{"id":"court_sdny_577_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":577,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-04","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方申请书 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #577（2025年4月4日立案）。申请人根据《美国法典》第21篇第853(n)条，请求法院修正针对 Yvette Wang 的没收令，主张对被冻结银行账户资金享有合法权益。","summary_en":"Third-party petition to adjudicate interest in forfeited property — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #577 (filed April 4, 2025). Petitioner seeks amendment of forfeiture order under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n), asserting superior legal interest in seized bank account funds against Defendant Yvette Wang.","body_en":"# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\n**THIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE - VERIFIED CLAIM OF**\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner (\"Petitioner\") files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the \"Petition\"). Petitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest (\"Petitioner's Property\") (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government (the \"Government\") improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with Defendant Yvette Wang (\"Defendant Wang\"). Specifically, Petitioner's Property was improperly seized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in bank account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Account 2770\"). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or interest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. The Forfeiture Order (as more fully defined below) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner's Property because right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property was vested in the Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was superior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the Forfeiture Order (as defined below). As such, this Court should amend the Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner's Property from the Forfeiture Order and order that the Government immediately return Petitioner's Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner's claim, Petitioner states as follows:\n\n#### **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nIt appears that the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, were purely \"collateral damage\" in the Government's seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant Wang and Miles Guo (\"Defendant Guo\"). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure of Account 2770, and in that time span, there has never been any explanation as to how Account 2770 (including Petitioner's Property) is related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any showing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were ever deposited in Account 2770; no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever commingled with Petitioner's Property; and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had anything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\n\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is a beneficiary of a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property and Petitioner's Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither Defendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, have ever demonstrated that they have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner's Property in Account 2770 or in Account 2770 in general. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of \"all her right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 (and thus, Petitioner's Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), her consent has no legal bearing as to Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. Defendant Wang never had such \"right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 – there is no evidence that she was a signatory\n\non Account 2770, ever deposited money into Account 2770, or otherwise had any control over Account 2770, and there is no evidence that Defendant Wang ever directed anyone, directly or indirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that she does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never established that Petitioner's Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\n### **II. BACKGROUND FACTS**\n\n#### **A. Petitioner's Property**\n\n1. Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Hamilton Opportunity Fund\"), a Cayman Islands Segregated Portfolio Company, provided Petitioner with an Offering Memorandum (the \"Offering Memorandum\") dated January 20, 2022. A true and correct copy of the Offering Memorandum is attached hereto as **Exhibit A.**\n\n2. Hamilton Opportunity Fund is a \"fund specializing in equity investments selected by the Investment Manager [as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum] with a view to long-term capital gains.\" **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 33. The Investment Manager (as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum) had identified an opportunity to invest in a bank (the \"Digital Bank\") (as more fully described in Offering Memorandum at 33). In connection with this investment, Hamilton Opportunity Fund sought to raise capital by issuing various classes of shares. *Id.* at 34.\n\n3. The Offering Memorandum offered Petitioner an opportunity to acquire Class B Shares attributed to a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund - Hamilton M&A Fund SP (the \"M&A Fund\").\n\n4. Defendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any corporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund or Hamilton Opportunity Fund. The evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n5. Defendant Wang did not make any investments in the M&A Fund; again, the evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n6. On January 26, 2022, Petitioner submitted an application (the \"Subscription Agreement\") to Hamilton Opportunity Fund for a subscription for \\$150,000 worth of Class B Shares in the M&A Fund. A true and correct copy of the Subscription Agreement is attached hereto as **Exhibit B.**\n\n7. On January 26, 2022, Hamilton Opportunity Fund, on behalf of the M&A Fund, approved and accepted the Subscription Agreement. *See* **Exhibit B**, Subscription Agreement at 15.