{"id":"court_sdny_641_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":641,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-06","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方请愿书——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF 641（2025年4月6日提交）。某请愿人主张对 Silvergate Bank 账户（Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名下账户 5090042770）内资金拥有法律权益，反对美国政府基于对被告 Yvette Wang 的没收令而对该账户的冻结；请愿人主张 Wang 对该账户及请愿人财产无任何权利、所有权或利益，因此没收令对请愿人财产的适用无效，并要求立即返还财产及提起律师费诉讼。","summary_en":"Third-party petition—United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF 641 (filed April 6, 2025). A petitioner asserts a legal interest in funds in a Silvergate Bank account held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (account 5090042770) and contests the government's seizure of those funds pursuant to a forfeiture order against defendant Yvette Wang; the petitioner argues that Wang has no right, title, or interest in the account or petitioner's property, rendering the forfeiture order invalid as applied to petitioner's property, and seeks immediate return of the property and recovery of attorney fees.","body_en":"1\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n-  v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG\na/k/a “Yanping,”\na/k/a “Y,”\n\nDefendant.\n\nTHIRD-PARTY PETITION TO\nADJUDICATE PETITIONER’S\nINTEREST IN FORFEITED\nPROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE\nPRELIMINARY ORDER OF\nFORFEITURE\n- VERIFIED CLAIM OF\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner\n (“Petitioner”) files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate\nPetitioner’s Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture,\npursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the “Petition”).\nPetitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest\n(“Petitioner’s Property”) (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government\n(the “Government”) improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with\nDefendant Yvette Wang (“Defendant Wang”). Specifically, Petitioner’s Property was improperly\nseized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in bank account number\n5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Account\n2770”). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770, including\nPetitioner’s Property, was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or\ninterest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner’s Property. The Forfeiture Order (as more fully\ndefined below) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner’s Property because right, title, or\ninterest in Petitioner’s Property was vested in the Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was\n\n---\n\n2\n\nsuperior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the\nacts which gave rise to the Forfeiture Order (as defined below). As such, this Court should amend\nthe Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner’s Property from the Forfeiture Order and order that the\nGovernment immediately return Petitioner’s Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner’s\nclaim, Petitioner states as follows:\nI.\nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nIt appears that the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner’s Property, were purely\n“collateral damage” in the Government’s seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant\nWang and Miles Guo (“Defendant Guo”). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure\nof Account 2770, and in that time span, there has never been any explanation as to how Account\n2770 (including Petitioner’s Property) is related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang\npled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any\nshowing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were\never deposited in Account 2770; no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever\ncommingled with Petitioner’s Property; and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had\nanything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is a beneficiary of a constructive trust over Petitioner’s\nProperty and Petitioner’s Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither\nDefendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, have ever demonstrated that\nthey have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner’s Property in Account 2770 or in Account 2770 in\ngeneral. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of “all her right, title, and interest” in\nAccount 2770 (and thus, Petitioner’s Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), her\nconsent has no legal bearing as to Account 2770 or Petitioner’s Property. Defendant Wang never\nhad such “right, title, and interest” in Account 2770 – there is no evidence that she was a signatory\n\n---\n\n3\n\non Account 2770, ever deposited money into Account 2770, or otherwise had any control over\nAccount 2770, and there is no evidence that Defendant Wang ever directed anyone, directly or\nindirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that\nshe does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never\nestablished that Petitioner’s Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required\nby Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner\nrespectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to\nexclude Petitioner’s Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner’s Property to Petitioner;\n(4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner’s attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in\nconnection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys’\nfees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\nII.\nBACKGROUND FACTS\nA. Petitioner’s Property\n1.\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Hamilton Opportunity Fund”), a Cayman\nIslands Segregated Portfolio Company, provided Petitioner with an Offering Memorandum (the\n“Offering Memorandum”) dated January 20, 2022. A true and correct copy of the Offering\nMemorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit A.\n2.\nHamilton Opportunity Fund is a “fund specializing in equity investments selected\nby the Investment Manager [as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum] with a view to\nlong-term capital gains.” Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 33. The Investment Manager (as\nthat term is defined in the Offering Memorandum) had identified an opportunity to invest in a bank\n(the “Digital Bank”) (as more fully described in Offering Memorandum at 33). In connection with\nthis investment, Hamilton Opportunity Fund sought to raise capital by issuing various classes of\n\n---\n\n4\n\nshares. Id. at 34.\n3.\nThe Offering Memorandum offered Petitioner an opportunity to acquire Class B\nShares attributed to a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund - Hamilton M&A Fund\nSP (the “M&A Fund”).\n4.\nDefendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any\ncorporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund or Hamilton Opportunity Fund.  The evidentiary\nrecord is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n5.\nDefendant Wang did not make any investments in the M&A Fund; again, the\nevidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n6.\nOn February 2, 2022, Petitioner submitted an application (the “Subscription\nAgreement”) to Hamilton Opportunity Fund for a subscription for $110,000 worth of Class B\nShares in the M&A Fund. A true and correct copy of the Subscription Agreement is attached hereto\nas Exhibit B.\n7.\nOn February 2, 2022, Hamilton Opportunity Fund, on behalf of the M&A Fund,\napproved and accepted the Subscription Agreement. See Exhibit B, Subscription Agreement at\n15.\n8.\nOn February 2, 2022, pursuant to the terms of the Subscription Agreement,\nPetitioner wired $110,050 (the “Petitioner’s Property”) to Account Number 5090042770 at\nSilvergate Bank. A true and correct copy of the wire confirmation is attached hereto as Exhibit C.\n9.\nThe account to which Petitioner wired Petitioner’s Property to is Account 2770.\n10.\nPursuant to the terms of the Offering Memorandum, Petitioner is entitled to\nredemption of Petitioner’s shares at the Petitioner’s option. Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at\n17; see also id. at 53 (stating that subject to certain limitations, “Class B Shares may be redeemed\n\n---\n\n5\n\nat the option of the Shareholder on any Redemption Day”).\n11.\nThe assets of Hamilton Opportunity Fund are “kept segregated, separate and\nseparately identifiable from those of any other segregated portfolios of the Fund and any general\nassets of the Fund.” Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 12. In addition, pursuant to the laws of\nthe Cayman Islands, it is the duty of Hamilton Opportunity Fund to “segregate, and keep\nsegregated, portfolio assets of each segregated portfolio separate and separately identifiable from\nsegregated portfolio assets of any other segregated portfolio.” Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum\nat 22-23 (citing the Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands, