{"id":"court_sdny_584_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":584,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-04","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方没收财产诉状 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #584（2025-04-04 立案）。一位投资者就政府查封的 Silvergate 银行账户资金（Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名下）提出第三方诉请，主张其对该账户资金拥有合法权益，被控人 Yvette Wang 无权对该财产进行没收，请求修正没收令以排除其财产。","summary_en":"Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #584 (filed April 4, 2025). A third-party petitioner contests the forfeiture of bank account funds (account 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC), asserting legal interest in the property and contending that defendant Yvette Wang has no right, title, or interest in the seized funds, and seeks amendment of the forfeiture order to exclude the petitioner's property.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- v. - YVETTE WANG a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\n**THIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE - VERIFIED CLAIM OF**  S4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner (\"Petitioner\") files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the \"Petition\"). Petitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest\n\n(\"Petitioner's Property\") (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government (the \"Government\") improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with Defendant Yvette Wang (\"Defendant Wang\"). Specifically, Petitioner's Property was improperly seized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in bank account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Account 2770\"). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or interest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. The Forfeiture Order (as more fully defined below) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner's Property because right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property was vested in the Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was superior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the Forfeiture Order (as defined below). As such, this Court should amend the Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner's Property from the Forfeiture Order and order that the Government immediately return Petitioner's Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner's claim, Petitioner states as follows:\n\n### **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nIt appears that the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, were purely \"collateral damage\" in the Government's seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant Wang and Miles Guo (\"Defendant Guo\"). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure of Account 2770, and in that time span, there has never been any explanation as to how Account 2770 (including Petitioner's Property) is related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any showing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were ever deposited in Account 2770; no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever commingled with Petitioner's Property; and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had anything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\n\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is a beneficiary of a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property and Petitioner's Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither Defendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, have ever demonstrated that they have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner's Property in Account 2770 or in Account 2770 in general. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of \"all her right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 (and thus, Petitioner's Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), her consent has no legal bearing as to Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. Defendant Wang never had such \"right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 – there is no evidence that she was a signatory on Account 2770, ever deposited money into Account 2770, or otherwise had any control over Account 2770, and there is no evidence that Defendant Wang ever directed anyone, directly or indirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that she does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never established that Petitioner's Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\n## **II. BACKGROUND FACTS**\n\n### **A. Petitioner's Property**\n\n1. Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Hamilton Opportunity Fund\"), a Cayman Islands Segregated Portfolio Company, provided Petitioner with an Offering Memorandum (the \"Offering Memorandum\") dated January 20, 2022. A true and correct copy of the Offering Memorandum is attached hereto as **Exhibit A.**\n\n2. Hamilton Opportunity Fund is a \"fund specializing in equity investments selected by the Investment Manager [as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum] with a view to longterm capital gains.\" **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 33. The Investment Manager (as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum) had identified an opportunity to invest in a bank (the \"Digital Bank\") (as more fully described in Offering Memorandum at 33). In connection with this investment, Hamilton Opportunity Fund sought to raise capital by issuing various classes of shares. *Id.* at 34.\n\n3. The Offering Memorandum offered Petitioner an opportunity to acquire Class B Shares attributed to a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund - Hamilton M&A Fund SP (the \"M&A Fund\").\n\n4. Defendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any corporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund or Hamilton Opportunity Fund. The evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n5. Defendant Wang did not make any investments in the M&A Fund; again, the evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n6. On January 27, 2022, Petitioner submitted an application (the \"Subscription Agreement\") to Hamilton Opportunity Fund for a subscription for \\$100,000 worth of Class B Shares in the M&A Fund. A true and correct copy of the Subscription Agreement is attached hereto as **Exhibit B.