{"id":"court_sdny_474_2","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":474,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2022-06-20","title":"SDNY ECF 474","summary_zh":"反-SLAPP特殊驳回动议 —— 美国内华达州Clark县第八司法区法庭，Guo v. Cheng民事诉讼案，案号A-18-779172-C，ECF #474-2（2022年6月20日）。被告Shuiyan Cheng通过律师Marc J. Randazza等提交根据内华达州法律NRS 41.660的反-SLAPP特殊驳回动议，对抗Wengui Guo（又名Miles Kwok）的诽谤声称；辩称被告在Twitter上的言论属于受保护的言论，程度不构成极端和令人震惊的行为。","summary_en":"Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss — Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, Nevada, Guo v. Cheng, Case No. A-18-779172-C, ECF #474-2 (filed June 20, 2022). Defendant Shuiyan Cheng, represented by counsel Marc J. Randazza et al., files Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss under NRS 41.660 against defamation claims brought by Wengui Guo a/k/a Miles Kwok. Argues defendant's Twitter statements constitute protected speech not rising to level of extreme and outrageous conduct.","body_en":"# **Exhibit 2**\n\n## Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Dismiss\n\n*Guo v. Cheng* Eight Judicial District Court for Clark County, Nevada\n\n|          | Case 22-50073<br>Doc 474-2<br>Filed 06/20/22                                        | Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16<br>Page 2 of 31<br>Electronically Filed<br>6/14/2019 4:33 PM<br>Steven D. Grierson<br>CLERK OF THE COURT |  |\n|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| 1        | MDSM                                                                                |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 2        | Marc J. Randazza (NV Bar No. 12265)<br>Ronald D. Green (NV Bar No. 7360)            |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 3        | LaTeigra C. Cahill (NV Bar No. 14352)                                               |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 4        | RANDAZZA<br>LEGAL<br>GROUP,<br>PLLC<br>2764 Lake Sahara Drive, Suite 109            |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 5        | Las Vegas, NV 89117<br>Telephone: 702-420-2001                                      |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 6        | ecf@randazza.com                                                                    |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 7        | Attorneys for Defendant                                                             |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 8        | SHUIYAN CHENG                                                                       |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 9        | EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT                                                      |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 10       | CLARK COUNTY, NEVADA                                                                |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 11       |                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 12       | WENGUI GUO a/k/a MILES KWOK,                                                        | Case No.<br>A-18-779172-C                                                                                                          |  |\n| 13       | Plaintiff,                                                                          | Dept. 32                                                                                                                           |  |\n| 14<br>15 | vs.                                                                                 | HEARING REQUESTED                                                                                                                  |  |\n| 16       | SHUIYAN CHENG a/k/a HUIYAN CHANG;                                                   | DEFENDANT SHUIYAN CHENG'S ANTI                                                                                                     |  |\n| 17       | FANG YONG a/k/a MA KE,                                                              | SLAPP SPECIAL MOTION TO DISMISS<br>UNDER NRS 41.660                                                                                |  |\n| 18       | Defendants.                                                                         |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 19       |                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 20       | Defendant Shuiyan Cheng hereby files his Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to               |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 21       | Dismiss Under NRS 41.660.                                                           |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 22       | This Motion is based upon the attached memorandum of points and                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 23       | authorities and attached exhibits, the papers and pleadings on file in this action, |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 24       | and any oral argument permitted by this Court.                                      |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 25       |                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 26       |                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 27       |                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n| 28       | - 1 -<br>Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss<br>A-18-779172-C                              |                                                                                                                                    |  |\n\n### **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**\n\n#### 2 **1.0 INTRODUCTION**\n\n1\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Plaintiff's lawsuit against Mr. Cheng is a classic SLAPP suit. Plaintiff prides himself on his status as a public figure and his alleged work as a Chinese dissident. Mr. Cheng published several statements on Twitter criticizing this reputation as unearned and stating that Plaintiff had in fact undermined the political movement he claimed to support. Instead of responding to Mr. Cheng's speech with speech of his own, Plaintiff instead filed the instant lawsuit in an attempt to stop Mr. Cheng from speaking about him at all.1 This is precisely the kind of situation to which the Anti-SLAPP statute is meant to apply.\n\n11 12 13 14 15 Mr. Cheng's statements are either true, constitute rhetorical hyperbole or opinion, or at the very least he made them without actual malice. Plaintiff cannot prevail on any of his claims, and so the Court should dismiss these claims with prejudice and award Mr. Cheng his attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending himself from these claims.\n\n#### 16 **2.0 FACTUAL BACKGROUND**\n\n### **2.1 Plaintiff's Reputation as a Public Figure**\n\n18 19 20 21 22 Plaintiff is a high-profile Chinese political figure who has used social media to \"expose[] widespread corruption in the Chinese Communist Party ('CCP'), multiple senior officials of the Chinese Government, and their family members,\" and has \"made an unprecedented impact on the international image and\n\n17\n\n<sup>23</sup> 24 25 26 27 <sup>1</sup> Plaintiff has a long history of suing his critics instead of participating in the marketplace of ideas to address their criticisms. *See, e.g., Guo v. Yuan*, No. 2:18 cv-02276-SVW-JC (C.D. Cal. 2018); *Guo v. Chen*, No. 2:18-cv-03800-MCA-MAH (D.N.J. 2018); *Guo v. Teng*, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134475 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2018); *Guo v. Lian*, Index No. 151428/2018 (Sup. Ct. of N.Y., Cty. Of N.Y. 2018); *Guo v. Xing*, Index No. 151430/2018 (Sup. Ct. of N.Y., Cty. Of N.Y. 2018); *Guo v. Xia*, No. 1:18 cv-00174-LO-TCB (E.D. Va. 2018); *Guo v. Yuan*, No. 2:18-cv-02276-SVW-JC (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2018).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 4 of 31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 credibility of the [CCP].\" (Second Amended Complaint (\"SAC\") at ¶¶ 5-7.) His Twitter account has over 400,000, followers, most of whom are Chinese, and he claims to be \"the one man who single-handedly challenged the CCP and exposed the CCP's building of an intelligence network in the United States and other countries.\" (*Id*. at ¶¶ 8-9.) He became a billionaire real-estate magnate in China, when eventually in 2015 the CCP seized his family's assets and arrested hundreds of his family members and business colleagues. (*See id*. at ¶¶ 75-82.) He claims that his acts of whistle blowing following this seizure are \"regarded as one of the biggest political incidents in China since the Tiananmen Square Massacre.\" (*Id*. at ¶ 86.) It is safe to say that Plaintiff is a public figure in the context of his political activity.\n\n### **2.2 Reporting on Allegations Against Plaintiff**\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 While Plaintiff depicts himself as a noble and forthright warrior for democracy against Chinese censorship, the actual record is mixed, to the say the least. First, Plaintiff is not being honest regarding his origins as a dissident. He claims that he was arrested by the CCP in 1989 during the Tiananmen Square massacre for assisting protesting Chinese students. (*See* SAC at ¶ 43.) However, Mr. Cheng researched this claim and, according to records from the court of Puyang city, Henan province, China, show that he was arrested for a completely unrelated transaction 300 miles away from Tiananmen Square on charges including fraud and resisting arrest when he attacked a police offer after his brother attacked an officer with a knife. (*See* Declaration of Mr. Cheng in support of reply to opposition to Motion to Dismiss, attached as **Exhibit 1**, at ¶ 16 & *Sub-Exhibit 6*.)\n\n25 26 27 There is also a great deal of reporting on accusations of criminal, unethical, and otherwise objectionable activity against Plaintiff. An April 2017 article in the *Wall Street Journal* reported that the CCP had issued an international arrest notice\n\n12\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 5 of 31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 with Interpol for the Plaintiff. (*See* Chun Han Wong, \"China Says Interpol Arrest Notice Issued for Businessman Guo Wengui,\" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 20, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 2**.)2 In May 2017, *Forbes* reported that Plaintiff was \"making largely unsubstantiated accusations\" against the CCP, which implied that Plaintiff was \"tainted by corruption,\" and explained that the Interpol arrest notice against Plaintiff was based on allegations of bribery. (*See* Nathan Vardi, \"The Chinese Fugitive Living in a \\$67 Million Manhattan Apartment,\" FORBES (May 19, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 3**.)3 It also reported on a Chinese reporter suing Plaintiff for defamation based on statements he made in retaliation for the reporter publishing an article accusing Plaintiff of using a sex tape to remove a Beijing deputy mayor so that he could acquire attractive real estate. (*See id*.)