{"id":"court_sdny_586_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":586,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-04","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方没收财产诉状 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #586（2025-04-04 立案）。另一位投资者就 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 账户的查封资金提出第三方诉请，依据 Archiwoods Investment Value Fund 投资备忘录主张对所投资基金的权益，认为被控人 Yvette Wang 无权没收其财产，请求排除该财产并恢复原状。","summary_en":"Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #586 (filed April 4, 2025). A third-party petitioner contests the forfeiture based on investment documentation and claims legal interest as an investor in the Hamilton M&A Fund, asserting that defendant Yvette Wang lacks any right or interest in the seized property, and seeks amendment of the forfeiture order to exclude and return the petitioner's funds.","body_en":"# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\n**THIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE - VERIFIED CLAIM OF**\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner (\"Petitioner\") files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the \"Petition\"). Petitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest (\"Petitioner's Property\") (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government (the \"Government\") improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with Defendant Yvette Wang (\"Defendant Wang\"). Specifically, Petitioner's Property was improperly seized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in bank account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Account 2770\"). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or interest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. The Forfeiture Order (as more fully defined below) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner's Property because right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property was vested in the Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was superior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the acts that gave rise to the Forfeiture Order (as defined below). As such, this Court should amend the Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner's Property from the Forfeiture Order and order that the Government immediately return Petitioner's Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner's claim, Petitioner states as follows:\n\n## **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nIt appears that the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, were purely \"collateral damage\" in the Government's seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant Wang and Miles Guo (\"Defendant Guo\"). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure of Account 2770, and in that time span, there has never been any explanation as to how Account 2770 (including Petitioner's Property) is related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any showing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were ever deposited in Account 2770; no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever commingled with Petitioner's Property; and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had anything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\n\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is a beneficiary of a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property and Petitioner's Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither Defendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, have ever demonstrated that they have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner's Property in Account 2770 or in Account 2770 in general. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of \"all her right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 (and thus, Petitioner's Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), her consent has no legal bearing as to Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. Defendant Wang never had such \"right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 – there is no evidence that she was a signatory on Account 2770, ever deposited money into Account 2770, or otherwise had any control over Account 2770, and there is no evidence that Defendant Wang ever directed anyone, directly or indirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that she does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never established that Petitioner's Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\n## **II. BACKGROUND FACTS**\n\n## **A. Petitioner's Property**\n\n1. Archiwoods Investment Value Fund (\"Archiwoods\") prepared an Information Option Memorandum (the \"Option Memorandum\"), dated February 14, 2022, outlining an investment opportunity in the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Hamilton Opportunity Fund\"), a Cayman Islands Segregated Portfolio Company. Archiwoods gave this Option Memorandum to prospective investors, including Petitioner. A true and correct copy of the Option Memorandum is attached hereto as **Exhibit A.**\n\n2. Investing in the Hamilton M&A Fund SP (the \"M&A Fund\"), was \"identified by the investment manager with a view to high value creation and long-term capital gain.\" **Exhibit A**, Option Memorandum at 4. The Investment Manager (defined as \"Archiwoods Investment Management Pty Ltd\" in the Option Memorandum) had identified an opportunity to invest in a\n\nbank (the \"Investment Strategy\"), **Exhibit A,** at 4, 8, and solicited investments, including from Petitioner, to take advantage of this opportunity.\n\n3. The Option Memorandum offered Petitioner an opportunity to acquire Class B Shares attributed to the M&A Fund, a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund . A true and correct copy of the standard Offering Memorandum provided by the Hamilton Opportunity Fund to potential investors in the M&A Fund, dated January 20, 2022, is attached hereto as **Exhibit**\n\n**B**.\n\n4. Defendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any corporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund, the Hamilton Opportunity Fund, or Archiwoods. The evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n5. Defendant Wang did not make any investments in the M&A Fund or Archiwoods; again, the evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n6. Prior to May 31, 2022, Petitioner submitted an application to invest in Archiwoods and agreed to invest \\$100,000.00. Petitioner's agreement to invest this sum was on the express condition that the entirety of the investment would be used to purchase shares in the M&A Fund. On May 31, 2022, Petitioner received confirmation of their investment in Archiwoods. A true and correct copy of Petitioner's investment confirmation is attached hereto as **Exhibit C.