{"id":"court_sdny_558_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":558,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-04","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方没收异议请愿 —— 美国诉Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #558（2025年4月立案）。一名投资者作为Hamilton Opportunity Fund权益人，对Yvette Wang案件的资产没收令提出第三方质疑，主张其在Silvergate Bank账户中的投资权益被政府不当扣押，而被告人Wang对该账户无任何法律权益，要求法院修改没收令并返还其财产。","summary_en":"Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Interest in Forfeited Property — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #558 (filed April 2025). A third-party investor holding interests in Hamilton Opportunity Fund challenges the forfeiture order against defendant Yvette Wang, asserting that the Government improperly seized funds in a Silvergate Bank account in which defendant Wang has no legal right or interest, and seeking amendment of the forfeiture order and return of the petitioner's property.","body_en":"1\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n-  v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG\na/k/a “Yanping,”\na/k/a “Y,”\n\nDefendant.\n\nTHIRD-PARTY PETITION TO\nADJUDICATE PETITIONER’S\nINTEREST IN FORFEITED\nPROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE\nPRELIMINARY ORDER OF\nFORFEITURE\n- VERIFIED CLAIM OF\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner\n (“Petitioner”) files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate\nPetitioner’s Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture,\npursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the “Petition”).\nPetitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest\n(“Petitioner’s Property”) (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government\n(the “Government”) improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with\nDefendant Yvette Wang (“Defendant Wang”). Specifically, Petitioner’s Property was improperly\nseized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in bank account number\n5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Account\n2770”). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770, including\nPetitioner’s Property, was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or\ninterest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner’s Property. The Forfeiture Order (as more fully\ndefined below) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner’s Property because right, title, or\ninterest in Petitioner’s Property was vested in the Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was\n\n---\n\n2\n\nsuperior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the\nacts which gave rise to the Forfeiture Order (as defined below). As such, this Court should amend\nthe Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner’s Property from the Forfeiture Order and order that the\nGovernment immediately return Petitioner’s Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner’s\nclaim, Petitioner states as follows:\nI.\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nIt appears that the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner’s Property, were purely\n“collateral damage” in the Government’s seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant\nWang and Miles Guo (“Defendant Guo”). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure\nof Account 2770, and in that time span, there has never been any explanation as to how Account\n2770 (including Petitioner’s Property) is related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang\npled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any\nshowing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were\never deposited in Account 2770; no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever\ncommingled with Petitioner’s Property; and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had\nanything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is a beneficiary of a constructive trust over Petitioner’s\nProperty and Petitioner’s Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither\nDefendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, have ever demonstrated that\nthey have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner’s Property in Account 2770 or in Account 2770 in\ngeneral. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of “all her right, title, and interest” in\nAccount 2770 (and thus, Petitioner’s Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), her\nconsent has no legal bearing as to Account 2770 or Petitioner’s Property. Defendant Wang never\nhad such “right, title, and interest” in Account 2770 – there is no evidence that she was a signatory\n\n---\n\n3\n\non Account 2770, ever deposited money into Account 2770, or otherwise had any control over\nAccount 2770, and there is no evidence that Defendant Wang ever directed anyone, directly or\nindirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that\nshe does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never\nestablished that Petitioner’s Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required\nby Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner\nrespectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to\nexclude Petitioner’s Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner’s Property to Petitioner;\n(4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner’s attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in\nconnection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys’\nfees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\nII.\nBACKGROUND FACTS\nA. Petitioner’s Property\n1.\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Hamilton Opportunity Fund”), a Cayman\nIslands Segregated Portfolio Company, provided Petitioner with an Offering Memorandum (the\n“Offering Memorandum”) dated January 20, 2022. A true and correct copy of the Offering\nMemorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit A.\n2.\nHamilton Opportunity Fund is a “fund specializing in equity investments selected\nby the Investment Manager [as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum] with a view to\nlong-term capital gains.” Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 33. The Investment Manager (as\nthat term is defined in the Offering Memorandum) had identified an opportunity to invest in a bank\n(the “Digital Bank”) (as more fully described in Offering Memorandum at 33). In connection with\nthis investment, Hamilton Opportunity Fund sought to raise capital by issuing various classes of\n\n---\n\n4\n\nshares. Id. at 34.\n3.\nThe Offering Memorandum offered Petitioner an opportunity to acquire Class B\nShares attributed to a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund - Hamilton M&A Fund\nSP (the “M&A Fund”).\n4.\nDefendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any\ncorporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund or Hamilton Opportunity Fund.  The evidentiary\nrecord is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n5.\nDefendant Wang did not make any investments in the M&A Fund; again, the\nevidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n6.\nOn January 24, 2022, Petitioner submitted an application (the “Subscription\nAgreement”) to Hamilton Opportunity Fund for a subscription for $200,000.00 worth of Class B\nShares in the M&A Fund. A true and correct copy of the Subscription Agreement is attached hereto\nas Exhibit B.\n7.\nOn January 24, 2022, Hamilton Opportunity Fund, on behalf of the M&A Fund,\napproved and accepted the Subscription Agreement. See Exhibit B, Subscription Agreement at\n15.\n8.\nOn February 14, 2022, pursuant to the terms of the Subscription Agreement,\nPetitioner wired $200,000.00 (the “Petitioner Property”) to Account Number 5090042770 at\nSilvergate Bank. A true and correct copy of the wire confirmation is attached hereto as Exhibit C.\n9.\nThe account to which Petitioner wired Petitioner Property to is Account 2770.\n10.\nPursuant to the terms of the Offering Memorandum, Petitioner is entitled to\nredemption of Petitioner’s shares at the Petitioner’s option. Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at\n17; see also id. at 53 (stating that subject to certain limitations, “Class B Shares may be redeemed\n\n---\n\n5\n\nat the option of the Shareholder on any Redemption Day”).\n11.\nThe assets of Hamilton Opportunity Fund are “kept segregated, separate and\nseparately identifiable from those of any other segregated portfolios of the Fund and any general\nassets of the Fund.” Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 12. In addition, pursuant to the laws of\nthe Cayman Islands, it is the duty of Hamilton Opportunity Fund to “segregate, and keep\nsegregated, portfolio assets of each segregated portfolio separate and separately identifiable from\nsegregated portfolio assets of any other segregated portfolio.” Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum\nat 22-23 (citing the Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands, Part XIV, 219(6)(b)).\nB. Seizure of Account 2770\n12.\nOn September 18, 2022, the Government seized the entire balance of the funds in\nAccount 2770.\n13.\nTo date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the\nGovernment had to seize the funds in Account 2770.\nC. The Criminal Case Against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the\nForfeiture Order\n14.\nOn March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang\nand Defendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n15.\nOn May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the\n“Superseding Information”) against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information\ncharged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I)\n(Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering\n(Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a\nForfeiture Allegation (the “Forfeiture Allegation”). Superseding Information at 4.\n16.\nOn the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count\n\n---\n\n6\n\nII as charged in the Superseding Information.\n17.\nAlso on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture\nas to Specific Property/Money Judgment (“Original Forfeiture Order”). ECF No. 329.\n18.\nIn the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, “all her\nright, title, and interest in” certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property\n“constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally\nobtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding]\nInformation.” Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n19.\nDefendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him.\nAccordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the “Guo Trial”). On\nJuly 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to\ncommit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities\nfraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this\nPetition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n20.\nOn January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n21.\nOn January 7, 2025, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture\nas to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the “Forfeiture Order”) ECF No. 488. As it pertains to\nPetitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all\nmaterial respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, “all her right, title,\nand interest in” certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property “constitute[ed]\nproceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or\nproperty involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.” Forfeiture\nOrder at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n---\n\n7\n\n22.\nThe assets in Account 2770 are described in both the Original Forfeiture Order and\nthe Forfeiture Order as follows:\n$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account\nnumber 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September\n18, 2022 (23-FBl-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\nIII.\nARGUMENT\n23.\nIn an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of\nthe evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited,\nand whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part,\nbecause such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any\nright, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to\nthe forfeiture of the property. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n24.\nHere, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner’s Property pursuant\nto 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of a constructive trust over such property. Moreover,\nPetitioner’s interest in Petitioner’s Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any\nright Defendant Wang had in Petitioner’s Property because Defendant Wang had no legal right,\ntitle or, interest in either Petitioner’s Property or Account 2770. In other words, Defendant Wang\ncould not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject\nto criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner’s\nProperty, and Petitioner’s Property should be returned to Petitioner.\n\n---\n\n8\n\nA. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770,\nIncluding Petitioner’s Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First\nInstance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds\n25.\nThe Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner’s Property because there is\nno evidence that the Government has ever demonstrated that Petitioner’s Property, and Account\n2770 in general, is actually forfeitable property, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n26.