\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 In June 2017, the *Wall Street Journal* reported on a criminal trial in China against Plaintiff's business subordinates for fabricating documents that allowed one of Plaintiff's companies to obtain a lucrative contract and repeated the claim of Plaintiff using a sex tape against a politician for his own benefit. (*See* Josh Chin, \"China Cranks Up Heat on Exiled Tycoon Guo Wengui,\" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (June 10, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 4**.)4 The article also reported that one of the subordinates on trial testified that Plaintiff ordered her to fabricate the documents. (*See id*.) In a September 2017 article, the *Wall Street Journal* repeated many of the allegations against Plaintiff, including that \"Chinese courts\n\n- 21 22 23 <sup>2</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n- 24 <sup>3</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n25 26 27 <sup>4</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n1 2 3 4 5 have jailed and fined a number of Mr. Guo's former associates and subordinates for crimes including fraud and embezzlement. Chinese media have published articles portraying him as unscrupulous.\" (Chun Han Wong and Felicia Schwartz, \"China Wants Fugitive Guo Wengui Back – but He's Applied for U.S. Asylum,\" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 7, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 5**.)5\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 An October 2017 article in the *Wall Street Journal* reported that Plaintiff was using his fortune to defend himself from multiple defamation lawsuits and that a Chinese woman filed a civil suit against Plaintiff, accusing him of raping her while she was working as his personal assistant. (*See* Cezary Podkul and Chun Han Wong, \"Chinese Fugitive Guo Wengui Amasses War Chest to Battle Beijing,\" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 3, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 6**.)6 Later that month, the same paper reported that the CCP said \"it is investigating Mr. Guo in at least 19 major criminal cases that involve bribery, kidnapping, fraud, money laundering and rape.\" (O'Keefe, Viswanatha, and Podkul, \"China's Pursuit of Fugitive Businessman Guo Wengui Kicks Off Manhattan Caper Worthy of Spy Thriller,\" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 22, 2017), attached as **Exhibit 7**.)7\n\n17 18 19 20 In January 2018, the *New York Times* published a lengthy expose on Plaintiff and questioned his claims of being a whistleblower. (*See* Lauren Hilgers, \"The Mystery of the Exiled Billionaire Whistle-Blower,\" The New York Times (Jan. 10, 2018), attached as **Exhibit 8**.)8 It recounted that Plaintiff fled China in anticipation of\n\n <sup>5</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n23 24 <sup>6</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n25 <sup>7</sup> Available at: http\n\n26 1508717977(last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n27 <sup>8</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\n21\n\n22\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 7 of 31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 corruption charges against him that swept up business and political partners, as well as the accusations of corruption, bribery, and rape that surfaced around 2017, and noted that \"[m]ost of Guo's accusations [against the CCP] have proved nearly impossible to verify.\" (*See id*.) It notes that, according to a university professor specializing in Chinese governance, people should not take Plaintiff's claims at face value, and many Chinese political dissidents view him with skepticism due to the fact that he exiled himself to avoid corruption charges instead of persecution. (*See id*.) It explains that Western media outlets have had difficulty substantiating his claims, and that he has withheld simple biographical details such as his age and date of birth. (*See id*.) It reports that Plaintiff took out and defaulted on loans totaling \\$89 million, despite claiming never to have taken government loans. (*See id*.) It discusses Plaintiff's friendship with the vice minister of China's equivalent of the CIA and FBI, Ma Jian, who was arrested in 2015 as part of the CCP's crackdown on corruption. (*See id*.) It notes that details regarding the years leading up to Plaintiff's departure from China are particularly difficult to discern due to a swirl of political scandal and allegations of criminality from all sides. (*See id*.) And it explains that Plaintiff has verifiably fabricated some details of his story9 and has made ridiculously implausible claims, such as never wearing the same pair of underwear twice. (*See id*.)\n\n20 21 22 23 24 Throughout 2018, other media outlets reported on these and similar allegations against Plaintiff, including reporting that many of his claims against the CCP have remained unverified and are often considered sensationalist. (*See* David Barboza, \"Steve Bannon and a Fugitive Billionaire Target a Common\n\n- 25 26 27 <sup>9</sup> Plaintiff additionally lies in his SAC. He claims that Mr. Cheng does not know him personally (SAC at ¶ 110), yet there is photographic evidence that the two met as early as October 2017. (*See* **Exhibit 1** at ¶ 6 and *Sub-Exhibit 2*.)\n\t- 6 Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss A-18-779172-C\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 8 of 31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Enemy: China,\" THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), attached as **Exhibit 9**;10 Chris Lau, \"Hong King police investigating fugitive Chinese tycoon Guo Wengui over alleged HK\\$32 billion money laundering conspiracy, court papers reveal,\" SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 14, 2018), attached as **Exhibit 10**;11 L. Todd Wood, \"Enemies abound for Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui,\" Washington Times (Dec. 19, 2018), attached as **Exhibit 11**;12 *and see* **Exhibit 1** at ¶¶ 18-20 and *Sub-Exhibits 9-11*.)) And in October 2018, the Chinese newspaper *Caixin* reported that five senior employees of one of Plaintiff's companies had been found guilty of multiple crimes, and that Plaintiff himself had embezzled over 2 billion yuan from a Chinese company. (*See* Xiankang, Jinbing, Wei, and Gang, \"Fugitive Billionaire Guo Wengui's Company Fined 60 Billion Yuan,\" Caixin (Oct. 13, 2018), attached as **Exhibit 12**.)13\n\n### **2.3 Mr. Cheng's Statements**\n\n14 15 16 17 18 This lawsuit is based on six statements (known as \"tweets\") Mr. Cheng posted on his publicly-accessible account on the social media web site Twitter. As an initial matter, there is a problem with the SAC; Mr. Cheng's tweets are in Chinese and the SAC (presumably by design) does not attach or display them, instead relying on Plaintiff's own unverified translations of them.\n\n13\n\n<sup>20</sup> 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 <sup>10</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019). <sup>11</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019). <sup>12</sup> Available at: http enemies-abound-for-chinese-billionaire-guo-wengui/ (last accessed June 14, 2019). <sup>13</sup> Available at: http (last accessed June 14, 2019).\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 9 of 31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 To determine what the statements at issue actually mean, Mr. Cheng retained Anmin Lee, a native speaker of Chinese fluent in English who has performed translations for a national political party in Belize. Upon review of the original tweets in question, he discovered that Plaintiff's translations contain significant flaws and omissions. (*See* Declaration of Anmin Lee [\"Lee Decl.\"], attached as **Exhibit 13**.)14\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 To begin with, the first allegedly defamatory statement identified in the SAC is missing half of the conversation. Mr. Cheng led into this tweet by writing, in regard to news that the CCP had released Plaintiff's family from custody: Everyone think about it, which is more likely, the Chinese communist party released Guo's family because: 1. Chinese Communist party is afraid of Guo and therefore they released Guo's family.\n\n- 2. Because Guo had done good by exposing information.\n- 3. The CCP is releasing Guo's family because some type of deal was made.\n- 4. Guo's family were detained to coincide with Guo's exposure of the information, this is done to bolster the credibility of Guo's exposure in the eyes of the masses.\"\n\n17 (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 10-12.)15 Mr. Cheng is thus presenting possible explanations for\n\n18 why the CCP decided to release the family of a high-profile political dissident,\n\n19 including the possibility that Plaintiff struck a deal with the CCP.\n\n20 The first allegedly defamatory tweet reads as follows:\n\n- 21 22 23 Possibility 3 could be right, because Guo and Xi made a deal involving large sums of money. Guo does not resemble a (normal) businessman at all. His great wealth all came from extortions done in collusion with the communists. This time his shady dealings with Xi\n- 24 25 <sup>14</sup> Mr. Cheng continues to gather information on a regular basis that may impact this Motion. In the event any becomes available, he will supplement this Motion.\n\n26 27 <sup>15</sup> Mr. Lee provides a literal translation and a more natural translation for many of the statements at issue. Unless specified otherwise, this Motion refers to the natural translation for each statement.\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 10 of\n\ninvolve making a deal that's worth a heavenly sum. But this deal is built upon a deal whose price is the sacrifice of the lives and properties belonging to 1.4 billion people. Everyone knows that as Xi will do anything to stay in power, he can casually give away 100 billion, a trillion. It's hard for Guo's wealth to not grow explosively.\n\n(Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 14-16.) Mr. Cheng is thus stating that it is possible Plaintiff struck a\n\n31\n\ndeal with the CCP to have his family released, in light of his long-documented shady history with central figures in the CCP and his tremendous unexplained\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 The second complained-of tweet is in response to a Twitter user calling into question claims from Plaintiff as to the numbers of viewers on his YouTube channel. (*See* Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 17-18.) The tweet reads: \"Guo lies and lies and lies with disregard. The more lying Guo lies, the more absurd the lies, even while he's entangled in numerous lawsuits. He no longer has any regard for the laws of civilized Western countries, you can imagine how much worse he must have acted in China.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 19-21.)\n\n16 17 18 19 20 The third tweet at issue reads: \"Guo acts with impunity because he can. He continuously fabricates large amounts of shameless lies; this is the greatest shame for the whole of our overseas Chinese community. Can it really be that evil has overcome justice, the sky and the earth has flipped itself upside down?\" (Lee Decl. at ¶ 22.)\n\n21 22 The fourth tweet at issue reads: \"We can't even deal with one lying Guo, how can we overthrow the evil Chinese communist party?\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 23-25.)\n\n27\n\n28\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\nwealth.