{"id":"court_sdny_476_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":476,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"JUDGMENT","filed_date":"2024-11-22","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"政府量刑意见书——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #476（2024年11月22日立案）。由美国联邦检察官办公室（南区）就联合被告 Yanping Wang（英文别名 \"Yvette\"）提交，主张其作为郭文贵所谓\"G企业\"的日常运营负责人，深度参与并推动一系列欺诈方案、损害众多支持者利益，并在被起诉后存在妨碍司法的行为，反对辩方要求大幅下调刑期的请求，主张法院应对其判处量刑指南范围内的监禁刑期。","summary_en":"Government sentencing memorandum — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF No. 476 (filed November 22, 2024). Filed by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York against co-defendant Yanping Wang (a/k/a \"Yvette\"), the memorandum argues she served as Miles Guo's day-to-day operations lead within the so-called \"G|Enterprise,\" played a central role in advancing multiple fraud schemes that harmed numerous supporters, and obstructed justice after being charged, and it urges the court to reject a substantial downward variance and instead impose a sentence within the Guidelines range.","body_en":"## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nv.\n\nYANPING WANG, a/k/a \"Yvette,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\n# **SENTENCING MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**\n\n DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York One St. Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007\n\n**S4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\nMicah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Justin R. Horton Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys *Of Counsel*\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n| BACKGROUND 1 |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| I. Offense Conduct 1 |\n| II. Procedural History 7 |\n| A. The Charges and Arrest 7 |\n| B. The Plea Agreement 8 |\n| C. Probation's Sentencing Recommendation 10 |\n| A GUIDELINES SENTENCE OF 120 MONTHS IS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE 10 |\n| A. Applicable Law 10 |\n| B. The Nature, Circumstances, and Seriousness of the Offenses Warrant a Guidelines 11 |\n| Sentence 11 |\n| 1. Wang's Offenses Caused Thousands of Innocent Victims to Lose More Than \\$1 Billion
12 |\n| 2. Wang Harmed the Chinese Pro-Democracy Movement 13 |\n| 3. Wang's Criminal Acts Occurred over a Period of Years 14 |\n| 4. Wang's Offenses Evolved and Adapted to Evade Law Enforcement 14 |\n| 5. Wang Was a Leader of the G Enterprise and Obstructed Justice 17 |\n| 6. Wang Personally Controlled Millions That She Stole from Victims 18 |\n| C. A Guidelines Sentence Is Necessary to Serve the Goals of Specific Deterrence and to
Protect the Public 20 |\n| D. A Guidelines Sentence Serves the Interests of General Deterrence 22 |\n| E. The Defendant's History and Characterizes Do Not Warrant a Variance 24 |\n| 1. The Actions of the CCP Are Not a Mitigating Factor 25 |\n| 2. A Guidelines Sentence Would Not Create Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities 27 |\n| 3. Any Immigration Consequences Are of Wang's Own Making 29 |\n| CONCLUSION 31 |\n\n## **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nYanping \"Yvette\" Wang, the defendant, was instrumental in carrying out a billion-dollar fraud scheme that injured thousands, obstructed justice, spurned regulatory enforcement, lasted for years, and harmed the so-called pro-democracy movement to which Wang claims to have devoted her life. The truth, which Wang seems unwilling to fully accept responsibility for, is that her actions took money from thousands of individuals who cared about democracy in China—and used that money to line Miles Guo's pockets as well as her own. Contrary to Wang's sentencing submission, Wang did benefit significantly from her crimes, which were not a momentary lapse of judgment or the result of life challenges. Every step of the way, over the course of at least five years, Wang was keenly aware she was not fighting against the Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\")—she was causing deep pain for thousands. And even after she was criminally charged and arrested, Wang obstructed justice, exemplifying an utter disregard for the law and for the victims she harmed. This serious conduct is worthy of *at least* a Guidelines sentence. The substantial variance the defense seeks overlooks the harm Wang imposed on others, does not sufficiently deter her from future criminal conduct, sends an inappropriate message to others contemplating similar actions, and fails to protect the public from future harm at the hands of this defendant. For those reasons, and those that follow, this Court should impose a sentence of 120 months imprisonment.\n\n## **BACKGROUND**\n\n## **I. Offense Conduct**\n\nIn this pervasive, malicious conspiracy, Yvette Wang was Miles Guo's right hand. For at least five years, Miles Guo led—and Yvette Wang operated with managerial authority—a massive, global racketeering conspiracy to harness Guo's image as an democratic activist billionaire and used it to steal more than a billion dollars from dedicated, trusting supporters around the world. (Presentence Investigation Report, dated August 8, 2024 (Dkt. 461) (\"PSR\") ¶ 10, 12). While Guo sat at the top of this criminal enterprise (the \"G|Enterprise\"), Wang maintained an important leadership role. In that capacity, Wang did the critical, and essential, work of ensuring that the G|Enterprise's wheels turned; that its dozens of \"complex and largely fraudulent and fictitious businesses and investment opportunities\" ran smoothly; and that its bank accounts stayed open and flush with fraud proceeds. (PSR ¶¶ 10-13). As Guo's lawyers told the jury on the opening day of his trial, Wang was his \"head of operations\" who \"ran the day-to-day\" of each of Guo's purported businesses. (Trial Tr. 42). Wang's formal titles underscored, but also understated, the breadth and centrality of her role in the G|Enterprise. She \"operated as a 'chief of staff' for GUO's family's companies in the United States, as well as in various entities that were instrumentalities of the fraud.\" (PSR ¶ 18). But in other instances, she \"exercised control over . . . other entities within the [G|] Enterprise, even where she had no formal position or title.\" (*Id.*). Indeed, conducting the criminal affairs of the vast G|Enterprise was Wang's full-time job, for which she received a salary funded by fraud proceeds and an allocation of millions of dollars of a purported cryptocurrency \"funded by victim money\" (PSR ¶ 14)—millions of dollars she was destined to collect if not for the intervention of the FBI and her arrest.\n\nWang's guilty plea allocution was focused mainly on one component of her criminal conduct: Wang's conduct relating to the GTV Private Placement: specifically, the June 2020 misappropriation and laundering of \\$100 million of victims' money into a risky hedge-fund investment for the benefit of Miles Guo's son (the \"Hedge Fund Misappropriation\"). (PSR ¶¶ 1- 5, 73). But the scope of Wang's conduct far exceeds the Hedge Fund Misappropriation scheme. Her key role in the G|Enterprise began long before the Hedge Fund Misappropriation. Indeed,\n\nWang played an important role in the various schemes of the G|Enterprise: the Rule of Law Charities, GTV Private Placement, Farm Loan Program, G|CLUBS, and the Himalaya Exchange.\n\n## A. The Rule of Law Charities\n\nIn the years before June 2020, Wang's operational duties extended to supporting Miles Guo's use of his phony philanthropic Rule of Law charitable organizations that were used to deceive their donors and misappropriate their funds. As former close Guo aide Karin Maistrello testified, Wang directed a scheme to transfer funds from various Guo business accounts to the Rule of Law organizations' accounts in order to create the false appearance of more and larger donations to Rule of Law. (*See* Trial Tr. 473-74). Later, Wang directed Maistrello to write a letter to the New York City Police Department (\"NYPD\") through which Guo himself would be given credit for an NYPD donation made with Rule of Law donors' funds. (*See id.* 481). Wang exacted her leadership and quieted the aide's objections by telling her that she \"was being paid to execute orders and not to think.\" (*Id.*).\n\n## B. The GTV Private Placement\n\nWang's June 2020 misconduct at the center of the GTV Private Placement scheme and Hedge Fund Misappropriation reflected the critical services she provided to the G|Enterprise more generally. In July 2018—nearly two years before the Hedge Fund Misappropriation in June 2020—Wang opened and served as the signatory for two bank accounts held for Saraca, (PSR ¶¶ 47-49), the Guo Enterprise entity that was ultimately owned by Miles Guo's son, Mileson Guo (P*Id.* ¶ 47-49). In April and May of 2020, those accounts—with Wang as the sole authorized signatory—received more than \\$300 million in defrauded victims' purported investments in GTV. (*Id.* ¶¶ 48-41). The fraudulent GTV stock offering's Private Placement Memorandum (\"PPM\") issued just earlier in April 2020—identified Wang to investors as GTV's executive director. (*Id.*\n\n¶ 25). On June 3, 2020—just after the Saraca accounts under Wang's control received more than \\$300 million in victims' money—Wang executed the subscription agreement by which \\$100 million of those victims' funds were to be invested in a high-risk hedge fund, (*id.* ¶¶ 52), for the benefit of Saraca's sole beneficial owner, Miles Guo's son. That same day, Wang personally used her online banking account to transfer the same \\$100 million from one Saraca bank account (where it had been received for the purported purpose of investment in GTV) to another Saraca bank account (which, prior to that transfer, had a \\$0 balance). (*Id.* ¶ 53). And two days later, Wang transferred the \\$100 million of victims' investment funds over to the hedge fund. (*Id.* ¶ 54). As Wang allocuted, she \"knew these funds had been received from investors in the GTV offering,\" and \"had concerns based on what I knew about representations [to] GTV investors, that this use of funds was improper,\" but she \"made the wire transfer anyway.\" (*Id.* ¶ 73). Indeed, Wang not only knew that the GTV PPM promised investors that their funds would be used solely \"to develop and grow that business,\" (*id.* ¶¶ 26-27), but she made a personal representation about the same limited purpose of GTV investor funds when transferring GTV private placement proceeds into a fresh set of bank accounts in July 2020. (*See id.* ¶¶ 59-61 (Wang's representation to a bank that \"[t]he funds in the account are funds of GTV Media Group and are strictly for operational purposes and acquisitions\")). Wang's own false representation about the limited use of GTV investors' funds came in the course of her efforts, in June and July 2020, to move the GTV private placement's proceeds into accounts to avoid bank-account closures and facilitate future criminal transfers including nearly \\$31,000 that she caused to be wired to a personal bank account as a purported \"director fee.