{"id":"court_sdny_55_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":55,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"LETTER","filed_date":"2023-04-21","title":"| Case 1:23-cr-00118-AT | Document 55<br>Filed 04/21/23 | Page 1 of 6 | |-----------------------|-----------------------","summary_zh":"政府信件（CIPA 程序说明函）——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）等人案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #55（2023-04-21 提交）。检方（联邦助理检察官 Juliana N. Murray、Ryan B. Finkel、Micah F. Fergenson 具名）致主审法官 Analisa Torres，概述《涉密信息程序法》(CIPA) 第 2、3、4 条框架，请求日后就涉密材料以单方（ex parte）、密封方式提交 CIPA 第 4 条动议，并申请召开单方预审会议；法官在函末批示「GRANTED. SO ORDERED」予以准许。","summary_en":"Government letter on CIPA procedures — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo) et al., SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF No. 55 (filed 2023-04-21). Submitted by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Juliana N. Murray, Ryan B. Finkel, and Micah F. Fergenson to presiding Judge Analisa Torres, outlining the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) framework (Sections 2, 3, and 4) and requesting leave to later file a CIPA Section 4 motion concerning classified material ex parte and under seal, plus an ex parte pretrial conference; the Court endorsed the request 'GRANTED. SO ORDERED.'","body_en":"|-----------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|\n|                       | U.S. Departme                 |             |\n|                       | United States A               |             |\n|                       | Southern Distri               |             |\n|                       | The Silvio J. Mollo Bui       | 4/21/2023   |\n|                       |                               |             |\n\n*One Saint Andrew's Pl New York, New York 10007*\n\nApril 20, 2023\n\n**VIA ECF**\n\nHon. Analisa Torres Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312\n\n# **Re:** *United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, Kin Ming Je, and Yanping Wang,* **S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)**\n\nDear Judge Torres:\n\nThe Government respectfully submits this letter, outlining the relevant legal framework under the Classified Information Procedures Act (\"CIPA\"), 18 U.S.C. app. 3. This letter provides a summary of (1) CIPA's statutory framework as it pertains to pretrial filings and (2) the different types of CIPA motions that may be filed in this case.\n\nAt the June 6, 2023 conference, the Government hopes to set a schedule for the Government's filing of a motion pursuant to Section 4 of CIPA—which the Government proposes to file on an *ex parte* basis under seal—seeking to withhold from discovery, substitute, and/or summarize certain classified information. Section 4 and other provisions of CIPA, and the applicable legal standards governing CIPA motions, are discussed in further detail below.\n\n## **Overview of the CIPA Statutory Framework**\n\nCIPA governs the discovery of classified information in federal criminal cases. *See United States v. Abu-Jihaad*, 630 F.3d 102, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2010). Congress enacted CIPA to enable the Government to fulfill its duty to protect national security information, while simultaneously complying with its discovery obligations in federal criminal prosecutions. *See* S. Rep. No. 96- 823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (1980), *reprinted in* 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4296; *see also United States v. Pappas*, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that CIPA's fundamental purpose is to \"'harmonize a defendant's right to obtain and present exculpatory material upon his trial and the government's right to protect classified material in the national interest.'\" (quoting *United States v. Wilson*, 571 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)); *see also, e.g.*, *United States v. Apperson*, 441 F.3d 1162, 1193 n.8 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that CIPA \"evidence[s] Congress's intent to prevent classified information from unnecessary disclosure at any stage of a criminal trial,\" while simultaneously ensuring that a defendant's right to present a defense is not compromised).