{"id":"court_sdny_475_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":475,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":null,"title":"SDNY ECF 475","summary_zh":"诉讼损害赔偿可放免性诉状 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，Connecticut 破产法院 22-50073，ECF #475。债权人 Rui Ma 要求宣布其对债务人的多项人身伤害诉因（电池、assault、情绪伤害、虚假监禁、歧视等）在破产中依据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)（故意恶意伤害）不可放免。","summary_en":"Complaint to Determine Dischargeability — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (a/k/a Guo Wengui, a/k/a Miles Guo), Connecticut Bankruptcy Court, Case No. 22-50073, ECF #475. Creditor Rui Ma seeks declaratory judgment that her claims for willful and malicious injury by the debtor—including assault, battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, and discrimination—are nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).","body_en":"| UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT |\n|--------------------------------|\n| DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT        |\n| BRIDGEPORT DIVISION            |\n\n| In re:        |            | CHAPTER 11                  |\n|---------------|------------|-----------------------------|\n| HO WAN KWOK,  |            | Case No. 22-50073(JAM)      |\n|               | Debtor.    |                             |\n| Rui Ma,<br>v. | Plaintiff, | Adv. Proc. No. ____________ |\n| Ho Wan Kwok,  | Defendant. |                             |\n\n## **COMPLAINT TO DETERMINE DISCHARGEABILITY**\n\nRui Ma (\"**Plaintiff**\"), by and through her undersigned attorneys, in support of her Complaint hereby, alleges and states as follows:\n\n#### **PARTIES**\n\n1. Plaintiff is a female Chinese national presently residing in China. At all times relevant to her claims at issue herein, Plaintiff was employed as an assistant to the Defendant primarily based in New York City.\n\n2. Ho Wan Kwok a/k/a Guo Wengui, also a Chinese national, is the defendant in this adversary proceeding and debtor in the above-captioned bankruptcy case (the \"**Defendant**\" or \"**Debtor**\"). Debtor purports to presently reside in Connecticut, and at all times relevant to Plaintiff and her claims, upon information and belief, Debtor resided in New York City.\n\n### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**\n\n3. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and this proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334.\n\n4. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I).\n\n5. Venue of this action is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a).\n\n6. The bases for the relief requested in this Complaint are 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 4007 and 7001.\n\n7. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on her claims against the Debtor and does not consent to trial in this Court.\n\n## **RELEVANT BACKGROUND**\n\n8. In 2017, Movant commenced a civil action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County (the \"**State Court**\"), Index No. 158140/2017 (the \"**State Court Litigation**\"), against the Debtor and Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. (\"**Golden Spring**\"), asserting claims for assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, discrimination, and false imprisonment against the Debtor and related claims for negligence and violations of applicable New York state and city workplace laws and regulations against Golden Spring. In all, Plaintiff asserts eleven causes of action in the State Court Litigation arising from her injuries caused by the Debtor (collectively, the \"**Plaintiff Claims**\").\n\n9. A true and correct copy of the Plaintiff's amended complaint in the State Court Litigation setting forth the Plaintiff Claims (the \"**State Court Complaint**\") is attached hereto as Exhibit A. As alleged therein, the Plaintiff Claims result from more than a year of horrific abuse by the Debtor, as the Plaintiff was repeatedly assaulted, battered, terrorized, imprisoned, and raped by the Debtor between April 2015 and November 2016. *See, e.g.,* State Court Complaint ¶¶ 19- 76.