{"id":"court_sdny_52_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":52,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"LETTER","filed_date":null,"title":"![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg) United States Attorney Southern District of New York","summary_zh":"检方函件（CIPA 法律框架说明）—— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）等案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #52。检方致 Torres 法官，系统梳理《机密信息程序法》(CIPA) 各条款及相关判例，告知拟依 CIPA 第4条就机密信息提交单方（ex parte）密封动议以限制开示，并请求法院安排单方预审会议讨论该动议的范围。","summary_en":"Government letter outlining the CIPA legal framework — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui) et al., SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF No. 52. The prosecution writes to Judge Torres summarizing the Classified Information Procedures Act's statutory scheme and governing case law, gives notice of its intent to file an ex parte, sealed motion under CIPA Section 4 to withhold or limit discovery of classified information, and requests an ex parte pretrial conference on the motion's scope.","body_en":"![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\n*United States Attorney Southern District of New York*\n\n*The Silvio J. Mollo Building One Saint Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007*\n\nApril 20, 2023\n\n**VIA ECF** Hon. Analisa Torres Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St.\n\nNew York, NY 10007-1312\n\n# **Re:** *United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, Kin Ming Je, and Yanping Wang,* **S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\nDear Judge Torres:\n\nThe Government respectfully submits this letter, outlining the relevant legal framework under the Classified Information Procedures Act (\"CIPA\"), 18 U.S.C. app. 3. This letter provides a summary of (1) CIPA's statutory framework as it pertains to pretrial filings and (2) the different types of CIPA motions that may be filed in this case.\n\nAt the June 6, 2023 conference, the Government hopes to set a schedule for the Government's filing of a motion pursuant to Section 4 of CIPA—which the Government proposes to file on an *ex parte* basis under seal—seeking to withhold from discovery, substitute, and/or summarize certain classified information. Section 4 and other provisions of CIPA, and the applicable legal standards governing CIPA motions, are discussed in further detail below.\n\n# **Overview of the CIPA Statutory Framework**\n\nCIPA governs the discovery of classified information in federal criminal cases. *See United States v. Abu-Jihaad*, 630 F.3d 102, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2010). Congress enacted CIPA to enable the Government to fulfill its duty to protect national security information, while simultaneously complying with its discovery obligations in federal criminal prosecutions. *See* S. Rep. No. 96- 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (1980), *reprinted in* 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4296; *see also United States v. Pappas*, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that CIPA's fundamental purpose is to \"'harmonize a defendant's right to obtain and present exculpatory material upon his trial and the government's right to protect classified material in the national interest.'\" (quoting *United States v. Wilson*, 571 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)); *see also, e.g.*, *United States v. Apperson*, 441 F.3d 1162, 1193 n.8 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that CIPA \"evidence[s] Congress's intent to prevent classified information from unnecessary disclosure at any stage of a criminal trial,\" while simultaneously ensuring that a defendant's right to present a defense is not compromised).