\n\nCIPA does not alter the defendant's substantive rights or the Government's discovery obligations. *See United States v. Anderson*, 872 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases). Rather, CIPA creates a procedural framework that permits the Court to rule, before trial, on questions related to classified materials. This framework helps to prevent unnecessary or\n\ninadvertent disclosure of classified information, and allows the Government to assess the national security \"costs\" associated with pursuing a certain course in its criminal prosecution. *See, e.g.*, *Anderson*, 872 F.2d at 1514; *United States v. Collins*, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1983); *United States v. Lopez-Lima*, 738 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (S.D. Fla. 1990).\n\nAn overview of certain potentially relevant CIPA provisions follows:\n\n## Section 2: Pretrial Conference\n\nSection 2 of CIPA provides that the Court may hold a conference at any time after an indictment has been filed to consider matters relating to classified information. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2. A court may elect to hold a Section 2 conference with both parties, or *ex parte* with either the Government or the defense, to address classified matters. *See United States v. Abu-Jihaad*, No. 07 Cr. 57 (MRK), 2007 WL 2972623, at \\*1 (D. Conn. Oct. 11, 2007) (collecting cases in which \"numerous courts have upheld the propriety of *ex parte*, *in camera* proceedings in cases involving classified information\").\n\n## Section 3: General Protective Order\n\nSection 3 of CIPA provides for an appropriate protective order to be entered to protect against the unauthorized dissemination of classified information disclosed to the defense in connection with the prosecution. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3.\n\n## Section 4: Discovery and Protective Orders\n\nSection 4 of CIPA outlines the procedures to be followed when the Government seeks to limit the information it is providing to the defense in the context of the discovery process. Among its provisions, CIPA authorizes a court to deny or modify discovery of classified information that ordinarily would be produced pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 or otherwise. Specifically, Section 4 of CIPA provides that \"upon a sufficient showing,\" a court may \"authorize the United States to delete specified items of classified information from [discovery], . . . to substitute a summary of the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove.\" 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4. This provision \"clarifies district courts' powers under Rule 16(d)(1) to issue protective orders denying or restricting discovery for good cause, which includes information vital to the national security.\" *United States v. Stewart*, 590 F.3d 93, 130 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); *see also* Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1) (district courts may \"for good cause, deny . . . discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief\").\n\nThe Second Circuit has explained that, in analyzing a Section 4 motion, a district court should engage in a three-stage analysis. *See United States v. Aref*, 533 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2008). First, the Court must determine whether the classified information at issue is discoverable. *See id.* at 80. Second, the Court should assess whether the Government has properly invoked the need to protect against the disclosure of classified information, which the Second Circuit determined is sourced in the common-law privilege against the disclosure of state secrets. *See id*. at 78. The Second Circuit explained that the state secrets \"privilege 'allows the government to withhold information from discovery when disclosure would be inimical to national security.'