{"id":"court_sdny_627_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":627,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方请愿书 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #627（2025年4月2日提交）。第三方就被控人 Yvette Wang 没收令中 Silvergate Bank 账户资金提出异议，主张请愿人对这些资金享有受信权益，Wang 对该账户及其中资金不享有任何法律权利或利益，要求法院修改没收令并返还资金。","summary_en":"Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Interest in Forfeited Property — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #627 (filed April 2, 2025). A third party challenges forfeiture of funds in a Silvergate Bank account under a forfeiture order against defendant Yvette Wang, asserting the petitioner holds a constructive trust interest in the funds and that Wang has no legal right, title, or interest in the account or its contents; petitioner seeks court amendment of the forfeiture order and return of the property.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n### UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y.\"\n\nDefendant.\n\nTHIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FOREITURE - VERIFIED CLAIM OF\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n(\"Petitioner\") files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the \"Petition\"). Petitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest (\"Petitioner's Property\") (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government (the \"Government\") improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with Defendant Yvette Wang (\"Defendant Wang\"). Specifically, Petitioner's Property was improperly seized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in bank account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Account 2770\"). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or interest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. The Forfeiture Order (as more fully defined below) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner's Property because right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property was vested in the Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was superior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the Forfeiture Order (as defined below). As such, this Court should amend the Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner's Property from the Forfeiture Order that the Government immediately return Petitioner's Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner's claim, Petitioner states as follows:\n\n#### L. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\nIt appears that the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, were purely \"collateral damage\" in the Government's seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant Wang and Miles Guo (\"Defendant Guo\"). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure of Account 2770, and in that time span, there has never been any explanation as to how Account 2770 (including Petitioner's Property) is related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any showing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were ever deposited in Account 2770; no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever commingled with Petitioner's Property; and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had anything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\n\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is a beneficiary of a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property and Petitioner's Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither Defendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, have ever demonstrated that they have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner's Property in Account 2770 or in Account 2770 in general. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of \"all her right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 (and thus, Petitioner's Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), her consent has no legal bearing as to Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. Defendant Wang never had such \"right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 - there is no evidence that she was a signatory\n\non Account 2770, ever deposited money into Account 2770, or otherwise had any control over Account 2770, and there is no evidence that Defendant Wang ever directed anyone, directly or indirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that she does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never established that Petitioner's Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\n#### BACKGROUND FACTS II.\n\n## A. Petitioner's Property\n\n1. Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Hamilton Opportunity Fund\"), a Cayman Islands Segregated Portfolio Company, provided Petitioner with an Offering Memorandum (the \"Offering Memorandum\") dated January 20, 2022. A true and correct copy of the Offering Memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit A.\n\n2. Hamilton Opportunity Fund is a \"fund specializing in equity investments selected by the Investment Manager [as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum] with a view to long-term capital gains.\" Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 33. The Investment Manager (as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum) had identified an opportunity to invest in a bank (the \"Digital Bank\") (as more fully described in Offering Memorandum at 33). In connection with this investment, Hamilton Opportunity Fund sought to raise capital by issuing various classes of shares. Id. at 34.\n\n3. The Offering Memorandum offered Petitioner an opportunity to acquire Class B Shares attributed to a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund - Hamilton M&A Fund SP (the \"M&A Fund\").