\n\nCIPA does not alter the defendant's substantive rights or the Government's discovery obligations. *See United States v. Anderson*, 872 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases). Rather, CIPA creates a procedural framework that permits the Court to rule, before trial, on questions related to classified materials. This framework helps to prevent unnecessary or\n\ninadvertent disclosure of classified information, and allows the Government to assess the national security \"costs\" associated with pursuing a certain course in its criminal prosecution. *See, e.g.*, *Anderson*, 872 F.2d at 1514; *United States v. Collins*, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1983); *United States v. Lopez-Lima*, 738 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (S.D. Fla. 1990).\n\nAn overview of certain potentially relevant CIPA provisions follows:\n\n# Section 2: Pretrial Conference\n\nSection 2 of CIPA provides that the Court may hold a conference at any time after an indictment has been filed to consider matters relating to classified information. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2. A court may elect to hold a Section 2 conference with both parties, or *ex parte* with either the Government or the defense, to address classified matters. *See United States v. Abu-Jihaad*, No. 07 Cr. 57 (MRK), 2007 WL 2972623, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Oct. 11, 2007) (collecting cases in which \"numerous courts have upheld the propriety of *ex parte*, *in camera* proceedings in cases involving classified information\").\n\n# Section 3: General Protective Order\n\nSection 3 of CIPA provides for an appropriate protective order to be entered to protect against the unauthorized dissemination of classified information disclosed to the defense in connection with the prosecution. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3.\n\n# Section 4: Discovery and Protective Orders\n\nSection 4 of CIPA outlines the procedures to be followed when the Government seeks to limit the information it is providing to the defense in the context of the discovery process. Among its provisions, CIPA authorizes a court to deny or modify discovery of classified information that ordinarily would be produced pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 or otherwise. Specifically, Section 4 of CIPA provides that \"upon a sufficient showing,\" a court may \"authorize the United States to delete specified items of classified information from [discovery], . . . to substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove.\" 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4. This provision \"clarifies district courts' powers under Rule 16(d)(1) to issue protective orders denying or restricting discovery for good cause, which includes information vital to the national security.\" *United States v. Stewart*, 590 F.3d 93, 130 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also* Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) (district courts may \"for good cause, deny . . . discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief\").\n\nThe Second Circuit has explained that, in analyzing a Section 4 motion, a district court should engage in a three-stage analysis. *See United States v. Aref*, 533 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2008). First, the Court must determine whether the classified information at issue is discoverable. *See id.* at 80. Second, the Court should assess whether the Government has properly invoked the need to protect against the disclosure of classified information, which the Second Circuit determined is sourced in the common-law privilege against the disclosure of state secrets. *See id*. at 78. The Second Circuit explained that the state secrets \"privilege 'allows the government to withhold information from discovery when disclosure would be inimical to national security.'\" *Id*. at 78-79 (quoting *Zuckerbraum v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.*, 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991)). That privilege, the *Aref* court observed, can only be invoked by the \"head of the department which has control\n\nover the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer.\" *Id*. at 80 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); *see United States v. Zubaydah*, 142 S. Ct. 959, 967 (2022). As a consequence, in cases in this Circuit involving the equities of the Department of Justice in classified information, any such claim of privilege must personally be asserted by the Attorney General, typically in the form of a declaration.\n\nThe third stage in the above-described analysis is the Court's determination of whether, if it has been invoked, the Government's common-law privilege must give way. *See Aref*, 533 F.3d at 80. This includes consideration of whether the classified material that the Government proposes to delete from discovery (or to produce in summary form) is both \"relevant and helpful\" to the defense. *See id*. at 79-80. The \"relevant and helpful\" standard was first articulated by the Supreme Court in *United States v. Roviaro*, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), a case that concerned the privilege that permits the Government, in certain circumstances, to withhold the identity of its informants.\n\n# Section 5: Notice from a Defendant\n\nPursuant to Section 5 of CIPA, a defendant who reasonably expects to disclose (or cause the disclosure of) classified information at any stage of a prosecution is required to file notice of such intention. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a). Such information might include classified information that the defense has learned through the discovery process, or classified information that is known to the defendant himself. The Section 5 notice must \"include a brief description of the classified information,\" *id*., and \"must be particularized, setting forth specifically the classified information which the defendant reasonably believes to be necessary to his defense.\" *Collins*, 720 F.2d at 1199. A defendant must provide any Section 5 notice \"within the time specified by the court or, where no time is specified, within thirty days prior to trial.\" 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a).\n\nIf the defendant fails to provide a timely and adequately detailed notice sufficiently in advance of trial to permit the implementation of CIPA procedures, Section 5(b) provides for preclusion. *See United States v. Badia*, 827 F.2d 1458, 1465 (11th Cir. 1987). Similarly, if the defense attempts to disclose at trial classified information which is not described in their Section 5(a) notice, preclusion is the appropriate remedy prescribed by Section 5(b). *See United States v. Smith*, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985) (\"A defendant is forbidden from disclosing any such information absent the giving of notice.\").\n\nIn this case, the Government believes it is possible that it may disclose classified information to cleared counsel for both defendants, Ho Wan Kwok and Yanping Wang.\n\n#### Section 6: Hearings and Substitutions\n\nIf the defense gives Section 5 notice of intention to disclose (or cause the disclosure of) classified information, the Government may request the Court to conduct a hearing to make determinations as to the use, relevance, or admissibility of the classified information at trial or a pretrial proceeding. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(a). Section 6 also requires that the Court hold any such hearing in camera \"if the Attorney General certifies to the Court in such petition that a public proceeding may result in the disclosure of classified information.\" *Id.* At the hearing, the defense must proffer why the classified information that they seek to disclose is relevant, while the Government is given an opportunity to challenge the request on various grounds—including, for example, the materiality and admissibility of the proposed information. *See, e.g.*, *United States v.*  *Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563, 1581 (S.D. Fla. 1995); *United States v. Rezaq*, 899 F. Supp. 697, 704 (D.D.C. 1995).