之外无法获得的保护；(c) 其通过 alter ego 诉求并非寻求 nunc pro tunc（溯及既往/补正生效）的救济，而是寻求使法律现实符合事实现实；以及 (d) 尽管 alter ego 在破产程序中提供的救济可能类似于实质性合并，但两种救济的事实和法律依据不同，且受托人已就 alter ego 提出了诉讼主张。受托人还反驳了联合被告全系无辜商业债权人以及其所寻求的救济在根本上不公平的主张。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 62 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 66 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 61 of 102\ni. 争点 (ii)：适用法律是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或 alter ego 认定？\n\n如上所述，联合被告将撤销之诉主张解释为主张了如下转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）= B（alter ego）→（转让消除）C（联合被告）\n（alter ego 认定）\n\n关于争点 (ii)，联合被告主张，即使 alter ego 认定会在个人债务人与所主张的 alter ego 之间确立同一性，撤销 B→C 的转让也是具有损害性的，因为联合被告并不知道 A=B，因此，法院不能依法在法律上作出 alter ego 认定。\n\n法院不予认同。首先，受托人无须就对 alter ego 的债权人未造成损害进行诉状主张。Delaware Court of Chancery（特拉华州衡平法院）在采纳反向揭开公司面纱时裁定，法院必须考量传统的 alter ego 因素，并额外考量一系列实质上涉及对所主张 alter ego 的债权人、所有权人及其他利益相关方造成损害的其他因素。Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 714–15。尽管如此，衡平法院驳回了被告关于因未就所主张 alter ego 的某些债权人未受损害进行诉状主张而应驳回起诉状的主张。同上，第 718 页。相反，衡平法院认定“起诉状中没有任何依据可以推断反向揭开公司面纱会给无辜的第三方债权人造成损害。……需要明确的是，与……第三方债权人相关的事实主张并未出现在起诉状中，至少在目前阶段，我的分析仅限于该诉状的‘四角范围’之内。”同上。未向本法院提供任何理由表明 Delaware Supreme Court（特拉华州最高法院）在此问题上会与衡平法院持不同意见。损害属于需要事实展开的争点。\n\n其次，受托人可以主张联合被告为最初受让人；后手受让人享有不同的抗辩理由并不构成影响。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp.，583 U.S. at\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 63 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 67 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 62 of 102\n\n382–86（裁定原告可以以某种方式主张转让，从而使安全港抗辩不适用）；比较 Covey v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. (In re Duckworth)，破产案号 10-83603，对抗程序案号 11-8104，2012 WL 4434681，第 *8 页（Bankr. C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012）（裁定受托人对 alter ego 的使用是不被允许的，部分原因在于这会剥夺被告在受托人主张了其他欺诈性转让时原本享有的后手受让人抗辩）。联合被告可以主张受托人未主张《破产法典》或 NYUVTA（《纽约州统一可撤销交易法》）项下的转让。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp.，583 U.S. at 382。事实上，如上文所讨论，联合被告已然这样做了。随着这些诉讼程序推进至诉状阶段之后，他们可以继续这样做。\n\n为了支持其主张，联合被告敦促本法院采纳 Duckworth 案的裁判，但其依赖是不当的。Duckworth 案中的法院面临的不是驳回动议——其面临的是简易判决动议。Duckworth，2012 WL 4434681，第 *2 页。Duckworth 案法院根据无争议的事实认定，允许受托人向所主张 alter ego 的商业债权人进行追偿是不公平的，且违背适用的州法律。同上，第 *7 页。在本案中，联合动议为驳回动议或依据附随答辩状作出的判决动议。在现阶段，标准在于受托人充分主张的事实指控在被推定为真实的情况下，是否支持作出存在不可允许之损害的认定。Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 718。对起诉状及并入其中的 alter ego 起诉状的审查并不支持作出此类认定。\n\n联合被告无权要求受托人必须主张他们是后手受让人。参见 Merit Mgmt. Grp.，583 U.S. at 382。受托人主张的转让为：\n\nA（个人债务人）→ C（联合被告）（A 的财产通过 alter ego B 转让）\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 64 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 68 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 63 of 102\n\n受托人无须将 alter ego 认定视为一次转让而主张 A→B→C 的转让，即无须指控个人债务人将其财产转让给作为最初受让人的 alter ego，且联合被告是 alter ego 的后手受让人。\nii. 争点 (iv)：反向揭开公司面纱或 alter ego 的认定是否可以溯及既往适用？\n\n转向争点 (iv)，本法院得出结论认为受托人并非寻求 nunc pro tunc 的救济。裁定某个实体现在是且一直是另一实体的 alter ego 并不是给予 nunc pro tunc 的救济——而是裁定该公司的法人形式现在是且一直是个幌子。按照联合被告关于 alter ego 的理论，胜诉方将得不到任何可用的救济。联合被告主张，根据特拉华州法律，alter ego 的认定仅仅是对可折算为金钱赔偿的附随索赔施加转承责任。正如联合被告所断言的那样，如果 alter ego 认定只能向前展望性地分摊责任，那么 alter ego 将不会根据已经存在的事实就胜诉方的附随索赔承担责任。这并非特拉华州法律的运作方式。alter ego 可以与附随索赔一并提起，参见 Tronox，549 B.R. at 27（人身伤害原告通过包括 alter ego 在内的各种理论寻求施加转承责任，其中原始被告无法应诉），甚至可以在就附随索赔作出判决之后提起，参见 Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 699–701（alter ego 诉求是在估价判决之后提起的），而无须分析 nunc pro tunc 救济是否恰当。这是因为其并未寻求 nunc pro tunc 救济。参见 Reid v. Wolf (In re Wolf)，644 B.R. 725, 749 n. 9 (N.D. Ill. 2022)（驳回了在破产案件中 alter ego 认定将属于不可允许的溯及既往这一“令人费解”的主张）。alter ego 是根据既有事实寻求救济，正如违约索赔是根据既有事实寻求救济一样。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 65 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 69 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 64 of 102\n\nalter ego 认定不是转让——它并不创设财产权益，而是确认财产权益。这是联合被告对撤销之诉主张的解释中的一个根本性缺陷。如上所述，联合被告将撤销之诉主张解释为指控了如下转让：\n\nA（个人债务人）= B（alter ego）→ C（联合被告）（alter ego 认定）（B 的财产转让）\n\n退一步假设 alter ego 认定在个人债务人与 alter ego 之间确立了同一性，联合被告主张 alter ego 认定会在事后改变 B→C 转让的性质。因此，联合被告主张法院不能将 alter ego 认定——即 A=B，亦可表述为 A↔B——视为在发生 B→C 转让时就已经发生。\n\n然而，受托人并未指控 A=B 的转让，而是指控 alter ego 一直以来都只是个人债务人的工具。其指控的转让为：\n\nA（个人债务人）→ C（联合被告）（A 的财产通过 alter ego B 转让）\n\n并主张通过这些 alter ego 进行的此类转让是个人债务人为其自身、其家族、其关联人士及其业务获取商品与服务以及转移资产的一贯作法。\n\n本法院拒绝在破产案件中对 alter ego 的适用采取审慎限制。特拉华州衡平法院在 Manichaean Capital 案中裁定：\n\n反向揭开公司面纱可能被用作伤害无辜各方、破坏公平交易预期的生硬工具，这些风险虽然真实存在，但在我看来，并不能成为直接彻底否定反向揭开公司面纱的正当理由。相反，对这些风险的认识创造了一个管理风险的机会，并以符合衡平利益的方式进行管理。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 66 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 70 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 65 of 102\n\n251 A.3d at 712。本法院认为，没有任何理由表明破产法院无法或不具备能力按照衡平法院的指示，为了衡平利益而承担起“管理[反向揭开公司面纱风险]的机会”。事实上，《破产法典》的首要目的之一就是提供一个单一的法院/法庭，以便对债权进行调整以及最终的衡平解决，包括通过集体追收程序进行解决。参见 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 et seq。对传统的 alter ego 因素与对 alter ego 的债权人及其他利益相关方造成的损害进行权衡考量，参见 Manichaean Cap.，251 A.3d at 714–15，属于破产法院的管辖职责范围。\n\n联合被告方力促本法院将受托人的“另我”（alter ego）指控视为隐秘的（sub rosa）实质性合并指控，并因此对任何“另我”认定的溯及既往效力施加限制——无论该等限制在州法下是否适用。实质性合并“除其他外，导致将两实体的资产以及针对两实体的债权予以归并；从由此产生的共同基金中清偿债务；消除公司间债权；以及为就重组计划进行表决之目的将两公司的债权人合并”。Union Savs. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., Ltd.), 860 F.2d 515, 518 (2d Cir. 1988)。“实质性合并的唯一目的在于确保所有债权人获得衡平对待。”Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518。实质性合并要求：(i) 债权人已“将这些实体作为单一经济单位进行交易，且‘在提供信贷时并未依赖其独立的身份’”；以及 (ii) 债务人的事务已“如此纠缠不清，以致合并将有利于所有债权人”。同上。在 Drabkin v. Midland-Ross Corp. (In re Auto-Train Corp.) 案中，United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit（美国哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院）裁定，在提议方能够证明实质性合并令的益处超过对潜在撤销诉讼被告造成的损害时，应予作出溯及既往的（nunc pro tunc）实质性合并令。810 F.2d 270, 277 (D.C. Cir. 1987)。联合被告方力促本法院将 Auto-Train 案规则适用于任何“另我”认定。\n\n正如受托人所承认的，破产程序中“另我”认定的效果类似于实质性合并的效果——各“另我”的资产和负债发生合并。然而，实质性合并的可用性——联合被告方对此似乎存疑——并不意味着在破产案件中不能主张“另我”。In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2005)（“在实质性合并出现之前，漠视公司形式的其他救济手段过去（且现在仍）存在。例如，当子公司被其母公司完全支配以至于成为母公司的‘另我’时，在州法下可以无视（或‘揭开’）该子公司的‘公司面纱’。”）。\n\n此外，这两项法理的要件和目的各不相同。根据 Delaware（特拉华州）法，传统的“另我”或揭开公司面纱包含两个要件：(i) 形式将被漠视的公司实体受到其指控的“另我”的极大支配和控制，以至于该实体与其“另我”实际上构成一个单一经济单位；以及 (ii) 将被漠视的公司形式造成了欺诈或某些类似的不公。Pauley Petroleum, 239 A.2d at 633; Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 706; Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable Income Partners II, Inc. v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1184 (Del. Ch. 1999); Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784, 793 (Del. Ch. 1992)。