\n\n4. Defendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any corporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund or Hamilton Opportunity Fund. The evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n5. Defendant Wang did not make any investments in the M&A Fund; again, the evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n6. On January 23, 2022, Petitioner submitted an application (the \"Subscription Agreement\") to Hamilton Opportunity Fund for a subscription for \\$500,000 worth of Class B Shares in the M&A Fund. A true and correct copy of the Subscription Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit B.\n\n7. approved and accepted the Subscription Agreement. See Exhibit B, Subscription Agreement at 15.\n\n8. On January 25, 2022, pursuant to the terms of the Subscription Agreement, Petitioner wired \\$500,100 (the \"Petitioner's Property\") to Account Number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank. A true and correct copy of the wire confirmation is attached hereto as Exhibit C.\n\n9.\n\n10. Pursuant to the terms of the Offering Memorandum, Petitioner is entitled to redemption of Petitioner's shares at the Petitioner's option. Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 17; see also id. at 53 (stating that subject to certain limitations, \"Class B Shares may be redeemed\n\n4\n\nat the option of the Shareholder on any Redemption Day\").\n\n11. The assets of Hamilton Opportunity Fund are \"kept segregated, separate and separately identifiable from those of any other segregated portfolios of the Fund and any general assets of the Fund.\" Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 12. In addition, pursuant to the laws of the Cayman Islands, it is the duty of Hamilton Opportunity Fund to \"segregate, and keep segregated, portfolio assets of each segregated portfolio separate and separately identifiable from segregated portfolio assets of any other segregated portfolio.\" Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 22-23 (citing the Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands, Part XIV, 219(6)(b)).\n\n#### B. Seizure of Account 2770\n\n12. O On September 18, 2022, the Government seized the entire balance of the funds in Account 2770.\n\n13. To date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the Government had to seize the funds in Account 2770.\n\n## C. The Criminal Case Against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the Forfeiture Order\n\n14. On March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n\n15. On May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the \"Superseding Information\") against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information charged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I) (Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering (Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a Forfeiture Allegation (the \"Forfeiture Allegation\"). Superseding Information at 4.\n\n16. O On the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count\n\nII as charged in the Superseding Information.\n\n17. Also on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (\"Original Forfeiture Order\"). ECF No. 329.\n\n18. In the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all her right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n\n19. Defendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him. Accordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the \"Guo Trial\"). On July 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this Petition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n\n20. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n\n21. On January 7, 2025, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Forfeiture Order\") ECF No. 488. As it pertains to Petitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all material respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all her right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Forfeiture Order at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n22.\n\nthe Forfeiture Order as follows:\n\n\\$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September 18, 2022 (23-FBI-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\n\n#### ARGUMENT 1000.\n\n23. In an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited, and whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part, because such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n\n24. Here, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of a constructive trust over such property. Moreover, Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any right Defendant Wang had in Petitioner's Property because Defendant Wang had no legal right, title or, interest in either Petitioner's Property or Account 2770. In other words, Defendant Wang could not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject to criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner's Property, and Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner.\n\n# A. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770, Including Petitioner's Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First Instance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds\n\n25. The Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner's Property because there is no evidence that the Government has ever demonstrated that Petitioner's Property, and Account 2770 in general, is actually forfeitable property, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\n26. \" \"When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, 'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.\"\" U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.\" Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); Watts, 786 F.3d at 172. \"At various points in the proceedings, the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion to varying degrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . . or by a preponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.\" Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). \"Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the property in question be considered 'subject to forfeiture' in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the government has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property is seen merely as 'potentially forfeitable' . . . or 'potentially subject to forfeiture.