\n\nIf the Court grants a defendant's request to disclose classified information, the Government may then seek Court approval for alternative means of disclosure—including an unclassified statement admitting the facts contained in the classified materials, or an unclassified summary of the facts contained in the classified materials. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(l). CIPA directs that the Court shall grant such an application from the Government if the Court \"finds that the statement or summary will provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified information.\" *Id*.\n\nIf the classified information cannot be disclosed in a manner that provides the \"defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense\" as would disclosure of the classified information, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c), and the Government is unwilling to disclose such information, then the Court may take appropriate action, including making a finding against the Government on any issue as to which the classified information is probative, striking testimony, barring the use of certain testimony or even dismissing the indictment. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e).\n\n#### Section 7: Interlocutory Appeals\n\nCIPA Section 7 gives the Government the right to pursue an interlocutory appeal of an adverse CIPA decision. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 7.\n\n#### **CIPA Section 4 Filings Are Properly Made** *Ex Parte* **and** *In Camera*\n\nCIPA expressly authorizes Section 4 filings to be made *ex parte*, *in camera*, as the Government proposes to do here. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4 (\"The court may permit the United States to make a [Section 4] request . . . in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone.\"). Congress viewed the *ex parte* nature of a Section 4 proceeding as important. As the record of the House of Representatives put it, \"since the government is seeking to withhold classified information from the defendant, an adversary hearing with defense knowledge would defeat the very purpose of the discovery rules.\" H.R. Rep. No. 96-831, pt. 1, at 27 n.22 (1980); *see also* Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 Advisory Committee Notes, 1966 Amendments, Subdivision (e) (\"[I]t would defeat the purpose of the protective order if the government were required to make its showing in open court. The problem arises in its most extreme form where matters of national security are involved.”).[1](#page-3-0)\n\nProceeding *ex parte* and *in camera* makes sense in light of CIPA's purpose. First, the Government makes a motion pursuant to Section 4 to delete or summarize certain materials so that it will not need to reveal those materials. If the Government's motion to delete or summarize were not reviewed *in camera* and *ex parte*, the motion practice would itself reveal the very information—and commonly, the sensitive technique or techniques used to obtain that information—that the Government seeks ultimately to shield in the interest of national security. *See, e.g.*, *Aref*, 533 F.3d at 81 (\"When the government is seeking to withhold classified information\n\n<span id=\"page-3-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> Similarly, Rule 16(d)(l) contemplates the same procedure, stating: \"At any time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief. The court may permit a party to show good cause by a written statement that the court will inspect *ex parte*.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1).\n\nfrom the defendant, an adversary hearing with defense knowledge would defeat the very purpose of the discovery rules.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); *United States v. Campa*, 529 F.3d 980, 995 (11th Cir. 2008) (\"The right that section four confers on the government would be illusory if defense counsel were allowed to participate in section four proceedings because defense counsel would be able to see the information that the government asks the district court to keep from defense counsel's view.