\" (*Id.* ¶¶ 55-61).\n\n## C. The Farm Loan Program\n\nAs the G|Enterprise's fraud schemes continued, Wang continued to play a critical operational role at their center. After \"domestic banks that held accounts used to process the funds raised through the GTV Private Placement began to freeze and close GTV associated bank accounts,\" (PSR ¶ 31), Guo—with Wang's operational support—promoted a scheme through which \"individuals seeking to invest (or reinvest) in GTV could participate in the Farm Loan Program\" (*id.*). \"Thousands of victims 'loaned' money to the Farms by sending money to bank accounts controlled by the Farms (and not GTV).\" (*Id.* ¶ 32). When \"Guo and Je misappropriated funds that were raised through the Farm Loan Program,\" (*id.* ¶ 33), it was with Wang's operational and executive support. \"Mulan\"—a former Guo supporter and Farm leader—funneled millions of supporter dollars to an Abu Dhabi bank account under Guo's control at Wang's direction. (*See* Trial Tr. 1389 (\"Q: Did you coordinate with Guo directly? A: No, is through Yvette Wang. Q: And why did you coordinate with Yvette Wang on that? A: Miles Guo say Yvette Wang will tell me how to do it.\")).\n\n## D. G|CLUBS\n\nAround the same time, \"GUO, JE, and WANG\" began to \"use[] G CLUBS\"—the \"purported online membership club\"—\"as a mechanism to continue fraudulent stock offerings.\" (PSR ¶ 34-37). Wang's role was, once again, critical. She hired and supervised G|CLUBS's figurehead CEO, Limarie Reyes. (Trial Tr. 2976, 2983). Indeed, in her leadership role, Wang ordered that the advice of a G|CLUBS's lawyer be disregarded and directed the entity's figurehead CEO to transfer \\$5 million, telling the CEO that it would be the CEO's \"fault if something went wrong.\" (*Id.* 2994). It was also Wang who gave the command to G|CLUBS's nominal CEO and in-house counsel to set up multiple memberships—that is, to solicit additional money from G|Enterprise victims under the premise that holders of multiple G|CLUBS memberships would be entitled to additional GTV stock. (*See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. 5920). And in connection with the G|CLUBS scheme, Wang—working with a banker whom she had hired to serve the G|Enterprise—created a shell company whose original purpose was to create a U.S. financial institution to serve the G|Enterprise, but whose ultimate purpose was to receive and launder defrauded investors' funds. (*See* Trial Tr. 1999-2001).\n\n## E. Himalaya Exchange\n\nWhen the locus of the G|Enterprise fraud schemes broadened to include the Himalaya Exchange and its purported cryptocurrencies, Wang continued to be instrumental. She hired the Exchange's nominal CEO, Jesse Brown, (*see* Trial Tr. 3638), who testified that Wang later called him \"to push along our development,\" and to convey that \"they\"—that is, the G|Enterprise, as voiced by Wang—\"were getting very frustrated that we weren't delivering on time\" (*id.* 3727). One metric of Wang's contribution to the Himalaya Exchange fraud was her personal allocation of Himalaya Coin: as a document found in her apartment reflected, Wang was allocated nearly 7 million Himalaya Coins at a price of \\$0.10, a value that was later dwarfed by the purported \\$27 per-coin price that the Exchange quoted potential investors after its launch. (*See* GXWA68; Trial Tr. 3679-80 (Exchange CEO's testimony that Himalaya Coin's price \"popped . . . from 10 cents to a dollar . . . and it later went to \\$20 in 14 days\")).\n\n## F. Obstruction of Justice\n\nWang's offense conduct also includes efforts to obstruct justice in further service of the G|Enterprise. (*See* PSR ¶ 5(g) (stipulation to application of obstruction enhancement)). Chats from Wang's devices showed evidence that she suborned perjury in Miles Guo's bankruptcy proceedings. (*See* Dkt. 255 at 11 and Exs. D-G). In Signal chats to Guo's daughter, Mei, Wang coached Mei Guo on how to falsely claim to both her attorneys and later in perjurious testimony that Miles Guo's yacht in fact belonged to her. (*See id.*). And after her arrest and while in custody in this case, Wang used prior counsel to ferry her requests to retrieve bank checks consisting of millions of dollars of G|CLUBS funds—that is, fraud proceeds. (*See id.* at 11).\n\n## **II. Procedural History**\n\n## A. The Charges and Arrest\n\nOn March 15, 2023, Wang was arrested at her Manhattan apartment on Criminal Complaint 23 Mag. 2007 (GWG), charging her with conspiracy to commit wire and securities fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2; securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) & 78ff, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2. On March 29, 2023, Superseding Indictment S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT), was filed, charging Kwok, Je, and Wang in various counts for their alleged participation in the fraud and money laundering conduct described therein. (Dkt. 19.)\n\nThe same day of her arrest, the FBI conducted a judicially authorized search of Wang's apartment. During that search, the FBI recovered bulk U.S. and foreign currency from inside a safe; specifically, more than approximately \\$138,000 in U.S. currency, approximately £3,000, approximately 1180 Hong Kong dollars, and approximately 600 Chinese Yuan. Additional items inside the safe included expired foreign passports for both Wang and Kwok from Vanuatu1 and\n\n1 Vanuatu is a small island nation in the South Pacific. It has been publicly reported that Vanuatu permits foreign nationals to acquire Vanuatu citizenship in exchange for investments in the country. *See* \"Citizenship for sale: fugitives, politicians and disgraced businesspeople buying Vanuatu passports,\" The Guardian, dated July 14, 2021 (available at http). Wang obtained this passport after fleeing China. (*See* Dkt. 22.)\n\nChina. (Dkt. 56, Lehr. Op. 3-4). The FBI recovered approximately 12 cellphones, two computers, and more than 25 USB flash drives from Wang's apartment. The FBI also recovered a variety of Hermes fashion items.\n\nAlso on March 15, 2023, the FBI arrested Miles Guo, and the FBI conducted judicially authorized searches of three of his residences—his Manhattan penthouse apartment, his Greenwich, Connecticut residence, and his Mahwah, New Jersey mansion. During those searches, the FBI recovered, among other things, dozens of electronic devices, more than approximately \\$394,000 in U.S. currency, evidence of Kwok's foreign travel documents, and luxury vehicles that had been purchased with fraud proceeds. On the same day Wang and Kwok were arrested, U.K. law enforcement attempted to arrest William Je in London and executed a judicially authorized search of Je's London residence. Je was not home nor was he in the United Kingdom at the time. Since March 15, 2023, Je has not returned to the United Kingdom and remains a fugitive abroad.\n\nOn January 3, 2024, a second superseding indictment was filed, charging Wang, Guo and Je with, *inter alia*, engaging in a racketeering conspiracy named in that Indictment as the \"Kwok Enterprise\" (*i.e.*, the G|Enterprise).\n\nThe foregoing charges were the product of a years-long investigation by the FBI that included, among other things, subpoenas sent to entities for which Wang \"worked.\" This is to say that Wang was long aware of the U.S. Government's investigation (as well investigatory efforts by the Securities and Exchange Commission) but nonetheless continued to participate in criminal conduct until the FBI arrested her.\n\n## B. The Plea Agreement\n\nOn May 3, 2024, Wang pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to Superseding Information S4 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (the \"Superseding Information\"), which charged her in two counts\n\nwith participating in a wire fraud conspiracy and a money laundering conspiracy, each in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count One of the Superseding Information, to which Wang pleaded, charged her with participating in a fraud scheme to raise money through entities including GTV Media Group, Inc., the Himalaya Farm Alliance, G CLUBS, and the Himalaya Exchange from 2018 through May 2023.\n\nUnder the terms of the plea agreement, Wang agreed to forfeit \\$1.4 billion dollars, which represents proceeds traceable to the offenses. The plea agreement further contains a Guidelines stipulation pursuant to which Wang agreed that, for Guidelines purposes, the applicable loss amount exceeds \\$550,000,000, the defendant purported to act on behalf of a charitable or political organization, the defendant relocated fraud proceeds to another jurisdiction to avoid detection, the offense involved sophisticated means, the defendant was a \"manager or supervisor\" of the criminal activity, and the defendant obstructed justice with respect to the investigation or prosecution of the offenses of conviction.\n\nWang further agreed that the applicable Guidelines offense level is 43, which with a criminal history category of I, equates to a sentencing range of life; however, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a), because the statutory maximum is 120 months, which is less than life, the applicable Guidelines range is 120 months.\n\nOn May 3, 2024, during her plea allocution, Wang stated that in June 2020 she wired \\$100 million dollars raised through the GTV stock offering to a hedge fund. Wang stated that she knew that using the money for that purpose was improper based on representations made to investors. Notably, during Wang's guilty plea proceeding, Wang interacted with the Court without the assistance of a Mandarin language interpreter, and stated affirmatively and repeatedly that she understood her rights as explained by the Court.\n\n## C. Probation's Sentencing Recommendation\n\nThe PSR similarly calculates an applicable offense level of 43 and a criminal history category of I. After reviewing Wang's personal circumstances, interviewing Wang, and considering the offense conduct, the Probation department recommended that Wang be sentenced to 120 months imprisonment. (PSR at 46). Probation noted that the criminal conduct \"resulted in astronomical losses totaling more than \\$1 billion to thousands of victims\" and that Wang \"played a pivotal role\" in that conduct. (*Id.* at 48). The Probation department further assessed that absent her plea agreement, Wang would be facing \"a life sentence under the guidelines due to the extraordinary losses caused by the offense.\" (*Id*.). Probation also was mindful of Wang's personal circumstances, including her claims of suffering \"at the hands of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party].\" (*Id*.). On balance, however, Probation \"do[es] not believe that these personal history and characteristics of the defendant outweigh the need for punishment and deterrence in this case.\" (*Id*.).