**\n\n7. On January 28, 2022, Hamilton Opportunity Fund, on behalf of the M&A Fund, approved and accepted the Subscription Agreement. *See* **Exhibit B**, Subscription Agreement at 15.\n\n8. On February 28, 2022, pursuant to the terms of the Subscription Agreement, Petitioner wired \\$100,100.00 (the \"Petitioner's Property\") to Account Number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank. A true and correct copy of the wire confirmation is attached hereto as **Exhibit C**.\n\n9. The account to which Petitioner wired Petitioner's Property to is Account 2770.\n\n10. Pursuant to the terms of the Offering Memorandum, Petitioner is entitled to redemption of Petitioner's shares at the Petitioner's option. **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at\n\n4\n\n17; *see also id.* at 53 (stating that subject to certain limitations, \"Class B Shares may be redeemed at the option of the Shareholder on any Redemption Day\").\n\n11. The assets of Hamilton Opportunity Fund are \"kept segregated, separate and separately identifiable from those of any other segregated portfolios of the Fund and any general assets of the Fund.\" **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 12. In addition, pursuant to the laws of the Cayman Islands, it is the duty of Hamilton Opportunity Fund to \"segregate, and keep segregated, portfolio assets of each segregated portfolio separate and separately identifiable from segregated portfolio assets of any other segregated portfolio.\" **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 22-23 (citing the Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands, Part XIV, 219(6)(b)).\n\n### **B. Seizure of Account 2770**\n\n12. On September 18, 2022, the Government seized the entire balance of the funds in Account 2770.\n\n13. To date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the Government had to seize the funds in Account 2770.\n\n# **C. The Criminal Case Against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the Forfeiture Order**\n\n14. On March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n\n15. On May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the \"Superseding Information\") against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information charged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I) (Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering (Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a Forfeiture Allegation (the \"Forfeiture Allegation\"). Superseding Information at 4.\n\n16. On the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count II as charged in the Superseding Information.\n\n17. Also on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (\"Original Forfeiture Order\"). ECF No. 329.\n\n18. In the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her* right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n\n19. Defendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him. Accordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the \"Guo Trial\"). On July 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this Petition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n\n20. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n\n21. On January 7, 2025, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Forfeiture Order\") ECF No. 488. As it pertains to Petitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all material respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her* right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Forfeiture Order at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n22. The assets in Account 2770 are described in both the Original Forfeiture Order and\n\nthe Forfeiture Order as follows:\n\n\\$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September 18, 2022 (23-FBl-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\n\n## **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n23. In an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited, and whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part, because such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n\n24. Here, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of a constructive trust over such property. Moreover, Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any right Defendant Wang had in Petitioner's Property because Defendant Wang had *no* legal right, title or, interest in either Petitioner's Property or Account 2770. In other words, Defendant Wang could not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject to criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner's Property, and Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner.\n\n# **A. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770, Including Petitioner's Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First Instance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds**\n\n25. The Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner's Property because there is no evidence that the Government has ever demonstrated that Petitioner's Property, and Account 2770 in general, is actually forfeitable property, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\n26. \"When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, 'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.'\" *U.S. v. Watts*, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing *U.S. v. Capoccia*, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court *must* determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.\" Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); *Watts*, 786 F.3d at 172. \"At various points in the proceedings, *the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion* to varying degrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . .or by a preponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.\" *Id.* (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). \"Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the property in question be considered 'subject to forfeiture' in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the government has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property is seen merely as 'potentially forfeitable' . . . or 'potentially subject to forfeiture.'