\n\n8. On February 11, 2022, pursuant to the terms of the Subscription Agreement, Petitioner wired \\$153,100.00 (the \"Petitioner Property\") to Account Number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank. A true and correct copy of the wire confirmation is attached hereto as **Exhibit C**.\n\n9. The account to which Petitioner wired Petitioner Property to is Account 2770.\n\n10. Pursuant to the terms of the Offering Memorandum, Petitioner is entitled to redemption of Petitioner's shares at the Petitioner's option. **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 17; *see also id.* at 53 (stating that subject to certain limitations, \"Class B Shares may be redeemed\n\n4\n\nat the option of the Shareholder on any Redemption Day\").\n\n11. The assets of Hamilton Opportunity Fund are \"kept segregated, separate and separately identifiable from those of any other segregated portfolios of the Fund and any general assets of the Fund.\" **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 12. In addition, pursuant to the laws of the Cayman Islands, it is the duty of Hamilton Opportunity Fund to \"segregate, and keep segregated, portfolio assets of each segregated portfolio separate and separately identifiable from segregated portfolio assets of any other segregated portfolio.\" **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 22-23 (citing the Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands, Part XIV, 219(6)(b)).\n\n#### **B. Seizure of Account 2770**\n\n12. On September 18, 2022, the Government seized the entire balance of the funds in Account 2770.\n\n13. To date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the Government had to seize the funds in Account 2770.\n\n# **C. The Criminal Case Against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the Forfeiture Order**\n\n14. On March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n\n15. On May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the \"Superseding Information\") against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information charged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I) (Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering (Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a Forfeiture Allegation (the \"Forfeiture Allegation\"). Superseding Information at 4.\n\n16. On the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count\n\nII as charged in the Superseding Information.\n\n17. Also on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (\"Original Forfeiture Order\"). ECF No. 329.\n\n18. In the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her*  right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n\n19. Defendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him. Accordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the \"Guo Trial\"). On July 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this Petition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n\n20. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n\n21. On January 7, 2025, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Forfeiture Order\") ECF No. 488. As it pertains to Petitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all material respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her* right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Forfeiture Order at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n22. The assets in Account 2770 are described in both the Original Forfeiture Order and\n\nthe Forfeiture Order as follows:\n\n\\$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September 18, 2022 (23-FBl-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\n\n### **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n23. In an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited, and whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part, because such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n\n24. Here, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of a constructive trust over such property. Moreover, Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any right Defendant Wang had in Petitioner's Property because Defendant Wang had *no* legal right, title or, interest in either Petitioner's Property or Account 2770. In other words, Defendant Wang could not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject to criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner's Property, and Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner.\n\n# **A. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770, Including Petitioner's Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First Instance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds**\n\n25. The Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner's Property because there is no evidence that the Government has ever demonstrated that Petitioner's Property, and Account 2770 in general, is actually forfeitable property, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\n26. \"When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, 'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.'\" *U.S. v. Watts*, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing *U.S. v. Capoccia*, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court *must* determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.\" Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); *Watts*, 786 F.3d at 172. \"At various points in the proceedings, *the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion* to varying degrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . .or by a preponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.\" *Id.* (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). \"Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the property in question be considered 'subject to forfeiture' in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the government has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property is seen merely as 'potentially forfeitable' . . . or 'potentially subject to forfeiture.'\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n27. This means that before the court reaches the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in dispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority to seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the\n\naccounts seized regardless of whether the petitioner can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). *See e.