\n\n## **A GUIDELINES SENTENCE OF 120 MONTHS IS NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE**\n\nA. Applicable Law\n\nWhile advisory following *United States v. Booker*, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Guidelines remain \"the starting point and the initial benchmark\" for sentencing. *Gall v. United States*, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). That is because the Guidelines are \"the product of careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions.\" *Id.* at 46. For that reason, \"in the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable in the particular circumstances.\" *United States v. Fernandez*, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006).\n\nIn imposing a sentence, the Court must consider seven factors outlined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a): (1) \"the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant\"; (2) the four legitimate purposes of sentencing, as set forth below; (3) \"the kinds of sentences available\"; (4) the Guidelines range itself; (5) any relevant policy statement by the Sentencing Commission; (6) \"the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants\"; and (7) \"the need to provide restitution to any victims.\" 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(l)–(7). *See Gall,* 552 U.S. at 50 & n.6.\n\nIn determining the appropriate sentence, the statute directs judges to \"impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes\" of sentencing, which are:\n\n- (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;\n\t- (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;\n\t- (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;\n\t- (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).\n\n# B. The Nature, Circumstances, and Seriousness of the Offenses Warrant a Guidelines Sentence\n\nAs to the offense conduct, as the Court well knows, the G|Enterprise operated an egregious,\n\nescalating fraud that stole over a billion dollars from thousands of victims worldwide. Wang helped manage and run the companies that were created and operated for the express purpose of perpetrating the fraud, and she played a critical role in the laundering of hundreds of millions of dollars in fraud proceeds through a complicated web of hundreds of bank accounts held in the names of dozens of entities. Wang was Guo's trusted associate and an essential member of Guo's inner circle who was involved in the G|Enterprise from its inception.\n\nIt is difficult to capture the scope and magnitude of Wang's offenses. Indeed, there are few fraud crimes as serious as the ones that Wang has committed. Wang was involved in a scheme of astounding scale—playing a managerial role, and serving as a member of the inner-circle of a literal enterprise of fraud. The nature and seriousness of her conduct itself warrants the imposition of a Guidelines sentence.\n\nThe severity of the conduct is best explained by the magnitude of the financial loss incurred, the staggering number of victims harmed, the geographic reach of the offense, the fact that Wang intentionally hurt the democratic movement she claimed to support, the length of Wang's involvement, the sophisticated nature in which these offenses were committed, Wang's leadership in the conspiracy, Wang's obstruction, and her personal financial benefit. Wang, through her submission, fails to address and accept responsibility for the immense magnitude of harm she caused, the thousands of victims who suffered because of her conduct, and the unparalleled breadth of her crimes.\n\n# 1. *Wang's Offenses Caused Thousands of Innocent Victims to Lose More Than \\$1 Billion*\n\nThe level of financial loss Wang helped cause is staggering. It is rare for a fraud case to cause harm exceeding a billion dollars. And when that has occurred, the loss often stems from corporate malfeasance, such as accounting fraud that causes the collapse of a stock price. The astronomical loss here was caused by theft. Guo told lies to take a billion dollars from victims, and Wang helped him every step of the way.\n\nWhile the billion-dollar loss figure is enormous on a macrolevel, it is important to appreciate the harm inflicted on an individual level as well. As victims recounted during Guo's trial, they lost retirement savings, incurred debt, and suffered deeply because of this fraud. Indeed,\n\nthe FBI interviewed dozens upon dozens of victims who recounted the sometimes-excruciating losses they suffered—but many were afraid to speak publicly, for fear of retribution by Guo, Wang, and their remaining supporters. The victims in this case were individuals who saw Guo and Wang's schemes in the way they were marketed—as a grand opportunity to become rich. That, as Wang well knew, was a colossal lie (or, more precisely, a torrent of lies). Wang is responsible for this harm to thousands of individuals and families who suffered because of her actions.\n\nThe seriousness of Wang's offenses also is exemplified by the geographic reach of the scheme. The scheme, and Wang's involvement in it, literally spanned the globe. Victims could be found in nearly every corner of the earth, and throughout the United States. The operations of the fraud were also global in scale, with companies, entities, and bank accounts in an array of jurisdictions including the British Virgin Islands, Australia, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and Kyrgyzstan.\n\n## *2. Wang Harmed the Chinese Pro-Democracy Movement*\n\nBeyond the financial harm she inflicted, Wang was a critical part of something even more malicious. The G|Enterprise targeted a specific group of victims—typically members of the Chinese diaspora who sought to promote democracy in China. Guo, with Wang's help, promoted himself as a \"freedom fighter\" who would eradicate the Chinese Communist Party. But Guo's actions did nothing to promote the ideals he espoused. Rather, and as Wang well understood, Guo drew his victims in by professing to fight on their behalf for these lofty goals of democracy, but all he did was collect, and spend, their money on himself and his family. The disturbing reality is that Guo and Wang did not strengthen a pro-democracy movement—they kneecapped it. Guo, with Wang's remarkable management skills, erected an empire of fraud that sucked money from those who actually desired a democratic China. Far from supporting a fight against the Chinese Communist Party, Guo and Wang extracted their followers' finances, drained the movement's resources, and violated their victims' trust. In so doing, Guo and Wang actually hurt the prodemocracy movement and, therefore, advanced the goals of who they claimed was their biggest threat: the CCP. That is the sinister reality of this fraud.\n\n## *3. Wang's Criminal Acts Occurred over a Period of Years*\n\nWang was involved in the G|Enterprise enterprise from its inception in 2018 through her March 2023 arrest—and for months after that. She participated in, and helped manage, the fluid nature of the G|Enterprise's operations, all of which were designed to evade regulatory and law enforcement detection. Wang's involvement to that degree and for such a prolonged length of time further underscores the seriousness of her offenses. Her involvement was not due to a moment of poor judgement, an innocent mistake, or a bad choice due to momentary financial stress—it was the result of a series of decisions that took place over five years. In her sentencing submission, Wang contends that her involvement was caused, in part, by \"a series of deep personal crises.\" (Def. Mem. at 1). Even if that is true, there can be no excuse for continuing to engage in deliberate criminal acts for *five* years—indeed, even after Wang was arrested and incarcerated in this case. Thus, the length of Wang's involvement is very much an aggregating factor when fashioning an appropriate sentence.\n\n## *4. Wang's Offenses Evolved and Adapted to Evade Law Enforcement*\n\nThe Court should consider not only the length of Wang's involvement and the insidious nature of her crimes themselves, but also the manner in which Wang and her co-conspirators continually adapted and evolved the scheme to keep it alive—and beyond the reach of law enforcement and regulators. After establishing the fraudulent purported dual charities (the Rule of Law Society and the Rule of Law Foundation) in April 2020, the G|Enterprise raised money in connection with the fraudulent offering of GTV stock. Given that this offering was not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, investors were required to meet a series of requirements to ensure they were qualified to participate. Guo, Wang, and others flouted those requirements and pooled victim money from unqualified investors, through vehicles such as Voice of Guo (*i.e.*, VOG, the company that former Phoenix Farm leader Sara Wei ran at Guo's direction, as described during trial). The SEC investigated the offering, put a stop to it, and ultimately entered into an agreement in which the money raised (to the extent it was not unlawfully spent) would be redistributed to investors. Of course, the money the G|Enterprise raised in the GTV Private Placement was not for GTV—it was for Guo and his family. Wang knew this, as she was responsible for moving \\$100 million of investor money to Hayman Capital Management, a hedge fund, which money was invested in a high-risk investment in the name of Guo's son. Like she often did, Wang handled the logistics of that investment and was responsible for first conducting a transfer of that \\$100 million to conceal its true source. There can be no doubt that, at the time, Wang was well aware of the wrongness of her actions; indeed, she confessed as much during her allocution.2\n\nBut Wang's involvement did not end in 2020. Indeed, after the GTV component of the conspiracy lost \\$30 million of victim funds, and after it drew regulatory attention, the conspiracy adapted. This time, it used \"Farm Loans\"—as opposed to direct sales of stock—to sell shares in GTV. That money was routed through a complex web of sophisticated monetary transactions before being funneled back to the Guo family. Then the G|Enterprise changed tactics again. This\n\n2 Wang Plea Tr. at 25-26 (\"In about June 2020, I was directed by others to wire approximately 100 million U.S. dollars from a bank account in New York to Hayman Capital Management, a hedge fund in Texas. I knew these funds had been received from investors in the GTV offering. . . . I knew what I was doing was wrong.\")\n\ntime it sold GTV (and other Guo-linked entities') shares through the guise of memberships in G|CLUBS. But G|CLUBS money was not used to fund a media company, or even to fund any real member benefits. Rather, G|CLUBS money was used to purchase luxury assets, fancy sports cars, and a literal mansion for the Guo family. Wang was deeply involved in G|CLUBS and acted as its *de facto* CEO. She directed million-dollar money transfers, million-dollar luxury purchases, and all the time knew this membership club was no more than a smoke screen to conceal the same fraud tricks as the GTV private placement and the Farm Loan Program—an offering of GTV stock. But when G|CLUBS and the G|Enterprise ran into banking difficulties, the G|Enterprise engineered yet another solution: a fake cryptocurrency called H-Coin and H-Dollar. In service of those phony cryptocurrencies, Wang helped set up the Himalaya Exchange, which operated both as a fraud scheme and a money laundering operation to draw victim money into \"cryptocurrency\" that Guo and the G|Enterprise fully controlled.