{"id":"court_sdny_630_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":630,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-05","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方没收异议申请书 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #630（2025年4月5日提交）。一名认购 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 旗下 M&A Fund Class B 份额的投资者（申请人姓名因文件提取问题未能识别）依 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及联邦刑事诉讼规则32.2(c) 提出异议，主张此前对被告 Yvette Wang（Yanping Wang）作出的没收令中涉及 Silvergate Bank 一账户的资金系其本人认购基金份额的款项、与 Wang 的犯罪行为无关，请求法院将该资金从没收令中排除并发还；代理律师与两日后提交的 ECF #674（Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 申请）相同。","summary_en":"Third-party petition contesting forfeiture — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF No. 630 (filed April 5, 2025). A petitioner who subscribed for Class B Shares in the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC's M&A Fund (the petitioner's name is not legible in the extracted text) petitions under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) to amend the forfeiture order entered against co-defendant Yvette Wang (Yanping Wang), arguing that funds in a Silvergate Bank account represent the petitioner's own fund-subscription proceeds unconnected to Wang's offense conduct; the same counsel filed the related Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC petition two days later at ECF No. 674.","body_en":"# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\nTHIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE - VERIFIED CLAIM OF\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner = (\"Petitioner\") files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the \"Petition\"). Petitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest (\"Petitioner's Property\") (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government (the \"Government\") improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with Defendant Yvette Wang (\"Defendant Wang\"). Specifically, Petitioner's Property was improperly seized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in bank account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Account 2770\"). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or interest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. The Forfeiture Order (as more fully defined below) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner's Property because right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property was vested in the Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was\n\nFHC8E<BEGB4ALE<:;GG<G?8BE<AG8E8FGB9898A74AG.4A:4GG;8G<@8B9G;86B@@<FF<BAB9G;8 46GFJ;<6;:4I8E<F8GBG;8BE98<GHE8'E78E4F789<A8758?BJ FFH6;G;<FBHEGF;BH?74@8A7 G;8BE98<GHE8'E78EGBE8@BI8(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL9EB@G;8BE98<GHE8'E78E4A7BE78EG;4GG;8 Government immediately return Petitioner’s Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner’s 6?4<@(8G<G<BA8EFG4G8F4F9B??BJF\n\n##\n\n!G 4CC84EFG;4GG;8 9HA7F<A66BHAG <A6?H7<A: (8G<G<BA8ETF (EBC8EGLJ8E8 CHE8?L Q6B??4G8E4?74@4:8R<AG;8BI8EA@8AGTFF8<MHE8B94FF8GFCE<BEGB<GFCEBF86HG<BAB9898A74AG Wang and Miles Guo (“Defendant Guo”). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure B966BHAG4A7<AG;4GG<@8FC4AG;8E8;4FA8I8E588A4AL8KC?4A4G<BA4FGB;BJ66BHAG <A6?H7<A:(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL<FE8?4G87GB4ALB9G;8B998AF8FGBJ;<6;898A74AG.4A: C?87:H<?GL4A868FF4ELCE8E8DH<F<G8GB4I4?<79BE98<GHE8BE78EHA78EG;8?4J +;8E8J4FA8I8E4AL F;BJ<A:G;4G4ALCEB6887FB94ALHA?4J9H?46G<I<GLGBJ;<6;898A74AG.4A:C?87:H<?GLJ8E8 8I8E 78CBF<G87 <A 66BHAG  AB F;BJ<A: G;4G 4AL CEB6887F B9 FH6; 46G<I<GL J8E8 8I8E 6B@@<A:?87J<G;(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL4A7<A7887ABF;BJ<A:G;4G898A74AG.4A:8I8E;47 anything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\n\nFJ<??58F;BJA58?BJ(8G<G<BA8E<F458A89<6<4ELB946BAFGEH6G<I8GEHFGBI8E(8G<G<BA8ETF (EBC8EGL 4A7 (8G<G<BA8ETF (EBC8EGL 64AABG 58 F8<M87 5L G;8 BI8EA@8AG <A G;<F 64F8 &8<G;8E 898A74AG.4A:ABEG;8BI8EA@8AGJ;BABJFG4A7F<A;8EF;B8F;4I88I8E78@BAFGE4G87G;4G G;8L;4I84AL<AG8E8FGJ;4GFB8I8E<A(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL<A66BHAGBE<A66BHAG<A :8A8E4? .;<?8898A74AG.4A:6BAF8AG87GBG;89BE98<GHE8B9Q4??;8EE<:;GG<G?84A7<AG8E8FGR<A 66BHAG4A7G;HF(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL<AG;8BE98<GHE8'E78E&B 4G ;8E 6BAF8AG;4FAB?8:4?584E<A:4FGB66BHAGBE(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL 898A74AG.4A:A8I8E ;47FH6;QE<:;GG<G?84A7<AG8E8FGR<A66BHAGPG;8E8<FAB8I<78A68G;4GF;8J4F4F<:A4GBEL\n\nBA66BHAG8I8E78CBF<G87@BA8L<AGB66BHAGBEBG;8EJ<F8;474AL6BAGEB?BI8E 66BHAG4A7G;8E8<FAB8I<78A68G;4G898A74AG.4A:8I8E7<E86G874ALBA87<E86G?LBE indirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that F;8 7B8F ABG BJA 4A7 <A J;<6; F;8 ;4F AB <AG8E8FG !A 946G <G 4CC84EF G;4G G;8 BHEG A8I8E 8FG45?<F;87G;4G(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL<F8I8AFH5=86GGB9BE98<GHE8<AG;89<EFG<AFG4A684FE8DH<E87 by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\nBE 4?? G;8 9BE8:B<A: E84FBAF 4A7 9BE G;8 E84FBAF 78@BAFGE4G87 58?BJ (8G<G<BA8E E8FC86G9H??L E8DH8FGFG;4GG;<FBHEG\n :E4AGG;<F (8G<G<BA 4@8A7G;8 BE98<GHE8 'E78EGB 8K6?H78(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGLBE78EG;8<@@87<4G8E8GHEAB9(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGLGB(8G<G<BA8E BE78EG;4G (8G<G<BA8E<F 8AG<G?87GB E86BI8E (8G<G<BA8ETF 4GGBEA8LFT 988F 4A7 6BFGF<A6HEE87<A 6BAA86G<BAJ<G;G;<F(8G<G<BA4A7:E4AG(8G<G<BA8E?84I8GBFH5@<G4A4CC?<64G<BA9BEFH6;4GGBEA8LFT 988F4A76BFGF4A7:E4AGFH6;4A7BG;8EE8?<89G;4G<FA868FF4EL4A7=HFG\n\n### **II. BACKGROUND FACTS**\n\n## **#1'1'-,#/70/-.#/15**\n\n 4@<?GBA 'CCBEGHA<GL HA7 \\*( Q 4@<?GBA 'CCBEGHA<GL HA7R 4 4L@4A !F?4A7F\\*8:E8:4G87(BEG9B?<BB@C4ALCEBI<787(8G<G<BA8EJ<G;4A'998E<A:%8@BE4A7H@G;8 Q'998E<A: %8@BE4A7H@R 74G87 \"4AH4EL   GEH8 4A7 6BEE86G 6BCL B9 G;8 '998E<A: %8@BE4A7H@<F4GG46;87;8E8GB4F**4&' '1**\n\n 4@<?GBA'CCBEGHA<GLHA7<F4Q9HA7FC86<4?<M<A:<A8DH<GL<AI8FG@8AGFF8?86G87 5LG;8!AI8FG@8AG%4A4:8E14FG;4GG8E@<F789<A87<AG;8'998E<A:%8@BE4A7H@2J<G;4I<8JGB ?BA: G8E@64C<G4?:4<AF .” Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 33. The Investment Manager (as G;4GG8E@<F789<A87<AG;8'998E<A:%8@BE4A7H@;47<78AG<9<874ABCCBEGHA<GLGB<AI8FG<A454A> (the “Digital Bank”) (as more fully described in Offering Memorandum at 33). In connection with G;<F<AI8FG@8AG 4@<?GBA'CCBEGHA<GLHA7FBH:;GGBE4<F864C<G4?5L<FFH<A:I4E<BHF6?4FF8FB9 shares. Id. at 34.