\n\na bunch of people, attacked and frightened some people, and seriously divided\n\na group of people so they caused harm to each other. In a short time, he\n\nmanaged to leave the overseas democracy movement in pieces, and they\n\nThe fifth tweet at issue reads: \"Guo confused a bunch of people, snared16\n\n31\n\ncompletely lost their ability to do battle.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶ 26.). The sixth tweet at issue reads: \"Guo deliberately manufactured large quantities of vulgar lies, and continuously makes enemies, his goal is to divert\n\n8 9 10 11 12 people's attention, divide and weaken democracy movement's ability to fight, and thus achieve the goal of overseas stability maintenance.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 27-28.) It is worth noting that a significant portion of the SAC's translation of this tweet is completely inaccurate and is found nowhere in the tweet itself. (*See* Lee Decl. at ¶ 29.)\n\n### 13 **3.0 LEGAL STANDARDS**\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 Under Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute, NRS 41.635 *et seq*., if a lawsuit is brought against a defendant based upon the exercise of his First Amendment rights, the defendant may file a special motion to dismiss. Evaluating the Anti-SLAPP motion is a two-step process. The movant bears the burden on the first step, and the nonmoving party bears the burden on the second. *See John v. Douglas County Sch. Dist.*, 125 Nev. 746, 754 (2009).\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 First, the defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff's claim is \"based upon a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.\" NRS 41.660(3)(a). One of the statutory categories of protected speech is \"[c]ommunication[s] made in direct connection with an issue\n\n26 27 <sup>16</sup> Mr. Lee explains that the character at issue here most likely means '\"to snare,' as in 'to lure or tempt someone into harm or error,\"' and that the SAC's translation, \"cheated on,\" \"is a stretch.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶ 26 fn.8.)\n\n28\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n31\n\n1 2 of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum, which is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.\" NRS 41.637(4).\n\n3 4 5 6 Second, once the defendant meets his burden on the first prong, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must make a *prima facie* evidentiary showing that he has a probability of prevailing on his claims. *See* NRS 41.660(3)(b); *see also John*, 125 Nev. at 754.\n\n7 8 9 10 11 12 Nevada treats an Anti-SLAPP motion as a species of a motion for summary judgment. *See Stubbs v. Strickland*, 297 P.3d 326, 329 (Nev. 2013); *see also Coker v. Sassone*, 432 P.3d 746, 748-49 (Nev. 2019). However, it has some additional procedures to avoid the abusive use of discovery, and if the court grants the motion to dismiss, the defendant is entitled to an award of reasonable costs and attorneys' fees, as well as an award of up to \\$10,000. *See* NRS 41.670(1)(a)-(b).\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Due to a relative dearth of case law applying Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute, Nevada courts look to case law applying California's Anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, which shares many similarities with Nevada's law. *See John*, 125 Nev. at 756 (stating that \"we consider California case law because California's anti-SLAPP statute is similar in purpose and language to Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute\"); *see also Shapiro v. Welt*, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (Nev. 2017) (same); *Sassone*, 432 P.3d at 749 n.3 (finding that \"California's and Nevada's statutes share a near-identical structure for anti-SLAPP review … Given the similarity in structure, language, and the legislative mandate to adopt California's standard for the requisite burden of proof, reliance on California case law is warranted\"); *and see* NRS 41.665(2) (defining the plaintiff's *prima facie* evidentiary burden in terms of California law).\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n### 31\n\n### 1 **4.0 ARGUMENT**\n\n2\n\n## **4.1 Mr. Cheng Satisfies the First Prong of the Anti-SLAPP Analysis**\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 As relevant here, the Anti-SLAPP statute protects any \"[c]ommunication made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum … which is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.\" NRS 41.637(4). A defendant therefore must make three showings to satisfy the first prong: (1) the claims are based upon communications made in direct connection with an issue of public interest; (2) the communications were made in a place open to the public or in a public forum; and (3) the communications are truthful or were made without knowledge of their falsehood. All three requirements are met here. Additionally, the merits of a plaintiff's claims, and the legality of the defendant's actions, are not the focus of the first prong analysis and, if relevant, should only be considered during the second prong analysis. *See Coretronic v. Cozen O'Connor*, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1381, 1388 (2d Dist. 2011); *see also Taus v. Loftus*, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 706-07, 713, 727-299 (2007).\n\n### **4.1.1 Plaintiff's Claims are Based Upon Protected Conduct**\n\n17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 \"Issue of public interest\" is defined broadly as \"any issue in which the public is interested.\" *Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula*, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1042 (2008). \"The issue need not be 'significant' to be protected by the anti-SLAPP statute – it is enough that it is one in which the public takes an interest.\" *Id*. \"Although matters of public interest include legislative and governmental activities, they may also include activities that involve private persona, and entities, **especially when a large, powerful organization may impact the lives of many individuals**.\" *Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim*, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 650 (1996) (emphasis added). An activity does not need to \"meet the lofty standard of pertaining to the heart of self-government\" to qualify for Anti-SLAPP protection; \"social or even\n\n16\n\n27\n\n1 2 low-brow topics may suffice.\" *Hilton v. Hallmark Cards*, 599 F.3d 894 905 (9th Cir. 2009).\n\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The lifestyles and conduct of well-known public figures and even celebrities constitute an issue of public interest. *See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards*, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2011) (celebrity Paris Hilton acknowledging that her \"privileged lifestyle and her catchphrase ('that's hot') are matters of widespread public interest\"). \"[T]here is a public interest which attaches to people who, by their accomplishments, mode of living, professional standing or calling, create a legitimate and widespread attention to their activities.\" *Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC*, 181 Cal. App. 4th 664, 667-68 (1st Dist. 2010). A California court found a suit by a former head football coach was subject to the Anti-SLAPP statute because the plaintiff's \"role as a head coach of a local university's football team already made him a public figure, and his employment termination was already a topic of widespread public interest.\" *McGarry v. University of San Diego*, 154 Cal. App. 4th 97, 110 (4th Dist. 2007). Issues that involve even private conduct by public figures may be of public interest. *See Sipple v. Foundation For Nat. Progress*, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 238 (2d Dist. 1999) (finding that lawsuit based on reported allegations against nationally prominent media strategist for political figures, accusing him of physically and verbally abusing his wife, involved a matter of public interest).\n\n21 22 23 24 25 26 27 As explained in Section 4.2.1.2, *infra*, Plaintiff is unquestionably a public figure. More importantly, Mr. Cheng's statements discuss Plaintiff's involvement in a major political dispute with the CCP, including allegations of criminal corruption by the CCP against Plaintiff. This kind of international political intrigue falls well within the kind of \"issue of public interest\" the Anti-SLAPP statute contemplates. The court in *Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman*, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 783-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) found that communications questioning whether\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 15 of\n\nmoney designated for charity ever reached its final, charitable destination\n\n31\n\naddressed an issue of public interest. In the years leading up to Mr. Cheng's statements on Twitter, there were numerous reports of the CCP's allegations of\n\ncriminal conduct, corruption, and extortion against Plaintiff in renowned media outlets such as the *Wall Street Journal* and the *New York Times*. And by his own account, Plaintiff is *the* preeminent dissident and critic of the CCP. Mr. Cheng's statements concern these allegations against Plaintiff, the authenticity of his \"dissident\" status, and his relationship with the CCP. There is no legitimate question that Mr. Cheng's statements are on an issue of public interest.\n\n10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Even assuming *arguendo* some of the statements were not on a matter of public concern (which Mr. Cheng denies), they are inextricably linked with statements that are, making Plaintiff's claims a \"mixed\" cause of action for Anti-SLAPP purposes. These \"mixed cause[s] of action [are] subject to the Anti-SLAPP statute if **at least one of the underlying acts is protected conduct**, unless the allegations of protected conduct are merely incidental to the unprotected activity.\" *Lauter v. Anoufrieva*, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (emphasis added); *see also Salma v. Capon*, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1287 (2008) (holding that a cause of action based on both protected and unprotected activity under California's Anti-SLAPP statute is subject to an Anti-SLAPP motion); *Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin*, 133 Cal. App. 4th 658, 675 (2005) (finding that because plaintiffs' claims \"are based in significant part on [defendant's] protected petitioning activity,\" the first anti-SLAPP prong was satisfied\"). Taken as a whole, Mr. Cheng's complained-of statements overwhelmingly discuss matters of significant public concern, and so any statements that do not directly speak to such issues still properly fall under the statute's protections.\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n27\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 16 of\n\n31\n\n## **4.1.2 Mr. Cheng's Statements Were Made in a Public Forum** Mr. Cheng published his statements on the web site <twitter.com>. Publicly\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 accessible web sites are public forums for Anti-SLAPP purposes. *See Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates*, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1095, 1121 (2012). In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that social media web sites such as Twitter are paradigmatic modern-day public forums. *See Packingham v. North Carolina*, 582 U.S. \\_\\_\\_, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735-37 (2017) (noting that \"[s]ocial media users employ these websites to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics as diverse as human thought\"). There is no question that Mr. Cheng's statements in direct connection with a matter of public interest were made in a place open to the public or a public forum.