\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n27. This means that before the court reaches the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in dispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority\n\nto seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the accounts seized regardless of whether the petitioner can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). *See*\n\n*e.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co*., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n\n28. A full and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair administration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has conducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary proceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an ancillary proceeding, since \"the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.\" S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392.\n\n29. In this matter, there has never been a determination of whether there exists a nexus between Account 2770 and any of the offenses Defendant Wang was charged with (and pled guilty to), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained in the publicly-available documents in both Defendant Wang's and Defendant Guo's criminal case, the Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n\n30. Here, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture Allegation as to both Counts I and Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding Information at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show, let alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n31. As to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the wire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a\n\n9\n\n\"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C)1. . .and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, \"if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n\n32. The record is devoid of any allegations pertaining to how funds in Account 2770 are, or are derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang's conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Superseding Information alleges that \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about March 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive stock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and GClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the Himalaya Exchange [(the \"Fraud Scheme\")]. Through the [Fraud Scheme], YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced investors to invest more than \\$1 billion into entities Guo controlled.\" Superseding Information at 2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing\n\n<sup>1</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that \"[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture] which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of\" various specified offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang in Count I.\n\nany proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into Account 2770. Similarly, there are no allegations in the Superseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into\n\nAccount 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits into Account 2770 were from investors who were investing in the Digital Bank – an investment that is not implicated in any way by the \"Fraud Scheme\" described in the Superseding Information. To be sure, Petitioner affirms that Petitioner was never a victim of any conduct by Defendant Wang alleged in the Superseding Information and does not believe that any of Petitioner's Property was ever used in any unlawful activity.\n\n33. Finally, there was no relevant testimony during Defendant Guo's trial concerning Account 2770. There was no testimony regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme were ever deposited into Account 2770, nor, for that matter, whether Defendant Wang ever deposited any money into Account 2770. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would indicate there is a nexus between Account 2770 and Defendant Wang's wire fraud charge, let alone sufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing, and the Court properly adjudicated, that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of Account 2770 to be proper.\n\n34. As to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the money laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1)2, any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense, or any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United\n\n<sup>2</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that \"[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that\n\nStates currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. As to Count II, The Government \"must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18\n\nU.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.\" *U.S. v. Beltramea*, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n35. The Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy to launder money because Defendant Wang \"knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . .and which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One of this Information.\" Superseding Information at 3.\n\n36. It is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited for the money laundering charge in Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang engaging in financial transactions with the \"proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One.\" Superseding Information at 3. As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account 2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (*see* ¶¶ 31-33, above) – there is no evidence that such funds \"constitute[d] or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of\" wire fraud. *See e.g.* 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were not Fraud Scheme proceeds nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could not serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part of Defendant Wang's conviction for Count II.\n\nthe person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, *involved in such offense*, or any property *traceable to such property*.