\n\n3. J Offering Memorandum offered Petitioner an opportunity to acquire Class B Shares attributed to a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund - Hamilton M&A Fund SP (the \"M&A Fund\").\n\n4. Defendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any corporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund or Hamilton Opportunity Fund. The evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n5. Defendant Wang did not make any investments in the M&A Fund; again, the evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n6. On January 23, 2022, Petitioner submitted an application (the \"Subscription Agreement\") to Hamilton Opportunity Fund for a subscription for \\$200,000.00 worth of Class B Shares in the M&A Fund. A true and correct copy of the Subscription Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit B.\n\n7. approved and accepted the Subscription Agreement. See Exhibit B, Subscription Agreement at 15.\n\n8. On February 2, 2022, pursuant to the terms of the Subscription Agreement, Petitioner wired \\$200,100.00 (the \"Petitioner Property\") to Account Number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank. A true and correct copy of the wire confirmation is attached hereto as Exhibit C.\n\n9. J The account to which Petitioner wired Petitioner Property to is Account 2770.\n\n10. Pursuant to the terms of the Offering Memorandum, Petitioner is entitled to redemption of Petitioner's shares at the Petitioner's option. Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 17; see also id. at 53 (stating that subject to certain limitations, \"Class B Shares may be redeemed\n\n4\n\nat the option of the Shareholder on any Redemption Day”).\n\n11. The assets of Hamilton Opportunity Fund are “kept segregated, separate and F8C4E4G8?L<78AG<9<45?89EB@G;BF8B94ALBG;8EF8:E8:4G87CBEG9B?<BFB9G;8HA74A74AL:8A8E4? assets of the Fund.” **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 12. In addition, pursuant to the laws of G;8 4L@4A !F?4A7F <G <F G;8 7HGL B9 4@<?GBA 'CCBEGHA<GL HA7 GB QF8:E8:4G8 4A7 >88C F8:E8:4G87CBEG9B?<B4FF8GFB9846;F8:E8:4G87CBEG9B?<BF8C4E4G84A7F8C4E4G8?L<78AG<9<45?89EB@ F8:E8:4G87CBEG9B?<B4FF8GFB94ALBG;8EF8:E8:4G87CBEG9B?<B R **4&' '1**'998E<A:%8@BE4A7H@ 4G 6<G<A:G;8B@C4A<8F6G)8I<F87B94L@4A!F?4A7F(4EG/!5\n\n### **#'62/#-\\$!!-2,1**\n\n12. On September 18, 2022, the Government seized the entire balance of the funds in 66BHAG\n\n13. To date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the BI8EA@8AG;47GBF8<M8G;89HA7F<A66BHAG\n\n# **C. The Criminal Case Against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the -/\\$#'12/#/\"#/**\n\n14. On March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang 4A7898A74AGHB4A74G;<E77898A74AG.<??<4@\"8J;B;4FA8I8E588A4EE4<:A87 ECF No. 2.\n\n15. On May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the Q\\*HC8EF87<A:!A9BE@4G<BAR4:4<AFG898A74AG.4A: ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information 6;4E:87 898A74AG .4A: J<G; BA8 6BHAG B9 BAFC<E46L GB B@@<G .<E8 E4H7 BHAG ! \\*HC8EF87<A: !A9BE@4G<BA 4G\n 4A7 BA8 6BHAG B9BAFC<E46LGBB@@<G%BA8L \\$4HA78E<A: BHAG !! \\*HC8EF87<A: !A9BE@4G<BA 4G +;8 \\*HC8EF87<A: !A9BE@4G<BA 4?FB 6BAG4<A87 4 BE98<GHE8??8:4G<BAG;8QBE98<GHE8??8:4G<BAR Superseding Information at 4.\n\n16. On the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count\n\nII as charged in the Superseding Information.\n\n17. Ju Also on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (\"Original Forfeiture Order\"). ECF No. 329.\n\n18. In the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all her right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n\n19. Defendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him. Accordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the \"Guo Trial\"). On July 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this Petition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n\n20. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n\n21. On January 7, 2025, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Forfeiture Order\") ECF No. 488. As it pertains to Petitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all material respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all her right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute [ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Forfeiture Order at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n22. The assets in Account 2770 are described in both the Original Forfeiture Order and\n\nthe Forfeiture Order as follows:\n\n\\$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September 18, 2022 (23-FB1-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\n\n#### III. ARGUMENT\n\n23. In an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited, and whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part, because such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n\n24. Here, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of a constructive trust over such property. Moreover, Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any right Defendant Wang had in Petitioner's Property because Defendant Wang had no legal right, title or, interest in either Petitioner's Property or Account 2770. In other words, Defendant Wang could not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject to criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner's Property, and Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner.\n\n# A. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770, Including Petitioner's Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First Instance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds\n\n25. J. The Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner's Property because there is no evidence that the Government has ever demonstrated that Petitioner's Property, and Account 2770 in general, is actually forfeitable property, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\n26. \" \"When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, 'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.\"\" U.S. v. Watts, 786 F. 3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.\" Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); Watts, 786 F.3d at 172. \"At various points in the proceedings, the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion to varying degrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . .or by a preponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.\" Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). \"Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the property in question be considered 'subject to forfeiture' in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the government has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property is seen merely as 'potentially forfeitable' . . . or 'potentially subject to forfeiture.\"\" Id. (internal citations omitted).\n\n27. This means that before the court reaches the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in dispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority to seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the\n\naccounts seized regardless of whether the petitioner can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). See e.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n\n28. Jull and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair administration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has conducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary proceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an ancillary proceeding, since \"the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.\" S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392.\n\n29. In this matter, there has never been a determination of whether there exists a nexus between Account 2770 and any of the offenses Defendant Wang was charged with (and pled guilty to), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained in the publicly-available documents in both Defendant Wang's and Defendant Guo's criminal case, the Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n\n30. Here, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture Allegation as to both Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding Information at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show, let alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n31. As to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the wire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United\n\n9\n\nStates Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C)<sup>1</sup> . . . and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and 4?? CEBC8EGL E84? 4A7 C8EFBA4? G;4G 6BAFG<GHG8F BE <F 78E<I87 9EB@ CEB6887F GE46845?8 GB G;8 commission of said offense.” Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the 8?8@8AGF B9 9BE98<GHE8 HA78E\n, U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 , U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, “if the Government’s theory of forfeiture is that the property was HF87 GB 6B@@<G BE 946<?<G4G8 G;8 6B@@<FF<BA B9 4 6E<@<A4? B998AF8 BE J4F <AIB?I87 <A G;8 6B@@<FF<BA B9 4 6E<@<A4? B998AF8G;8 BI8EA@8AG F;4?? 8FG45?<F;G;4GG;8E8 J4F 4 FH5FG4AG<4? 6BAA86G<BA58GJ88AG;8CEBC8EGL4A7G;8B998AF8 ” 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n\n32. The record is devoid of any allegations pertaining to how funds in Account 2770 4E8BE4E878E<I879EB@CEB6887FGE46845?8GB898A74AG.4A:TF6BAFC<E46LGB6B@@<GJ<E89E4H7 +;8\\*HC8EF87<A:!A9BE@4G<BA4??8:8FG;4GQ192EB@4G?84FG<ABE45BHG\nHAG<?4G?84FGBABE45BHG %4E6;\n6B6BAFC<E4GBEF@47894?F8E8CE8F8AG4G<BAFGB<AI8FGBEFG;4GG;8LJBH?7E868<I8 FGB6><A8K6;4A:89BEG;8<E<AI8FG@8AGF<A+-G;8 <@4?4L44E@??<4A68BE:4A<M4G<BA4A7 ?H5F 4A7 G;4G G;8L JBH?7 E868<I8 6ELCGB6HEE8A6L <A 8K6;4A:89BE G;8<E <AI8FG@8AGF <A G;8 <@4?4L4K6;4A:8 1G;8 QE4H7 \\*6;8@8R2 +;EBH:;G;8 1E4H7 \\*6;8@820-++.& 4>4Q04AC<A:R4>4Q0RG;87898A74AG4A7;8E6B6BAFC<E4GBEF<A6?H7<A:%<?8FHB<A7H687 investors to invest more than \\$1 billion into entities Guo controlled.” Superseding Information at +;8E84E8AB4??8:4G<BAF<AG;8\\*HC8EF87<A:!A9BE@4G<BAE8:4E7<A:898A74AG.4A:78CBF<G<A: 4ALCEB6887F9EB@G;8E4H7\\*6;8@8<AGB66BHAG \\*<@<?4E?LG;8E84E8AB4??8:4G<BAF<AG;8 \\*HC8EF87<A:!A9BE@4G<BAG;4G4F4E8FH?GB9G;8E4H7\\*6;8@84AL<AI8FGBEF78CBF<G87@BA8L<AGB\n\n , U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that “[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture] J;<6; 6BAFG<GHG8F BE <F 78E<I87 9EB@ CEB6887F GE46845?8 GB 4 I<B?4G<BA B9R I4E<BHF FC86<9<87 offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang <ABHAG!\n\nAccount 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits into Account 2770 were 9EB@<AI8FGBEFJ;BJ8E8<AI8FG<A:<AG;8<:<G4?4A>P4A<AI8FG@8AGG;4G<FABG<@C?<64G87<A any way by the “Fraud Scheme” described in the Superseding Information. To be sure, Petitioner 499<E@F G;4G (8G<G<BA8E J4F A8I8E 4 I<6G<@ B9 4AL 6BA7H6G 5L 898A74AG.4A: 4??8:87 <A G;8 \\*HC8EF87<A:!A9BE@4G<BA4A77B8FABG58?<8I8G;4G4ALB9(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGLJ4F8I8EHF87<A 4ALHA?4J9H?46G<I<GL\n\n33. Finally, there was no relevant testimony during Defendant Guo’s trial concerning 66BHAG +;8E8J4FABG8FG<@BALE8:4E7<A:J;8G;8E4ALB9G;8CEB6887FB9G;8E4H7\\*6;8@8 J8E8 8I8E 78CBF<G87 <AGB 66BHAG  ABE 9BE G;4G @4GG8E J;8G;8E 898A74AG .4A: 8I8E deposited any money into Account 2770. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would <A7<64G8G;8E8<F4A8KHF58GJ88A66BHAG4A7898A74AG.4A:TFJ<E89E4H76;4E:8?8G4?BA8 FH99<6<8AG8I<78A68GB78G8E@<A8G;4GG;8BI8EA@8AG@8G<GF5HE78AB9F;BJ<A:4A7G;8BHEG CEBC8E?L47=H7<64G87G;4GG;84CCEBCE<4G8A8KHF8K<FGF9BE9BE98<GHE8B966BHAGGB58CEBC8E\n\n34. As to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, “[a]s a result of committing the @BA8L?4HA78E<A: B998AF8 4??8:87<A BHAG +JB B9G;<F !A9BE@4G<BA 0-++.& 4>4 Q04AC<A:R4>4Q0RG;87898A74AGF;4??9BE98<GGBG;8,A<G87\\*G4G8FCHEFH4AGGB+<G?8\n,A<G87 \\*G4G8FB78\\*86G<BA4 4AL4A74??CEBC8EGLE84?4A7C8EFBA4?<AIB?I87<AF4<7B998AF8 BE4ALCEBC8EGLGE46845?8GBFH6;CEBC8EGL<A6?H7<A:5HGABG?<@<G87GB4FH@B9@BA8L<A,A<G87 States currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.” Superseding !A9BE@4G<BA4G FGBBHAG!!+;8BI8EA@8AGQ@HFGCEBI8G;88?8@8AGFB99BE98<GHE8HA78E\n\n, U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that “[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an B998AF8<AI<B?4G<BAB9F86G<BA\n1G;8@BA8L ?4HA78E<A:FG4GHG82B9G;<FG<G?8 F;4??BE78EG;4G G;8C8EFBA9BE98<GGBG;8,A<G87\\*G4G8F4ALCEBC8EGLE84?BEC8EFBA4?*+081.8'&+057%\\*1(('05'*BE any property *traceable to such property*.” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\nU.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.