{"id":"court_sdny_624_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":624,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-05","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方没收财产诉讼 — 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #624（2025年4月立案）。请愿人基于对 Hamilton M&A 基金的投资，主张对被没收账户资金拥有独立的法律利益，并论证 Yvette Wang 从未对该账户拥有权利或利益。","summary_en":"Third-party petition to adjudicate forfeited property interest — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #624 (filed April 2025). Petitioner claims independent legal interest in funds based on investment in Hamilton M&A Fund, arguing defendant Yvette Wang never had any right, title, or interest in the seized account, and seeks return of property and relief.","body_en":"# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- V. -\n\nYVETTE WANG a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\nTHIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE - VERIFIED CLAIM OF\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner\n\n(\"Petitioner\") files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate\n\nPetitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the \"Petition\"). Petitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest (\"Petitioner's Property\") (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government (the \"Government\") improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with Defendant Yvette Wang (\"Defendant Wang\"). Specifically, Petitioner's Property was improperly seized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in bank account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Account 2770\"). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or interest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. The Forfeiture Order (as more fully defined below) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner's Property because right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property was vested in the Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was\n\nsuperior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the acts that gave rise to the Forfeiture Order (as defined below). As such, this Court should amend the Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner's Property from the Forfeiture Order that the Government immediately return Petitioner's Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner's claim, Petitioner states as follows:\n\n#### I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\nIt appears that the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, were purely \"collateral damage\" in the Government's seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant Wang and Miles Guo (\"Defendant Guo\"). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure of Account 2770, and in that time span, there has never been any explanation as to how Account 2770 (including Petitioner's Property) is related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any showing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were ever deposited in Account 2770; no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever commingled with Petitioner's Property; and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had anything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\n\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is a beneficiary of a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property and Petitioner's Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither Defendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, have ever demonstrated that they have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner's Property in Account 2770 or in Account 2770 in general. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of \"all her right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 (and thus, Petitioner's Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), her consent has no legal bearing as to Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. Defendant Wang never had such \"right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 - there is no evidence that she was a signatory\n\non Account 2770, ever deposited money into Account 2770, or otherwise had any control over Account 2770, and there is no evidence that Defendant Wang ever directed anyone, directly or indirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that she does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never established that Petitioner's Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\n#### BACKGROUND FACTS II.\n\n### A. Petitioner's Property\n\n1. Archiwoods Investment Value Fund (\"Archiwoods\") prepared an Information Option Memorandum (the \"Option Memorandum\"), dated February 14, 2022, outlining an investment opportunity in the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Hamilton Opportunity Fund\"), a Cayman Islands Segregated Portfolio Company. Archiwoods gave this Option Memorandum to prospective investors, including Petitioner. A true and correct copy of the Option Memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit A.\n\n2. Investing in the Hamilton M&A Fund SP (the \"M&A Fund\"), was \"identified by the investment manager with a view to high value creation and long-term capital gain.\" Exhibit A, Option Memorandum at 4. The Investment Manager (defined as \"Archiwoods Investment Management Pty Ltd\" in the Option Memorandum) had identified an opportunity to invest in a bank (the \"Investment Strategy\"), Exhibit A, at 4, 8, and solicited investments, including from Petitioner, to take advantage of this opportunity.\n\n3. The Option Memorandum offered Petitioner an opportunity to acquire Class B Shares attributed to the M&A Fund, a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund . A true and correct copy of the standard Offering Memorandum provided by the Hamilton Opportunity Fund to potential investors in the M&A Fund, dated January 20, 2022, is attached hereto as Exhibit B.\n\n4. Defendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any corporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund, the Hamilton Opportunity Fund, or Archiwoods. The evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n5. again, the evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n6. and agreed to invest \\$100,000.00. Petitioner's agreement to invest this sum was on the express condition that the entirety of the investment would be used to purchase shares in the M&A Fund. On or about May 31, 2022, Petitioner received confirmation of their investment in Archiwoods. A true and correct copy of Petitioner's application to Archiwoods is attached hereto as Exhibit C.