\n\n## **4.1.3 Mr. Cheng Made His Statements in Good Faith**\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 To be protected under the Anti-SLAPP statute, statements must \"truthful or … made without knowledge of [their] falsehood.\" NRS 41.637. Even if a statement is false, the defendant must have made it with *actual knowledge* that it was false; neither negligence nor even reckless disregard for the truth can defeat a defendant's showing under prong one. Furthermore, by the Anti-SLAPP statute's plan language, the \"good faith\" analysis is completely unrelated to a defendant's motivations in making a statement.\n\n20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Plaintiff's only support for the allegation that Mr. Cheng knew his statements were false is the conclusory assertion that he made each statement \"with malicious intent and knowing it to be false.\" (*See* SAC at ¶¶ 18-23, 112-117.) This is not at all true. Rather, as explained in greater detail in Section 4.2.1.1, *infra*, Mr. Cheng's statements are expressions of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole based on widely available information and reporting about accusations against Plaintiff. For several months prior to Mr. Cheng publishing any of the statements at issue, newspapers like the *Wall Street Journal* and *The New York Times* had published\n\n12\n\n28\n\n31\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 numerous articles regarding allegations of Plaintiff's criminality, extortion, and embezzlement, whether personally or through his business associates. This reporting, on the whole, permitted the conclusion that Plaintiff fled China on his own initiative to avoid corruption charges after exploiting his ties with prominent CCP members for his personal enrichment, then styled himself as a political dissident to further enrich himself and garner attention. After all, the reporting prior to Mr. Cheng's tweets indicated that most of Plaintiff's claims about the CCP and its members were false or unverifiable.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 There is also nothing to suggest that Mr. Cheng made claims of Plaintiff working with the CCP and Xi Jinping knowing they were false. This allegation stemmed from speculation by Mr. Cheng in July 2018 as to the reason for the CCP releasing Plaintiff's family from custody. Plaintiff had positioned himself as a vocal opponent of the CCP threatening to expose corruption at the top levels (yet, by and large, had not verifiably done so), and so it was not likely the CCP was trying to reward Plaintiff for his alleged whistleblowing, that the CCP was afraid of Plaintiff, or that the CCP for some reason wanted to bolster his credibility. To Mr. Cheng, then, that left one possibility: Plaintiff struck a deal with the CCP. Given his extreme wealth, allegedly obtained at least in part by exploiting the Chinese people and China's political system (according to pending criminal allegations and court cases against him and his subordinates), this was the most plausible scenario.\n\n22 23 24 25 26 Accordingly, all of the statements at issue are thus opinion or rhetorical hyperbole, and thus cannot be false for purposes of this analysis or were made without knowledge of their falsity. Mr. Cheng satisfies his burden under the first prong of the Anti-SLAPP analysis, and now the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show a probability of prevailing on his claims. He cannot do so.\n\n27\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 18 of\n\n31\n\n**4.2 Plaintiff Cannot Show a Probability of Prevailing on His Claims**\n\nproof that a plaintiff has been required to meet pursuant to California's anti-\n\nStrategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation law as of the effective date of this\n\nact.\" NRS 41.665(2). Plaintiff cannot simply make vague accusations or provide\n\nNRS 41.660 defines a plaintiff's burden of proof as \"the same burden of\n\na mere scintilla of evidence to defeat Mr. Cheng's Motion. Rather, to satisfy his evidentiary burden under the second prong of the Anti-SLAPP statute, Plaintiff\n\nmust present \"substantial evidence that would support a judgment of relief made in the plaintiff's favor.\" *S. Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P.*, 193 Cal. App. 4th 634, 670 (2011); *see also Mendoza v. Wichmann*, 194 Cal. App. 4th 1430, 1449 (2011) holding that \"substantial evidence\" of lack of probable cause was required to withstand Anti-SLAPP motion on malicious prosecution claim). Plaintiff cannot make this showing as to any of his claims.\n\n### **4.2.1 Plaintiff's Defamation Claims Fail**\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 To establish a cause of action for defamation, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a false and defamatory statement by the defendant concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third person; (3) fault, amounting to at least negligence; and (4) actual or presumed damages. *See Wynn v. Smith*, 117 Nev. 6, 10 (Nev. 2001); *see also Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 118 Nev. 706, 718 (2002). A statement is only defamatory if it contains a factual assertion that can be proven false. *See Pope v. Motel 6*, 114 P.3d 277, 282 (Nev. 2005). And, for a public figure, like the plaintiff, to prevail in a defamation action, he must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the statements were made with actual malice. *See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc.*, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).\n\n26 27 A statement must include a false assertion of fact to be defamatory. \"[M]inor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity unless the inaccuracies 'would\n\n**4.2.1.1 Mr. Cheng's Statements are Not Actionable**\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n25\n\n1 2 3 4 have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.'\" *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 715 n.17. If the \"gist\" or \"sting\" of a story is true, it is not defamatory even if some details are incorrect. *Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991).\n\n5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 A statement of opinion cannot be defamatory, as the First Amendment recognizes that there is no such thing as a \"false\" idea. *See Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 118 Nev. 706, 714 (Nev. 2002); *see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). Additionally, in Nevada, \"a statement is not defamatory if it is an exaggeration or generalization that could be interpreted by a reasonable person as 'mere rhetorical hyperbole.'\" *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 715 (citing *Wellman v. Fox*, 108 Nev. 83, 88 (Nev. 1992) (finding that \"exaggerated statements are permissible in contexts in which the statements would be interpreted by a reasonable person as mere rhetorical hyperbole\")); *see also Flowers v. Carville*, 310 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that references to tabloid articles as \"trash,\" \"crap,\" and \"garbage\" were not actionable); *and see Phantom Touring v. Affiliated Publ'ns*, 953 F.2d 724, 728, 730-31 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that theatre review calling a production \"a rip-off, a fraud, a scandal, a snake-oil job\" was \"obviously protected hyperbole\" or incapable of being proven false). Politically-charged invective is typically considered an expression of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole, even if the words used might be considered capable of defamatory meaning in different contexts. *See Rosenaur v. Scherer*, 88 Cal. App. 4th 260, 280 (2001) (finding that calling political foe a \"thief\" and a \"liar\" was not actionable). \"[B]road, unfocused and wholly subjective comment[s]\" are protected as opinion and are not actionable. *Fletcher v. San Jose Mercury news*, 216 Cal. App. 3d 172, 191 (1989) (finding that calling someone a \"crooked politician\" was not actionable).\n\n27\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 20 of\n\nstatement of fact, or merely one of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. *See Balzaga*\n\n*v. Fox News Network, LLC*, 173 Cal. App. 4th 1325, 1339 (2009) (finding that \"the\n\nfact that a statement '[s]tanding alone' could be construed as false is not\n\nsufficient to support a defamation claim\"); *see also Lewis v. Time, Inc.*, 710 F.2d\n\nThe context of a statement is important in determining whether it is a\n\n31\n\n549, 553 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating \"even apparent statements of fact may assume the character of statements of opinion, and thus be privileged, when made [under] circumstances in which 'an audience may anticipate efforts by the\n\nparties to persuade others to their position by use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole'\") (quoting *Information Control Group v. Genesis One Computer*, 611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980)). If a publication containing an allegedly defamatory statement is surrounded by \"loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language,\" then any allegedly defamatory meaning may be negated by the publication's overall tenor. *See Morningstar, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 23 Cal. App. 4th 676, 689 (1994).\n\n15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 It is particularly important to keep in mind that Mr. Cheng made his statements on an online forum, Twitter, a context in which there is a lesser expectation that statements will be factual. *See Krinsky v. Doe 6*, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1173, 1178 (2008) finding that in a chat room setting, anonymous post that corporate officers consisted of a \"cockroach,\" \"losers,\" \"boobs,\" and \"crooks\" were \"crude, satirical hyperbole which … constitute protected opinion\"); *see also James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.*, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1, 12, 14 (1993) (finding that article describing lawyer as engaging in \"sleazy, illegal, and unethical practice\" fell into \"protected zone of 'imaginative expression' or 'rhetorical hyperbole'\").\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n28\n\n- 19 - Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss A-18-779172-C\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 21 of 31\n\n### **4.2.1.1.1 Tweet One17**\n\nThe first allegedly defamatory tweet reads as follows:\n\nPossibility 3 could be right, because Guo and Xi made a deal involving large sums of money. Guo does not resemble a (normal) businessman at all. His great wealth all came from extortions done in collusion with the communists. This time his shady dealings with Xi involve making a deal that's worth a heavenly sum. But this deal is built upon a deal whose price is the sacrifice of the lives and properties belonging to 1.4 billion people. Everyone knows that as Xi will do anything to stay in power, he can casually give away 100 billion, a trillion. It's hard for Guo's wealth to not grow explosively.