\n\nIn September and October 2022, after the U.S. Government seized \\$630 million from the G|Enterprise, including hundreds of millions from accounts linked to the Himalaya Exchange, the conspiracy adapted yet *again*; this time, with the launch of \"A10\" and \"A15,\" schemes that collected money by claiming to sell stock in Gettr, G|CLUBS, and other Guo-linked entities. Except this money, this time, was to be sent to the Middle East to place it beyond the reach of the U.S. Government. Wang played a key role in transitioning the G|Enterprise's operations to the United Arab Emirates, including by designating which New York G|CLUBS and other G|Enterprise \"employees\" should travel to Abu Dhabi to help establish operations of a Middle East-based G|CLUBS and the Himalaya Exchange.\n\nIn March 2023, Wang was arrested, but her involvement in the G|Enterprise continued. She attempted to engineer, through her then-attorneys, to have a G|CLUBS employee collected approximately \\$7 million of G|CLUBS proceeds from a P.O. Box in midtown Manhattan. The sophisticated tactics that Wang and her co-conspirators employed over the course of this five-year racketeering conspiracy highlight the severity of Wang's criminal acts. All of which are collectively worthy of a Guidelines sentence.\n\n## *5. Wang Was a Leader of the G|Enterprise and Obstructed Justice*\n\nWang—as she has stipulated—played a managerial role in this sweeping conspiracy. She was not a foot solider or a messenger. Wang was instrumental in organizing the scheme, hiring its personnel, making financial decisions, and directing some of its attorneys and financial experts. Of course, Wang was a subordinate to Miles Guo, but aside from Guo, Wang often had absolute authority. Take, for example, G|CLUBS. Wang directed the figurehead CEO Limarie Reyes on a near-daily basis. Reyes took direction from Wang or from others reporting to Wang. Indeed, it was Wang who informed G|CLUBS that it needed to offer \"multiple\" memberships (a way to increase the amount of money it could collect from each member-victim). It was Wang who hired those in the G|Enterprise's New York City offices, and controlled entities such as HCHK to carry out the fraud. It was Wang who kept meticulous notes on the directions she gave others, serving as the organizer and manager of dozens of participants. Indeed, returns from the search warrant executed on Wang's apartment include dozens of daily planners from each year of the conspiracy containing extensive notes covering all corners of the G|Enterprise.\n\nWang's obstruction also deserves reflection. Not only did Wang help lead the conspiracy's evolution to avoid intervention of law enforcement, she personally took steps to obstruct. To start, and as documented by a series of text and voice messages, Wang directed Guo's daughter to lie in a deposition to Guo's Bankruptcy trustee. This was part of an effort to conceal G|Enterprise assets from the Bankruptcy trustee, and it demonstrates a contempt on Wang's part for the American\n\njudicial system and due process. Moreover, after she was arrested in this case, Wang attempted to obtain millions of G|CLUBS member fees (*i.e.*, victim proceeds) by asking her then-attorneys to ask G|CLUBS \"employees\" to arrange to pick up a check from a P.O. box. Despite stipulating to the obstruction enhancement, Wang's sentencing submission contends that these conversations which are recorded—are \"confused.\" They are not. G|CLUBS employees whom Wang directed (both prior and after her arrest) were clear in the recorded conversations that *Wang* had asked her attorneys to contact them to retrieve the checks. Wang's sentencing submission tries to excuse this criminal conduct, arguing that \"Wang was not charged with any substantive crime relating to G Clubs\" at that time, which is both a surprising statement and belied by the clear facts. (Def. Mem. at 11.) At the time, G|CLUBS was described as part of the conspiracy in Indictment S1, in which Wang was a charged defendant. More to the point, Wang knew by the time of her arrest (and long before it) that G|CLUBS was not providing members with stock, nor was it providing any tangible member benefits. Indeed, Wang was the *de facto* CEO of G|CLUBS. That she sought to obtain G|CLUBS funds, after her arrest, constitutes obstruction of justice and establishes that she continued to try to convert victim money to the benefit of the G|Enterprise even after she was arrested. Wang's obstructive conduct underscores her lack of remorse and complete disregard for the law and for the victims she harmed.\n\n## *6. Wang Personally Controlled Millions That She Stole from Victims*\n\nWang argues that she did not significantly financially benefit from the offense, and a lower sentence is therefore warranted. (Def. Mem. at 12-14). Wang is factually incorrect. First, a document recovered from Wang's apartment during the investigation reflects that 6,999,800 Himalaya Coins (HCN) were allocated to Wang at the initial coin offering price of \\$.10 per HCN. (Dkt. 42.) A separate document recovered from Wang's apartment, which was entitled \"Himalaya\n\nCoin Distribution Table at launch on 1 November 2021,\" reflects the distribution of certain of the \"HCN (in US dollar terms),\" including \\$700,000 to Wang. (*Id.*). Wang was set to receive this cash, and most likely cash out the HCN allocated to her for millions more. It is true, as the defense now argues, that HCN is a worthless crypto but the fraud scheme was designed to lure victims into sending money to purchase HCN. Once real dollars entered Himalaya Exchange accounts, those that the conspiracy wanted to benefit—*i.e.* Wang, Guo and Je—could them \"redeem\" their allocated HCN and obtain victim-provided fiat currency. Indeed, Guo did as much when he obtained a \\$37 million dollar loan to avoid criminal contempt in New York State Court, and Je attempted to do as much when the Government seized Himalaya Exchange bank accounts. Wang would have certainly followed that path, and personally collected millions from victims if not for the intervention of U.S. law enforcement. Thus, Wang stood to collect several million dollars of victim money for her work in the G|Enterprise.\n\nIn addition, at least approximately \\$34 million in victim funds were maintained in bank accounts held in the name of entities under *Wang's* management or control. Wang also had approximately \\$138,000 in U.S. currency and additional foreign currency secured in a safe in her apartment at the time of her arrest—a fact she concealed from Pretrial Services. (Dkt. 42).\n\nWang contends that her annual salary of approximately \\$231,900 to \\$313,961 was the only benefit she received from her participation in the fraud scheme, and that she validly earned that salary \"for a job she actually performed.\" (Def. Mem. at 14). This argument is entirely misguided, because the sole purpose of her \"job\" for the various G|Enterprise entities—companies that are all members of a racketeering enterprise—was to raise, launder, and misappropriate hundreds of millions of dollars in fraud scheme proceeds. Wang cannot credibly argue that she did not\n\nmaterially benefit from the fraud because she \"only\" took home a salary of a quarter of a million dollars for her years-long criminal activity. The Court should dismiss that argument out of hand.\n\n# C. A Guidelines Sentence Is Necessary to Serve the Goals of Specific Deterrence and to Protect the Public\n\nUnder Section 3553(a), the need for the sentence to \"protect the public from further crimes of the defendant\" and \"afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct\" must be considered. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C). Here, a Guidelines sentence of 120 months is necessary to serve these purposes.\n\nThe risk of recidivism here is substantial. First, as the defense concedes, the personal circumstances that Wang cites as the reasons she engaged in the offense conduct in the first place and then continued to commit crimes—the CCP's targeting of Wang, her forced separation from her family, her personal trauma, and her lack of permanent status in the U.S. and lack of social connections here—will be unchanged after she serves her term of imprisonment, or even exacerbated. (*See generally* Def. Mem. at 1-10, 17). The Government can derive no comfort that Wang will not return to fraud when she is released from prison.\n\nSecond, Wang's extensive and long-running participation in the G|Enterprise fraud scheme demonstrates that she is undeterred from committing crimes. Indeed, neither the immense pain she caused to thousands of victims, nor the possibility of prison deterred her from committing crimes. As Wang's allocution makes plain, she understood she was in a criminal conspiracy as early as June 2020. *She still maintained her commitment to the criminal enterprise for the next five years.* And in or around the spring of 2020, as executive director of GTV, Wang also knew the SEC was investigating the stock offering and ultimately disgorged the proceeds GTV raised. The intervention of civil regulatory authorities did not cause Wang to seek lawful work elsewhere. Indeed, and critically, Wang continued to perpetrate the fraud and steal money from victims for at\n\nleast more than a year *after* she became aware of the Government's *criminal* investigation. Wang personally received the Government's subpoenas to G|CLUBS and other G|Enterprise entities; she sent text messages referencing several of the undersigned prosecutors in this case; she directed an employee not to assist in the Government's investigation; and she did so all while continuing to operate the G|Enterprise entities that took in victim funds, launder fraud proceeds, and assist in the misappropriation of those funds.\n\nThird, and perhaps most troubling, even after she was arrested and incarcerated in this case, she still engaged in obstructive conduct and took active steps to frustrate the Government's investigation and shield fraud proceeds from the Government. (*See* Dkt. 255 at 11; Def. Mem. at 11 n.5). Wang's effort to explain away this defiant behavior and blatant disrespect for the law is entirely unavailing. Regardless of whether the checks were from closed bank accounts or directly from individual victim-investors, the *source* of the \\$7 million in was the G|CLUBS fraud scheme that Wang operated. And Wang's minimization of her obstructive conduct as a purportedly innocent attempt to \"take steps to assist certain entities in continuing to carry out their obligations to remaining employees and others\" entirely ignores that the express purpose of those entities and their operations was to continue the fraud scheme. As the *de facto* CEO Wang plainly understood that. The Court should approach Wang's excuse for her conduct with skepticism and recognize her actions for exactly what they were: a disrespect for the law and an indication that Wang has not been deterred.