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co*., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n\n28. A full and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair administration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has conducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary proceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an ancillary proceeding, since \"the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.\" S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392.\n\n29. In this matter, there has never been a determination of whether there exists a nexus between Account 2770 and any of the offenses Defendant Wang was charged with (and pled guilty to), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained in the publicly-available documentsin both Defendant Wang's and Defendant Guo's criminal case, the Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n\n30. Here, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture Allegation as to both Counts I and Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding Information at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show, let alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n31. As to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the wire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United\n\n9\n\nStates Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C)[1](#page-9-0) . . .and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, \"if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n\n32. The record is devoid of any allegations pertaining to how funds in Account 2770 are, or are derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang's conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Superseding Information alleges that \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about March 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive stock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and GClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the Himalaya Exchange [(the \"Fraud Scheme\")]. Through the [Fraud Scheme], YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced investors to invest more than \\$1 billion into entities Guo controlled.\" Superseding Information at 2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing any proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into Account 2770. Similarly, there are no allegations in the Superseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that \"[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture] which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of\" various specified offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang in Count I.\n\nAccount 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits into Account 2770 were from investors who were investing in the Digital Bank – an investment that is not implicated in any way by the \"Fraud Scheme\" described in the Superseding Information. To be sure, Petitioner affirms that Petitioner was never a victim of any conduct by Defendant Wang alleged in the Superseding Information and does not believe that any of Petitioner's Property was ever used in any unlawful activity.\n\n33. Finally, there was no relevant testimony during Defendant Guo's trial concerning Account 2770. There was no testimony regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme were ever deposited into Account 2770, nor, for that matter, whether Defendant Wang ever deposited any money into Account 2770. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would indicate there is a nexus between Account 2770 and Defendant Wang's wire fraud charge, let alone sufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing, and the Court properly adjudicated, that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of Account 2770 to be proper.\n\n34. As to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the money laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1)[2](#page-10-0) , any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense, or any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United States currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. As to Count II, The Government \"must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18\n\n<span id=\"page-10-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that \"[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, *involved in such offense*, or any property *traceable to such property*.\" 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\nU.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.\" *U.S. v. Beltramea*, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n35. The Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy to launder money because Defendant Wang \"knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . .and which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One of this Information.\" Superseding Information at 3.\n\n36. It is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited for the money laundering charge in Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang engaging in financial transactions with the \"proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One.\" Superseding Information at 3. As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account 2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (*see* ¶¶ 31-33, above) – there is no evidence that such funds \"constitute[d] or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of\" wire fraud. *See e.g.* 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were not Fraud Scheme proceeds nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could not serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part of Defendant Wang's conviction for Count II.\n\n37. The overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge further fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be forfeitable. In the Superseding Information, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding Information at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were \"among others\" that Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money\n\n12\n\n(Superseding Information at 3), these other acts were never identified.\n\n38. First, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened a bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was *not*. Superseding Information at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately \\$200 million to that account. *Id.