\"\" Id. (internal citations omitted).\n\n27. This means that before the court reaches the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in dispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority to seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the\n\naccounts seized regardless of whether the petitioner can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). See e.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n\n28. A full and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair administration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has conducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary proceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an ancillary proceeding, since \"the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.\" S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392.\n\n29. In this matter, there has never been a determination of whether there exists a nexus between Account 2770 and any of the offenses Defendant Wang was charged with (and pled guilty to), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained in the publicly-available documents in both Defendant Wang's and Defendant Guo's criminal case, the Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n\n30. Here, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture Allegation as to both Counts I and Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding Information at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show, let alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n31. 9 As to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the wire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United\n\n9\n\nStates Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C) ! . . and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, \"if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n\n32. The record is devoid of any allegations pertaining to how funds in Account 2770 are, or are derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang's conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Superseding Information alleges that \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about March 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive stock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and GClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the Himalaya Exchange [(the \"Fraud Scheme\")]. Through the [Fraud Scheme], YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced investors to invest more than \\$1 billion into entities Guo controlled.\" Superseding Information at 2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing any proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into Account 2770. Similarly, there are no allegations in the Superseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into\n\n<sup>1 18</sup> U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that \"[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture] which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of\" various specified offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang in Count I.\n\nAccount 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits into Account 2770 were from investors who were investing in the Digital Bank - an investment that is not implicated in any way by the \"Fraud Scheme\" described in the Superseding Information. To be sure, Petitioner affirms that Petitioner was never a victim of any conduct by Defendant Wang alleged in the Superseding Information and does not believe that any of Petitioner's Property was ever used in any unlawful activity.\n\n33. Finally, there was no relevant testimony during Defendant Guo's trial concerning Account 2770. There was no testimony regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme were ever deposited into Account 2770, nor, for that matter, whether Defendant Wang ever deposited any money into Account 2770. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would indicate there is a nexus between Account 2770 and Defendant Wang's wire fraud charge, let alone sufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing, and the Court properly adjudicated, that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of Account 2770 to be proper.\n\n34. As to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the money laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Y anoing\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1)2, any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense, or any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United States currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. As to Count II, The Government \"must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18\n\n<sup>2 18</sup> U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that \"[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property.\" 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\nU.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.\" U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n35. J The Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy to launder money because Defendant Wang \"knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . . and which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One of this Information.\" Superseding Information at 3.\n\n36. It is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited for the money laundering charge in Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang engaging in financial transactions with the \"proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One.\" Superseding Information at 3. As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account 2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (see ¶¶ 31-33, above) - there is no evidence that such funds \"constitute[d] or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of\" wire fraud. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were not Fraud Scheme proceeds nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could not serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part of Defendant Wang's conviction for Count II.