\" 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\n37. The overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge further fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be forfeitable. In the Superseding Information, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding Information at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were \"among others\" that Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money (Superseding Information at 3), these other acts were never identified.\n\n38. First, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened a bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was *not*. Superseding Information at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately \\$200 million to that account. *Id.* The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank account held by Saraca Media Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\") (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo Trial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), *not* from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be transferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information. Moreover, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n39. The second act the Government alleges is that \"on or about June 5, 2020,\" Defendant Wang \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from GTV's parent company, Saraca, to a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Defendant Guo's son.\" Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was transferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account. Moreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n40. As seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding Account 2770 whatsoever. The *only* reference in the record to Account 2770 is Defendant Wang's consent to forfeit it. However, \"a defendant's consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the requirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of offense.\" *Beltramea*, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, \"[t]he district court had an independent duty to *ensure* that the required nexus exists.\" *Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n41. Here, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the Original Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account 2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n42. The Government's continued retention of the funds in Account 2770, without showing that there is a nexus, is wrong and inequitable. Should the Government retain the funds in Account 2770, it will be unjustly enriched, since the funds belong to third parties, including Petitioner, who are (1) not Defendant Wang or Defendant Guo; and (2) not involved the Fraud Scheme, let alone victims of such a scheme. *See, e.g., U.S. v. Bajakajian*, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (explaining that a criminal \"forfeiture serves no remedial purpose, is designed to punish the offender, *and cannot be imposed upon innocent owners*.\") (emphasis added).\n\n# **B. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner's Property Because There Exists a Constructive Trust Over Such Property**\n\n43. Even putting aside the Government's failure to properly demonstrate that the funds in Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does Defendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n\n44. Under the doctrine of constructive trusts, Petitioner's Property is protected and remains the property of Petitioner regardless of any other ownership claims, including Defendant Wang's or the Government, standing in her shoes. The Second Circuit3 has held that \"a\n\nconstructive trust qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" *Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States*, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n45. \"A constructive trust is an equitable remedy, *necessarily flexible to accomplish its purpose*.\" *Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co*., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). \"Its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate the performance of a wrongful act. . .What is necessary is that the court identify a party who is holding property *under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it*.\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n46. \"Whether a party is unjustly enriched is a legal conclusion reached through the application of principles of equity. . . A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound\n\n<sup>3</sup> \"The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation.\" *In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.*, 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), *aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A*., No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). Here, there are three competing jurisdictions whose laws could apply: New York, California, and Cayman Islands. Petitioner's payment of Petitioner's Property was pursuant to the Subscription Agreement, which is governed by Cayman Islands law. *See* **Exhibit B**, Subscription Agreement at 8, ¶ 2(s). Account 2770 *was* an account in a California bank when Petitioner deposited Petitioner's Property. Since Account 2770 was seized (pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a court in New York state), the funds are now in possession of the Government in New York. New York is the forum state of this case. From these facts, New York has the greatest interest in this litigation, and its laws should apply to an imposition of a constructive trust. However, to the extent that the Government challenges this choice-of-law determination, Petitioner reserves all rights to request that this Court impose a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property under California and/or Cayman Islands law.\n\nby no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief. . . Unjust enrichment results when a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the transfer and considering the relationship of the parties, it would be inequitable to retain.\" *Id.* (internal\n\ncitations omitted).\n\n47. The New York Court of Appeals outlined several factors to be considered in determining whether a constructive trust should be imposed in certain circumstances, including \"(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment.\" *Sharp v. Kosmalski*, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976). However, New York courts have long held that \"these factors are merely useful guides and are not talismanic.\" *Counihan*, 194 F.3d at 362 (citing to a plethora of New York state cases that have stated this proposition).\n\n48. Here, there is a constructive trust for the benefit of Petitioner over Petitioner's Property as of the date that it was deposited into Account 2770.\n\n49. Petitioner entered into a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship4 with Hamilton Opportunity Fund when Petitioner executed the Subscription Agreement in order to acquire certain Class B shares in Hamilton M&A Fund SP. Per the Subscription Agreement, Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC made a promise to Petitioner that Petitioner's Property would be invested in the Digital Bank. In reliance on this promise, the Petitioner wired Petitioner's Property to\n\n<sup>4</sup> Even if the Court determines that the relationship was not confidential and/or there was no fiduciary relationship between Hamilton Opportunity Fund and Petitioner, such would not be determinative, as the absence of a fiduciary relationship does not preclude the Court from finding a constructive trust exists. *See Koreag,* 961 F.2d at 353 (stating that \"[w]e do not believe, however, that the lack of a fiduciary relationship between [the parties] automatically defeats [a] claim of constructive trust. Although a fiduciary relationship is one of the factors cited by New York courts, the absence of any one factor will not itself defeat the imposition of a constructive trust when otherwise required by equity\").\n\nAccount 2770 as instructed in the Subscription Agreement. The Government's improper seizure of Account 2770 forced a breach of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC's promise to invest Petitioner's Property into the Digital Bank. Because of Government's seizure, Petitioner is not even able to exercise his Right of Redemption to obtain back Petitioner's Property. This would\n\nresult in unjust enrichment to the benefit of the Government since the Government is now retaining Petitioner's Property without any legal cause to do so. *See, e.g., U.S. v. Coluccio*, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding that imposition of a constructive trust was proper where, amongst other reasons, Government's forfeiture caused a breach of an implied promise); *Torres v. \\$36,256.80 U.S. Currency*, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a constructive trust appropriate where \"The government's forfeiture forced a breach of that promise that may result in a potentially unjust enrichment of the government (and commensurate unjust impoverishment of [the plaintiff]).\")\n\n50. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown that a constructive trust should be imposed over Petitioner's Property. Such a constructive trust \"qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" *Willis*, 652 F.3d at 242.\n\n51. The property upon which the constructive trust is sought – Petitioners Property - is easily traceable. *See* **Exhibit C***.*\n\n52. Moreover, the imposition of a constructive trust is fully available to Petitioner, even if the Government contends that others are owed restitution from any forfeited property. \"When a party can directly trace its assets, without resorting to fictions or presumptions, a constructive trust is available even in cases involving multiple fraud victims.\" *U.S. v. Ovid,* 2012 WL 2087084, \\*7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012). \"[C]ourts are not free to disregard the law of constructive trusts when a claimant can directly trace its property, even if this leaves one innocent victim better off than another equally innocent victim.\" *Id.* The \"orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases\" is to \"return[] identifiable assets to their owners, turning to pro rata distribution only when specific identification or transactional tracing is impossible.\" *Id.* at \\*8 (citing *Restatement (Third) of*\n\n# *Restitution & Unjust Enrichment*, § 59 Reporter's Note G, at 437). **C. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner's Property**\n\n53. Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property is absolutely superior to any interest that the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner's Property.\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner's interest in the forfeited property, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's interest \"renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner *rather than the defendant* or was superior to any right, title, or interest *of the defendant* at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section.\" 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n\n55. Here, as set forth above, Defendant Wang never had any interest in Petitioner's Property or Account 2770; indeed, the record is entirely silent as to what the relationship is between Defendant Wang, the Fraud Scheme, and Account 2770.\n\n56. It is axiomatic that neither the Government nor Defendant Wang can argue that they have a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Likewise, Defendant Wang cannot forfeit her interest in a property in which she had no interest.\n\n## **D. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys' Fees**\n\n57. The Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to file this petition asserting Petitioner's right to Petitioner's Property and to challenge the forfeiture of Petitioner's Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner's costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (\"EAJA\"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the purposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney's fees under the EAJA. *See United States v. Cox*, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Douglas*, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995); *U.S. v. Bailey*, 2015 WL 1893610 at \\*20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\n\n## **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\n58. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner's Property, which renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. *See e.g.* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Defendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property, and never did. Petitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that the Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner's Property.