\"); *United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria*, 144 F.3d 1249, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (\"The legislative history of [CIPA] explains that because the government is seeking to withhold classified information from the defendant, an adversary hearing with defense knowledge would defeat the very purpose of the discovery rule.\").\n\nSecond, CIPA Section 4 motions concern the question of what the Government will turn over during the discovery process. Such questions are usually answered solely by Government attorneys with no Court involvement. When the Government moves for the Court to become involved in assessing whether certain materials must be produced, it is entirely routine for that judicial assessment to be handled *ex parte*, *in camera*. As the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has noted, *ex parte* CIPA practice is \"close[ly] analog[ous]\" to more familiar *ex parte* practices:\n\n> When a court (rather than the prosecutor alone, as is ordinarily the case) reviews evidence in camera to determine whether it constitutes a witness statement subject to disclosure under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b), or exculpatory material subject to disclosure under Brady, the defendant is likewise not entitled to access to any of the evidence reviewed by the court . . . to assist in his argument that it should be disclosed.\n\n*United States v. Mejia*, 448 F.3d 436, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\nIn accordance with the foregoing principles, courts in this Circuit and elsewhere routinely permit the Government to make Section 4 filings *ex parte* and *in camera*, regardless of whether one or more defense counsel has or could obtain an appropriate security clearance. *See, e.g.*, *Abu-Jihaad*, 630 F.3d at 143 (rejecting argument that Government's *ex parte* and *in camera* submissions were improper (citing *Aref*, 533 F.3d at 81)); *Abu-Jihaad*, 2007 WL 2972623, at \\*l (collecting numerous cases), *aff'd*, *Abu-Jihaad*, 630 F.3d 102; *United States v. Liu*, No. 19 Cr. 804 (VEC), 2021 WL 3374535, at \\*4 (S.DN.Y. Aug. 3, 2021) (noting that *ex parte* consideration was appropriate and that an argument to the contrary \"is foreclosed by CIPA itself and has been rejected repeatedly by the Second Circuit and other courts to consider the issue\"); *United States v. Saipov*, No. 17 Cr. 722 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2019), ECF No. 212 (\"Courts routinely permit the Government to proceed *ex parte* when the substance of the classified information that the Government seeks to [] with[o]ld from discovery is explicitly discussed in the relevant motion.\") (collecting cases); *accord* Opinion & Order, *Alimehmeti*, ECF No. 54, May 8, 2017 (denying defense motion for access to Government's *ex parte* Section 4 motion); Order, *United States v. Ashe*, No. 15 Cr. 706 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2016), ECF No. 272 (same); Transcript, *United States v. Jones*, No. 16 Cr. 19 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2016), ECF No. 30 (same); Memorandum Decision and Order, *United States v. Mostafa*, No. 04 Cr. 356 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y Jan. 17, 2014), ECF No. 233 (same); *United States v. Ahmad*, Nos. 04 Cr. 301 (JCH), 06 Cr. 194 (JCH), 2013 WL 1899792, at \\*3 (D. Conn. May 1, 2013) (\"Because the court finds that, in accordance with section 4, the classified information is not discoverable, a clearance would not have entitled the defense to see any of the information.