\n\n7. On February 25, 2022, pursuant to the terms of the Option Memorandum, Petitioner wired \\$102,050.00 (the \"Petitioner Property\") to a bank account belonging to Archiwoods. A true and correct copy of Petitioner's wire information is attached hereto as Exhibit\n\nD.\n\n8. Pursuant to the terms of the Option Memorandum, Archiwoods entered into an agreement with Hamilton Opportunity Fund, acting on behalf of the M&A Fund. Upon\n\ninformation and belief, Archiwoods invested a monetary sum (including the entirety of Petitioner's Property) with the Hamilton Opportunity Fund for the acquisition of Class B shares in the Hamilton M&A Fund SP, a Segregated Portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund.\n\n9. Upon information and belief, Archiwoods wired its full investment amount (including Petitioner's Property) into Account 2770, which is the only account in which Hamilton Opportunity Fund held funds meant for the acquisition of Class B Shares.\n\n10. her investment into the Hamilton Opportunity Fund (including the M&A Fund), entitles investors to redeem their shares at the investor's option. Exhibit B, at 17; see also id. at 53 (stating that subject to certain limitations, \"Class B Shares may be redeemed at the option of the Shareholder on any Redemption Day\"). In turn, Petitioner had the right to redeem his investment with Archiwoods at the end of the investment term (the \"Right of Redemption\"). Exhibit A, at 4-5.\n\n11. I . The assets of each segregated portfolio of the Hamilton Opportunity Fund are \"kept segregated, separate and separately identifiable from those of any other segregated portfolios of the Fund and any general assets of the Fund.\" See Exhibit B, at 12; see also Exhibit A, at 4. In addition, pursuant to the laws of the Cayman Islands, it is the duty of Hamilton Opportunity Fund to \"segregate, and keep segregated, portfolio assets of each segregated portfolio separate and separately identifiable from segregated portfolio assets of any other segregated portfolio.\" Exhibit B, at 22-23 (citing The Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands, Part XIV, 219(6)(b)).\n\n### B. Seizure of Account 2770\n\n12. On September 18, 2022, the Government seized the entire balance of the funds in Account 2770, which included Petitioner's Property.\n\n13. To date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the Government had to seize the funds in Account 2770.\n\n# C. The Criminal Case Against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the Forfeiture Order\n\n14. On March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n\n15. On May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the \"Superseding Information\") against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information charged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I) (Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering (Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a Forfeiture Allegation (the \"Forfeiture Allegation\"). Superseding Information at 4.\n\n16. O On the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count II as charged in the Superseding Information.\n\n17. Also on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (\"Original Forfeiture Order\"). ECF No. 329.\n\n18. In the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all her right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n\n19. Defendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him. Accordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the \"Guo Trial\"). On July 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities\n\nfraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this Petition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n\n20. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n\n21. January 7, 2025, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Forfeiture Order\") ECF No. 488. As it pertains to Petitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all material respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all her right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Forfeiture Order at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n22. The assets in Account 2770 are described in both the Original Forfeiture Order and the Forfeiture Order as follows:\n\n> \\$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September 18, 2022 (23-FBI-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\n\n### III. ARGUMENT\n\n23. In an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited, and whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part, because such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to\n\nthe forfeiture of the property. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n\n24. Here, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of a constructive trust over such property. Moreover, Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any right Defendant Wang had in Petitioner's Property because Defendant Wang had *no* legal right, title or, interest in either Petitioner's Property or Account 2770. In other words, Defendant Wang could not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject to criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner's Property, and Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner.\n\n# A. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770, Including Petitioner's Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First Instance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds\n\n25. J. The Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner's Property because there is no evidence that the Government has ever demonstrated that Petitioner's Property, and Account 2770 in general, is actually forfeitable property, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\n26. \" \"When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, 'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.\"\" *U.S. v. Watts*, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing *U.S. v. Capoccia*, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2. \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.\" Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); Watts, 786 F.3d at 172. \"At various points in the proceedings, the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion to varying degrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . . or by a preponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.\" Id. (emphasis added) (internal\n\ncitations omitted). \"Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the property in question be considered 'subject to forfeiture' in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the government has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property is seen merely as 'potentially forfeitable' . . . or 'potentially subject to forfeiture.\" Id. (internal citations omitted).\n\n27. This means that before the court reaches the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in dispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority to seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the accounts seized regardless of whether the petitioner can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). See e.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n\n28. Jull and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair administration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has conducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary proceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an ancillary proceeding, since \"the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.\" S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392.\n\n29. In this matter, there has never been a determination of whether there exists a nexus between Account 2770 and any of the offenses Defendant Wang was charged with (and pled guilty to), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained in the publicly-available documents in both Defendant Wang's and Defendant Guo's criminal case, the Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n\n30. Here, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture Allegation as to both Counts I and Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding Information at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show, let alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n31. wire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Y anping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C) '. . . and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, \"if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n\n32. The record is devoid of any allegations pertaining to how funds in Account 2770 are, or are derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang's conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Superseding Information alleges that \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about March 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive\n\n<sup>1 18</sup> U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that \"[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture] which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of\" various specified offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang in Count I.\n\nstock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and GClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the Himalaya Exchange [(the \"Fraud Scheme\")]. Through the [Fraud Scheme], YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced investors to invest more than \\$1 billion into entities Guo controlled.\" Superseding Information at 2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing any proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into Account 2770. Similarly, there are no allegations in the Superseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into Account 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits from Archiwoods into Account 2770 were from investors who were investing in the Digital Bank pursuant to the Investment Strategy - an investment that is not implicated in any way by the \"Fraud Scheme\" described in the Superseding Information. To be sure, Petitioner affirms that Petitioner was never a victim of any conduct by Defendant Wang alleged in the Superseding Information and does not believe that any of Petitioner's Property was ever used in any unlawful activity.\n\n33. Finally, there was no relevant testimony during Defendant Guo's trial concerning Account 2770. There was no testimony regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme were ever deposited into Account 2770, nor, for that matter, whether Defendant Wang ever deposited any money into Account 2770. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would indicate there is a nexus between Account 2770 and Defendant Wang's wire fraud charge, let alone sufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing, and the Court properly adjudicated, that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of Account 2770 to be proper.\n\n34. As to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the money laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, alk/a\n\n\"Y anping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18. United States Code, Section 982(a)(1)2, any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense. or any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United States currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. As to Count II, The Government \"must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.\" U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n35. J The Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy to launder money because Defendant Wang \"knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . and which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One of this Information.\" Superseding Information at 3.\n\n36. It is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited for the money laundering charge in Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang engaging in financial transactions with the \"proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One.\" Superseding Information at 3. As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account 2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (see ¶¶ 31-33, above) - there is no evidence that such funds \"constitute[d] or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of' wire fraud. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were\n\n<sup>2 18</sup> U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that \"[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property.\" 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\nnot Fraud Scheme proceeds nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could not serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part of Defendant Wang's conviction for Count II.\n\n37. The overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge further fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be forfeitable. In the Superseding Information, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding Information at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were \"among others\" that Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money (Superseding Information at 3), these other acts were never identified.\n\n38. First, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened a bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was not. Superseding Information at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately \\$200 million to that account. *Id.* The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank account held by Saraca Media Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\") (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo Trial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), not from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be transferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information. Moreover, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n39. The second act the Government alleges is that \"on or about June 5, 2020,\" Defendant Wang \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from GTV's parent company, Saraca, to a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Defendant Guo's son.\" Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was transferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there\n\nwas never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account. Moreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n40. As seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding Account 2770 whatsoever. The only reference in the record to Account 2770 is Defendant Wang's consent to forfeit it. However, \"a defendant's consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the requirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of offense.\" Beltramea, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, \"[t]he district court had an independent duty to ensure that the required nexus exists.\" Id. (emphasis added).\n\n41. Here, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the Original Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account 2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n42. J The Government's continued retention of the funds in Account 2770, without showing that there is a nexus, is wrong and inequitable. Should the Government retain the funds in Account 2770, it will be unjustly enriched, since the funds belong to third parties, including Petitioner, who are (1) not Defendant Wang or Defendant Guo; and (2) not involved the Fraud Scheme, let alone victims of such a scheme. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (explaining that a criminal \"forfeiture serves no remedial purpose, is designed to punish the offender, and cannot be imposed upon innocent owners.\") (emphasis added).\n\n## B. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner's Property Because There Exists a Constructive Trust Over Such Property\n\n43. in Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does Defendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n\n44. Under the doctrine of constructive trusts, Petitioner's Property is protected and remains the property of Petitioner regardless of any other ownership claims, including Defendant Wang's or the Government, standing in her shoes. The Second Circuit3 has held that \"a constructive trust qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n45. \"A constructive trust is an equitable remedy, necessarily flexible to accomplish its purpose.\" Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). \"Its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate the performance of a wrongful act. . What is necessary is that the court identify a party who is holding property under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it.\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n46. \" \"Whether a party is unjustly enriched is a legal conclusion reached through the\n\n<sup>3 &</sup>quot;The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation.\" In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). Here, there are four competing jurisdictions whose laws could apply: Australia, New York, California, and Cayman Islands. Petitioner's payment of Petitioner's Property was pursuant to the Option Memorandum. The Option Memorandum makes clear that Archiwoods would then enter into some agreement with the Hamilton Opportunity Fund on Petitioner's behalf. On information and belief, any agreement between Archiwoods and the Hamilton Opportunity Fund is governed by Cayman Islands law. Account 2770 was an account in a California bank when Petitioner deposited Petitioner's Property. Since Account 2770 was seized (pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a court in New York state), the funds are now in possession of the Government in New York and the California bank no longer exists. New York is the forum state of this case. From these facts, New York has the greatest interest in this litigation, and its laws should apply to an imposition of a constructive trust. However, to the extent that the Government challenges this choice-of-law determination, Petitioner reserves all rights to request that this Court impose a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property under California, Australia, and/or Cayman Islands law.\n\napplication of principles of equity. . . A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief. . . Unjust enrichment results when a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the transfer and considering the relationship of the parties, it would be inequitable to retain.