\n\n10. The State Court Complaint is incorporated herein in its entirety by reference. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each allegation of the State Court Complaint as if said allegation is fully set forth herein.\n\n11. On February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11, Title 11 of the United States Code (the \"**Bankruptcy Code**\") commencing this bankruptcy case.\n\n12. The Debtor's list of largest unsecured creditors identifies Movant as the second largest non-insider creditor in this case. (ECF Nos. 4, 20).\n\n13. On April 12, 2022, Plaintiff moved for relief from the automatic stay to proceed to liquidate her claims against the Debtor in the pending State Court Litigation for cause. [Case No. 22-50073, Docket No. 206] (the \"**Stay Relief Motion**\"). The grounds for the Stay Relief Motion included, among other things, that discovery is complete in the State Court Litigation and that action is already on the trial calendar. Stay Relief Motion ¶¶ 7, 21. In addition, the Plaintiff Claims are personal injury claims that are expressly excluded from matters in which bankruptcy courts may enter final judgments or that may be estimated by bankruptcy courts for distribution purposes, nor do bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction to try such claims. Stay Relief Motion ¶ 16 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B), (O), 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(5)). Further, Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on her claims against the Debtor and did not (and does not) consent to trial in this Court. Stay Relief Motion ¶ 16.\n\n14. On May 27, 2022, this Court entered an order [Case No. 22-50073, Docket No. 445] granting the Stay Relief Motion and authorizing Plaintiff to proceed against the Debtor and liquidate the Plaintiff Claims in State Court.\n\n# **COUNT I – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the Battery Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n15. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n16. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n17. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n18. The first cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the intentional tort of battery (the \"**Battery Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 77-88. Debtor's conduct resulting in the Battery Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the Battery Claim, the Debtor's liability for the Battery Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n## **COUNT II – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the Assault Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n19. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n20. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n21. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n22. The second cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the intentional tort of assault (the \"**Assault Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 89-100. Debtor's conduct resulting in the Assault Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the Assault Claim, the Debtor's liability for the Assault Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n## **COUNT III – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the IIED Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n23. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n24. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n25. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n26. The third cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the intentional infliction of emotional distress (the \"**IIED Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 101-108. Debtor's conduct resulting in the IIED Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the IIED Claim, the Debtor's liability for the IIED Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n#### **COUNT IV – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the NIED Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n27. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n28. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n29. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries. Debtor's conduct in abusing Plaintiff was careless and negligent as to the emotional health of Plaintiff.\n\n30. The fourth cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the negligent infliction of emotional distress (the \"**NIED Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 109-115. Debtor's conduct resulting in the NIED Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the NIED Claim, the Debtor's liability for the NIED Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n## **COUNT V – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the Negligence Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n31. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n32. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n33. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n34. The fifth cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the negligent breach of his duty as Plaintiff's employer to protect her from injury while performing the duties and responsibilities of her employment (the \"**Negligence Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 116-125. Debtor's conduct resulting in the Negligence Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the Negligence Claim, the Debtor's liability for the Negligence Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n# **COUNT VI – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the False Imprisonment Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n35. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n36. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n37. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n38. The sixth cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for the confinement of Plaintiff against her will (the \"**False Imprisonment Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 126-134. Debtor's conduct resulting in the False Imprisonment Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the False Imprisonment Claim, the Debtor's liability for the False Imprisonment Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n# **COUNT VII – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the NYC Discrimination Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n39. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n40. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n41. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n42. The eighth cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for sexual harassment as well as gender and other discrimination against Plaintiff in violation of the New York City Administrative Code (the \"**NYC Discrimination Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 144-155. Debtor's conduct resulting in the NYC Discrimination Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the NYC Discrimination Claim, the Debtor's liability for the NYC Discrimination Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n### **COUNT VIII – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Nondischargeability of the NYS Discrimination Claim Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)**\n\n43. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each paragraph above as if fully set forth herein.\n\n44. Individual debtors are not entitled to a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code from any debt \"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity.\" 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).\n\n45. As set forth above and in the State Court Complaint, which is incorporated herein by reference, Debtor repeatedly and intentionally abused the Plaintiff. Debtor engaged in repeated acts of confinement, physical violence and sexual attacks against Plaintiff. Debtor physically restrained Plaintiff, hit her, grabbed her, and forcibly raped her. Debtor's conduct was intentional, unauthorized, and grossly offensive in nature. Debtor intentionally caused Plaintiff to suffer great physical and emotional pain and humiliation, to be deprived of her liberty, and other damage and injuries.