\" *Id*. at 78-79 (quoting *Zuckerbraum v. Gen. Dynamics Corp.*, 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991)). That privilege, the *Aref* court observed, can only be invoked by the \"head of the department which has control\n\nover the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer.\" *Id*. at 80 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); *see United States v. Zubaydah*, 142 S. Ct. 959, 967 (2022). As a consequence, in cases in this Circuit involving the equities of the Department of Justice in classified information, any such claim of privilege must personally be asserted by the Attorney General, typically in the form of a declaration.\n\nThe third stage in the above-described analysis is the Court's determination of whether, if it has been invoked, the Government's common-law privilege must give way. *See Aref*, 533 F.3d at 80. This includes consideration of whether the classified material that the Government proposes to delete from discovery (or to produce in summary form) is both \"relevant and helpful\" to the defense. *See id*. at 79-80. The \"relevant and helpful\" standard was first articulated by the Supreme Court in *United States v. Roviaro*, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), a case that concerned the privilege that permits the Government, in certain circumstances, to withhold the identity of its informants.\n\n## Section 5: Notice from a Defendant\n\nPursuant to Section 5 of CIPA, a defendant who reasonably expects to disclose (or cause the disclosure of) classified information at any stage of a prosecution is required to file notice of such intention. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a). Such information might include classified information that the defense has learned through the discovery process, or classified information that is known to the defendant himself. The Section 5 notice must \"include a brief description of the classified information,\" *id*., and \"must be particularized, setting forth specifically the classified information which the defendant reasonably believes to be necessary to his defense.\" *Collins*, 720 F.2d at 1199. A defendant must provide any Section 5 notice \"within the time specified by the court or, where no time is specified, within thirty days prior to trial.\" 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a).\n\nIf the defendant fails to provide a timely and adequately detailed notice sufficiently in advance of trial to permit the implementation of CIPA procedures, Section 5(b) provides for preclusion. *See United States v. Badia*, 827 F.2d 1458, 1465 (11th Cir. 1987). Similarly, if the defense attempts to disclose at trial classified information which is not described in their Section 5(a) notice, preclusion is the appropriate remedy prescribed by Section 5(b). *See United States v. Smith*, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985) (\"A defendant is forbidden from disclosing any such information absent the giving of notice.\").\n\nIn this case, the Government believes it is possible that it may disclose classified information to cleared counsel for both defendants, Ho Wan Kwok and Yanping Wang.\n\n#### Section 6: Hearings and Substitutions\n\nIf the defense gives Section 5 notice of intention to disclose (or cause the disclosure of) classified information, the Government may request the Court to conduct a hearing to make determinations as to the use, relevance, or admissibility of the classified information at trial or a pretrial proceeding. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(a). Section 6 also requires that the Court hold any such hearing in camera \"if the Attorney General certifies to the Court in such petition that a public proceeding may result in the disclosure of classified information.\" *Id.* At the hearing, the defense must proffer why the classified information that they seek to disclose is relevant, while the Government is given an opportunity to challenge the request on various grounds—including, for example, the materiality and admissibility of the proposed information. *See, e.g.