反向揭开面纱还要求法院额外考虑对被指控的“另我”之债权人、所有者和其他利益相关方造成的损害。Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 714–15。“另我”为滥用公司形式提供了救济。相比之下，在没有压倒性损害的前提下，实质性合并为过于复杂的财务事务提供了救济，使之能以更简便得多的方式处理。\n\n这是一个有实质意义的区别。“最好将实质性合并视为一种经济救济，其首要目标是衡平对待所有债权人。相反，州法下的另我诉求是一种侧重于防止‘欺诈或不公’的衡平法救济。”Parker v. Titan Mining (US) Corp. (In re Star Mountain Res., Inc.), Case No.: 2:18-bk-01594- DPC, Adversary No.: 2:19-ap-00412-DPC, 2022 WL 2294175, at *8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 22, 2022)。实质性合并并不旨在救济任何欺诈或不公。Augie/Restivo, 860 F.2d at 518。公司形式无须被滥用，各实体无须为皮包公司，也无须有任何债权人受到公司形式的损害。同上。所必需的仅仅是债权人将从实质性合并中获益。同上。在对破产财产进行实质性合并时，法院是在通过前瞻性地简化其面前的事实来解决一个实际问题——即管理高度交织且预期会耗费高额行政成本来理清的破产财产——只要这样做利大于弊即可。参见同上。而在揭开公司面纱时，法院是确认既已存在的滥用公司形式损害债权人的现实，并在衡平法上不允许该滥用行为继续存在。参见 Pauley Petroleum, 239 A.2d at 633。实质性合并可能涉及转让；而“另我”认定则不涉及。\n\n破产的核心问题之一在于损失的衡平分担。联合被告方在请求法院将 Auto-Train 案规则适用于“另我”诉求时，试图将分析焦点转移到 B 到 C 的转让上，从而偏离 A。在这样做时，联合被告方忽视了起诉状中指控的涉及众多“另我”的骗局，该骗局系由个人债务人实施并为其利益服务，旨在阻碍、拖延或欺诈其债权人——而这些指控正是“另我”分析的核心。参见 Pauley Petroleum, 239 A.2d at 633。（参见例如 Complaint ¶¶ 15–34, Despins v. Agora Lab, Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 24-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 9, 2024), ECF No. 1。）这些指控在被推定为真实的情况下，与权衡反向揭开面纱的各项考量因素相关。Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 715–16（指出法院将权衡“维护受影响公司债权人或债务人的合理预期的社会价值——适用有利于保障该等预期的可反驳推定——与在涉及的特定情况下允许反向揭开所维护的政策的重要性。”）（援引 Gregory S. Crespi, The Reverse Pierce Doctrine: Applying Appropriate Standards, 16 J. CORP. L. 33, 51 (1990)）。\n\n尽管联合被告方请求法院将 Auto-Train 案的溯及既往分析适用于“另我”诉求，但法院认定没有理由或依据偏离特拉华州“另我”法。尽管实质性合并法理出现，该法律对于受托人而言仍然可用。Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 205–06。\n\n* * *\n\n基于所有这些理由，联合被告方就争议点 (ii) 和 (iv) 的论点均不具有说服力。法院不会在驳回起诉动议或根据诉状作出判决的动议中权衡对联合被告方的损害与支持“另我”的因素。同样，法院不会对“另我”的使用强加超出该法理构成要件之外的审慎限制。\n\nC. 非联合动议及 Z&Z 异议 24（24 参见上文注 12。）\n\n法院将仅处理非联合被告方就四项争议点提出的独特论点。下列非联合被告方：(1) FFP (BVI) Limited；(2) Mr. Aaron A. Mitchell；(3) V.X. Cerda & Associates, P.A.；(4) The Francis Firm PLLC；(5) Berkeley Rowe Ltd.；(6) Weddle Law PLLC；(7) Lawall & Mitchell, LLC；(8) G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd.；以及 (9) ACASS Canada LTD，（统称“各类非联合被告方”）均由同一名代理律师代表，该律师将其非联合动议作为单一论点进行了辩论。\n\n另有两名其他非联合被告方：(10) Liberty Jet Management Corp.（“Liberty Jet”）和 (11) Z&Z。Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z 并未提出任何各类非联合被告方未曾提出的独特论点。此外，Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z 在听证会期间均未提出独立论点。因此，法院将仅讨论各类非联合被告方的论点。在 Liberty Jet 或 Z&Z 提出或加入下文所讨论论点的范围内，本讨论亦适用于 Liberty Jet 和 Z&Z。\n\n各类非联合被告方提出了两项独特的论点。首先，关于争议点 (ii)——即适用法律是否允许反向揭开面纱或“另我”认定——各类非联合被告方主张受托人缺乏提起“另我”诉求的当事人资格，因为受托人代位承受个人债务人的权利，而在采信受托人指控为真实的情况下，该个人债务人与被指控的“另我”处于同等过错（in pari delicto）地位。其次，关于争议点 (i) 即受托人能否撤销非债务人实体的初始转让，以及争议点 (iii) 即反向揭开面纱或“另我”认定在适用法律下的效果，各类非联合被告方主张受托人是在“另我”未申请破产且未对个人债务人的第 11 章案件与未申请破产的“另我”破产案件进行实质性合并的情况下，不当地主张“另我”破产财产的诉求。各类非联合被告方声称，受托人这样做是在规避《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）的信息披露要求。\n\n作为回应，受托人主张其根据《破产法典》第 541 条或第 544(a) 条享有当事人资格，因为其代位承受个人债务人债权人的权利，且即便并非如此，同等过错原则的内部人例外规定亦将适用。受托人主张其已正当地主张了个人债务人破产财产的诉求，已正当地主张了“另我”诉求，并且无论如何，其将申请设立新的债权申报截止期，以允许各“另我”的债权人针对破产财产申报债权。\n\n1. 争议点 (ii)：当事人资格\n\n《破产法典》赋予破产受托人代表债权人提起特定诉求的当事人资格。PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d at 700。在缺乏此类法定授权的情况下，“破产受托人通常没有代表破产财产的债权人起诉第三方的当事人资格，而只能主张破产公司自身所享有的诉求。”Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991); 参见 Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir. 1995); Sobchack v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 17 F.3d 600, 607 (2d Cir. 1994)。\n\n在受托人并非代表债权人主张权利的情况下，Wagoner 案指示法院判定：(i) 债务人是否本可以提起该项主张；以及 (ii) 若可以，通过将债务人的行为归咎于受托人，受托人是否构成 in pari delicto（同等过错）。Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 119–20。尽管主张同等过错通常被视为一项衡平法上的积极抗辩，但 Wagoner 原则（包括其对同等过错的考量）“起到了审慎当事人适格限制的作用”。Carney ex rel. Highview Point Partners, LLC v. Horion Invs. Ltd., 107 F. Supp. 3d 216, 228 (D. Conn. 2015)（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院 2015 年）。\n\n第二巡回法院已认定，受托人有诉讼资格代表全体债权人提起 alter ego（另我/分身）主张。在 PepsiCo 案中，第二巡回法院采纳了 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit（美国联邦第七巡回上诉法院）在 Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987) 案中的做法。PepsiCo, 884 F.2d at 697–98, 700–01, 704–05。在 Koch Refining 案中，第七巡回法院认定，根据第 544(a) 条，破产受托人是“一般债权人的代表”，并且可以提起另我主张，因为这些主张针对的是对债权人的普遍性损害而非特定化损害。831 F.2d at 1351–54；见 Titan Real Est. Ventures, LLC v. MJCC Realty Ltd. P'ship (In re Flanagan), 415 B.R. 29, 47 (D. Conn. 2009)。这与第 544(a) 条的法定文本一致：任何判决债权人均可提起另我主张以收回其债权；该权利并不取决于其特定的主张。11 U.S.C. § 544(a)。\n\n虽然第二巡回法院在 Picard v. JPMorgan Chase Bank & Co. (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Secs. LLC), 721 F.3d 54, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2013) 案中对 PepsiCo 案进行了区分，但其所依据的事实是，在该案中 Securities Investor Protection Act（《证券投资者保护法》）受托人试图代表受欺诈债权人提起特定化主张——即使在 Madoff（麦道夫）庞氏骗局的特定事实下此类主张非常普遍，JPMorgan, 721 F.3d at 58–59（脚注 25：实际上，第 544(a) 条避免了这种偶然的普遍性主张，因为它赋予受托人的不是代表特定债权人提起主张的诉讼资格，而是代表拟制判决债权人——没有特定基础主张——本可以提起的主张的诉讼资格，即第 544(a) 条引入了一个独立于围绕债务人及其债务的特定事实之外的债权人）。JPMorgan 案中的主张与 Wagoner 案中的主张极为相似。对比 JPMorgan, 721 F.3d at 58–59 与 Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 116–17。此外，与 PepsiCo 案一致，第二巡回法院最近重申，受托人有诉讼资格代表全体债权人提起另我主张，且另我主张属于破产财产。对比 Nordlicht, 115 F.4th at 104–06, 107–11 与 PepsiCo, 884 F.2d at 701。\n\n各类非共同被告辩称，Nordlicht 案遵循了始于 Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Rest. Equip. Co.), 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987) 的一系列判例，该案与 Koch 案不同，认定第 544(a) 条并未赋予受托人代表全体债权人提起普遍主张的诉讼资格。见 PepsiCo, 884 F.2d at 698–99。各类非共同被告主张，这意味着受托人的另我主张受制于 Wagoner 原则。尽管 Nordlicht 案本身对第 544(a) 条保持沉默，但认定受托人享有某些拟制债权人的权利和权力，与认定其源自这些权利和权力的主张属于破产财产是完全一致的。此外，即使仅根据第 541 条受托人才享有提起另我主张的诉讼资格，该等诉讼资格也是源自全体债权人的一般主张。\n\n因此，Wagoner 原则不适用。当受托人代位债权人提起诉讼时，该原则不适用。Wagoner, 944 F.2d at 118（“受托人坚持认为他并未主张票据持有人的诉求，因此我们无需深入探讨受托人何时（如果有的话）可以代表破产人的债权人起诉第三方”）；见 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. First Republic Bank (In re Salander), 503 B.R. 559, 569 n. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)（纽约南区联邦地区法院 2013 年）（“Wagoner 规则和同等过错原则均不适用于受托人根据《破产法典》第 544 条享有的法定诉讼资格”）；Arnold v. First Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Cornerstone Homes, Inc.), 567 B.R. 37, 52–53 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2017)（纽约西区联邦破产法院 2017 年）。本法院不对各方关于同等过错例外的辩论作出认定。受托人具有提起另我主张的诉讼资格。\n\n2. 争议焦点 (i) 与 (iii)：另我、实质性合并与披露\n\n关于受托人为何不能使用另我理论来诉称个人债务人是转让人，或者声称转让了债务人的财产和/或若非该转让本属于破产财产的财产，各类非共同被告提出了与共同被告基本相同的辩解，本法院已在上方驳回了该辩解。本法院将不再重复讨论该辩解。区别在于各类非共同被告主张受托人本应采取的替代做法。