\n\nAlso, the fact that a past fraud does not necessarily deter a future one is evidenced by the number of first-time fraudsters in this district who have become recidivists. *See, e.g., United States v. Jonathan Ghertler*, No. 23 Cr. 100 (ER) (investment fraud scheme following over a dozen prior convictions); *United States v. Franklin Ray*, No. 22 Cr. 228 (AT) (orchestrating a Ponzi scheme after having served a prior two-year sentence for bank and wire fraud); *United States v. Vitaly Borker*, No. 22 Cr. 273 (JSR) (defendant convicted of wire fraud for operation of fraudulent eyeglasses website after two prior federal convictions for the same conduct); *United States v. Joseph Meli*, No. 19 Cr. 480 (RA) (defendant convicted of participating in a Broadway ticket resale investment fraud scheme after previously serving a 78 month sentence for the same scheme); *United States v. Edward Durante*, No. 15 Cr. 171 (ALC) (beginning a new investment fraud scheme while serving a 121 month sentence for fraud); *United States v. John Galanis*, No. 15 Cr. 643 (PKC) (defendant convicted of securities fraud after 1973 and 1988 convictions for mail fraud and securities fraud).\n\nThat Wang was unwilling to stop her criminal conduct despite her years-long involvement in it, as well as knowledge of civil and criminal investigations, raises another important consideration for the Court: protection of the public. While some of Guo's supporters have realized the criminal scheme for what it is, others continue to move forward and, in some cases, raise money in similar ways. If not incapacitated, Wang is likely to return to that work and continue to commit crimes upon her release. Indeed, letters submitted by Wang in support of a sentencing variance come from individuals who were, and likely still are, close to Guo and remain devoted followers. Given Wang's willingness to continue criminal conduct unabated for years, a significant sentence is necessary to protect the public and the vulnerable victim population that Wang targeted and exploited from future harm.\n\n## D. A Guidelines Sentence Serves the Interests of General Deterrence\n\nA Guidelines Sentence is also necessary in this case to afford adequate general deterrence to criminal conduct. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). \"Considerations of (general) deterrence argue for punishing more heavily those offenses that either are lucrative or are difficult to detect and\n\npunish, since both attributes go to increase the expedited benefits of a crime and hence the punishment required to deter it.\" *United States v. Heffernan*, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994); *see also United States v. Martin*, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (\"Because economic and fraud-based crimes are more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, these crimes are prime candidates for general deterrence.\" (quotation marks and citation omitted)); *United States v. Mueffelman*, 470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (deterrence of white-collar crime is \"of central concern to Congress\").\n\nGeneral deterrence is critically important in this case given the magnitude of the fraud and in order to send an appropriate message to those who obstruct regulatory authorities and the judicial process. Hiding behind corporate forms, shell entities, and foreign accounts, and concealing criminal conduct demand a sentence that signals clearly that those who take steps to violate the laws, hide their crimes, and hurt others over a period of years will face significant and serious penalties. A sentence for Wang that is below the Guidelines would not sufficiently discourage others similarly situated committing similar crimes.\n\nThe need for general deterrence is heightened here where, to this day, individuals are still acting in Guo's name and raising money purportedly to fight the CCP. The Court must send a message to Guo's supporters and associates that continuing these types of crimes will result in significant consequences. Those who contemplate doing what Wang has done—promoting this grand criminal conspiracy under the guise of democratic activism—should understand that doing so will come with serious penalties. A Guidelines sentence of 120-months' imprisonment is necessary to serve that purpose.\n\n## E. The Defendant's History and Characterizes Do Not Warrant a Variance\n\nThe extensive scale of the G|Enterprise, and Wang's critical role in that scheme, warrant a 120-month sentence. The defense's request for a substantial downward variance that is less than half of the recommendation of the Probation Department, the Government, and the Guidelines is inadequate and will not satisfy the important purposes of sentencing. That is especially true here, where the Guidelines range without a statutory cap would have been life imprisonment.\n\nThe Probation Department carefully assessed both the mitigating and aggravating circumstances that are present. Wang has no criminal history, and she reportedly had legitimate employment before her participation in the offense conduct (although the Government notes that her prior employment was for Guo). Her apparent personal profit for her participation in the G|Enterprise appears to be largely comprised of a substantial annual income, along with the grant of approximately 7 million worth of in Himalaya Exchange credits—which, as proved at Guo's trial, were not legitimate cryptocurrency holdings, but which represented victim-investor funds that Wang could have cashed out in the form of fiat, as her co-defendant William Je attempted to do in his exit scheme. She was also a target of the CCP online harassment. That said, Wang perpetrated the subject offense over a period of years. She played a pivotal role in the offense and worked tirelessly, day in and day out, to carry out the criminal conduct. The G|Enterprise preyed on vulnerable victims throughout the world; victims who are unlikely to be made whole for the substantial financial hardships they suffered.\n\nSimply put, a 120-month sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to account for the offense conduct, afford adequate deterrence, and promote respect for the law and provide just punishment for the offense. Wang's role in the scheme was critical and deliberate, and calls\n\nfor such a term of imprisonment. The defendant's arguments for a substantial variance are unavailing.\n\n## *1. The Actions of the CCP Are Not a Mitigating Factor*\n\nThe defendant's sentencing submission spends several pages recounting CCP targeting aimed at Wang. (Def. Mem. 7-10.) However, any actions by the CCP toward Wang underscore the malicious nature of *Wang's offenses* and are not sufficiently mitigating to warrant a variance.\n\nTo start, even if the Court were to credit all of Wang's accusations about CCP targeting, they do not excuse a five-year course of criminal conduct aimed at victimizing third parties. There is no legal defense—let alone a moral one—that permits Wang (or anyone else) to harm innocent victims, merely because someone else has harmed Wang. Accepting Wang's contentions otherwise would sanction a bizarre vigilante system of justice that would enable a victim of one crime to harm others—even others who have no connection to the former crime. During the Guo trial, Guo's own purported FoxHunt expert recognized the absurdity of the mitigation argument Wang now makes. (Trial Tr. at 5190 (\"Q: [FoxHunt] has nothing to do with the business opportunities that Miles Guo promoted, correct? A. Correct.\").)\n\nNext, if Wang's targeting at the hands of the CCP were as pernicious as her submission suggests, her response to that targeting is puzzling. After being targeted, Wang responded by playing an instrumental and essential role in a global criminal organization that stole money from thousands of democratic activists who wanted to displace the CCP. That is, in response to CCP targeting, *Wang hurt the CCP's enemies* all the while claiming she was supporting a movement to dismantle the CCP. Properly understood, Wang—and Miles Guo alongside her—did far more to help the CCP than to combat it.\n\nWang also reports a disturbing stalking situation.3 But even accepting Wang's description as true, a disturbing and upsetting situation does not justify inflicting significant pain and harm on others, as Wang did in this case. Wang, moreover, inflicted largely similar harm in G|Enterprise's targeting, stalking, and protesting against the Bankruptcy trustee and his family—the G|Enterprise even went as far as to protest outside a public elementary school where the Bankruptcy trustee's daughter worked. That Wang supported the G|Enterprise's targeting of others, despite her own reportedly harmful stalking experience, raises two possibilities: either the actions of Wang's alleged stalker never truly impacted Wang in the way she claims, or Wang plainly understood that she was deeply hurting, smearing, and emotionally injuring many individuals when she helped the G|Enterprise target its critics.4\n\nIn addition, in response to the stalker, Wang sought the help of law enforcement. She contacted the police and obtained, through the judicial process, a court order of protection. This demonstrates that, first, Wang was capable of rational action and could have withdrawn from the\n\n3 To be clear, there is no evidence (and Wang cites none) that this stalker's conduct is related to the CCP's targeting of Wang.\n\n4 Dr. Askinsulure's report thus presents, at best, an incomplete picture of Wang that is based on a curated set of slanted facts. It does not, for example, consider the any of Wang's conduct, including materials that were readily available to the defense, such as: Wang's emails about offense conduct, text messages directing others, or even the Indictment. Rather, Dr. Askinsulure's opinion is based on a document written by Wang, unspecified social media posts, an article about the MDC, and temporary restraining orders. These materials are not appropriately characterized as a \" ,\" as Dr. Askinsulure claims. (Def. Ex. A at 2). Indeed, Dr. Askinsulure has ignored five years of Wang's personal history and conduct toward others. Further, Dr. Askinsulure's assessment that Wang has is entirely belied by evidence uncovered by the Government, dozens of witness interviews the Government conducted, and the Court's own observations of Wang. If anything, Wang has above-average intellect, superior managerial and organizational skills, and a remarkable ability to manipulate others. Wang managed the work of a global organization with dozens, if not hundreds, of employees. She tracked hundreds of millions of dollars, kept straight the assignments of her underlings, and was an essential leader in this massive fraud enterprise. Dr. Askinsulure's report should be afforded little weight.