\n\n37. The overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge further fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be forfeitable. In the Superseding Information, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding Information at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were \"among others\" that Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money\n\n12\n\n(Superseding Information at 3), these other acts were never identified.\n\n38. First, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened a bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was not. Superseding Information at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately \\$200 million to that account. Id. The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank account held by Saraca Media Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\") (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo Trial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), not from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be transferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information. Moreover, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n39. The second act the Government alleges is that \"on or about June 5, 2020,\" Defendant Wang \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from GTV's parent company, Saraca, to a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Defendant Guo's son.\" Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was transferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account. Moreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n40. As seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding Account 2770 whatsoever. The only reference in the record to Account 2770 is Defendant Wang's consent to forfeit it. However, \"a defendant's consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the requirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of offense.\" Beltramea, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, \"[t]he district court had an independent duty to ensure that the required nexus exists.\" Id. (emphasis added).\n\n41. Here, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the Original Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account 2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n42. J The Government's continued retention of the funds in Account 2770, without showing that there is a nexus, is wrong and inequitable. Should the Government retain the funds in Account 2770, it will be unjustly enriched, since the funds belong to third parties, including Petitioner, who are (1) not Defendant Wang or Defendant Guo; and (2) not involved the Fraud Scheme, let alone victims of such a scheme. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (explaining that a criminal \"forfeiture serves no remedial purpose, is designed to punish the offender, and cannot be imposed upon innocent owners.\") (emphasis added).\n\n## B. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner's Property Because There Exists a Constructive Trust Over Such Property\n\n43. Even putting aside the Government's failure to properly demonstrate that the funds in Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does Defendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n\n44. Under the doctrine of constructive trusts, Petitioner's Property is protected and remains the property of Petitioner regardless of any other ownership claims, including Defendant Wang's or the Government, standing in her shoes. The Second Circuit3 has held that \"a constructive trust qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n45. purpose.\" Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). \"Its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate the performance of a wrongful act. . What is necessary is that the court identify a party who is holding property under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it.\" Id. (internal citations omitted).\n\n46. \" \"Whether a party is unjustly enriched is a legal conclusion reached through the application of principles of equity. . . A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief. . . Unjust enrichment results when a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the transfer and considering the relationship of the parties, it would be inequitable to retain.\" Id. (internal\n\n<sup>3 &</sup>quot;The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation.\" In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., No. 89 CV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). Here, there are three competing jurisdictions whose laws could apply: New York, California, and Cayman Islands. Petitioner's payment of Petitioner's Property was pursuant to the Subscription Agreement, which is governed by Cayman Islands law. See Exhibit B, Subscription Agreement at 8, ¶2(s). Account 2770 was an account in a California bank when Petitioner deposited Petitioner's Property. Since Account 2770 was seized (pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a court in New York state), the funds are now in possession of the Government in New York. New York is the forum state of this case. From these facts, New York has the greatest interest in this litigation, and its laws should apply to an imposition of a constructive trust. However, to the extent that the Government challenges this choice-of-law determination, Petitioner reserves all rights to request that this Court impose a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property under California and/or Cayman Islands law.\n\ncitations omitted).\n\n47. The New York Court of Appeals outlined several factors to be considered in determining whether a constructive trust should be imposed in certain circumstances, including \"(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment.\" Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976). However, New York courts have long held that \"these factors are merely useful guides and are not talismanic.