\n“When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, ‘Federal Rule of\nCriminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is\nsubject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.’” U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)\n(citing U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, “if\nthe government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must determine whether the\ngovernment has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.”\nFed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); Watts, 786 F.3d at 172. “At various points in the\nproceedings, the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion to varying\ndegrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . .or by a\npreponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal\ncitations omitted). “Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the\nproperty in question be considered ‘subject to forfeiture’ in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the\ngovernment has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property\nis seen merely as ‘potentially forfeitable’ . . . or ‘potentially subject to forfeiture.’” Id. (internal\ncitations omitted).\n27.\nThis means that before the court reaches the question of whether the petitioner is\nentitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in\ndispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority\nto seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the\n\n---\n\n9\n\naccounts seized regardless of whether the petitioner can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). See\ne.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n28.\nA full and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair\nadministration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has\nconducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary\nproceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an\nancillary proceeding, since “the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in\nthe criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.” S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,\n3392.\n29.\nIn this matter, there has never been a determination of whether there exists a nexus\nbetween Account 2770 and any of the offenses Defendant Wang was charged with (and pled guilty\nto), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained\nin the publicly-available documents in both Defendant Wang’s and Defendant Guo’s criminal case,\nthe Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n30.\nHere, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture\nAllegation as to both Counts I and Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding\nInformation at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show,\nlet alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which\nDefendant Wang pled guilty.\n31.\nAs to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, “[a]s a result of committing the\nwire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a\n“Yanping” a/k/a “Y,” the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United\n\n---\n\n10\n\nStates Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C)1. . .and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and\nall property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the\ncommission of said offense.” Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the\nelements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18\nU.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, “if the Government’s theory of forfeiture is that the property was\nused to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the\ncommission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial\nconnection between the property and the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n32.\nThe record is devoid of any allegations pertaining to how funds in Account 2770\nare, or are derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang’s conspiracy to commit wire fraud.\nThe Superseding Information alleges that “[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about\nMarch 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive\nstock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and\nGClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the\nHimalaya Exchange [(the “Fraud Scheme”)]. Through the [Fraud Scheme], YVETTE WANG,\na/k/a “Yanping,” a/k/a “Y,” the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced\ninvestors to invest more than $1 billion into entities Guo controlled.” Superseding Information at\n2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing\nany proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into Account 2770. Similarly, there are no allegations in the\nSuperseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into\n\n1 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that “[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture]\nwhich constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of” various specified\noffenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang\nin Count I.\n\n---\n\n11\n\nAccount 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits into Account 2770 were\nfrom investors who were investing in the Digital Bank – an investment that is not implicated in\nany way by the “Fraud Scheme” described in the Superseding Information.  To be sure, Petitioner\naffirms that Petitioner was never a victim of any conduct by Defendant Wang alleged in the\nSuperseding Information and does not believe that any of Petitioner’s Property was ever used in\nany unlawful activity.\n33.\nFinally, there was no relevant testimony during Defendant Guo’s trial concerning\nAccount 2770. There was no testimony regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme\nwere ever deposited into Account 2770, nor, for that matter, whether Defendant Wang ever\ndeposited any money into Account 2770. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would\nindicate there is a nexus between Account 2770 and Defendant Wang’s wire fraud charge, let alone\nsufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing, and the Court\nproperly adjudicated, that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of Account 2770 to be proper.\n34.