\n\nconspiracy and left Guo and the G|Enterprise. Second, it demonstrates that Wang well understood the importance of the judicial system, which she nonetheless abused and obstructed when it suited her criminal ends.\n\n## *2. A Guidelines Sentence Would Not Create Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities*\n\nWang cites the sentences of several defendants who she claims are similarly situated, in an effort to persuade the Court to significantly vary downward from the Guidelines. Contrary to Wang's assertions, those defendants are not similarly situated, and a 120-month sentence would not be inconsistent with those cases.\n\nIrina Dilkinska, cited by Wang, was head of legal for OneCoin, a company that marketed and sold a fraudulent cryptocurrency and raised approximately \\$4 billion through its multi-level marketing scheme. *See United States v. Dilkinska*, 17 Cr. 630 (ER) (S.D.N.Y). (*See* Def. Mem. at 16-18). Judge Ramos sentenced Dilkinska to 48 months' imprisonment. While it is true that Dilkinska was a licensed attorney who violated her ethical obligations through her crimes, there are substantial—and relevant—differences between Dilkinska and Wang. First, Dilkinska was only approximately 32 years old, and relatively inexperienced, when she began her participation in the OneCoin fraud. By contrast, Wang was approximately 40 years old, and both highly educated and business-savvy when she began her participation with the G|Enterprise. Second, while OneCoin was another billion-dollar fraud, Dilkinska's conduct in the OneCoin scheme was substantially less active than Wang's conduct in the G|Enterprise. Wang cites the Government's allegations that Dilkinska \"creat[ed] and manag[ed] shell companies\" in an effort to equate Dilkinska to Wang. (Def. Mem. at 17.) Dilkinska's role, however, was to work entirely at the direction of OneCoin founder Ruja Ignatova and others, and the shell companies that she \"managed\" were mere corporate vehicles for fund movements. Wang, by stark contrast, was the\n\n*de facto* chief-of-staff for G|Enterprise companies like G|CLUBS, G|Fashion, and the Himalaya Exchange—companies that were intentionally and painstakingly constructed and operated to appear to offer legitimate goods and services. Wang worked tirelessly to further and expand the operations of the G|Enterprise. The daily planners recovered from her apartment reflect meetings relating to all aspects of the fraud scheme, and her communications with employees of the various G|Enterprise entities—which are corroborated by witness testimony—indisputably establish that Wang was the day-to-day boss. She was calling the shots. Guo was the mastermind of the fraud, but Wang was the conductor, and it was through her substantial efforts to defraud victims that the G|Enterprise was able to raise more than \\$1 billion. Moreover, despite her control over every aspect of the operations of the various entities, Wang very deliberately removed herself from titled positions, and bank accounts, and formally disclaimed her involvement with the G|Enterprise entities. These deliberate efforts to conceal her involvement and to insulate herself from potential criminal liability should be heavily weighed as aggravating factors, and they certainly distinguish her from Dilkinska.\n\nOther cases Wang cites are similarly distinguishable. Most notably, aside from Elizabeth Holmes, the conduct of defendants cited by the defense was not as unilaterally critical to their respective schemes as Wang's was to the G|Enterprise. Joanne Crupi played a role in the Madoff scheme as an investment adviser, including moving client funds, transferring funds among accounts, and submitting false information to banks. *United States v. Crupi*, No. 10 Cr. 228 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y.). (Def. Mem. at 18). Yet Crupi was one of many engaging in similar conduct to successfully operate the Madoff scheme, while Wang was the sole chief-of-staff, and the essential manager of the G|Enterprise fraud. Wang emphasizes that Crupi went to trial, apparently as an aggravating factor that reflects a lack of acceptance of responsibility by Crupi. Indeed, in discussing the Crupi case, Wang suggests that Crupi is more culpable because, \"unlike Ms. Wang she did not undertake her actions while being targeted by a foreign government.\" (Def. Mem. at 19). Wang's attempt to justify her criminal conduct and her essential role in operating the G|Enterprise fraud scheme and defrauding thousands of victims—and thus to deny complete responsibility for her actions—is familiar to this Court from the trial against Miles Guo, where Guo advanced that defense. As with Guo, it is of no moment to Wang's culpability for her offense conduct that she was targeted by the CCP. That fact certainly does not make her less culpable than Crupi and should not be any basis for a downward departure. And Michelle Morton was involved in a fraud valued at tens of millions of dollars, not over a billion dollars. *See United States v. Morton*, No. 16 Cr. 371 (RA) (S.D.N.Y.). (Def. Mem. at 19). Simply put, there are distinguishing factors between Wang's aggravated conduct and the conduct of the defendants she cites in arguing for a sentence of less than 48 months, and a Guidelines sentence of 120 months would not create any unwarranted disparities particularly given the many aggravating factors described above.\n\n## *3. Any Immigration Consequences Are of Wang's Own Making*\n\nWang immigrated to the United States claiming she was being subjected to persecution at the hands of the CCP. As an educated, intelligent, immigrant with fluency in English, the United States presented her an opportunity to live a law-abiding peaceful life free from any claimed CCP threats. She chose a different path and decided to abuse the opportunities provided to her in this country. Wang spurned the promise the United States offered and used it, with Miles Guo, as the base of operations for a global criminal enterprise. While in the United States as an asylee she targeted U.S. citizens and stole from them, she abused and thwarted the judicial system here. She did these things for five years and any time could have left and tried to make amends and live a law-abiding life. She did not. Now, as a convicted felon, she unsurprisingly, may be subject to immigration consequences—but those consequences are a result of the choices Wang made over a period of years.5 If anything, Wang's immigration status should have incentivized her to act within the bounds of the law while in the United States. She knowingly chose a different path.\n\nWang also complains that as a result of her citizenship-status she is ineligible for designation to a minimum-security prison camp. At this time, the Government understands that the Bureau of Prisons does not strictly forbid the designation of a non-citizen to a minimum security prison camp, and the Court may make such a recommendation. That said, the Bureau of Prisons does not ordinarily designate noncitizens to such facilities, and any designation decision, were the defendant to be sentenced to a term of incarceration, would be left to the discretion of the Bureau of Prisons. Regardless of the designation made by BOP, in view of all the factors, the seriousness of Wang's conduct outweighs any mitigation that may be warranted to the extent that Wang is ineligible for a prison camp as opposed to a minimum-security facility.\n\n5 In contrast to the defendant's assertions now, when Wang sought pretrial release, she argued to this Court that, even if she were convicted, she would not be deported to China and thus had no motive to flee the United States. (Dkt. 81 at 20 n. 14 (\"Even if she were convicted, she would likely not be deported after serving her sentence because of the U.S.'s participation in the Convention Against Torture\").)\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\nWang's multiyear commitment to criminal conduct, the astounding level of harm she caused others, her repeated obstruction of justice, and her important leadership role in a complex, pernicious, and grand enterprise of criminal activity demand a serious sanction. The Government respectfully requests that for the reasons described herein, the Court impose a Guidelines sentence of 120 months imprisonment.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n DAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney\n\nBy:\n\nBy: */s/*\n\n Micah F. Fergenson Ryan B. Finkel Justin R. Horton Juliana N. Murray Assistant United States Attorneys 212-637-2190/-6612 /-2314","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n诉\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），又名“Yvette”，\n\n被告。\n\n美利坚合众国量刑备忘录\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS\n美国纽约南区联邦检察官\nOne St. Andrew's Plaza\nNew York, New York 10007\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\nRyan B. Finkel\nJustin R. Horton\nJuliana N. Murray\n助理联邦检察官\n特聘法律顾问\n\n目录\n背景 1\nI. 犯罪行为 1\nII. 诉讼程序历程 7\nA. 指控与逮捕 7\nB. 认罪协议 8\nC. 缓刑监督部门的量刑建议 10\n判处 120 个月的《量刑指南》刑期是必要且适当的 10\nA. 适用法律 10\nB. 罪行的性质、情节和严重性应判处《量刑指南》刑期 11\n1. 王的罪行导致数千名无辜受害者损失超过 10 亿美元 11\n2. 王损害了中国民运 13\n3. 王的犯罪行为持续了数年 14\n4. 王的罪行不断演变和适应以规避执法 14\n5. 王是 G 系企业的领导者并妨害司法 17\n6. 王亲自控制了其从受害者处窃取的数百万美元 18\nC. 判处《量刑指南》刑期是实现特别威慑和保护公众目标所必需的 20\nD. 判处《量刑指南》刑期符合一般威慑的利益 22\nE. 被告的历史和特征不足以支持偏离量刑指南 24\n1. 中国共产党的行为不是减轻处罚的情节 25\n2. 判处《量刑指南》刑期不会造成不合理的量刑差异 27\n3. 任何移民后果均由王咎由自取 29\n结论 31\n\n初步陈述\n\n被告 Yanping \"Yvette\" Wang（王雁平，又名“Yvette”）在实施一起涉案金额达十亿美元的欺诈阴谋中发挥了关键作用，该阴谋伤害了数千人、妨害司法、抗拒监管执法、持续数年之久，并损害了王声称毕生奉献的所谓民运。王似乎不愿对此承担全部责任，但事实是，她的行为掠夺了数千名关心中国民主事业人士的资金——并利用这些资金中饱 Miles Guo（郭文贵）以及她自己的私囊。与王的量刑意见书相反，王确实从其犯罪中获得了巨大利益，这些犯罪既非一时的判断失误，亦非生活挑战所致。在至少五年的时间里，王走的每一步都非常清楚自己并非在与中国共产党（“CCP”）作斗争——而是在给数千人造成深重的痛苦。甚至在被提起刑事起诉和逮捕之后，王仍妨害司法，这充分体现了她对法律和受害者的彻底漠视。这种严重的行为至少应当判处《量刑指南》规定的刑期。辩方所寻求的实质性偏离量刑指南忽视了王施加给受害者的伤害，不足以威慑其未来的犯罪行为，向其他企图采取类似行动的人传递了不当信息，并且未能保护公众免受该被告未来可能造成的伤害。基于这些理由以及下文所述的理由，本法院应当判处 120 个月监禁。\n\n背景\nI. 犯罪行为\n\n在这一蔓延广泛、恶意累累的共谋犯罪中，Yvette Wang（王雁平）是 Miles Guo（郭文贵）的得力助手。至少五年来，郭文贵领导——王雁平以管理权限运作——一个庞大的全球性敲诈勒索共谋集团，利用郭作为民主活动家亿万富翁的形象，从世界各地忠实、信任的支持者手中窃取了超过 10 亿美元。（2024 年 8 月 8 日《判决前调查报告》（ECF 编号：461）（“PSR”）第 10、12 段）。虽然郭处于该犯罪企业（“G 企业”）的顶层，但王保持着重要的领导地位。在此身份下，王从事了关键且必不可少的工作，确保 G 企业的齿轮运转；确保其数十个“复杂且基本上属于欺诈和虚构的企业及投资机会”顺利运行；并确保其银行账户保持开放且充斥着欺诈收益。（PSR 第 10-13 段）。正如郭的律师在其审判开庭首日向陪审团所说的那样，王是他的“运营主管”，“负责郭名下各项所谓业务的日常运营”。（审判记录 42）。王的正式头衔凸显了、但也低估了她在 G 企业中角色的广泛性与核心地位。她“在郭的家族在美公司以及作为欺诈工具的各个实体中担任‘幕僚长’”。（PSR 第 18 段）。但在其他情况下，她“对……[G] 企业内的其他实体行使控制权，即使她在其中没有任何正式职位或头衔”。（同上）。事实上，管理庞大 G 企业的犯罪事务是王的全职工作，为此她领取由欺诈收益支付的薪水，并获得了价值数百万美元的由“受害者资金资助”的所谓加密货币配额（PSR 第 14 段）——若非联邦调查局（FBI）的介入和对她的逮捕，她注定会收取这数百万美元。\n\n王的认罪答辩陈词主要集中在其犯罪行为的一个组成部分上：王与 GTV 私募相关的行为：具体而言，即 2020 年 6 月为 Miles Guo（郭文贵）儿子的利益，将 1 亿美元受害者资金挪用并洗钱至高风险对冲基金投资中（“对冲基金挪用案”）。（PSR 第 1-5、73 段）。但王的行为范围远远超出了对冲基金挪用案的阴谋。她在 G 企业中的关键角色早在对冲基金挪用案发生前就已经开始。事实上，\n\n王在 G 企业的各项阴谋中均发挥了重要作用：法治慈善机构、GTV 私募、农场贷款项目、G|CLUBS 以及喜马拉雅交易所。\n\nA. 法治慈善机构\n\n在 2020 年 6 月之前的几年里，王的运营职责扩展到了支持 Miles Guo（郭文贵）利用其虚假的“法治”慈善机构，这些机构被用来欺骗捐赠者并挪用其资金。正如郭的前亲信助理 Karin Maistrello 作证所言，王指挥了一项将资金从郭的各个商业账户转移到法治机构账户的计划，以制造向法治机构提供更多且更大额捐款的假象。（见审判记录 473-74）。后来，王指示 Maistrello 给 New York City Police Department（纽约市警察局，“NYPD”）写了一封信，通过该信，郭本人将凭借利用法治捐赠者资金向 NYPD 进行的捐赠而获得功劳。