* The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank account held by Saraca Media Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\") (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo Trial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), *not* from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be transferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information. Moreover, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n39. The second act the Government alleges is that \"on or about June 5, 2020,\" Defendant Wang \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from GTV's parent company, Saraca, to a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Defendant Guo's son.\" Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was transferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account. Moreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n40. As seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding Account 2770 whatsoever. The *only* reference in the record to Account 2770 is Defendant Wang's consent to forfeit it. However, \"a defendant's consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the requirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of offense.\" *Beltramea*, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, \"[t]he district court had an independent duty to *ensure* that the required nexus exists.\" *Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n41. Here, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the Original Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account 2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n42. The Government's continued retention of the funds in Account 2770, without showing that there is a nexus, is wrong and inequitable. Should the Government retain the funds in Account 2770, it will be unjustly enriched, since the funds belong to third parties, including Petitioner, who are (1) not Defendant Wang or Defendant Guo; and (2) not involved the Fraud Scheme, let alone victims of such a scheme. *See, e.g., U.S. v. Bajakajian*, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (explaining that a criminal \"forfeiture serves no remedial purpose, is designed to punish the offender, *and cannot be imposed upon innocent owners*.\") (emphasis added).\n\n## **B. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner's Property Because There Exists a Constructive Trust Over Such Property**\n\n43. Even putting aside the Government's failure to properly demonstrate that the funds in Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does Defendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n\n44. Under the doctrine of constructive trusts, Petitioner's Property is protected and remains the property of Petitioner regardless of any other ownership claims, including Defendant\n\nWang's or the Government, standing in her shoes. The Second Circuit[3](#page-14-0) has held that \"a constructive trust qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" *Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States*, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n45. \"A constructive trust is an equitable remedy, *necessarily flexible to accomplish its purpose*.\" *Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co*., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). \"Its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate the performance of a wrongful act. . .What is necessary is that the court identify a party who is holding property *under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it*.\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n46. \"Whether a party is unjustly enriched is a legal conclusion reached through the application of principles of equity. . . A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief. . . Unjust enrichment results when a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the transfer and considering the relationship of the parties, it would be inequitable to retain.\" *Id.* (internal\n\n<span id=\"page-14-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> \"The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation.\" *In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.*, 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), *aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A*., No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). Here, there are three competing jurisdictions whose laws could apply: New York, California, and Cayman Islands. Petitioner's payment of Petitioner's Property was pursuant to the Subscription Agreement, which is governed by Cayman Islands law. *See* **Exhibit B**, Subscription Agreement at 8, ¶ 2(s). Account 2770 *was* an account in a California bank when Petitioner deposited Petitioner's Property. Since Account 2770 was seized (pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a court in New York state), the funds are now in possession of the Government in New York. New York is the forum state of this case. From these facts, New York has the greatest interest in this litigation, and its laws should apply to an imposition of a constructive trust. However, to the extent that the Government challenges this choice-of-law determination, Petitioner reserves all rights to request that this Court impose a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property under California and/or Cayman Islands law.\n\ncitations omitted).\n\n47. The New York Court of Appeals outlined several factors to be considered in determining whether a constructive trust should be imposed in certain circumstances, including \"(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment.\" *Sharp v. Kosmalski*, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976). However, New York courts have long held that \"these factors are merely useful guides and are not talismanic.\" *Counihan*, 194 F.3d at 362 (citing to a plethora of New York state cases that have stated this proposition).\n\n48. Here, there is a constructive trust for the benefit of Petitioner over Petitioner's Property as of the date that it was deposited into Account 2770.