**\n\n7. On February 6, 2022, and February 7, 2022, pursuant to the terms of the Option Memorandum, Petitioner wired a total of \\$102,100.00 (the \"Petitioner Property\") to a bank account belonging to Archiwoods. A true and correct copy of Petitioner's wire information is attached hereto as **Exhibit D**.\n\n8. Pursuant to the terms of the Option Memorandum, Archiwoods entered into an agreement with Hamilton Opportunity Fund, acting on behalf of the M&A Fund. Upon\n\ninformation and belief, Archiwoods invested a monetary sum (including the entirety of Petitioner's Property) with the Hamilton Opportunity Fund for the acquisition of Class B shares in the Hamilton M&A Fund SP, a Segregated Portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund.\n\n9. Upon information and belief, Archiwoods wired its full investment amount (including Petitioner's Property) into Account 2770, which is the only account in which Hamilton Opportunity Fund held funds meant for the acquisition of Class B Shares.\n\n10. The Offering Agreement that all investors sign and that governs the terms of his or her investment into the Hamilton Opportunity Fund (including the M&A Fund), entitles investors to redeem their shares at the investor's option. **Exhibit B**, at 17; *see also id.* at 53 (stating that subject to certain limitations, \"Class B Shares may be redeemed at the option of the Shareholder on any Redemption Day\"). In turn, Petitioner had the right to redeem his investment with Archiwoods at the end of the investment term (the \"Right of Redemption\"). **Exhibit A**, at 4-5.\n\n11. The assets of each segregated portfolio of the Hamilton Opportunity Fund are \"kept segregated, separate and separately identifiable from those of any other segregated portfolios of the Fund and any general assets of the Fund.\" *See* **Exhibit B**, at 12; *see also* **Exhibit A**, at 4. In addition, pursuant to the laws of the Cayman Islands, it is the duty of Hamilton Opportunity Fund to \"segregate, and keep segregated, portfolio assets of each segregated portfolio separate and separately identifiable from segregated portfolio assets of any other segregated portfolio.\" **Exhibit B**, at 22-23 (citing The Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands, Part XIV, 219(6)(b)).\n\n## **B. Seizure of Account 2770**\n\n12. On September 18, 2022, the Government seized the entire balance of the funds in Account 2770, which included Petitioner's Property.\n\n13. To date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the Government had to seize the funds in Account 2770.\n\n# **C. The Criminal Case Against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the Forfeiture Order**\n\n14. On March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n\n15. On May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the \"Superseding Information\") against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information charged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I) (Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering (Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a Forfeiture Allegation (the \"Forfeiture Allegation\"). Superseding Information at 4.\n\n16. On the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count II as charged in the Superseding Information.\n\n17. Also on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (\"Original Forfeiture Order\"). ECF No. 329.\n\n18. In the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her*  right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n\n19. Defendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him. Accordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the \"Guo Trial\"). On July 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities\n\nfraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this Petition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n\n20. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n\n21. On January 7, 2025, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Forfeiture Order\") ECF No. 488. As it pertains to Petitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all material respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her* right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Forfeiture Order at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n22. The assets in Account 2770 are described in both the Original Forfeiture Order and the Forfeiture Order as follows:\n\n> \\$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September 18, 2022 (23-FBl-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\n\n# **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n23. In an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited, and whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part, because such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n\n24. Here, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of a constructive trust over such property. Moreover, Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any right Defendant Wang had in Petitioner's Property because Defendant Wang had *no* legal right, title or, interest in either Petitioner's Property or Account 2770. In other words, Defendant Wang could not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject to criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner's Property, and Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner.\n\n# **A. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770, Including Petitioner's Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First Instance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds**\n\n25. The Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner's Property because there is no evidence that the Government has ever demonstrated that Petitioner's Property, and Account 2770 in general, is actually forfeitable property, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\n26. \"When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, 'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.'\" *U.S. v. Watts*, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing *U.S. v. Capoccia*, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court *must* determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.\" Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); *Watts*, 786 F.3d at 172. \"At various points in the proceedings, *the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion* to varying degrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . .or by a preponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.\" *Id.* (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). \"Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the property in question be considered 'subject to forfeiture' in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the government has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property is seen merely as 'potentially forfeitable' . . . or 'potentially subject to forfeiture.'\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n27. This means that before the court reaches the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in dispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority to seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the accounts seized regardless of whether the petitioner can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). *See e.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co*., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n\n28. A full and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair administration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has conducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary proceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an ancillary proceeding, since \"the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.\" S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392.\n\n29. In this matter, there has never been a determination of whether there exists a nexus between Account 2770 and any of the offenses Defendant Wang was charged with (and pled guilty to), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained in the publicly-available documentsin both Defendant Wang's and Defendant Guo's criminal case, the Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n\n30. Here, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture Allegation as to both Counts I and Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding Information at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show, let alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n31. As to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the wire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C)[1](#page-9-0) . . .and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, \"if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n\n32. The record is devoid of any allegations pertaining to how funds in Account 2770 are, or are derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang's conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Superseding Information alleges that \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about March 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that \"[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture] which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of\" various specified offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang in Count I.\n\nstock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and GClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the Himalaya Exchange [(the \"Fraud Scheme\")]. Through the [Fraud Scheme], YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced investors to invest more than \\$1 billion into entities Guo controlled.\" Superseding Information at 2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing any proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into Account 2770. Similarly, there are no allegations in the Superseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into Account 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits from Archiwoods into Account 2770 were from investors who were investing in the Digital Bank pursuant to the Investment Strategy – an investment that is not implicated in any way by the \"Fraud Scheme\" described in the Superseding Information. To be sure, Petitioner affirms that Petitioner was never a victim of any conduct by Defendant Wang alleged in the Superseding Information and does not believe that any of Petitioner's Property was ever used in any unlawful activity.\n\n33. Finally, there was no relevant testimony during Defendant Guo's trial concerning Account 2770. There was no testimony regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme were ever deposited into Account 2770, nor, for that matter, whether Defendant Wang ever deposited any money into Account 2770. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would indicate there is a nexus between Account 2770 and Defendant Wang's wire fraud charge, let alone sufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing, and the Court properly adjudicated, that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of Account 2770 to be proper.\n\n34. As to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the money laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a\n\n\"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1)[2](#page-11-0) , any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense, or any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United States currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. As to Count II, The Government \"must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.\" *U.S. v. Beltramea*, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n35. The Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy to launder money because Defendant Wang \"knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . .and which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One of this Information.\" Superseding Information at 3.\n\n36. It is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited for the money laundering charge in Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang engaging in financial transactions with the \"proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One.\" Superseding Information at 3. As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account 2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (*see* ¶¶ 31-33, above) – there is no evidence that such funds \"constitute[d] or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of\" wire fraud. *See e.g.* 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were\n\n<span id=\"page-11-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that \"[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, *involved in such offense*, or any property *traceable to such property*.\" 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\nnot Fraud Scheme proceeds nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could not serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part of Defendant Wang's conviction for Count II.