\n\n46. The tenth cause of action in the Complaint sets forth the Plaintiff's claim against the Debtor for sexual harassment as well as gender and other discrimination against Plaintiff in violation of the New York Executive Law § 296 (the \"**NYS Discrimination Claim**\"). Complaint ¶¶ 170-180. Debtor's conduct resulting in the NYS Discrimination Claim constitutes willful and malicious injury to Plaintiff within the meaning of section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, in the event that the Debtor is determined in the State Court Litigation to be liable on the NYS Discrimination Claim, the Debtor's liability for the NYS Discrimination Claim is nondischargeable.\n\n## **RELIEF REQUESTED**\n\nWHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court grant judgment as follows:\n\n(a) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the Battery Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(b) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the Assault Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(c) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the IIED Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(d) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the NIED Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(e) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the Negligence Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(f) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the False Imprisonment Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(g) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the NYC Discrimination Claim, as detailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6);\n\n(h) Declaring the liability of Debtor to Plaintiff for the NYS Discrimination Claim, as\n\ndetailed in the Complaint and as determined by the State Court in the State Court Litigation, to be\n\nnondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6); and\n\n(i) Granting such other and further relief to Plaintiff as may be just and proper.\n\nDated: June 20, 2022/s/ Kristin B. Mayhew\n\nKristin Mayhew **MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP** 30 Jelliff Lane Southport, CT 06890 (203) 319-4000 kmayhew@mdmc-law.com\n\n- and -\n\nCarollynn H.G. Callari (*pro hac vice*) David S. Forsh (*pro hac vice*) **CALLARI PARTNERS LLC** One Rockefeller Plaza, 10th Floor New York, NY 10020 (212) 202-3050 ccallari@callaripartners.com dforsh@callaripartners.com\n\n*Attorneys for Rui Ma*","body_zh":"UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT（美国破产法院）\nDISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT（康涅狄格区）\nBRIDGEPORT DIVISION（布里奇波特分院）\n\n关于：第11章\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵），案号：22-50073(JAM)\n债务人。\nRui Ma（马蕊），对抗性诉讼案号：____________\n原告，\n诉\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵），\n被告。\n\n确定不可免责性起诉状\n\n原告 Rui Ma（“原告”）通过其下文签名的代理律师，为支持其起诉状，特此指控并陈述如下：\n\n当事人\n\n1. 原告为女性中国公民，目前居住在中国。在与本案所涉主张相关的所有时间内，原告受雇担任被告的助理，主要工作地点位于纽约市。\n\n2. Ho Wan Kwok 又名郭文贵，亦为中国公民，是本对抗性诉讼中的被告，也是上述标题所示破产案件中的债务人（“被告”或“债务人”）。债务人声称目前居住在康涅狄格州，并且根据知悉及确信，在与原告及其主张相关的所有时间内，债务人均居住在纽约市。\n\n管辖权与审判地\n\n3. 根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 和 1334，本法院对各方当事人及本诉讼具有管辖权。\n\n4. 根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I)，本案属于核心诉讼程序。\n\n5. 根据 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a)，本诉讼在本司法管辖区审理是适当的。\n\n6. 本起诉状所请求救济的法律依据为 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 以及《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》第4007条和第7001条。\n\n7. 原告就其针对债务人的各项主张要求进行陪审团审判，且不同意在本法院进行审理。\n\n相关背景\n\n8. 2017年，动议人向 Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County（纽约州最高法院纽约县分院）（“州法院”）提起民事诉讼，案号为 Index No. 158140/2017（“州法院诉讼”），起诉债务人及 Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.（“Golden Spring”），针对债务人主张人身侵犯恐吓、人身侵犯伤害、故意施加精神痛苦、过失施加精神痛苦、过失、歧视以及非法监禁，并针对 Golden Spring 提出过失以及违反适用的纽约州和纽约市工作场所法律法规的相关主张。原告在州法院诉讼中总共提出了十一项诉讼请求，均由债务人对其造成的损害引发（统称“原告主张”）。\n\n9. 载明原告主张的原告在州法院诉讼中的修正起诉状（“州法院起诉状”）的真实正确副本作为附件 A 随附于本文件。如其中所指控，原告主张源于债务人长达一年多的可怕虐待，在2015年4月至2016年11月期间，原告多次遭受债务人的人身侵犯恐吓、人身侵犯伤害、恐吓威胁、监禁以及强奸。参见例如州法院起诉状第 19-76 段。\n\n10. 州法院起诉状通过引用全文并入本文件。