\" Id. (internal citations omitted).\n\n47. The New York Court of Appeals outlined several factors to be considered in determining whether a constructive trust should be imposed in certain circumstances, including \"(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment.\" Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976). However, New York courts have long held that \"these factors are merely useful guides and are not talismanic.\" Counihan, 194 F.3d at 362 (citing to a plethora of New York state cases that have stated this proposition).\n\n48. Here, there is a constructive trust for the benefit of Petitioner over Petitioner's Property as of the date that it was deposited into Account 2770 by Archiwoods.\n\n49. Petitioner, through Archiwoods, who acted as Petitioner's agent and/or intermediary, entered into a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship4 with Archiwoods and/or Hamilton Opportunity Fund when Petitioner invested in Archiwoods, who then executed an agreement on Petitioner's behalf in order to acquire certain Class B shares in Hamilton M&A Fund SP using Petitioner's Property. Per the Option Memorandum, Archiwoods made a promise to\n\n<sup>4</sup> Even if the Court determines that the relationship was not confidential and/or there was no fiduciary relationship between Archiwoods and/or Hamilton Opportunity Fund and Petitioner, such would not be determinative, as the absence of a fiduciary relationship does not preclude the Court from finding a constructive trust exists. See Koreag, 961 F.2d at 353 (stating that \"[w]e do not believe, however, that the lack of a fiduciary relationship between [the parties] automatically defeats [a] claim of constructive trust. Although a fiduciary relationship is one of the factors cited by New York courts, the absence of any one factor will not itself defeat the imposition of a constructive trust when otherwise required by equity\").\n\nPetitioner that Petitioner's Property would be invested in the Digital Bank pursuant to the Investment Strategy. Exhibit A, at 4. In reliance on this promise, the Petitioner wired Petitioner's Property to Archiwoods, who then, upon information and belief, wired it to Account 2770. The Government's improper seizure of Account 2770 forced a breach of Archiwoods' promise to invest Petitioner's Property into the Digital Bank pursuant to the Investment Strategy. Because of Government's seizure, Petitioner is not even able to exercise his Right of Redemption to reobtain Petitioner's Property at the appropriate time. This would result in unjust enrichment to the benefit of the Government since the Government is now retaining Petitioner's Property without any legal cause to do so. See, e.g., U.S. v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding that imposition of a constructive trust was proper where, amongst other reasons, Government's forfeiture caused a breach of an implied promise); Torres v. \\$36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a constructive trust appropriate where \"The government's forfeiture forced a breach of that promise that may result in a potentially unjust enrichment of the government (and commensurate unjust impoverishment of [the plaintiff]).\")\n\n50. Petitioner's Property. Such a constructive trust \"qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" Willis, 652 F.3d at 242.\n\n51. J The property upon which the constructive trust is sought - Petitioner's Property is easily traceable. See Exhibit D.\n\n52. if the Government contends that others are owed restitution from any forfeited property. \"When a party can directly trace its assets, without resorting to fictions or presumptions, a constructive trust\n\nis available even in cases involving multiple fraud victims.\" U.S. v. Ovid, 2012 WL 2087084, \\*7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012). \"[C]ourts are not free to disregard the law of constructive trusts when a claimant can directly trace its property, even if this leaves one innocent victim better off than another equally innocent victim.\" Id. The \"orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases\" is to \"return[] identifiable assets to their owners, turning to pro rata distribution only when specific identification or transactional tracing is impossible.\" Id. at \\*8 (citing Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, § 59 Reporter's Note G, at 437).\n\n# C. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner's Property\n\n53. Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property is absolutely superior to any interest that the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner's Property.\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner's interest in the forfeited property, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's interest \"renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section.\" 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n\n55. Here, as set forth above, Defendant Wang never had any interest in Petitioner's Property or Account 2770; indeed, the record is entirely silent as to what the relationship is between Defendant Wang, the Fraud Scheme, and Account 2770.\n\n56. have a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Likewise, Defendant Wang cannot forfeit her interest in a property in which she had no interest.\n\n### D. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys' Fees\n\n57. J The Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to\n\nfile this petition asserting Petitioner's right to Petitioner's Property and to challenge the forfeiture of Petitioner's Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner's costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (\"EAJA\"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the purposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney's fees under the EAJA. See United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Bailey, 2015 WL 1893610 at \\*20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\n\n#### IV. CONCLUSION\n\n58. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner's Property, which renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. See e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Defendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property, and never did. Petitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that the Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner's Property.