\nAs to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, “[a]s a result of committing the\nmoney laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a\n“Yanping” a/k/a “Y,” the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United\nStates Code, Section 982(a)(1)2, any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense,\nor any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United\nStates currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.” Superseding\nInformation at 4. As to Count II, The Government “must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18\n\n2 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that “[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an\noffense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that\nthe person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or\nany property traceable to such property.” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\n---\n\n12\n\nU.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.” U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th\nCir. 2015).\n35.\nThe Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy\nto launder money because Defendant Wang “knowing that the property involved in certain\nfinancial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did\nconduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . .and which in fact involved the\nproceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count\nOne of this Information.” Superseding Information at 3.\n36.\nIt is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited for the money laundering charge\nin Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang\nengaging in financial transactions with the “proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count\nOne.” Superseding Information at 3.  As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account\n2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (see ¶¶ 31-33, above) – there is no\nevidence that such funds “constitute[d] or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the\ncommission of” wire fraud. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were\nnot Fraud Scheme proceeds nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could\nnot serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part\nof Defendant Wang’s conviction for Count II.\n37.\nThe overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge\nfurther fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be forfeitable. In the Superseding\nInformation, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding\nInformation at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were “among others”\nthat Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money\n\n---\n\n13\n\n(Superseding Information at 3), these other acts were never identified.\n38.\nFirst, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened\na bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was not. Superseding\nInformation at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately $200 million to\nthat account. Id. The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank\naccount held by Saraca Media Group, Inc. (“Saraca”) (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo\nTrial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), not from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any\nmoney from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be\ntransferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information. Moreover, Account 2770 did\nnot even exist in 2020.\n39.\nThe second act the Government alleges is that “on or about June 5, 2020,”\nDefendant Wang “authorized a wire transfer of $100 million from GTV’s parent company, Saraca,\nto a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Defendant\nGuo’s son.” Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was\ntransferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there\nwas never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account.\nMoreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n40.\nAs seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding\nAccount 2770 whatsoever. The only reference in the record to Account 2770 is Defendant Wang’s\nconsent to forfeit it. However, “a defendant’s consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the\nrequirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of\noffense.” Beltramea, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, “[t]he district court had an\nindependent duty to ensure that the required nexus exists.” Id. (emphasis added).\n\n---\n\n14\n\n41.\nHere, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the\nOriginal Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account\n2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n42.\nThe Government’s continued retention of the funds in Account 2770, without\nshowing that there is a nexus, is wrong and inequitable. Should the Government retain the funds\nin Account 2770, it will be unjustly enriched, since the funds belong to third parties, including\nPetitioner, who are (1) not Defendant Wang or Defendant Guo; and (2) not involved the Fraud\nScheme, let alone victims of such a scheme.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)\n(explaining that a criminal “forfeiture serves no remedial purpose, is designed to punish the\noffender, and cannot be imposed upon innocent owners.”) (emphasis added).\nB. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner’s Property Because There Exists a\nConstructive Trust Over Such Property\n43.\nEven putting aside the Government’s failure to properly demonstrate that the funds\nin Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner’s\nProperty should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does\nDefendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n44.\nUnder the doctrine of constructive trusts, Petitioner’s Property is protected and\nremains the property of Petitioner regardless of any other ownership claims, including Defendant\n\n---\n\n15\n\nWang’s or the Government, standing in her shoes. The Second Circuit3 has held that “a\nconstructive trust qualifies as a ‘legal right, title, or interest in the property’ that ‘may be a superior\ninterest’ to a defendant’s interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. §\n853(n)(6)(A).” Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).\n45.\n“A constructive trust is an equitable remedy, necessarily flexible to accomplish its\npurpose.” Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). “Its\npurpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate\nthe performance of a wrongful act. . .What is necessary is that the court identify a party who is\nholding property under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to\nretain it.” Id. (internal citations omitted).\n46.\n“Whether a party is unjustly enriched is a legal conclusion reached through the\napplication of principles of equity. . . A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound\nby no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief. . . Unjust\nenrichment results when a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the transfer\nand considering the relationship of the parties, it would be inequitable to retain.” Id. (internal\n\n3 “The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the\ngreatest interest in the litigation.” In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d\nCir. 1992), aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., No. 89 CIV. 3071\n(WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). Here, there are three competing jurisdictions\nwhose laws could apply: New York, California, and Cayman Islands. Petitioner’s payment of\nPetitioner’s Property was pursuant to the Subscription Agreement, which is governed by Cayman\nIslands law. See Exhibit B, Subscription Agreement at 8, ¶ 2(s). Account 2770 was an account in\na California bank when Petitioner deposited Petitioner’s Property. Since Account 2770 was seized\n(pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a court in New York state), the funds are now\nin possession of the Government in New York. New York is the forum state of this case. From\nthese facts, New York has the greatest interest in this litigation, and its laws should apply to an\nimposition of a constructive trust. However, to the extent that the Government challenges this\nchoice-of-law determination, Petitioner reserves all rights to request that this Court impose a\nconstructive trust over Petitioner’s Property under California and/or Cayman Islands law.\n\n---\n\n16\n\ncitations omitted).\n47.\nThe New York Court of Appeals outlined several factors to be considered in\ndetermining whether a constructive trust should be imposed in certain circumstances, including\n“(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4)\nunjust enrichment.” Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976). However, New York courts\nhave long held that “these factors are merely useful guides and are not talismanic.” Counihan, 194\nF.3d at 362 (citing to a plethora of New York state cases that have stated this proposition).\n48.\nHere, there is a constructive trust for the benefit of Petitioner over Petitioner’s\nProperty as of the date that it was deposited into Account 2770.\n49.\nPetitioner entered into a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship4 with Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund when Petitioner executed the Subscription Agreement in order to acquire certain\nClass B shares in Hamilton M&A Fund SP.  Per the Subscription Agreement, Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC made a promise to Petitioner that Petitioner’s Property would be invested\nin the Digital Bank. In reliance on this promise, the Petitioner wired Petitioner’s Property to\nAccount 2770 as instructed in the Subscription Agreement. The Government’s improper seizure\nof Account 2770 forced a breach of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC’s promise to invest\nPetitioner’s Property into the Digital Bank. Because of Government’s seizure, Petitioner is not\neven able to exercise his Right of Redemption to obtain back Petitioner’s Property. This would\n\n4 Even if the Court determines that the relationship was not confidential and/or there was no\nfiduciary relationship between Hamilton Opportunity Fund and Petitioner, such would not be\ndeterminative, as the absence of a fiduciary relationship does not preclude the Court from finding\na constructive trust exists. See Koreag, 961 F.2d at 353 (stating that “[w]e do not believe, however,\nthat the lack of a fiduciary relationship between [the parties] automatically defeats [a] claim of\nconstructive trust. Although a fiduciary relationship is one of the factors cited by New York courts,\nthe absence of any one factor will not itself defeat the imposition of a constructive trust when\notherwise required by equity”).\n\n---\n\n17\n\nresult in unjust enrichment to the benefit of the Government since the Government is now retaining\nPetitioner’s Property without any legal cause to do so. See, e.g., U.S. v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 340\n(2nd Cir. 1995) (finding that imposition of a constructive trust was proper where, amongst other\nreasons, Government’s forfeiture caused a breach of an implied promise); Torres v. $36,256.80\nU.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a constructive trust appropriate  where\n“The government’s forfeiture forced a breach of that promise that may result in a potentially unjust\nenrichment of the government (and commensurate unjust impoverishment of [the plaintiff]).”)\n50.\nAccordingly, Petitioner has shown that a constructive trust should be imposed over\nPetitioner’s Property. Such a constructive trust “qualifies as a ‘legal right, title, or interest in the\nproperty’ that ‘may be a superior interest’ to a defendant’s interest for the purposes of a forfeiture\nstatute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).” Willis, 652 F.3d at 242.\n51.\nThe property upon which the constructive trust is sought – Petitioners Property - is\neasily traceable. See Exhibit C.\n52.\nMoreover, the imposition of a constructive trust is fully available to Petitioner, even\nif the Government contends that others are owed restitution from any forfeited property. “When a\nparty can directly trace its assets, without resorting to fictions or presumptions, a constructive trust\nis available even in cases involving multiple fraud victims.” U.S. v. Ovid, 2012 WL 2087084, *7\n(E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012). “[C]ourts are not free to disregard the law of constructive trusts when a\nclaimant can directly trace its property, even if this leaves one innocent victim better off than\nanother equally innocent victim.” Id. The “orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases” is to\n“return[] identifiable assets to their owners, turning to pro rata distribution only when specific\nidentification or transactional tracing is impossible.” Id. at *8 (citing Restatement (Third) of\nRestitution & Unjust Enrichment, § 59 Reporter’s Note G, at 437).\n\n---\n\n18\n\nC. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner’s Property\n53.\nPetitioner’s interest in Petitioner’s Property is absolutely superior to any interest\nthat the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner’s Property.\n54.\n21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner’s interest in the forfeited\nproperty, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner’s\ninterest “renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest\nwas vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest\nof the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the\nproperty under this section.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n55.