*, *United States v.*\n\n*Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563, 1581 (S.D. Fla. 1995); *United States v. Rezaq*, 899 F. Supp. 697, 704 (D.D.C. 1995).\n\nIf the Court grants a defendant's request to disclose classified information, the Government may then seek Court approval for alternative means of disclosure—including an unclassified statement admitting the facts contained in the classified materials, or an unclassified summary of the facts contained in the classified materials. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(l). CIPA directs that the Court shall grant such an application from the Government if the Court \"finds that the statement or summary will provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified information.\" *Id*.\n\nIf the classified information cannot be disclosed in a manner that provides the \"defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense\" as would disclosure of the classified information, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c), and the Government is unwilling to disclose such information, then the Court may take appropriate action, including making a finding against the Government on any issue as to which the classified information is probative, striking testimony, barring the use of certain testimony or even dismissing the indictment. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e).\n\n#### Section 7: Interlocutory Appeals\n\nCIPA Section 7 gives the Government the right to pursue an interlocutory appeal of an adverse CIPA decision. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 7.\n\n### **CIPA Section 4 Filings Are Properly Made** *Ex Parte* **and** *In Camera*\n\nCIPA expressly authorizes Section 4 filings to be made *ex parte*, *in camera*, as the Government proposes to do here. *See* 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4 (\"The court may permit the United States to make a [Section 4] request . . . in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone.\"). Congress viewed the *ex parte* nature of a Section 4 proceeding as important. As the record of the House of Representatives put it, \"since the government is seeking to withhold classified information from the defendant, an adversary hearing with defense knowledge would defeat the very purpose of the discovery rules.\" H.R. Rep. No. 96-831, pt. 1, at 27 n.22 (1980); *see also* Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 Advisory Committee Notes, 1966 Amendments, Subdivision (e) (\"[I]t would defeat the purpose of the protective order if the government were required to make its showing in open court. The problem arises in its most extreme form where matters of national security are involved.\").<sup>1</sup>\n\nProceeding *ex parte* and *in camera* makes sense in light of CIPA's purpose. First, the Government makes a motion pursuant to Section 4 to delete or summarize certain materials so that it will not need to reveal those materials. If the Government's motion to delete or summarize were not reviewed *in camera* and *ex parte*, the motion practice would itself reveal the very information—and commonly, the sensitive technique or techniques used to obtain that information—that the Government seeks ultimately to shield in the interest of national security. *See, e.g.*, *Aref*, 533 F.3d at 81 (\"When the government is seeking to withhold classified information\n\n<sup>1</sup> Similarly, Rule 16(d)(l) contemplates the same procedure, stating: \"At any time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or grant other appropriate relief. The court may permit a party to show good cause by a written statement that the court will inspect *ex parte*.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1).\n\nfrom the defendant, an adversary hearing with defense knowledge would defeat the very purpose of the discovery rules.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); *United States v. Campa*, 529 F.3d 980, 995 (11th Cir. 2008) (\"The right that section four confers on the government would be illusory if defense counsel were allowed to participate in section four proceedings because defense counsel would be able to see the information that the government asks the district court to keep from defense counsel's view.