\n\n59. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\nDated: April 3, 2025\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman Jeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq. Jeremy W. Schulman, Esq. SCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC 6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425 North Bethesda, MD 20852 (240) 356-8550 jgavenman(aschulmanbh.com jschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler Paul W. Butler, Esq. BUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES 1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531 Washington, D.C. 20036 paul @butlerlegalstrategies.com Counsel for Petitioner\n\n# ATTESTATION AND OATH\n\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I, ¡\n\n***\\_***\\_\\_, attest\n\nttest and declare under\n\npenalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided in support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.\n\nExecuted on this 4th\n\n![](_page_20_Picture_7.jpeg)","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n- 诉 -\n\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\n关于裁决请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收裁定的第三方请愿书——经核实的权利主张\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n请愿人\n\n（“请愿人”）依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c) 条提起本《关于裁决请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收裁定的第三方请愿书》（下称“本请愿书”）。请愿人请求归还请愿人拥有合法权利、所有权和/或权益的资金（“请愿人财产”）（定义详见下文），该资金已被 United States Government（美国政府，下称“政府”）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（下称“被告王”）达成的没收裁定的一部分而不当扣押。具体而言，当政府扣押以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）的账号为 5090042770 的银行账户（下称“2770 账户”）内的全部资金时，请愿人财产被政府不当扣押。然而，任何涉及 2770 账户内资金（包括请愿人财产）的没收裁定均属非法和不当，因为被告王对 2770 账户或请愿人财产均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。因此，没收裁定（定义详见下文）就请愿人财产而言归于无效，因为在导致作出没收裁定（定义见下文）的行为发生之时，请愿人财产的权利、所有权或权益归属于请愿人而非被告王，且优于被告王的任何权利、所有权或权益。据此，本法院应修改没收裁定，将请愿人财产从没收裁定中剔除，并责令政府立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人。为支持请愿人的权利主张，请愿人陈述如下：\n\nI. 初步声明\n\n2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）显然纯属政府在起诉被告王和 Miles Guo（郭文贵，下称“被告郭”）之前扣押资产过程中的“附带损害”。自 2770 账户被扣押以来已过去两年半有余，在此期间，从未有任何解释说明 2770 账户（包括请愿人财产）与被告王认罪答辩的任何罪行有何关联，而这是依法作出有效没收裁定的必要前提。从未有任何证据表明被告王认罪答辩的任何非法活动的收益曾存入 2770 账户；没有证据表明此类活动的任何收益曾与请愿人财产发生混同；而且，事实上也没有证据表明被告王曾与 2770 账户有任何关系，甚至不知道其存在。\n\n如下文所述，请愿人是就请愿人财产设立的推定信托的受益人，本案中政府不得扣押请愿人财产。无论是被告王，还是如今代位承继其地位的政府，均未曾证明其对 2770 账户中的请愿人财产或对 2770 账户整体享有任何权益。尽管被告王在没收裁定（ECF No. 488，第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在 2770 账户（从而包括请愿人财产）中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，但她的同意对 2770 账户或请愿人财产不具有法律效力。被告王在 2770 账户中从未拥有过此类“权利、所有权和权益”——没有证据表明她是 2770 账户的签字人、曾向 2770 账户存入资金或对 2770 账户拥有任何控制权，也没有证据表明被告王曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770 账户存入任何资金。被告王不能没收其并不拥有且不享有任何权益的财产。事实上，本法院似乎从一开始就未曾依法确立请愿人财产属于可被没收的财产，而这是 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) 所要求的。\n\n基于所有前述理由以及下文阐明的理由，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 支持本请愿书；(2) 修改没收裁定以排除请愿人财产；(3) 责令立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追索与本请愿书相关的律师费及开支，并准许请愿人提交关于该等律师费及开支的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的其他救济。\n\nII. 背景事实\n\nA. 请愿人财产\n\n1. Archiwoods Investment Value Fund（Archiwoods投资价值基金，下称“Archiwoods”）编制了一份日期为 2022年2月14日 的《投资期权备忘录》（下称“《期权备忘录》”），概述了对 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金，一家 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）独立投资组合公司）的投资机会。Archiwoods 将该《期权备忘录》提供给了包括请愿人在内的潜在投资者。《期权备忘录》的真实准确副本作为附件 A 附于本请愿书后。\n\n2. 投资于 Hamilton M&A Fund SP（汉密尔顿并购基金独立投资组合，下称“并购基金”）是“由投资管理人选定的，旨在创造高价值和实现长期资本收益”。附件 A，《期权备忘录》第 4 页。投资管理人（在《期权备忘录》中定义为“Archiwoods Investment Management Pty Ltd（Archiwoods投资管理有限公司）”）已确定了一项投资于某银行的机会（下称“投资策略”），附件 A，第 4、8 页，并招揽了包括请愿人在内的投资以利用该机会。\n\n3. 《期权备忘录》向请愿人提供了认购属于并购基金（汉密尔顿机会基金的一个独立投资组合）的 B 类股份的机会。汉密尔顿机会基金向并购基金潜在投资者提供的标准《招股备忘录》（日期为 2022年1月20日）的真实准确副本作为附件 B 附于本请愿书后。\n\n4. 被告王不是并购基金、汉密尔顿机会基金或 Archiwoods 的董事或成员，且在其他方面对上述各方均不享有任何公司权益或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n5. 同样，证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n6. 并同意投资 $100,000.00。请愿人同意投资该金额的明示条件是该笔投资的全部金额将用于购买并购基金的股份。在 2022年5月31日 或该日前后，请愿人收到了其在 Archiwoods 投资的确认函。请愿人向 Archiwoods 提交的申请表的真实准确副本作为附件 C 附于本请愿书后。\n\n7. 2022年2月25日，根据《期权备忘录》的条款，请愿人向属于 Archiwoods 的银行账户电汇了 $102,050.00（“请愿人财产”）。请愿人电汇信息的真实准确副本作为附件 D 附于本请愿书后。\n\n8. 根据《期权备忘录》的条款，Archiwoods 代表并购基金与汉密尔顿机会基金签订了协议。据知悉并确信，Archiwoods 向汉密尔顿机会基金投资了一笔款项（包括请愿人财产的全部），用于认购 Hamilton M&A Fund SP（汉密尔顿机会基金的一个独立投资组合）的 B 类股份。\n\n9. 据知悉并确信，Archiwoods 将其全部投资金额（包括请愿人财产）电汇至 2770 账户，该账户是汉密尔顿机会基金存放用于认购 B 类股份资金的唯一账户。\n\n10. 其对汉密尔顿机会基金（包括并购基金）的投资赋予投资者按其选择赎回股份的权利。附件 B，第 17 页；另见同前，第 53 页（说明在符合特定限制的前提下，“股东可在任何赎回日自行选择赎回 B 类股份”）。反过来，请愿人有权在投资期限届满时赎回其在 Archiwoods 的投资（“赎回权”）。附件 A，第 4-5 页。\n\n11. 汉密尔顿机会基金各个独立投资组合的资产均“与本基金任何其他独立投资组合的资产以及本基金的任何一般资产保持隔离、分开且可单独识别”。参见附件 B，第 12 页；另见附件 A，第 4 页。此外，根据开曼群岛法律，汉密尔顿机会基金有责任“将每个独立投资组合的投资组合资产与任何其他独立投资组合的投资组合资产进行隔离，并保持隔离、分开且可单独识别”。附件 B，第 22-23 页（引自《开曼群岛公司法（修订版）》第 XIV 部分第 219(6)(b) 条）。\n\nB. 扣押 2770 账户\n\n12. 2022年9月18日，政府扣押了 2770 账户内的全部余额资金，其中包含请愿人财产。\n\n13. 迄今为止，没有任何公开可得的文件说明政府扣押 2770 账户内资金具有何种合理根据。\n\nC. 针对被告王和被告郭的刑事案件及没收裁定\n\n14. 2023年3月6日，政府对被告王、被告郭以及第三名从未被提审的被告 William Je（余建明）提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n15. 2024年5月3日，政府对被告王提交了一份替代起诉书（下称“《替代起诉书》”）。ECF No. 325。《替代起诉书》指控被告王犯有一项共谋电汇诈骗罪（罪名项一）（《替代起诉书》第 1-2 页）和一项共谋洗钱罪（罪名项二）（《替代起诉书》第 2-4 页）。《替代起诉书》还包含一项没收指控（下称“《没收指控》”）。《替代起诉书》第 4 页。\n\n16. 同日，即 2024年5月3日，被告王对《替代起诉书》中所指控的罪名项一和罪名项二作出了认罪答辩。\n\n17. 同样在 2024年5月3日，本法院签署了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的合意初步没收裁定》（下称“《原没收裁定》”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n18. 在《原没收裁定》中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，包括 2770 账户，理由是该等财产“构成被告个人取得的罪名项一所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及［《替代起诉书》］罪名项二所指控罪行的财产”。《原没收裁定》第 2-6 页（后加强调）。\n\n19. 被告郭对其被指控的任何罪名均未作认罪答辩。因此，法院于 2024年5月22日 至 2024年7月16日 期间举行了陪审团审判（下称“郭案审判”）。2024年7月16日，陪审团裁定被告郭犯有共谋敲诈勒索罪、共谋电汇诈骗罪、共谋洗钱罪、共谋证券诈骗罪、证券诈骗罪、电汇诈骗罪及洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本请愿书提交之日，被告郭尚未被判刑。\n\n20. 2025年1月6日，被告王被判刑。\n\n21. 2025年1月7日，本法院作出了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的合意初步没收裁定》（Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment，下称“《没收裁定》”），ECF No. 488。就涉及Petitioner（申诉人）的部分而言，该《没收裁定》在所有实质方面与《原没收裁定》基本相同。