\" Counihan, 194 F.3d at 362 (citing to a plethora of New York state cases that have stated this proposition).\n\n48. Here, there is a constructive trust for the benefit of Petitioner over Petitioner's Property as of the date that it was deposited into Account 2770.\n\n49. Petitioner entered into a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship4 with Hamilton Opportunity Fund when Petitioner executed the Subscription Agreement in order to acquire certain Class B shares in Hamilton M&A Fund SP. Per the Subscription Agreement, Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC made a promise to Petitioner's Property would be invested in the Digital Bank. In reliance on this promise, the Petitioner wired Petitioner's Property to Account 2770 as instructed in the Subscription Agreement. The Government's improper seizure of Account 2770 forced a breach of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC's promise to invest Petitioner's Property into the Digital Bank. Because of Government's seizure, Petitioner is not even able to exercise his Right of Redemption to obtain back Petitioner's Property. This would\n\n<sup>4</sup> Even if the Court determines that the relationship was not confidential and/or there was no fiduciary relationship between Hamilton Opportunity Fund and Petitioner, such would not be determinative, as the absence of a fiduciary relationship does not preclude the Court from finding a constructive trust exists. See Koreag, 961 F.2d at 353 (stating that \"[w]e do not believe, however, that the lack of a fiduciary relationship between [the parties] automatically defeats [a] claim of constructive trust. Although a fiduciary relationship is one of the factors cited by New York courts, the absence of any one factor will not itself defeat the imposition of a constructive trust when otherwise required by equity\").\n\nresult in unjust enrichment to the Government since the Government is now retaining Petitioner's Property without any legal cause to do so. See, e.g., U.S. v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding that imposition of a constructive trust was proper where, amongst other reasons, Government's forfeiture caused a breach of an implied promise); Torres v. \\$36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a constructive trust appropriate where \"The government's forfeiture forced a breach of that may result in a potentially unjust enrichment of the government (and commensurate unjust impoverishment of [the plaintiff]).\")\n\n50. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown that a constructive trust should be imposed over Petitioner's Property. Such a constructive trust \"qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" Willis, 652 F.3d at 242.\n\n51. The property upon which the constructive trust is sought - Petitioners Property - is easily traceable. See Exhibit C.\n\n52. Moreover, the imposition of a constructive trust is fully available to Petitioner, even if the Government contends that others are owed restitution from any forfeited property. \"When a party can directly trace its assets, without resorting to fictions or presumptions, a constructive trust is available even in cases involving multiple fraud victims.\" U.S. v. Ovid, 2012 WL 2087084, \\*7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012). \"[C]ourts are not free to disregard the law of constructive trusts when a claimant can directly trace its property, even if this leaves one innocent victim better off than another equally innocent victim.\" Id. The \"orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases\" is to \"return[] identifiable assets to their owners, turning to pro rata distribution only when specific identification or transactional tracing is impossible.\" Id. at \\*8 (citing Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, § 59 Reporter's Note G, at 437).\n\n### C. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner's Property\n\n53. Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property is absolutely superior to any interest that the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner's Property.\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner's interest in the forfeited property, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's interest \"renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section.\" 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n\n55. Here, as set forth above, Defendant Wang never had any interest in Petitioner's Property or Account 2770; indeed, the record is entirely silent as to what the relationship is between Defendant Wang, the Fraud Scheme, and Account 2770.\n\n56. It is axiomatic that neither the Government nor Defendant Wang can argue that they have a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Likewise, Defendant Wang cannot forfeit her interest in a property in which she had no interest.\n\n### D. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys' Fees\n\n57. The Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to file this petition asserting Petitioner's right to Petitioner's Property and to challenge the forfeiture of Petitioner's Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner's costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (\"EAJA\"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the purposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney's fees under the EAJA. See United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Bailey, 2015 WL 1893610 at \\*20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\n\n#### CONCLUSION IV.\n\n58. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner's Property, which renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. See e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Defendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property, and never did. Petitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that the Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner's Property.\n\n59. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\nDated: April 2, 2025\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman Jeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq. Jeremy W. Schulman, Esq. SCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC 6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425 North Bethesda, MD 20852 (240) 356-8550 jgavenman@schulmanbh.com jschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler Paul W. Butler, Esq. BUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES 1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531 Washington, D.C. 20036 paul abutlerlegalstrategies.com Counsel for Petitioner\n\n# ATTESTATION AND OATH\n\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I, ¿ x = ==================================================================================================================================\n\npenalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided\n\nin support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.\n\nExecuted on this 2nd day of April, 2025\n\n![](_page_19_Picture_6.jpeg)","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n- v. -（诉）\n\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y.”\n\n被告。\n\n第三方请求裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收令之请愿书 - 经核实的权利主张书\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n（“请愿人”）依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c) 条提起本《第三方请求裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收令之请愿书》（“本请愿书”）。请愿人寻求返还请愿人拥有合法权利、所有权和/或权益的资金（“请愿人财产”）（定义详见下文），且该资金系由美国政府（“政府”）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平）（“被告王”）达成的没收令之一部分而不当扣押。具体而言，政府在扣押以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名义在 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）开立的账号为 5090042770 的银行账户（“2770 账户”）内的全部资金时，不当扣押了请愿人财产。然而，任何涉及 2770 账户内资金（包括请愿人财产）的没收令均属非法且不当，因为被告王对 2770 账户或请愿人财产均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。因此，该没收令（定义详见下文）就请愿人财产而言归于无效，因为在引发该没收令（定义见下文）的民事侵权行为/犯罪行为发生时，请愿人财产的权利、所有权或权益已归属于请愿人而非被告王，且优先于被告王的任何权利、所有权或权益。据此，本法院应修改没收令，将请愿人财产从没收令中剔除，并责令政府立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人。为支持请愿人的主张，请愿人陈述如下：\n一、 导言\n\n2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）似乎纯属政府在起诉被告王及 Miles Guo（郭文贵）（“被告郭”）之前扣押资产时的“附带损害”。自 2770 账户被扣押以来已有两年半有余，在此期间，从未有任何关于 2770 账户（包括请愿人财产）如何与被告王认罪答辩的任何罪行相关联的解释，而这是根据法律作出有效没收令的必要先决条件。从未有任何证明表明被告王认罪答辩的任何非法活动的任何收益曾存入 2770 账户；没有证明表明此类活动的任何收益曾与请愿人财产发生混同；并且事实上，没有任何证明表明被告王曾与 2770 账户有任何牵涉，甚至不知道其存在。\n\n如下文所示，请愿人是就请愿人财产设立的拟制信托的受益人，请愿人财产在本案中不得被政府扣押。无论是被告王，还是现处于其地位的政府，都从未证明其对 2770 账户中的请愿人财产或对一般的 2770 账户享有任何权益。虽然被告王在没收令（ECF No. 488，第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在 2770 账户（从而包括请愿人财产）中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，但她的同意对于 2770 账户或请愿人财产不具有法律效力。被告王在 2770 账户中从未拥有过此类“权利、所有权和权益”——没有证据表明她是 2770 账户的签字人、曾向 2770 账户存入款项、或以其他方式对 2770 账户拥有任何控制权，并且没有证据表明被告王曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770 账户存入任何款项。被告王不能没收其不拥有且不享有任何权益的财产。事实上，本法院似乎从未依 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 的要求，在第一阶段确立过请愿人财产甚至应予没收。\n\n基于上述所有理由以及下文阐明的理由，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 批准本请愿书；(2) 修改没收令以排除请愿人财产；(3) 责令立即向请愿人返还请愿人财产；(4) 裁定请愿人有权获得与本请愿书相关的律师费及开支，并准予请愿人提交关于此类律师费及开支的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的其他救济。\n二、 背景事实\nA. 请愿人财产\n\n1. 开曼群岛独立投资组合公司 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“汉密尔顿机会基金”）向请愿人提供了一份日期为 2022 年 1 月 20 日的《发售备忘录》（“《发售备忘录》”）。《发售备忘录》的真实准确副本作为附件 A 附于本请愿书之后。\n\n2. 汉密尔顿机会基金是一家“专门从事由投资管理人[定义见发售备忘录]精选的、以长期资本增值为目的的股权投资的基金”。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 33 页。投资管理人（定义见《发售备忘录》）已确定了一项投资于一家银行（“数字银行”）的机会（详见《发售备忘录》第 33 页）。就该项投资而言，汉密尔顿机会基金寻求通过发行不同类别的股份来募集资金。同上，第 34 页。\n\n3. 《发售备忘录》向请愿人提供了认购汉密尔顿机会基金项下一个独立投资组合——Hamilton M&A Fund SP（“并购基金”）归属的 B 类股份的机会。\n\n4. 被告王不是并购基金或汉密尔顿机会基金的董事或成员，且在其他方面缺乏并购基金或汉密尔顿机会基金的任何公司权益或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n5. 被告王未在并购基金中进行任何投资；同样，证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n6. 2022 年 1 月 23 日，请愿人向汉密尔顿机会基金提交了一份申请（“《认购协议》”），以认购价值 $500,000 的并购基金 B 类股份。《认购协议》的真实准确副本作为附件 B 附于本请愿书之后。\n\n7. 批准并接受了《认购协议》。见附件 B，《认购协议》第 15 页。\n\n8. 2022 年 1 月 25 日，根据《认购协议》的条款，请愿人向银门银行账号为 5090042770 的账户电汇了 $500,100（“请愿人财产”）。电汇确认书的真实准确副本作为附件 C 附于本请愿书之后。\n\n9.\n\n10. 根据《发售备忘录》的条款，请愿人有权依请愿人之选择赎回请愿人的股份。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 17 页；另见同上，第 53 页（说明在受限于若干限制的前提下，“B 类股份可在任何赎回日由股东自行选择赎回”）。\n\n11. 汉密尔顿机会基金的资产“与该基金任何其他独立投资组合的资产及该基金的任何普通资产保持独立、隔离并单独可识别”。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 12 页。此外，根据开曼群岛法律，汉密尔顿机会基金有责任“将每个独立投资组合的投资组合资产予以隔离，并使其与任何其他独立投资组合的独立投资组合资产保持隔离且单独可识别”。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 22-23 页（引用《开曼群岛公司法（修订版）》第 XIV 部第 219(6)(b) 条）。\nB. 扣押 2770 账户\n\n12. 2022 年 9 月 18 日，政府扣押了 2770 账户内的全部资金余额。\n\n13. 迄今为止，没有任何公开可得的文件说明政府扣押 2770 账户内资金具有何种合理根据。\nC. 针对被告王和被告郭的刑事案件及没收令\n\n14. 2023 年 3 月 6 日，政府对被告王和被告郭以及第三名从未被提审的被告 William Je（余建明）提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n15. 2024 年 5 月 3 日，政府提交了针对被告王的一份附随起诉书（“《附随起诉书》”）。ECF No. 325。《附随起诉书》指控被告王犯有一项共谋电汇欺诈罪（罪名项一）（《附随起诉书》第 1-2 页）和一项共谋洗钱罪（罪名项二）（《附随起诉书》第 2-4 页）。《附随起诉书》还包含一项没收指控（“《没收指控》”）。《附随起诉书》第 4 页。\n\n16. 就在同日（2024 年 5 月 3 日），被告王对《附随起诉书》中所指控的罪名项一和罪名项二作出了认罪答辩。\n\n17. 同样在 2024 年 5 月 3 日，本法院签署了一份《关于特定财产/金钱判决的经同意的初步没收令》（“原没收令”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n18. 在原没收令中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产（包括 2770 账户）中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，因为该等财产“构成了被告个人获得的罪名项一所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及[附随]起诉书罪名项二所指控罪行的财产”。原没收令第 2-6 页（后加强调）。\n\n19. 被告郭对其被指控的任何罪行均未作认罪答辩。相应地，陪审团审理于 2024 年 5 月 22 日至 2024 年 7 月 16 日期间进行（“郭案审判”）。2024 年 7 月 16 日，陪审团裁定被告郭犯有共谋敲诈勒索罪、共谋电汇欺诈罪、共谋洗钱罪、共谋证券欺诈罪、证券欺诈罪、电汇欺诈罪以及洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本请愿书提交之日，被告郭尚未被判刑。\n\n20. 2025 年 1 月 6 日，被告王被判刑。\n\n21. 2025 年 1 月 7 日，本法院签署了一份《关于特定财产/金钱判决的经同意的初步没收令》（“没收令”），ECF No. 488。在涉及请愿人的方面，该没收令在所有实质性方面均与原没收令基本一致。在没收令中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产（包括 2770 账户）中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，因为该等财产“构成了被告个人获得的罪名项一所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及[附随]起诉书罪名项二所指控罪行的财产”。没收令第 2-11 页（后加强调）。\n\n22. 没收令中关于 2770 账户的描述如下：\n\n原存放于银门银行账号为 5090042770 的账户中、以“Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC”名义持有并于 2022 年 9 月 18 日前后被政府扣押的 $89,992,861.75 美元（23-FBI-000074）。