\" U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n35. Jo The Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy to launder money because Defendant Wang \"knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . . and which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One of this Information.\" Superseding Information at 3.\n\n36. It is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited for the money laundering charge in Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang engaging in financial transactions with the \"proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One.\" Superseding Information at 3. As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account 2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (see ¶ 31-33, above) - there is no evidence that such funds \"constitute|d| or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of' wire fraud. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were not Fraud Scheme proceeds nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could not serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part of Defendant Wang's conviction for Count II.\n\n37. J The overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge further fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be forfeitable. In the Superseding Information, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding Information at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were \"among others\" that Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money\n\n12\n\n(Superseding Information at 3), these other acts were never identified.\n\n38. First, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened a bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was not. Superseding Information at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately \\$200 million to that account. Id. The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank account held by Saraca Media Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\") (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo Trial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), not from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be transferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information. Moreover, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n39. The second act the Government alleges is that \"on or about June 5, 2020,\" Defendant Wang \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from GTV's parent company, Saraca, to a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Defendant Guo's son.\" Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was transferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account. Moreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n40. As seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding Account 2770 whatsoever. The only reference in the record to Account 2770 is Defendant Wang's consent to forfeit it. However, \"a defendant's consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the requirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of offense.\" Beltramea, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, \"ftThe district court had an independent duty to ensure that the required nexus exists.\" Id. (emphasis added).\n\n41. Here, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the Original Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account 2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n42. J The Government's continued retention of the funds in Account 2770, without showing that there is a nexus, is wrong and inequitable. Should the Government retain the funds in Account 2770, it will be unjustly enriched, since the funds belong to third parties, including Petitioner, who are (1) not Defendant Wang or Defendant Guo; and (2) not involved the Fraud Scheme, let alone victims of such a scheme. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (explaining that a criminal \"forfeiture serves no remedial purpose, is designed to punish the offender, and cannot be imposed upon innocent owners.\") (emphasis added).\n\n## B. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner's Property Because There Exists a Constructive Trust Over Such Property\n\n43. Even putting aside the Government's failure to properly demonstrate that the funds in Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does Defendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n\n44. Under the doctrine of constructive trusts, Petitioner's Property is protected and remains the property of Petitioner regardless of any other ownership claims, including Defendant\n\nWang's or the Government, standing in her shoes. The Second Circuit has held that \"a constructive trust qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n45. purpose.\" Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). \"Its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate the performance of a wrongful act. . What is necessary is that the court identify a party who is holding property under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it.\" Id. (internal citations omitted).\n\n46. \" \"Whether a party is unjustly enriched is a legal conclusion reached through the application of principles of equity. . . A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief. . . Unjust enrichment results when a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the transfer and considering the relationship of the parties, it would be inequitable to retain.\" Id. (internal\n\n<sup>3 &</sup>quot;The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation.\" In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., No. 89 CV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). Here, there are three competing jurisdictions whose laws could apply: New York, California, and Cayman Islands. Petitioner's payment of Petitioner's Property was pursuant to the Subscription Agreement, which is governed by Cayman Islands law. See Exhibit B, Subscription Agreement at 8, ¶2(s). Account 2770 was an account in a California bank when Petitioner deposited Petitioner's Property. Since Account 2770 was seized (pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a court in New York state), the funds are now in possession of the Government in New York. New York is the forum state of this case. From these facts, New York has the greatest interest in this litigation, and its laws should apply to an imposition of a constructive trust. However, to the extent that the Government challenges this choice-of-law determination, Petitioner reserves all rights to request that this Court impose a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property under California and/or Cayman Islands law.