\n\n9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 14-16.) Mr. Cheng is thus stating that it is possible Plaintiff struck a deal with the CCP to have his family released, in light of his shady history with central figures in the CCP and his tremendous wealth. This is a follow-up to Mr. Cheng speculating as to possible explanations for the CCP releasing Plaintiff's family from custody, and in this tweet, he explains that the most likely explanation for this development is that Plaintiff struck a deal with the CCP. This aspect of the statement is pure speculation and his immediately preceding tweet allows for multiple other interpretations of the disclosed fact that Plaintiff's family was released by the CCP. It is thus a statement of opinion incapable of being defamatory.\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 To the extent Plaintiff contends the statement that he does not resemble a normal businessman and made his money via extortion, this is an expression of opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. There is a wealth of media coverage, as well as allegations of criminality by the Chinese government, speculating or outright claiming that Plaintiff may be a shady businessman who made his billions by exploiting contacts within the CCP to enrich himself. While Plaintiff claims he has always kept himself at arms-reach from the CCP, this is far from established and\n\n26\n\n28\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n<sup>27</sup> <sup>17</sup> For a side-by-side comparison of Plaintiff's translation alongside Mr. Lee's translation, *see* **Exhibit 14**.\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 22 of\n\nthere is a sufficient basis in the public record for Mr. Cheng to reasonably believe\n\nthat he was intimately involved with the CCP at the time of his self-exile. Unless\n\npolitical corruption is so endemic in China that it is expected, this makes it so that\n\nMr. Cheng understood Plaintiff not to be a normal businessman, and the\n\n31\n\nenormous amount of political scandal and allegations against Plaintiff can accurately be summarized to include allegations of extortion in collusion with the\n\n8 9 10 11 12 As for the claim that Plaintiff is involved in a deal based on a deal at the cost of 1.4 billion people's lives and property, this is precisely the kind of \"loose, figurative\" language that clues the reader into the fact that Mr. Cheng is not making precise factual allegations, but is instead speaking rhetorically and offering his subjective opinion. This tweet is thus non-actionable in its entirety.\n\n### **4.2.1.1.2 Tweet Two**\n\n14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The second complained-of tweet is in response to a Twitter user calling into question claims from Plaintiff as to the numbers of viewers on his YouTube channel. (*See* Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 17-18.) The tweet reads: \"Guo lies and lies and lies with disregard. The more lying Guo lies, the more absurd the lies, even while he's entangled in numerous lawsuits. He no longer has any regard for the laws of civilized Western countries, you can imagine how much worse he must have acted in China.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 19-21.)\n\n21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Vaguely calling someone, especially a politically-involved public figure, a \"liar\" repeatedly is precisely the kind of language courts have found to constitute protected opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. *See Rosenaur*, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 280; *Fletcher*, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 191; *James*, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 12, 14. Additionally, while an opinion need not be reasonable to be protected, it was entirely reasonable for Mr. Cheng to think of Plaintiff as a liar. There was plenty of media coverage by this time that Plaintiff was a defendant in defamation suits, that he\n\n13\n\n28\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\nCCP.\n\n1 2 3 had been accused of dishonesty and fraud, and that his extreme claims against the CCP and its members were unreliable. This tweet is thus non-actionable in its entirety.\n\n### **4.2.1.1.3 Tweet Three**\n\n5 6 7 8 9 The third tweet at issue reads: \"Guo acts with impunity because he can. He continuously fabricates large amounts of shameless lies; this is the greatest shame for the whole of our overseas Chinese community. Can it really be that evil has overcome justice, the sky and the earth has flipped itself upside down?\" (Lee Decl. at ¶ 22.)\n\n10 11 12 13 14 As with the second statement, non-specifically calling Plaintiff a flagrant liar is not capable of any defamatory meaning. Furthermore, the tweet contains flowery language, \"evil has overcome justice, the sky and the earth has flipped itself upside down,\" that makes it clear to the reader Mr. Cheng is not made any specific factual allegation. This tweet is thus non-actionable in its entirety.\n\n## 15\n\n24\n\n28\n\n4\n\n### **4.2.1.1.4 Tweet Four**\n\n16 17 18 The fourth tweet at issue reads: \"We can't even deal with one lying Guo, how can we overthrow the evil Chinese communist party?\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 23-25.)\n\n19 20 21 22 23 Again, this tweet consists of Mr. Cheng non-specifically calling Plaintiff a liar. Calling Plaintiff \"lying Guo\" is a familiar rhetorical construction in political discussion, as can be found repeatedly by figures such as President Donald J. Trump calling his opponents like \"crooked Hillary.\" (*See* Lee Decl. at ¶ 24.) The tweet is thus non-actionable in its entirety.\n\n### **4.2.1.1.5 Tweet Five**\n\n25 26 27 The fifth tweet at issue reads: \"Guo confused a bunch of people, snared a bunch of people, attacked and frightened some people, and seriously divided a group of people so they caused harm to each other. In a short time, he managed Case 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 24 of\n\nto leave the overseas democracy movement in pieces, and they completely lost\n\nto Plaintiff confusing, snaring, attacking, frightening, and dividing people. These\n\nstatements do not accuse Plaintiff of any specific actions, however, and are thus\n\nThere is no factual allegation in this tweet. Mr. Cheng non-specifically refers\n\n31\n\nno more actionable than statements vaguely accusing someone of being a \"crook\" or engaging in \"sleazy, illegal, and unethical practice.\" *See Krinsky*, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 1173, 1178; *see also James*, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 12, 14. Claiming\n\ntheir ability to do battle.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶ 26.)\n\nPlaintiff has weaken the overseas democracy movement is a classic statement of opinion, and the language used (\"in pieces\" and \"completely lost their ability to do battle\") is classic rhetorical hyperbole. This tweet is non-actionable in its entirety.\n\n### **4.2.1.1.6 Tweet Six**\n\n14 15 16 17 18 The sixth tweet at issue reads: \"Guo deliberately manufactured large quantities of vulgar lies, and continuously makes enemies, his goal is to divert people's attention, divide and weaken democracy movement's ability to fight, and thus achieve the goal of overseas stability maintenance.\" (Lee Decl. at ¶¶ 27-28.)\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 As with prior statements \"Guo deliberately manufactured large quantities of vulgar lies\" is a non-specific statement incapable of defamatory meaning. The statement that Plaintiff \"continuously makes enemies\" is not even potentially defamatory because it does not tend to harm Plaintiff's reputation, and in any event is a statement of opinion based on all the reporting that Plaintiff is constantly being sued for defamation, that he is a target of at least some CCP members, and that he has enemies within the Chinese political dissident movement. Mr. Cheng's statement that Plaintiff has weakened the democracy movement is another statement of opinion based on the fact that Plaintiff has made numerous\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n1 2 3 4 5 extreme claims of corruption and wrongdoing within the CCP, yet has rarely provided evidence that actually bears these claims out. A high-profile, fabulously wealthy self-proclaimed political dissident who constantly over-delivers and under-performs would indeed have a tendency to weaken the public's regard for actual, less flamboyant, Chinese dissidents.\n\n**4.2.1.2 Mr. Cheng Did Not Act with the Requisite Fault**\n\n7 8 9 Even assuming, *arguendo*, any of Mr. Cheng's statements are false statements of fact, he did not make them with the requisite degree of fault and cannot be liable for them.\n\n### **4.2.1.2.1 Plaintiff is a Public Figure**\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 The degree of fault required by a defendant for defamation liability to attach depends upon the target and content of the defendant's speech. There are three categories of defamation plaintiffs: the general public figure, the limited purpose public figure, and the private individual. A limited purpose public figure \"voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues.\" *Gerz v. Robert Welch*, 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974); *see also Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 720. This is a question of law, and a court's determination is based \"on whether the person's role in a matter of public concern is voluntary and prominent.\" *Bongiovi v. Sullivan*, 122 Nev. 556, 572 (2006).\n\n21 22 23 24 25 26 27 As explained in Section 2.1*, supra*, Plaintiff claims he is an extremely wealthy, extremely prominent (in fact, *the most* prominent) Chinese political dissident. And as shown in Section 2.2, *supra*, there has been voluminous coverage in international media of all the controversy surrounding Plaintiff and his reputation, including allegations that he is a liar, a fraud, a criminal, an embezzler, a rapist, that he was in bed with the CCP when he made his billions, and that, at the very least, he is an unreliable source of criticism against the CCP. If he is not a public\n\n6\n\n10\n\n1 2 3 4 figure for all purposes, Plaintiff is without doubt a public figure in the context of his status as a prominent political dissident and critic of the CCP. He is thus required to show that Mr. Cheng wrote his statements on Twitter with actual malice, which he has no hope of doing.\n\n### **4.2.1.2.2 Mr. Cheng Did Not Act with Actual Malice**\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 \"Actual malice\" is not ill will towards a plaintiff, but rather a defendant's knowledge that his statements are false, or reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. *Harte-Hanks Comm'n v. Connaughton*, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989). \"The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that in defamation cases, the phrase 'actual malice' 'has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will.\"' *D.A.R.E. Am. v. Rolling Stone Magazine*, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting *Harte-Hanks*, 491 U.S. at 667 n.7). The definition of knowing falsity is self-evident. To show \"reckless disregard,\" a public figure must prove that the publisher \"entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.