\nHere, as set forth above, Defendant Wang never had any interest in Petitioner’s\nProperty or Account 2770; indeed, the record is entirely silent as to what the relationship is\nbetween Defendant Wang, the Fraud Scheme, and Account 2770.\n56.\nIt is axiomatic that neither the Government nor Defendant Wang can argue that they\nhave a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Likewise, Defendant\nWang cannot forfeit her interest in a property in which she had no interest.\nD. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys’ Fees\n57.\nThe Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to\nfile this petition asserting Petitioner’s right to Petitioner’s Property and to challenge the forfeiture\nof Petitioner’s Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover\nattorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner’s\ncosts and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28\nU.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the\npurposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney’s fees under the EAJA. See United\nStates v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th\n\n---\n\n19\n\nCir. 1995); U.S. v. Bailey, 2015 WL 1893610 at *20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\nIV.\nCONCLUSION\n58.\nFor the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner’s Property,\nwhich renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. See e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\nDefendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner’s Property, and never did.\nPetitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that\nthe Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner’s Property.\n59.\nTherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition;\n(2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner’s Property; (3) order the immediate return of\nPetitioner’s Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner’s\nattorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to\nsubmit an application for such attorneys’ fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is\nnecessary and just.\nDated: April 2, 2025\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\n\nJeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq.\nJeremy W. Schulman, Esq.\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\n\nPaul W. Butler, Esq.\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\nCounsel for Petitioner\n\n---\n\n20\n\nATTESTATION AND OATH\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I,\n__, attest and declare under\npenalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided\nin support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.\nExecuted on this ________ day of April, 2025\n\nSignature","body_zh":"美国联邦地区法院\n纽约南区（Southern District of New York）\n\n美利坚合众国（United States of America）\n\n- 诉 -\n\nYvette Wang（王雁平）\n又名“Yanping（雁平）”\n又名“Y”\n\n被告。\n\n裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收令的第三方请愿书\n- 经核实的权利主张\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n请愿人（“请愿人”）依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c) 条，提出本份《裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收令的第三方请愿书》（“本请愿书”）。请愿人请求返还请愿人拥有合法权利、所有权及/或权益的资金（“请愿人财产”）（定义详见下文），该笔资金系由美国政府（“政府”）在依据针对被告 Yvette Wang（“被告 Wang”）做出的没收令中予以不当扣押。具体而言，请愿人财产系由政府在扣押以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机遇基金独立投资组合公司，“Hamilton Opportunity Fund”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）的第 5090042770 号银行账户（“2770 账户”）内的全部资金时不当扣押。然而，任何涉及 2770 账户内资金（包括请愿人财产）的没收令均属违法且不当，因为被告 Wang 对 2770 账户及请愿人财产均无任何合法权利、所有权或权益。因此，由于请愿人财产的权利、所有权或权益自始归属于请愿人而非被告 Wang，并且在引发没收令（定义详见下文）的行为发生之时优于被告 Wang 的任何权利、所有权或权益，该没收令（定义详见下文）就请愿人财产而言归于无效。据此，本法院应修改没收令，将请愿人财产从没收令中剔除，并命令政府立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人。为支持请愿人的主张，请愿人陈述如下：\n\nI.\n初步陈述\n\n2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）显然纯属政府在起诉被告 Wang 和 Miles Guo（郭文贵，“被告 Guo”）之前扣押资产过程中的“附带损害”。自 2770 账户被扣押以来已有两年半之久，在此期间，从未有任何解释说明 2770 账户（包括请愿人财产）如何与被告 Wang 认罪答辩的任何罪行相关联，而这是依法做出有效没收令的必要前提。从未有任何证据表明被告 Wang 认罪答辩的任何非法活动的收益曾存入 2770 账户；没有证据表明此类活动的任何收益曾与请愿人财产发生混同；事实上，也没有证据表明被告 Wang 曾与 2770 账户有任何关联，或甚至知晓其存在。\n\n如下文所述，请愿人是请愿人财产的拟制信托受益人，在本案中请愿人财产不得被政府扣押。无论是被告 Wang，还是目前代位承受其地位的政府，均未曾证明他们对 2770 账户中的请愿人财产或对一般的 2770 账户享有任何权益。虽然被告 Wang 在没收令（ECF No. 488 第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在 2770 账户（从而包括请愿人财产）中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，但她的同意对 2770 账户或请愿人财产不具有任何法律效力。被告 Wang 从未在 2770 账户中拥有此类“权利、所有权和权益”——没有证据表明她是 2770 账户的签字人、曾向 2770 账户存入资金，或以其他方式对 2770 账户拥有任何控制权，也没有证据表明被告 Wang 曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770 账户存入任何资金。被告 Wang 不能没收她并不拥有且不享有任何权益的财产。事实上，本法院似乎在最初就从未依据 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) 的要求确立请愿人财产是否属于可没收之财产。\n\n基于上述全部理由以及下文阐明的理由，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 批准本请愿书；(2) 修改没收令以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追索因本请愿书而发生的请愿人律师费及诉讼费用，并准许请愿人提交关于该项律师费和费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的该等及其他救济。\n\nII.\n背景事实\n\nA. 请愿人财产\n\n1.\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“Hamilton Opportunity Fund”）系一家开曼群岛独立投资组合公司（Cayman Islands Segregated Portfolio Company），其向请愿人提供了一份日期为 2022 年 1 月 20 日的发售备忘录（“《发售备忘录》”）。《发售备忘录》的真实准确副本作为附件 A 附于本请愿书后。\n\n2.\nHamilton Opportunity Fund 是一家“专门从事由投资经理人［定义见《发售备忘录》］选定的股权投资、旨在实现长期资本利得的基金”。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 33 页。投资经理人（定义见《发售备忘录》）已确定了一项投资某家银行（“数字银行”）（详见《发售备忘录》第 33 页）的机会。就该项投资而言，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 试图通过发行不同类别的股份来募集资金。同上，第 34 页。\n\n3.\n《发售备忘录》向请愿人提供了认购属于 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 某独立投资组合——Hamilton M&A Fund SP（“并购基金”）的 B 类股份的机会。\n\n4.\n被告 Wang 不是并购基金或 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的董事或成员，在其他方面亦不享有并购基金或 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的任何公司权益或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n5.\n被告 Wang 未在并购基金中进行任何投资；同样，证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n6.\n2022 年 1 月 24 日，请愿人向 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 提交了一份认购价值 200,000.00 美元的并购基金 B 类股份的申请（“《认购协议》”）。《认购协议》的真实准确副本作为附件 B 附于本请愿书后。\n\n7.\n2022 年 1 月 24 日，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 代表并购基金批准并接受了《认购协议》。见附件 B，《认购协议》第 15 页。\n\n8.\n2022 年 2 月 14 日，根据《认购协议》的条款，请愿人向 Silvergate Bank 的第 5090042770 号账户电汇了 200,000.00 美元（“请愿人财产”）。电汇确认书的真实准确副本作为附件 C 附于本请愿书后。\n\n9.\n请愿人将请愿人财产电汇至的账户即为 2770 账户。\n\n10.\n根据《发售备忘录》的条款，请愿人有权根据请愿人的选择赎回请愿人的股份。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 17 页；另见同上第 53 页（载明在特定限制条件下，“股东可选择在任何赎回日赎回 B 类股份”）。\n\n11.\nHamilton Opportunity Fund 的资产“与本基金任何其他独立投资组合的资产及本基金的任何一般资产保持隔离、分开且可单独识别”。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 12 页。此外，根据开曼群岛法律，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 有责任“将每个独立投资组合的投资组合资产与任何其他独立投资组合的投资组合资产进行隔离，并保持隔离、分开且可单独识别”。