\n\n原没收令第 3 页；没收令第 3 页。\n三、 辩论理由\n\n23. 在依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 和《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c)(1) 条进行的附随刑事没收程序中，本法院必须依据优势证据标准判定请愿人是否对待没收财产享有合法权利、所有权或权益，以及该等权利、所有权或权益是否使没收令全部或部分归于无效，因为在引发该财产没收的行为发生时，该权益已归属于请愿人而非被告，或者优先于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n24. 在本案中，根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)，请愿人（Petitioner）凭借对该等财产设定的推定信托，对请愿人财产享有法定权利、所有权或权益。此外，请愿人对请愿人财产的权益既已归属于请愿人，且优先于被告 Wang（王艳平）在请愿人财产中享有的任何权利，因为被告 Wang 对请愿人财产或 2770 账户均不享有任何法定权利、所有权或权益。换言之，被告 Wang 不可能没收其在 2770 账户中的权益，因为她根本没有任何依法应予刑事没收的权益。因此，应修改没收令（Forfeiture Order），将请愿人财产予以剔除，并将请愿人财产归还给请愿人。\n\nA. 政府未能证明 2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）自始即属于依法应予没收的财产，导致没收令对该等资金的处理是不当的\n\n25. 政府没有扣留请愿人财产的合法理由，因为没有任何证据表明政府曾依 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1)(A) 条）的要求，证明请愿人财产以及整个 2770 账户实际属于可没收财产。\n\n26. “当政府寻求获得没收令时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1) 条……要求量刑法院根据适用法规确定哪些财产应予没收。’” U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（引用 U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2007)）。根据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院必须确定政府是否已确立财产与犯罪之间必要的关联性。” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（强调为原文所加）；Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的各个阶段，政府承担着以不同确信程度证明该法律结论的举证责任：在起诉后听证会上达到合理根据的标准……或在法官审判或陪审团面前达到优势证据的标准。”同上引（强调为原文所加）（内部引用省略）。“然而，只有在政府达到相关法定门槛的情况下，涉案财产才能在任何法律意义上被视为‘应予没收’。在此之前，当政府仅通过起诉书宣布其寻求没收的意图时，该财产仅被视为‘潜在可没收的’……或‘潜在应予没收的’。”同上引（内部引用省略）。\n\n27. 这意味着，在法院触及请愿人是否有权根据 § 853(n) 获得财产返还这一问题之前，有必要首先确定争议财产是否实际属于自始可没收的财产。如果不是，政府便没有扣押该财产的法定职权。如果财产被不当扣押，无论请愿人是否符合 § 853(n) 规定的标准，政府都必须返还被扣押的账户。参见如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)。\n\n28. 依照 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 进行全面且完整的审查，对于司法的公正实施至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已进行审查并判定该财产应予没收的假定之上。在制定附随程序法规时，国会选择在附随程序中将举证责任交由第三方承担，其前提是“美国在刑事案件中已排除合理怀疑地证明了其没收指控。” S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n29. 在本案中，从未就 2770 账户与被告 Wang 被指控（并认罪答辩）的任何犯罪之间是否存在关联性作出过认定，因此，请愿人被迫提交本请愿书（Petition）。根据被告 Wang 和被告 Guo（郭文贵）刑事案件中所有公开文件所包含的信息，政府在 2770 账户相关问题上无法胜诉。\n\n30. 在本案中，在替代起诉书（Superseding Information）中，政府就罪名项一和罪名项二均列入了没收指控，并寻求没收特定财产。替代起诉书第 4 页。记录中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明、更谈不上达到其举证责任来证明 2770 账户与被告 Wang 认罪答辩的犯罪之间存在关联性。\n\n31. 关于罪名项一，没收指控载明：“由于犯下本替代起诉书罪名项一所指控的电汇诈骗罪，被告 YVETTE WANG（王艳平），又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，应依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条以及《美国法典》第 28 编第 2461(c) 条，向美国没收构成或源自可追溯至犯下前述罪行所得收益的任何及所有不动产与动产。”替代起诉书第 4 页。政府必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 项下的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收理论是该财产被用于实施或便利实施犯罪行为，或卷入犯罪行为的实施，则政府应证明该财产与犯罪之间存在实质性联系。” 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n脚注 1：18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定，“构成或源自可追溯至违反”各项特定犯罪所得收益的“任何不动产或动产[均应予以没收]”，包括违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 电汇诈骗罪，正如罪名项一中对被告 Wang 所指控的那样。\n\n32. 记录中没有任何关于 2770 账户中的资金如何构成或源自可追溯至被告 Wang 共谋实施电汇诈骗所得收益的指控。替代起诉书指控：“至少在 2018 年前后至至少 2023 年 3 月 15 日前后，共谋者向投资者进行虚假陈述，谎称投资者将获得 GTV、喜马拉雅农场联盟组织（Himalaya Farm Alliance）和 GClubs 的投资股份，并谎称投资者将获得喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）投资的加密货币[（下称‘诈骗计划’）]。通过该[诈骗计划]，被告 YVETTE WANG（王艳平），又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，及其共谋者（包括 Miles Guo）诱导投资者向 Guo 控制的实体投资超过 10 亿美元。”替代起诉书第 2 页。替代起诉书中没有任何关于被告 Wang 将诈骗计划的任何收益存入 2770 账户的指控。同样，替代起诉书中也没有任何指控称有任何投资者因该诈骗计划而将款项存入 2770 账户。也不可能有任何此类指控，因为 2770 账户的唯一入账款项均来自投资数字银行（Digital Bank）的投资者——而这项投资与替代起诉书中所描述的“诈骗计划”没有任何关联。可以肯定的是，请愿人确认请愿人从未成为替代起诉书中所指控的被告 Wang 任何行为的受害者，并且请愿人不认为请愿人财产的任何部分曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n33. 最后，在被告 Guo 的庭审期间，没有关于 2770 账户的相关证言。没有任何关于诈骗计划的任何收益是否曾存入 2770 账户的证言，就此而言，也没有关于被告 Wang 是否曾将任何资金存入 2770 账户的证言。简而言之，记录中没有任何内容表明 2770 账户与被告 Wang 的电汇诈骗指控之间存在关联，更没有充分的证据来判定政府已完成举证责任证明、且法院已正当裁决存在合效应予没收 2770 账户所需的适当关联性。\n\n34. 关于罪名项二，没收指控载明：“由于犯下本起诉书罪名项二所指控的洗钱罪，被告 YVETTE WANG（王艳平），又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，应依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 982(a)(1) 条，向美国没收卷入前述罪行的任何及所有不动产与动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产，包括但不限于代表卷入前述罪行之财产金额的以美元计价的一笔款项。”替代起诉书第 4 页。关于罪名项二，政府“必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 项下的没收要件。” U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015)。\n\n脚注 2：18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定，“法院对被判定犯有违反本编第 1956 条[洗钱法规]罪行的人判处刑罚时……应命令该人向美国没收卷入该罪行的任何不动产或动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产。” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调为原文所加）。\n\n35. 替代起诉书指控被告 Wang 犯有共谋洗钱罪，因为被告 Wang“明知卷入某些金融交易的财产代表某种形式非法活动的收益，将要实施并实际实施且试图实施该等金融交易……而这些交易事实上涉及特定非法活动的收益，即本起诉书罪名项一所指控的电汇诈骗计划的收益。”替代起诉书第 3 页。\n\n36. 目前尚不清楚 2770 账户如何能够因罪名项二的洗钱指控而被没收。从指控来看，洗钱指控源于被告 Wang 使用“罪名项一所指控的电汇诈骗计划的收益”进行金融交易。替代起诉书第 3 页。如上所述，没有任何证据表明 2770 账户中的资金与罪名项一所指控的诈骗计划存在任何关系（见上文第 31-33 段）——没有任何证据表明该等资金“构成或源自可追溯至犯下”电汇诈骗罪所得的收益。参见如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。鉴于 2770 账户中的资金既非诈骗计划收益，亦非衍生自诈骗计划收益，该等资金不能作为罪名项二洗钱指控的基础，也不能作为被告 Wang 罪名项二定罪的一部分而被没收。\n\n37. 政府为支持洗钱指控而指控的公开行为（overt acts），进一步未能证明 2770 账户中的资金何以属于可没收财产。在替代起诉书中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项行为。替代起诉书第 3 页。尽管政府声称这两项公开行为是被告 Wang 为推进涉嫌共谋洗钱而实施的“诸项行为之一”（替代起诉书第 3 页），但这些其他行为从未被明确指明。\n\n38. 首先，根据《替代起诉书》（Superseding Information），2020年5月20日，被告Wang（王雁平）以GTV的名义开设了一个银行账户，值得注意的是，2770号账户并非该账户。《替代起诉书》第3页。2020年6月2日，被告王向该账户转账约2亿美元。同上。转入GTV账户的资金来自Saraca Media Group, Inc.（“Saraca”）（郭案庭审，2024年5月31日，953:25-954:4；郭案庭审，2024年6月26日，4359:1-14）所持有的JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）账户，而非来自2770号账户。从未有任何证词表明2770号账户中的任何资金曾流入Saraca的摩根大通银行账户，进而再转入《替代起诉书》中所引用的GTV账户。此外，2770号账户在2020年甚至根本不存在。\n\n39. 政府指控的第二项行为是，“在2020年6月5日或前后”，被告王“批准从GTV的母公司Saraca向一家高风险对冲基金电汇1亿美元，以谋取Saraca及其最终受益所有人、被告Guo（郭文贵）之子的利益”。《替代起诉书》第3-4页。首先，这清楚地指控了资金是从Saraca账户转出的，而事实证明2770号账户显然不是该账户。此外，再次强调，从未有任何证词表明2770号账户中的任何资金曾流入Saraca账户。而且，再次声明，2770号账户在2020年甚至根本不存在。\n\n40. 从上述论证可以看出，根本没有任何关于2770号账户的指控或证词。记录中对2770号账户的唯一提及是被告王同意将其没收。然而，“被告对没收的同意[并不]免除在寻求没收的财产与定罪罪行之间必须存在关联的要求”。Beltramea案，785 F.3d at 291。