\n\n37. The overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge further fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be forfeitable. In the Superseding Information, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding Information at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were \"among others\" that Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money (Superseding Information at 3), these other acts were never identified.\n\n38. First, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened a bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was *not*. Superseding Information at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately \\$200 million to that account. *Id.* The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank account held by Saraca Media Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\") (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo Trial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), *not* from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be transferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information. Moreover, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n39. The second act the Government alleges is that \"on or about June 5, 2020,\" Defendant Wang \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from GTV's parent company, Saraca, to a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Defendant Guo's son.\" Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was transferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there\n\nwas never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account. Moreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n40. As seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding Account 2770 whatsoever. The *only* reference in the record to Account 2770 is Defendant Wang's consent to forfeit it. However, \"a defendant's consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the requirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of offense.\" *Beltramea*, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, \"[t]he district court had an independent duty to *ensure* that the required nexus exists.\" *Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n41. Here, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the Original Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account 2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n42. The Government's continued retention of the funds in Account 2770, without showing that there is a nexus, is wrong and inequitable. Should the Government retain the funds in Account 2770, it will be unjustly enriched, since the funds belong to third parties, including Petitioner, who are (1) not Defendant Wang or Defendant Guo; and (2) not involved the Fraud Scheme, let alone victims of such a scheme. *See, e.g., U.S. v. Bajakajian*, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (explaining that a criminal \"forfeiture serves no remedial purpose, is designed to punish the offender, *and cannot be imposed upon innocent owners*.\") (emphasis added).\n\n# **B. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner's Property Because There Exists a Constructive Trust Over Such Property**\n\n43. Even putting aside the Government's failure to properly demonstrate that the funds in Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does Defendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n\n44. Under the doctrine of constructive trusts, Petitioner's Property is protected and remains the property of Petitioner regardless of any other ownership claims, including Defendant Wang's or the Government, standing in her shoes. The Second Circuit[3](#page-14-0) has held that \"a constructive trust qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" *Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States*, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n45. \"A constructive trust is an equitable remedy, *necessarily flexible to accomplish its purpose*.\" *Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co*., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). \"Its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate the performance of a wrongful act. . .What is necessary is that the court identify a party who is holding property *under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it*.\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n46. \"Whether a party is unjustly enriched is a legal conclusion reached through the\n\n<span id=\"page-14-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> \"The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation.\" *In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.*, 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), *aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A*., No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). Here, there are four competing jurisdictions whose laws could apply: Australia, New York, California, and Cayman Islands. Petitioner's payment of Petitioner's Property was pursuant to the Option Memorandum. The Option Memorandum makes clear that Archiwoods would then enter into some agreement with the Hamilton Opportunity Fund on Petitioner's behalf. On information and belief, any agreement between Archiwoods and the Hamilton Opportunity Fund is governed by Cayman Islands law. Account 2770 *was* an account in a California bank when Petitioner deposited Petitioner's Property. Since Account 2770 was seized (pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a court in New York state), the funds are now in possession of the Government in New York and the California bank no longer exists. New York is the forum state of this case. From these facts, New York has the greatest interest in this litigation, and its laws should apply to an imposition of a constructive trust. However, to the extent that the Government challenges this choice-of-law determination, Petitioner reserves all rights to request that this Court impose a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property under California, Australia, and/or Cayman Islands law.\n\napplication of principles of equity. . . A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief. . . Unjust enrichment results when a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the transfer and considering the relationship of the parties, it would be inequitable to retain.\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n47. The New York Court of Appeals outlined several factors to be considered in determining whether a constructive trust should be imposed in certain circumstances, including \"(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment.\" *Sharp v. Kosmalski*, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976). However, New York courts have long held that \"these factors are merely useful guides and are not talismanic.\" *Counihan*, 194 F.3d at 362 (citing to a plethora of New York state cases that have stated this proposition).\n\n48. Here, there is a constructive trust for the benefit of Petitioner over Petitioner's Property as of the date that it was deposited into Account 2770 by Archiwoods.\n\n49. Petitioner, through Archiwoods, who acted as Petitioner's agent and/or intermediary, entered into a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship[4](#page-15-0) with Archiwoods and/or Hamilton Opportunity Fund when Petitioner invested in Archiwoods, who then executed an agreement on Petitioner's behalf in order to acquire certain Class B shares in Hamilton M&A Fund SP using Petitioner's Property. Per the Option Memorandum, Archiwoods made a promise to\n\n<span id=\"page-15-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> Even if the Court determines that the relationship was not confidential and/or there was no fiduciary relationship between Archiwoods and/or Hamilton Opportunity Fund and Petitioner, such would not be determinative, as the absence of a fiduciary relationship does not preclude the Court from finding a constructive trust exists. *See Koreag,* 961 F.2d at 353 (stating that \"[w]e do not believe, however, that the lack of a fiduciary relationship between [the parties] automatically defeats [a] claim of constructive trust. Although a fiduciary relationship is one of the factors cited by New York courts, the absence of any one factor will not itself defeat the imposition of a constructive trust when otherwise required by equity\").\n\nPetitioner that Petitioner's Property would be invested in the Digital Bank pursuant to the Investment Strategy. **Exhibit A**, at 4. In reliance on this promise, the Petitioner wired Petitioner's Property to Archiwoods, who then, upon information and belief, wired it to Account 2770. The Government's improper seizure of Account 2770 forced a breach of Archiwoods' promise to invest Petitioner's Property into the Digital Bank pursuant to the Investment Strategy. Because of Government's seizure, Petitioner is not even able to exercise his Right of Redemption to reobtain Petitioner's Property at the appropriate time. This would result in unjust enrichment to the benefit of the Government since the Government is now retaining Petitioner's Property without any legal cause to do so. *See, e.g., U.S. v. Coluccio*, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding that imposition of a constructive trust was proper where, amongst other reasons, Government's forfeiture caused a breach of an implied promise); *Torres v. \\$36,256.80 U.S. Currency*, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a constructive trust appropriate where \"The government's forfeiture forced a breach of that promise that may result in a potentially unjust enrichment of the government (and commensurate unjust impoverishment of [the plaintiff]).\")\n\n50. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown that a constructive trust should be imposed over Petitioner's Property. Such a constructive trust \"qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" *Willis*, 652 F.3d at 242.\n\n51. The property upon which the constructive trust is sought – Petitioner's Property is easily traceable. *See* **Exhibit D***.*\n\n52. Moreover, the imposition of a constructive trust is fully available to Petitioner, even if the Government contends that others are owed restitution from any forfeited property. \"When a party can directly trace its assets, without resorting to fictions or presumptions, a constructive trust\n\nis available even in cases involving multiple fraud victims.\" *U.S. v. Ovid,* 2012 WL 2087084, \\*7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012). \"[C]ourts are not free to disregard the law of constructive trusts when a claimant can directly trace its property, even if this leaves one innocent victim better off than another equally innocent victim.\" *Id.* The \"orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases\" is to \"return[] identifiable assets to their owners, turning to pro rata distribution only when specific identification or transactional tracing is impossible.\" *Id.* at \\*8 (citing *Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment*, § 59 Reporter's Note G, at 437).\n\n# **C. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner's Property**\n\n53. Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property is absolutely superior to any interest that the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner's Property.\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner's interest in the forfeited property, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's interest \"renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner *rather than the defendant* or was superior to any right, title, or interest *of the defendant* at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section.\" 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n\n55. Here, as set forth above, Defendant Wang never had any interest in Petitioner's Property or Account 2770; indeed, the record is entirely silent as to what the relationship is between Defendant Wang, the Fraud Scheme, and Account 2770.\n\n56. It is axiomatic that neither the Government nor Defendant Wang can argue that they have a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Likewise, Defendant Wang cannot forfeit her interest in a property in which she had no interest.\n\n# **D. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys' Fees**\n\n57. The Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to\n\nfile this petition asserting Petitioner's right to Petitioner's Property and to challenge the forfeiture of Petitioner's Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner's costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (\"EAJA\"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the purposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney's fees under the EAJA. *See United States v. Cox*, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Douglas*, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995); *U.S. v. Bailey*, 2015 WL 1893610 at \\*20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\n\n# **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\n58. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner's Property, which renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. *See e.g.* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Defendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property, and never did. Petitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that the Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner's Property.\n\n59. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\nDated: April 3, 2025\n\nDated: April 3, 2025 Respectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman Jeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq. Jeremy W. Schulman, Esq. SCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC 6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425 North Bethesda, MD 20852 (240) 356-8550 [jgavenman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jgavenman@schulmanbh.com) [jschulman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jschulman@schulmanbh.com)\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler Paul W. Butler, Esq. BUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES 1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531 Washington, D.C. 20036 [paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com](mailto:paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com) *Counsel for Petitioner*\n\n# **ATTESTATION AND OATH**\n\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I, \\_ \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_, attest and declare under\n\npenalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided in support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.\n\nExecuted on this \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ day of April, 2025\n\nSignature","body_zh":"United States District Court Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUnited States of America（美利坚合众国）\n\n- 对 -\n\nYvette Wang（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\n第三人就裁定请求人在被没收财产中的权益并修改没收初步命令的申请书——经核实的权利主张\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n请求人（“请求人”）依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c) 条提起本《第三人就裁定请求人在被没收财产中的权益并修改没收初步命令的申请书》（下称“《申请书》”）。请求人请求返还其拥有合法权利、所有权和/或权益的资金（下称“请求人财产”，定义详见下文），该资金被美国政府（下称“政府”）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（下称“被告王”）达成的没收命令的一部分而不当扣押。具体而言，政府扣押了 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司，下称“Hamilton Opportunity Fund”）名义开设的账号为 5090042770 的银行账户（下称“2770 账户”）内的全部资金，从而不当地扣押了请求人财产。然而，任何涉及 2770 账户内资金（包括请求人财产）的没收命令均属非法且不当，因为被告王对 2770 账户或请求人财产均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。因此，就请求人财产而言，该没收命令（定义详见下文）归于无效，因为在引发该没收命令（定义见下文）的行为发生时，请求人财产的权利、所有权或权益归属于请求人而非被告王，且优于被告王的任何权利、所有权或权益。因此，本法院应当修改没收命令，将请求人财产从没收命令中剔除，并命令政府立即将请求人财产返还给请求人。为支持请求人的主张，请求人陈述如下：\n\n一、初步陈述\n\n2770 账户中的资金（包括请求人财产）显然纯属政府在起诉被告王及 Miles Guo（郭文贵，下称“被告郭”）之前扣押资产过程中的“附带损害”。自 2770 账户被扣押至今已有两年半以上，在此期间，从未有任何关于 2770 账户（包括请求人财产）与被告王认罪答辩的任何罪行存在何种关联的解释，而根据法律规定，这是形成有效没收命令的必要前提。从未有任何证据表明被告王认罪答辩的任何非法活动所得曾存入 2770 账户；没有证据表明此类活动的任何收益曾与请求人财产发生混同；事实上，也没有证据表明被告王曾与 2770 账户有任何牵连，甚至不知晓其存在。\n\n如下文所述，请求人是请求人财产拟制信托的受益人，在本案中请求人财产不得被政府扣押。无论被告王，还是目前代其行事的政府，均从未证明其对 2770 账户中的请求人财产或对 2770 账户整体享有任何权益。尽管被告王在没收命令（ECF No. 488 第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在 2770 账户（从而包括请求人财产）中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，但她的同意对于 2770 账户或请求人财产不具有法律效力。被告王从未在 2770 账户中拥有此类“权利、所有权和权益”——没有证据表明她是 2770 账户的签字人、曾向 2770 账户存入资金，或以其他方式对 2770 账户拥有任何控制权，也没有证据表明被告王曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770 账户存入任何资金。被告王不能没收其不拥有且不享有任何权益的财产。事实上，本法院似乎在最初阶段就从未依据 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) 的要求，认定请求人财产属于应予没收的财产。\n\n基于上述全部理由以及下文阐明的理由，请求人谨请本法院：(1) 批准本申请；(2) 修改没收命令以排除请求人财产；(3) 命令立即将请求人财产返还给请求人；(4) 命令请求人有权追索因本申请而发生的律师费和诉讼费用，并准予请求人提交该等律师费和诉讼费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的其他救济。\n\n二、背景事实\n\nA. 请求人的财产\n\n1. Archiwoods Investment Value Fund（下称“Archiwoods”）编制了一份日期为 2022 年 2 月 14 日的信息期权备忘录（下称“《期权备忘录》”），概述了对 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（开曼群岛独立投资组合公司）的投资机会。Archiwoods 将该《期权备忘录》提供给了包括请求人在内的潜在投资者。《期权备忘录》的真实准确副本作为证据 A 附于本申请之后。\n\n2. 投资于 Hamilton M&A Fund SP（下称“并购基金”）是“由投资经理出于创造高价值和长期资本增值的考量而确定的”。证据 A，《期权备忘录》第 4 页。投资经理（在《期权备忘录》中定义为“Archiwoods Investment Management Pty Ltd”）已确定了投资一家银行的机会（下称“投资策略”），证据 A 第 4、8 页，并招揽包括请求人在内的投资以利用该机会。\n\n3. 《期权备忘录》向请求人提供了认购归属于并购基金（Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的一个独立投资组合）的 B 类股份的机会。Hamilton Opportunity Fund 于 2022 年 1 月 20 日向并购基金潜在投资者提供的标准发售备忘录的真实准确副本作为证据 B 附于本申请之后。\n\n4. 被告王不是并购基金、Hamilton Opportunity Fund 或 Archiwoods 的董事或成员，亦不享有上述实体的任何公司或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n5. 被告王未向并购基金或 Archiwoods 进行任何投资；同样，证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n6. 在 2022 年 5 月 31 日之前，请求人提交了投资 Archiwoods 的申请，并同意投资 $100,000.00。请求人同意投资该笔款项的明示条件是全部投资款将用于购买并购基金的股份。2022 年 5 月 31 日，请求人收到了其在 Archiwoods 投资的确认书。请求人投资确认书的真实准确副本作为证据 C 附于本申请之后。\n\n7. 2022 年 2 月 6 日及 2022 年 2 月 7 日，依据《期权备忘录》的条款，请求人向属于 Archiwoods 的银行账户总共电汇了 $102,100.00（即“请求人财产”）。请求人电汇信息的真实准确副本作为证据 D 附于本申请之后。\n\n8. 依据《期权备忘录》的条款，Archiwoods 与代表并购基金行事的 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 签订了协议。据信，Archiwoods 向 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 投资了一笔款项（包括请求人财产的全部），用于收购 Hamilton M&A Fund SP（Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的一个独立投资组合）的 B 类股份。\n\n9. 据信，Archiwoods 将其全部投资金额（包括请求人财产）电汇至 2770 账户，该账户是 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 存放用于收购 B 类股份资金的唯一账户。\n\n10. 所有投资者均签署并约束其对 Hamilton Opportunity Fund（包括并购基金）投资条款的《发售协议》规定，投资者有权按其意愿赎回其股份。证据 B 第 17 页；另见同前第 53 页（说明在符合特定限制的情况下，“股东可在任何赎回日自行选择赎回 B 类股份”）。相应地，请求人有权在投资期结束时赎回其在 Archiwoods 的投资（下称“赎回权”）。证据 A 第 4-5 页。\n\n11. Hamilton Opportunity Fund 每个独立投资组合的资产均“与本基金任何其他独立投资组合的资产及本基金的任何一般资产保持隔离、分开且可独立识别”。见证据 B 第 12 页；另见证据 A 第 4 页。此外，依据开曼群岛法律，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 有责任“将每个独立投资组合的投资组合资产与任何其他独立投资组合的投资组合资产隔离开来，并保持隔离、分开且可独立识别”。证据 B 第 22-23 页（引用《开曼群岛公司法（修订版）》（The Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands）第 XIV 部分第 219(6)(b) 条）。\n\nB. 扣押 2770 账户\n\n12. 2022 年 9 月 18 日，政府扣押了 2770 账户中的全部资金余额，其中包含请求人财产。\n\n13. 迄今为止，没有任何公开文件说明政府扣押 2770 账户内资金具备何种合理根据。\n\nC. 针对被告王与被告郭的刑事案件及没收命令\n\n14. 2023 年 3 月 6 日，政府对被告王、被告郭以及第三名从未被提审的被告 William Je（余建明）提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n15. 2024 年 5 月 3 日，政府针对被告王提交了一份替代起诉书（下称“《替代起诉书》”）。ECF No. 325。《替代起诉书》指控被告王犯有一项共谋电汇欺诈罪（罪名项 I）（《替代起诉书》第 1-2 页）以及一项共谋洗钱罪（罪名项 II）（《替代起诉书》第 2-4 页）。《替代起诉书》还包含一项没收指控（下称“没收指控”）。《替代起诉书》第 4 页。\n\n16. 同日，即 2024 年 5 月 3 日，被告王对《替代起诉书》中指控的罪名项 I 和罪名项 II 进行了认罪答辩。\n\n17. 同样在 2024 年 5 月 3 日，本法院签发了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意没收初步命令》（下称“《原没收命令》”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n18. 