\n\n59. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition;\n\n(2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of\n\nPetitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\nDated: April 2, 2025\n\nDated: April 2, 2025 Respectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman Jeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq. Jeremy W. Schulman, Esq. SCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC 6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425 North Bethesda, MD 20852 (240) 356-8550 jgavenman@schulmanbh.com jschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler Paul W. Butler, Esq. BUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES 1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531 Washington, D.C. 20036 paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com *Counsel for Petitioner*\n\n# **ATTESTATION AND OATH**\n\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I, , attest and declare under penalty of\n\nperjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided in support\n\nof this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief. Executed on this 03day\n\nof April, 2025\n\nSignature","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n- 诉 -\n\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\n要求裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益并修改初步没收令的第三方请愿书 - 经核实的权利主张书  S4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n请愿人（“请愿人”）根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c) 条提起本《要求裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益并修改初步没收令的第三方请愿书》（“请愿书”）。请愿人请求返还请愿人拥有合法权利、所有权和/或权益的资金（“请愿人财产”）（定义详见下文），该资金系美国政府（“政府”）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平被告）达成的没收令的一部分而不当扣押的。具体而言，当政府扣押了以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名义在 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）开立的账号为 5090042770 的银行账户（“2770账户”）内的全部资金时，请愿人财产被政府不当扣押。然而，任何涉及 2770账户 内资金（包括请愿人财产）的没收令均属违法且不当，因为王雁平被告对 2770账户 或请愿人财产均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。因此，没收令（定义详见下文）就请愿人财产而言归于无效，因为在产生没收令（定义见下文）的作为发生时，请愿人财产的权利、所有权或权益已归属于请愿人而非王雁平被告，且优于王雁平被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。据此，本法院应当修改没收令以从中剔除请愿人财产，并命令政府立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人。为支持请愿人的主张，请愿人陈述如下：\n\nI. 初步陈述\n\n2770账户 中的资金（包括请愿人财产）似乎纯粹是政府在起诉王雁平被告和 Miles Guo（郭文贵被告）之前扣押资产过程中的“附带损害”。自扣押 2770账户 以来已过去两年半以上，在此期间，从未有任何解释说明 2770账户（包括请愿人财产）与王雁平被告认罪的任何罪行有何关联，而这是依法形成有效没收令的必要前提。从未有任何证据表明王雁平被告认罪的任何非法活动的任何收益曾存入 2770账户；没有证据表明此类活动的任何收益曾与请愿人财产发生混同；而且事实上，没有任何证据表明王雁平被告曾与 2770账户 有任何牵连，甚至知晓其存在。\n\n如下文所示，请愿人是针对请愿人财产所设立拟制信托的受益人，请愿人财产在本案中不得由政府扣押。无论是王雁平被告，还是如今代位其立场的政府，均从未证明其对 2770账户 中的请愿人财产或对 2770账户 本身享有任何权益。尽管王雁平被告在没收令（ECF No. 488 第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在 2770账户（从而包括请愿人财产）中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，但她的同意对 2770账户 或请愿人财产不具有任何法律效力。王雁平被告从未在 2770账户 中拥有此类“权利、所有权和权益”——没有证据表明她是 2770账户 的签字人、曾向 2770账户 存入资金，或以其他方式对 2770账户 拥有任何控制权，并且没有证据表明王雁平被告曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770账户 存入任何款项。王雁平被告不能没收其不拥有且不享有任何权益的财产。事实上，本法院似乎在最初阶段根本就从未依据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1)(A) 条的规定确立请愿人财产属于应当予以没收的财产。\n\n基于上述全部理由以及下文阐明的理由，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 批准本请愿书；(2) 修改没收令以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追索因本请愿书而发生的律师费和诉讼费用，并准许请愿人就该等律师费和费用提交申请；以及 (5) 给予其他必要且公正的救济。\n\nII. 背景事实\n\nA. 请愿人财产\n\n1. Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“Hamilton Opportunity Fund”），一家开曼群岛独立投资组合公司，向请愿人提供了一份日期为 2022年1月20日 的发行备忘录（“发行备忘录”）。发行备忘录的真实且正确的副本作为证据 A 附于本请愿书后。\n\n2. Hamilton Opportunity Fund 是一家“专门从事由投资经理［定义见发行备忘录］挑选的股权投资，旨在获取长期资本增值的基金”。证据 A，发行备忘录第 33 页。投资经理（定义见发行备忘录）已确定了投资一家银行（“数字银行”）（详见发行备忘录第 33 页）的机会。就该项投资而言，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 试图通过发行各类股份来募集资金。同上，第 34 页。\n\n3. 发行备忘录向请愿人提供了认购归属于 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 之一独立投资组合——Hamilton M&A Fund SP（“并购基金”）的 B 类股份的机会。\n\n4. 王雁平被告并非并购基金或 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的董事或成员，亦不享有其中的任何公司或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n5. 王雁平被告未对并购基金进行任何投资；同样，证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n6. 2022年1月27日，请愿人向 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 提交了一份认购并购基金价值 $100,000 的 B 类股份的申请书（“认购协议”）。认购协议的真实且正确的副本作为证据 B 附于本请愿书后。\n\n7. 2022年1月28日，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 代表并购基金批准并接受了该认购协议。参见证据 B，认购协议第 15 页。\n\n8. 2022年2月28日，依据认购协议的条款，请愿人向 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090042770 的账户电汇了 $100,100.00（“请愿人财产”）。电汇确认单的真实且正确的副本作为证据 C 附于本请愿书后。\n\n9. 请愿人电汇请愿人财产所至的账户即为 2770账户。\n\n10. 根据发行备忘录的条款，请愿人有权根据请愿人的选择赎回请愿人的股份。证据 A，发行备忘录第 17 页；亦参见同上第 53 页（载明在受限于特定限制的前提下，“B 类股份可在任何赎回日根据股东的选择予以赎回”）。\n\n11. Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的资产“与本基金任何其他独立投资组合的资产及本基金的任何通用资产保持隔离、分开且可单独识别”。证据 A，发行备忘录第 12 页。此外，根据开曼群岛法律，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 有责任“将每个独立投资组合的投资组合资产与任何其他独立投资组合的独立投资组合资产隔离并保持隔离、分开且可单独识别”。证据 A，发行备忘录第 22-23 页（引用开曼群岛《公司法（修订版）》第十四部分第 219(6)(b) 条）。\n\nB. 对 2770账户 的扣押\n\n12. 2022年9月18日，政府扣押了 2770账户 内的全部资金余额。\n\n13. 迄今为止，没有任何公开可得的文件说明政府扣押 2770账户 内资金具备何种合理根据。\n\nC. 针对王雁平被告及郭文贵被告的刑事案件以及没收令\n\n14. 2023年3月6日，政府对王雁平被告、郭文贵被告以及第三名从未被传讯的被告 William Je 提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n15. 2024年5月3日，政府针对王雁平被告提交了一份替代起诉书（“替代起诉书”）。ECF No. 325。替代起诉书指控王雁平被告犯有一项共谋电汇欺诈罪（罪名项一）（替代起诉书第 1-2 页）和一项共谋洗钱罪（罪名项二）（替代起诉书第 2-4 页）。替代起诉书还包含一项没收指控（“没收指控”）。替代起诉书第 4 页。\n\n16. 同日，即 2024年5月3日，王雁平被告就替代起诉书中所指控的罪名项一和罪名项二作出了认罪答辩。\n\n17. 同样在 2024年5月3日，本法院签署了一份《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（“原没收令”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n18. 在原没收令中，王雁平被告同意没收其在包括 2770账户 在内的某些资产中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，理由是该等财产“构成被告个人取得的第一项罪名中所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及［替代］起诉书第二项罪名中所指控罪行的财产”。原没收令第 2-6 页（后加着重强调）。\n\n19. 郭文贵被告未对其被指控的任何罪名认罪。据此，于 2024年5月22日 至 2024年7月16日 期间举行了陪审团审判（“郭案审判”）。2024年7月16日，陪审团裁定郭文贵被告犯有诈骗敲诈勒索共谋罪、共谋电汇欺诈罪、共谋洗钱罪、共谋证券欺诈罪、证券欺诈罪、电汇欺诈罪以及洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本请愿书出具之日，郭文贵被告尚未被判刑。\n\n20. 2025年1月6日，王雁平被告被判刑。\n\n21. 2025年1月7日，本法院签署了一份《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（“没收令”）ECF No. 488。在涉及请愿人的方面，没收令在所有实质方面与原没收令基本相同。在没收令中，王雁平被告同意没收其在包括 2770账户 在内的某些资产中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，理由是该等财产“构成被告个人取得的第一项罪名中所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及［替代］起诉书第二项罪名中所指控罪行的财产”。