\"); *United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria*, 144 F.3d 1249, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (\"The legislative history of [CIPA] explains that because the government is seeking to withhold classified information from the defendant, an adversary hearing with defense knowledge would defeat the very purpose of the discovery rule.\").\n\nSecond, CIPA Section 4 motions concern the question of what the Government will turn over during the discovery process. Such questions are usually answered solely by Government attorneys with no Court involvement. When the Government moves for the Court to become involved in assessing whether certain materials must be produced, it is entirely routine for that judicial assessment to be handled *ex parte*, *in camera*. As the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has noted, *ex parte* CIPA practice is \"close[ly] analog[ous]\" to more familiar *ex parte* practices:\n\n> When a court (rather than the prosecutor alone, as is ordinarily the case) reviews evidence in camera to determine whether it constitutes a witness statement subject to disclosure under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b), or exculpatory material subject to disclosure under Brady, the defendant is likewise not entitled to access to any of the evidence reviewed by the court . . . to assist in his argument that it should be disclosed.\n\n*United States v. Mejia*, 448 F.3d 436, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\n\nIn accordance with the foregoing principles, courts in this Circuit and elsewhere routinely permit the Government to make Section 4 filings *ex parte* and *in camera*, regardless of whether one or more defense counsel has or could obtain an appropriate security clearance. *See, e.g.*, *Abu-Jihaad*, 630 F.3d at 143 (rejecting argument that Government's *ex parte* and *in camera* submissions were improper (citing *Aref*, 533 F.3d at 81)); *Abu-Jihaad*, 2007 WL 2972623, at \\*l (collecting numerous cases), *aff'd*, *Abu-Jihaad*, 630 F.3d 102; *United States v. Liu*, No. 19 Cr. 804 (VEC), 2021 WL 3374535, at \\*4 (S.DN.Y. Aug. 3, 2021) (noting that *ex parte* consideration was appropriate and that an argument to the contrary \"is foreclosed by CIPA itself and has been rejected repeatedly by the Second Circuit and other courts to consider the issue\"); *United States v. Saipov*, No. 17 Cr. 722 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2019), ECF No. 212 (\"Courts routinely permit the Government to proceed *ex parte* when the substance of the classified information that the Government seeks to [] with[o]ld from discovery is explicitly discussed in the relevant motion.\") (collecting cases); *accord* Opinion & Order, *Alimehmeti*, ECF No. 54, May 8, 2017 (denying defense motion for access to Government's *ex parte* Section 4 motion); Order, *United States v. Ashe*, No. 15 Cr. 706 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2016), ECF No. 272 (same); Transcript, *United States v. Jones*, No. 16 Cr. 19 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2016), ECF No. 30 (same); Memorandum Decision and Order, *United States v. Mostafa*, No. 04 Cr. 356 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y Jan. 17, 2014), ECF No. 233 (same); *United States v. Ahmad*, Nos. 04 Cr. 301 (JCH), 06 Cr. 194 (JCH), 2013 WL 1899792, at \\*3 (D. Conn. May 1, 2013) (\"Because the court finds that, in accordance with section 4, the classified information is not discoverable, a clearance would not have entitled the defense to see any of the information.