原告重申并再次指控州法院起诉状中的每一项指控，如同该指控已在本文中完整陈述一样。\n\n11. 2022年2月15日，债务人根据《美国法典》第11篇（“《破产法典》”）第11章提交了自愿救济申请，从而启动了本破产案件。\n\n12. 债务人的最大无担保债权人名单将动议人列为本案中第二大非内部人债权人。（ECF Nos. 4, 20）。\n\n13. 2022年4月12日，原告因有正当理由申请解除自动中止，以便在正在进行的州法院诉讼中继续确定并清算其针对债务人的主张。[案号：22-50073，案卷号：206]（“解除中止动议”）。提出解除中止动议的理由包括（除其他事项外）州法院诉讼中的证据开示程序已完成，且该诉讼已列入审判日程。解除中止动议第 7、21 段。此外，原告主张属于人身伤害主张，明确排除在破产法院可作出终局判决或破产法院可为分配目的进行估算的事项之外，破产法院亦无审判此类主张的管辖权。解除中止动议第 16 段（引用 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(B), (O), 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5)）。此外，原告就其针对债务人的主张要求进行陪审团审判，过去没有（现在也）不同意在本法院进行审理。解除中止动议第 16 段。\n\n14. 2022年5月27日，本法院作出一项裁定 [案号：22-50073，案卷号：445]，批准了解除中止动议，并授权原告在州法院继续对债务人提起诉讼并清算原告主张。\n\n罪名项一 – 宣告性判决 根据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 人身侵犯伤害主张的不可免责性\n\n15. 原告重申并再次指控上述各段内容，如同在本文中完整陈述一样。\n\n16. 根据《破产法典》，个人债务人因“债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产故意且恶意造成的损害”而产生的任何债务均无权获得免责。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n17. 如上文及通过引用并入本文的州法院起诉状所述，债务人多次故意虐待原告。债务人对原告实施了多次非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵害行为。债务人对原告进行人身限制、殴打、拉扯，并强行强奸了原告。债务人的行为属于故意的、未经许可的且性质极其恶劣的冒犯行为。债务人故意导致原告遭受巨大的肉体和精神痛苦与羞辱、被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。\n\n18. 起诉状中的第一项诉讼请求阐明了原告针对债务人故意侵权之人身侵犯伤害的主张（“人身侵犯伤害主张”）。起诉状第 77-88 段。债务人导致人身侵犯伤害主张的行为构成了《破产法典》第523(a)(6)条含义内对原告的故意且恶意伤害。因此，如果债务人在州法院诉讼中被判定对人身侵犯伤害主张承担责任，则债务人对人身侵犯伤害主张的责任属于不可免责。\n\n罪名项二 – 宣告性判决 根据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 人身侵犯恐吓主张的不可免责性\n\n19. 原告重申并再次指控上述各段内容，如同在本文中完整陈述一样。\n\n20. 根据《破产法典》，个人债务人因“债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产故意且恶意造成的损害”而产生的任何债务均无权获得免责。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n21. 如上文及通过引用并入本文的州法院起诉状所述，债务人多次故意虐待原告。债务人对原告实施了多次非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵害行为。债务人对原告进行人身限制、殴打、拉扯，并强行强奸了原告。债务人的行为属于故意的、未经许可的且性质极其恶劣的冒犯行为。债务人故意导致原告遭受巨大的肉体和精神痛苦与羞辱、被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。\n\n22. 起诉状中的第二项诉讼请求阐明了原告针对债务人故意侵权之人身侵犯恐吓的主张（“人身侵犯恐吓主张”）。起诉状第 89-100 段。债务人导致人身侵犯恐吓主张的行为构成了《破产法典》第523(a)(6)条含义内对原告的故意且恶意伤害。因此，如果债务人在州法院诉讼中被判定对人身侵犯恐吓主张承担责任，则债务人对人身侵犯恐吓主张的责任属于不可免责。\n\n罪名项三 – 宣告性判决 根据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 故意施加精神痛苦主张的不可免责性\n\n23. 原告重申并再次指控上述各段内容，如同在本文中完整陈述一样。\n\n24. 根据《破产法典》，个人债务人因“债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产故意且恶意造成的损害”而产生的任何债务均无权获得免责。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n25. 如上文及通过引用并入本文的州法院起诉状所述，债务人多次故意虐待原告。债务人对原告实施了多次非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵害行为。债务人对原告进行人身限制、殴打、拉扯，并强行强奸了原告。债务人的行为属于故意的、未经许可的且性质极其恶劣的冒犯行为。债务人故意导致原告遭受巨大的肉体和精神痛苦与羞辱、被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。\n\n26. 起诉状中的第三项诉讼请求阐明了原告针对债务人故意施加精神痛苦的主张（“IIED 主张”）。起诉状第 101-108 段。债务人导致 IIED 主张的行为构成了《破产法典》第523(a)(6)条含义内对原告的故意且恶意伤害。因此，如果债务人在州法院诉讼中被判定对 IIED 主张承担责任，则债务人对 IIED 主张的责任属于不可免责。\n\n罪名项四 – 宣告性判决 根据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 过失施加精神痛苦主张的不可免责性\n\n27. 原告重申并再次指控上述各段内容，如同在本文中完整陈述一样。\n\n28. 根据《破产法典》，个人债务人因“债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产故意且恶意造成的损害”而产生的任何债务均无权获得免责。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n29. 如上文及通过引用并入本文的州法院起诉状所述，债务人多次故意虐待原告。债务人对原告实施了多次非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵害行为。债务人对原告进行人身限制、殴打、拉扯，并强行强奸了原告。债务人的行为属于故意的、未经许可的且性质极其恶劣的冒犯行为。债务人故意导致原告遭受巨大的肉体和精神痛苦与羞辱、被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。债务人虐待原告的行为对原告的情绪健康表现为疏忽与过失。\n\n30. 起诉状中的第四项诉讼请求阐明了原告针对债务人过失施加精神痛苦的主张（“NIED 主张”）。起诉状第 109-115 段。债务人导致 NIED 主张的行为构成了《破产法典》第523(a)(6)条含义内对原告的故意且恶意伤害。因此，如果债务人在州法院诉讼中被判定对 NIED 主张承担责任，则债务人对 NIED 主张的责任属于不可免责。\n\n罪名项五 – 宣告性判决 根据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 过失主张的不可免责性\n\n31. 原告重申并再次指控上述各段内容，如同在本文中完整陈述一样。\n\n32. 根据《破产法典》，个人债务人因“债务人对另一实体或另一实体的财产故意且恶意造成的损害”而产生的任何债务均无权获得免责。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n33. 如上文及州法院起诉书（State Court Complaint，在此引为参考）所述，债务人（Debtor）反复且故意虐待原告（Plaintiff）。债务人对原告实施了反复的非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵犯行为。债务人对原告实施身体控制、殴打她、抓拽她，并强行强奸她。债务人的行为在性质上是故意的、未经许可的且具有极度攻击性的。债务人故意造成原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦与羞辱，被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。\n\n34. 