在《原没收命令》中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产（包括 2770 账户）中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，理由是该等财产“构成被告个人获取的第项一指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及［替代］起诉书第二项指控罪行的财产”。《原没收命令》第 2-6 页（后加强调）。\n\n19. 被告郭对其被指控的任何罪行均未作认罪答辩。因此，法院于 2024 年 5 月 22 日至 2024 年 7 月 16 日期间进行了陪审团审理（下称“郭案审判”）。2024 年 7 月 16 日，陪审团裁定被告郭犯有共谋敲诈勒索、共谋电汇欺诈、共谋洗钱、共谋证券欺诈、证券欺诈、电汇欺诈以及洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本申请提出之日，被告郭尚未被判刑。\n\n20. 2025 年 1 月 6 日，被告王被判刑。\n\n21. 2025年1月7日，本院作出一份《针对特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（下称“《没收令》”），ECF No. 488。就涉及请愿人的部分而言，该《没收令》在所有实质方面均与《原没收令》大体相似。在《没收令》中，被告 Wang（王雁平）同意没收其在某些资产中“所有的权利、所有权和利益”，包括 2770 账户，因为该等财产“构成了被告个人获取的第 1 项罪名所指控罪行的收益，及/或涉及［替代］起诉书第 2 项罪名所指控罪行的财产”。《没收令》第 2-11 页（强调为后加）。\n\n22. 2770 账户中的资产在《原没收令》和《没收令》中均被描述如下：\n\n存放于 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号为 5090042770、开户名为“Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC”的原存款 89,992,861.75 美元，并由政府于 2022年9月18日左右扣押（23-FBl-000074）。\n\n《原没收令》第 3 页；《没收令》第 3 页。\n\nIII. 辩论意见\n\n23. 在依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c)(1) 条提起的刑事没收附属程序中，本院必须依据优势证据标准判定：请愿人对拟被没收的财产是否享有合法的权利、所有权或利益；以及该等权利、所有权或利益是否使没收令全部或部分无效，原因在于该等利益归属于请愿人而非被告，或者在导致财产被没收的行为发生时优于被告的任何权利、所有权或利益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n24. 在本案中，依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)，请愿人凭借对请愿人财产享有的拟制信托，对该等财产享有合法的权利、所有权或利益。此外，请愿人在请愿人财产中享有的利益既已归属于请愿人，亦优于被告王雁平在请愿人财产中享有的任何权利，因为被告王雁平对请愿人财产或 2770 账户均不享有任何合法的权利、所有权或利益。换言之，被告王雁平无法没收其在 2770 账户中的利益，因为她根本不享有适于予以刑事没收的利益。因此，《没收令》应予修改以剔除请愿人的财产，并将请愿人的财产归还给请愿人。\n\nA. 政府未能证明 2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人的财产）自始即适于被没收，致使《没收令》针对该等资金是不当的\n\n25. 政府没有保留请愿人财产的合法理由，因为没有任何证据表明政府曾按照 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 的要求证明请愿人的财产乃至 2770 账户总体上确实属于可没收财产。\n\n26. “当政府寻求获得没收令时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1) 条……要求量刑法院确定根据适用法规哪些财产属于可没收财产’。”U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（援引 U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2007)）。依据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院必须确定政府是否已确立财产与犯罪之间必要的关联性。”Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（强调为后加）；Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的各个阶段，政府承担以不同确定程度证明这一法律结论的举证责任：在起诉后听证会上达到合理根据的标准……或在法官审判或陪审团审判中达到优势证据的标准。”同上（强调为后加）（内部引文省略）。“然而，只有在政府达到相关法定门槛的情况下，涉案财产才能在任何法律意义上被视为‘适于被没收’。在此之前，虽然政府仅是通过起诉书宣布了寻求没收的意图，但该财产仅被视为‘可能可没收的’……或‘可能适于被没收的’。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n27. 这意味着在法院触及请愿人是否有权根据 § 853(n) 获得财产返还这一问题之前，必须首先确定争议财产自始是否确实可予没收。如果不可没收，政府便没有扣押该财产的法定权力。如果财产扣押不当，无论请愿人是否符合 § 853(n) 规定的标准，政府都必须返还被扣押的账户资产。参见例如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)。\n\n28. 依据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 进行全面且完整的审查对于公正司法至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已进行审查并判定财产适于被没收这一前提之上。在制定附属程序法规时，国会选择在附属程序中将举证责任置于第三方，因为“美国在刑事案件中已排除合理怀疑地证明了其没收指控”。S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n29. 在本案中，从未就 2770 账户与被告王雁平被指控（并已认罪）的任何罪行之间是否存在关联性作出过认定，结果导致请愿人被迫提交本请愿书。基于被告王雁平和 Defendant Guo（被告郭文贵）刑事案件中所有公开文件中包含的信息，政府在 2770 账户上无法胜诉。\n\n30. 在本案中，在替代起诉书中，政府就第 1 项和第 2 项罪名均列入了没收指控，并寻求没收特定财产。替代起诉书第 4 页。案卷中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明（更不用说达到其举证责任来证明）2770 账户与被告王雁平认罪的罪行之间存在关联性。\n\n31. 关于第 1 项罪名，没收指控载明：“由于犯下了本替代起诉书第 1 项罪名所指控的电信诈骗罪，被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，应依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条脚注1……及《美国法典》第 28 编第 2461(c) 条，向美国没收构成犯下上述罪行所得的可追溯收益或由其衍生的任何及所有财产，包括不动产和动产。”替代起诉书第 4 页。政府必须以优势证据标准证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 项下的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收理论是该财产被用于实施或便利实施刑事犯罪，或涉及刑事犯罪的实施，则政府应确立该财产与该犯罪之间存在实质性关联。”18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n32. 案卷中没有任何关于 2770 账户中的资金如何属于或衍生自可追溯至被告王雁平共谋实施电信诈骗所得收益的指控。替代起诉书指控：“至少约自 2018 年起至至少约 2023年3月15日止，共谋者向投资者进行虚假陈述，称其投资 GTV、Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）组织和 GClubs 将获得股票作为回报，且投资 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）将获得加密货币作为回报［（下称“诈骗计划”）］。通过该［诈骗计划］，被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，及其包括 Miles Guo（郭文贵）在内的共谋者，诱导投资者向郭文贵控制的实体投资了超过 10 亿美元。”替代起诉书第 2 页。替代起诉书中没有关于被告王雁平将来自该诈骗计划的任何收益存入 2770 账户的指控。同样，替代起诉书中也没有指控任何投资者因该诈骗计划而将资金存入 2770 账户。也不可能存在任何此类指控，因为从 Archiwoods 存入 2770 账户的唯一款项来自依据投资策略投资于数字银行的投资者——该投资与替代起诉书中所描述的“诈骗计划”没有任何关联。可以肯定的是，请愿人确认其从未是被告王雁平在替代起诉书中所涉任何指控行为的受害者，并且不认为请愿人的任何财产曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n脚注1：18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定，“构成可追溯至违反特定罪行所得收益或由其衍生的任何财产（无论不动产还是动产）［均适于被没收］”，其中包括违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 的电信诈骗罪，即第 1 项罪名中对被告王雁平的指控。\n\n33. 最后，在被告郭文贵的审判期间，没有任何关于 2770 账户的相关证词。没有任何关于该诈骗计划的任何收益是否曾被存入 2770 账户的证词，就此而言，也没有任何关于被告王雁平是否曾将任何资金存入 2770 账户的证词。简而言之，案卷中没有任何内容表明 2770 账户与被告王雁平的电信诈骗指控之间存在关联，更没有充分的证据以判定政府已完成举证责任证明存在适当的关联性、且法院已适当地裁定没收 2770 账户是正当的。\n\n34. 关于第 2 项罪名，没收指控载明：“由于犯下了本起诉书第 2 项罪名所指控的洗钱罪，被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，应依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 982(a)(1) 条脚注2，向美国没收涉及上述罪行的任何及所有财产（无论不动产还是动产），或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产，包括但不限于代表涉及上述罪行财产数额的某一美元金额。”替代起诉书第 4 页。关于第 2 项罪名，政府“必须以优势证据标准证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 项下的没收要件”。U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015)。\n\n35. 替代起诉书指控被告王雁平犯有共谋洗钱罪，因为被告王雁平“明知涉及某些金融交易的财产代表某种形式的非法活动收益，仍将实施并确实实施及试图实施该等金融交易……且该等交易实际上涉及特定非法活动的收益，即本起诉书第 1 项罪名所指控的电信诈骗计划的收益”。替代起诉书第 3 页。\n\n36. 目前尚不清楚2770号账户何以能因第二项罪名中的洗钱指控而被没收。从指控来看，洗钱指控源于被告Wang（王）从事涉及“第一项罪名中所指控的电信欺诈计划之收益”的金融交易。替代起诉书第3页。如上所述，没有任何证据表明2770号账户中的资金与第一项罪名中所指控的欺诈计划有任何关联（参见上文第31至33段）——没有任何证据表明此类资金“构成或源自可追溯至实施”电信欺诈“的收益”。参见例如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。由于2770号账户中的资金既非欺诈计划收益，亦非源自欺诈计划收益，因此此类资金不能作为第二项罪名中洗钱指控的依据，也不能作为被告Wang就第二项罪名被定罪的一部分而被没收。\n\n脚注2：18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定：“法院在对被判犯有违反本编第1956条［洗钱法规］罪行的人判刑时……应命令该人向美国没收涉及该罪行的任何不动产或动产，或可追溯至该财产的任何财产。”18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（后加强调）。\n\n37. 政府为支持洗钱指控所主张的公开行为，进一步未能表明2770号账户中的资金何以属于可没收财产。在替代起诉书中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项行为。替代起诉书第3页。尽管政府声称这两项公开行为是被告Wang为推进所指控的洗钱共谋而实施的“诸项行为之一”（替代起诉书第3页），但这些其他行为从未被指明。\n\n38. 首先，根据替代起诉书，2020年5月20日，被告Wang以GTV的名义开设了一个银行账户，值得注意的是，2770号账户并非该账户。替代起诉书第3页。2020年6月2日，被告Wang向该账户转账约2亿美元。同上。转入GTV账户的资金来自Saraca Media Group, Inc.（“Saraca”）持有的JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）账户（Guo案庭审，2024年5月31日，953:25-954:4；Guo案庭审，2024年6月26日，4359:1-14），而非来自2770号账户。从未有任何证词表明来自2770号账户的任何款项曾进入Saraca的摩根大通银行账户并随后转入替代起诉书中所提及的GTV账户。此外，2770号账户在2020年甚至根本不存在。\n\n39. 政府指控的第二项行为是，“在2020年6月5日或前后”，被告Wang“授权从GTV的母公司Saraca向一家高风险对冲基金电汇1亿美元，以使Saraca及其最终受益所有人、被告Guo（郭）之子受益”。替代起诉书第3至4页。首先，这明确指控资金是从Saraca账户转出的，而显而易见2770号账户并非该账户。而且，同样地，从未有任何证词表明来自2770号账户的任何款项曾进入Saraca账户。