没收令第 2-11 页（后加着重强调）。\n\n22. 2770账户 中的资产在原没收令和没收令中均被描述如下：\n\n先前存放在 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090042770、户名为“Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC”的账户中，并由政府于 2022年9月18日 或前后扣押的 89,992,861.75 美元货币 (23-FBl-000074)。\n\n原没收令第 3 页；没收令第 3 页。\n\nIII. 论证理由\n\n23. 在依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c)(1) 条进行的附随刑事没收程序中，本法院必须以优势证据标准认定请愿人是否对拟没收财产享有合法权利、所有权或权益，以及该等权利、所有权或权益是否使没收命令全部或部分无效，原因在于该等权益归属于请愿人而非被告，或在引发财产没收的行为发生时优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n24. 在本案中，依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)，请愿人凭借对请愿人财产设立的拟制信托，对该财产享有合法权利、所有权或权益。此外，请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益不仅已归属于请愿人，且优于被告 Wang（王雁平）在请愿人财产中享有的任何权利，因为被告王雁平对请愿人财产或 2770 账户均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。换言之，被告王雁平无法没收其在 2770 账户中的权益，因为她不拥有任何适于作为刑事没收对象的权益。因此，没收命令应予以修改以剔除请愿人财产，且请愿人财产应归还给请愿人。\n\nA. 政府未能在一开始证明 2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）适于作为没收对象，从而使针对该等资金的没收命令不当\n\n25. 政府没有扣押请愿人财产的法律依据，因为没有任何证据表明政府曾依 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) 之规定证明过请愿人财产以及整个 2770 账户实际上属于可没收财产。\n\n26. “当政府寻求获取没收命令时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1) 条……要求量刑法院根据适用法规认定哪些财产属于应予没收的财产。’”U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（引用 U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)）。依据 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院必须认定政府是否已确立该财产与罪行之间存在所要求的关联。”Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A)（强调后加）；Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的各个阶段，政府承担证明该法律结论的举证责任，且需达到不同程度的确信：在起诉书后听证会上需达到合理确信（probable cause）……在无陪审团审判或陪审团审判中需达到优势证据标准。”同上（强调后加）（内部引文省略）。“然而，唯有在政府达到相关法定门槛的情况下，涉案财产方可在任何法律意义上被视为‘应予没收’。在此之前，虽然政府已通过起诉书宣布其寻求没收的意图，但该财产仅被视为‘可能可没收的’……或‘可能属于应予没收的’。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n27. 这意味着，在法院审理请愿人是否有权依据 § 853(n) 获返还财产这一问题之前，有必要首先确定争议财产在一开始是否实际上属于可没收财产。若非如此，政府便没有扣押该财产的法定职权。如果财产被不当扣押，则无论请愿人是否符合 § 853(n) 规定的标准，政府都必须返还所扣押的账户。见如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)。\n\n28. 全面且完整的 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) 审查对于司法公正至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已进行审查并认定财产属于应予没收财产这一假定之上。在制定附随程序法规时，国会选择在附随程序中将举证责任置于第三方，因为“美国在刑事案件中已排除合理怀疑地证明了其没收主张。”S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n29. 在本案中，从未就 2770 账户与被告王雁平被指控（并已认罪）的任何罪行之间是否存在关联作出过认定，请愿人因此被迫提交本请愿书。基于被告王雁平和被告 Guo（郭文贵）刑事案件中所有公开可得文件所包含的信息，政府在 2770 账户方面无法胜诉。\n\n30. 在本案的《替代起诉书》（Superseding Information）中，政府就罪名项一和罪名项二均列入了没收指控，并寻求没收特定财产。《替代起诉书》第 4 页。记录中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明、更不用说达到其证明责任来证明 2770 账户与被告王雁平认罪的罪行之间存在关联。\n\n31. 关于罪名项一，没收指控载明：“作为实施本《替代起诉书》罪名项一所指控的电汇诈骗罪行的后果，被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，应依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C)1 条……及《美国法典》第 28 编第 2461(c) 条向合众国没收构成该罪行之收益或源自可追溯至该罪行之收益的任何及所有不动产与动产。”《替代起诉书》第 4 页。政府必须以优势证据标准证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收主张依据是该财产曾用于实施或协助实施刑事罪行，或曾卷入刑事罪行的实施，则政府应确立该财产与罪行之间存在实质性联系。”18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n32. 记录中没有任何关于 2770 账户中的资金如何构成或源自可追溯至被告王雁平串谋实施电汇诈骗之收益的指控。《替代起诉书》指控称：“自至少约 2018 年起直至至少约 2023 年 3 月 15 日，共谋者向投资者作出虚假陈述，称投资者对 GTV、喜马拉雅农场联盟组织（Himalaya Farm Alliance）和 GClubs 的投资将获得股票作为回报，且对喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）的投资将获得加密货币作为回报[（即‘诈骗计划’）]。通过该[诈骗计划]，被告王雁平（又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）及其包括 Miles Guo（郭文贵）在内的共谋者诱使投资者向郭文贵控制的实体投资了超过 10 亿美元。”《替代起诉书》第 2 页。《替代起诉书》中没有任何关于被告王雁平将\n\n1 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定：“任何不动产或动产，若构成违反……各项特定罪行（包括《替代起诉书》罪名项一指控被告王雁平违反的 18 U.S.C. § 1343 电汇诈骗罪）之收益或源自可追溯至该等违法行为之收益，[均应予以没收]。”\n\n来自该诈骗计划的任何收益存入 2770 账户的指控。同样，《替代起诉书》中也没有指控任何投资者因该诈骗计划而将资金存入\n\n2770 账户。也不可能有任何此类指控，因为存入 2770 账户的唯一款项均来自投资数字银行（Digital Bank）的投资者——该项投资与《替代起诉书》中所描述的“诈骗计划”没有任何关联。可以肯定的是，请愿人确认，请愿人绝不是《替代起诉书》中所指控的被告王雁平任何行为的受害者，且请愿人不认为请愿人财产曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n33. 最后，在被告郭文贵的审判期间，没有任何关于 2770 账户的相关证词。没有任何关于诈骗计划的任何收益是否曾被存入 2770 账户的证词，就此而言，也没有关于被告王雁平是否曾将任何款项存入 2770 账户的证词。简而言之，记录中没有任何内容表明 2770 账户与被告王雁平的电汇诈骗指控之间存在关联，更没有充分证据用以判定政府已达到其举证责任证明、且法院已适当裁定存在使没收 2770 账户成立所需的正当关联。\n\n34. 关于罪名项二，没收指控载明：“作为实施本起诉书罪名项二所指控的洗钱罪行的后果，被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，应依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 982(a)(1)2 条向合众国没收卷入上述罪行的任何及所有不动产与动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产，包括但不限于代表卷入上述罪行之财产金额的美元款项。”《替代起诉书》第 4 页。关于罪名项二，政府“必须以优势证据标准证明 18\n\n2 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定：“法院在对被判定违反本编第 1956 条[洗钱法规]罪行的人判刑时……应命令\n\nU.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定的没收要件。”U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015)。\n\n35. 《替代起诉书》指控被告王雁平犯有串谋洗钱罪，因为被告王雁平“明知某些金融交易中涉及的财产代表某种形式的非法活动收益，仍将实施并确实实施以及试图实施该等金融交易……且该等交易实际上涉及特定非法活动的收益，即本起诉书罪名项一所指控的电汇诈骗计划的收益。”《替代起诉书》第 3 页。\n\n36. 目前尚不清楚 2770 账户如何能够因罪名项二的洗钱指控而被没收。从指控来看，洗钱罪名源于被告王雁平利用“罪名项一所指控的电汇诈骗计划的收益”从事金融交易。《替代起诉书》第 3 页。如上所述，没有证据表明 2770 账户中的资金与罪名项一所指控的诈骗计划有任何关联（见上文第 31-33 段）——没有证据表明该等资金“构成或源自可追溯至实施”电汇诈骗“之收益”。见如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。由于 2770 账户中的资金既不是诈骗计划的收益，也不是源自诈骗计划的收益，因此该等资金不能作为罪名项二洗钱指控的基础，亦不能作为被告王雁平罪名项二定罪的一部分予以没收。\n\n该人向合众国没收卷入该罪行的任何不动产或动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产。”18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调后加）。\n\n37. 政府指控用以支持洗钱罪名的公开行为（overt acts），进一步未能证明2770号账户（Account 2770）中的资金何以属于可没收财产。在替代起诉书（Superseding Information）中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项行为。替代起诉书第3页。尽管政府声称这两项公开行为是Defendant Wang（被告王雁平）为推进所指控的洗钱共谋而实施的“诸项行为之一”（替代起诉书第3页），但这些其他行为从未被指明。\n\n38. 首先，根据替代起诉书，2020年5月20日，被告王雁平以GTV名义开设了一个银行账户，值得注意的是，2770号账户并非该账户。替代起诉书第3页。2020年6月2日，被告王雁平向该账户转账约$200 million。同上。转入GTV账户的资金来自Saraca Media Group, Inc.（“Saraca”，萨拉卡媒体集团股份有限公司）持有的JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）账户（Guo Trial，05/31/2024，953:25-954:4；Guo Trial，06/26/2024，4359:1-14），而非来自2770号账户。从未有任何证词表明2770号账户中的任何资金曾进入过Saraca的摩根大通银行账户，进而再转入替代起诉书中所引用的GTV账户。此外，2770号账户在2020年根本就不存在。\n\n39. 政府指控的第二项行为是，“在2020年6月5日或前后”，被告王雁平“授权将$100 million从GTV的母公司Saraca电汇至一家高风险对冲基金，以使Saraca及其最终实益拥有人即Defendant Guo（被告郭文贵）之子获益”。替代起诉书第3-4页。首先，这明确指控了资金是从Saraca账户转出的，而显而易见2770号账户并非该账户。同样，再次强调，从未有任何证词表明2770号账户中的任何资金曾进入过Saraca账户。此外，再次说明，2770号账户在2020年根本就不存在。\n\n40. 从上述论证可以看出，根本没有任何关于2770号账户的指控或证词。记录中对2770号账户的唯一提及是被告王雁平同意予以没收。然而，“被告对没收的同意[并不]免除要求在寻求没收的财产与被定罪的犯罪之间存在关联性的要件”。Beltramea案，785 F.3d at 291。正如Eighth Circuit（第八巡回上诉法院）所强调的那样，“地区法院负有独立职责以确保所要求的关联性存在”。