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 22-23 页（引用开曼群岛《公司法（修订版）》第 XIV 部第 219(6)(b) 条）。\n\nB. 扣押 2770 账户\n\n12.\n2022 年 9 月 18 日，政府扣押了 2770 账户中的全部资金余额。\n\n13.\n迄今为止，没有任何公开文件说明政府扣押 2770 账户资金具有何种合理根据。\n\nC. 针对被告 Wang 和被告 Guo 的刑事案件及没收令\n\n14.\n2023 年 3 月 6 日，政府对被告 Wang、被告 Guo 以及从未被提审的第三名被告 William Je（余建明）提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n15.\n2024 年 5 月 3 日，政府对被告 Wang 提起了替代控告书（“《替代控告书》”）。ECF No. 325。《替代控告书》指控被告 Wang 犯有一项串谋电汇欺诈罪（罪名项 I）（《替代控告书》第 1-2 页）以及一项串谋洗钱罪（罪名项 II）（《替代控告书》第 2-4 页）。《替代控告书》还包含一项没收指控（“《没收指控》”）。《替代控告书》第 4 页。\n\n16.\n同日，即 2024 年 5 月 3 日，被告 Wang 就《替代控告书》所指控的罪名项 I 和罪名项 II 作出认罪答辩。\n\n17.\n同样在 2024 年 5 月 3 日，本法院作出了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（“《原没收令》”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n18.\n在《原没收令》中，被告 Wang 同意没收其在某些资产中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，包括 2770 账户，因为该等财产“构成被告个人获取的第一项指控罪行的收益，及/或属于涉及［替代］控告书第二项指控罪行的财产”。《原没收令》第 2-6 页（强调为后加）。\n\n19.\n被告 Guo 未对其被指控的任何罪行进行认罪答辩。据此，于 2024 年 5 月 22 日至 2024 年 7 月 16 日期间进行了陪审团审理（“Guo 案庭审”）。2024 年 7 月 16 日，陪审团裁定被告 Guo 犯有敲诈勒索串谋罪、串谋电汇欺诈罪、串谋洗钱罪、串谋证券欺诈罪、证券欺诈罪、电汇欺诈罪和洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本请愿书提交之日，被告 Guo 尚未被判刑。\n\n20.\n2025 年 1 月 6 日，被告 Wang 被判刑。\n\n21.\n2025 年 1 月 7 日，本法院作出了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（“《没收令》”）ECF No. 488。就涉及请愿人的部分而言，《没收令》在所有实质性方面均与《原没收令》大体相同。在《没收令》中，被告 Wang 同意没收其在某些资产中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，包括 2770 账户，因为该等财产“构成被告个人获取的第一项指控罪行的收益，及/或属于涉及［替代］控告书第二项指控罪行的财产”。《没收令》第 2-11 页（强调为后加）。\n\n22.\n2770 账户中的资产在《原没收令》和《没收令》中均被描述如下：\n\n原存放在 Silvergate Bank 开立的第 5090042770 号账户中、以“Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC”名义持有并由政府于 2022 年 9 月 18 日或该日左右扣押的 89,992,861.75 美元法定货币 (23-FBl-000074)。\n\n原没收裁定第 3 页；没收裁定第 3 页。\n\nIII.\n辩论理由\n\n23.\n在依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c)(1) 条进行的附随刑事没收程序中，本院必须以优势证据标准判定：请愿人是否对拟没收财产享有合法权利、所有权或权益，以及该等权利、所有权或权益是否使没收裁定全部或部分无效，理由是该权益归属于请愿人而非被告，或在产生财产没收的作为发生时优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n24.\n在本案中，依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)，请愿人凭借对请愿人财产的推定信托，对该财产享有合法权利、所有权或权益。此外，请愿人在请愿人财产中的权益既已归属于请愿人，亦优于被告 Wang（王雁平）在请愿人财产中享有的任何权利，因为被告王在请愿人财产或 2770 账户中均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。换言之，被告王无法没收其在 2770 账户中的权益，因为她不享有任何依律应受刑事没收的权益。因此，应修改没收裁定以剔除请愿人财产，并应将请愿人财产返还给请愿人。\n\nA. 政府未能在最初阶段证明 2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）依律应予没收，从而使没收裁定就该等资金而言是不当的\n\n25.\n政府没有任何合法理由扣押请愿人财产，因为没有证据表明政府曾按照 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) 的要求，证明请愿人财产以及整个 2770 账户确属可没收财产。\n\n26.\n“当政府寻求获得没收裁定时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1) 条……要求量刑法院根据适用法规确定哪些财产应予没收。’”U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（援引 U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)）。依据 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院必须确定政府是否已在财产与犯罪之间确立了必要的关联。”Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A)（强调为原文所加）；Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的各个阶段，政府承担以不同确定程度证明这一法律结论的举证责任：在起诉后的听证会上达到合理根据的标准……或在法官审判或陪审团审判中达到优势证据的标准。”同上（强调为原文所加）（内部引文省略）。“然而，只有当政府达到相关的法定门槛时，争议财产才能在任何法律意义上被视为‘应予没收’。在此之前，虽然政府只是通过起诉书宣布了其寻求没收的意图，但该财产仅被视为‘潜在可没收的’……或‘潜在应予没收的’。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n27.\n这意味着，在法院探讨请愿人是否有权根据 § 853(n) 获返还财产这一问题之前，必须首先确定争议财产在最初阶段是否确属可没收财产。若非如此，政府便没有扣押该财产的法定职权。如果财产被不当扣押，则无论请愿人是否符合 § 853(n) 规定的标准，政府都必须返还被扣押的账户。参见，例如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)。\n\n28.\n全面且完整的 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) 审查对于司法公正至关重要。整个没收体系都建立在法院已进行审查并判定该财产应予没收的假设之上。在制定附随程序法规时，国会之所以选择在附随程序中将举证责任置于第三方，是因为“美国在刑事案件中已排除合理怀疑地证明了其没收指控。”S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n29.\n在本案中，从未就 2770 账户与被告王被指控（并已认罪）的任何罪行之间是否存在关联作出过认定，结果导致请愿人被迫提交本请愿书。基于被告王和被告 Guo（郭文贵）刑事案件中所有公开文件中包含的信息，政府在 2770 账户问题上无法胜诉。\n\n30.\n在本案中，在替代起诉书（Superseding Information）中，政府就第一项罪名和第二项罪名均包含了没收指控，并寻求没收特定财产。替代起诉书第 4 页。案卷中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明、更不用说达到其证明责任来证明 2770 账户与被告王认罪的罪行之间存在关联。\n\n31.\n关于第一项罪名，没收指控称：“由于实施了本替代起诉书第一项罪名所指控的电汇诈骗罪行，被告 YVETTE WANG（王艳平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，应依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条1……及《美国法典》第 28 编第 2461(c) 条，向美国没收构成或源自可追溯至实施上述罪行所得收益的任何及所有财产（不动产和动产）。”替代起诉书第 4 页。政府必须以优势证据标准证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 项下的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收理论是该财产被用于实施或便利实施刑事犯罪，或参与了刑事犯罪的实施，则政府应证明该财产与犯罪之间存在实质性联系。”18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n32.\n案卷中没有任何关于 2770 账户中的资金如何构成或源自可追溯至被告王共谋实施电汇诈骗所得收益的指控。替代起诉书指控称：“至少在 2018 年前后至至少 2023 年 3 月 15 日前后，共谋者向投资者进行虚假陈述，称其在 GTV、Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）组织和 GClubs 的投资将获得股票作为回报，且在 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的投资将获得加密货币作为回报[（即‘诈骗计划’）]。通过该[诈骗计划]，被告 YVETTE WANG，又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，及其包括 Miles Guo 在内的共谋者，诱使投资者向郭控制的实体投资了超过 10 亿美元。”替代起诉书第 2 页。替代起诉书中没有任何关于被告王将诈骗计划的任何收益存入 2770 账户的指控。同样，替代起诉书中也没有任何指控称由于该诈骗计划，有任何投资者将资金存入了 2770 账户。也不可能有任何此类指控，因为 2770 账户的唯一存款来自投资于 Digital Bank（数字银行）的投资者——该投资与替代起诉书中所述的“诈骗计划”没有任何牵涉。诚然，请愿人确认，请愿人绝非替代起诉书中所指控的被告王任何行为的受害者，且不认为请愿人的任何财产曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n1 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定，“构成或源自可追溯至违反”各种特定罪行所得收益的“任何财产（不动产或动产）[均应予以没收]”，包括违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 电汇诈骗罪，即在第一项罪名中对被告王提出的指控。\n\n33.\n最后，在被告郭的审判期间，没有任何关于 2770 账户的相关证词。没有任何关于诈骗计划的任何收益是否曾被存入 2770 账户的证词，就此而言，也没有关于被告王是否曾向 2770 账户存入任何款项的证词。简而言之，案卷中没有任何内容表明 2770 账户与被告王的电汇诈骗指控之间存在关联，更不用说有充分的证据用以判定政府已尽到了证明责任、以及法院正当地裁定存在使 2770 账户被适当没收的相应关联。\n\n34.\n关于第二项罪名，没收指控称：“由于实施了本起诉书第二项罪名所指控的洗钱罪行，被告 YVETTE WANG，又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，应依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 982(a)(1) 条2，向美国没收参与上述罪行的任何及所有财产（不动产和动产），或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产，包括但不限于代表参与上述罪行财产金额的以美元货币计的款项。”替代起诉书第 4 页。关于第二项罪名，政府“必须以优势证据标准证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 项下的没收要件。”U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015)。\n\n2 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定：“法院在对被判定违反本编第 1956 条[洗钱法规]罪行的人判刑时……应命令该人向美国没收参与该罪行的任何财产（不动产或动产），或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产。”18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调为原文所加）。\n\n35.\n替代起诉书指控被告王犯有共谋洗钱罪，因为被告王“明知参与某些金融交易的财产代表某种形式非法活动的收益，仍意图进行并实际进行了及企图进行该等金融交易……而这些交易实际上涉及特定非法活动的收益，即本起诉书第一项罪名所指控的电汇诈骗计划的收益。”替代起诉书第 3 页。\n\n36.\n目前尚不清楚 2770 账户如何能因第二项罪名中的洗钱指控而被没收。从指控来看，洗钱罪名源于被告王利用“第一项罪名所指控的电汇诈骗计划的收益”进行金融交易。替代起诉书第 3 页。如上文所辩，没有任何证据表明 2770 账户中的资金与第一项罪名所指控的诈骗计划有任何关联（参见上文第 31-33 段）——没有证据表明该等资金“构成[或]源自可追溯至实施”电汇诈骗所得的收益。参见，例如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。既然 2770 账户中的资金不是诈骗计划的收益，也不是源自诈骗计划的收益，那么该等资金就不能作为第二项罪名洗钱指控的事实依据，也不能作为被告王第二项罪名定罪的一部分予以没收。\n\n37.\n政府为支持洗钱指控而指控的公开行为（overt acts），进一步未能证明 2770 账户中的资金何以成为可没收财产。