\n\n49. Petitioner entered into a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship[4](#page-15-0) with Hamilton Opportunity Fund when Petitioner executed the Subscription Agreement in order to acquire certain Class B shares in Hamilton M&A Fund SP. Per the Subscription Agreement, Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC made a promise to Petitioner that Petitioner's Property would be invested in the Digital Bank. In reliance on this promise, the Petitioner wired Petitioner's Property to Account 2770 as instructed in the Subscription Agreement. The Government's improper seizure of Account 2770 forced a breach of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC's promise to invest Petitioner's Property into the Digital Bank. Because of Government's seizure, Petitioner is not even able to exercise his Right of Redemption to obtain back Petitioner's Property. This would\n\n<span id=\"page-15-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> Even if the Court determines that the relationship was not confidential and/or there was no fiduciary relationship between Hamilton Opportunity Fund and Petitioner, such would not be determinative, as the absence of a fiduciary relationship does not preclude the Court from finding a constructive trust exists. *See Koreag,* 961 F.2d at 353 (stating that \"[w]e do not believe, however, that the lack of a fiduciary relationship between [the parties] automatically defeats [a] claim of constructive trust. Although a fiduciary relationship is one of the factors cited by New York courts, the absence of any one factor will not itself defeat the imposition of a constructive trust when otherwise required by equity\").\n\nresult in unjust enrichment to the benefit of the Government since the Government is now retaining Petitioner's Property without any legal cause to do so. *See, e.g., U.S. v. Coluccio*, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding that imposition of a constructive trust was proper where, amongst other reasons, Government's forfeiture caused a breach of an implied promise); *Torres v. \\$36,256.80 U.S. Currency*, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a constructive trust appropriate where \"The government's forfeiture forced a breach of that promise that may result in a potentially unjust enrichment of the government (and commensurate unjust impoverishment of [the plaintiff]).\")\n\n50. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown that a constructive trust should be imposed over Petitioner's Property. Such a constructive trust \"qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" *Willis*, 652 F.3d at 242.\n\n51. The property upon which the constructive trust is sought – Petitioners Property - is easily traceable. *See* **Exhibit C***.*\n\n52. Moreover, the imposition of a constructive trust is fully available to Petitioner, even if the Government contends that others are owed restitution from any forfeited property. \"When a party can directly trace its assets, without resorting to fictions or presumptions, a constructive trust is available even in cases involving multiple fraud victims.\" *U.S. v. Ovid,* 2012 WL 2087084, \\*7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012). \"[C]ourts are not free to disregard the law of constructive trusts when a claimant can directly trace its property, even if this leaves one innocent victim better off than another equally innocent victim.\" *Id.* The \"orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases\" is to \"return[] identifiable assets to their owners, turning to pro rata distribution only when specific identification or transactional tracing is impossible.\" *Id.* at \\*8 (citing *Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment*, § 59 Reporter's Note G, at 437).\n\n### **C. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner's Property**\n\n53. Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property is absolutely superior to any interest that the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner's Property.\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner's interest in the forfeited property, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's interest \"renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner *rather than the defendant* or was superior to any right, title, or interest *of the defendant* at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section.\" 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n\n55. Here, as set forth above, Defendant Wang never had any interest in Petitioner's Property or Account 2770; indeed, the record is entirely silent as to what the relationship is between Defendant Wang, the Fraud Scheme, and Account 2770.\n\n56. It is axiomatic that neither the Government nor Defendant Wang can argue that they have a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Likewise, Defendant Wang cannot forfeit her interest in a property in which she had no interest.\n\n#### **D. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys' Fees**\n\n57. The Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to file this petition asserting Petitioner's right to Petitioner's Property and to challenge the forfeiture of Petitioner's Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner's costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (\"EAJA\"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the purposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney's fees under the EAJA. *See United States v. Cox*, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Douglas*, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995); *U.S. v. Bailey*, 2015 WL 1893610 at \\*20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\n\n### **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\n58. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner's Property, which renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. *See e.g.* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Defendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property, and never did. Petitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that the Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner's Property.\n\n59. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\nDated: April 2, 2025\n\nDated: April 2, 2025 Respectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman Jeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq. Jeremy W. Schulman, Esq. SCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC 6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425 North Bethesda, MD 20852 (240) 356-8550 [jgavenman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jgavenman@schulmanbh.com) [jschulman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jschulman@schulmanbh.com)\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler Paul W. Butler, Esq. BUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES 1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531 Washington, D.C. 20036 [paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com](mailto:paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com) *Counsel for Petitioner*\n\n# **ATTESTATION AND OATH**\n\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I, \\_\\_ \\_\\_\\_, attest and declare under\n\npenalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided in support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.\n\nExecuted on this \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ day of April, 2025 2\n\n![](_page_19_Picture_5.jpeg)\n\nSignature","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\n要求裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益并修改初步没收裁定的第三方请愿书——经核实的权利主张书\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n请愿人（“请愿人”）依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c) 条提起本《要求裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益并修改初步没收裁定的第三方请愿书》（“本请愿书”）。请愿人寻求返还请愿人拥有合法权利、所有权和/或权益的资金（“请愿人财产”）（定义详见下文），且该资金系由 United States Government（美国政府）（“政府”）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平被告）（“王被告”）达成的没收裁定的一部分而不当查扣。具体而言，当政府查扣以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名义在 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）开立的账号为 5090042770 的银行账户（“2770 账户”）中的全部资金时，请愿人财产被政府不当查扣。然而，任何涉及 2770 账户内资金（包括请愿人财产）的没收裁定均属非法和不当，因为王被告对 2770 账户或请愿人财产均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。因此，该没收裁定（定义详见下文）就请愿人财产而言归于无效，因为在产生该没收裁定（定义见下文）的行为发生时，请愿人财产的权利、所有权或权益已归属于请愿人而非王被告，且优于王被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。因此，本法院应当修改该没收裁定，将请愿人财产从该没收裁定中剔除，并命令政府立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人。为支持请愿人的主张，请愿人陈述如下：\n\nI. 引言陈述\n\n2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）显然纯粹是政府在起诉王被告及 Miles Guo（郭文贵）（“郭被告”）之前查扣资产时的“附带损害”。自 2770 账户被查扣至今已有两年半以上，在此期间，从未有任何关于 2770 账户（包括请愿人财产）与王被告认罪答辩的任何罪行之间存在何种关联的解释，而根据法律，这是有效没收裁定的必要前提条件。从未有任何证据表明王被告认罪答辩的任何非法活动的任何收益曾被存入 2770 账户；没有证据表明此类活动的任何收益曾与请愿人财产发生混同；事实上，也没有证据表明王被告曾与 2770 账户有任何牵连，甚至不知晓其存在。\n\n如下文所示，请愿人是就请愿人财产设立的推定信托的受益人，请愿人财产在本案中不得被政府查扣。无论王被告，还是现处于其地位的政府，均未曾证明其对 2770 账户中的请愿人财产或对 2770 账户整体享有任何权益。虽然王被告在《没收裁定》（ECF No. 488 第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在 2770 账户（以及请愿人财产）中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，但她的同意对于 2770 账户或请愿人财产没有任何法律效力。王被告从未在 2770 账户中拥有此类“权利、所有权和权益”——没有证据表明她是 2770 账户的签字人、\n\n曾向 2770 账户存入资金，或以其他方式对 2770 账户拥有任何控制权，也没有证据表明王被告曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770 账户存入任何资金。王被告不能没收其并不拥有且不享有任何权益的财产。事实上，本法院似乎在最初阶段根本未曾依法依《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1)(A) 条确立请愿人财产是否属于应予没收的财产。\n\n基于上述所有理由以及下文阐明的理由，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 批准本请愿书；(2) 修改《没收裁定》以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人；(4) 命令请愿人有权追索因本请愿书而发生的律师费和诉讼费用，并准许请愿人提交关于该等律师费和诉讼费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的其他救济。\n\nII. 背景事实\n\nA. 请愿人财产\n\n1. 开曼群岛独立投资组合公司 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“Hamilton Opportunity Fund”）向请愿人提供了一份日期为 2022 年 1 月 20 日的《发售备忘录》（“《发售备忘录》”）。《发售备忘录》的真实准确副本作为附件 A 附于本请愿书。\n\n2. Hamilton Opportunity Fund 是一家“专门从事由投资经理［如《发售备忘录》中所定义］挑选的以长期资本增值为目的的股权投资的基金”。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 33 页。投资经理（如《发售备忘录》中所定义）已发现投资于一家银行（“数字银行”）（详见《发售备忘录》第 33 页所载）的机会。就该项投资而言，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 寻求通过发行各类股份来募集资金。同上，第 34 页。\n\n3. 《发售备忘录》向请愿人提供了认购归属于 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 之一独立投资组合——Hamilton M&A Fund SP（“并购基金”）的 B 类股份的机会。\n\n4. 王被告不是该并购基金或 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的董事或成员，且以其他方式在该并购基金或 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 中均不享有任何公司权益或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n5. 王被告未在该并购基金中进行任何投资；同样，证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n6. 2022 年 1 月 26 日，请愿人向 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 提交了一份认购该并购基金价值 150,000 美元的 B 类股份的申请（“《认购协议》”）。《认购协议》的真实准确副本作为附件 B 附于本请愿书。\n\n7. 2022 年 1 月 26 日，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 代表该并购基金批准并接受了《认购协议》。见附件 B，《认购协议》第 15 页。\n\n8. 2022 年 2 月 11 日，依据《认购协议》的条款，请愿人向 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090042770 的账户电汇了 153,100.00 美元（“请愿人财产”）。电汇确认单的真实准确副本作为附件 C 附于本请愿书。\n\n9. 请愿人汇入请愿人财产的账户即为 2770 账户。\n\n10. 依据《发售备忘录》的条款，请愿人有权选择赎回请愿人的股份。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 17 页；另见同上，第 53 页（载明在受限于特定限制的前提下，“B 类股份可在任何赎回日由股东选择赎回”）。\n\n11. Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的资产“与该基金的任何其他独立投资组合的资产以及该基金的任何一般资产保持隔离、分开并可予单独识别”。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 12 页。此外，依据开曼群岛法律，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 有责任“隔离并保持隔离每个独立投资组合的投资组合资产，使其与任何其他独立投资组合的独立投资组合资产分开并可予单独识别”。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 22-23 页（引用《开曼群岛公司法（修订版）》第 XIV 部分第 219(6)(b) 条）。\n\nB. 查扣 2770 账户\n\n12. 2022 年 9 月 18 日，政府查扣了 2770 账户内的全部资金余额。\n\n13. 截至目前，没有任何公开可得的文件说明政府查扣 2770 账户内资金具备何种合理确信。\n\nC. 针对王被告和郭被告的刑事案件及没收裁定\n\n14. 2023 年 3 月 6 日，政府对王被告、郭被告以及从未被提审的第三名被告 William Je 提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n15. 2024 年 5 月 3 日，政府针对王被告提交了一份替代控告书（“《替代控告书》”）。ECF No. 325。《替代控告书》指控王被告犯有一项共谋电汇欺诈罪（罪名项一）（《替代控告书》第 1-2 页）和一项共谋洗钱罪（罪名项二）（《替代控告书》第 2-4 页）。《替代控告书》还包含一项没收指控（“《没收指控》”）。《替代控告书》第 4 页。\n\n16. 同日，即 2024 年 5 月 3 日，王被告对《替代控告书》中指控的罪名项一及罪名项二作出了认罪答辩。\n\n17. 同样在 2024 年 5 月 3 日，本法院作出了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的经同意初步没收裁定》（“《原没收裁定》”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n18. 在《原没收裁定》中，王被告同意没收其在某些资产（包括 2770 账户）中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，因为该等财产“构成被告个人获取的［替代］控告书第一项罪名所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及［替代］控告书第二项罪名所指控罪行的财产”。《原没收裁定》第 2-6 页（后加粗强调）。\n\n19. 郭被告未对他被指控的任何罪行作出认罪答辩。因此，于 2024 年 5 月 22 日至 2024 年 7 月 16 日期间进行了陪审团审判（“郭案审判”）。2024 年 7 月 16 日，陪审团裁定郭被告犯有敲诈勒索共谋罪、共谋电汇欺诈罪、共谋洗钱罪、共谋证券欺诈罪、证券欺诈罪、电汇欺诈罪和洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本请愿书出具之日，郭被告尚未被判刑。\n\n20. 2025 年 1 月 6 日，王被告被判刑。\n\n21. 2025 年 1 月 7 日，本法院作出了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的经同意初步没收裁定》（“《没收裁定》”），ECF No. 488。在涉及请愿人的方面，该《没收裁定》在所有实质方面与《原没收裁定》大体相同。