同上（重点为后加）。\n\n41. 在本案中，替代起诉书、原没收令（Original Forfeiture Order）或没收令（Forfeiture Order）中均无任何事实指控涉及2770号账户与被告王雁平认罪的罪行之间存在哪怕是声称的关联性。\n\n42. 政府在未证明存在关联性的情况下继续扣押2770号账户中的资金，是错误的且不符合衡平原则的。若政府扣押2770号账户中的资金，其将构成不当得利，因为这些资金属于第三方（包括申诉人），而这些第三方（1）既非被告王雁平亦非被告郭文贵；且（2）未参与欺诈计划（Fraud Scheme），更谈不上是该计划的受害者。参见，例如，U.S. v. Bajakajian案，524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)（解释称刑事“没收不具有救济目的，旨在惩罚犯罪者，且不能强加于无辜所有权人。”）（重点为后加）。\n\nB. 申诉人对申诉人财产享有权益，因为在该等财产上存在拟制信托（Constructive Trust）\n\n43. 即使撇开政府未能妥善证明2770号账户中的资金属于替代起诉书中所指控的任何活动的一部分不谈，申诉人财产（Petitioner's Property）也应当返还给申诉人，因为申诉人对其享有的权益高于被告王雁平或现如今承继其地位的政府所享有的权益。\n\n44. 根据拟制信托法理，无论存在任何其他所有权主张，包括被告王雁平或承继其地位的政府的主张，申诉人财产均受到保护并仍属于申诉人的财产。Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）3 曾认定，“就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，拟制信托构成‘对该财产的法定权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益”。Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States案，652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n45. “拟制信托是一种衡平法救济，为实现其目的必然具有灵活性。” Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co.案，194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999)（重点为后加）。“其目的在于防止不当得利，尽管不当得利并不必然涉及实施不法行为……所必需的是法院认定一方当事人持有财产所处的具体情形使得依照衡平与良知原则其不应保留该财产。” 同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n46. “一方当事人是否构成不当得利，是通过适用衡平法原则得出的法律结论……衡平法院在判定设立拟制信托时不受\n\n3 “联邦普通法的法律适用规则是适用对诉讼具有最大重大利益的法域的法律。” In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.案，961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992)，部分维持原判并更名为 Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A.案，No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992)。在本案中，有三个竞争法域的法律可能适用：New York（纽约州）、California（加利福尼亚州）和 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）。申诉人支付申诉人财产是依据认购协议（Subscription Agreement）进行的，该协议受开曼群岛法律管辖。参见证据附录B（Exhibit B），认购协议第8页第2(s)段。在申诉人存入申诉人财产时，2770号账户是位于加利福尼亚州某银行的账户。自2770号账户被查扣（依据纽约州某法院签发的搜查与扣押令）以来，这些资金目前由政府在纽约占有。纽约是本案的受诉法院地（forum state）。根据这些事实，纽约对本诉讼具有最大重大利益，其法律应适用于拟制信托的设立。然而，在政府对该法律选择决定提出异议的范围内，申诉人保留请求本法院根据加利福尼亚州和/或开曼群岛法律在申诉人财产上设立拟制信托的一切权利。\n\n任何死板公式的束缚。交易的衡平性必须决定救济的尺度……当一人保留了某项利益，而在转让的具体情形下并考虑到各方当事人之间的关系保留该利益属于不衡平时，即产生不当得利。” 同上（内部\n\n引文省略）。\n\n47. New York Court of Appeals（纽约州上诉法院）概述了在确定某些情形下是否应设立拟制信托时所要考虑的若干因素，包括“(1) 保密或信义关系，(2) 允诺，(3) 基于对其信赖而作出的转让，以及 (4) 不当得利。” Sharp v. Kosmalski案，40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976)。然而，纽约州各法院长期以来一直认为，“这些因素仅是有用的指引，而非不可变通的法宝。” Counihan案，194 F.3d at 362（引用了大量阐述该观点的纽约州案件）。\n\n48. 在本案中，自申诉人财产被存入2770号账户之日起，便存在以申诉人为受益人的关于申诉人财产的拟制信托。\n\n49. 当申诉人签署认购协议以收购Hamilton M&A Fund SP的若干B类股份时，申诉人与Hamilton Opportunity Fund（汉密尔顿机会基金）建立了保密和/或信义关系4。根据认购协议，Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）向申诉人作出允诺，申诉人财产将被投资于Digital Bank（数字银行）。基于对该允诺的信赖，申诉人将申诉人财产电汇至\n\n4 即使法院认定汉密尔顿机会基金与申诉人之间不存在保密关系和/或不存在信义关系，该情况亦非决定性的，因为信义关系的缺失并不妨碍法院认定存在拟制信托。参见 Koreag案，961 F.2d at 353（指出“[然]而，我们并不认为[各方当事人]之间缺乏信义关系就会自动否定关于拟制信托的权利主张。尽管信义关系是纽约州各法院引用的因素之一，但当衡平法另有要求时，任何单一因素的缺失本身并不会否定拟制信托的设立”）。\n\n认购协议中指示的2770号账户。政府对2770号账户的不当查扣迫使汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司违反了将申诉人财产投资于数字银行的允诺。由于政府的查扣，申诉人甚至无法行使其赎回权（Right of Redemption）以取回申诉人财产。这将\n\n导致使政府获益的不当得利，因为政府目前在没有任何法律事由的情况下保留着申诉人财产。参见，例如，U.S. v. Coluccio案，51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995)（认定设立拟制信托是正当的，原因包括政府的没收导致了对默示允诺的违背）；Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency案，25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994)（认定拟制信托是恰当的，其中指出“政府的没收迫使违背了该允诺，这可能导致政府潜在的不当得利（以及[原告]相应的不当受损）。”）\n\n50. 因此，申诉人已证明应当在申诉人财产上设立拟制信托。就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，该等拟制信托“构成‘对该财产的法定权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益”。Willis案，652 F.3d at 242。\n\n51. 寻求设立拟制信托所针对的财产——申诉人财产——是容易追溯的。参见证据附录C（Exhibit C）。\n\n52. 此外，即使政府主张应从任何被没收财产中对他人进行赔偿，设立拟制信托对申诉人而言亦完全适用。“当一方当事人在无需借助拟制或推定的情况下能够直接追溯其资产时，即使在涉及多名欺诈受害者的案件中，拟制信托亦同样适用。” U.S. v. Ovid案，2012 WL 2087084, *7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012)。“当权利请求人能够直接追溯其财产时，法院不得随意忽视拟制信托法，即使这会使一名无辜受害者处于比另一名同等无辜受害者更有利的境地。” 同上。针对“涉及多起欺诈案件的传统做法”是“将可辨识的资产返还给其所有权人，仅在特定辨识或交易追溯无法实现时才转为按比例分配。” 同上，第*8页（引用《Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment》（侵权法与不当得利重述（第三版））§ 59 报告人附注G，第437页）。\n\nC. 申诉人对申诉人财产享有优先权益\n\n53. 申诉人对申诉人财产享有的权益绝对优于政府或被告王雁平对申诉人财产可能享有的任何权益。\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 明确规定，除申诉人对被没收财产享有的权益外，申诉人还必须以优势证据证明，申诉人的权益“致使没收令全部或部分无效，因为在该等行为（即依据本条导致财产被没收的行为）发生时，该法定权利、所有权或权益归属于申诉人而非被告，或者优于被告的任何法定权利、所有权或权益”。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（重点为后加）。\n\n55. 在本案中，如上所述，被告 Wang（王）从未对请愿人财产或 2770 账户享有任何权益；事实上，记录中完全没有提及被告 Wang、该欺诈计划与 2770 账户之间存在何种关系。\n\n56. 显而易见的是，政府和被告 Wang 都不能主张他们对一项从未享有过权益的财产拥有优先权益。同样，被告 Wang 也无法没收其从未享有权益的财产中的权益。\n\nD. 请愿人有权获得诉讼费用和律师费\n\n57. 请愿人被迫聘请法律顾问并支付费用提起本请愿，以主张请愿人对请愿人财产的权利并对请愿人财产的没收提出异议。在本次程序中胜诉后，请愿人保留追索与本请愿相关的律师费和费用的全部权利，并可根据《Equal Access to Justice Act（平等获取司法公正法）》（“EAJA”），28 U.S.C. § 2412，追索请愿人的费用和合理的律师费。联邦法院一贯认为，为了允许胜诉的权利主张人根据 EAJA 收取律师费，§ 853(n) 程序属于民事性质。参见 United States v. Cox，575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009)；United States v. Douglas，55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995)；U.S. v. Bailey，2015 WL 1893610 at *20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015)。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n58. 基于上述理由，请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，这使得该没收命令就该财产而言无效。参见例如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告 Wang 对请愿人财产不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。请愿人已经以优势证据证明，并可在任何必要的听证会上以优势证据证明，需要对该没收命令进行修改以排除请愿人财产。\n\n59. 因此，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 批准本请愿；(2) 修改该没收命令以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人；(4) 命令请愿人有权追索与本请愿相关的请愿人律师费和费用，并准许请愿人提交关于该等律师费和费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的该等及其他救济。\n\n日期：2025年4月2日\n\n日期：2025年4月2日 谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\nJeffrey S. Gavenman, 律师\nJeremy W. Schulman, 律师\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\nPaul W. Butler, 律师\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n请愿人代理律师\n\n证明与宣誓\n\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人 [姓名] 在受伪证罪处罚的条件下证明并声明，本人对该财产的权利主张并非无理取闹，且据本人所知和所信，为支持该主张所提供的信息均属真实准确。签署于2025年4月03日\n\n签名","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Torres","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":5973,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-04 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-04","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:47:04"}