共同被告主张受托人只能向被指控的另我本身追偿，且这是其潜在追偿的全部范围，而各类非共同被告则辩称受托人本应夺取对个人债务人名下企业的控制权，将其置于破产程序中，然后寻求 nunc pro tunc（溯及既往生效）的实质性合并。\n\n本法院也已在上方裁定，尽管存在实质性合并，受托人仍可主张另我诉求。关于各类非共同被告对通知的担忧，各类非共同被告并不代表被指控的另我的全体债权人。各类非共同被告自身已获知受托人的另我主张。受托人已多次声明，他将为被判定为另我的实体的债权人申请设定新的债权申报截止日期。若提出此类请求，本法院届时将考量该截止日期的正当通知与送达问题。\n\nD. 争议焦点 (ii)：另我指控的合理性\n\n本法院已审理了共同被告和非共同被告关于受托人未合理诉称另我理论的主张。本法院已认定受托人具有提起反向揭开公司面纱主张的诉讼资格，受托人无需诉称对被指控的另我的债权人不存在损害，且在法律层面上不存在损害。然而，该讨论使得争议焦点 (ii)——即准据法是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或进行另我判定——尚未得到彻底解决。\n\n根据起诉书及所包含的另我起诉书中的指控，本法院认定受托人已合理指控以下主体为个人债务人的另我，并应当对其反向揭开公司面纱：(1) Golden Spring；(2) Lamp Capital；(3) HCHK Tech；(4) HCHK Property；(5) Lexington；(6) Greenwich Land；以及 (7) Leading Shine。受托人已合理诉称：(i) 个人债务人支配并控制了这些另我，以至于它们没有独立的经济实体存在，仅充当个人债务人的门面；以及 (ii) 这些另我的公司形式用于阻碍、迟延或欺诈个人债务人的债权人，作为旨在有效使个人债务人免受判决执行的大型皮包公司骗局的一部分。见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 706。（例如，参见 Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok), 案号 22-50073 (JAM), 附随诉讼案号 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2023 年 7 月 25 日), ECF No. 1 起诉书第 13–38 段）。此外，起诉书及另我起诉书中的指控若视为真实，并不构成对另我债权人的损害。见 Manichaean Cap., 251 A.3d at 718。\n\nV. 结论与裁定\n\n提交给本法院的某些争议属于法律问题——但其范围被狭隘界定，实质上是要求本法院忽视或重新定性起诉书中的指控。在对驳回动议或依诉状判决动议作出裁定时，本法院不会这样做。被告将受托人的转让指控呈现为一个序列，即 A=B 转至 C：先进行另我认定，在 A（个人债务人）与 B（被指控的另我）之间建立同一性，然后将 B 的财产转让给 C（共同被告）。然而，受托人指控的是 A 转至 C 的转让，即利用 B 将 A 的财产转让给 C。提交给本法院的其他争议被特意设计，试图使其适合在驳回动议中作出裁决。在这样做时，被告将焦点放在未被指控的 B 转至 C 的转让上，并辩称在这一转让中增加另一项转让 A=B 会损害 C 的利益。被告要求本法院超越诉状并对事实作出认定，本法院将不会这样做。\n\n基于上述理由，本法院就这四项争议焦点得出如下结论：\n\n(i) 受托人能否撤销非债务人实体的初始转让？\n\n受托人并非寻求撤销非债务人实体的初始转让。受托人指控个人债务人实施了转让。转让的定义包括间接转让。因此，名义转让人并不具有决定性。受托人提出了另我和实际所有权指控，以主张个人债务人是转让人。\n\n(ii) 准据法是否允许反向揭开公司面纱或进行另我判定？\n\nDelaware（特拉华州）法律承认反向揭开公司面纱。本法院已审理了各方关于受托人对另我事实陈述充分性的辩解。受托人具有提起反向揭开公司面纱主张的诉讼资格。受托人无需诉称对被指控的另我的债权人缺乏损害。受托人已合理诉称了另我。\n\n(iii) 根据准据法，反向揭开公司面纱或进行另我判定的效力为何？\n\n受托人并非仅依赖另我（alter ego）主张——其亦主张实益所有权。然而，根据特拉华州（Delaware）法律，反向刺破公司面纱的效力在于否认公司形式。根据相关联诉由的实体法，否认公司形式会产生不同的结果。通常情况下，这会导致承担替代责任。其亦可被用于证明某种权利请求或抗辩。根据《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code），认定构成另我可用于确立债务人进行了间接转让，并使债务人另我的财产成为破产财团财产。根据《纽约州可撤销转让统一法》（NYUVTA），认定构成另我可用于撤销由该另我就其自身财产所作出的转让。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 77 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 81 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 76 of 102\n\n(iv) 反向刺破公司面纱或另我的认定是否可溯及既往适用？\n\n受托人并非寻求溯及既往的救济。另我是针对过去及现在滥用公司形式的一种救济途径。它使法律现实与事实真相相符。另我在破产程序中出现实质性合并后依然适用。没有任何依据将起诉状重新解释为寻求实质性合并而非另我。\n\n据此，特此裁定如下：\n\n- 1. 附录 A 所列之联合动议，予以驳回（DENIED）。\n\n- 2. 附录 B 所列之非联合动议，就其中提出的与《联合简报裁定》（Joint Briefing Order）中所列问题相关的任何及全部论点，予以部分驳回（DENIED IN PART）。尽管有前述规定，但就处于中止状态之撤销权主张而言，本裁决不适用于中止或部分中止的撤销权主张（Stayed or Partially Stayed Avoidance Claims，定义见《撤销权诉讼程序裁定》第 2(e)(i) 和 (ii) 款）。本裁定后附之附录 D 中载有注释，注明哪些撤销权主张属于中止或部分中止的撤销权主张。\n\n- 3. 本裁定附录 C 所列之 Z&Z 异议，就其中提出的与《联合简报裁定》中所列问题相关的任何及全部论点，予以部分驳回（OVERRULED IN PART）。尽管有前述规定，但就处于中止状态之撤销权主张而言，本裁决不适用于中止或部分中止的撤销权主张（定义见《撤销权诉讼程序裁定》第 2(e)(i) 和 (ii) 款）。本裁定后附之附录 D 中载有注释，注明哪些撤销权主张属于中止或部分中止的撤销权主张。\n\n- 4. 在 2025年3月28日或之前，各非联合被告应在其各自的撤销权诉讼中与受托人共同提交一份联合声明，说明就\n\n\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 77 of\n\n其非联合动议或 Z&Z 提出异议的根据诉状请求作出判决的动议而言，尚待判定的问题。该声明必须具体指明诉状中何处提出了上述问题。在审阅各声明后，法院将就每一事项确定是否有必要举行听证会，或者是否可以根据当事各方提交的材料作出裁决。\n\n特此裁定，于康涅狄格州布里奇波特（Bridgeport, Connecticut），2025年3月4日。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 83 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 79 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 78 of\n\n附录 A 联合动议\n\n- 1. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Agora Lab, Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05005 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 24（由被告 Agora Lab, Inc. 提交）。\n\n- 2. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Amazon Web Servs., Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05006 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 21（由被告 Amazon Web Services, Inc. 提交）。\n\n- 3. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Direct Persuasion LLC（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05010 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 26（由被告 Direct Persuasion LLC 提交）。\n\n- 4. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Fox News Network, LLC（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05015 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 23（由被告 Fox News Network, LLC 提交）。\n\n- 5. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Arri Americas Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05031 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年11月27日），ECF No. 17（由被告 Arri Americas Inc. 提交）。\n\n- 6. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Teris-Phoenix, LLC（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05044 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 20（由被告 Teris-Phoenix, LLC 提交）。\n\n- 7. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Phillips Nizer LLP（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05047 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 23（由被告 Phillips Nizer LLP 提交）。\n\n- 8. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Gunderson（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05048 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 21（由被告 Mark Gundersen 先生提交）。\n\n- 9. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05055 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 17（由被告 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC 提交）。\n\n- 10. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Amazon.com, Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05057 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 42（由被告 Amazon.com, Inc. 提交）。\n\n- 11. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Anthem Health Plans, Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05058 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 21（由被告 Anthem Health Plans, Inc. 提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 80 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 84 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 79 of 102\n\n- 12. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Fed. Express Corp.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05059 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 20（由被告 Federal Express Corporation 提交）。\n\n- 13. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 DJD Creative LLC（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05063 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年12月4日），ECF No. 22（由被告 DJD Creative, LLC 提交）。