在《没收裁定》中，Defendant Wang（被告王雁平）同意没收其在某些资产中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，其中包括Account 2770（2770账户），因为该等财产“构成被告个人获得的在第一项罪名中被指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及在《Superseding Information（替代检控书）》第二项罪名中被指控罪行的财产”。《没收裁定》第2-11页（后加强调）。\n\n22. 在《原没收裁定》和《没收裁定》中，对2770账户中资产的描述均如下：\n\n原存放在Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号为5090042770、以“Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机遇基金独立投资组合公司）”名义持有，并由政府于2022年9月18日左右扣押的89,992,861.75美元货币（23-FBI-000074）。\n\n《原没收裁定》第3页；《没收裁定》第3页。\n\nIII. 论证\n\n23. 在依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c)(1) 条提起的刑事附随没收程序中，本法院必须依据优势证据标准裁定：申诉人是否对拟没收的财产享有合法权利、所有权或权益，以及该等权利、所有权或权益是否导致没收裁定全部或部分无效，理由是该权益在导致财产被没收的行为发生时归属于申诉人而非被告，或优于被告所享有的任何权利、所有权或权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n24. 在本案中，依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)，申诉人凭借对申诉人财产设立的推定信托，对申诉人财产享有合法权利、所有权或权益。此外，申诉人在申诉人财产中的权益既已归属于申诉人，亦优于被告王雁平在申诉人财产中享有的任何权利，因为被告王雁平对申诉人财产或2770账户均无任何合法权利、所有权或权益。换言之，被告王雁平无法没收其在2770账户中的权益，因为她不拥有任何依法应受刑事没收管辖的权益。因此，应对《没收裁定》予以修改以剔除申诉人财产，并将申诉人财产返还给申诉人。\n\nA. 政府未能在一开始证明2770账户中的资金（包括申诉人财产）属于依法应当予以没收的财产，从而导致针对该等资金的《没收裁定》不当\n\n25. 政府没有扣留申诉人财产的合法理由，因为没有任何证据表明政府曾按照 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 的要求，证明申诉人财产以及整个2770账户中的财产属于实际可予没收的财产。\n\n26. “当政府寻求获得没收裁定时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1) 条……要求量刑法院根据适用的成文法确定哪些财产应当予以没收。’”U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir.（第二巡回法院）2015)（援引 U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2007)）。根据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院必须确定政府是否确立了财产与罪行之间所必需的关联性。”Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（后加强调）；Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的不同阶段，政府承担以不同确信程度证明该法律结论的举证责任：在起诉后的听证会上达到合理根据的标准……或在法官审判或陪审团审判中达到优势证据的标准。”同上（后加强调）（内部引文省略）。“然而，只有在政府达到相关法定门槛的情况下，涉案财产才能在任何法律意义上被视为‘应予没收’。在此之前，虽然政府仅通过起诉书宣布了其寻求没收的意图，但该财产仅被视为‘潜在可予没收’……或‘可能应当没收’。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n27. 这意味着，在法院进入到审查申诉人是否有权依据 § 853(n) 获得财产返还的问题之前，必须首先确定争议财产在一开始是否实际上属于可予没收的财产。如果不是，政府便没有成文法授权扣押该财产。如果财产系被不当扣押，则无论申诉人是否符合 § 853(n) 规定的标准，政府都必须返还被扣押的账户资金。参见例如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA（宾夕法尼亚东区联邦地区法院）, 1991)。\n\n28. 进行全面而完整的 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 审查对于司法公正至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已进行了审查并认定该财产属于应当没收之财产的假定之上。国会在制定附随程序成文法时，选择将附随程序中的举证责任交由第三方承担，是因为“美国在刑事案件中已排除合理怀疑地证明了其没收指控”。S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n29. 在本案中，法院从未就2770账户与被告王雁平被指控（且已认罪）的任何罪行之间是否存在关联作出过认定，因此申诉人被迫提起本申诉。基于被告王雁平和Defendant Guo（被告郭文贵）刑事案件中所有公开可得文件所包含的信息，政府在2770账户问题上无法胜诉。\n\n30. 在本案中，政府在《替代检控书》中对第一项罪名和第二项罪名均提出了没收指控，并寻求没收特定财产。《替代检控书》第4页。记录中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明、更不用说达到其举证责任证明2770账户与被告王雁平认罪的罪行之间存在关联。\n\n31. 因实施本《替代检控书》第一项罪名所指控的电信欺诈罪，“被告YVETTE WANG（王雁平，又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）应依据《美国法典》第18篇第981(a)(1)(C)条……及《美国法典》第28篇第2461(c)条向合众国没收构成或源自可追溯至实施上述罪行所得收益的任何及全部动产与不动产”。《替代检控书》第4页。政府必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 项下的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收理论主张该财产曾用于实施或协助实施刑事犯罪，或曾卷入刑事犯罪的实施，则政府应证明该财产与犯罪之间存在实质性联系”。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n32. 记录中没有任何指控涉及2770账户中的资金如何构成、或源自可追溯至被告王雁平共谋实施电信欺诈所得的收益。《替代检控书》指控称，“至少在2018年左右至至少2023年3月15日左右，共谋人向投资者虚假陈述称，投资者投资GTV、Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）组织和GClubs将获得股票，投资Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）将获得加密货币[（下称‘欺诈计划’）]。通过该[欺诈计划]，被告YVETTE WANG（又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）及其包括Miles Guo（郭文贵）在内的共谋人诱使投资者向郭文贵控制的实体投资超过10亿美元”。《替代检控书》第2页。《替代检控书》中没有任何关于被告王雁平将欺诈计划的任何收益存入2770账户的指控。同样，《替代检控书》中也没有任何关于由于该欺诈计划而有任何投资者将资金存入2770账户的指控。也不可能存在任何此类指控，因为从Archiwoods存入2770账户的唯一款项均来自根据Investment Strategy（投资策略）向Digital Bank（数字银行）投资的投资者——该投资与《替代检控书》中所述的“欺诈计划”没有任何关联。申诉人明确确认，申诉人从未是被告王雁平在《替代检控书》中所被指控的任何行为的受害者，且申诉人不认为申诉人的任何财产曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n33. 最后，在被告郭文贵的庭审过程中，没有出现任何涉及2770账户的相关证词。没有任何证词涉及欺诈计划的任何收益是否曾存入过2770账户，事实上也没有任何关于被告王雁平是否曾将任何资金存入2770账户的证词。简而言之，记录中没有任何内容表明2770账户与被告王雁平的电信欺诈指控之间存在关联，更没有充分证据认定政府已履行其举证责任证明、且法院已适当裁定存在没收2770账户所必需的适当关联。\n\n34. 关于第二项罪名，没收指控载明：“因实施本《替代检控书》第二项罪名所指控的洗钱罪，被告YVETTE WANG（又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）应依据《美国法典》第18篇第982(a)(1)条向合众国没收涉及上述罪行的任何及全部动产与不动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产，包括但不限于代表涉及上述罪行财产金额的美元款项。”《替代检控书》第4页。就第二项罪名而言，政府“必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 项下的没收要件”。U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir.（第八巡回法院）2015)。\n\n35. 《替代检控书》指控被告王雁平犯有共谋洗钱罪，因为被告王雁平“明知涉及某些金融交易的财产代表某种形式非法活动的收益，仍实施并企图实施此类金融交易……且该等交易实际上涉及特定非法活动的收益，即本《替代检控书》第一项罪名所指控的电信欺诈计划的收益”。《替代检控书》第3页。\n\n36. 尚不清楚2770账户如何能够因第二项罪名中的洗钱指控而被没收。从指控来看，洗钱罪名源于被告王雁平使用“第一项罪名所指控的电信欺诈计划的收益”进行金融交易。《替代检控书》第3页。如上文所述，没有任何证据表明2770账户中的资金与第一项罪名所指控的欺诈计划存在任何关联（参见上文第31-33段）——没有任何证据表明该等资金“构成或源自可追溯至实施电信欺诈所得的收益”。参见例如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。鉴于2770账户中的资金曾\n\n2 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定：“法院在对被判犯有违反本编第 1956 条［洗钱法规］罪行的人进行判决时……应命令该人向 United States（美国）没收涉及该罪行的任何不动产或动产，或可追溯至该财产的任何财产。”18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调为后加）。\n\n并非 Fraud Scheme（欺诈计划）收益，也不是源自欺诈计划收益，因此该等资金不能作为 Count II（罪名项二）洗钱指控的依据，也不能作为被告 Wang（王）在罪名项二定罪的一部分被予以没收。\n\n37. 政府为支持洗钱指控所主张的公开行为，进一步未能表明 2770 账户中的资金何以具有可没收性。在 Superseding Information（替代起诉书）中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项行为。替代起诉书第 3 页。尽管政府声称这两项公开行为是被告王为推进所指控的洗钱共谋而实施的“包括但不限于”的行为（替代起诉书第 3 页），但这些其他行为从未被明确指出。\n\n38. 首先，根据替代起诉书，2020年5月20日，被告王以 GTV 的名义开立了一个银行账户，值得注意的是，该账户并非 2770 账户。替代起诉书第 3 页。2020年6月2日，被告王向该账户转账约 $200 million。同上。转入 GTV 账户的资金来自 Saraca Media Group, Inc.（“Saraca”）持有的 JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）账户（Guo Trial［郭案庭审］，05/31/2024，953:25-954:4；郭案庭审，06/26/2024，4359:1-14），而非来自 2770 账户。从未有任何证词表明来自 2770 账户的任何款项曾进入 Saraca 的摩根大通银行账户，随后再转入替代起诉书中所引述的 GTV 账户。此外，2770 账户在 2020 年甚至根本不存在。\n\n39. 政府指控的第二项行为是，“在 2020年6月5日或前后”，被告王“授权从 GTV 的母公司 Saraca 向一家高风险对冲基金电汇 $100 million，以使 Saraca 及其最终实益所有人、被告 Guo（郭）的儿子受益”。替代起诉书第 3-4 页。首先，这明确指控资金是从 Saraca 账户转出的，显而易见该账户并非 2770 账户。此外，同样，也\n\n从未有任何证词表明来自 2770 账户的任何款项曾进入 Saraca 账户。而且，再次强调，2770 账户在 2020 年甚至根本不存在。\n\n40. 从上述论述可以看出，完全不存在关于 2770 账户的任何指控或证词。记录中对 2770 账户的唯一提及是被告王同意没收该账户。然而，“被告对没收的同意［并未］废除寻求没收的财产与被定罪罪行之间必须存在关联的要求。”Beltramea 案，785 F.3d at 291。正如 Eighth Circuit（第八巡回上诉法院）所强调的，“地方法院负有确保所需关联存在的独立职责。”同上（强调为后加）。\n\n41. 在本案中，在替代起诉书、Original Forfeiture Order（原没收命令）或 Forfeiture Order（没收命令）中，均不存在关于 2770 账户与被告王认罪答辩的罪行之间存在哪怕是所谓的关联的任何事实指控。