\" *St. Amant v. Thompson*, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); *see also Bose Corp*, 466 U.S. at 511 n.30. Under Nevada law, reckless disregard only exists when the defendant \"acted with a 'high degree of awareness of … [the] probable falsity' of the statement or had serious doubt as to the publication's truth.\" *Pegasus*, 118 Nev. at 719. The question is not \"whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.\" *Reader's Digest Assn. v. Superior Court*, 690 P.2d 610, 617-18 (Cal. 1984); *see also St. Amant*, 390 U.S. at 731. Moreover, \"[a] publisher does not have to investigate personally, but may rely on the investigation and conclusions of reputable sources.\" *Id*. at 619. Finally, a defamation plaintiff must establish actual malice by **clear and convincing evidence**. *See Bose Corp.*, 466 U.S. at 511. This is a requirement that presents \"a heavy burden, far in excess of the preponderance\n\n28\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 27 of\n\n31\n\nsufficient for most civil litigation.\" *Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.*, 255 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). \"The burden of\n\n2 3 4 5 6 7 proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a finding of high probability. The evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.\" *Copp v. Paxton*, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 831, 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\n8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Major newspapers, including the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*, reported on allegations against Plaintiff starting at least in 2017. These allegations included that Plaintiff fled China to avoid corruption charges which swept up high-profile CCP officials with whom he had close relations; that China had issued an arrest notice with Interpol; that Plaintiff had earned his billions by corruptly working with and influencing Chinese politicians, as well as defrauding investors and other companies; that his business subordinates claimed he instructed them to engage in criminal activity; that he was being investigated for several crimes including fraud and embezzlement; that he raped his former personal assistant; that many of his claims of the CCP's corruption have not been verified and are unverifiable; that he was a divisive figure amongst the Chinese dissident community; and that he was a defendant in multiple defamation lawsuits. (*See* **Exhibits 2-12**.) These were not the ramblings of anonymous madmen on the Internet, but rather respected media outlets and even a foreign government. It was thus eminently reasonable for Mr. Cheng to rely on these reports of allegations against Plaintiff in forming his opinions about Plaintiff and that he was likely not a true advocate against the CCP.\n\n25 26 27 In the face of all this evidence supporting the conclusions Mr. Cheng expressed on Twitter, Plaintiff makes no real attempt to show actual malice. Rather, he only provides a formulaic recitation of actual malice as defined by the\n\n28\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 28 of\n\nSupreme Court, without a single supporting factual allegation. This would fail to\n\nsatisfy Plaintiff's burden even under NRCP 12(b)(5), much less the more stringent\n\nburden under the Anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiff cannot make any showing that\n\nMr. Cheng knew his statements were false (to the extent he made any factual\n\nstatements at all) and cannot show that he made any statements with substantial\n\nsubjective doubt as to their accuracy. Plaintiff cannot meet his burden under the\n\n31\n\nAnti-SLAPP statute, and his defamation and defamation per se claims must be **4.2.2 Plaintiff's IIED Claim Fails** To establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,\n\n11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Plaintiff must affirmatively prove: \"(1) extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of, or reckless disregard for, causing emotional distress, (2) the plaintiff's having suffered severe or extreme emotional distress, and (3) actual or proximate causation.\" *Olivero v. Lowe*, 116 Nev. 395, 398-99 (2000) (citing *Star v. Rabello*, 97 Nev. 124, 125 (1981) (citations omitted). \"Extreme and outrageous conduct is that which is outside all possible bounds of decency and is regarded as utterly intolerable in a civilized community.\" *Maduike v. Agency Rent-A-Car*, 114 Nev. 1, 4 (1998). Harm is only recognized for this tort if \"the stress [is] so severe and of such intensity that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.\" *Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp.*, 819 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Nev. 1993). Because he is a public figure, Plaintiff must also prove that Mr. Cheng's statements are false and were made with actual malice. *See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell*, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).\n\n24 25 26 Under *Falwell*, Plaintiff's IIED claim fails for the same reasons his defamation claims fail. Beyond that, however, Plaintiff cannot show any extreme or outrageous conduct, and cannot show severe emotional distress.\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\ndismissed.\n\n9\n\n10\n\n27\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 29 of\n\nevery statement that one finds personally upsetting may provide the basis for\n\nliability. *See Chehade Refai v. Lazaro*, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1121-22 (D. Nev. 2009);\n\n*see also* Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d. While Plaintiff is not running\n\nThe bar for establishing extreme and outrageous conduct is high, and not\n\n31\n\nfor public office, his alleged work as a high-profile political dissident against the CCP is comparable to entering the rough-and-tumble jungle of a political fight,\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 where courts have repeatedly found that hurtful statements are not actionable. *See Harte-Hanks*, 491 U.S. at 687 (finding that \"[w]hen a candidate enters the political arena, he or she must expect that the debate will sometimes be rough and personal\"); *Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm.*, 669 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating that \"[c]ampaigning for public office sometimes has the feel of a contact sport, with candidates, political organizations, and others trading rhetorical jabs and sound-bite attacks in hopes of landing a knockout blow at the polls. It is not for the thin-skinned or the fainthearted\"); *Desert Sun Pul'g Co. v. Sup. Ct.*, 97 Cal. App. 3d 49, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that \"[o]nce an individual decides to enter the political wars, he subjects himself to this kind of treatment[, and] deeply ingrained in our political history is a tradition of free-wheeling-irresponsible, bare knuckled, Pier 6, political brawls\").\n\n19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Mr. Cheng's statements on Twitter are not, by any stretch of the imagination, extreme or outrageous, especially in the context of speaking about the self-avowed most prominent Chinese political dissident on the planet. Mr. Cheng's statements are no harsher than the schoolyard taunt \"liar liar, pants on fire,\" and he goes no further than recounting what Chinese and American media have already reported about Plaintiff. It is not at all plausible to assert that mild criticisms no worse than what can be found on public fora like Twitter every day are so extreme that civilized society simply cannot tolerate them. This claim fails.\n\n28\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 30 of\n\nPlaintiff cannot show he suffered severe emotional distress. For years, Plaintiff has\n\nwithstood allegations of extreme and monstrous criminal and unethical behavior\n\nby international media and the Chinese government, sources with far greater\n\nauthority and credibility than a man with a few thousand followers on Twitter. It is\n\nlaughable for Plaintiff to assert that he could bear the weight of all these\n\nEven if Mr. Cheng's statements were extreme and outrageous, however,\n\n31\n\nallegations, but that a man with little internet presence calling him a liar was enough to break him emotionally. Plaintiff cannot show severe emotional distress, and thus has no probability of prevailing on this claim. It must be dismissed. **5.0 CONCLUSION**\n\n11 12 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims with prejudice and award both Mr. Cheng's costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, as well as award him \\$10,000, to be sought by separate motion.\n\nDATED June 14, 2019. Respectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Marc J. Randazza Marc J. Randazza (NV Bar No. 12265) Ronald D. Green (NV Bar No. 7360) LaTeigra C. Cahill (NV Bar No. 14352) RANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP, PLLC 2764 Lake Sahara Drive, Suite 109 Las Vegas, NV 89117\n\nAttorneys for Defendant SHUIYAN CHENG\n\n1\n\n2\n\n3\n\n4\n\n5\n\n6\n\n7\n\n8\n\n9\n\n10\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n26\n\n27\n\n![](_page_30_Figure_0.jpeg)","body_zh":"证物 2\n反反战略诉讼（Anti-SLAPP）特别驳回动议\n\n郭诉成案，内华达州克拉克县第八司法区法院（Eight Judicial District Court for Clark County, Nevada）\n案号 22-50073\n文件 474-2\n提交日期 06/20/22 | 录入日期 06/20/22 13:31:16\n\n电子提交\n6/14/2019 下午 4:33\nSteven D. Grierson\n法院书记官 | |\n1 MDSM\n2 Marc J. Randazza（内华达州律师执业号：12265）\nRonald D. Green（内华达州律师执业号：7360） | | |\n3 LaTeigra C. Cahill（内华达州律师执业号：14352）\n4 RANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP, PLLC\n2764 Lake Sahara Drive, Suite 109 | | |\n5 Las Vegas, NV 89117\n电话：702-420-2001 | | |\n6 ecf@randazza.com\n7 被告代理律师\n8 SHUIYAN CHENG（成水炎）\n9 第八司法区法院\n10 内华达州克拉克县\n\n12 WENGUI GUO（郭文贵），又名 MILES KWOK，案号 A-18-779172-C | |\n13 原告，第 32 法庭\n\n15 对 | 要求举行听证会 | |\n16 SHUIYAN CHENG（成水炎），又名 HUIYAN CHANG；被告成水炎依据 NRS 41.660\n17 FANG YONG（房勇），又名 MA KE（马克），提出的反 SLAPP 特别驳回动议 | |\n18 被告。\n\n20 被告成水炎特此依据 NRS 41.660 提交其反 SLAPP 特别驳回动议。\n21\n22 本动议基于随附的要点与依据备忘录以及随附证物、本诉讼中归档的各项文书与答辩状，\n23 以及本法院允许的任何口头辩论。\n24\n\n28 - 1 -\n反 SLAPP 驳回动议\nA-18-779172-C | | |\n要点与依据备忘录\n2 1.0 引言\n3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 原告针对成先生提起的诉讼是一起典型的 SLAPP（针对公众参与的战略性诉讼）诉讼。原告以其作为公众人物的身份及其据称作为中国异见人士的工作而自豪。成先生在 Twitter（推特）上发表了若干声明，批评这种名声名不副实，并指出原告实际上破坏了他自称支持的政治运动。原告并未以自己的言论来回应成先生的言论，而是提起了本起诉讼，企图阻止成先生谈论他1。这正是反 SLAPP 法规所意图适用的情况。\n\n11 12 13 14 15 成先生的声明要么属实，要么构成修辞性夸张或意见，或者至少他在发表这些声明时并不具有实际恶意。原告无法在其任何主张上胜诉，因此法院应附带偏见驳回这些主张，并裁定将成先生因针对这些主张进行辩护而产生的律师费和费用赔偿给他。\n16 2.0 事实背景\n2.1 原告作为公众人物的声誉\n\n18 19 20 21 22 原告是一名引人注目的中国政治人物，他利用社交媒体“揭露中国共产党（‘中共’/CCP）、中国政府多名高级官员及其家属的普遍腐败”，并“对中共的国际形象和公信力产生了前所未有的影响”。（第二次修订起诉书（“SAC”）第 5-7 段。）他的 Twitter 账号拥有超过 400,000 名关注者，其中大部分是中国人，他自称是“单枪匹马挑战中共并揭露中共在美国及其他国家建立情报网络的一人”。（同上，第 8-9 段。）他在中国成为一名亿万富翁房地产大亨，直到 2015 年中共最终查封了他家族的资产，并逮捕了他数百名家人和商业同事。（见同上，第 75-82 段。）他声称自己在资产被查封后的吹哨行为“被视为自天安门广场事件以来中国最大的政治事件之一”。（同上，第 86 段。）可以肯定地说，原告在其政治活动的背景下是一名公众人物。\n23 24 25 26 27 1 原告有着长期通过起诉批评者而非参与思想市场来应对批评的历史。参见例如 Guo v. Yuan，案号 2:18-cv-02276-SVW-JC（加利福尼亚中区联邦地区法院（C.D. Cal.）2018 年）；Guo v. Chen，案号 2:18-cv-03800-MCA-MAH（新泽西区联邦地区法院（D.N.J.）2018 年）；Guo v. Teng，2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134475（新泽西区联邦地区法院 2018 年 8 月 9 日）；Guo v. Lian，索引号 151428/2018（纽约州纽约县高等法院（Sup. Ct. of N.Y., Cty. Of N.Y.）2018 年）；Guo v. Xing，索引号 151430/2018（纽约州纽约县高等法院 2018 年）；Guo v. Xia，案号 1:18-cv-00174-LO-TCB（弗吉尼亚东区联邦地区法院（E.D. Va.）2018 年）；Guo v. Yuan，案号 2:18-cv-02276-SVW-JC（加利福尼亚中区联邦地区法院 2018 年 8 月 22 日）。