本起诉书中的第五项诉讼理由提出了原告针对债务人的索赔主张，即债务人作为原告的雇主，疏忽违反了在原告履行雇佣职责和责任期间保护其免受伤害的义务（简称“疏忽索赔”，Negligence Claim）。起诉书第 116-125 段。导致该疏忽索赔的债务人行为构成了 Bankruptcy Code（破产法典）第 523(a)(6) 条含义内的对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦在州法院诉讼（State Court Litigation）中认定债务人对该疏忽索赔承担责任，债务人因该疏忽索赔所产生的债务属于不可免除债务。\n\n第六项罪名——宣告性判决 根据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 认定非法拘禁索赔不可免除\n\n35. 原告重申并重新主张上文各段，如同在此完整载明一般。\n\n36. 个人债务人根据破产法典无权免除因“债务人对另一主体或另一主体的财产造成蓄意和恶意伤害”而产生的任何债务。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n37. 如上文及州法院起诉书（在此引为参考）所述，债务人反复且故意虐待原告。债务人对原告实施了反复的非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵犯行为。债务人对原告实施身体控制、殴打她、抓拽她，并强行强奸她。债务人的行为在性质上是故意的、未经许可的且具有极度攻击性的。债务人故意造成原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦与羞辱，被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。\n\n38. 本起诉书中的第六项诉讼理由提出了原告针对债务人的索赔主张，即违背原告意愿对原告进行拘禁（简称“非法拘禁索赔”，False Imprisonment Claim）。起诉书第 126-134 段。导致该非法拘禁索赔的债务人行为构成了破产法典第 523(a)(6) 条含义内的对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦在州法院诉讼中认定债务人对该非法拘禁索赔承担责任，债务人因该非法拘禁索赔所产生的债务属于不可免除债务。\n\n第七项罪名——宣告性判决 根据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 认定纽约市歧视索赔不可免除\n\n39. 原告重申并重新主张上文各段，如同在此完整载明一般。\n\n40. 个人债务人根据破产法典无权免除因“债务人对另一主体或另一主体的财产造成蓄意和恶意伤害”而产生的任何债务。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n41. 如上文及州法院起诉书（在此引为参考）所述，债务人反复且故意虐待原告。债务人对原告实施了反复的非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵犯行为。债务人对原告实施身体控制、殴打她、抓拽她，并强行强奸她。债务人的行为在性质上是故意的、未经许可的且具有极度攻击性的。债务人故意造成原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦与羞辱，被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。\n\n42. 本起诉书中的第八项诉讼理由提出了原告针对债务人的索赔主张，即违反 New York City Administrative Code（纽约市行政法典）对原告实施性骚扰以及性别和其他歧视（简称“纽约市歧视索赔”，NYC Discrimination Claim）。起诉书第 144-155 段。导致该纽约市歧视索赔的债务人行为构成了破产法典第 523(a)(6) 条含义内的对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦在州法院诉讼中认定债务人对该纽约市歧视索赔承担责任，债务人因该纽约市歧视索赔所产生的债务属于不可免除债务。\n\n第八项罪名——宣告性判决 根据 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) 认定纽约州歧视索赔不可免除\n\n43. 原告重申并重新主张上文各段，如同在此完整载明一般。\n\n44. 个人债务人根据破产法典无权免除因“债务人对另一主体或另一主体的财产造成蓄意和恶意伤害”而产生的任何债务。11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)。\n\n45. 如上文及州法院起诉书（在此引为参考）所述，债务人反复且故意虐待原告。债务人对原告实施了反复的非法拘禁、身体暴力和性侵犯行为。债务人对原告实施身体控制、殴打她、抓拽她，并强行强奸她。债务人的行为在性质上是故意的、未经许可的且具有极度攻击性的。债务人故意造成原告遭受巨大的身体和精神痛苦与羞辱，被剥夺人身自由，并遭受其他损害和伤害。\n\n46. 本起诉书中的第十项诉讼理由提出了原告针对债务人的索赔主张，即违反 New York Executive Law（纽约州行政法）§ 296 对原告实施性骚扰以及性别和其他歧视（简称“纽约州歧视索赔”，NYS Discrimination Claim）。起诉书第 170-180 段。导致该纽约州歧视索赔的债务人行为构成了破产法典第 523(a)(6) 条含义内的对原告的蓄意和恶意伤害。因此，一旦在州法院诉讼中认定债务人对该纽约州歧视索赔承担责任，债务人因该纽约州歧视索赔所产生的债务属于不可免除债务。\n\n请求的救济\n\n据此，原告谨请求法院作出如下判决：\n\n(a) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告债务人对原告因人身侵犯索赔（Battery Claim）而承担的责任（如起诉书所详述并在州法院诉讼中由州法院所确定）属于不可免除债务；\n\n(b) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告债务人对原告因恐吓侵犯索赔（Assault Claim）而承担的责任（如起诉书所详述并在州法院诉讼中由州法院所确定）属于不可免除债务；\n\n(c) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告债务人对原告因故意造成精神痛苦索赔（IIED Claim）而承担的责任（如起诉书所详述并在州法院诉讼中由州法院所确定）属于不可免除债务；\n\n(d) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告债务人对原告因疏忽造成精神痛苦索赔（NIED Claim）而承担的责任（如起诉书所详述并在州法院诉讼中由州法院所确定）属于不可免除债务；\n\n(e) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告债务人对原告因疏忽索赔而承担的责任（如起诉书所详述并在州法院诉讼中由州法院所确定）属于不可免除债务；\n\n(f) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告债务人对原告因非法拘禁索赔而承担的责任（如起诉书所详述并在州法院诉讼中由州法院所确定）属于不可免除债务；\n\n(g) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告债务人对原告因纽约市歧视索赔而承担的责任（如起诉书所详述并在州法院诉讼中由州法院所确定）属于不可免除债务；\n\n(h) 根据 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(6)，宣告债务人对原告因纽约州歧视索赔而承担的责任（如起诉书所详述并在州法院诉讼中由州法院所确定）属于不可免除债务；以及\n\n(i) 裁定给予原告法院认为公正且适当的该等其他及进一步救济。\n\n日期：2022年6月20日 /签名/ Kristin B. Mayhew\n\nKristin Mayhew\nMCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP\n30 Jelliff Lane\nSouthport, CT 06890\n(203) 319-4000\nkmayhew@mdmc-law.com\n\n- 以及 -\n\nCarollynn H.G. Callari（特别许可出庭律师，pro hac vice）\nDavid S. Forsh（特别许可出庭律师，pro hac vice）\nCALLARI PARTNERS LLC\nOne Rockefeller Plaza, 10th Floor\nNew York, NY 10020\n(212) 202-3050\nccallari@callaripartners.com\ndforsh@callaripartners.com\n\nRui Ma（马蕊）的代理律师","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":3112,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:33:26"}