\n\n- 14. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05069 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 35（由被告 B&H Foto & Electronics Corp. 提交）。\n\n- 15. 根据诉状请求作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Am. Express Co.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05077 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 18（由被告 American Express Company 提交）。\n\n- 16. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05082 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 17（由被告 Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC 提交）。\n\n- 17. 根据诉状请求作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Zeta Glob. Corp.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05092 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 21（由被告 Zeta Global Corp. 提交）。\n\n- 18. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 GroCyber LLC（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05100 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 17（由被告 GroCyber LLC 提交）。\n\n- 19. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05108 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 22（由被告 Conservative Campaign Technology, LLC 提交）。\n\n- 20. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05112 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 23（由被告 Anthem HealthChoice Assurance Inc. 提交）。\n\n- 21. 对抗诉讼驳回动议，Despins 诉 ModSquad Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05114 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 21（由被告 ModSquad Inc. 提交）。\n\n- 22. 根据诉状请求作出判决的动议，Despins 诉 Cloudflare, Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案件号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗诉讼案号 24-05115 (JAM)（康涅狄格区破产法院，2024年10月18日），ECF No. 22（由被告 Cloudfare, Inc. 提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 81 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 85 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 80 of 102\n\n- 23. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 3 Columbus Circle LLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05120 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 17（由被告 3 Columbus Circle LLC 提交）。\n- 24. 根据答辩状作出判决动议，Despins 诉 Indium Software Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05122 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 19（由被告 Indium Software Inc. 提交）。\n- 25. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Miller Motorcars Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05128 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 18（由被告 Miller Motorcars Inc. 提交）。\n- 26. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05130 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 21（由被告 On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. 提交）。\n- 27. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Target Enters., LLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05138 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 19（由被告 Target Enterprises, LLC 提交）。\n- 28. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05141 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 19（由被告 Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. 提交）。\n- 29. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Jamestown Assocs., LLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05147 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 19（由被告 Jamestown Associates, LLC 提交）。\n- 30. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Nardello & Co., LLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05162 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 19（由被告 Nardello & Co., LLC 提交）。\n- 31. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05196 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 18（由被告 Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. 提交）。\n- 32. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05202 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 28（由被告 Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP 提交）。\n- 33. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Putnam's Landscaping LLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05211 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 18（由被告 Putnam's Landscaping LLC 提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 82 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 86 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 81 of 102\n\n- 34. 根据答辩状作出判决动议，Despins 诉 Jason Miller（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05219 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 23（由被告 Jason Miller 先生提交）。\n- 35. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Sedgwick Realty Corp.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05222 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 18（由被告 Sedgwick Realty Corp. 提交）。\n- 36. 根据答辩状作出判决动议，Despins 诉 Cirrus Design Corp.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05225 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 21（由被告 Cirrus Design Corp. 提交）。\n- 37. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Marcum LLP（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05229 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月18日），ECF No. 25（由被告 Marcum LLP 提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 83 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 87 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 82 of\n附录 B 非共同动议\n\n- 1. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 FFP (BVI) Ltd.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05056 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年8月12日），ECF No. 17（由被告 FFP (BVI) Ltd. 提交）。\n- 2. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Mitchell（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05110 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年5月24日），ECF No. 19（由被告 Aaron A. Mitchell 先生提交）。\n- 3. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05134 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年6月5日），ECF No. 16（由被告 V.X. Cerda & Associates P.A. 提交）。\n- 4. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05135 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年6月20日），ECF No. 19（由被告 Liberty Jet Management Corp. 提交）。\n- 5. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Francis Firm PLLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05168 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年5月29日），ECF No. 15（由被告 The Francis Firm PLLC 提交）。