正如Eighth Circuit（第八巡回上诉法院）所强调的那样，“地区法院负有确保所需关联存在的独立职责”。同上（后加强调）。\n\n41. 在本案中，《替代起诉书》、《原没收令》（Original Forfeiture Order）或《没收令》（Forfeiture Order）中均不存在任何关于2770号账户与被告王认罪答辩之罪行之间甚至存在涉嫌关联的事实指控。\n\n42. 政府在未证明存在关联的情况下继续扣留2770号账户中的资金，是错误的且不公平的。如果政府保留2770号账户中的资金，将构成不当得利，因为这些资金属于包括请愿人在内的第三方，而他们（1）既不是被告王也不是被告郭；并且（2）未参与欺诈计划（Fraud Scheme），更不是该计划的受害者。参见，例如，U.S. v. Bajakajian案，524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)（解释刑事“没收不具有救济目的，旨在惩罚违法者，且不能强加于无辜所有权人。”）（后加强调）。\n\nB. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，因为该等财产上存在拟制信托\n\n43. 即使抛开政府未能妥善证明2770号账户中的资金属于《替代起诉书》中所指控之任何活动的一部分不谈，请愿人财产也应归还给请愿人，因为请愿人对其享有的权益大于被告王，或如今处于其地位的政府。\n\n44. 根据拟制信托法理，请愿人财产受到保护，并且无论存在任何其他所有权主张（包括被告王或承继其权利地位的政府的主张），仍属于请愿人的财产。Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）3裁定，“就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，拟制信托符合构成对被告权益‘可能具有优先性的权益’的‘对财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’”。Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States案，652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n45. 目的”。Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co.案，194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999)（后加强调）。“其目的是防止不当得利，尽管不当得利并不必然涉及不法行为的实施。……所必需的是，法院确定某一方在依衡平法及良知不应保留财产的情况下持有该财产。”同上（省略内部引证）。\n\n46. “一方是否构成不当得利是通过适用衡平法原则得出的法律结论。……衡平法院在判令拟制信托时不受任何僵硬公式的约束。交易的公平性必须决定救济的尺度。……当一人保留了一项利益，而根据转让的情形并考虑到当事人之间的关系，保留该利益是不公平的，即构成不当得利。”同上（省略内部\n\n3 “联邦普通法的法律适用规则是适用对诉讼具有最大利益的司法管辖区的法律。” In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.案，961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992)，部分维持原判，案件名称变更为 Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A.，No. 89 CV. 3071 (WK)，1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992)。在本案中，有三个法律可能适用的竞合管辖区：New York（纽约州）、California（加利福尼亚州）以及Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）。请愿人对请愿人财产的支付是依据受开曼群岛法律管辖的《认购协议》（Subscription Agreement）进行的。参见证据B，《认购协议》第8页，¶2(s)。在请愿人存入请愿人财产时，2770号账户是加利福尼亚州一家银行的账户。自2770号账户被查封（依据纽约州一所法院签发的搜查和查封令）以来，这些资金目前由位于纽约的政府持有。纽约是本案的法院地州。根据这些事实，纽约对本诉讼具有最大利益，其法律应适用于拟制信托的设立。但是，在政府质疑此法律适用决定的范围内，请愿人保留要求本法院根据加利福尼亚州和/或开曼群岛法律对请愿人财产设立拟制信托的所有权利。\n\n引证）。\n\n47. New York Court of Appeals（纽约州上诉法院）概述了在确定某些情况下是否应设立拟制信托时应考虑的若干因素，包括“（1）保密或信义关系，（2）承诺，（3）信赖该承诺的转让，以及（4）不当得利”。Sharp v. Kosmalski案，40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976)。然而，纽约州法院长期以来一直认为“这些因素仅仅是有用的指引，而非神圣不可变通的法宝”。Counihan案，194 F.3d at 362（引用了阐明该主张的大量纽约州判例）。\n\n48. 在本案中，自请愿人财产存入2770号账户之日起，该等财产上即存在为请愿人利益而设立的拟制信托。\n\n49. 请愿人在签署《认购协议》以收购Hamilton M&A Fund SP的某些B类股份时，与Hamilton Opportunity Fund建立了保密和/或信义关系4。根据《认购协议》，Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC作出承诺，请愿人财产将投资于数字银行（Digital Bank）。基于对该承诺的信赖，请愿人按照《认购协议》中的指示将请愿人财产电汇至2770号账户。政府对2770号账户的不当查封迫使Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC违背了将请愿人财产投资于数字银行的承诺。由于政府的查封，请愿人甚至无法行使其赎回权（Right of Redemption）以取回请愿人财产。这会导致\n\n4 即使法院认定Hamilton Opportunity Fund与请愿人之间的关系不属于保密关系和/或不存在信义关系，这也不是决定性的，因为不存在信义关系并不妨碍法院认定存在拟制信托。参见Koreag案，961 F.2d at 353（指出“然而，我们不认为[当事人之间]缺乏信义关系会自动否定拟制信托[的主张]。尽管信义关系是纽约州法院引用的因素之一，但在衡平法另有要求时，缺少任何单一因素本身并不会阻碍拟制信托的设立”）。\n\n政府的不当得利，因为政府目前在没有任何合法理由的情况下保留请愿人财产。参见，例如，U.S. v. Coluccio案，51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995)（认定设立拟制信托是正当的，除其他原因外，政府的没收导致了对默示承诺的违反）；Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency案，25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994)（认定拟制信托是恰当的，其中指出“政府的没收迫使发生违约，这可能导致政府潜在的不当得利（以及[原告]相应的不当受损）。”）\n\n50. 因此，请愿人已证明应对请愿人财产设立拟制信托。就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，该等拟制信托“符合构成对被告权益‘可能具有优先性的权益’的‘对财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’”。Willis案，652 F.3d at 242。\n\n51. 寻求设立拟制信托的财产——请愿人财产——易于追溯。参见证据C。\n\n52. 此外，即使政府主张从任何被没收的财产中应向他人支付赔偿，请愿人也完全可以主张设立拟制信托。“当一方可以直接追溯其资产而无需借助拟制或推定手段时，即使在涉及多名欺诈受害者的案件中，拟制信托也是适用的。” U.S. v. Ovid案，2012 WL 2087084, *7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012)。“当申索人可以直接追溯其财产时，法院不能随意忽视拟制信托法，即使这会让一名无辜受害者处于比另一名同样无辜的受害者更有利的地位。”同上。处理“多重欺诈案件的正统方法”是“将可识别的资产归还给其所有权人，只有在无法进行具体识别或交易追溯时才采用按比例分配”。同上，*8（引用《返还法与不当得利重述（第三版）》（Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment），§ 59 报告人说明G，第437页）。\n\nC. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有优先权益\n\n53. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益绝对优先于政府或被告王在请愿人财产中可能享有的任何权益。\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 明确规定，除请愿人在被没收财产中享有权益外，请愿人还必须以优势证据证明，请愿人的权益“使没收令全部或部分无效，因为在该等导致根据本条没收财产的行为发生之时，该权利、所有权或权益已归属于请愿人而非被告，或优先于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益”。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（后加强调）。\n\n55. 在本案中，如上所述，被告王从未在请愿人财产或2770号账户中享有任何权益；事实上，记录完全未提及被告王、欺诈计划与2770号账户之间存在何种关系。\n\n56. 显而易见的是，政府和被告王都不能主张他们对一项从未享有过权益的财产拥有优先权益。同样，被告王也不能放弃没收一项其并不享有任何权益的财产权益。\n\nD. 请愿人有权获得诉讼费用和律师费\n\n57. 申诉人已被迫聘请法律顾问，并因提起本申诉主张申诉人对申诉人财产的权利及对申诉人财产的没收提出异议而产生了费用。在本程序中胜诉后，申诉人保留追索因本申诉而产生之律师费及费用的全部权利，并可根据《Equal Access to Justice Act（平等获取司法机会法）》（“EAJA”），28 U.S.C. § 2412 追索申诉人的费用及合理律师费。联邦法院一贯认定，为允许胜诉的主张人根据 EAJA 收取律师费之目的，§ 853(n) 程序属于民事性质。参见 United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009)；United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995)；U.S. v. Bailey, 2015 WL 1893610 at *20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015)。\n\n结论 四、\n\n58. 基于上述理由，申诉人对申诉人财产享有权益，这使得《没收令》就该等财产而言无效。参见例如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告 Wang（王）对申诉人财产不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。申诉人已经证明、并能够在任何必要的听证会上以优势证据证明，《没收令》须予以修改以排除申诉人财产。\n\n59. 因此，申诉人谨请本法院：(1) 批准本申诉；(2) 修改《没收令》以排除申诉人财产；(3) 命令立即将申诉人财产返还给申诉人；(4) 命令申诉人有权追索因本申诉而产生的申诉人律师费及费用，并准予申诉人提交关于该等律师费及费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的该等其他救济。\n\n日期：April 2, 2025\n\n谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\nJeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq.\nJeremy W. Schulman, Esq.\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\nPaul W. Butler, Esq.\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n申诉人代理律师\n\n见证与宣誓\n\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人，[签名/姓名信息受阻]，在接受伪证罪处罚的前提下声明，本人对该财产的主张并非无理缠诉，且据本人所知及所信，为支持该主张所提供的信息均真实无误。\n\n签署于 2025 年 4 月 2 日\n\n[签名图片]","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Torres","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":5923,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:45:48"}