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); *United States v. Ahmed*, No. 10 Cr. 131 (PKC), 2011 WL 4915005, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011) (ruling, over objection of cleared defense counsel, that *ex parte*, *in camera* consideration of the Government's Section 4 motion was proper); *Abu-Jihaad*, 2007 WL 2972623, at \\*2 (holding that a Section 4 motion can be made ex parte and noting that \"[i]f . . . the Court decides that the information is not discoverable at all, Defendant is not entitled to production of the information, regardless whether his counsel is willing to submit to security clearance procedures\"); *United States v. Libby*, 429 F. Supp. 2d 18, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (permitting the Government to file *ex parte* Section 4 motions—even though the defendant and his counsel held appropriate security clearances—upon a showing in the Government's filing that the defense did not have the requisite \"need-to-know\").\n\n# **The Government's Section 4 Motion**\n\nFor the reasons set out above, and in line with the uniform practice of courts in this District, the Government requests to file its Section 4 motion on an *ex parte* basis when such motion is due, and for the Court to review that motion *in camera* and maintain it under seal.\n\nShould the Court have any further questions about the anticipated scope or substance of the Government's Section 4 motion, the Government requests that the Court and the Government proceed to an *ex parte* Section 2 pretrial conference.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney\n\nBy: /s/\n\nJuliana N. Murray Ryan B. Finkel Micah F. Fergenson Assistants United States Attorney (212) 637-2314 / 6612 / 2190\n\ncc: Stephen Cook, Esq., and Steven Best, Esq., *counsel for defendant Ho Wan Kwok* Alex Lipman, Esq., and Priya Chaudhry, Esq., *counsel for defendant Yanping Wang*","body_zh":"United States Attorney（美国联邦检察官）\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区）\n\nThe Silvio J. Mollo Building One Saint Andrew's Plaza New York, New York 10007\n\n2023年4月20日\n\n通过 ECF 送达\nHon. Analisa Torres（阿纳丽莎·托雷斯法官）\nDaniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse（丹尼尔·帕特里克·莫伊尼汉美国联邦法院）\n500 Pearl St.\nNew York, NY 10007-1312\n\n事由：United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, Kin Ming Je, and Yanping Wang（美国 诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）、Kin Ming Je（余建明）及 Yanping Wang（王雁平）案），案号 S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n尊敬的托雷斯法官：\n\n政府谨此提交本信函，概述《Classified Information Procedures Act（机密信息程序法）》（简称“CIPA”）（18 U.S.C. app. 3）项下的相关法律框架。本信函总结了：(1) CIPA 中关于审前提交文件的法定框架；(2) 本案中可能提交的不同类型 CIPA 动议。\n\n在2023年6月6日的庭审会议上，政府希望确定政府依据 CIPA 第4条提交动议的时间表——政府建议在单方（ex parte）且封存的情况下提交该动议——以申请对某些机密信息不予开示、进行替代及/或进行汇总摘要。关于第4条及 CIPA 的其他规定，以及管辖 CIPA 动议的适用法律标准，下文将详加论述。\n\nCIPA 法定框架概述\n\nCIPA 规范联邦刑事案件中机密信息的证据开示。参见 United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2010)。国会颁布 CIPA 旨在使政府能够在履行保护国家安全信息职责的同时，遵守其在联邦刑事起诉中的证据开示义务。参见 S. Rep. No. 96-823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4296；亦见 United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996)（指出 CIPA 的根本目的是“‘调和被告在审判中获取并出示开脱罪责材料的权利，与政府为了国家利益保护机密材料的权利’”）（援引 United States v. Wilson, 571 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)）；亦见如 United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1193 n.8 (10th Cir. 2006)（指出 CIPA “证明了国会意在防止机密信息在刑事审判的任何阶段发生不必要的披露”，同时确保被告进行辩护的权利不受损害）。\n\nCIPA 并未改变被告的实体权利或政府的证据开示义务。参见 United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1989)（汇集判例）。相反，CIPA 建立了一套程序性框架，允许法院在审判前就涉及机密材料的问题作出裁定。该框架有助于防止机密信息发生不必要或疏忽的披露，并允许政府评估在其刑事起诉中采取特定策略所涉及的国家安全“代价”。参见如 Anderson, 872 F.2d at 1514；United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1983)；United States v. Lopez-Lima, 738 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (S.D. Fla. 1990)。\n\n以下是某些潜在相关的 CIPA 条款概述：\n\n第2条：审前会议\n\nCIPA 第2条规定，在起诉书提交后的任何时间，法院均可召开会议以审议与机密信息有关的事项。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2。法院可选择与双方当事人共同召开第2条会议，或单独与政府或辩方举行单方会议，以处理机密事项。参见 United States v. Abu-Jihaad, No. 07 Cr. 57 (MRK), 2007 WL 2972623, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 11, 2007)（汇集判例指出“众多法院均支持在涉及机密信息的案件中举行单方、秘密审理（in camera）程序的正当性”）。