\n- 6. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Berkeley Rowe Ltd.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05186 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年10月12日），ECF No. 35（由被告 Berkeley Rowe Ltd. 提交）。\n- 7. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Weddle Law PLLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05188 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年4月22日），ECF No. 11（由被告 Weddle Law PLLC 提交）。\n- 8. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05199 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年5月24日），ECF No. 21（由被告 Lawall & Mitchell, LLC 及 Aaron A. Mitchell 先生提交）。\n- 9. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05204 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年8月22日），ECF No. 19（由被告 G4S Security Systems (Hong Kong) Ltd. 提交）。\n- 10. 驳回对抗性程序动议，Despins 诉 ACASS Canada LTD.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05226 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年9月12日），ECF No. 26（由被告 ACASS Canada LTD. 提交）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 84 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 88 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 83 of 102\n附录 C Z&Z 异议\n\n1. 反对法律备忘录，Despins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05208 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年9月6日），ECF No. 21（由被告 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 提交，用以反对信托受托人的根据答辩状作出判决动议，Despins 诉 Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05208 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年8月2日），ECF No. 17）。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 89 of\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 107\nFiled 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 85 of\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 84 of 102\n附录 D 针对共同及非共同被告的起诉状\n\n图例\n针对非共同被告的起诉状以粗体显示\n\n撤销请求\n\nAFT (BC) – 实际欺诈性转让（《破产法典》）\n\n根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(A) 及 550(a)，向最初受让人撤销并追回个人债务人财产权益的实际欺诈性转让。\n\nAFT (NY) – 实际欺诈性转让（《纽约州法》）根据 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(1)、274 及 276 以及 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) 及 550(a)，向最初受让人撤销并追回个人债务人财产权益的实际欺诈性转让。\n\nCFT (BC) – 推定欺诈性转让（《破产法典》）根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1)(B) 及 550(a)，向最初受让人撤销并追回个人债务人财产权益的推定欺诈性转让。\n\n- CFT (NY) 推定欺诈性转让（《纽约州法》）根据 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 273(a)(2)、274 及 276 以及 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) 及 550(a)，向最初受让人撤销并追回个人债务人财产权益的推定欺诈性转让。\n- UPT 未经授权的申请后转让 根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 549 及 550(a)，向最初受让人撤销并追回未经授权的破产财产申请后转让。\n- ST 向后续受让人追回 根据 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)，向后续受让人追回已被撤销的转让。\n\n* 部分中止的请求\n\n** 中止的请求\n\n（既非针对共同被告亦非针对非共同被告的请求显示在括号中）\n分身 / 另我主体（Alter Egos）\n\nGSNY – Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. LC – Lamp Capital LLC HCHKT – HCHK Technologies, Inc. HCHKP – HCHK Property Management, Inc. LPS – Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. GL – Greenwich Land, LLC LSNY – Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\n[在未被《撤销诉讼程序令》第 2(e) 段中止的范围内，涉及撤销请求的分身主体显示在方括号中]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 86 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 90 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 85 of 102\n\n1. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Agora Lab, Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05005 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月9日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项请求： AFT (BC) [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项请求： AFT (NY) [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项请求： UPT [HCHKT]\n\n2. 修正起诉状，Despins 诉 Amazon Web Servs., Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05006 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月15日），ECF No. 4。\n第一项请求： AFT (BC)* [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY]\n第二项请求： AFT (NY)* [HCHKT, LPS, LSNY]\n第三项请求： UPT [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n3. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Direct Persuasion LLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05010 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月9日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项请求： AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项请求： AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n4. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Fox News Network, LLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05015 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月9日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项请求： AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项请求： AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n5. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Arri Americas Inc.（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05031 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求： UPT [HCHKP]\n\n6. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Teris-Phoenix, LLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05044 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求： UPT* [LPS]\n\n7. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Phillips Nizer LLP（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05047 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项请求： AFT (BC) [LC]\n第二项请求： AFT (NY) [LC]\n第三项请求： UPT [LPS]\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 87 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 91 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 86 of 102\n\n8. 起诉状，Despins 诉 Gunderson（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05048 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日），ECF No. 1。\n第一项请求： AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项请求： AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n9. 起诉状，Despins 诉 270 W. 39th St. Co., LLC（In re Kwok 案），案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性程序编号 24-05055 (JAM)（Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日），ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项请求： UPT [LPS]\n\n10. 起诉书，Despins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. (In re Kwok（涉郭案）)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05056 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn.（康涅狄格区破产法院）2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LSNY]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LSNY]\n第三项主张：UPT\n\n11. 起诉书，Despins v. Amazon.com, Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05057 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第三项主张：CFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第四项主张：CFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第五项主张：UPT* [GSNY, LPS, GL]\n第六项主张：(ST*)\n\n12. 起诉书，Despins v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05058 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT* [HCHKP]\n\n13. 起诉书，Despins v. Fed. Express Corp. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05059 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT* [LPS]\n\n14. 起诉书，Despins v. DJD Creative LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05063 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 88 页（共 103 页）案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 92 页（共 107 页）\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 87 页（共 102 页）\n\n15. 起诉书，Despins v. B&H Foto & Elecs. Corp. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05069 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月10日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第三项主张：CFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第四项主张：CFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS, GL]\n第五项主张：UPT* [GSNY, HCHKT, GL]\n第六项主张：(ST*)\n\n16. 修正起诉书，Despins v. Am. Express Co. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05077 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2025年2月14日)，ECF No. 30。\n\n第一项主张：UPT* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n17. 起诉书，Despins v. Ohtzar Shlomo Solomon Treasure LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05082 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n18. 起诉书，Despins v. Zeta Glob. Corp. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05092 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n19. 起诉书，Despins v. GroCyber LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05100 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n20. 起诉书，Despins v. Conservative Campaign Tech., LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05108 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n21. 起诉书，Despins v. Mitchell (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05110 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LPS]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LPS]\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [LPS]\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [LPS]\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 89 页（共 103 页）案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 93 页（共 107 页）\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 88 页（共 102 页）\n\n22. 起诉书，Despins v. Anthem HealthChoice Assurance, Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05112 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n23. 起诉书，Despins v. ModSquad Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05114 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n\n24. 起诉书，Despins v. Cloudflare, Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05115 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项主张：UPT* [LPS]\n\n25. 起诉书，Despins v. 3 Columbus Circle LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05120 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n26. 起诉书，Despins v. Indium Software Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05122 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC)* [HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY)* [HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项主张：UPT [HCHKT]\n\n27. 起诉书，Despins v. Miller Motorcars Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05128 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC]\n\n28. 起诉书，Despins v. On the Spot Home Improvement, Inc. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05130 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月11日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [HCHKP]\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 89 页 案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 90 页（共 103 页）案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 94 页（共 107 页）\n\n-\n- 29. 起诉书，Despins v. V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05134 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [GSNY]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [GSNY]\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [GSNY]\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [GSNY]\n第五项主张：UPT* [GSNY, HCHKP, LPS, GL]\n\n30. 修正起诉书，Despins v. Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05135 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月15日)，ECF No. 2。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC]\n\n31. 起诉书，Despins v. Target Enters., LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05138 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT] 第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n32. 起诉书，Despins v. Flat Rate Movers, Ltd. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05141 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [GSNY]\n\n33. 起诉书，Despins v. Jamestown Assocs., LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05147 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT]\n\n34. 起诉书，Despins v. Nardello & Co., LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05162 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC, LPS]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC, LPS]\n\n- 案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 90 页（共 102 页）案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 91 页（共 103 页）案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 95 页（共 107 页）\n\t- 35. 起诉书，Despins v. Francis Firm PLLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05168 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月12日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC]\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [LC]\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [LC]\n第五项主张：UPT [LC, LPS]\n\n36. 修正起诉书，Despins v. Berkeley Rowe Ltd. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05186 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年8月15日)，ECF No. 23。