在替代起诉书中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项行为。替代起诉书第 3 页。尽管政府声称这两项公开行为是被告王为推进所指控的共谋洗钱而实施的“其中包括的”行为\n\n（Superseding Information（替代表明书）第 3 页），这些其他行为从未被指明。\n\n38.\n首先，根据替代表明书，在 2020 年 5 月 20 日，Defendant Wang（被告王）以 GTV 的名义开设了一个银行账户，值得注意的是，该账户并非 2770 账户。替代表明书第 3 页。2020 年 6 月 2 日，被告王向该账户转账约 200,000,000 美元。同上。转入 GTV 账户的资金来自 Saraca Media Group, Inc.（萨拉卡媒体集团公司，简称“Saraca”）持有的 JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）账户（Guo 审判，05/31/2024，953:25-954:4；Guo 审判，06/26/2024，4359:1-14），而非来自 2770 账户。没有任何证词表明 2770 账户中的任何资金曾流入 Saraca 的摩根大通银行账户，进而再转入替代表明书中所引用的 GTV 账户。此外，2770 账户在 2020 年根本就不存在。\n\n39.\n政府指控的第二项行为是“在 2020 年 6 月 5 日或前后”，被告王“授权从 GTV 的母公司 Saraca 向一家高风险对冲基金电汇 100,000,000 美元，用于 Saraca 及其最终实益拥有人即被告 Guo 之子的利益”。替代表明书第 3-4 页。首先，这明确指控了该资金是从 Saraca 账户转出的，而 2770 账户显而易见并非该账户。此外，同样地，没有任何证词表明 2770 账户中的任何资金曾流入过 Saraca 账户。而且，再次强调，2770 账户在 2020 年根本不存在。\n\n40.\n从上述论述可以看出，根本没有任何关于 2770 账户的指控或证词。记录中对 2770 账户的唯一提及是被告王同意将其没收。然而，“被告对没收的同意[并不]废除在所请求没收的财产与犯罪定罪之间存在关联性的要求”。Beltramea, 785 F.3d at 291。正如第八巡回法院所强调的那样，“[地方法院]负有确保所要求的关联性存在的独立职责”。同上（强调为后加）。\n\n41.\n在本案中，替代表明书、原没收命令或没收裁定中，均没有任何关于 2770 账户与被告王认罪答辩之罪行之间甚至存在涉嫌关联性的事实指控。\n\n42.\n政府在未证明存在关联性的情况下继续扣留 2770 账户中的资金，是不正当且不公平的。如果政府保留 2770 账户中的资金，将构成不当得利，因为这些资金属于第三方，包括 Petitioner（申请人），而这些第三方（1）既不是被告王也不是被告 Guo；且（2）未卷入涉案欺诈计划，更不是此类计划的受害者。参见，例如，U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)（解释刑事“没收不具有救济目的，旨在惩罚犯罪者，且不能强加于无辜所有权人。”）（强调为后加）。\n\nB. 申请人对申请人财产享有权益，因为在此类财产上存在拟制信托\n\n43.\n即使撇开政府未能适当证明 2770 账户中的资金属于替代表明书中所指控的任何活动的一部分不谈，申请人财产也应归还给申请人，因为申请人对其享有的权益大于被告王，或大于如今处于其地位的政府。\n\n44.\n根据拟制信托法理，申请人财产受到保护，且无论任何其他所有权主张为何——包括被告王或处于其地位的政府的主张——该财产仍为申请人的财产。Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）3 裁定，“拟制信托构成‘对财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，该权益‘可能优于’被告的权益”。Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n45.\n“拟制信托是一种衡平法上的救济措施，其必然具有灵活性以实现其目的。”Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999)（强调为后加）。“其目的在于防止不当得利，尽管不当得利并不必然涉及不法行为的实施……所必需的是法院认定一方持有财产的情况，使得根据衡平法和良知，他不应保留该财产。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n46.\n“一方是否构成不当得利是通过适用衡平法原则得出的法律结论……衡平法院在判令拟制信托时不受任何僵化公式的约束。交易的公平性必须决定救济的限度……当一个人保留了一项利益，而根据转让的情形并考虑到当事方之间的关系，保留该利益是不公平的，即构成不当得利。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n3 “联邦普通法冲突法规则是适用与诉讼具有最重大利益的司法管辖区的法律。”In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992)。在本案中，有三个法律可能适用的竞合司法管辖区：New York（纽约州）、California（加利福尼亚州）和 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）。申请人支付申请人财产是依据 Subscription Agreement（认购协议）进行的，该协议受开曼群岛法律管辖。参见证据附录 B，认购协议第 8 页，第 2(s) 段。当申请人存入申请人财产时，2770 账户是加利福尼亚州一家银行的账户。自 2770 账户被扣押以来（依据纽约州一家法院签发的搜查与扣押令），这些资金目前由位于纽约的政府占有。纽约是本案的法院地法管辖区。从这些事实来看，纽约对本诉讼具有最重大利益，其法律应适用于拟制信托的设立。但是，在政府质疑该法律适用决定的范围内，申请人保留请求本法院根据加利福尼亚州和/或开曼群岛法律对申请人财产设立拟制信托的一切权利。\n\n47.\nNew York Court of Appeals（纽约州上诉法院）概述了在确定某些情况下是否应设立拟制信托时应考虑的若干因素，包括“（1）保密或信义关系，（2）承诺，（3）基于信赖该承诺的转让，以及（4）不当得利。”Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976)。然而，纽约法院长期以来一直认为“这些因素仅仅是有用的指导，并非神圣不可变通的法宝”。Counihan, 194 F.3d at 362（引用了阐述这一主张的大量纽约州判例）。\n\n48.\n在本案中，自申请人财产被存入 2770 账户之日起，即存在为申请人利益对申请人财产设立的拟制信托。\n\n49.\n申请人在签署认购协议以获得 Hamilton M&A Fund SP 的特定 B 类股份时，与 Hamilton Opportunity Fund（汉密尔顿机会基金）建立了保密和/或信义关系4。根据认购协议，Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）向申请人做出承诺，申请人财产将投资于数字银行。基于对该承诺的信赖，申请人按照认购协议中的指示将申请人财产电汇至 2770 账户。政府对 2770 账户的不当扣押导致汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司被迫违反了将申请人财产投资于数字银行的承诺。由于政府的扣押，申请人甚至无法行使回赎权以取回申请人财产。这将导致以政府为受益方的不当得利，因为政府目前在没有任何合法理由的情况下保留申请人财产。参见，例如，U.S. v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995)（裁定设立拟制信托是正当的，除其他原因外，政府的没收导致了默示承诺的违反）；Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994)（在“政府的没收迫使该承诺被违反，这可能导致政府潜在的不当得利（以及[原告]相应的不当受损）”的情形下，认定设立拟制信托是恰当的）。\n\n4 即使法院认定汉密尔顿机会基金与申请人之间不存在保密关系和/或不存在信义关系，这也不是决定性的，因为信义关系的不存在并不妨碍法院认定存在拟制信托。参见 Koreag, 961 F.2d at 353（指出“[然而，我们并不认为[当事方]之间缺乏信义关系就会自动击败拟制信托的[主张]。尽管信义关系是纽约法院引用的因素之一，但在衡平法另有要求时，任何单一因素的缺失本身不会阻碍拟制信托的设立]”）。\n\n50.\n据此，申请人已证明应当对申请人财产设立拟制信托。就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，该等拟制信托“构成‘对财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，该权益‘可能优于’被告的权益”。Willis, 652 F.3d at 242。\n\n51.\n请求设立拟制信托所指向的财产——即申请人财产——是极易追踪的。参见证据附录 C。\n\n52.\n此外，即便政府主张其他人员亦应从任何被没收的财产中获得赔偿，申请人也完全可以获得拟制信托救济。“当一方能够直接追踪其资产，而无需诉诸拟制或推定手段时，即使在涉及多个欺诈受害人的案件中，亦可适用拟制信托。”U.S. v. Ovid, 2012 WL 2087084, *7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012)。“[当索赔人能够直接追踪其财产时，法院无权忽视拟制信托法，即使这会使一个无辜受害人处于比另一个同样无辜受害人更有利的地位。”同上。在涉及多起欺诈的案件中，“正统做法”是“将可识别的资产归还给其所有权人，只有在无法进行特定识别或交易追踪时才采用按比例分配”。同上第 *8 页（引用《侵权及不当得利法重述（第三版）》§ 59 报告人附注 G，第 437 页）。\n\n---\nC. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有优先权益\n53.\n请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益，绝对优先于政府或被告Wang（王）在请愿人财产中可能享有的任何权益。\n54.\n21 U.S.C. § 853(n)明确规定，除请愿人在被没收财产中享有的权益外，请愿人还必须以优势证据证明，请愿人的权益“使得没收裁定全部或部分无效，因为在该条项下导致财产被没收的作为发生时，该权利、所有权或权益已归属于请愿人而非被告，或优先于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益”。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（后加强调）。\n55.\n在此，如上所述，被告王从未在请愿人财产或2770号账户中享有过任何权益；事实上，记录中对于被告王、欺诈计划与2770号账户之间存在何种关系完全没有任何记载。\n56.\n显而易见的是，无论是政府还是被告王，都不能主张他们对一项从未享有过权益的财产享有优先权益。同样地，被告王也不能没收其毫无权益的财产中的权益。\nD. 请愿人有权获得诉讼费用及律师费\n57.\n请愿人已被迫聘请法律顾问，并为提交本请愿书以主张请愿人对请愿人财产的权利并对没收请愿人财产提出异议而产生了费用。在本次程序中胜诉后，请愿人保留追索因本请愿书而产生的所有律师费和费用的全部权利，并可根据《Equal Access to Justice Act（平等获取司法公正法）》（“EAJA”），28 U.S.C. § 2412追索请愿人的费用和合理的律师费。联邦法院一贯认为，就允许胜诉的主张人根据EAJA收取律师费而言，§ 853(n)程序属于民事程序。参见United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009)；United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th\n\n---\nCir. 1995)；U.S. v. Bailey, 2015 WL 1893610 at *20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015)。\nIV.\n结论\n58.\n基于上述理由，请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，该权益使得没收裁定就该等财产而言无效。参见如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告王在请愿人财产中不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。请愿人已经以优势证据证明，并能够在任何必要听证会上证明，没收裁定需要进行修正以排除请愿人财产。\n59.\n因此，请愿人谨请本法院：(1) 准予本请愿书；(2) 修正没收裁定以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即向请愿人返还请愿人财产；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追索因本请愿书而产生的请愿人律师费和费用，并准予请愿人提交该等律师费和费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的该等及其他救济。\n日期：2025年4月2日\n谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\n\nJeffrey S. Gavenman，律师\nJeremy W. Schulman，律师\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\n\nPaul W. Butler，律师\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n请愿人代理律师\n\n---\n证实与宣誓\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人________在此证实并在受伪证罪处罚的前提下声明，本人对该财产的权利主张绝非无理取闹，且就本人所知所信，支持本主张所提供的信息均属真实准确。\n签署于 2025年4月________日\n\n签名","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Torres","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":5995,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-04 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-04","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:46:21"}