在《没收裁定》中，王被告同意没收其在某些资产（包括 2770 账户）中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，因为该等财产“构成被告个人获取的［替代］控告书第一项罪名所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及［替代］控告书第二项罪名所指控罪行的财产”。《没收裁定》第 2-11 页（后加粗强调）。\n\n22. 2770 账户中的资产在《原没收裁定》和《没收裁定》中均被描述如下：\n\n原存放在 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090042770、户名为“Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC”的账户中，并由政府于 2022 年 9 月 18 日或前后查扣的 89,992,861.75 美元法定货币 (23-FBl-000074)。\n\n《原没收裁定》第 3 页；《没收裁定》第 3 页。\n\nIII. 论证理由\n\n23. 在依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 和《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c)(1) 条进行的附随刑事没收程序中，本法院必须以优势证据标准认定请愿人是否对拟没收财产拥有合法权利、所有权或权益，以及该等权利、所有权或权益是否使没收命令全部或部分无效，原因在于该等权益在导致财产被没收的行为发生时归属于请愿人而非被告，或优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n24. 在本案中，依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)，请愿人凭借对请愿人财产设定的拟制信托（constructive trust），对请愿人财产享有合法权利、所有权或权益。此外，请愿人对请愿人财产的权益既已归属于请愿人，且优于被告 Wang（王）在请愿人财产中拥有的任何权利，因为被告王在请愿人财产或 2770 账户中均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。换言之，被告王不可能没收其在 2770 账户中的权益，因为她没有任何适格于刑事没收的权益。因此，没收命令应予修改以剔除请愿人财产，且请愿人财产应返还给请愿人。\n\nA. 政府未能证明 2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）在首要环节适格于没收，导致该没收命令针对此类资金是不当的\n\n25. 政府没有合法理由扣留请愿人财产，因为没有任何证据表明政府曾按照 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) 的要求证明请愿人财产以及整个 2770 账户实际上属于可没收财产。\n\n26. “当政府寻求获得没收命令时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1) 条……要求量刑法院根据适用法规确定哪些财产应予没收。’”U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（援引 U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)）。根据 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院必须确定政府是否已在财产与犯罪之间确立了必要的关联。”Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A)（强调为后加）；Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的各个阶段，政府承担以不同确定程度证明此项法律结论的举证责任：在起诉后听证会上以合理根据为标准……或在无陪审团审理或陪审团审理中以优势证据为标准。”同上（强调为后加）（内部引文省略）。“然而，唯有在政府达到相关法律门槛的情况下，涉案财产才可在任何法律意义上被视为‘应予没收’。在此之前，虽然政府仅通过起诉书宣布其寻求没收的意图，但该财产仅被视为‘潜在可没收’……或‘潜在应予没收’。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n27. 这意味着，在法院触及请愿人是否有权根据 § 853(n) 获得财产返还这一问题之前，有必要首先确定争议财产在首要环节是否确实可予没收。若非如此，政府便没有扣押该财产的法定职权。如果财产被不当扣押，则无论请愿人是否符合 § 853(n) 规定的标准，政府都必须返还所扣押的账户。参见如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)。\n\n28. 进行全面且完整的 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) 审查对于司法公正至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已进行审查并认定该财产应予没收这一假设之上。在制定附随程序法规时，国会选择在附随程序中将举证责任置于第三方，因为“美国在刑事案件中已经排除合理怀疑地证明了其没收指控。”S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n29. 在本案中，从未就 2770 账户与被告王被指控（并已认罪答辩）的任何罪行之间是否存在关联作出过认定，因此，请愿人被迫提交本请愿书。基于被告王和被告 Guo（郭文贵）刑事案件公开文件中包含的所有信息，政府在涉及 2770 账户的事项上无法胜诉。\n\n30. 在本案中，政府在替代起诉书（Superseding Information）中对罪名项一和罪名项二均列入了没收指控，并寻求没收特定财产。替代起诉书第 4 页。记录中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明（更不用说满足其举证责任证明）2770 账户与被告王认罪答辩的罪行之间存在关联。\n\n31. 关于罪名项一，没收指控称，“由于实施了本替代起诉书罪名项一所指控的电汇欺诈罪行，被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平，又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”）应依据美国法典第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条[1]……及美国法典第 28 编第 2461(c) 条向美国没收构成或来源于可追溯至实施上述罪行之收益的任何及所有财产（无论不动产还是动产）。”替代起诉书第 4 页。政府必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 项下的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收理论是该财产被用于实施或便利实施刑事犯罪，或卷入刑事犯罪的实施，则政府应证明该财产与该犯罪之间存在实质性联系。”18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n32. 记录中没有任何关于 2770 账户中的资金如何构成或来源于可追溯至被告王共谋实施电汇欺诈之收益的指控。替代起诉书指控称：“至少在 2018 年前后至至少 2023 年 3 月 15 日前后，共谋人向投资者作虚假陈述，称其对 GTV、Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）组织和 GClubs 的投资将获得股票作为回报，且其对 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的投资将获得加密货币作为回报[（下称“欺诈计划”）]。通过该[欺诈计划]，被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平，又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”）及其包括 Miles Guo（郭文贵）在内的共谋人，诱使投资者向郭控制的实体投资超过 10 亿美元。”替代起诉书第 2 页。替代起诉书中没有任何关于被告王将欺诈计划的任何收益存入 2770 账户的指控。同样，替代起诉书中也没有任何关于由于该欺诈计划而有任何投资者向 2770 账户存入资金的指控。也不可能有任何此类指控，因为向 2770 账户存入的唯一款项是来自投资于 Digital Bank（数字银行）的投资者——而该项投资完全未卷入替代起诉书中所述的“欺诈计划”。可以肯定的是，请愿人确认，请愿人从未是被告王在替代起诉书中所指控之任何行为的受害者，且请愿人不认为请愿人财产曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n1 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定，“构成或来源于可追溯至违反”各项指定罪行“之收益的任何财产（无论不动产还是动产）[均应予没收]”，包括在罪名项一中对被告王指控的违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 电汇欺诈罪。\n\n33. 最后，在被告郭的审理过程中，没有任何关于 2770 账户的相关证词。没有任何关于欺诈计划的任何收益是否曾被存入 2770 账户的证词，而且就此而言，也没有关于被告王是否曾向 2770 账户存入任何款项的证词。简而言之，记录中没有任何内容表明 2770 账户与被告王的电汇欺诈指控之间存在关联，更没有充分的证据来认定政府已完成了其举证责任、且法院已妥当裁定存在使 2770 账户适格于没收的正当关联。\n\n34. 关于罪名项二，没收指控称，“由于实施了本起诉书罪名项二所指控的洗钱罪行，被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平，又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”）应依据美国法典第 18 编第 982(a)(1) 条[2]向美国没收涉及上述罪行的任何及所有财产（无论不动产还是动产），或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产，包括但不限于代表涉及上述罪行之财产数额的一笔美元款项。”替代起诉书第 4 页。关于罪名项二，政府“必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 项下的没收要件。”U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015)。\n\n2 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定，“法院对被判犯有违反本编第 1956 条[洗钱法规]罪行的人判处刑罚时……应命令该人向美国没收涉及该罪行的任何财产（无论不动产还是动产），或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产。”18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调为后加）。\n\n35. 替代起诉书指控称，被告王犯有共谋洗钱罪，因为被告王“明知某些金融交易中涉及的财产代表某种形式的非法活动收益，仍意图进行并确实进行及试图进行该等金融交易……且该等交易实际上涉及指定非法活动的收益，即本起诉书罪名项一所指控的电汇欺诈计划的收益。”替代起诉书第 3 页。\n\n36. 目前尚不清楚 2770 账户如何能因罪名项二中的洗钱指控而被没收。从指控来看，洗钱指控源于被告王利用“罪名项一所指控的电汇欺诈计划的收益”进行金融交易。替代起诉书第 3 页。如上所述，没有任何证据表明 2770 账户中的资金与罪名项一所指控的欺诈计划存在任何关联（参见上文第 31-33 段）——没有任何证据表明此类资金“构成或来源于可追溯至实施”电汇欺诈的收益。参见如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。由于 2770 账户中的资金既非欺诈计划收益，亦非来源于欺诈计划收益，因此该等资金不能作为罪名项二洗钱指控的依据，也不能作为被告王在罪名项二定罪的一部分被没收。\n\n37. 政府指控用以支持洗钱罪名项的公开行为，亦未能证明2770号账户（Account 2770）中的资金何以符合应予没收的条件。在《替代起诉书》（Superseding Information）中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项行为。《替代起诉书》第3页。尽管政府声称这两项公开行为是被告Wang（王雁平）为推进涉嫌洗钱共谋而实施的“诸多行为之一”（《替代起诉书》第3页），但这些其他行为从未被明确指认。\n\n38. 首先，根据《替代起诉书》，2770号账户在2020年5月20日由被告王雁平以GTV的名义开设银行账户，值得注意的是，该账户显然不是2770号账户。《替代起诉书》第3页。2020年6月2日，被告王雁平向该账户转账约2亿美元。同上。转入GTV账户的资金来自Saraca Media Group, Inc.（萨拉卡媒体集团公司，下称“Saraca”）持有的JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）账户（Guo案庭审，2024年5月31日，953:25-954:4；Guo案庭审，2024年6月26日，4359:1-14），而不是来自2770号账户。没有任何证词表明2770号账户中的任何资金曾流入Saraca的摩根大通银行账户，进而再转入《替代起诉书》中所述的GTV账户。此外，2770号账户在2020年根本不存在。\n\n39. 政府指控的第二项行为是，“在2020年6月5日或前后”，被告王雁平“授权从GTV的母公司Saraca向一家高风险对冲基金电汇1亿美元，以使Saraca及其最终实益拥有人即被告Guo（郭文贵）之子受益。”《替代起诉书》第3-4页。首先，这明确指控了资金是从Saraca的账户转出的，而事实证明2770号账户并非该账户。同样，再次强调，没有任何证词表明2770号账户中的任何资金曾流入过Saraca的账户。此外，再次说明，2770号账户在2020年根本不存在。\n\n40. 从上述论证可以看出，根本没有任何关于2770号账户的指控或证词。