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [GSNY, LSNY]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LSNY]\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [GSNY, LSNY]\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [GSNY, LSNY]\n\n37. 起诉书，Despins v. Weddle Law PLLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05188 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：UPT* [HCHKT, HCHKP]\n\n38. 起诉书，Despins v. Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Anello P.C. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05196 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [HCHKP, LPS]\n\n39. 起诉书，Despins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05199 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日)，ECF No. 1。\nAFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\nAFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\nCFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\nCFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, LPS, LSNY]\nUPT* [GSNY, LPS, GL]\nST*\n\n40. 起诉书，Despins v. Clayman Rosenberg Kirshner & Linder LLP (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05202 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [GSNY, LC]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [GSNY, LC]\n第三项主张：UPT [LC]\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 92 页（共 103 页）案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 96 页（共 107 页）\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 91 页（共 102 页）\n\n41. 起诉书，Despins v. G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05204 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC, LSNY]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC, LSNY]\n第三项主张：UPT [LC]\n\n42. 起诉书，Despins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05208 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [LC, GL]\n\n43. 起诉书，Despins v. Putnam's Landscaping LLC (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05211 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月13日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC, GL]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC, GL]\n第三项主张：UPT [LC, HCHKP, GL]\n\n44. 起诉书，Despins v. Jason Miller (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05219 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月14日)，ECF No 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n\n45. 起诉书，Despins v. Sedgwick Realty Corp. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05222 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月14日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n第一项主张：UPT [LC]\n\n46. 起诉书，Despins v. Cirrus Design Corp. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05225 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月14日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [LC, HCHKT, LSNY]\n第五项主张：(ST)\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 92 页 案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 93 页（共 103 页）案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 97 页（共 107 页）\n\n47. 第二次修正起诉书，Despins v. ACASS Canada LTD. (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05226 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年8月29日)，ECF No. 22。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC)* [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY)* [GSNY, LC, HCHKT]\n第三项主张：UPT [GSNY, LC]\n\n48. 起诉书，Despins v. Marcum LLP (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 24-05229 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2024年2月14日)，ECF No. 1。\n第一项主张：AFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第二项主张：AFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第三项主张：CFT (BC) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第四项主张：CFT (NY) [HCHKT, LPS]\n第五项主张：UPT [HCHKP, LPS]\n案号 22-50073 文件 4236-1 提交于 03/19/25 录入于 03/19/25 16:06:06 第 98 页（共 107 页）\n案号 22-50073 文件 4229-1 提交于 03/18/25 录入于 03/18/25 23:57:29 第 94 页（共 103 页）\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 4189 提交于 03/04/25 录入于 03/04/25 14:45:18 第 93 页（共 102 页）\n附录 E 精选成文法条款\n《破产法典》条款\n\n定义\n\n11 U.S.C. § 101(54)\n\n(54) “转让”（transfer）一词指——\n\n(A) 设立留置权；\n\n(B) 保留所有权作为担保权益；\n\n(C) 止赎债务人的赎回权；或\n\n(D) 以直接或间接、绝对或附条件、自愿或非自愿的各种方式处置或放弃——\n\n(i) 财产；或\n\n(ii) 财产中的权益。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)\n\n(a) 根据本篇第 301 条、第 302 条或第 303 条启动案件即构成破产财产。该破产财产由下列所有财产组成，无论其位于何处且由何人持有：\n\n(1) 除本条第 (b) 款和第 (c)(2) 款另有规定外，债务人在案件启动时对财产享有的所有法定或衡平法权益。\n\n撤销条款\n\n11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1)\n\n(b) (1) 除第 (2) 款另有规定外，如果持有根据本篇第 502 条可予确认的无担保债权，或仅根据本篇第 502(e) 条不可予确认的无担保债权的债权人，依据适用法律可撤销债务人对财产权益的任何转让或债务人承担的任何债务，则受托人可撤销该等转让或债务。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 95 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 99 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 94 of 102\n\n11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)\n\n(a) (1) 受托人可以撤销债务人在提交申请书之日或其前 2 年内作出的、债务人对财产权益的任何转让（包括根据雇佣合同向内部人或为了内部人的利益所作的任何转让），或债务人承担的任何债务（包括根据雇佣合同向内部人或为了内部人的利益所承担的任何债务），如果债务人自愿或非自愿地——\n\n(A) 作出该转让或承担该债务时，具有阻碍、拖延或欺诈债务人在作出该转让或承担该债务之日或之后对其负有或将负有债务的任何主体的实际意图；或\n\n(B) (i) 作为该转让或债务的对价，收到的价值低于合理等值价值；且\n\n(ii) (I) 在作出该转让或承担该债务之日已无力偿债，或因该转让或债务而变得无力偿债；\n\n (II) 正在从事或即将从事某项业务或交易，且债务人剩余的任何财产对于该业务或交易而言构成不合理的小额资本；\n\n (III) 意图承担，或相信债务人将承担超出债务人于该等债务到期时偿付能力的债务；或\n\n (IV) 根据雇佣合同且非在正常业务过程中，向内部人或为了内部人的利益作出该转让，或向内部人或为了内部人的利益承担该债务。\n\n11 U.S.C. § 549(a)\n\n(a) 除本条第 (b) 款或第 (c) 款另有规定外，受托人可以撤销符合下列条件的对破产财产的转让——\n\n- (1) 发生在案件启动之后；且\n- (2) (A) 仅依据本篇第 303(f) 条或第 542(c) 条获得授权；或\n- (B) 未根据本篇或法院授权。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 96 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 100 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 95 of 102\n\n11 U.S.C. § 550(a)\n\n(a) 除本条另有规定外，在根据本篇第 544 条、第 545 条、第 547 条、第 548 条、第 549 条、第 553(b) 条或第 724(a) 条撤销转让的范围内，受托人为了破产财产的利益，可向下列主体追回被转让的财产，或者在法院作出如此命令的情况下，追回该财产的价值：\n\n(1) 该转让的初始受让人，或该转让为之利益而作出的主体；或\n\n(2) 该初始受让人的任何直接或间接受让人。\n\nNYUVTA（纽约州统一可撤销转让法）条款\n\n定义\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 270(b), (f), (p)\n\n(b) “资产”指债务人的财产，但该术语不包括：\n\n- (1) 设定了有效留置权范围内的财产；\n- (2) 依据非破产法普遍享有豁免范围内的财产；或\n\n(3) 以不可分共有（tenancy by the entirety）形式持有的财产权益，且仅对其中一名共有人享有债权的债权人无法对其进行司法执行的范围。\n\n. . .\n\n(f) “债务人”指对债权负有责任的人。\n\n. . .\n\n(p) “转让”指处置或放弃某项资产或某项资产中权益的每一种方式，不论是直接的还是间接的、绝对的还是附条件的、自愿的还是非自愿的，并包括支付金钱、免除、租赁、许可，以及设立留置权或其他负担。