\n\n案号 22-50073 文件 474-2 提交日期 06/20/22 录入日期 06/20/22 13:31:16 第 4 页，共 31 页\n\n2.2 针对原告指控的报道\n\n13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 尽管原告将自己描绘成一名反对中国审查制度、高尚且正直的民主斗士，但实际记录至少可以说是毁誉参半。首先，原告在其作为异见人士的渊源上并不诚实。他声称自己因协助抗议的中国学生，于 1989 年天安门广场事件期间被中共逮捕。（见 SAC 第 43 段。）然而，成先生对这一说法进行了调查，中国河南省濮阳市法院的记录显示，他是因为在距离天安门广场 300 英里外的一起完全不相关的交易而被捕，指控包括诈骗以及在其兄弟持刀袭警后他本人袭警的拒捕行为。（见成先生支持对驳回动议反对意见之答辩的声明，作为证物 1 附后，第 16 段及子证物 6。）\n\n25 26 27 此外，还有大量关于针对原告的犯罪、不道德和其他令人反感行为的指控报道。《华尔街日报》（Wall Street Journal）2017 年 4 月的一篇文章报道称，中共已通过国际刑警组织（Interpol）对原告发出了国际逮捕通报。\n案号 22-50073 文件 474-2 提交日期 06/20/22 录入日期 06/20/22 13:31:16 第 5 页，共 31 页\n\n1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 （见 Chun Han Wong，“China Says Interpol Arrest Notice Issued for Businessman Guo Wengui”，THE WALL STREET JOURNAL（2017 年 4 月 20 日），作为证物 2 附后。）2 2017 年 5 月，《福布斯》（Forbes）报道称原告对中共提出“在很大程度上未经证实的指控”，暗示原告“沾染了腐败”，并解释说针对原告的国际刑警组织逮捕通报是基于行贿指控。（见 Nathan Vardi，“The Chinese Fugitive Living in a $67 Million Manhattan Apartment”，FORBES（2017 年 5 月 19 日），作为证物 3 附后。）3 该报道还报道了一名中国记者因原告发表的言论而起诉原告诽谤，原告发表这些言论是为了报复该记者发表文章指责原告利用性爱录像扳倒一名北京市副市长以便获取优质房地产。（见同上。）\n\n12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2017 年 6 月，《华尔街日报》报道了在中国针对原告企业下属伪造文件使原告旗下公司获得利润丰厚合同的刑事审判，并重申了原告为了自身利益针对政界人士使用性爱录像的主张。（见 Josh Chin，“China Cranks Up Heat on Exiled Tycoon Guo Wengui”，THE WALL STREET JOURNAL（2017 年 6 月 10 日），作为证物 4 附后。）4 该文章还报道称，受审的下属之一作证称原告命令她伪造了这些文件。（见同上。）在 2017 年 9 月的一篇文章中，《华尔街日报》重申了针对原告的诸多指控，包括“中国法院\n\n- 21 22 23 2 获取地址：http（最后访问日期：2019 年 6 月 14 日）。\n- 24 3 获取地址：http（最后访问日期：2019 年 6 月 14 日）。\n\n25 26 27 4 获取地址：http（最后访问日期：2019 年 6 月 14 日）。\n\n1 2 3 4 5 已对郭先生的多名前合伙人和下属因包括诈骗和侵占在内的罪行判处监禁并处以罚金。中国媒体发表了将他描绘为不择手段之人的文章。”（Chun Han Wong 与 Felicia Schwartz，“China Wants Fugitive Guo Wengui Back – but He's Applied for U.S. Asylum”，THE WALL STREET JOURNAL（2017 年 9 月 7 日），作为证物 5 附后。）5\n\n6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 《华尔街日报》2017 年 10 月的一篇文章报道称，原告正利用其巨额财富在多起诽谤诉讼中为自己辩护，并且一名中国女性对原告提起了民事诉讼，指控原告在她担任其私人助理期间对她进行了强奸。（见 Cezary Podkul 与 Chun Han Wong，“Chinese Fugitive Guo Wengui Amasses War Chest to Battle Beijing”，THE WALL STREET JOURNAL（2017 年 10 月 3 日），作为证物 6 附后。）6 该报在当月晚些时候报道称，中共表示“正在对郭先生涉嫌受贿、绑架、诈骗、洗钱和强奸的至少 19 起重大刑事案件进行调查”。（O'Keefe、Viswanatha 与 Podkul，“China's Pursuit of Fugitive Businessman Guo Wengui Kicks Off Manhattan Caper Worthy of Spy Thriller”，THE WALL STREET JOURNAL（2017 年 10 月 22 日），作为证物 7 附后。）7\n\n17 18 19 20 2018 年 1 月，《纽约时报》（New York Times）发表了针对原告的长篇深度调查报道，并对其自称吹哨人的说法提出质疑。（见 Lauren Hilgers，“The Mystery of the Exiled Billionaire Whistle-Blower”，The New York Times（2018 年 1 月 10 日），作为证物 8 附后。）8 报道叙述了原告由于预见到\n\n 5 获取地址：http（最后访问日期：2019 年 6 月 14 日）。\n\n23 24 6 获取地址：http（最后访问日期：2019 年 6 月 14 日）。\n\n25 7 获取地址：http\n\n26 1508717977（最后访问日期：2019 年 6 月 14 日）。\n\n27 8 获取地址：http（最后访问日期：2019 年 6 月 14 日）。\n案号 22-50073 文件 474-2 提交日期 06/20/22 录入日期 06/20/22 13:31:16 第 7 页，共 31 页\n\n针对他的腐败指控卷入了商业和政治伙伴，以及在2017年前后浮出水面的腐败、行贿和强奸指控，并指出“Guo（郭文贵）对中国共产党的绝大多数指控已被证明几乎无法核实”。（参见同上。）文中指出，据一位专研中国治理的大学教授称，人们不应轻信原告的主张，而且许多中国政治异见人士对他持怀疑态度，因为他是为了逃避腐败指控而非因遭受迫害而流亡。（参见同上。）文中解释称，西方媒体机构一直难以证实他的主张，并且他隐瞒了简单的个人履历细节，如年龄和出生日期。（参见同上。）文中报道称，原告借入并拖欠了总计8900万美元的贷款，尽管他声称从未借过政府贷款。（参见同上。）文中讨论了原告与中国相当于CIA（中央情报局）和FBI（联邦调查局）机构的副部长Ma Jian（马建）之间的友谊，后者于2015年在中国共产党反腐行动中被捕。（参见同上。）文中指出，由于政治丑闻交织以及各方的犯罪指控，原告离开中国前几年的细节尤为难以辨清。（参见同上。）并且文中解释称，原告在自身经历的可查证细节上存在捏造9，并提出了极其荒唐且不可信的主张，例如从不穿同一条内裤两次。（参见同上。）\n\n在整个2018年期间，其他媒体机构也对针对原告的这些及类似指控进行了报道，包括报道称他对中国共产党的许多指控仍未得到核实，且通常被认为是耸人听闻的。（参见David Barboza撰写的《Steve Bannon and a Fugitive Billionaire Target a Common Enemy: China》（史蒂夫·班农与一名逃亡亿万富翁瞄准共同敌人：中国），载于THE NEW YORK TIMES（纽约时报）（2018年12月4日），附为附件9；10 Chris Lau撰写的《Hong King police investigating fugitive Chinese tycoon Guo Wengui over alleged HK$32 billion money laundering conspiracy, court papers reveal》（法院文件显示香港警方正在就涉嫌320亿港元洗钱共谋案调查中国逃亡大亨郭文贵），载于SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST（南华早报）（2018年8月14日），附为附件10；11 L. Todd Wood撰写的《Enemies abound for Chinese billionaire Guo Wengui》（中国亿万富翁郭文贵仇敌四伏），载于Washington Times（华盛顿盛顿邮报/华盛顿时报）（2018年12月19日），附为附件11；12 并参见附件1第18-20段及子附件9-11。）并且在2018年10月，中国报纸《财新》（Caixin）报道称，原告旗下某公司有五名高管被判犯有多项罪行，原告本人从一家中国公司侵占了超过20亿元人民币。（参见Xiankang、Jinbing、Wei及Gang撰写的《Fugitive Billionaire Guo Wengui's Company Fined 60 Billion Yuan》（逃亡亿万富翁郭文贵旗下公司被罚款600亿元），载于Caixin（2018年10月13日），附为附件12。）13\n\n9 原告在其SAC（第二次修正起诉状）中还撒了谎。他声称Mr. Cheng（程先生）并不认识他本人（SAC第110段），然而有照片证据表明两人早在2017年10月就见过面。（参见附件1第6段及子附件2。）\n6 反SLAPP驳回动议 A-18-779172-C\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 8 of 31\n\n2.3 程先生的言论\n\n本案诉讼基于程先生在其位于社交媒体网站Twitter（推特）的公开账户上发布的六条言论（被称为“推文”）。首先，SAC存在一个问题；程先生的推文是中文的，而SAC（推测是有意为之）并未附上或展示这些推文，而是依赖于原告自身未经核实的翻译。\n\n10 网址为：http（最后访问日期：2019年6月14日）。 11 网址为：http（最后访问日期：2019年6月14日）。 12 网址为：http enemies-abound-for-chinese-billionaire-guo-wengui/（最后访问日期：2019年6月14日）。 13 网址为：http（最后访问日期：2019年6月14日）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 9 of 31\n\n为了确定涉案言论的实际含义，程先生聘请了Anmin Lee（李安民），一位母语为中文、精通英文，并曾为伯利兹一个全国性政党提供翻译服务的人员。在审查涉案原始推文后，他发现原告的翻译存在重大缺陷和遗漏。（参见Anmin Lee的声明[“李声明”]，附为附件13。）14\n\n首先，SAC中指称的第一条诽谤性言论缺失了一半的对话背景。针对中国共产党释放原告家属的消息，程先生在这条推文开头写道：大家想想，中国共产党释放郭的家人，哪种可能性更大：1. 中国共产党害怕郭，因此释放了郭的家人。\n- 2. 因为郭通过爆料做了好事。\n- 3. 中国共产党释放郭的家人是因为达成了某种交易。\n- 4. 拘留郭的家人是为了配合郭的爆料，以此在群众眼中增强郭爆料的可信度。\n\n（李声明第10-12段。）15 因此，程先生是在为中国共产党为何决定释放一名知名政治异见人士的家人提出可能的解释，包括原告与中国共产党达成交易的可能性。\n\n第一条涉嫌诽谤的推文内容如下：\n\n- 可能性3可能是对的，因为郭与习达成了一笔涉及巨额资金的交易。郭根本不像一个（正常的）商人。他的巨额财富全部来自与共产党勾结的敲诈勒索。这一次他与习的暗中交易涉及一笔价值天文数字的买卖。但这笔买卖是建立在以牺牲14亿人的生命和财产为代价的交易之上的。大家都知道，由于习为了保住权力不择手段，他可以随手送出1000亿、1万亿。郭的财富很难不出现爆发式增长。\n\n14 程先生仍在定期收集可能影响本动议的信息。一旦有任何可用信息，他将对本动议进行补充。\n\n15 李先生对许多涉案言论同时提供了字面直译和更为自然的意译。除另有说明外，本动议指称的均系各项言论的意译版本。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 10 of\n\n（李声明第14-16段。）因此，鉴于原告长期以来有据可查的与中国共产党核心人物的暗昧历史，及其巨大的无法解释的财富，程先生是在陈述原告有可能与中国共产党达成交易以换取其家人获释。\n\n第二条被控推文是对一名Twitter用户质疑原告YouTube频道观众人数的回应。（参见李声明第17-18段。）推文内容为：“郭肆无忌惮地撒谎、撒谎、再撒谎。说谎的郭越撒谎，谎言就越荒谬，即便身陷多起诉讼也是如此。他已经对西方文明国家的法律毫无顾忌，你可以想象他在中国时的行为肯定更为恶劣。”（李声明第19-21段。）\n\n第三条涉案推文内容为：“郭肆无忌惮，因为他有恃无恐。他不断编造大量无耻的谎言；这是我们整个海外华人社区最大的耻辱。难道真的是邪恶战胜了正义，天地颠倒了吗？”（李声明第22段。）\n\n第四条涉案推文内容为：“我们连一个撒谎的郭都对付不了，我们怎么能推翻邪恶的中国共产党？”（李声明第23-25段。）\n\n第五条涉案推文内容为：“郭迷惑了一群人，诱捕了16一群人，攻击并吓唬了一些人，严重分化了一群人使他们自相残害。在短时间内，他成功让海外民运四分五裂，彻底丧失了战斗力。”（李声明第26段。）\n\n第六条涉案推文内容为：“郭故意制造大量低俗谎言，不断树敌，其目的是为了转移人们的注意力，分化和削弱民运的战斗力，从而达到海外维稳的目的。”（李声明第27-28段。）值得注意的是，SAC对该推文的翻译中有很大一部分完全不准确，且在推文原文中根本不存在。（参见李声明第29段。）\n\n3.0 法律标准\n\n根据Nevada（内华达州）的反SLAPP法案NRS 41.635 et seq.（内华达州修订法规第41.635条及以下），如果针对被告提起诉讼是基于其行使第一修正案权利，被告可提出特别驳回动议。对反SLAPP动议的审查是一个两步程序。动议方在第一步中承担举证责任，非动议方在第二步中承担举证责任。参见John v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 125 Nev. 746, 754 (2009)。\n\n首先，被告必须以优势证据证明原告的主张是“基于为促进请愿权或自由言论权而进行的、与公共关切问题直接相关的善意交流”。NRS 41.660(3)(a)。法定受保护言论类别之一是“在向公众开放的场所或公共论坛中，与公共利益问题直接相关、属实或在不知其为虚假的情况下作出的交流”。NRS 41.637(4)。\n\n16 李先生解释称，此处涉及的汉字最可能的含义是“‘诱捕’（to snare），即‘引诱或诱导某人陷入伤害或错误’”，而SAC翻译的“欺骗”（cheated on）则“过于牵强”。（李声明第26段附注8。）\n\n其次，一旦被告在第一阶段完成其举证责任，责任便转移至原告，原告必须作出初步表面证据（prima facie）证明，显示其主张有胜诉的可能性。参见NRS 41.660(3)(b)；并参见John, 125 Nev. at 754。\n\n内华达州将反SLAPP动议视为一种即决判决动议。参见Stubbs v. Strickland, 297 P.3d 326, 329 (Nev. 2013)；并参见Coker v. Sassone, 432 P.3d 746, 748-49 (Nev. 2019)。然而，该法案设有某些额外程序以避免滥用证据开示，且如果法院准予驳回动议，被告有权获批合理费用和律师费，以及最高达10,000美元的裁赔款项。参见NRS 41.670(1)(a)-(b)。\n\n由于适用内华达州反SLAPP法案的判例法相对匮乏，内华达州法院参考了适用California（加利福尼亚州）反SLAPP法案（Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16（加利福尼亚州民事诉讼法第425.16条））的判例法，后者与内华达州法律有诸多相似之处。参见John, 125 Nev. at 756（指出“我们参考加利福尼亚州的判例法，因为加利福尼亚州的反SLAPP法案在目的和语言上与内华达州的反SLAPP法案相似”）；并参见Shapiro v. Welt, 389 P.3d 262, 268 (Nev. 2017)（同上）；Sassone, 432 P.3d at 749 n.3（认定“加利福尼亚州和内华达州的法案在反SLAPP审查方面具有几乎相同的结构……鉴于结构、语言上的相似性以及采纳加利福尼亚州关于必要举证责任标准的立法授权，依赖加利福尼亚州的判例法是正当合理的”）；并参见NRS 41.665(2)（依据加利福尼亚州法界定原告的初步表面证据举证责任）。\n\n4.0 论证\n\n4.1 程先生符合反SLAPP分析的第一项要件\n\n就本案而言，《反战略性针对公众参与诉讼法》（Anti-SLAPP statute）保护任何「在向公众开放的场所或公共论坛中……作出的与公共利益问题直接相关的、真实的或在不知晓其虚假性的情况下作出的传播内容」。NRS 41.637(4)。因此，被告必须完成三项举证以满足第一阶段的要求：(1) 主张所依据的传播内容与公共利益问题直接相关；(2) 传播内容是在向公众开放的场所或公共论坛中作出的；以及 (3) 传播内容是真实的或是在不知晓其虚假性的情况下作出的。本案中全部三项要求均已满足。此外，原告各项主张的实体依据以及被告行为的合法性并非第一阶段分析的重点，若具相关性，应仅在第二阶段分析中予以考量。参见 Coretronic v. Cozen O'Connor, 192 Cal. App. 4th 1381, 1388 (2d Dist. 2011)；亦参见 Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal. 4th 683, 706-07, 713, 727-299 (2007)。\n\n4.1.1 原告的诉讼请求基于受保护的行为\n\n「公共利益问题」被广泛界定为「公众感兴趣的任何问题」。Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1042 (2008)。「该问题无需具有『重大性』即可受到反 SLAPP 法的保护——只要公众对其产生兴趣便已足够。」同上。「尽管公共利益事项包括立法和政府活动，但其亦可包括涉及私人身份及实体的活动，特别是当一个庞大、有势力的组织可能对众多个人的生活产生影响时。」Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 650 (1996)（强调为原文所加）。一项活动无需「达到关乎自治核心的高标准」即可符合反 SLAPP 保护的资格；「社会层面的甚至低俗的话题便已足矣。」Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2009)。\n\n知名公众人物乃至名人的生活方式和行为构成公共利益问题。参见 Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2011)（名人 Paris Hilton 承认其「优渥的生活方式及其口头禅（『that's hot』）属于广泛的公众利益事项」）。「对于那些凭借自身成就、生活方式、专业地位或职业而使其活动引发合法且广泛关注的人士，存在附随于他们的公共利益。」Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 181 Cal. App. 4th 664, 667-68 (1st Dist. 2010)。一家加利福尼亚州法院认定，一名前橄榄球主教练提起的诉讼受《反 SLAPP 法》管辖，因为原告「作为一所当地大学橄榄球队主教练的身份已使其成为公众人物，而他被解雇一事本身便已是引发广泛公众利益的话题。」McGarry v. University of San Diego, 154 Cal. App. 4th 97, 110 (4th Dist. 2007)。涉及公众人物甚至私人行为的问题亦可能关乎公共利益。参见 Sipple v. Foundation For Nat. Progress, 71 Cal. App. 4th 226, 238 (2d Dist. 1999)（认定针对知名政治人物全国媒体战略专家的报道指控——指控其对妻子进行身体和言语虐待——所引发的诉讼涉及公共利益事项）。\n\n如下文第 4.2.1.2 节所述，原告无疑是公众人物。更重要的是，Cheng（程）先生的言论讨论了原告卷入与 CCP（中国共产党）的重大政治纷争，包括 CCP 对原告刑事腐败的指控。此类国际政治内幕完全属于《反 SLAPP 法》所预期的「公共利益问题」。Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 783-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 案中的法院认定，质疑指定用于慈善的款项是否实际到达最终慈善目的地的传播内容，涉及了公共利益问题。在程先生于 Twitter 上发表言论之前的数年间，在诸如 Wall Street Journal（《华尔街日报》）和 New York Times（《纽约时报》）等知名媒体上，已有大量关于 CCP 对原告涉嫌犯罪行为、腐败和勒索指控的报道。根据原告自己的说法，原告是 CCP 最主要的异见人士和批评者。程先生的言论关涉针对原告的这些指控、其「异见人士」身份的真实性以及他与 CCP 的关系。毫无合理疑问的是，程先生的言论属于公共利益问题。\n\n退一步讲，即使假设某些言论并非关乎公共利益事项（程先生否认这一点），它们也与关乎公共利益的言论有着不可分割的联系，从而使原告的主张在反 SLAPP 分析中构成「混合」诉由。这些「混合诉由只要其中至少有一项基础行为属于受保护行为，即受《反 SLAPP 法》管辖，除非对受保护行为的指控仅是对非受保护活动的附带附随。」Lauter v. Anoufrieva, 642 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2008)（强调为原文所加）；亦参见 Salma v. Capon, 161 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1287 (2008)（裁定根据加利福尼亚州《反 SLAPP 法》，基于受保护活动和非受保护活动的诉由均受反 SLAPP 动议管辖）；Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin, 133 Cal. App. 4th 658, 675 (2005)（认定由于原告的诉求「在很大程度上基于［被告］受保护的请愿活动」，因此满足了反 SLAPP 的第一阶段要求）。总体而言，程先生被控的言论绝大多数都在讨论涉及重大公共利益的事项，因此任何未直接涉及此类事项的言论仍正当地属于该法保护的范畴。\n\n4.1.2 程先生的言论系在公共论坛中作出\n\n程先生在网站 <twitter.com> 上发表了其言论。出于反 SLAPP 目的，公众可访问的网站属于公共论坛。参见 Cole v. Patricia A. Meyer & Associates, 206 Cal. App. 4th 1095, 1121 (2012)。事实上，美国最高法院已承认，诸如 Twitter 等社交媒体网站是典型的现代公共论坛。参见 Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735-37 (2017)（指出「社交媒体用户利用这些网站在像人类思想一样多元的话题上从事广泛的受第一修正案保护的活动」）。毫无疑问，程先生与公共利益事项直接相关的言论是在向公众开放的场所或公共论坛中作出的。\n\n4.1.3 程先生出于善意发表其言论\n\n为了受到《反 SLAPP 法》的保护，言论必须「真实或……在不知晓其虚假性的情况下作出」。NRS 41.637。即使某项言论是不真实的，被告也必须是在明知其不真实的情况下作出的；无论是过失还是对真相的肆意漠视，都不能否定被告在第一阶段下的举证。此外，根据《反 SLAPP 法》明晰的文义，「善意」分析与被告发表言论的动机完全无关。\n\n原告关于程先生明知其言论虚假的指控，唯一的支持就是结论性的断言，即他发表每一项言论都是「出于恶意且明知其为虚假」。（参见 SAC 第 18-23、112-117 段。）这完全不是事实。相反，正如在下文第 4.2.1.1 节中更详细阐述的，程先生的言论是基于关于针对原告指控的广泛可获取的信息和报道所作出的观点表达或修辞性夸张。在程先生发表任何涉案言论之前的数月里，诸如 Wall Street Journal（《华尔街日报》）和 The New York Times（《纽约时报》）等报纸已发表了大量关于原告无论是个人还是通过其商业伙伴涉嫌犯罪、勒索和侵占指控的文章。总体而言，该报道得出的结论是，原告在利用其与 CCP 显要成员的联系谋取个人私利后，主动逃离中国以逃避腐败指控，随后又将自己标榜为政治异见人士以进一步谋取私利并博取关注。毕竟，在程先生发布推文之前的报道表明，原告关于 CCP 及其成员的大多数说法都是虚假的或无法核实的。\n\n同样，没有任何证据表明程先生在发表原告与 CCP 及 Xi Jinping（习近平）合作的言论时明知其为虚假。该指控源于程先生在 2018 年 7 月对 CCP 释放原告家属的原因所作出的推测。原告曾将自己塑造成 CCP 的直言批评者，威胁要揭露高层腐败（然而大体上并未核实做到这一点），因此 CCP 不太可能试图因原告所谓的告密行为而奖励原告、CCP 不太可能害怕原告，或者 CCP 不太可能出于某种原因想要提升他的可信度。因此，在程先生看来，那就只剩下一种可能性：原告与 CCP 达成了交易。