此外，再次重申，2770号账户在2020年甚至根本不存在。\n\n40. 从上述论证可以看出，根本没有任何关于2770号账户的指控或证词。记录中对2770号账户的唯一提及是被告Wang同意没收该账户。然而，“被告对没收的同意［并未］废除寻求没收的财产与被定罪罪行之间必须存在关联性的要求”。Beltramea案，785 F.3d at 291。正如Eighth Circuit（第八巡回上诉法院）所强调的那样，“地区法院负有独立职责以确保所要求的关联性存在”。同上（后加强调）。\n\n41. 在本案中，替代起诉书、原没收令或没收令中均没有任何事实指控表明2770号账户与被告Wang认罪的罪行之间存在任何指称的关联性。\n\n42. 政府在未能证明存在关联性的情况下继续扣留2770号账户中的资金，是不当且不公平的。如果政府保留2770号账户中的资金，将会构成不当得利，因为这些资金属于包括请愿人在内的第三方，而这些第三方（1）并非被告Wang或被告Guo；且（2）并未参与欺诈计划，更非该计划的受害者。参见例如 U.S. v. Bajakajian案，524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)（解释刑事“没收不具有救济目的，旨在惩罚违法者，且不得施加于无辜所有权人”）（后加强调）。\n\nB. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，因为对该财产存在推定信托\n\n43. 即使抛开政府未能恰当证明2770号账户中的资金属于替代起诉书中所指控的任何活动的一部分不谈，请愿人财产亦应归还给请愿人，因为请愿人对该财产享有的权益高于被告Wang或如今代位受让其地位的政府所享有的权益。\n\n44. 根据推定信托原则，无论存在任何其他所有权主张，包括被告Wang或代位受让其地位的政府的主张，请愿人财产均受保护且仍为请愿人的财产。Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）认为，就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，“推定信托构成对财产的‘合法权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益”。Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States案，652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n45. “推定信托是一项衡平法救济，必然具有灵活性以实现其目的。”Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co.案，194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999)（后加强调）。“其目的在于防止不当得利，尽管不当得利并不必然涉及不法行为的实施……所必需的是法院确认一方持有财产的情形在衡平与良知上使其不应保留该财产。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n46. “一方是否构成不当得利是通过适用衡平法原则得出的法律结论……衡平法院在裁定推定信托时不受任何死板公式的束缚。交易的衡平性必须决定救济的限度……当一人获得了某项利益，且根据转让时的具体情形并考虑到各方之间的关系，保留该利益是不公平的，即构成不当得利。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n脚注3：“联邦普通法关于法律适用的规则是适用对诉讼具有最大利益的管辖区的法律。”In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.案，961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992)，部分维持原判，案件名称变更为 Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A.案，No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992)。在本案中，有四个可能适用其法律的竞合管辖区：澳大利亚、纽约州、加利福尼亚州和开曼群岛。请愿人对请愿人财产的支付是依据《期权备忘录》进行的。《期权备忘录》明确表明Archiwoods随后将代表请愿人与Hamilton Opportunity Fund达成某种协议。基于知悉与相信，Archiwoods与Hamilton Opportunity Fund之间的任何协议均受开曼群岛法律管辖。在请愿人存入请愿人财产时，2770号账户曾是加利福尼亚州某银行的一个账户。由于2770号账户已被扣押（依据纽约州某法院签发的搜查与扣押令），这些资金现由位于纽约的政府持有，且该加利福尼亚州银行已不复存在。纽约州是本案的法院地州。基于这些事实，纽约州对本诉讼具有最大利益，其法律应适用于推定信托的设立。然而，如果政府对该法律适用决定提出异议，请愿人保留所有权利，以请求本法院根据加利福尼亚州、澳大利亚和/或开曼群岛法律对请愿人财产设立推定信托。\n\n47. New York Court of Appeals（纽约州上诉法院）概述了在确定某些情形下是否应设立推定信托时应考虑的若干因素，包括“(1) 保密或信义关系，(2) 承诺，(3) 基于信赖该承诺而作出的转让，以及 (4) 不当得利。”Sharp v. Kosmalski案，40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976)。然而，纽约州法院长期以来一直认为“这些因素仅仅是有用的指导，并非神圣不可变通的法条”。Counihan案，194 F.3d at 362（援引了大量阐述该观点的纽约州案件）。\n\n48. 在本案中，自Archiwoods将请愿人财产存入2770号账户之日起，即存在为请愿人利益对请愿人财产设立的推定信托。\n\n49. 请愿人通过作为请愿人代理人和/或中间人的Archiwoods，在请愿人向Archiwoods投资时与Archiwoods和/或Hamilton Opportunity Fund建立了保密和/或信义关系，Archiwoods随后代表请愿人签署了一份协议，以便使用请愿人财产收购Hamilton M&A Fund SP的若干B类股份。根据《期权备忘录》，Archiwoods向请愿人作出承诺，请愿人财产将根据《投资策略》投资于数字银行。证物A，第4页。基于对该承诺的信赖，请愿人将请愿人财产电汇给Archiwoods，Archiwoods随后基于知悉与相信将其电汇至2770号账户。政府对2770号账户的不当扣押导致Archiwoods未能履行根据《投资策略》将请愿人财产投资于数字银行的承诺。由于政府的扣押，请愿人甚至无法在适当时间行使其赎回权以重新获得请愿人财产。这将导致政府受益的不当得利，因为政府目前在没有任何法律依据的情况下扣留请愿人财产。参见例如 U.S. v. Coluccio案，51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995)（认定设立推定信托是恰当的，除其他原因外，因为政府的没收导致了对默示承诺的违反）；Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency案，25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994)（认定推定信托是恰当的，其中指出“政府的没收迫使该承诺被违反，这可能导致政府潜在的不当得利（以及［原告］相应的不当受损）”）。\n\n脚注4：即使法院认定Archiwoods和/或Hamilton Opportunity Fund与请愿人之间不存在保密关系和/或不存在信义关系，这亦非决定性的，因为缺乏信义关系并不妨碍法院认定推定信托的存在。参见 Koreag案，961 F.2d at 353（指出“然而，我们不认为［各方］之间缺乏信义关系会自动击败对推定信托的主张。尽管信义关系是纽约州法院引用的因素之一，但在衡平法另有要求时，缺乏任何单一因素本身并不会阻碍推定信托的设立”）。\n\n50. 因此，请愿人已证明应对请愿人财产设立推定信托。就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，此类推定信托“构成对财产的‘合法权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益”。Willis案，652 F.3d at 242。\n\n51. 寻求确立推定信托的财产——即请愿人财产——极易追溯。参见证据 D。\n\n52. 此外，即便政府主张其他受害人亦有权从任何被没收财产中获得赔偿，对请愿人施以推定信托救济亦完全可行。“当一方当事人在无需借助拟制或推定的情况下能够直接追溯其资产时，即使在涉及多名欺诈受害人的案件中，亦可适用推定信托。”参见 U.S. v. Ovid，2012 WL 2087084, *7（E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区），2012年6月8日）。“当索赔人能够直接追溯其财产时，法院不得随意无视推定信托法，即便这会使一名无辜受害人获得优于另一名同等无辜受害人的处境。”同上。处理“多起欺诈案件的传统做法”是“将可识别资产归还其所有权人，唯有在无法进行特定识别或交易追溯时，才采用按比例分配”。同上，第 *8 页（援引 Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment（《第三次返还法与不当得利重述》）§ 59 报告人说明 G，第 437 页）。\n\nC. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有优先权益\n\n53. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益，绝对优于政府或被告 Wang（王）对请愿人财产可能享有的任何权益。\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 明确规定，除请愿人对被没收财产享有权益外，请愿人还必须以优势证据证明，请愿人的权益“使得没收命令全部或部分无效，原因是在导致根据本条没收财产的行为发生时，该权利、所有权或权益归属于请愿人而非被告，或者优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益”。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（后加强调）。\n\n55. 在本案中，如上所述，被告王从未对请愿人财产或 2770 账户享有任何权益；事实上，案卷记录对被告王、欺诈计划与 2770 账户之间存在何种关系完全未予提及。\n\n56. 显而易见的是，政府和被告王均不能主张他们对一项从未享有过权益的财产拥有优先权益。同样，被告王也不能没收其本就不享有任何权益的财产中的权益。\n\nD. 请愿人有权获得诉讼费用和律师费\n\n57. 请愿人被迫聘请法律顾问并已产生费用，以提起本请愿书主张请愿人对请愿人财产的权利，并对请愿人财产的没收提出异议。在此程序中胜诉后，请愿人保留追索与本请愿书相关的律师费及费用的全部权利，并可根据 Equal Access to Justice Act（《平等获取司法机会法》，“EAJA”），28 U.S.C. § 2412 追索请愿人的费用和合理的律师费。联邦法院一贯认定，就允许胜诉索赔人根据 EAJA 收取律师费而言，§ 853(n) 程序属于民事性质。参见 United States v. Cox，575 F.3d 352, 355（4th Cir.（第四巡回法院），2009年）；United States v. Douglas，55 F.3d 584, 588（11th Cir.（第十一巡回法院），1995年）；U.S. v. Bailey，2015 WL 1893610 at *20（W.D.N.C.（北卡罗来纳西区），2015年4月27日）。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n58. 基于上述理由，请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，该权益使得没收命令就该等财产而言归于无效。参见如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告王对请愿人财产不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。请愿人已证明，并能在任何必要的听证会上以优势证据证明，没收命令须予修改以排除请愿人财产。\n\n59. 因此，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 准许本请愿；(2) 修改没收命令以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产归还请愿人；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追索与本请愿相关的请愿人律师费及诉讼费用，并准予请愿人提交关于该等律师费及诉讼费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的该等及其他救济。\n\n日期：2025年4月3日\n\n日期：2025年4月3日 谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\nJeffrey S. Gavenman, 律师\nJeremy W. Schulman, 律师\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\nPaul W. Butler, 律师\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n请愿人代理律师\n\n证明与宣誓\n\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人，_________，在此证明并声明，如有虚假陈述甘受伪证罪处罚，本人对该财产的主张绝非无理取闹，且据本人所知及所信，为支持该主张所提供的信息均属真实准确。\n\n签署于 2025年4月________日\n\n签名","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Torres","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":6248,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-04 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-04","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:03:05"}