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 97 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 101 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 96 of 102\n\n撤销条款\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 273(a)\n\n(a) 债务人作出的转让或承担的债务，对于债权人而言是可撤销的，不论该债权人的债权是在该转让作出或该债务承担之前还是之后产生，如果债务人作出该转让或承担该债务系：\n\n(1) 具有阻碍、拖延或欺诈债务人的任何债权人的实际意图；或\n\n(2) 作为该转让或债务的对价未收到合理等值价值，且债务人：\n\n(i) 正在从事或即将从事某项业务或交易，而债务人剩余的资产相对于该业务或交易而言是不合理的小额；或\n\n(ii) 意图承担，或相信或应当合理地相信债务人将承担超出债务人于债务到期时偿付能力的债务。\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. §§ 274(a), (b)\n\n(a) 债务人作出的转让或承担的债务，对于在其转让作出或债务承担之前产生债权的债权人而言是可撤销的，如果债务人作出该转让或承担该债务时作为该转让或债务的对价未收到合理等值价值，且债务人在当时已无力偿债，或债务人因该转让或债务而变得无力偿债。\n\n(b) 债务人向内部人就先存债务作出的转让，对于在转让作出之前产生债权的债权人而言是可撤销的，如果债务人在当时已无力偿债，且该内部人有合理理由相信债务人已无力偿债。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 97 of Case 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 98 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 102 of 107\n\nN.Y. CRED. & DEBT. § 276(a)\n\n(a) 在根据本条针对转让或债务寻求救济的诉讼中，在受本条第二百七十七条限制的前提下，债权人可获得：\n\n(1) 在清偿该债权人债权所必需的限度内，撤销该转让或债务；\n\n(2) 如果适用法律允许，对所转让的资产或受让人的其他财产采取扣押或其他临时救济措施；以及\n\n(3) 在符合衡平法原则并遵照适用的民事诉讼规则的前提下：\n\n(i) 禁止债务人或受让人，或两者进一步处置所转让资产或其他财产的禁令；\n\n(ii) 指定一名接管人接管所转让的资产或受让人的其他财产；或\n\n(iii) 视情况可能需要的任何其他救济。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 99 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 103 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 98 of 102\n\n附录 F 并入的针对人格否认（Alter Egos）主体的起诉书\n\n1. Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（“Golden Spring”）\n\n并入的起诉书：Complaint, Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 25, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\n指控的设立州：Delaware（特拉华州）。第一项诉讼请求：人格否认（Alter ego）。第二项诉讼请求：对实体和/或其资产享有实益所有权。第三项诉讼请求：撤销并追回实际欺诈性转让。\n\n处理结果：Order Granting Motion for Default Judgment, Despins v. Golden Spring (N.Y.) Ltd. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05018 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Dec. 4, 2023), ECF No. 35.\n\n2. Lamp Capital LLC\n\n并入的起诉书：Complaint, Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 26, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\n指控的设立州：特拉华州。第一项诉讼请求：人格否认（Alter ego）（Lamp Capital LLC）。第二项诉讼请求：对 Lamp Capital LLC 和/或其资产享有实益所有权。第三项诉讼请求：人格否认（Hudson Diamond NY LLC）。第四项诉讼请求：对 Hudson Diamond NY LLC 和/或其资产享有实益所有权。第五项诉讼请求：人格否认（Leading Shine NY Ltd.）。第六项诉讼请求：对 Leading Shine NY Ltd. 和/或其资产享有实益所有权。\n\n处理结果：Default Judgment, Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok), Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Feb. 1, 2024), ECF No. 66.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 100 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 104 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 99 of 102\n\n3. HCHK Technologies, Inc.\n\n并入的起诉书：Complaint, Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\n指控的设立州：特拉华州。第一项诉讼请求：人格否认。第二项诉讼请求：对实体和/或其资产享有实益所有权。第三项诉讼请求：永久禁令。\n\n处理结果：Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\n4. HCHK Property Management, Inc.\n\n并入的起诉书：Complaint, Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\n指控的设立州：特拉华州。第一项诉讼请求：人格否认。第二项诉讼请求：对实体和/或其资产享有实益所有权。第三项诉讼请求：永久禁令。\n\n处理结果：Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\n5. Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.\n\n并入的起诉书：Complaint, Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\n指控的设立州：特拉华州。第一项诉讼请求：人格否认。第二项诉讼请求：对实体和/或其资产享有实益所有权。第三项诉讼请求：永久禁令。\n\n处理结果：Amended Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Despins v. HCHK Techs., Inc. (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. June 24, 2024), ECF No. 297.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 101 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 105 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 100 of 102\n\n6. Greenwich Land LLC\n\n并入的起诉书：Complaint, Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2023), ECF No. 1.\n\n指控的设立州：特拉华州。第一项诉讼请求：人格否认。第二项诉讼请求：对实体的实益所有权\n\n处理结果：Summary Judgment, Despins v. Greenwich Land, LLC (In re Kwok), Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 23-05005 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. July 2, 2024), ECF No. 134.\n\n7. Leading Shine NY Ltd.\n\n纳入的诉状：诉状，Despins v. Lamp Cap. LLC (In re Kwok)［德斯平斯 诉 Lamp Cap. LLC（关于郭文贵案）］，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗程序案号 23-05023 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2023年10月26日)，ECF No. 1。\n\n指称设立州：Delaware（特拉华州）。第一项主张：Alter ego（另我/人格混同）（Lamp Capital LLC）。第二项主张：Lamp Capital LLC 及其/或其资产的实际所有权。第三项主张：Alter ego（另我/人格混同）（Hudson Diamond NY LLC）。第四项主张：Hudson Diamond NY LLC 及其/或其资产的实际所有权。第五项主张：Alter ego（另我/人格混同）（Leading Shine NY Ltd.）。第六项主张：Leading Shine NY Ltd. 及其/或其资产的实际所有权。\n\n处置结果：审理中。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 102 of 103 Case 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 106 of 107\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 101 of 102\n对抗程序 动议 ECF 提交日期 异议 ECF 提交日期 答复 ECF 提交日期\n24-05056\nDespins v. FFP (BVI) Ltd. 17 8/12/24 20 10/11/24 22 11/11/24\n24-05110 19 5/24/24 23 7/23/24 24 8/22/24\nDespins v. Mitchell\n24-05134\nDespins v. V.X. Cerda & Assocs. P.A. 16 6/5/24 20 8/5/24 21 9/3/24\n24-05135\nDespins v. Liberty Jet Mgmt. Corp. 19 6/20/24 24 9/16/24 27 10/16/24\n24-05168\nDespins v. Francis Firm PLLC 15 5/29/24 19 7/29/24 20 8/28/24\n24-05186\nDespins v. Berkeley Rowe Ltd. 35 10/12/24 42 12/11/24 51 1/10/25\n24-05188\nDespins v. Weddle Law PLLC 11 4/22/24 17 6/21/24 27 8/2/24\n24-05199\nDespins v. Lawall & Mitchell, LLC 21 5/24/24 26 7/23/24 27 8/22/24\n24-05204\nDespins v. G4S Sec. Sys. (H.K.) Ltd. 19 8/22/24 23 10/21/24 25 11/20/24\n24-05208\nDespins v. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 17 8/2/24 21 9/6/24 22 9/20/24\n24-05226\nDespins v. ACASS Canada LTD. 26 9/12/24 33 11/12/24 41 12/20/24\n\n附录 G 非共同动议及 Z&Z 异议的书面意见陈述\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4236-1 Filed 03/19/25 Entered 03/19/25 16:06:06 Page 107 of 107\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4229-1 Filed 03/18/25 Entered 03/18/25 23:57:29 Page 103 of 103\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 4189 Filed 03/04/25 Entered 03/04/25 14:45:18 Page 102 of 102\n附录 H 转让图示\n\n指称的转让形式：\n\nA（个人债务人） C（共同被告）（通过另我/人格混同 B 转让 A 的财产）\n\n共同被告对转让形式的解释：\n\nA（个人债务人） = B（另我/人格混同） C（共同被告）（另我/人格混同认定）（转让 B 的财产）","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":31481,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-03-18 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-03-18","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:37:54"}