鉴于其极高的财富——据称（根据针对他及其下属的未决刑事指控和法院案件）至少部分是通过剥削中国人民和中国政治体制获得的——这是最合乎情理的情形。\n\n因此，所有涉案言论均属于观点或修辞性夸张，因此就本分析而言不可能为虚假，或者是在不知晓其虚假性的情况下作出的。程先生履行了其在反 SLAPP 分析第一阶段下的举证责任，现在举证责任转移至原告，由其证明其诉求具有胜诉可能性。他无法做到这一点。\n\n4.2 原告无法证明其诉求具有胜诉可能性\n\nNRS 41.660 将原告的证明责任定义为「与原告在本法生效之日依据加利福尼亚州《反针对公众参与的战略性诉讼法》（Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation law）被要求达到的相同证明责任」。NRS 41.665(2)。原告不能仅凭含糊的指责或仅提供微不足道的些许证据来推翻程先生的动议。相反，为了满足其在《反 SLAPP 法》第二阶段下的证据举证责任，原告必须提出「能够支持作出有利于原告的救济判决的实质性证据」。S. Sutter, LLC v. LJ Sutter Partners, L.P., 193 Cal. App. 4th 634, 670 (2011)；亦参见 Mendoza v. Wichmann, 194 Cal. App. 4th 1430, 1449 (2011)（裁定需要「实质性证据」证明缺乏合理根据，才能经受住对恶意追诉主张提起的反 SLAPP 动议）。原告就其任何主张均无法作出此项证明。\n\n4.2.1 原告的诽谤主张不成立\n\n为确立诽谤之诉的诉因，原告必须指控：(1) 被告针对原告发表了虚假且具诽谤性的陈述；(2) 向第三方进行了无特权的公开发布；(3) 存在过错，其程度至少构成过失；以及 (4) 实际损害或推定损害。参见 Wynn v. Smith 案，117 Nev. 6, 10 (Nev. 2001)；另见 Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc. 案，118 Nev. 706, 718 (2002)。一项陈述唯有包含可被证明为假的关于事实的断言时，才具有诽谤性。参见 Pope v. Motel 6 案，114 P.3d 277, 282 (Nev. 2005)。并且，像原告这样的公众人物若要在诽谤诉讼中胜诉，必须以清晰且具说服力的证据证明有关陈述是出于实际恶意而作出的。参见 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc. 案，466 U.S. 485 (1984)。\n\n一项陈述必须包含虚假的事实断言才构成诽谤。“细微的不准确并不构成虚假，除非该等不准确之处‘对读者的心智产生的影响，不同于据状词所主张的真实事实本应产生的影响’。”Pegasus 案，118 Nev. at 715 n.17。如果报道的“要旨”或“刺痛点”属实，即使部分细节有误，也不构成诽谤。Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 案，501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991)。\n\n4.2.1.1 郑先生的陈述不具诉因\n\n意见陈述不能构成诽谤，因为《第一修正案》承认不存在所谓“虚假”的思想。参见 Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc. 案，118 Nev. 706, 714 (Nev. 2002)；另见 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 案，418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)。此外，在内华达州，“如果一项陈述属于理智之人可解释为‘纯粹修辞夸张’的夸大或概括，则该陈述不具诽谤性。”Pegasus 案，118 Nev. at 715（援引 Wellman v. Fox 案，108 Nev. 83, 88 (Nev. 1992)（认定“在理智之人会将陈述解释为纯粹修辞夸张的语境中，夸大性陈述是允许的”））；另见 Flowers v. Carville 案，310 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002)（认定将小报文章称为“垃圾”、“废话”和“烂货”不具诉因）；并见 Phantom Touring v. Affiliated Publ'ns 案，953 F.2d 724, 728, 730-31 (1st Cir. 1992)（认定将某剧目称为“敲诈、骗局、丑闻、假药把戏”的戏剧评论属于“显然受保护的夸张”或无法证明为假）。带有政治色彩的谩骂通常被视为意见表达或修辞夸张，即使所用词语在不同语境下可能被认为具有诽谤含义。参见 Rosenaur v. Scherer 案，88 Cal. App. 4th 260, 280 (2001)（认定将政治对手称为“小偷”和“骗子”不具诉因）。“宽泛、无焦点且完全主观的评论”作为意见受到保护，不具诉因。Fletcher v. San Jose Mercury news 案，216 Cal. App. 3d 172, 191 (1989)（认定称某人为“腐败政客”不具诉因）。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 20 of\n\n陈述的语境对于确定其究竟属于事实陈述，抑或仅属于意见或修辞夸张至关重要。参见 Balzaga v. Fox News Network, LLC 案，173 Cal. App. 4th 1325, 1339 (2009)（认定“一项陈述‘单凭自身’可被解释为虚假这一事实，并不足以支持诽谤主张”）；另见 Lewis v. Time, Inc. 案，710 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1983)（阐明“即便是表面上的事实陈述，若是在‘受众可预见到当事人会通过使用称号、激烈修辞或夸张来劝说他人接受其立场’的情形下作出的，亦可具有意见陈述的性质，从而享有特权”）（引自 Information Control Group v. Genesis One Computer 案，611 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1980)）。如果包含涉嫌诽谤性陈述的出版物充斥着“松散、比喻或夸张的语言”，则任何涉嫌诽谤的含义都可能被该出版物的整体基调所消除。参见 Morningstar, Inc. v. Superior Court 案，23 Cal. App. 4th 676, 689 (1994)。\n\n尤为重要的是应当铭记，郑先生是在推特（Twitter）这一网络论坛上发表其陈述的，在此种语境下，人们对陈述具有事实性的预期较低。参见 Krinsky v. Doe 6 案，159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1173, 1178 (2008)（认定在聊天室环境中，匿名发帖称公司高管由“蟑螂”、“输家”、“蠢货”和“骗子”组成属于“粗俗、讽刺性的夸张，……构成受保护的意见”）；另见 James v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. 案，17 Cal. App. 4th 1, 12, 14 (1993)（认定将律师描述为从事“卑劣、非法和不道德做法”的文章属于“‘富有想象力的表达’或‘修辞夸张’的受保护领域”）。\n- 19 - 反 SLAPP 驳回起诉动议 A-18-779172-C\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 21 of 31\n4.2.1.1.1 推文一 17\n\n第一条涉嫌诽谤的推文内容如下：\n\n可能性3或许是对的，因为郭与习做了一笔涉及巨额资金的交易。郭一点也不像一个（正常的）生意人。他的巨额财富全部来自于与共产党勾结进行的勒索。这次他与习的暗相交易涉及一笔价值惊人的交易。但这项交易是建立在一笔以牺牲14亿人的生命和财产为代价的交易之上的。人人都知道，习为了保住权力不择手段，随随便便就能送出1000亿、1万亿。郭的财富很难不出现爆发式增长。\n\n（Lee 声明，第 14-16 段。）鉴于原告与中共核心人物的暗昧历史及其巨额财富，郑先生借此陈述的是：原告有可能为了让家人获释而与中共达成了协议。这是郑先生对中共释放原告家属的可能解释进行推测的后续，并且在这条推文中，他解释了对此事态发展最可能的解释是原告与中共达成了协议。该陈述的这一方面纯属推测，且他紧前的一条推文对已披露的原告家属被中共释放的事实提供了多种其他解释。因此，这属于无法构成诽谤的意见陈述。\n\n在原告主张该推文称其不像正常生意人且通过勒索敛财的范围内，这属于意见表达或修辞夸张。有大量的媒体报道以及中国政府的犯罪指控，都在推测或直接声称原告可能是一个通过利用中共内部人脉牟取暴利的暗昧商人。虽然原告声称自己始终与中共保持距离，但这远未确立，并且\n17 原告译文与 Lee 先生译文的逐行对照，参见证物 14（Exhibit 14）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 22 of\n\n公共记录中有充分的依据让郑先生合理地认为原告在其自我流亡之时与中共关系密切。除非政治腐败在中国普遍到被视为意料之中的程度，否则这使得郑先生认定原告并非正常生意人，且针对原告的大量政治丑闻和指控可以被准确地概括为包含勾结中共进行勒索的指控。\n\n至于指称原告卷入一项以14亿人生命财产为代价的交易之上的交易，这恰恰属于那种提示读者注意郑先生并非在作出精确事实指控、而是在运用修辞并提出其主观意见的“松散、比喻性”语言。因此，该推文整体上均不具诉因。\n\n4.2.1.1.2 推文二\n\n第二条被控推文是对一名推特用户质疑原告关于其 YouTube（油管）频道观看人数主张的回应。（参见 Lee 声明，第 17-18 段。）该推文写道：“郭毫无顾忌地撒谎、撒谎、再撒谎。谎言郭越撒谎，谎言就越荒谬，即便在他身陷无数诉讼之时也是如此。他已不再把西方文明国家的法律放在眼里，你可以想象他在中国时的行为一定更加恶劣。”（Lee 声明，第 19-21 段。）\n\n含糊地反复称呼某人（尤其是参与政治的公众人物）为“骗子”，恰恰属于法院认定构成受保护的意见或修辞夸张的语言类型。参见 Rosenaur 案，88 Cal. App. 4th at 280；Fletcher 案，216 Cal. App. 3d at 191；James 案，17 Cal. App. 4th at 12, 14。此外，虽然意见无须具备合理性即可受到保护，但郑先生认为原告是骗子完全是合理的。到此时已有大量媒体报道表明原告是多起诽谤诉讼的被告，他曾被指控不诚实和欺诈，且他对中共及其成员的极端指控是不可靠的。因此，该推文整体上均不具诉因。\n\n4.2.1.1.3 推文三\n\n涉案的第三条推文写道：“郭之所以肆无忌惮，是因为他能够做到。他不断编造大量无耻谎言；这是我们整个海外华人社区最大的耻辱。难道真是邪恶战胜了正义，天地颠倒了吗？”（Lee 声明，第 22 段。）\n\n如同第二项陈述一样，非特定性地称原告为公然的骗子并不具备任何诽谤含义。此外，该推文包含“邪恶战胜了正义，天地颠倒了”这种华丽修辞，使读者清楚明白郑先生并未作出任何具体的事实指控。因此，该推文整体上均不具诉因。\n\n4.2.1.1.4 推文四\n\n涉案的第四条推文写道：“我们连一个撒谎郭都对付不了，还怎么推翻邪恶的中国共产党？”（Lee 声明，第 23-25 段。）\n\n同样，该推文包含郑先生非特定性地称原告为骗子。称原告为“撒谎郭”是政治讨论中常见的修辞结构，正如唐纳德·J·特朗普总统（Donald J. Trump）等人物反复将对手称为“腐败希拉里”（crooked Hillary）那样。（参见 Lee 声明，第 24 段。）因此，该推文整体上均不具诉因。\n\n4.2.1.1.5 推文五\n\n涉案的第五条推文写道：“郭迷惑了一群人，诱捕了一群人，攻击恐吓了一些人，并严重分化了一群人致使其互相伤害。在短时间内，他成功地\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 24 of\n\n让海外民运四分五裂，彻底丧失了战斗力。”（Lee 声明，第 26 段。）\n\n该推文中不存在事实指控。郑先生非特定性地提及原告迷惑、诱捕、攻击、恐吓和分化他人。然而，这些陈述并未指控原告有任何具体行为，因此其可诉性并不高于含糊指控某人为“骗子”或从事“卑劣、非法和不道德做法”的陈述。参见 Krinsky 案，159 Cal. App. 4th at 1173, 1178；另见 James 案，17 Cal. App. 4th at 12, 14。声称\n\n原告削弱了海外民运是典型的意见陈述，所使用的措辞（“支离破碎”和“完全丧失战斗力”）是典型的修辞性夸张。该条推文整体均不构成可诉事由。\n\n4.2.1.1.6 推文六\n\n涉案第六条推文内容为：“郭蓄意制造大量低劣谎言，不断树敌，其目的是转移视线，分化削弱民运战斗力，以达到海外维稳的目的。”（Lee Decl.，第27-28段。）\n\n与先前的陈述一样，“郭蓄意制造大量低劣谎言”属于非具体陈述，不具有诽谤性含义。关于原告“不断树敌”的陈述甚至不具有潜在的诽谤性，因为它无损原告的名誉，且在任何情况下都是基于以下所有报道而作出的意见陈述：即原告经常因诽谤被起诉、他是至少部分 CCP（中国共产党）成员的目标、以及他在中国政治异见运动中树敌。Cheng（程）先生关于原告削弱了民运的陈述是另一项意见陈述，其依据的事实是原告针对 CCP 内部的腐败和不法行为提出了大量极端的指控，却极少提供能够切实证实这些指控的证据。一个高调、极其富有、自称政治异见人士且不断言过其实的人，确实容易削弱公众对实际存在但较为低调的中国异见人士的尊重。\n\n4.2.1.2 程先生未以必要过错行事\n\n退一步讲，即使在假设的情况下（arguendo），程先生的任何陈述属于虚假事实陈述，他作出这些陈述时也未达到必要程度的过错，因此不对其承担责任。\n\n4.2.1.2.1 原告属于公众人物\n\n被告承担诽谤责任所需的过错程度取决于被告言论的对象和内容。诽谤案件的原告分为三类：一般公众人物、特定目的公众人物和普通私人。特定目的公众人物“自愿卷入或被卷入特定的公共争议，从而在有限的问题范围内成为公众人物。”Gerz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974)；亦见 Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 720。这是一个法律问题，法院的认定依据是“该人在涉及公共利益的事项中的角色是否自愿且显著。”Bongiovi v. Sullivan, 122 Nev. 556, 572 (2006)。\n\n正如前文第2.1节所述，原告声称自己是一名极其富有、极其显赫（事实上是最显赫）的中国政治异见人士。正如前文第2.2节所示，国际媒体围绕原告及其名誉所产生的全部争议进行了大量报道，包括指控他是骗子、诈骗犯、罪犯、挪用公款者、强奸犯，指控他在赚取数十亿身家时与 CCP 勾结，以及至少指控他是针对 CCP 的不可靠批评来源。即便他并非全方位的公众人物，原告在作为显赫政治异见人士及 CCP 批评者的背景下，毫无疑问也是公众人物。因此，他必须证明程先生在 Twitter（推特）上发表其陈述时具有实际恶意，而他绝无可能做到这一点。\n\n4.2.1.2.2 程先生未以实际恶意行事\n\n“实际恶意”并非针对原告的恶意或敌意，而是指被告明知其陈述虚假，或者罔顾其真伪。Harte-Hanks Comm'n v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989)。“最高法院反复裁定，在诽谤案件中，‘实际恶意’一词‘与不良动机或恶意无关。’”D.A.R.E. Am. v. Rolling Stone Magazine, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2000)（引自 Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 667 n.7）。明知虚假的定义是不言自明的。要证明“轻率罔顾”，公众人物必须证明发布者“对其出版内容的真实性抱有严重怀疑。”St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)；亦见 Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 511 n.30。根据内华达州法律，仅当被告“在行为时对陈述的‘可能虚假性具有高度认知’或对出版内容的真实性抱有严重怀疑”时，才构成轻率罔顾。Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 719。问题并不在于“一个合理谨慎的人是否会予以发布，或者在发布前是否会进行调查。必须有充分的证据得出被告实际上对其出版内容的真实性抱有严重怀疑的结论。”Reader's Digest Assn. v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 610, 617-18 (Cal. 1984)；亦见 St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731。此外，“发布者不必亲自调查，而是可以信赖信誉良好的消息来源的调查和结论。”出处同上，第619页。最后，诽谤案原告必须以高度盖然性（clear and convincing evidence）证明实际恶意。见 Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 511。这一要求构成了“沉重的负担，远超在大多数民事诉讼中充足的优势证据标准。”Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (9th Cir. 2001)（内部引用标记省略）。“以高度盖然性举证的责任要求认定具有高度可能性。证据必须确凿无误，不留任何重大疑虑。证据必须足够有力，足以获得每个理性心智毫不犹豫的认可。”Copp v. Paxton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 831, 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)（内部引用标记省略）。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 27 of\n\n各大报纸，包括 New York Times（纽约时报）和 Wall Street Journal（华尔街日报），至少从2017年起就报道了针对原告的指控。这些指控包括：原告为逃避席卷了与其关系密切的高层 CCP 官员的腐败指控而逃离中国；中国已通过 Interpol（国际刑警组织）发布了逮捕通缉；原告通过与中国政客腐败合作并施加影响，以及欺诈投资者和其他公司赚取了数十亿身家；其商业下属声称原告指示他们从事犯罪活动；他正因包括欺诈和挪用公款在内的多项罪行接受调查；他强奸了其前个人助理；他针对 CCP 腐败的许多主张未经核实且无法核实；他是中国异见群体中一个具有分裂性的人物；以及他在多起诽谤诉讼中担任被告。（见证据2-12。）这些不是互联网上匿名疯子的胡言乱语，而是受人尊敬的媒体机构甚至外国政府的报道。因此，程先生在形成其对原告的意见以及认为原告可能并非真正的反对 CCP 倡导者时，依赖这些针对原告指控的报道是完全合理的。\n\n面对支持程先生在 Twitter 上表达的结论的所有这些证据，原告没有做出任何实质性努力来证明实际恶意。相反，他仅按照最高法院的定义，公式化地背诵了实际恶意的表述，未提供任何支持性的事实指控。这甚至无法满足原告在 NRCP（内华达州民事诉讼规则）12(b)(5) 下的举证责任，更不用说反 SLAPP 法规下更为严格的举证责任了。原告无法证明程先生明知其陈述为虚假（就其作出过任何事实陈述而言），也无法证明他在作出任何陈述时对其准确性抱有重大的主观怀疑。原告无法达到其在反 SLAPP 法规下的举证责任，其诽谤及自认诽谤（defamation per se）主张必须予以驳回。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 28 of\n\n4.2.2 原告的蓄意施加精神痛苦（IIED）主张不能成立\n\n为确立蓄意施加精神痛苦的诉由，原告必须肯定性地证明：“(1) 旨在造成精神痛苦或对此轻率罔顾的极端且恶劣的行为，(2) 原告遭受了严重或极度的精神痛苦，以及 (3) 实际或直接的因果关系。”Olivero v. Lowe, 116 Nev. 395, 398-99 (2000)（援引 Star v. Rabello, 97 Nev. 124, 125 (1981)（省略引用））。“极端且恶劣的行为是指超出所有可能得体范围、且在文明社会中被视为完全不可容忍的行为。”Maduike v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 114 Nev. 1, 4 (1998)。就该侵权行为而言，仅在“压力如此严重且强度极大，以至于任何理性人都无法被指望承受”的情况下，损害才被予以认定。Alam v. Reno Hilton Corp., 819 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Nev. 1993)。因为原告属于公众人物，他还必须证明程先生的陈述是虚假的且带有实际恶意。见 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)。\n\n根据 Falwell 案，原告的 IIED 主张因导致其诽谤主张不成立的相同理由而不能成立。除此之外，原告无法证明存在任何极端或恶劣的行为，也无法证明存在严重的精神痛苦。\n\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 29 of\n\n确立极端且恶劣行为的门槛很高，并非每句让人感到不快的陈述都能构成承担法律责任的基础。见 Chehade Refai v. Lazaro, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1121-22 (D. Nev. 2009)；亦见侵权法重述（第二版）第46条评注d。虽然原告并未竞选公职，但他所谓作为一名反对 CCP 的高调政治异见人士所从事的工作，堪比踏入政治斗争的激烈丛林，法院已一再认定伤人的言论在此类情境中不构成可诉事由。见 Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 687（认定“当候选人进入政治舞台时，他或她必须预料到辩论有时会是激烈且针对个人的”）；Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 52 (1st Cir. 2012)（指出“竞选公职有时感觉像是一项对抗性运动，候选人、政治组织和其他人互相进行修辞攻击和口号式抨击，希望能在大选中给予致命一击。这不适合薄脸皮或胆怯懦弱之人”）；Desert Sun Pub'g Co. v. Sup. Ct., 97 Cal. App. 3d 49, 54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)（指出“一旦一个人决定卷入政治战争，他就使自己承受了这种待遇[，而且]在我们的政治历史上根深蒂固的传统就是自由放任、不负责任、赤手空拳的码头式政治斗殴”）。\n\nCheng 先生（郑水艳）在 Twitter（推特）上的言论绝非极端或令人发指，特别是在谈论这位自诩为全球最著名中国政治异见人士的背景下。Cheng 先生的言论并不比校园里的嘲弄“撒谎精，裤子着火了”更严苛，且他所言并未超出中美媒体此前对原告报道的内容。日常在 Twitter 等公共论坛上随处可见的温和批评，竟然被主张为极端至文明社会绝无法容忍的程度，这根本不具合理性。该项主张不能成立。\nCase 22-50073 Doc 474-2 Filed 06/20/22 Entered 06/20/22 13:31:16 Page 30 of\n\n然而，即便 Cheng 先生的言论属于极端且令人发指，原告也无法证明其遭受了严重的情绪困扰。多年来，原告一直经受着来自国际媒体和中国政府关于极端且极其恶劣的犯罪及不道德行为的指控，这些消息来源的权威性和可信度远高于一个在 Twitter 上仅有几千名关注者的人。原告一方面主张自己能够承受所有这些指控的重压，另一方面却声称一个在网络上几乎毫无影响力的人骂他是骗子就足以击垮其情绪，这种主张实属可笑。原告无法证明其遭受了严重的情绪困扰，因此在该项主张上毫无胜诉可能。该诉求必须予以驳回。5.0 结论\n\n基于上述理由，法院应驳回原告的所有诉求且不得再次起诉（dismiss with prejudice），判给 Cheng 先生诉讼费用和合理的律师费，并判给他 $10,000，该款项将通过另行提交的动议申请。\n\n日期：2019年6月14日。谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Marc J. Randazza\nMarc J. Randazza（内华达州律师执业号：12265）\nRonald D. Green（内华达州律师执业号：7360）\nLaTeigra C. Cahill（内华达州律师执业号：14352）\nRANDAZZA LEGAL GROUP, PLLC\n2764 Lake Sahara Drive, Suite 109\nLas Vegas, NV 89117\n\n被告 SHUIYAN CHENG（郑水艳）之代理律师","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":9967,"status":"published","published_at":"2022-06-20 00:00:00","created_at":"2022-06-20","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:13:59"}