\n\n42. 政府在未证明存在关联的情况下继续扣留 2770 账户中的资金，是不当且不公平的。若政府扣留 2770 账户中的资金，将构成不当得利，因为这些资金属于第三方，包括 Petitioner（请愿人），他们（1）不是被告王或被告郭；且（2）未卷入欺诈计划，更不是该计划的受害者。参见例如 U.S. v. Bajakajian 案，524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)（解释刑事“没收不具有补救目的，旨在惩罚违法者，且不能强加于无辜所有权人。”）（强调为后加）。\n\nB. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，因为该等财产上存在推定信托\n\n43. 2770 账户中的资金属于替代起诉书中所指控的任何活动的一部分，请愿人财产应归还给请愿人，因为请愿人对该财产享有的权益大于被告王，或现今政府所享有的权益。\n\n44. 根据推定信托原则，无论存在任何其他所有权主张，包括被告王或处于其地位的政府的主张，请愿人财产均受到保护并仍为请愿人的财产。Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）3 曾裁定，“就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，推定信托符合‘对财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益。”Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States 案，652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n45. “推定信托是一种衡平法救济，必然具有实现其目的的灵活性。”Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co. 案，194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999)（强调为后加）。“其目的在于防止不当得利，尽管不当得利并不必然涉及实施不法行为。……所必需的是法院认定一方在依据衡平法和良知不应保留财产的情况下持有该财产。”同上（内部引用省略）。\n\n46. “一方是否构成不当得利，是通过\n\n3 “联邦普通法冲突法规则是适用与诉讼具有最大利益的管辖区的法律。”In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. 案，961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992)，部分维持原判，案件名称改为 Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A. 案，No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992)。在本案中，有四个可能适用其法律的竞合管辖区：Australia（澳大利亚）、New York（纽约州）、California（加利福尼亚州）和 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）。请愿人对请愿人财产的支付是依据 Option Memorandum（期权备忘录）进行的。期权备忘录明确表明 Archiwoods 随后将代表请愿人与 Hamilton Opportunity Fund（汉密尔顿机会基金）达成某项协议。据信，Archiwoods 与汉密尔顿机会基金之间的任何协议均受开曼群岛法律管辖。在请愿人存入请愿人财产时，2770 账户是加利福尼亚州一家银行的账户。自 2770 账户被扣押（依据 New York state［纽约州］一家法院签发的搜查与扣押令）以来，该等资金现由位于纽约州的政府占有，且该加利福尼亚州银行已不复存在。纽约州是本案的法院地州。基于这些事实，纽约州在本诉讼中享有最大利益，其法律应适用于推定信托的设定。然而，在政府对该法律选择认定提出异议的范围内，请愿人保留要求本法院根据加利福尼亚州、澳大利亚和/或开曼群岛法律在请愿人财产上设定推定信托的一切权利。\n\n适用衡平法原则得出的法律结论。……衡平法院在判令设定推定信托时不受固定公式的约束。交易的公平性必须决定救济的尺度。……当一个人保留了一项利益，而根据转让的情形并考虑到各方之间的关系，保留该利益是不公平的时，即构成不当得利。”同上（内部引用省略）。\n\n47. New York Court of Appeals（纽约州上诉法院）概述了确定在特定情形下是否应设定推定信托所要考虑的若干因素，包括“(1) 保密或信义关系，(2) 承诺，(3) 基于对该承诺的信赖而进行的转让，以及 (4) 不当得利。”Sharp v. Kosmalski 案，40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976)。然而，纽约州各法院长期以来一直认为“这些因素仅仅是有益的指引，并非绝对标准。”Counihan 案，194 F.3d at 362（引述了阐述该主张的大量纽约州判例）。\n\n48. 在本案中，自 Archiwoods 将请愿人财产存入 2770 账户之日起，该财产上即存在以为请愿人谋利益的推定信托。\n\n49. 请愿人通过作为请愿人代理人和/或中间人的 Archiwoods，在请愿人投资于 Archiwoods 时，与 Archiwoods 和/或汉密尔顿机会基金建立了保密和/或信义关系4；Archiwoods 随后代表请愿人签署了一项协议，以便使用请愿人财产获取 Hamilton M&A Fund SP（汉密尔顿并购基金 SP）的特定 B 类股份。根据期权备忘录，Archiwoods 向\n\n4 即使法院认定不存在保密关系和/或 Archiwoods 和/或汉密尔顿机会基金与请愿人之间不存在信义关系，这也不是决定性的，因为信义关系的缺失并不妨碍法院认定存在推定信托。参见 Koreag 案，961 F.2d at 353（指出“然而，我们不认为［各方］之间缺乏信义关系会自动否定推定信托的主张。虽然信义关系是纽约州各法院引用的因素之一，但在衡平法另有要求时，任何单一因素的缺失本身并不会阻碍推定信托的设定”）。\n\n请愿人承诺，请愿人财产将根据 Investment Strategy（投资策略）投资于 Digital Bank（数字银行）。证物 A 第 4 页。基于对该承诺的信赖，请愿人将请愿人财产电汇给 Archiwoods，据信 Archiwoods 随后将其电汇至 2770 账户。政府对 2770 账户的不当扣押，迫使 Archiwoods 违背了根据投资策略将请愿人财产投资于数字银行的承诺。由于政府的扣押，请愿人甚至无法在适当的时候行使其 Right of Redemption（赎回权）以重新获得请愿人财产。这将导致有利于政府的不当得利，因为政府目前在没有任何法律依据的情况下扣留请愿人财产。参见例如 U.S. v. Coluccio 案，51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995)（认定在政府的没收导致默示承诺被违背等原因下，设定推定信托是适当的）；Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency 案，25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994)（认定在“政府的没收迫使违背了该承诺，这可能导致政府潜在的不当得利（以及［原告］相应的不当受损）”的情形下，推定信托是适当的）。\n\n50. 请愿人财产。此种推定信托“就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，符合‘对财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益。”Willis 案，652 F.3d at 242。\n\n51. 寻求设立推定信托的财产——请愿人财产——极易追溯。参见证物 D。\n\n52. 即使政府主张其他主体应从任何被没收财产中获得赔偿。“当一方无需诉诸拟制或推定即可直接追溯其资产时，推定信托\n\n即使在涉及多名欺诈受害者的案件中亦可适用。”U.S. v. Ovid，2012 WL 2087084，*7（E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区），2012年6月8日）。“当主张权利人能够直接追踪其财产时，法院不能随意忽视推定信托法，即使这会使一名无辜受害者比另一名同样无辜的受害者处于更有利的地位。”同上。针对多重欺诈案件的“正统处理方法”是“将可识别的资产返还给其所有权人，仅在无法进行特定识别或交易追踪时才采用按比例分配。”同上，第 *8 页（引用《重述（第三版）返还与不当得利法》（Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment）第 59 节报告人说明 G，第 437 页）。\n\nC. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有优先权益\n\n53. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益，绝对优于政府或被告 Wang（王）可能对请愿人财产享有的任何权益。\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 明确规定，除请愿人对被没收财产享有权益外，请愿人还必须以优势证据证明，请愿人的权益“使得没收裁定全部或部分无效，因为在该条下导致财产被没收的行为发生时，该权利、所有权或权益属于请愿人而非被告，或优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益”。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（强调为原文所加）。\n\n55. 在本案中，如上文所述，被告王从未对请愿人财产或 2770 账户享有任何权益；事实上，记录对于被告王、欺诈计划与 2770 账户之间存在何种关系完全未予提及。\n\n56. [政府或被告不可能]对其从未享有过权益的财产拥有优先权益。同样地，被告王也不能没收其毫无权益的财产中的权益。\n\nD. 请愿人有权获得诉讼费用和律师费\n\n57. 请愿人被迫聘请法律顾问，并为提交本请愿书以主张请愿人对请愿人财产的权利及质疑对请愿人财产的没收而产生了费用。在本程序中胜诉后，请愿人保留追索与本请愿书相关的一切律师费和费用的全部权利，并可根据《平等获取司法法》（Equal Access to Justice Act，简称“EAJA”），28 U.S.C. § 2412 追索请愿人的诉讼费用和合理律师费。联邦法院一贯认定，出于允许胜诉的主张权利人根据 EAJA 收取律师费的目的，§ 853(n) 程序属于民事程序。参见 United States v. Cox，575 F.3d 352, 355（4th Cir.（第四巡回法院），2009年）；United States v. Douglas，55 F.3d 584, 588（11th Cir.（第十一巡回法院），1995年）；U.S. v. Bailey，2015 WL 1893610 at *20（W.D.N.C.（北卡罗来纳西区），2015年4月27日）。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n58. 基于上述理由，请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，这使得没收裁定就该等财产而言归于无效。参见例如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告王对请愿人财产不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。请愿人已证明，并能在任何必要的听证会上以优势证据证明，没收裁定需要予以修改以排除请愿人财产。\n\n59. 因此，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 准许本请愿书；(2) 修改没收裁定以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人；(4) 命令请愿人有权追索与本请愿书相关的请愿人律师费和费用，并准予请愿人提交该等律师费和费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予其他必要且公正的救济。\n\n日期：2025年4月3日\n\n谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\nJeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq.\nJeremy W. Schulman, Esq.\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\nPaul W. Butler, Esq.\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n请愿人代理律师\n\n证明与宣誓\n\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人______谨在此证明并在甘受伪证罪处罚的前提下声明，本人对该财产的主张绝非无理取闹，且就本人所知所信，为支持该主张所提供的信息均属真实、准确。\n\n签署于本年4月4日\n\n[图片签名处]","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Torres","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":6138,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-05 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-05","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:59:23"}