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)); *United States v. Ahmed*, No. 10 Cr. 131 (PKC), 2011 WL 4915005, at \\*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011) (ruling, over objection of cleared defense counsel, that *ex parte*, *in camera* consideration of the Government's Section 4 motion was proper); *Abu-Jihaad*, 2007 WL 2972623, at \\*2 (holding that a Section 4 motion can be made ex parte and noting that \"[i]f . . . the Court decides that the information is not discoverable at all, Defendant is not entitled to production of the information, regardless whether his counsel is willing to submit to security clearance procedures\"); *United States v. Libby*, 429 F. Supp. 2d 18, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (permitting the Government to file *ex parte* Section 4 motions—even though the defendant and his counsel held appropriate security clearances—upon a showing in the Government's filing that the defense did not have the requisite \"need-to-know\").\n\n### **The Government's Section 4 Motion**\n\nFor the reasons set out above, and in line with the uniform practice of courts in this District, the Government requests to file its Section 4 motion on an *ex parte* basis when such motion is due, and for the Court to review that motion *in camera* and maintain it under seal.\n\nShould the Court have any further questions about the anticipated scope or substance of the Government's Section 4 motion, the Government requests that the Court and the Government proceed to an *ex parte* Section 2 pretrial conference.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS United States Attorney\n\nBy: /s/\n\nJuliana N. Murray Ryan B. Finkel Micah F. Fergenson Assistants United States Attorney (212) 637-2314 / 6612 / 2190\n\ncc: Stephen Cook, Esq., and Steven Best, Esq., *counsel for defendant Ho Wan Kwok*  Alex Lipman, Esq., and Priya Chaudhry, Esq., *counsel for defendant Yanping Wang*\n\nGRANTED.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nDated: April 21, 2023 New York, New York\n\nQs","body_zh":"美国司法部（U.S. Department of Justice）\n联邦检察官办公室（United States Attorney's Office）\n纽约南区（Southern District of New York）\nSilvio J. Mollo 大楼\n4/21/2023\n纽约州纽约市圣安德鲁广场 1 号，邮编 10007（One Saint Andrew's Pl New York, New York 10007）\n\n2023年4月20日\n\n通过 ECF 送达（VIA ECF）\n\n尊敬的 Analisa Torres（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯）法官，Daniel Patrick Moynihan 联邦法院，纽约州纽约市珍珠街 500 号，邮编 10007-1312（Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl St. New York, NY 10007-1312）\n\n关于：合众国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）、Kin Ming Je（余建明）及 Yanping Wang（王雁平）案，案号 S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)（Re: United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, Kin Ming Je, and Yanping Wang, S1 23 Cr. 118 (AT)）\n\n尊敬的托雷斯法官：\n\n政府谨此提交本信函，概述《机密信息程序法》（Classified Information Procedures Act，简称“CIPA”），18 U.S.C. app. 3 项下的相关法律框架。本信函对以下内容提供概述：(1) CIPA 涉及审前提交文件的法定框架，以及 (2) 本案中可能提交的各类 CIPA 动议。\n\n在 2023年6月6日的庭审会议上，政府希望就政府根据 CIPA 第 4 条提交动议确定日程——政府提议单方（ex parte）以保全（under seal）方式提交该动议——以寻求在证据开示中扣留、替代和/或总结某些机密信息。CIPA 第 4 条及其他规定，以及管辖 CIPA 动议的适用法律标准，详述如下。\n\nCIPA 法定框架概述\n\nCIPA 规范联邦刑事案件中机密信息的证据开示。参见 United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2010)。国会颁布 CIPA 旨在使政府能够履行其保护国家安全信息的职责，同时履行其在联邦刑事起诉中的证据开示义务。参见 S. Rep. No. 96-823, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294, 4296；亦见 United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 1996)（指出 CIPA 的根本目的是“‘协调被告在审判中获取并出示开脱罪责材料的权利与政府为了国家利益保护机密材料的权利。’”（引自 United States v. Wilson, 571 F. Supp. 1422, 1426 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)）；亦见例如 United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1193 n.8 (10th Cir. 2006)（指出 CIPA “体现了国会旨在防止机密信息在刑事审判的任何阶段发生不必要披露的意图，”同时确保被告出示辩护的权利不受损害）。\n\nCIPA 并不改变被告的实体权利或政府的证据开示义务。参见 United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1989)（汇集判例）。相反，CIPA 建立了一套程序框架，允许法院在审判前就涉及机密材料的问题作出裁决。该框架有助于防止不必要或非故意地披露机密信息，并允许政府评估在其刑事起诉中采取某种路径所涉及的国家安全“代价”。参见例如 Anderson, 872 F.2d at 1514；United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 1983)；United States v. Lopez-Lima, 738 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (S.D. Fla. 1990)。\n\n以下为可能相关的某些 CIPA 规定的概述：\n\n第 2 条：审前会议\n\nCIPA 第 2 条规定，起诉书提交后的任何时间，法院均可召开会议以审议与机密信息有关的事项。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2。法院可选择与双方当事人共同召开第 2 条会议，或单方与政府或辩方召开，以处理机密事项。