（见同上，481）。王行使其领导权，并通过告诉该助理她“拿薪水是为了执行命令而不是为了思考”来平息其异议。（同上）。\n\nB. GTV 私募\n\n王在 2020 年 6 月处于 GTV 私募阴谋和对冲基金挪用案核心的不当行为，反映了她向 G 企业更广泛提供的关键服务。2018 年 7 月——即 2020 年 6 月对冲基金挪用案发生前近两年——王为 Saraca 公司开设并作为两个银行账户的签字人（PSR 第 47-49 段），该公司是郭氏企业实体，最终由 Miles Guo（郭文贵）的儿子 Mileson Guo 拥有（同上，第 47-49 段）。2020 年 4 月和 5 月，这些以王为唯一授权签字人的账户收到了被骗受害者用于所谓 GTV 投资的 3 亿多美元。（同上，第 48-41 段）。此前于 2020 年 4 月刚刚发布的欺诈性 GTV 股票发售《私募备忘录》（“PPM”）——向投资者指明王为 GTV 的执行董事。（同上，\n\n第 25 段）。2020 年 6 月 3 日——就在王控制下的 Saraca 账户收到超过 3 亿美元的受害者资金之后——王签署了认购协议，根据该协议，这些受害者资金中的 1 亿美元将被投资于一家高风险对冲基金（同上，第 52 段），以使 Saraca 的唯一实益所有人、郭文贵的儿子受益。同一天，王亲自使用其网上银行账户，将同一笔 1 亿美元从一个 Saraca 银行账户（该账户接收该资金的所谓目的是用于投资 GTV）转移到另一个 Saraca 银行账户（在该笔转账之前，该账户余额为 0 美元）。（同上，第 53 段）。两天后，王将受害者的 1 亿美元投资资金转至该对冲基金。（同上，第 54 段）。正如王在答辩陈词中所述，她“知道这些资金来自 GTV 发售中的投资者”，并且“根据我对向 GTV 投资者所作陈述的了解，我担心这种资金使用是不恰当的”，但她“还是进行了电汇”。（同上，第 73 段）。事实上，王不仅知道 GTV 的 PPM 向投资者承诺其资金将专门用于“发展和壮大该业务”（同上，第 26-27 段），而且在 2020 年 7 月将 GTV 私募收益转入一套新银行账户时，她就 GTV 投资者资金的相同受限用途亲自作出了陈述。（见同上，第 59-61 段（王向一家银行陈述称，“账户中的资金是 GTV Media Group 的资金，严格用于运营目的和收购”})）。王自己在 GTV 投资者资金受限用途上所作的虚假陈述，发生在她于 2020 年 6 月和 7 月试图将 GTV 私募收益转入其他账户以避免银行账户被关闭，并促成未来的犯罪转账的过程中，其中包括她促成电汇至其个人银行账户作为所谓“董事费”的近 31,000 美元。（同上，第 55-61 段）。\n\nC. 农场贷款项目\n\n随着 G 企业的欺诈阴谋继续进行，王继续在其中心发挥关键的运营作用。在“持有用于处理通过 GTV 私募筹集资金的账户的国内银行开始冻结并关闭 GTV 关联银行账户”之后（PSR 第 31 段），郭在王的运营支持下推广了一项计划，通过该计划，“寻求投资（或再投资）GTV 的个人可以参与农场贷款项目”（同上）。“数千名受害者通过向农场（而非 GTV）控制的银行账户汇款，向农场‘出借’了资金。”（同上，第 32 段）。当“郭和余挪用通过农场贷款项目筹集的资金”时（同上，第 33 段），得到了王的运营和执行支持。“Mulan”——郭的前支持者兼农场领导人——在王的指示下将数百万美元的支持者资金输送到了郭控制下的阿布扎比银行账户。（见审判记录 1389（“问：你是直接与郭协调的吗？答：不是，是通过 Yvette Wang。问：那你为什么要就此与 Yvette Wang 协调？答：郭文贵说 Yvette Wang 会告诉我怎么做。”））。\n\nD. G|CLUBS\n\n大约在同一时间，“GUO（郭）、JE（余）和 WANG（王）”开始“利用 G CLUBS”——即“所谓的在线会员俱乐部”——“作为继续进行欺诈性股票发行的机制”。(PSR ¶ 34-37)。王的作用再次至关重要。她聘用并监督了 G|CLUBS 的傀儡首席执行官 Limarie Reyes。(Trial Tr. 2976, 2983)。事实上，在她的领导职位上，王下令不理会一名 G|CLUBS 律师的意见，并指示该实体的傀儡首席执行官转账 500 万美元，并告知该首席执行官“如果出了差错”将由首席执行官“承担责任”。(Id. 2994)。同样是王向 G|CLUBS 的名义首席执行官和公司内部法律顾问发出指令，要求设立多重会员资格——即以持有多个 G|CLUBS 会员资格将有权获得额外 GTV 股票为前提，向 G|Enterprise（G系企业）受害者索取更多资金。(See, e.g., Trial Tr. 5920)。在涉及 G|CLUBS 的骗局中，王与她聘请来为 G|Enterprise 服务的某银行家合作，创建了一家空壳公司，其最初目的虽是建立一家为 G|Enterprise 服务的美国金融机构，但最终目的却是接收并洗白被骗投资者的资金。(See Trial Tr. 1999-2001)。\n\nE. Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）\n\n当 G|Enterprise 欺诈计划的范围扩大至包含 Himalaya Exchange 及其所谓的加密货币时，王继续发挥关键作用。她聘请了该交易所的名义首席执行官 Jesse Brown，(see Trial Tr. 3638)，后者作证称，王后来致电给他以“推动我们的开发进度”，并转达“他们”——即由王代表发声的 G|Enterprise——“因为我们未能按时交付而变得非常沮丧”(id. 3727)。衡量王对 Himalaya Exchange 欺诈行为贡献的一个指标是她个人获得的 Himalaya Coin（喜币）配额：正如在她公寓中发现的一份文件所反映的，王以 0.10 美元的价格获得了近 700 万枚 Himalaya Coin 的配额，这一价值后来与该交易所在上线后向潜在投资者开出的每枚 27 美元的所谓报价相比显得微不足道。(See GXWA68; Trial Tr. 3679-80（交易所首席执行官作证称 Himalaya Coin 的价格“从 10 美分暴涨……到 1 美元……后来在 14 天内涨到了 20 美元”）)。\n\nF. Obstruction of Justice（妨害司法）\n\n王指控中的罪行还包括为了进一步服务 G|Enterprise 而企图妨害司法的行为。(See PSR ¶ 5(g)（关于适用妨害司法罪行调整的约定）)。来自王设备的聊天记录显示了她在 Miles Guo（郭文贵）破产程序中教唆伪证的证据。(See Dkt. 255 at 11 and Exs. D-G)。在通过 Signal 与郭的女儿 Mei（郭美）的聊天中，王指导郭美如何向其律师作虚假陈述，并在随后的伪证作证中谎称郭文贵的游艇实际上属于她。(See id.)。并且在她被捕之后、就本案处于拘押状态期间，王利用前辩护律师转达其请求，以取回由数百万美元 G|CLUBS 资金（即欺诈收益）构成的银行支票。(See id. at 11)。\n\nII. 诉讼程序沿革\n\nA. 指控与逮捕\n\n2023 年 3 月 15 日，王因刑事控告书 23 Mag. 2007 (GWG) 在其曼哈顿公寓被捕，指控其犯有合谋实施电汇及证券欺诈（违反 18 U.S.C. § 371）；电汇欺诈（违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 和 2）；证券欺诈（违反 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) 及 78ff、17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 以及 18 U.S.C. § 2）；以及洗钱（违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 和 2）。2023 年 3 月 29 日，第一份替代起诉书 S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT) 提交归档，在多项罪名项中指控 Kwok（郭）、Je（余）和王涉嫌参与其中所述的欺诈及洗钱行为。(Dkt. 19.)\n\n在她被捕的同一天，FBI（联邦调查局）对王的公寓进行了司法授权搜查。在搜查过程中，FBI 从一个保险箱内查获了大量美元及外币现钞；具体包括约 138,000 多美元现金、约 3,000 英镑、约 1180 港币以及约 600 元人民币。保险箱内的其他物品包括王和郭持有的已过期的 Vanuatu（瓦努阿图）1 以及\n\n1 瓦努阿图是南太平洋的一个岛国。据公开报道，瓦努阿图允许外国国民通过在当地投资获得瓦努阿图公民身份。See “Citizenship for sale: fugitives, politicians and disgraced businesspeople buying Vanuatu passports,” The Guardian, dated July 14, 2021 (available at http). 王在逃离中国后获得了该护照。(See Dkt. 22.)\n\n中国护照。(Dkt. 56, Lehr. Op. 3-4)。FBI 从王的公寓中查获了约 12 部手机、两台电脑和 25 个以上的 USB 闪存盘。FBI 还查获了各种爱马仕时尚用品。\n\n同样在 2023 年 3 月 15 日，FBI 逮捕了郭文贵，并且 FBI 对他的三处住所进行了司法授权搜查——即他的曼哈顿顶层公寓、他的 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）格林威治住所，以及他的 New Jersey（新泽西州）马瓦豪宅。在搜查过程中，FBI 查获了数十台电子设备、约 394,000 多美元现金、郭持有外国旅行证件的证据，以及用欺诈收益购买的豪车等物品。在王和郭被捕的同一天，英国执法部门试图在伦敦逮捕 William Je（余建明），并对其伦敦住所执行了司法授权搜查。余当时不在家，也不在英国境内。自 2023 年 3 月 15 日起，余未再返回英国，至今仍潜逃海外。\n\n2024 年 1 月 3 日，第二份替代起诉书提交归档，除其他罪名外，指控王、郭和余参与了在该起诉书中被称为“Kwok Enterprise（郭氏企业）”（即 G|Enterprise）的敲诈勒索合谋。\n\n上述指控是 FBI 多年调查的成果，调查内容除其他事项外，包括向王“工作”过的实体发出传票。这就是说，王早就知晓美国政府的调查（以及证券交易委员会的调查工作），但仍继续参与犯罪行为，直至被 FBI 逮捕。\n\nB. 认罪协议\n\n2024 年 5 月 3 日，根据一份认罪协议，王对第四份替代正式起诉书 S4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)（“替代正式起诉书”）表示认罪，该起诉书指控其两项罪名项，\n\n即参与合谋电汇欺诈和合谋洗钱，各违反 18 U.S.C. § 371。王认罪的替代正式起诉书第一项罪名指控其从 2018 年至 2023 年 5 月期间，参与通过包括 GTV Media Group, Inc.、Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）、G CLUBS 以及 Himalaya Exchange 在内的实体筹集资金的欺诈计划。\n\n根据认罪协议的条款，王同意没收 14 亿美元，该金额代表可追溯至该等罪行的收益。认罪协议还包含一项量刑指南约定，据此王同意就量刑指南而言：适用的损失金额超过 550,000,000 美元；被告声称代表慈善或政治组织行事；被告为逃避侦查将欺诈收益转移至另一司法管辖区；该罪行涉及复杂手段；被告是犯罪活动的“管理者或监督者”；以及被告就定罪罪行的调查或起诉实施了妨害司法行为。\n\n王进一步同意，适用的量刑指南罪行级别为 43 级，在犯罪前科类别为 I 级的情况下，相当于终身监禁的量刑范围；然而，根据 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a)，由于法定最高刑期为 120 个月（短于终身监禁），适用的量刑指南范围为 120 个月。\n\n2024 年 5 月 3 日，在认罪答辩陈述过程中，王陈述称她在 2020 年 6 月将通过 GTV 股票发行筹集的 1 亿美元电汇给了一家对冲基金。王陈述称，根据向投资者的陈述，她知晓将这笔资金用于该目的是不当的。值得注意的是，在王的认罪答辩程序中，王在没有普通话口译员协助的情况下与法庭进行互动，并明确且多次陈述称她理解法庭向其解释的各项权利。\n\nC. 假释监督部门的量刑建议\n\n假释监督报告同样计算出适用的罪行级别为 43 级，犯罪前科类别为 I 级。在审查王的个人情况、对王进行面谈并考量指控罪行后，假释监督部门建议对王判处 120 个月监禁。(PSR at 46)。假释监督部门指出，该犯罪行为“造成了给数千名受害者带来总计超过 10 亿美元的天文数字损失”，且王在其中“发挥了举足轻重的作用”。(Id. at 48)。假释监督部门进一步评估认为，若没有其认罪协议，“由于该罪行造成的巨大损失，根据量刑指南王将面临终身监禁”。(Id.)。假释监督部门也注意到了王的个人情况，包括她声称“遭受 CCP [中国共产党] 迫害”的说法。(Id.)。然而，综合权衡之下，假释监督部门“认为被告的这些个人经历和特征并不足以超过本案惩罚和威慑的需要”。(Id.)。\n\n120 个月的量刑指南刑期是必要且适当的\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n尽管在 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) 一案后量刑指南仅具建议性质，但量刑指南仍是量刑的“出发点和初始基准”。Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)。这是因为量刑指南是“在审查数千起单独量刑裁决所获取的大量实证依据的基础上仔细研究的产物”。Id. at 46。出于这个原因，“在绝大多数案件中，按量刑指南判处的刑罚将完全落入在特定情形下属于合理的广泛刑罚范围之内”。United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006)。\n\n在量刑时，法院必须考虑《美国法典》第 18 编第 3553 条 (a) 款所列出的七项因素：(1) “犯罪的性质和情节，以及被告的历史和特征”；(2) 如下所述的量刑的四项合法目的；(3) “可适用的刑罚种类”；(4) 量刑指南范围本身；(5) 量刑委员会发布的任何相关政策声明；(6) “避免被告之间产生无合理依据的量刑差异的需要”；以及 (7) “向任何受害者提供赔偿的需要”。18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(l)–(7)。See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 & n.6。\n\n在确定适当的刑罚时，法律指示法官“判处足以、但不超出必要限度以符合量刑目的的刑罚”，量刑目的为：\n\n- (A) 反映罪行的严重性、促进对法律的尊重，并对该罪行提供公正的惩处；\n\t- (B) 对犯罪行为提供充分的威慑；\n\t- (C) 保护公众免受被告进一步犯罪的侵害；\n\t- (D) 以最有效的方式向被告提供所需的教育或职业培训、医疗护理或其他矫正治疗。\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)。\n\nB. 罪行的性质、情节与严重性要求作出量刑指南范围内的判决\n\n关于罪行行为，正如法庭所深知的那样，G|Enterprise 实施了一起令人发指的、\n\n不断升级的欺诈行为，从全球数千名受害者手中窃取了超过10亿美元。Wang（王雁平）协助管理和运营了那些专门为实施欺诈而设立和运作的公司，并在通过以数十个实体名义开立的数百个银行账户构成的复杂网络洗钱数亿美元欺诈收益的过程中发挥了关键作用。王雁平是Guo（郭文贵）值得信任的亲信，也是郭文贵核心圈子的重要成员，从G|Enterprise（G系列企业）创立伊始便参与其中。\n\n王雁平罪行的范围与规模难以尽述。事实上，极少有欺诈犯罪能达到王雁平所犯之罪的严重程度。王雁平参与了一项规模惊人的犯罪计划——扮演着管理角色，并作为一个字面意义上的欺诈企业的核心圈子成员发挥作用。其行为的性质和严重性本身就应被判处《量刑指南》（Guidelines）建议的刑罚。\n\n其行为的严重性最能通过以下方面得以说明：造成的巨大经济损失、受害的大量受害者、犯罪行为波及的地理范围、王雁平蓄意伤害其声称支持的民主运动这一事实、王雁平参与时间之长、实施这些罪行所采用手段的高度复杂性、王雁平在共谋中的领导地位、王雁平的妨害司法行为以及她个人的经济利益。王雁平在其提交的文书中，未能正视并承担起因其造成的巨大损害、因其行为受害的数千名受害者以及其犯罪无与伦比的广度所应负的责任。\n\n1. 王雁平的罪行导致数千名无辜受害者损失超过10亿美元\n\n王雁平协助造成的经济损失程度令人震惊。在欺诈案件中，造成的损害超过10亿美元的情况实属罕见。而即使发生这种情况，损失往往也源于公司不当行为，例如导致股价崩盘的财务造假。而本案中天文数字般的损失是由盗窃造成的。郭文贵靠说谎从受害者手中骗取了10亿美元，而王雁平在每一步都为他提供了协助。\n\n虽然从宏观层面看，10亿美元的损失数额极其庞大，但认识到其在个人层面所造成的伤害同样重要。正如受害者在郭文贵案庭审期间所陈述的那样，他们失去了退休储蓄，背负了债务，并因这起欺诈遭受了沉重的打击。事实上，\n\nFBI（联邦调查局）询问了数十名又数十名受害者，他们讲述了自己所遭受的有时令人极度痛苦的损失——但由于害怕遭到郭文贵、王雁平及其残余支持者的报复，许多人不敢公开表态。本案中的受害者都是这样一些个人，他们把郭文贵和王雁平的犯罪计划看作正如其推销宣传的那样——一个发家致富的绝佳机会。然而，正如王雁平深知的那样，这完全是一个巨大的谎言（或者更准确地说，是一连串滔滔不绝的谎言）。王雁平对因其行为而遭受痛苦的数千名个人和家庭所承受的这些伤害负有责任。\n\n王雁平罪行的严重性还体现在该计划波及的地理范围上。该计划以及王雁平在其中的参与，真真切切地横跨全球。受害者几乎遍布世界的每一个角落，以及全美各地。该欺诈的运作在规模上也是全球性的，其公司、实体和银行账户分布在包括British Virgin Islands（英属维尔京群岛）、Australia（澳大利亚）、Switzerland（瑞士）、United Arab Emirates（阿拉伯联合酋长国）和Kyrgyzstan（吉尔吉斯斯坦）在内的一系列司法管辖区。\n\n2. 王雁平伤害了中国民运\n\n除了她造成的经济损失之外，王雁平还是一件更为恶毒的事情的关键参与者。G系列企业瞄准了一群特定的受害者——通常是寻求在中国推动民主的海外华人社群成员。郭文贵在王雁平的协助下，将自己标榜为誓要消灭中国共产党的“自由战士”。但郭文贵所做的一切根本没有促进他所宣扬的理想。相反，正如王雁平深知的那样，郭文贵通过声称为这些崇高的民主目标代表他们战斗来吸引受害者，而他所做的仅仅是敛财，并将他们的钱财花在自己和家人身上。令人不安的现实是，郭文贵和王雁平并没有壮大民运——他们重创了民运。郭文贵凭借王雁平卓越的管理技能，建立起一个欺诈帝国，从那些真正渴望民主中国的人身上榨取钱财。郭文贵和王雁平根本没有支持对抗中国共产党的斗争，反而榨取了其追随者的资金，耗尽了该运动的资源，并践踏了受害者的信任。通过这种做法，郭文贵和王雁平实际上伤害了民运，从而推进了他们声称的自身最大威胁即CCP（中共）的目标。这就是这起欺诈的险恶现实。\n\n3. 王雁平的犯罪行为持续了数年之久\n\n王雁平从2018年G系列企业创立之初就参与其中，直至2023年3月被捕——并且在此之后还持续了数月。她参与并协助管理了G系列企业运作的灵活变动性，所有这些运作都是为了逃避监管机构和执法部门的侦查。王雁平参与程度之深、时间之长，进一步凸显了其罪行的严重性。她的参与并非出于一时的判断失误、无心之过，或是因暂时的财务压力而做出的错误选择——而是五年来做出的一系列决定的结果。在其量刑陈情中，王雁平辩称她的参与部分是由“一系列严重的个人危机”引起的。（Def. Mem. at 1）。即便确实如此，也绝不能成为持续五年从事故意犯罪行为的借口——事实上，甚至在王雁平于本案中被捕并被羁押之后，该行为仍在继续。因此，在拟定适当刑罚时，王雁平的参与时长在很大程度上是一个加重情节。\n\n4. 王雁平的罪行不断演变和适应以规避执法\n\n法院不仅应考虑王雁平参与的时间长短及其罪行本身的险恶性质，还应考虑王雁平及其共犯为了使该计划维持下去——并逃避执法部门和监管机构的制裁——而不断调整和演变该计划的方式。在2020年4月设立了欺诈性的所谓双重慈善机构（Rule of Law Society（法治公会）和Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金））之后，G系列企业通过欺诈性发售GTV股票募集了资金。鉴于该发行未在Securities and Exchange Commission（SEC，美国证券交易委员会）注册，投资者须符合一系列要求以确保其有资格参与。郭文贵、王雁平等人漠视这些要求，通过诸如Voice of Guo（即VOG，根据庭审期间的陈述，该实体是前凤凰农场负责人Sara Wei（魏丽红）在郭文贵指示下运营的公司）等工具，从不合格投资者手中汇集受害者的资金。SEC对该发行进行了调查，叫停了该行为，并最终达成了一项协议，根据该协议，所募集的资金（在未被非法挥霍的范围内）将重新分配给投资者。当然，G系列企业在GTV私募中募集的资金并不是为了GTV——而是为了郭文贵及其家人。王雁平知道这一点，因为她负责将1亿美元的投资者资金转移到对冲基金Hayman Capital Management（海曼资本管理公司），该笔款项随后以郭文贵儿子的名义投入了一项高风险投资中。正如她经常做的那样，王雁平负责处理该投资的具体事务，并负责首先对该1亿美元进行转账以隐匿其真实来源。毫无疑问，在当时，王雁平对其行为的违法性十分清楚；事实上，她在认罪答辩陈述中也承认了这一点。2\n\n但王雁平的参与并没有在2020年结束。事实上，在共谋中的GTV部分损失了3000万美元受害者资金并引起监管部门注意之后，该共谋进行了调整。这一次，它利用“农场贷款”（Farm Loans）——而非直接出售股票——来出售GTV的股份。这笔资金在通过一个由复杂货币交易构成的网络后，最终被输送回郭氏家族。随后，G系列企业再次改变了策略。这\n\n2 王雁平认罪答辩笔录（Wang Plea Tr.）第25-26页（“在2020年6月前后，受他人指示，我将大约1亿美元资金从纽约的一个银行账户电汇至德克萨斯州的一家对冲基金海曼资本管理公司。我知道这些资金来自GTV股票发售中的投资者。……我知道我的所作所为是错误的。”）\n\n次，它以G|CLUBS（G俱乐部）会员资格为伪装出售GTV（以及其他与郭文贵相关联实体的）股份。但G俱乐部的资金并没有用于资助媒体公司，甚至没有用于资助任何真正的会员福利。相反，G俱乐部的资金被用于为郭氏家族购买豪车、豪华奢侈资产以及一栋名副其实的豪宅。王雁平深度参与了G俱乐部，并担任其事实上的首席执行官（de facto CEO）。她指挥了数百万美元的资金转账、数百万美元的奢侈品采购，并且自始至终都知道这个会员俱乐部不过是用来掩盖与GTV私募和农场贷款计划相同的欺诈伎俩——即发售GTV股票——的烟幕。但是，当G俱乐部和G系列企业遭遇银行开户和交易困难时，G系列企业又设计出了另一个解决方案：一种名为H-Coin（喜币）和H-Dollar（喜美元）的虚假加密货币。为了配合这些虚假加密货币，王雁平协助建立了Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所），该交易所既作为欺诈计划运作，又作为洗钱工具运作，以将受害者的资金吸引到郭文贵和G系列企业完全控制的“加密货币”中。\n\n2022年9月和10月，在U.S. Government（美国政府）从G系列企业查扣了6.3亿美元（包括从与喜马拉雅交易所关联的账户中查扣的数亿美元）之后，该共谋再次进行了调整；这一次，推出了“A10”和“A15”计划，这些计划声称通过出售Gettr（盖特）、G俱乐部及其他与郭文贵相关实体的股票来集资。不同的是，这一次这笔钱要被汇往中东，以置于美国政府管辖范围之外。王雁平在将G系列企业的业务转移至阿联酋的过程中发挥了关键作用，包括指定纽约G俱乐部及其他G系列企业的哪些“雇员”应当前往Abu Dhabi（阿布扎比），以协助建立设在中东的G俱乐部和喜马拉雅交易所的运营。\n\n2023年3月，王雁平被捕，但她对G系列企业的参与仍在继续。她试图通过当时代表她的律师进行策划，让一名G俱乐部的雇员从位于曼哈顿中城的一个P.O. Box（邮政信箱）提取大约700万美元的G俱乐部收益。王雁平及其共谋者在这场长达五年的敲诈勒索共谋过程中所采用的复杂手段，凸显了王雁平犯罪行为的严重性。所有这些综合起来，完全应当被判处《量刑指南》建议的刑罚。\n\n5. 王雁平是G系列企业的领导者且妨害了司法公正\n\nWang（王雁平）——正如她已达成的附带协议所承认的——在这一波及广泛的共谋中扮演了管理角色。她不是一名小卒或传话员。王在组织该骗局、雇佣其人员、做出财务决定以及指导部分律师和财务专家方面发挥了关键作用。