记录中对2770号账户的唯一提及是被告王雁平同意没收该账户。然而，“被告对没收的同意[并不能]免除申请没收的财产与定罪罪行之间必须存在关联的要求。”Beltramea案，785 F.3d at 291。正如Eighth Circuit（第八巡回上诉法院）所强调的那样，“地区法院负有独立职责以确保存在所要求的关联。”同上（强调为原文所加）。\n\n41. 在本案中，《替代起诉书》、《原没收裁定》或《没收裁定》中均没有任何事实指控表明2770号账户与被告王雁平认罪答辩的罪行之间存在哪怕是涉嫌的关联。\n\n42. 政府在未能证明存在关联的情况下继续扣留2770号账户中的资金，是不当且不公平的。如果政府保留2770号账户中的资金，将构成不当得利，因为这些资金属于包括申诉人在内的第三方，而这些第三方（1）不是被告王雁平或被告郭文贵；并且（2）没有参与欺诈计划，更不用说是此类计划的受害者。参见如U.S. v. Bajakajian案，524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)（解释称刑事“没收不具有补偿目的，旨在惩罚违法者，且不能强加于无辜的所有权人。”）（强调为原文所加）。\n\nB. 申诉人对申诉人财产享有权益，因该等财产上存在推定信托\n\n43. 即使抛开政府未能妥善证明2770号账户中的资金属于《替代起诉书》中所指控的任何活动的一部分不谈，申诉人财产也应当归还给申诉人，因为申诉人对其享有的权益高于被告王雁平，或如今代其位阶的政府所享有的权益。\n\n44. 根据推定信托原则，无论存在任何其他所有权主张，包括被告王雁平或承继其地位的政府的主张，申诉人财产均受到保护，且仍属于申诉人的财产。Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）[3]认定，“就类似于21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)的没收法规而言，推定信托符合‘对该财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益。”Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States案，652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n45. “推定信托是一种衡平法救济，必然具有实现其目的所需的灵活性。”Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co.案，194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999)（强调为原文所加）。“其目的是防止不当得利，尽管不当得利并不必然涉及不法行为的实施……必要的是法院认定某一方持有财产的情形根据衡平法和良知是他不应当保留该财产的。”同上（内部引用省略）。\n\n46. “一方是否构成不当得利是通过适用衡平法原则得出的法律结论……衡平法院在作出推定信托裁决时不受任何僵化公式的约束。交易的公平性必须决定救济的尺度……当一人保留了一项利益，而根据转让时的具体情形并考虑到各方之间的关系，保留该利益是不公平时，即构成不当得利。”同上（内部引用省略）。\n\n[脚注3] “联邦普通法的法律适用规则是适用对诉讼具有重大利益的司法管辖区的法律。”In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.案，961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992)，部分维持原判 sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A.案，No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992)。在本案中，有三个相互竞争的司法管辖区的法律可以适用：New York（纽约州）、California（加利福尼亚州）和Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）。申诉人支付申诉人财产是依据受开曼群岛法律管辖的《认购协议》（Subscription Agreement）。参见证物B，《认购协议》第8页第2(s)段。申诉人存入申诉人财产时，2770号账户是加利福尼亚州一家银行的账户。由于2770号账户已被查扣（根据纽约州一家法院签发的搜查和扣押令），该资金目前由位于纽约的政府持有。纽约是本案的法院地州。从这些事实来看，纽约对本诉讼具有重大利益，其法律应适用于推定信托的设立。然而，在政府质疑此项法律适用决定的范围内，申诉人保留请求本法院根据加利福尼亚州和/或开曼群岛法律对申诉人财产设立推定信托的一切权利。\n\n47. New York Court of Appeals（纽约州上诉法院）概述了确定在特定情形下是否应设立推定信托所要考虑的若干因素，包括“(1) 保密或信义关系，(2) 承诺，(3) 基于对该承诺的信赖而进行的财产转让，以及 (4) 不当得利。”Sharp v. Kosmalski案，40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976)。然而，纽约州法院长期以来一直认为“这些因素仅仅是有用的指导，并非不可变通的法宝。”Counihan案，194 F.3d at 362（引用了大量陈述该主张的纽约州判例）。\n\n48. 在本案中，自申诉人财产存入2770号账户之日起，即存在以申诉人为受益人的对申诉人财产的推定信托。\n\n49. 申诉人在签署《认购协议》以收购Hamilton M&A Fund SP（汉密尔顿并购基金独立投资组合）的特定B类股份时，与Hamilton Opportunity Fund（汉密尔顿机会基金）建立了保密和/或信义关系[4]。根据《认购协议》，Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）向申诉人作出承诺，申诉人财产将投资于Digital Bank（数字银行）。出于对该承诺的信赖，申诉人按照《认购协议》中的指示将申诉人财产电汇至2770号账户。政府对2770号账户的不当查扣迫使汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司违背了将申诉人财产投资于数字银行的承诺。由于政府的查扣，申诉人甚至无法行使其赎回权以取回申诉人财产。这将导致有利于政府的不当得利，因为政府目前在没有任何合法理由的情况下保留申诉人财产。参见如U.S. v. Coluccio案，51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995)（认定在政府的没收导致违反默示承诺等原因下，设立推定信托是适当的）；Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency案，25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994)（认定设立推定信托是适当的，其中指出“政府的没收迫使违背了该承诺，这可能导致政府潜在的不当得利（以及[原告]相应的不当受损）。”）。\n\n[脚注4] 即使法院认定汉密尔顿机会基金与申诉人之间不存在保密关系和/或不存在信义关系，这也不是决定性的，因为不存在信义关系并不妨碍法院认定存在推定信托。参见Koreag案，961 F.2d at 353（陈述称“[然而]，我们认为[当事各方]之间缺乏信义关系并不会自动否定推定信托的主张。尽管信义关系是纽约州法院引用的因素之一，但在衡平法另有要求的情况下，缺少任何一个因素本身并不会阻碍推定信托的设立”）。\n\n50. 因此，申诉人已证明应当对申诉人财产设立推定信托。就类似于21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)的没收法规而言，此类推定信托“符合‘对该财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益。”Willis案，652 F.3d at 242。\n\n51. 申请设立推定信托所指向的财产——即申诉人财产——是易于追溯的。参见证物C。\n\n52. 此外，即使政府主张其他主体应从任何被没收财产中获得赔偿，申诉人也完全可以主张设立推定信托。“当一方可以直接追溯其资产而无需借助拟制或推定手段时，即使在涉及多名欺诈受害者的案件中，推定信托救济依然适用。”U.S. v. Ovid案，2012 WL 2087084, *7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012)。“当权利人可以直接追溯其财产时，即使这会使一名无辜受害者获得优于另一名同等无辜受害者的地位，法院也不得无视推定信托法。”同上。处理多重欺诈案件的“正统做法”是“将可识别的资产返还给其所有权人，仅在无法进行特定识别或交易追溯时才采用按比例分配。”同上，*8（引用《第三次侵权法重述：返还与不当得利》（Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment）§ 59报告人说明G，第437页）。\n\nC. 申诉人对申诉人财产享有优先权益\n\n53. 申诉人对申诉人财产享有的权益绝对优于政府或被告王雁平可能对申诉人财产享有的任何权益。\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)明确规定，除了申诉人对被没收财产享有的权益外，申诉人还必须以优势证据证明，申诉人的权益“使得没收裁定全部或部分无效，因为该合法权利、所有权或权益在引发根据本条没收财产的行为发生之时归属于申诉人而非被告，或优于被告的任何合法权利、所有权或权益”。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（强调为原文所加）。\n\n55. 在本案中，如上所述，被告 Wang（王）从未对请愿人财产或 2770 账户拥有任何权益；事实上，记录中关于被告王、欺诈计划与 2770 账户之间的关系完全没有任何说明。\n\n56. 显而易见的是，政府和被告王都不能主张自己对一项从未拥有过权益的财产享有优先权益。同样，被告王也不能没收其并无权益的财产中的自身权益。\n\nD. 请愿人有权获得诉讼费用和律师费\n\n57. 请愿人被迫聘请法律顾问并产生费用以提出本请愿书，主张请愿人对请愿人财产的权利，并质疑对请愿人财产的没收。在本次程序中胜诉后，请愿人保留追索因本请愿书而产生的律师费和诉讼费用的全部权利，并可根据《Equal Access to Justice Act（平等获取司法公正法案）》（“EAJA”），28 U.S.C. § 2412，追索请愿人的诉讼费用和合理的律师费。联邦法院一贯认为，为了允许胜诉的权利主张人根据 EAJA 收取律师费，§ 853(n) 程序属于民事程序。参见 United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009)；United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995)；U.S. v. Bailey, 2015 WL 1893610 at *20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015)。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n58. 基于上述理由，请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，这使得没收裁定就该等财产而言无效。参见如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告王对请愿人财产不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。请愿人已证明、并且可以在任何必要的听证会上以证据优势证明，没收裁定需要进行修改以排除请愿人财产。\n\n59. 因此，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 批准本请愿书；(2) 修改没收裁定以排除请愿人财产；(3) 裁定立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追索因本请愿书而产生的请愿人律师费和诉讼费用，并准许请愿人提交该等律师费和诉讼费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的该等及其他救济。\n\n日期：2025年4月2日\n\n日期：2025年4月2日 谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\nJeffrey S. Gavenman 律师\nJeremy W. Schulman 律师\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC（舒尔曼·巴塔查里亚有限责任公司）\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\nPaul W. Butler 律师\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES（巴特勒法律策略事务所）\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n请愿人代理律师\n\n证明与誓词\n\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人______，在承担作伪证处罚的前提下证明并声明，本人对该财产的主张并非无理取闹，且就本人所知所信，为支持该主张所提供的信息均真实、准确。\n\n于2025年4月2日签署\n\n[图片]\n\n签名","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Torres","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":5985,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-04 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-04","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:56:09"}