\n\n第3条：一般保护令\n\nCIPA 第3条规定应签发适当的保护令，以防止向辩方披露的与起诉相关的机密信息发生未经授权的散播。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3。\n\n第4条：证据开示与保护令\n\nCIPA 第4条概述了当政府在证据开示过程中寻求限制向辩方提供信息时应遵循的程序。在这些条款中，CIPA 授权法院拒绝或变更通常应依据《Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure（联邦刑事诉讼规则）》第16条或其他规定所应开示的机密信息。具体而言，CIPA 第4条规定，“经充分证明”，法院可“授权美国从[证据开示中]删除特定的机密信息项目，……以信息的摘要替代此类机密文件，或以承认该机密信息往往能证明的相关事实的声明替代”。18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4。该条款“明确了地方法院根据第 16(d)(1) 条签发保护令的权力，即出于正当理由（包括关乎国家安全的关键信息）拒绝或限制证据开示”。United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 130 (2d Cir. 2009)（内部引文省略）；亦见 Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1)（地方法院可“出于正当理由，拒绝……证据开示或查验，或给予其他适当救济”）。\n\nSecond Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）解释称，在审查第4条动议时，地方法院应进行三阶段分析。参见 United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2008)。首先，法院必须确定涉案机密信息是否属于可开示范围。参见同上，第80页。其次，法院应评估政府是否正当援引了防止披露机密信息的必要性，第二巡回法院认定该必要性源自反对披露国家机密的普通法特权。参见同上，第78页。第二巡回法院解释称，国家机密“特权‘允许政府在披露信息会危及国家安全时，在证据开示中扣留该信息’”。同上，第78-79页（援引 Zuckerbraum v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991)）。Aref 案法院指出，该特权只能由“对该事项拥有控制权的部门主管在亲自实际考量后”方可援引。同上，第80页（内部引证与引号省略）；参见 United States v. Zubaydah, 142 S. Ct. 959, 967 (2022)。因此，在本巡回区涉及 Department of Justice（美国司法部）在机密信息中权益的案件中，任何此类特权主张都必须由 Attorney General（美国司法部长）亲自提出，通常以声明书的形式作出。\n\n上述分析中的第三个阶段是法院确定：如果政府援引了普通法特权，该特权是否必须让步。参见 Aref, 533 F.3d at 80。这包括考量政府提议从证据开示中删除（或以摘要形式提供）的机密材料对辩方而言是否既“相关又有帮助”。参见同上，第79-80页。“相关且有帮助”的标准最初由 Supreme Court（最高法院）在 United States v. Roviaro, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) 一案中阐述，该案涉及允许政府在特定情况下隐瞒线人身份的特权。\n\n第5条：被告的通知\n\n根据 CIPA 第5条，合理预期将在起诉的任何阶段披露（或导致披露）机密信息的被告，必须提交具有该等意图的通知。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a)。此类信息可能包括辩方通过证据开示程序获知的机密信息，或被告本人知晓的机密信息。第5条通知必须“包括对机密信息的简要说明”，同上，且“必须是具体明确的，具体列出被告合理认为对其辩护所必需的机密信息”。Collins, 720 F.2d at 1199。被告必须“在法院指定的时间内，或在未指定时间的情况下，于审判前三十天内”提供任何第5条通知。18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a)。\n\n如果被告未能在审判前足够提前的时间内提供及时且充分详尽的通知以落实 CIPA 程序，第 5(b) 条规定了证据排除救济。参见 United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1465 (11th Cir. 1987)。同样，如果辩方试图在审判中披露其第 5(a) 条通知中未描述的机密信息，第 5(b) 条规定的适当救济为证据排除。参见 United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985)（“未发出通知的，禁止被告披露任何此类信息。”）。\n\n在本案中，政府认为其有可能向被告郭文贵及王雁平两人的持安全许可律师披露机密信息。\n\n第6条：听证会与替代方案\n\n如果辩方发出了有意披露（或导致披露）机密信息的第5条通知，政府可请求法院举行听证会，以就审判或审前程序中机密信息的使用、相关性或可采性作出裁定。18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(a)。第6条还要求，如果司法部长在该等请求中向法院证明公开程序可能导致机密信息被披露，则法院必须秘密审理举行任何此类听证会。同上。在听证会上，辩方必须举证说明其寻求披露的机密信息为何具有相关性，同时政府有权基于各种理由对该请求提出异议——例如包括提议信息的重要性与可采性。参见如 United States v. Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. 1563, 1581 (S.D. Fla. 1995)；United States v. Rezaq, 899 F. Supp. 697, 704 (D.D.C. 1995)。\n\n如果法院准许了被告披露机密信息的请求，政府随后可就替代披露方式寻求法院批准——包括承认机密材料中所含事实的非保密声明，或机密材料中所含事实的非保密摘要。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(1)。CIPA 规定，如果法院“认定该声明或摘要将向被告提供与其披露具体机密信息基本相同的辩护能力”，则法院应当准许政府的此类申请。同上。\n\n如果机密信息无法以向“被告提供与其披露机密信息基本相同的辩护能力”的方式进行披露（18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)），且政府不愿披露该等信息，则法院可采取适当行动，包括在机密信息具有证明力的任何问题上作出对政府不利的认定、删除证词、禁止使用特定证词，乃至驳回起诉书。18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e)。\n\n第7条：中间上诉\n\nCIPA 第7条赋予政府就针对其的不利 CIPA 裁定提起中间上诉的权利。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 7。\n\nCIPA 第4条的提交文件适于以单方及秘密审理方式提出\n\n《机密信息程序法》（Classified Information Procedures Act，简称 CIPA）明确授权依据第4条（Section 4）提出的文书可以单方（ex parte）、秘密（in camera）提交，正如政府在此拟进行的操作。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4（“法院可允许合众国以书面陈述的形式提出[第4条]请求……仅供法院单独审查。”）。国会认为第4条程序的单方性质至关重要。正如众议院（House of Representatives）记录所述，“鉴于政府正寻求对被告隐匿机密信息，允许辩方知情的对抗性听证会将会彻底挫败证据开示规则的目的本身。”H.R. Rep. No. 96-831, pt. 1, at 27 n.22 (1980)；另见 Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 咨询委员会附注（Advisory Committee Notes），1966年修正案，第(e)小节（“如果要求政府在公开法庭进行举证，将挫败保护令的目的。这一问题在涉及国家安全事项时表现得最为极端。”）1。\n\n鉴于 CIPA 的立法目的，进行单方和秘密审理是合乎情理的。首先，政府依据第4条提出动议以删除或汇总某些材料，以便无需披露这些材料。