参见 United States v. Abu-Jihaad, No. 07 Cr. 57 (MRK), 2007 WL 2972623, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 11, 2007)（汇集判例，其中“众多法院支持在涉及机密信息的案件中进行单方、不公开（in camera）程序的正当性”）。\n\n第 3 条：一般保护令\n\nCIPA 第 3 条规定录入适当的保护令，以防止在起诉过程中向辩方披露的机密信息发生未经授权的传播。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 3。\n\n第 4 条：证据开示与保护令\n\nCIPA 第 4 条概述了当政府寻求限制其在证据开示过程中向辩方提供的信息时应遵循的程序。在其各项规定中，CIPA 授权法院拒绝或修改原本应依据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第 16 条或其他规定出示的机密信息的证据开示。具体而言，CIPA 第 4 条规定，“在做出充分表明后”，法院可“授权合众国从[证据开示]中删除机密信息的指定项目……以该等信息的摘要替代此类机密文件，或以承认该机密信息倾向于证明的相关事实的声明予以替代”。18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4。该规定“阐明了地区法院依据规则第 16(d)(1) 条出于正当理由签发拒绝或限制证据开示的保护令的权力，正当理由包括对国家安全至关重要的信息”。United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 130 (2d Cir. 2009)（内部引号省略）；亦见 Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1)（地区法院可“出于正当理由，拒绝……证据开示或查验，或给予其他适当救济”）。\n\n第二巡回法院解释称，在分析第 4 条动议时，地区法院应进行三阶段分析。参见 United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2008)。第一，法院必须确定涉案机密信息是否属于可开示范围。参见同前，第 80 页。第二，法院应评估政府是否已正当主张防止披露机密信息的必要性，第二巡回法院认定该必要性源自反对披露国家秘密的普通法特权。参见同前，第 78 页。第二巡回法院解释称，国家秘密“特权‘允许政府在披露将有害于国家安全时在证据开示中扣留信息。’”同前，第 78-79 页（引自 Zuckerbraum v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546 (2d Cir. 1991)）。Aref 案法院指出，该特权只能由“对该事项具有管辖权的部门首长在经过该官员实际亲自审议后”方可主张。同前，第 80 页（内部引文和引号省略）；参见 United States v. Zubaydah, 142 S. Ct. 959, 967 (2022)。因此，在本巡回区涉及司法部在机密信息中的权益的案件中，任何此类特权主张均必须由司法部长亲自提出，通常以声明书的形式作出。\n\n上述分析中的第三阶段是法院确定如果政府的普通法特权已被主张，该特权是否必须让步。参见 Aref, 533 F.3d at 80。这包括审议政府提议从证据开示中删除（或以摘要形式出示）的机密材料对辩方而言是否既“相关又有帮助”。参见同前，第 79-80 页。“相关且有帮助”的标准最初由最高法院在 United States v. Roviaro, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) 案中阐述，该案涉及允许政府在某些情况下扣留其线人身份的特权。\n\n第 5 条：来自被告的通知\n\n根据 CIPA 第 5 条，合理预期将在起诉的任何阶段披露（或导致披露）机密信息的被告，须就该意图提交通知。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a)。该等信息可能包括辩方通过证据开示程序获悉的机密信息，或被告本人知悉的机密信息。第 5 条通知必须“包括对机密信息的简要描述”，同前，且“必须具体化，具体列出被告合理认为对其辩护所必需的机密信息。”Collins, 720 F.2d at 1199。被告必须“在法院指定的时间内，或者在未指定时间的情况下，在审判前三十日内”提供任何第 5 条通知。18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 5(a)。\n\n如果被告未能在审判前足够提前的时间内提供及时且充分详细的通知以允许实施 CIPA 程序，第 5(b) 条规定了证据排除。参见 United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1465 (11th Cir. 1987)。同样，如果辩方试图在审判中披露其第 5(a) 条通知中未描述的机密信息，证据排除是第 5(b) 条规定的适当救济。参见 United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir. 1985)（“未发出通知的情况下，禁止被告披露任何此类信息。”）。\n\n在本案中，政府认为其可能向两位被告郭文贵和王雁平的已获安全审查许可的律师披露机密信息。\n\n第 6 条：听证与替代\n\n如果辩方给出披露（或导致披露）机密信息意图的第 5 条通知，政府可请求法院举行听证，以对审判或审前程序中机密信息的使用、相关性或可采性作出认定。18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(a)。第 6 条还要求，“如果司法部长在此类请求书中向法院证明公开程序可能导致机密信息披露”，法院应不公开举行任何此类听证。同前。在听证会上，辩方必须举证说明其寻求披露的机密信息为何具有相关性，同时给予政府基于各种理由质疑该请求的机会——包括例如拟出示信息的重要性和可采性。参见例如 United States v. Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. 1563, 1581 (S.D. Fla. 1995)；United States v. Rezaq, 899 F. Supp. 697, 704 (D.D.C. 1995)。\n\n如果法院准许被告披露机密信息的请求，政府随后可寻求法院批准替代披露方式——包括承认机密材料中所含事实的非机密声明，或机密材料中所含事实的非机密摘要。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(l)。CIPA 规定，如果法院“认定该声明或摘要将向被告提供与其进行辩护基本相同的能力，如同披露具体机密信息一样”，法院应当准许政府的此类申请。同前。\n\n如果机密信息无法以向“被告提供与其进行辩护基本相同的能力”（如同披露该机密信息一样）的方式进行披露，18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)，且政府不愿披露该等信息，则法院可采取适当行动，包括对该机密信息具有证明力的任何问题作出不利于政府的认定、剔除证言、禁止使用某些证言，甚至驳回起诉书。18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e)。\n\n第 7 条：中间上诉\n\nCIPA 第 7 条赋予政府对不利的 CIPA 裁定提起中间上诉的权利。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 7。\n\nCIPA（Classified Information Procedures Act，机密信息程序法）第4条项下的提交材料适宜以单方（ex parte）且不公开（in camera）方式提出\n\n正如政府在此提议的那样，CIPA明确授权根据第4条提出的提交材料可以单方、不公开的方式提出。参见 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4（“法院可允许美国以书面声明的形式提出[第4条]请求……仅供法院单独审查。”）。国会认为第4条程序的单方性质至关重要。正如House of Representatives（众议院）记录所指出的，“由于政府是在寻求向被告隐瞒机密信息，如果在辩方知情的情况下举行对席听证会，将破坏证据开示规则的根本目的。”H.R. Rep. No. 96-831, pt. 1, at 27 n.22 (1980)；另见 Fed. R. Crim. P.（《联邦刑事诉讼规则》）第16条顾问委员会说明，1966 Amendments，Subdivision (e)（“[如果]要求政府在公开法庭进行举证，将破坏保护令的目的。在涉及国家安全事务的情况下，该问题表现得最为极端。”）。注1\n\n根据CIPA的立法目的，以单方且不公开的方式进行程序是合理的。首先，政府依据第4条提出动议以删除或汇总某些材料，从而无需披露这些材料。如果政府关于删除或汇总的动议不以不公开和单方的方式进行审查，则动议程序本身就会泄露政府为了国家安全利益最终寻求屏蔽的那些信息本身——而且通常还包括用于获取该敏感信息的技术。参见例如 Aref, 533 F.3d at 81（“当政府寻求向被告隐瞒机密信息时，在辩方知情的情况下举行对席听证会将破坏证据开示规则的根本目的。”