当然，王是Miles Guo（郭文贵）的下属，但除郭之外，王往往拥有绝对的权威。以G|CLUBS为例。王几乎每天都在指导傀儡首席执行官Limarie Reyes。Reyes接受来自王或向王汇报的其他人的指示。事实上，正是王告知G|CLUBS需要提供“多重”会员资格（一种增加从每位会员受害者处收取资金金额的方式）。正是王雇佣了G|Enterprise（G系列企业）纽约市办公室的人员，并控制诸如HCHK等实体来实施欺诈。正是王对她给其他人的指示保留了细致的笔记，担任数十名参与者的组织者和管理者。事实上，在王住所执行搜查令的搜查清单中，包括共谋期间每一年包含涵盖G系列企业各个角落的大量笔记的数十本日程记事本。\n\n王的妨碍司法行为也值得深思。王不仅协助引导了共谋的发展演变以规避执法部门的介入，而且她还亲自采取措施进行妨碍。首先，并且正如一系列文字和语音信息所记录的那样，王指示郭的女儿在向郭的破产管理人作证宣誓供述时作伪证。这是向破产管理人隐瞒G系列企业资产企图的一部分，且这表明了王对美国司法系统和正当程序的蔑视。此外，在本案被捕后，王企图通过要求其当时的律师让G|CLUBS“员工”安排从一个邮政信箱提取支票，来获取数百万美元的G|CLUBS会员费（即受害者收益）。尽管对妨碍司法的量刑加重条款作出了附带协议承认，王的量刑意见书仍辩称这些录了音的对话是“混乱不清的”。它们并非如此。王所指导的G|CLUBS员工（无论是在其被捕前还是被捕后）在录音对话中清楚表明，正是王要求其律师联系他们取回支票。王的量刑意见书试图为这一犯罪行为开脱，辩称当时“王并未被指控犯有与G Clubs相关的任何实质性罪名”，这一陈述既令人震惊，也被清晰的事实所推翻。（辩方量刑意见书第11页。）当时，G|CLUBS在S1号起诉书中已被描述为共谋的一部分，而王在其中是被指控的被告人。更确切地说，王在其被捕之时（以及在此之前很久）就知道G|CLUBS既未向会员提供股票，也未提供任何实质性的会员福利。事实上，王是G|CLUBS事实上的首席执行官。她在被捕后企图获取G|CLUBS的资金，构成妨碍司法公正，并证明了即便在被捕之后，她仍继续试图将受害者资金转移用于谋取G系列企业的利益。王的妨碍行为凸显了她缺乏悔意，并对法律及其伤害的受害者表现出彻底的漠视。\n\n6. 王亲自控制了她从受害者处窃取的数百万美元\n\n王辩称她并未从该违法行为中获得重大经济利益，因此理应获得更低的刑罚。（辩方量刑意见书第12-14页）。王在事实上是不正确的。首先，在调查期间从王住所起获的一份文件显示，在首次代币发行价格为每枚HCN 0.10美元时，有6,999,800枚喜马拉雅币（HCN）被分配给了王。（ECF编号：Dkt. 42。）从王住所起获的另一份标题为“2021年11月1日发行时的喜马拉雅币分配表”的文件，反映了某些“HCN（以美元计）”的分配情况，包括向王分配的$700,000。（同上）。王本将获得这笔现金，并极有可能将分配给她的HCN套现数百万美元以上。正如辩方目前所主张的，HCN确实是一种毫无价值的加密货币，但该欺诈计划的设计初衷就是诱骗受害者汇款购买HCN。一旦真正的美元进入Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）账户，共谋企图使其受益的人——即王、郭以及Je（余建明）——便可以“赎回”分配给他们的HCN并获取受害者提供的法定货币。事实上，郭在获得3700万美元贷款以规避纽约州法院的刑事藐视法庭裁定时就曾这样做过，而Je在政府扣押喜马拉雅交易所银行账户时也企图这样做。若不是美国执法部门的介入，王必定也会走上这条道路，并亲自从受害者那里收取数百万美元。因此，王本可凭借其在G系列企业中的工作收取数百万美元的受害者资金。\n\n此外，至少约$34,000,000的受害者资金存放在以王管理或控制的实体名义开设的银行账户中。在被捕时，王的住所保险箱内还存放有约$138,000的美元现金以及额外外币——她向审前服务处隐瞒了这一事实。（Dkt. 42）。\n\n王主张，她每年约$231,900至$313,961的薪水是她参与该欺诈计划所获得的唯一利益，并且她是“为其切实履行的工作”合法挣得该薪水的。（辩方量刑意见书第14页）。这种辩解完全是具有误导性的，因为她为各个G系列企业实体——全部属于勒索敲诈企业成员的公司——所做“工作”的唯一目的，就是募集、清洗和挪用数亿美元的欺诈计划收益。王无法令人信服地辩称她没有从欺诈中获得实质性利益，仅仅因为她在长达数年的犯罪活动中“只”拿回了二十五万美元的薪水。法院应断然驳回这一辩解。\n\nC. 为实现特殊威慑目标和保护公众，判处《量刑指南》建议刑罚是必要的\n\n根据第3553(a)条，必须考虑判决“保护公众免受被告人进一步犯罪的危害”以及“对犯罪行为提供充分威慑”的必要性。18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C)。在此，判处120个月的《量刑指南》建议刑罚对于实现这些目的是必要的。\n\n本案中重新犯罪的风险是重大的。首先，正如辩方所承认的，王引述的作为她最初参与该违法行为继而继续犯罪的原因的个人情况——中共对王的针对、她与家庭的被迫分离、她的个人创伤，以及她在缺乏美国永久身份和缺乏本地社会关系——在她服完监禁刑后将不会改变，甚至可能会加剧。（总体参见辩方量刑意见书第1-10、17页）。政府无法确信王在刑满释放后不会重操欺诈旧业。\n\n其次，王对G系列企业欺诈计划广泛而长期的参与表明，她并未因违法后果而对犯罪有所戒惧。事实上，无论是她给数千名受害者造成的巨大痛苦，还是入狱的可能性，都未能阻止她继续犯罪。正如王的量刑前陈述所明确表明的，她早在2020年6月就清楚自己身处刑事共谋之中。在接下来的五年里，她仍然保持着对该犯罪企业的效忠。并且在2020年春季左右，作为GTV执行董事的王还知道SEC（美国证券交易委员会）正在调查该股票发售，并最终追缴了GTV募集的收益。民事监管机构的介入并未促使王另寻合法工作。事实上，关键在于，王在获悉政府的刑事调查之后，仍继续实施欺诈并从受害者处窃取资金至少长达一年以上。王亲自接收了政府向G|CLUBS及其他G系列企业实体发出的传票；她发送了提及本案数名署名检察官的文字信息；她指示一名员工不要协助政府调查；而她在做这一切的同时，仍继续运营收取受害者资金、清洗欺诈收益并协助挪用这些资金的G系列企业实体。\n\n第三，或许也是最令人不安的是，即使在本案中被捕并被羁押之后，她仍从事妨碍行为，并采取积极措施阻挠政府调查并向政府隐匿欺诈收益。（参见Dkt. 255第11页；辩方量刑意见书第11页附注5）。王试图为这种对抗行为和对法律的公然藐视进行辩解的努力是完全徒劳的。无论支票是来自已关闭的银行账户还是直接来自个体受害者投资者，这$7,000,000资金的来源都是王所运营的G|CLUBS欺诈计划。王将其妨碍行为轻描淡写为据称无辜的“采取步骤协助某些实体继续履行其对剩余员工及其他人员的义务”的尝试，这完全无视了那些实体及其运作的明确目的就是继续进行该欺诈计划。作为事实上的首席执行官，王显然清楚这一点。法院应当对王为其行为所作的借口持怀疑态度，并认清其行为的本质：对法律的蔑视以及王未受到威慑的迹象。\n\n此外，过去的欺诈并不必然威慑未来的欺诈，本司法管辖区内众多初犯欺诈者沦为累犯的事实便证明了这一点。参见，例如，United States v. Jonathan Ghertler，案号 23 Cr. 100 (ER)（在十多次前科定罪后再次实施投资欺诈计划）；United States v. Franklin Ray，案号 22 Cr. 228 (AT)（在因银行和电汇欺诈服刑两年后策划庞氏骗局）；United States v. Vitaly Borker，案号 22 Cr. 273 (JSR)（被告人因运营欺诈性眼镜网站被判电汇欺诈罪，此前已因相同行为两次受到联邦定罪）；United States v. Joseph Meli，案号 19 Cr. 480 (RA)（被告人此前因相同计划服刑78个月后，再次因参与百老汇门票转售投资欺诈计划被定罪）；United States v. Edward Durante，案号 15 Cr. 171 (ALC)（在因欺诈服121个月刑期期间开始新的投资欺诈计划）；United States v. John Galanis，案号 15 Cr. 643 (PKC)（被告人在1973年和1988年因邮件欺诈和证券欺诈被定罪后，再次被判证券欺诈罪）。\n\n尽管王多年参与其中，并且知晓民事和刑事调查，但她仍不愿停止其犯罪行为，这引发了法院需要考虑的另一个重要因素：保护公众。虽然郭的一些支持者已经认清了该犯罪计划的本质，但其他人仍在继续推进，并在某些情况下以类似方式募集资金。如果不剥夺其行动能力，王在获释后很可能会重操旧业并继续犯罪。事实上，王为支持偏离量刑建议而提交的求情信，均来自曾与郭关系密切且至今仍是忠实追随者的人士。鉴于王多年来毫不减弱地继续从事犯罪行为的意愿，为了保护公众以及王所针对和盘剥的弱势受害者群体免受未来的伤害，判处重大刑期是必要的。\n\nD. 《量刑指南》建议刑罚符合一般威慑的利益\n\n本案中亦有必要判处《量刑指南》（Guidelines）范围内的刑罚，以对犯罪行为提供充分的普遍威慑。《参见》18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)。“出于（普遍）威慑的考量，主张对那些要么获利丰厚、要么难以侦查和惩处的犯罪行为施以更严厉的惩罚，因为这两项属性都会增加犯罪带来的迅速收益，从而增加威慑该罪行所需的惩罚力度。”United States v. Heffernan，43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994)；《并见》United States v. Martin，455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006)（“由于经济犯罪和基于欺诈的犯罪相比突发的激情或机会犯罪更为理性、冷静和精打细算，因此这些犯罪是普遍威慑的主要适用对象。”（引用标记及引文省略））；United States v. Mueffelman，470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006)（威慑白领犯罪是“国会的核心关注事项”）。\n\n鉴于本案欺诈规模巨大，且为了向阻碍监管机构和司法程序的人士传递恰当的信息，普遍威慑在本案中至关重要。躲在公司形式、空壳实体和外国账户背后并隐瞒犯罪行为，要求判处一项能够明确发出信号的刑罚，即那些在数年期间采取措施违反法律、掩盖罪行并伤害他人的人，将面临重大且严厉的惩处。对Wang（王雁平）判处低于《量刑指南》的刑罚，将无法充分阻止处于类似境地的其他人实施类似犯罪。\n\n在此处，普遍威慑的必要性进一步加剧，因为直至今日，仍有人以Guo（郭文贵）的名义行事，并据称为了对抗CCP（中国共产党）而募集资金。法院必须向郭文贵的追随者和同伙传递一个信息：继续实施此类犯罪将导致重大后果。那些企图仿效王雁平所作所为——以民主行动为幌子推行这一宏大犯罪共谋——的人应当明白，这样做将伴随着严厉的惩罚。判处《量刑指南》规定的120个月监禁刑罚对于实现这一目的是必要的。\n\nE. 被告的个人历史和特征并不构成偏离量刑的理由\n\nG|Enterprise（G系列企业）的庞大规模以及王雁平在该犯罪计划中的关键作用，支持判处120个月的刑期。辩方请求大幅向下偏离量刑，使其刑期不到缓刑监督部门（Probation Department）、政府以及《量刑指南》建议刑期的一半，这是不充分的，无法满足量刑的重要目的。在此处尤其如此，因为在没有法定上限的情况下，《量刑指南》建议的范围本应为终身监禁。\n\n缓刑监督部门仔细评估了本案中存在的从轻和从重情节。王雁平没有犯罪前科，据报告，她在参与本案犯罪行为之前拥有合法工作（尽管政府指出其先前受雇于郭文贵）。她参与G系列企业所获得的明显个人收益，似乎主要包括丰厚的年收入，以及获赠价值约700万的喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）积分——正如在郭文贵的庭审中所证明的，这些积分并非合法的加密货币资产，而是代表了王雁平本可以以法币形式变现的受害投资者资金，正如她的同案被告William Je（余建明）在其退出计划中所企图做的那样。她也是中共网络骚扰的目标。话虽如此，王雁平实施涉案罪行长达数年。她在犯罪中发挥了核心作用，日复一日地不知疲倦地工作，以推行犯罪行为。G系列企业在全世界范围内掠夺弱势受害者；这些受害者因遭受巨大的经济困境而不太可能获得完全弥补。\n\n简而言之，120个月的刑期足以体现犯罪行为、提供充分威慑、促进对法律的尊重并对犯罪提供公正的惩罚，且未超出必要限度。王雁平在该犯罪计划中的作用是关键且深思熟虑的，应当判处上述监禁期限。被告要求大幅偏离量刑的论点均不能成立。\n\n1. 中共的行为不构成从轻情节\n\n被告的量刑陈述书用了数页篇幅叙述中共针对王雁平的打击行动。（辩方备忘录 7-10。）然而，中共针对王雁平的任何行为都凸显了王雁平罪行的恶意性质，且不足以作为支持偏离量刑的从轻情节。\n\n首先，即使法院完全采信王雁平关于中共打击行动的所有指控，这些指控也不能成为针对第三方受害人实施长达五年犯罪行为的免责理由。没有任何法律抗辩理由——更不用说道德理由——允许王雁平（或任何其他人）仅仅因为受到他人的伤害就去伤害无辜的受害者。接受王雁平相反的主张将是对一种离奇的私力救济司法制度的认可，该制度将允许某一犯罪的受害者去伤害其他人——甚至是与前一犯罪毫无关联的其他人。在郭文贵案庭审期间，郭文贵自己所谓的“猎狐行动”（FoxHunt）专家承认了王雁平现在提出的从轻论点的荒谬性。（庭审记录第5190页（“问：[猎狐行动]与郭文贵推广的商业机会没有任何关系，对吗？答：对。”）。）\n\n其次，如果王雁平遭受中共打击的情况真如其陈述书所言那般恶劣，那么她对该打击行动的反应则令人费解。在成为目标后，王雁平的反应是在一个全球性犯罪组织中发挥了核心和不可或缺的作用，该组织从成千上万希望推翻中共的民主人士手中盗取资金。也就是说，面对中共的打击，王雁平伤害了中共的敌人，同时坚称自己支持推翻中共的运动。准确地说，王雁平——以及与其并肩的郭文贵——在帮助中共方面所起的作用，远大于打击中共的作用。\n\n王雁平还报告了一起令人不安的跟踪骚扰事件。3 但即使采信王雁平的描述为真，令人不安和沮丧的情形也不能成为对他人造成重大痛苦和伤害的合法理由，而王雁平在本案中正是这样做的。此外，王雁平在G系列企业针对破产受托人（Bankruptcy trustee）及其家人进行定位、跟踪和抗议的过程中，造成了基本类似的伤害——G系列企业甚至前往破产受托人女儿任职的一所公立小学门外进行抗议。王雁平尽管据称遭遇了有害的跟踪经历，却依然支持G系列企业针对他人的行动，这引发了两种可能性：要么王雁平所谓跟踪者的行为从未真正对王雁平产生她所声称的影响，要么王雁平在帮助G系列企业针对其批评者时，完全清楚自己正在深深地伤害、诋毁许多个人并对其造成精神伤害。4\n\n此外，针对该跟踪者，王雁平寻求了执法部门的帮助。她联系了警方，并通过司法程序获得了法院的保护令。这表明，第一，王雁平具备理性行动的能力，本可以退出共谋并离开郭文贵及G系列企业。第二，这表明王雁平深知司法系统的重要性，但当符合其犯罪目的时，她却滥用并阻碍了该系统。\n\n3 需要明确的是，没有证据（王雁平亦未引用任何证据）表明该跟踪者的行为与中共针对王雁平的行动有关。\n\n4 因此，Askinsulure博士的报告充其量只是基于一组经过挑选的片面事实展现了王雁平的不完整画像。例如，该报告没有考虑王雁平的任何行为，包括辩方唾手可得的材料，例如：王雁平关于犯罪行为的电子邮件、指示他人的短信，甚至是起诉书。相反，Askinsulure博士的意见是基于王雁平撰写的一份文件、未指明的社交媒体帖子、一篇关于大都会拘留中心（MDC）的文章以及临时限制令。这些材料正如Askinsulure博士所称的那样，不能被恰当地定性为“ ”。（辩方证物A第2页）。事实上，Askinsulure博士忽略了王雁平五年的个人经历及其对他人的行为。此外，Askinsulure博士关于王雁平具有 的评估，完全被政府发现的证据、政府进行的数十次证人访谈以及法院对王雁平本人的观察所推翻。若说有何事实，那就是王雁平拥有高于常人的智力、卓越的管理和组织能力，以及非凡的操纵他人的能力。王雁平管理着一个拥有数十名甚至数百名员工的全球性组织的工作。她追踪数亿美元资金，清晰安排下属的工作任务，并且是这一巨额欺诈企业中不可或缺的领导者。对Askinsulure博士的报告应给予极低的采信权重。\n\n2. 判处《量刑指南》规定的刑罚不会造成不合理的量刑差异\n\n王雁平引用了其声称处于类似境地的数名被告人的判决，试图说服法院大幅向下偏离《量刑指南》。与王雁平的主张相反，那些被告人并未处于类似境地，判处120个月的刑期与那些判例并无不一致之处。\n\n王雁平引用的Irina Dilkinska（伊琳娜·迪尔金斯卡）曾是OneCoin（维卡币）的法务主管，OneCoin是一家推销和销售欺诈性加密货币的公司，并通过其多层次传销计划募集了约40亿美元。《参见》United States v. Dilkinska，17 Cr. 630 (ER) (S.D.N.Y.，纽约南区联邦地区法院)。（《参见》辩方备忘录 16-18）。Ramos（拉莫斯）法官判处迪尔金斯卡48个月监禁。虽然迪尔金斯卡确为执业律师并通过其犯罪行为违反了职业道德义务，但迪尔金斯卡与王雁平之间存在实质性且相关的差异。首先，迪尔金斯卡在开始参与OneCoin欺诈案时年仅约32岁，且相对缺乏经验。相比之下，王雁平在开始参与G系列企业时年约40岁，受过高等教育且精通商业。其次，尽管OneCoin是另一起涉及数十亿美元的欺诈案，但迪尔金斯卡在OneCoin犯罪计划中的行为远不如王雁平在G系列企业中的行为积极。王雁平引用了政府指控迪尔金斯卡“创建并管理空壳公司”的内容，试图将迪尔金斯卡与王雁平相提并论。（辩方备忘录 17。）然而，迪尔金斯卡的角色完全是在OneCoin创始人Ruja Ignatova（鲁雅·伊格纳托娃）等人的指示下工作，她所“管理”的空壳公司仅仅是资金流动的公司工具。与此形成鲜明对比的是，王雁平是\n\n诸如G|CLUBS、G|Fashion和喜马拉雅交易所等G系列企业公司的实际（de facto）幕僚长——这些公司经过精心设计和运营，表面上提供合法的商品和服务。王雁平不知疲倦地工作，以推进和扩大G系列企业的运营。从她公寓中搜出的工作日程本反映了涉及欺诈计划各方面的会议，她与G系列企业各个实体员工的沟通——并得到了证人证言的印证——无可争议地确立了王雁平就是日常的老板。她发号施令。郭文贵是欺诈的幕后主脑，但王雁平是指挥者，正是通过她为欺诈受害者付出的巨大努力，G系列企业才得以募集超过10亿美元。此外，尽管王雁平控制着各个实体运营的方方面面，但她却非常刻意地使自己避开具名的职位和银行账户，并从形式上否认自己参与G系列企业实体。这些隐瞒其参与并使自己免受潜在刑事责任的刻意举动，应作为从重情节予以重点考量，并且这些举动无疑将她与迪尔金斯卡区分开来。\n\nWang（王雁平）引用的其他案件同样存在明显区别。最值得注意的是，除Elizabeth Holmes（伊丽莎白·霍姆斯）外，辩方引用的被告人的行为，对其各自犯罪计划的关键性单边作用，均不如王雁平之于G|Enterprise（G系列商业帝国）。Joanne Crupi（乔安妮·克鲁皮）在Madoff（麦道夫）案中作为投资顾问发挥了作用，包括转移客户资金、在各账户间转移资金以及向银行提交虚假信息。见United States v. Crupi（美国诉克鲁皮案），案号 No. 10 Cr. 228 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）)。（辩方备忘录第18页）。然而，克鲁皮只是为使麦道夫犯罪计划成功运作而从事类似行为的众多人员之一，而王雁平则是唯一的幕僚长，也是G系列商业帝国诈骗案的核心管理人员。王雁平强调克鲁皮选择接受审判，显然将其视为反映克鲁皮缺乏认罪悔罪态度的加重情节。事实上，在讨论克鲁皮案时，王雁平认为克鲁皮更具罪责，因为“与王女士不同，她并非在受到外国政府针对的情况下采取行动”。（辩方备忘录第19页）。王雁平试图为其犯罪行为以及在运作G系列商业帝国诈骗计划并欺诈数千名受害者中的核心作用开脱——从而否认对自身行为负有完全责任——对于审理过Miles Guo（郭文贵）案的本院而言并不陌生，郭文贵在审判中曾提出过同样的辩解。与郭文贵一样，王雁平被CCP（中国共产党）针对这一情况，对其罪行责任而言并不重要。该事实绝不会使她的罪责轻于克鲁皮，也不应成为任何向下偏离量刑建议的依据。此外，Michelle Morton（米歇尔·莫顿）涉及的诈骗金额为数千万美元，而非超过十亿美元。参见United States v. Morton（美国诉莫顿案），案号 No. 16 Cr. 371 (RA) (S.D.N.Y.)。（辩方备忘录第19页）。简而言之，王雁平的加重情节行为与她为争取48个月以下刑期而引用的被告人行为之间存在明显区别，判处量刑指南建议的120个月刑期不会造成任何不合理的量刑差异，特别是考虑到上述诸多加重因素。\n\n3. 任何移民后果均系王雁平自作自受\n\n王雁平移民美国时声称自己受到CCP的迫害。作为一名受过良好教育、聪慧且精通英语的移民，美国为她提供了一个远离任何所声称的CCP威胁、守法和平生活的机会。但她选择了另一条道路，决定滥用这个国家为她提供的机会。王雁平唾弃了美国给予的承诺，并与郭文贵一起将美国用作全球犯罪集团的行动基地。在作为庇护申请人在美期间，她以美国公民为目标并窃取其财物，滥用并阻挠了这里的司法系统。她从事这些行为长达五年，在此期间她随时都可以离开并试图弥补过错以过上守法生活。但她并未这样做。如今，作为一名已被定罪的重罪犯，她不出所料地可能面临移民后果——但这些后果是王雁平多年来所作选择的结果。5 如果说有什么区别的话，王雁平的移民身份本应激励她在美期间在法律范围内行事。但她明知故犯地选择了另一条道路。\n\n王雁平还抱怨由于其公民身份状况，她没有资格被指定关押在最低安全级别的低度设防监狱营（prison camp）。目前，政府理解Federal Bureau of Prisons（联邦监狱管理局，BOP）并未严格禁止将非美国公民指定关押在最低安全级别的低度设防监狱营，且本院可以作出此类建议。话虽如此，联邦监狱管理局通常不会将非公民指定关押在上述设施中，若被告人被判处监禁刑，任何指定关押决定都将由联邦监狱管理局自由裁量。无论联邦监狱管理局作出何种指定决定，综合考虑所有因素，王雁平行为的严重性远超过其因无法被指定关押在低度设防监狱营（相对于一般最低安全级别设施）而可能主张的任何从轻情节。\n\n5 与被告人当前的陈述相反，在王雁平申请审前释放时，她曾向本院辩称，即使被定罪，她也不会被递解出境至中国，因此没有逃离美国的动机。（Dkt. 81 第20页注14（“即使被定罪，由于美国加入了《联合国禁止酷刑公约》，她在服刑期满后也很可能不会被递解出境”）。）\n\n结论\n\n王雁平多年来持续从事犯罪行为，对他人造成了惊人的危害，屡次阻碍司法公正，并在一个复杂、恶劣且庞大的犯罪集团中扮演了重要的领导角色，这些都要求对其施以严厉的制裁。基于本文件所述理由，政府谨请求本院判处《联邦量刑指南》建议的120个月监禁刑。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯）\n联邦检察官\n\n签署人：\n\n签署人：/s/\n\nMicah F. Fergenson（迈卡·F·弗根森）\nRyan B. Finkel（赖安·B·芬克尔）\nJustin R. Horton（贾斯汀·R·霍顿）\nJuliana N. Murray（朱莉安娜·N·默里）\n联邦助理检察官\n212-637-2190/-6612/-2314","key_entities":["Guo","GTV","CCP","Himalaya","Je","Miles Guo","CIPA","Himalaya Exchange","Farm Loan","Kwok","Saraca","Chinese Communist Party","G Clubs","William Je","Horton","Fergenson","Murray","Finkel","Yanping Wang","HCHK","GETTR"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":19,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":22,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":42,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":56,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":81,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":255,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":461,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":9913,"status":"published","published_at":"2024-11-22 00:00:00","created_at":"2024-11-22","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:13:45"}