如果政府关于删除或汇总的动议不进行秘密和单方审查，动议程序本身就会泄露政府为了国家安全利益最终寻求屏蔽的信息本身——以及通常用于获取该信息的敏感技术。参见例如 Aref 案，533 F.3d at 81（“当政府寻求对被告隐匿机密信息时，允许辩方知情的对抗性听证会将会挫败证据开示规则的目的本身。”（引文省略））；United States v. Campa 案，529 F.3d 980, 995 (11th Cir. 2008)（“如果允许辩护律师参与第四条程序，第四条赋予政府的权利将沦为空谈，因为辩护律师将能够看到政府请求地区法院向辩护律师隐匿的信息。”）；United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria 案，144 F.3d 1249, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998)（“[CIPA] 的立法历史说明，由于政府正寻求对被告隐匿机密信息，允许辩方知情的对抗性听证会将会挫败证据开示规则的目的本身。”）。\n\n1 同样，第16(d)(1)条也设想了相同的程序，规定：“法院得在任何时候因正当理由拒绝、限制或推迟证据开示或查验，或给予其他适当救济。法院可允许一方当事人通过书面陈述证明具有正当理由，该书面陈述由法院单方审查。”Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1)。\n\n其次，CIPA 第4条动议涉及政府在证据开示过程中应移交哪些材料的问题。此类问题通常完全由政府检察官在没有法院介入的情况下做出答复。当政府动议请求法院介入评估是否必须提供某些材料时，该项司法评估以单方、秘密方式处理是完全符合惯例的。正如哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院（Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit）所指出的，CIPA 的单方做法与更为熟知的单方做法“高度相似”：\n\n当法院（而非通常情况下的检察官单独）秘密审查证据以确定其是否构成依据《詹克斯法案》（Jencks Act，18 U.S.C. § 3500(b)）应予披露的证人证言，或依据布雷迪规则（Brady）应予披露的开脱罪责材料时，被告同样无权查阅法院审查的任何证据……以协助其论证该证据应当予以披露。\n\nUnited States v. Mejia 案，448 F.3d 436, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2006)（引用与内部引号省略）。\n\n根据上述原则，本巡回区及其他地区的法院通常均允许政府单方且秘密地提交第4条文书，不论一名或多名辩护律师是否拥有或能否获得适当的安全许可。参见例如 Abu-Jihaad 案，630 F.3d at 143（驳回关于政府单方和秘密提交材料系不当的抗辩（援引 Aref 案，533 F.3d at 81））；Abu-Jihaad 案，2007 WL 2972623, at *1（汇编多起判例），aff'd，Abu-Jihaad 案，630 F.3d 102；United States v. Liu 案，No. 19 Cr. 804 (VEC), 2021 WL 3374535, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2021)（指出单方审议是适当的，且相反的论点“被 CIPA 本身所排斥，并已被第二巡回法院及审理该问题的其他法院反复驳回”）；United States v. Saipov 案，No. 17 Cr. 722 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2019)，ECF No. 212（“当政府寻求在证据开示中隐匿的机密信息的实质内容在相关动议中被明确讨论时，法院通常允许政府进行单方程序。”）（汇编判例）；一致意见参见 Opinion & Order，Alimehmeti 案，ECF No. 54，2017年5月8日（驳回辩方要求查阅政府单方第4条动议的动议）；Order，United States v. Ashe 案，No. 15 Cr. 706 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2016)，ECF No. 272（同上）；Transcript，United States v. Jones 案，No. 16 Cr. 19 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2016)，ECF No. 30（同上）；Memorandum Decision and Order，United States v. Mostafa 案，No. 04 Cr. 356 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2014)，ECF No. 233（同上）；United States v. Ahmad 案，Nos. 04 Cr. 301 (JCH), 06 Cr. 194 (JCH), 2013 WL 1899792, at *3 (D. Conn. May 1, 2013)（“由于法院认定，根据第4条，该机密信息不可开示，因此安全许可并不能赋予辩方查看任何该信息的权利。”（内部引号省略））；United States v. Ahmed 案，No. 10 Cr. 131 (PKC), 2011 WL 4915005, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011)（在持有安全许可的辩护律师提出异议的情况下，裁定对政府的第4条动议进行单方、秘密审议是正当的）；Abu-Jihaad 案，2007 WL 2972623, at *2（认定第4条动议可以单方提出，并指出“如果……法院裁定该信息根本不可开示，则无论被告律师是否愿意接受安全审查程序，被告均无权要求提供该信息”）；United States v. Libby 案，429 F. Supp. 2d 18, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)（在政府文书证明辩方不具备必要的“知悉必要性”的前提下，允许政府单方提交第4条动议——即使被告及其律师持有适当的安全许可）。\n\n政府的第4条动议\n\n基于上述理由，并符合本区法院的一贯做法，政府请求在该动议到期时以单方形式提交其第4条动议，并请求法院以秘密方式审查该动议并将其予以封存。\n\n如果法院对政府第4条动议的预期范围或实质内容有任何进一步疑问，政府请求法院与政府进行单方的第2条庭前会议。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS\n联邦检察官（United States Attorney）\n\n签署人：/s/\n\nJuliana N. Murray\nRyan B. Finkel\nMicah F. Fergenson\n助理联邦检察官（Assistants United States Attorney）\n(212) 637-2314 / 6612 / 2190\n\n抄送：\nStephen Cook 律师及 Steven Best 律师，被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）之辩护律师\nAlex Lipman 律师及 Priya Chaudhry 律师，被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）之辩护律师","key_entities":["Classified Information","CIPA","Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Yanping Wang","Torres","Kin Ming Je","Analisa Torres","Fergenson","Murray","Finkel","Brady","Jencks"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":30,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":54,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":212,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":233,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":272,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":3072,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:32:29"}