（引文省略））；United States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 995 (11th Cir. 2008)（“如果允许辩护律师参与第4条程序，那么第4条赋予政府的权利将成为泡影，因为辩护律师将能够看到政府请求地方法院不让辩护律师看到的信息。”）；United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998)（“[CIPA]的立法历史表明，由于政府是在寻求向被告隐瞒机密信息，在辩方知情的情况下举行对席听证会将破坏证据开示规则的根本目的。”）。\n\n注1：同样，Rule 16(d)(1) 也考虑了相同的程序，规定：“法院可在任何时候基于正当理由，拒绝、限制或推迟证据开示或检查，或给予其他适当救济。法院可允许一方当事人通过书面声明证明存在正当理由，由法院进行单方审查。”Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1)。\n\n其次，CIPA第4条动议涉及政府在证据开示过程中应移交哪些材料的问题。此类问题通常完全由政府检察官在没有法院介入的情况下作出解答。当政府提请法院介入评估是否必须提供某些材料时，由法院以单方、不公开的方式进行该司法评估是完全符合常规做法的。正如Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit（哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院）所指出的，单方CIPA实践与更为人熟知的单方实践“高度相似”：\n\n当法院（而非通常情况下的检察官单独一人）以不公开方式审查证据，以确定其是否构成根据 Jencks Act（《詹克斯法案》）18 U.S.C. § 3500(b) 应予披露的证人证言，或根据 Brady（布雷迪规则）应予披露的开脱罪责材料时，被告同样无权查阅法院审查的任何证据……以协助其主张该等证据应当予以披露。\n\nUnited States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2006)（引文及内部引号省略）。\n\n根据前述原则，本巡回区及其他地区的法院常规性地允许政府以单方且不公开的方式提出第4条提交材料，无论一名或多名辩护律师是否具有或能够获得适当的安全许可。参见例如 Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 143（驳回关于政府单方且不公开提交材料不当的主张（援引 Aref, 533 F.3d at 81））；Abu-Jihaad, 2007 WL 2972623, at *1（汇总大量判例），aff'd, Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102；United States v. Liu, No. 19 Cr. 804 (VEC), 2021 WL 3374535, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2021)（指出单方审理是适当的，且相反主张“已被CIPA本身所排除，并已被第二巡回法院及其他审理该问题的法院反复驳回”）；United States v. Saipov, No. 17 Cr. 722 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2019), ECF No. 212（“当相关动议中明确讨论了政府寻求在证据开示中予以不公开的机密信息的实质内容时，法院常规性地允许政府以单方程序进行。”）（判例汇总）；另见意见书与裁定，Alimehmeti, ECF No. 54, May 8, 2017（驳回辩方要求查阅政府单方第4条动议的动议）；裁定，United States v. Ashe, No. 15 Cr. 706 (VSB) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2016), ECF No. 272（同上）；庭审记录，United States v. Jones, No. 16 Cr. 19 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2016), ECF No. 30（同上）；备忘录决定与裁定，United States v. Mostafa, No. 04 Cr. 356 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2014), ECF No. 233（同上）；United States v. Ahmad, Nos. 04 Cr. 301 (JCH), 06 Cr. 194 (JCH), 2013 WL 1899792, at *3 (D. Conn. May 1, 2013)（“由于法院依据第4条认定该机密信息不属于可开示范围，因此即使获得许可，辩方也无权查阅任何此类信息。”（内部引号省略））；United States v. Ahmed, No. 10 Cr. 131 (PKC), 2011 WL 4915005, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011)（不顾已获安全许可的辩护律师的反对，裁定对政府的第4条动议进行单方、不公开审理是正当的）；Abu-Jihaad, 2007 WL 2972623, at *2（裁定第4条动议可单方提出，并指出“[如果]……法院认定该信息根本不可开示，则无论被告的律师是否愿意接受安全许可审查程序，被告均无权要求提供该信息”）；United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 18, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)（在政府提交的文件证明辩方不具备必要的“知悉必要性”后，允许政府提出单方第4条动议——即使被告及其律师持有适当的安全许可）。\n\n政府的第4条动议\n\n基于上述理由，并依照本地区法院的一贯做法，政府请求在第4条动议到期时以单方方式提交该动议，并请求法院对该动议进行不公开审查并予以封存。\n\n如果法院对政府第4条动议的预期范围或实质内容有任何进一步疑问，政府请求法院与政府进行单方的第2条审前会议。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nDAMIAN WILLIAMS（达米安·威廉姆斯）\nUnited States Attorney（美国联邦检察官）\n\n签署人：/s/\n\nJuliana N. Murray\nRyan B. Finkel\nMicah F. Fergenson\nAssistants United States Attorney（美国联邦助理检察官）\n(212) 637-2314 / 6612 / 2190\n\n抄送：Stephen Cook, Esq. 及 Steven Best, Esq.，被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）之辩护律师；Alex Lipman, Esq. 及 Priya Chaudhry, Esq.，被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）之辩护律师\n\n准予所请。\n\n特此裁定。\n\n日期：April 21, 2023 纽约州纽约市\n\nQs","key_entities":["Classified Information","CIPA","Je","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Yanping Wang","Torres","Kin Ming Je","Analisa Torres","Fergenson","Murray","Finkel","Brady","Jencks"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":30,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":54,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":212,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":233,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":272,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":3103,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-04-21 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-04-21","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:32:42"}