\n\ncitations omitted).\n\n47. The New York Court of Appeals outlined several factors to be considered in 78G8E@<A<A:J;8G;8E46BAFGEH6G<I8GEHFGF;BH?758<@CBF87<A68EG4<A6<E6H@FG4A68F<A6?H7<A: Q\n46BA9<78AG<4?BE9<7H6<4ELE8?4G<BA4CEB@<F84GE4AF98E<AE8?<4A68G;8E8BA4A7 HA=HFG8AE<6;@8AG .\" *Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976).* However, New York courts ;4I8?BA:;8?7G;4GQG;8F8946GBEF4E8@8E8?LHF89H?:H<78F4A74E8ABGG4?<F@4A<6 R*170+\\*#0* F.3d at 362 (citing to a plethora of New York state cases that have stated this proposition).\n\n 8E8 G;8E8 <F 4 6BAFGEH6G<I8 GEHFG 9BE G;8 58A89<G B9 (8G<G<BA8E BI8E (8G<G<BA8ETF Property as of the date that it was deposited into Account 2770.\n\n49. Petitioner entered into a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship<sup>4</sup> with Hamilton 'CCBEGHA<GLHA7J;8A(8G<G<BA8E8K86HG87G;8\\*H5F6E<CG<BA:E88@8AG<ABE78EGB46DH<E868EG4<A Class B shares in Hamilton M&A Fund SP. Per the Subscription Agreement, Hamilton 'CCBEGHA<GLHA7\\*(@4784CEB@<F8GB(8G<G<BA8EG;4G(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGLJBH?758<AI8FG87 in the Digital Bank. In reliance on this promise, the Petitioner wired Petitioner's Property to 66BHAG4F<AFGEH6G87<AG;8\\*H5F6E<CG<BA:E88@8AG +;8BI8EA@8AGTF<@CEBC8EF8<MHE8 B9 66BHAG  9BE687 4 5E846; B9 4@<?GBA 'CCBEGHA<GL HA7 \\*(TF CEB@<F8 GB <AI8FG Petitioner's Property into the Digital Bank. Because of Government's seizure, Petitioner is not 8I8A45?8GB8K8E6<F8;<F)<:;GB9)878@CG<BAGBB5G4<A546>(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL +;<FJBH?7\n\n I8A <9 G;8 BHEG 78G8E@<A8F G;4G G;8 E8?4G<BAF;<C J4F ABG 6BA9<78AG<4? 4A7BE G;8E8 J4F AB 9<7H6<4EL E8?4G<BAF;<C 58GJ88A 4@<?GBA 'CCBEGHA<GL HA7 4A7 (8G<G<BA8E FH6; JBH?7 ABG 58 78G8E@<A4G<I84FG;845F8A68B949<7H6<4ELE8?4G<BAF;<C7B8FABGCE86?H78G;8BHEG9EB@9<A7<A: a constructive trust exists. *See Koreag, 961 F.2d at 353* (stating that “[w]e do not believe, however, G;4GG;8?46>B94 9<7H6<4EL E8?4G<BAF;<C58GJ88A1G;8C4EG<8F24HGB@4G<64??L78984GF 1426?4<@B9 constructive trust. Although a fiduciary relationship is one of the factors cited by New York courts, G;845F8A68B94AL BA8 946GBEJ<?? ABG<GF8?9 78984GG;8<@CBF<G<BA B946BAFGEH6G<I8GEHFGJ;8A otherwise required by equity”).\n\nE8FH?G<AHA=HFG8AE<6;@8AGGBG;858A89<GB9G;8BI8EA@8AGF<A68G;8BI8EA@8AG<FABJE8G4<A<A: (8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGLJ<G;BHG4AL?8:4?64HF8GB7BFB *''')81.7%%+1* 7 A7<E 9<A7<A:G;4G<@CBF<G<BAB946BAFGEH6G<I8GEHFGJ4FCEBC8EJ;8E84@BA:FGBG;8E E84FBAFBI8EA@8AGTF9BE98<GHE864HF8745E846;B94A<@C?<87CEB@<F8*144'58- 744'0%;* 7\n\n7<E 9<A7<A:46BAFGEH6G<I8GEHFG4CCEBCE<4G8J;8E8 Q+;8:BI8EA@8AGTF9BE98<GHE89BE68745E846;B9G;4GCEB@<F8G;4G@4LE8FH?G<A4CBG8AG<4??LHA=HFG 8AE<6;@8AGB9G;8:BI8EA@8AG4A76B@@8AFHE4G8HA=HFG<@CBI8E<F;@8AGB91G;8C?4<AG<992 R\n\n 66BE7<A:?L(8G<G<BA8E;4FF;BJAG;4G46BAFGEH6G<I8GEHFGF;BH?758<@CBF87BI8E (8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL \\*H6;46BAFGEH6G<I8GEHFGQDH4?<9<8F4F4S?8:4?E<:;GG<G?8BE<AG8E8FG<AG;8 CEBC8EGLTG;4GS@4L584FHC8E<BE<AG8E8FGTGB47898A74AGTF<AG8E8FG9BEG;8CHECBF8FB949BE98<GHE8 FG4GHG84A4?B:BHFGB\n, \\* NA R *!+..+5* 74G\n\n +;8CEBC8EGLHCBAJ;<6;G;86BAFGEH6G<I8GEHFG<FFBH:;GP(8G<G<BA8EF(EBC8EGL <F 84F<?LGE46845?8 *''***4&' '1** *-*\n\n %BE8BI8EG;8<@CBF<G<BAB946BAFGEH6G<I8GEHFG<F9H??L4I4<?45?8GB(8G<G<BA8E8I8A <9G;8BI8EA@8AG6BAG8A7FG;4GBG;8EF4E8BJ87E8FG<GHG<BA9EB@4AL9BE98<G87CEBC8EGL Q.;8A4 C4EGL64A7<E86G?LGE468<GF4FF8GFJ<G;BHGE8FBEG<A:GB9<6G<BAFBECE8FH@CG<BAF46BAFGEH6G<I8GEHFG <F4I4<?45?88I8A<A64F8F<AIB?I<A:@H?G<C?89E4H7I<6G<@F R*88+&*\n.\\$ C.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012). “[C]ourts are not free to disregard the law of constructive trusts when a 6?4<@4AG 64A 7<E86G?LGE468<GF CEBC8EGL 8I8A<9G;<F?84I8F BA8<AAB68AG I<6G<@ 58GG8E B99G;4A another equally innocent victim.” *Id.* The “orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases” is to QE8GHEA12<78AG<9<45?84FF8GFGBG;8<E BJA8EFGHEA<A:GB CEB E4G4 7<FGE<5HG<BA BA?LJ;8A FC86<9<6 identification or transactional tracing is impossible.” *Id.* at \\*8 (citing *Restatement (Third)* of *'56+676+100,75604+%\\*/'06*N)8CBEG8ETF&BG84G\n\n## **C. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner’s Property**\n\n53. Petitioner’s interest in Petitioner’s Property is absolutely superior to any interest G;4GG;8BI8EA@8AGBE898A74AG.4A:@4L;4I8<A(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL\n\n54. 21 U. \\* C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner’s interest in the forfeited CEBC8EGLG;4G(8G<G<BA8E@HFG78@BAFGE4G85L4CE8CBA78E4A68B9G;88I<78A68G;4G(8G<G<BA8ETF <AG8E8FGQE8A78EFG;8BE78EB99BE98<GHE8<AI4?<7<AJ;B?8BE<AC4EG5864HF8G;8E<:;GG<G?8BE<AG8E8FG J4FI8FG87<AG;8C8G<G<BA8E*4#6\\*'46\\*#06\\*'&'('0&#06*BEJ4FFHC8E<BEGB4ALE<:;GG<G?8BE<AG8E8FG *1(6\\*'&'('0&#06*4GG;8G<@8B9G;86B@@<FF<BAB9G;846GFJ;<6;:<I8E<F8GBG;89BE98<GHE8B9G;8 CEBC8EGLHA78EG;<FF86G<BA ” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (*emphasis added*).\n\n 8E84F F8G 9BEG;45BI8898A74AG.4A: A8I8E ;474AL<AG8E8FG<A(8G<G<BA8ETF (EBC8EGL BE 66BHAG  <A7887 G;8 E86BE7 <F 8AG<E8?L F<?8AG 4F GB J;4G G;8 E8?4G<BAF;<C <F 58GJ88A898A74AG.4A:G;8E4H7\\*6;8@84A766BHAG\n\n56. It is axiomatic that neither the Government nor Defendant Wang can argue that they ;4I84FHC8E<BE<AG8E8FG<A4CEBC8EGL<AJ;<6;G;8LA8I8E;474A<AG8E8FG \\$<>8J<F8898A74AG .4A:64AABG9BE98<G;8E<AG8E8FG<A4CEBC8EGL<AJ;<6;F;8;47AB<AG8E8FG\n\n### **D. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys’ Fees**\n\n57. The Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to 9<?8G;<FC8G<G<BA4FF8EG<A:(8G<G<BA8ETFE<:;GGB(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL4A7GB6;4??8A:8G;89BE98<GHE8 of Petitioner's Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover 4GGBEA8LFT 988F4A76BFGF<A6HEE87<A6BAA86G<BAJ<G;G;<F(8G<G<BA4A7@4L E86BI8E(8G<G<BA8ETF 6BFGF4A7 E84FBA45?84GGBEA8LTF 988F CHEFH4AGGBG;8DH4?668FFGB \"HFG<686G Q\"R , U.S.C.  $§$  2412. Federal courts have consistently held that  $§$  853(n) proceedings are civil for the CHECBF8FB94??BJ<A:4FH668FF9H?6?4<@4AGGB6B??86G4GGBEA8LTF988FHA78EG;8\" *''0+6'& 6#6'581:* F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Douglas*, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995); *U.S. v. Bailey*, 2015 WL 1893610 at \\*20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\n\n## IV. **CONCLUSION**\n\n58. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner's Property, J;<6;E8A78EFG;8BE98<GHE8'E78E<AI4?<74FGBFH6;CEBC8EGL *See e.g.* 21 U.S.C.  $§$  853(n)(6)(A). 898A74AG.4A:7B8FABG;4I84ALE<:;GG<G?8BE<AG8E8FG<A(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGL4A7A8I8E7<7 (8G<G<BA8E;4FCEBI8A4A764ACEBI84G4ALA868FF4EL;84E<A:5LCE8CBA78E4A68B98I<78A68G;4G the Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner's Property.\n\n59. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; 4@8A7G;8BE98<GHE8'E78EGB8K6?H78(8G<G<BA8ETF(EBC8EGLBE78EG;8<@@87<4G8E8GHEAB9 (8G<G<BA8ETF (EBC8EGL GB (8G<G<BA8E BE78E G;4G (8G<G<BA8E <F 8AG<G?87 GB E86BI8E (8G<G<BA8ETF 4GGBEA8LFT 988F4A76BFGF<A6HEE87<A6BAA86G<BAJ<G;G;<F(8G<G<BA4A7:E4AG(8G<G<BA8E?84I8GB FH5@<G4A4CC?<64G<BA9BEFH6;4GGBEA8LFT988F4A76BFGF4A7:E4AGFH6;4A7BG;8EE8?<89G;4G<F A868FF4EL4A7=HFG\n\nDated: April 2, 2025\n\n4G87CE<? )8FC86G9H??LFH5@<GG87\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman \"899E8L\\* Gavenman, Esq. \"8E8@L. Schulman, Esq. \\* ,\\$%& ++ )0 \\$\\$ K86HG<I8BH?8I4E7\\*H<G8 &BEG;8G;8F74% =:4I8A@4AF6;H?@4A5; 6B@ =F6;H?@4AF6;H?@4A5; 6B@\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler (4H?. Butler, Esq. ,+\\$)\\$\\$\\*+)+!\\*\nBAA86G<6HGI8AH8&.\\*H<G8 .4F;<A:GBA C. 20036 C4H?5HG?8E?8:4?FGE4G8:<8F 6B@ *1705'.(14'6+6+10'4*\n\n# ATTESTATION AND OATH\n\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I, e ======================================================================================================================================\n\npenalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided in support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.\n\nExecuted on this D O day of April, 2025\n\n![](_page_19_Picture_5.jpeg)","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n- 诉 -\n\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\n要求裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益并修改初步没收令的第三方请愿书——经核实的主张\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n请愿人（“请愿人”）依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c) 条提起本《要求裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益并修改初步没收令的第三方请愿书》（“本请愿书”）。请愿人请求退还请愿人拥有法定权利、所有权和/或权益的资金（“请愿人财产”）（定义详见下文），该资金系由 United States Government（美国政府，以下简称“政府”）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平，以下简称“被告王”）达成的没收令的一部分而不当扣押的。具体而言，当政府扣押以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）的第 5090042770 号银行账户（“2770 账户”）内的全部资金时，请愿人财产被政府不当扣押。然而，任何涉及 2770 账户内资金（包括请愿人财产）的没收令均属违法且不当，因为被告王对 2770 账户及请愿人财产均无任何法定权利、所有权或权益。因此，没收令（定义详见下文）就请愿人财产而言归于无效，因为请愿人财产的权利、所有权或权益归属于请愿人而非被告王，并且\n\n在导致没收令做出的行为发生之时（定义见下文），优于被告王的任何权利、所有权或权益。因此，本法院应当修改没收令，从没收令中剔除请愿人财产，并命令政府立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人。为支持请愿人的主张，请愿人陈述如下：\n\n事实表明，2770 账户内的资金（包括请愿人财产）纯属政府在起诉被告王及 Miles Guo（郭文贵，以下简称“被告郭”）之前扣押资产过程中的“附带损害”。自 2770 账户被扣押以来已有两年半以上的时间，在此期间，从未有任何解释说明 2770 账户（包括请愿人财产）与被告王认罪答辩所涉及的任何罪行有何关联——而这是根据法律做出有效没收令的必要先决条件。从未有任何证据表明被告王认罪答辩所涉及的任何非法活动的收益曾存入 2770 账户；没有证据表明此类活动的任何收益曾与请愿人财产发生混同；事实上也完全没有证据表明被告王与 2770 账户有任何牵连，甚至没有证据表明她知晓该账户的存在。\n\n正如后文将予证明，请愿人是请愿人财产推定信托的受益人，请愿人财产在本案中不能被政府扣押。无论是被告王，还是承继其地位的政府，都从未证明他们对请愿人财产、对 2770 账户或总体上对 2770 账户拥有任何权益。虽然被告王同意在没收令中没收她在 2770 账户以及由此包含的请愿人财产中的“全部权利、所有权及权益”，但她的同意对 2770 账户或请愿人财产不具有法律拘束力。被告王在 2770 账户中从未拥有此类“权利、所有权及权益”；没有证据表明她是 2770 账户的签字人，\n\n曾在 2770 账户存入资金，或以其他方式对 2770 账户拥有任何控制权；也没有证据表明被告王曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770 账户存入任何款项。被告王不能没收她并不拥有且在其中没有任何权益的财产。事实上，本法院似乎在最初就从未依据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1)(A) 条的规定认定请愿人财产属于应予没收的财产。\n\n基于所有前述理由以及下文阐明的理由，请愿人谨请求本法院：\n准予本请愿书；修改没收令以排除请愿人财产；命令立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人；裁定请愿人有权追索因本请愿书而发生的律师费和诉讼费用；准予请愿人提交关于该等律师费和诉讼费用的申请；并准予该等及其他必要且公正的救济。\n\nII. 背景事实\nA. 汉密尔顿机会基金\n\n1. Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“汉密尔顿机会基金”），一家 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）独立投资组合公司，向请愿人提供了一份日期为 2022 年 1 月的《发售备忘录》（“《发售备忘录》”）。《发售备忘录》的真实准确副本作为附件 A 附于本请愿书。\n\n2. 汉密尔顿机会基金是一家“专门投资于由投资管理人挑选的股权投资的基金（该词定义见《发售备忘录》），旨在获得长期资本收益”（如《发售备忘录》第 33 页详述）。关于此项投资，汉密尔顿机会基金试图通过发行各类股份来筹集资金。见同上，第 34 页。\n\n3. 《发售备忘录》向请愿人提供了认购属于 Hamilton Opportunity Fund - Hamilton M&A Fund SP（汉密尔顿并购基金独立投资组合，以下简称“并购基金”）这一独立投资组合的 B 类股份的机会。\n\n4. 被告王不是并购基金或汉密尔顿机会基金的董事或成员，也不以其他方式享有任何公司或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n5. 被告王未在并购基金中进行任何投资；同样，证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n6. 2022 年 1 月 23 日，请愿人向汉密尔顿机会基金提交了认购并购基金价值 200,000.00 美元的 B 类股份的申请（“《认购协议》”）。《认购协议》的真实准确副本作为附件 B 附于本请愿书。\n\n7. 汉密尔顿机会基金批准并接受了《认购协议》。见附件 B，《认购协议》第 15 页。\n\n8. 2022 年 2 月 2 日，依据《认购协议》的条款，请愿人向 Silvergate Bank 的第 5090042770 号账户电汇了 200,100.00 美元（“请愿人财产”）。电汇确认单的真实准确副本作为附件 C 附于本请愿书。\n\n9. 请愿人向其电汇请愿人财产的账户即为 2770 账户。\n\n10. 依据《发售备忘录》的条款，请愿人有权根据请愿人的选择赎回请愿人的股份。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 17 页；另见同上，第 53 页（规定在满足某些限制条件的前提下，“B 类股份可在任何赎回日由股东选择赎回”）。\n\n11. 汉密尔顿机会基金的资产“与本基金任何其他独立投资组合的资产及本基金的任何一般资产保持隔离、分开且可单独识别”。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 12 页。此外，依据开曼群岛法律，应“将每个独立投资组合的独立投资组合资产与任何其他独立投资组合的独立投资组合资产保持分开且可单独识别”。附件 A，《发售备忘录》第 12 页，援引《开曼群岛公司法（修订版）》第 XIV 编。\n\nB. 账户扣押\n\n12. 2022 年 9 月 18 日，政府扣押了 2770 账户内的全部资金余额。\n\n13. 迄今为止，尚无任何公开文件显示政府是依据何种合理根据扣押 2770 账户内资金的。\n\nC. 针对被告王与被告郭的刑事案件及没收程序\n\n14. 2023 年 3 月 6 日，政府对被告王、被告郭以及第三名从未被提审的被告 William Je（余建明）提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n15. 2024 年 5 月 3 日，政府提交了针对被告王的一份替代起诉书（“《替代起诉书》”）。ECF No. 325。《替代起诉书》指控被告王犯有一项共谋电汇欺诈罪（罪名项一），《替代起诉书》第 1-2 页；以及一项共谋洗钱罪（罪名项二），《替代起诉书》第 2-3 页。《替代起诉书》还包含没收指控（“没收指控”）。《替代起诉书》第 4 页。\n\n16. 同日，即 2024 年 5 月 3 日，被告王对《替代起诉书》中所指控的罪名项一和罪名项二作了认罪答辩。\n\n17. 同样在 2024 年 5 月 3 日，本法院签署了一份《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（“原没收令”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n18. 在《原没收令》中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产中的“全部权利、所有权及权益”，包括 2770 账户，因为该等财产“构成被告个人取得的罪名项一所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及［替代］起诉书罪名项二所指控罪行的财产”。《原没收令》第 2-6 页（强调为后加）。\n\n19. 被告郭对其被指控的任何罪名均未作认罪答辩。因此，在 2024 年 5 月 22 日至 2024 年 7 月 16 日期间进行了陪审团审理（“郭案庭审”）。2024 年 7 月 16 日，陪审团裁定被告郭犯有勒索共谋、共谋电汇欺诈、共谋洗钱、共谋证券欺诈、证券欺诈、电汇欺诈和洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本请愿书提交之日，被告郭尚未被判刑。\n\n20. 2025 年 1 月 6 日，被告王被判刑。\n\n21. 2025 年 1 月 7 日，本法院签署了一份《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（“没收令”）。ECF No. 488。在涉及请愿人的部分，该《没收令》在所有实质方面与《原没收令》基本相同。在《没收令》中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产中的“全部权利、所有权及权益”，包括 2770 账户，因为该等财产“构成被告个人取得的罪名项一所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及［替代］起诉书罪名项二所指控罪行的财产”。《没收令》第 2-11 页（强调为后加）。\n\n22. 《原没收令》和《没收令》中对 2770 账户内资产的描述均如下：\n\n原存入以“Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC”名义开立于 Silvergate Bank 的第 5090042770 号账户中，并于 2022 年 9 月 18 日前后被政府扣押的 89,992,861.75 美元法定货币 (23-FB1-000074)。\n\n《原没收令》第 3 页；《没收令》第 3 页。\n\nIII. 法律论证\n\n23. 在依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 和《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c)(1) 条进行的附随刑事没收程序中，本法院必须根据优势证据标准判定：请愿人对拟被没收的财产是否拥有法定权利、所有权或权益；以及该等权利、所有权或权益是否导致没收令全部或部分无效，理由是该等权益系归属于请愿人而非被告，或者在导致财产被没收的行为发生之时，该等权益优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n24. 在本案中，根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)，请愿人（Petitioner）凭借对请愿人财产（Petitioner's Property）所享有的拟制信托，对该财产拥有合法权利、所有权或权益。此外，请愿人对请愿人财产的权益既已归属于请愿人，且优于 Defendant Wang（王被告）对请愿人财产可能享有的任何权利，因为王被告对请愿人财产或 2770 账户（Account 2770）均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。换言之，王被告不可能没收其在 2770 账户中的权益，因为她根本没有任何依法应受刑事没收的权益。因此，没收裁定（Forfeiture Order）应予以修改以剔除请愿人财产，且请愿人财产应返还给请愿人。\nA. 政府未能初步证明 2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）属于依法应当没收的财产，导致针对该等资金作出的没收裁定不当\n\n25. 根据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 的规定，政府没有任何合法事由扣留请愿人财产，因为没有任何证据表明政府曾证明过请愿人财产以及 2770 账户总体上确系可予没收的财产。\n\n26. “当政府寻求获得没收裁定时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(b)(1) 条……要求量刑法院根据适用成文法判定哪些财产属于应予没收的财产。’” U.S. v. Watts, 786 F. 3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（援引 U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)）。根据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 的规定，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院必须确定政府是否已确立财产与犯罪行为之间所必需的关联性。” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（强调后加）；Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的各个阶段，政府承担以不同确定程度证明该法律结论的举证责任：在起诉后听证会上达到合理根据的标准……或在法官审判或陪审团审判中达到优势证据的标准。” 同上（强调后加）（引文内部出处省略）。“然而，唯有在政府达到相关法律门槛的情况下，涉案财产才能在任何法律意义上被视为‘应予没收的财产’。在此之前，尽管政府已通过起诉书宣布其寻求没收的意图，该财产仅被视为‘潜在可予没收的’……或‘潜在应予没收的’。” 同上（引文内部出处省略）。\n\n27. 这意味着，在法院进入判定请愿人是否有权根据 § 853(n) 获得财产返还这一问题之前，必须首先确定争议财产在起初是否确属可予没收之财产。若非如此，政府便毫无扣押该财产的成文法授权。如果财产系遭不当扣押，则无论请愿人是否符合 § 853(n) 所规定的标准，政府都必须返还所扣押的账户。参见例如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)。\n\n28. 依据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 进行全面且完整的审查对于司法的公正实施至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已进行审查并判定该财产应予没收这一假定之上。在制定附随程序成文法时，国会选择在附随程序中将举证责任置于第三方，乃是因为“美国在刑事案件中应当已经排除合理怀疑证明了其没收指控”。S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n29. 在本案中，从未有裁定认定 2770 账户与王被告被指控（并认罪）的任何犯罪之间存在关联，因此，请愿人被迫提起本请愿。基于王被告与 Defendant Guo（Miles Guo / 郭文贵被告）刑事案件中所有公开可查阅文件所包含的信息，政府在 2770 账户问题上无法胜诉。\n\n30. 在本案的替代起诉书（Superseding Information）中，政府就第二项罪名（Count II）列入了没收指控（Forfeiture Allegation），并寻求没收特定财产。替代起诉书第 4 页。记录中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明、更不用说达到其举证责任以证明 2770 账户与王被告认罪的罪名之间存在关联。\n\n31. 关于第一项罪名（Count I），没收指控指出：“由于实施了本替代起诉书第一项罪名所指控的电信诈骗犯罪，被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，应根据《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条……以及《美国法典》第 28 编第 2461(c) 条，向美国没收构成或源自可追溯至实施上述犯罪收益的任何及所有不动产与动产。”替代起诉书第 4 页。政府必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 项下的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收理论是该财产被用于实施或便利实施刑事犯罪，或参与了刑事犯罪的实施，则政府应证明该财产与犯罪行为之间存在实质性联系。” 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n32. 记录中没有任何关于 2770 账户中的资金如何属于或源自可追溯至王被告串谋实施电信诈骗所得收益的指控……“以换取其在 Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）组织中的投资”……“被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平），又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，及其同谋（包括 Miles Guo（郭文贵））诱使投资者向郭控制的实体投资超过 $1 billion。”替代起诉书第 2 页。替代起诉书中没有任何关于王被告将诈骗计划所得收益存入 2770 账户的指控。同样，替代起诉书中也没有指控任何投资者因该诈骗计划而将资金存入 2770 账户。\n\n18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定，“构成或源自可追溯至违反各指定犯罪（包括针对王被告在第一项罪名中所指控的违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 电信诈骗罪）收益的任何财产（无论是动产还是不动产）[均应予以没收]”。\n\n2770 账户。也不可能存在此类指控，因为存入 2770 账户的唯一款项均来自投资于 Digital Bank（数字银行）的投资者，而该投资与替代起诉书中所描述的“诈骗计划”毫无任何牵涉。可以肯定的是，请愿人确认，请愿人从未成为替代起诉书中所指控的王被告任何行为的受害者，并且不认为请愿人财产曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n33. 最后，在郭被告的审判过程中，没有任何关于 2770 账户的相关证词。没有任何证词涉及诈骗计划的任何收益是否曾被存入 2770 账户，就此而言，也毫无关于王被告是否曾向 2770 账户存入任何款项的证词。简而言之，记录中没有任何内容表明 2770 账户与王被告的电信诈骗指控之间存在关联，更谈不上存在充分证据以认定政府已达到其举证责任，以及法院已正当裁定存在适格的没收关联性……关于第二项罪名……“被告 Yvette Wang，又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，应根据《美国法典》第 18 编第 982(a)(1) 条向美国没收涉及上述犯罪的任何及全部财产（无论是动产还是不动产），或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产，包括但不限于代表涉及上述犯罪财产金额的以美国货币计价的款项。”替代起诉书第 4 页。关于第二项罪名，政府“必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 项下的没收要件”。U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015)。\n\n18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定，“法院对被判犯有违反本编第 1956、1957 或 1960 条[洗钱成文法]罪行的人进行判决时，应命令该人向美国没收涉及该犯罪的任何财产（无论是动产还是不动产），或任何可追溯至该等财产的财产。” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调后加）。\n\n35. 替代起诉书指控王被告犯有串谋洗钱罪，因为王被告“在明知涉及某些金融交易的财产代表某种形式的非法活动收益的情况下，意图进行并确实进行及试图进行该等金融交易……且该等交易实际上涉及指定非法活动的收益，即本起诉书第一项罪名中所指控的电信诈骗计划的收益”。替代起诉书第 3 页。\n\n36. 目前尚不清楚 2770 账户如何能够因第二项罪名的洗钱指控而被没收。从指控内容来看，洗钱指控源于王被告使用“第一项罪名中指控的电信诈骗计划收益”进行金融交易。替代起诉书第 3 页。如前所述，没有任何证据表明 2770 账户中的资金与第一项罪名指控的诈骗计划存在任何关联（见上文第 31-33 段）——没有任何证据表明该等资金“构成或源自可追溯至实施”电信诈骗所得收益。参见例如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。由于 2770 账户中的资金既非诈骗计划收益，亦非源自诈骗计划收益，因此该等资金不能作为第二项罪名中洗钱指控的根据，亦不能作为王被告第二项罪名定罪的一部分被没收。\n\n37. 政府为支持洗钱指控而指控的公开行为进一步未能证明 2770 账户中的资金如何具有可没收性。在替代起诉书中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项行为。替代起诉书第 3 页。尽管政府声称这两项公开行为是王被告为推进涉嫌串谋洗钱而实施的“其他行为之一”（替代起诉书第 3 页），但这些其他行为从未被明确指出。\n\n38. 首先，根据替代起诉书，在 2020 年 5 月 20 日，王被告以 GTV 的名义开设了一个银行账户，值得注意的是，该账户并非 2770 账户。替代起诉书第 3 页。2020 年 6 月 2 日，王被告向该账户转账约 $200 million。同上。转入 GTV 账户的资金来自 Saraca Media Group, Inc.（萨拉卡媒体集团）（“Saraca”）名下的 JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）账户（郭案审判，2024 年 5 月 31 日，953:25-954:4；郭案审判，2024 年 6 月 26 日，4359:1-14），而非来自 2770 账户。从未有任何证词表明来自 2770 账户的任何款项曾进入 Saraca 的摩根大通银行账户，进而再转入替代起诉书所提及的 GTV 账户。此外，2770 账户在 2020 年甚至根本不存在。\n\n39. 政府指控的第二项行为是“在 2020 年 6 月 5 日或前后”，王被告“授权从 GTV 的母公司 Saraca 向一家高风险对冲基金电汇 $100 million，以使 Saraca 及其最终实益拥有人郭被告之子获益”。替代起诉书第 3-4 页。首先，这明确指控资金是从 Saraca 账户转出的，而 2770 账户显然并非该账户。同样，也从未有任何证词表明来自 2770 账户的任何款项曾进入 Saraca 账户。此外，2770 账户在 2020 年再次根本不存在。\n\n40. 正如上述论证所示，完全没有任何关于 2770 号账户（Account 2770）的指控或证言。记录中唯一提及 2770 号账户之处，便是被告 Wang（王女士）同意没收该账户。然而，“被告同意没收[并不]废除所寻求没收的财产与所定罪行之间存在关联性的要求。”Beltramea, 785 F.3d at 291。正如第八巡回上诉法院（Eighth Circuit）所强调的，“地区法院负有独立职责，以确保所要求的关联性确实存在。”同上引（强调为原文所加）。\n\n41. 在本案中，无论是替代起诉书（Superseding Information）、原没收命令（Original Forfeiture Order）还是没收命令（Forfeiture Order）中，均没有任何关于 2770 号账户与被告 Wang 认罪之罪名之间存在哪怕是声称之关联性的事实指控。\n\n42. 政府在未证明存在关联性的情况下继续扣留 2770 号账户中的资金，是不当且不公正的。如果政府保留 2770 号账户中的资金，将构成不当得利，因为这些资金属于包括请愿人（Petitioner）在内的第三方，而这些第三方：(1) 不是被告 Wang 或被告 Guo（郭先生）；且 (2) 未参与该欺诈计划（Fraud Scheme），更不用说作为该计划的受害者。参见如 U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)（解释刑事“没收不具有救济目的，旨在惩罚犯罪者，且不能强加于无辜所有权人。”）（强调为原文所加）。\n\nB. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，因为该等财产上存在拟制信托\n\n43. 即使抛开政府未能妥善证明 2770 号账户中的资金属于替代起诉书中所指控之任何活动的一部分不谈，请愿人财产（Petitioner's Property）也应当归还给请愿人，因为请愿人对其享有的权益优于被告 Wang，或目前代位其主张的政府。\n\n44. 根据拟制信托（constructive trust）原则，请愿人财产受到保护，并且无论存在任何其他所有权主张，包括被告 Wang 或代位其主张的政府，该财产仍属于请愿人的财产。第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）已认定，“在类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收成文法适用中，拟制信托构成对该财产的‘合法权利、所有权或权益’，且该等权益‘可能优于’被告的权益。”Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n45. “其目的在于防止不当得利，尽管不当得利并不必然意味着存在不法行为。……所必需的是法院认定某一方持有财产的情形在衡平法与良知上使其不应予以保留。”Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999)（强调为原文所加；内部引文省略）。\n\n46. “一方是否构成不当得利是适用衡平法原则得出的法律结论。……衡平法院在判令设立拟制信托时不受固定僵化公式的束缚。救济的尺度必须由交易的衡平性所决定。……当一人保留了一项利益，而结合转让时的具体情形并考量双方关系，保留该利益是不公正的时，即构成不当得利。”同上引（内部引文省略）。\n\n3 “联邦普通法冲突法规则是适用对诉讼具有最大利益管辖区的法律。”In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., No. 89 CV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992)。在本案中，有三个竞争管辖区的法律可以适用：New York（纽约州）、California（加利福尼亚州）和 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）。请愿人支付请愿人财产是依据受开曼群岛法律管辖的《认购协议》（Subscription Agreement）。参见证物 B（Exhibit B），《认购协议》第 8 页第 2(s) 段。当请愿人存入请愿人财产时，2770 号账户是加利福尼亚州一家银行的账户。自 2770 号账户被扣押（依据纽约州某法院签发的搜查与扣押令）后，该笔资金目前由位于纽约的政府占有。纽约是本案的法院地所在州（forum state）。从这些事实来看，纽约对本诉讼具有最大利益，其法律应当适用于拟制信托的设立。然而，在政府对该法律选择决定提出异议的范围内，请愿人保留要求本法院根据加利福尼亚州和/或开曼群岛法律在请愿人财产上设立拟制信托的一切权利。\n\n47. New York Court of Appeals（纽约州上诉法院）概述了在某些情形下确定是否应当设立拟制信托所考量的若干因素，包括：“信义或信托关系、承诺、基于该承诺的财产转让以及不当得利。”Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976)。然而，纽约州法院长期以来一直认定，这些因素仅仅是实用的指导准则，并非必须机械满足的护身符。Counihan, 194 F.3d at 362（引用了陈述该命题的大量纽约州判例）。\n\n48. 在本案中，当请愿人签署《认购协议》以取得 Hamilton M&A Fund SP 的某些 B 类股份时，请愿人与 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 之间存在拟制信托关系。根据《认购协议》，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 向请愿人承诺，请愿人财产将投资于数字银行（Digital Bank）。基于对该承诺的信赖，请愿人按照《认购协议》的指示将请愿人财产电汇至 2770 号账户。政府对 2770 号账户的不当扣押迫使 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 违背了对请愿人财产的承诺。\n\n49. 即使法院认定 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 与请愿人之间不存在保密关系和/或信义关系，该认定也不具有决定性，因为信义关系的缺失并不排除法院认定存在拟制信托。参见 Koreag, 961 F.2d at 353（指出“然而，我们不认为双方之间缺乏信义关系就会自动使拟制信托主张归于无效。尽管信义关系是纽约州法院引用的因素之一，但在衡平法另有要求时，任何单一因素的缺失本身并不会否定拟制信托的设立”）。\n\n50. 鉴于政府在没有任何合法理由的情况下保留请愿人财产，这将导致政府获得不当得利。参见 Counihan, 194 F.3d at 361（第二巡回法院认定，在包括政府没收导致违反默示承诺在内的情形下设立拟制信托是恰当的）；同上引（第二巡回法院认定，在“政府的没收迫使违背了该项承诺，从而可能导致政府获得潜在的不当得利，并伴随原告相应的不公正贫困化”的情形下，设立拟制信托是恰当的）。\n\n51. 因此，请愿人已证明应当在请愿人财产上设立拟制信托。此类拟制信托“在类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收成文法适用中，符合对该财产的‘合法权利、所有权或权益’，且该等权益‘可能优于’被告的权益”。Willis, 652 F.3d at 242。\n\n52. 设立拟制信托所针对的财产——即请愿人财产——是极易追踪的。参见证物 B。此外，即使政府主张其他主体也享有从任何被没收财产中获得赔偿的权利，请愿人也完全可以获得拟制信托的救济。“当一方能够直接追踪其资产而无需诉诸法律拟制或推定时代，拟制信托即使在涉及多个欺诈受害人的案件中亦可适用。”FTC v. Commonwealth Mktg. Grp., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 530, 540 (W.D. Pa. 1999)；亦见 SEC v. FTC Credit Sols. LLC, 2012 WL 12888636, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jun. 8, 2012)。“当权利主张人能够直接追踪其财产时，法院不能随意无视拟制信托法，即便这会使一名无辜受害人的处境优于另一名同样无辜的受害人。”同上引。多重欺诈案件的“传统处理方法”是“将可识别的资产归还给其所有权人，仅在特定识别或交易追踪无法实现时才转向按比例分配。”同上引第 *8 页（引用《侵权法重述（第三版）：返还不当得利》第 59 节，报告人附注）。\n\nC. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有优先权益\n\n53. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益绝对优于政府或被告 Wang 对请愿人财产可能享有的任何权益。\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 明确规定，除了请愿人对被没收财产享有权益之外，请愿人还必须以优势证据证明，请愿人的权益“使得没收命令全部或部分无效，因为该权利、所有权或权益在导致本条项下财产被没收的行为发生时已归属于请愿人而非被告，或优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益”。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（强调为原文所加）。\n\n55. 在本案中，如上所述，被告 Wang 从未对请愿人财产或 2770 号账户享有任何权益。事实上，记录中完全没有关于被告 Wang 与请愿人财产之间有何关系的记载。被告 Wang 不能没收其从未享有权益的财产中的权益。\n\nD. 请愿人有权获得诉讼费用及律师费\n\n57. 请愿人被迫聘请法律顾问并支付了费用以提交本请愿书，主张请愿人对请愿人财产的权利并对请愿人财产的没收提出异议。在本次程序中胜诉后，请愿人保留追索因本请愿书而发生的律师费和诉讼费用的全部权利，并可根据《平等获取司法法》（Equal Access to Justice Act，简称“EAJA”），28 U.S.C. § 2412，收回请愿人的诉讼费用和合理的律师费。联邦法院一贯认定，出于允许胜诉申请人根据 EAJA 收取律师费的目的，§ 853(n) 程序属于民事性质。参见 United States v. Caro, 597 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009)；United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995)；U.S. v. Bailey, 2015 WL 1893610 at *20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015)。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n58. 基于上述理由，请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，该权益使得没收命令就该财产而言归于无效。参见如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告 Wang 对请愿人财产不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。请愿人已经证明且能够在任何必要的听证会上以优势证据证明，没收命令需要作出修改以排除请愿人财产。\n\n59. 因此，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 准许本请愿书；(2) 修改没收命令以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人；(4) 命令请愿人有权收回因本请愿书而发生的请愿人律师费及诉讼费用，并准予请愿人提交关于该等律师费及诉讼费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的该等其他救济。\n\n日期：2025年4月2日\n\n谨此提交\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\nJeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq.\nJeremy W. Schulman, Esq.\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n7500 Old Georgetown Road, Suite 901\nBethesda, MD 20814\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\nPaul W. Butler, Esq.\nPAUL BUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES, PLLC\n1717 K Street NW, Suite 900\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n请愿人代理律师\n\n见证与宣誓\n\n依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人在接受伪证罪处罚的前提下声明，本人对该财产的权利主张并非无理取闹，且就本人所知所信，为支持该权利主张所提供的信息均属真实准确。\n\n签署于 2025年4月2日\n\n[签名]","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","853(n)","Je","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":4524,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-05 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-05","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:45:12"}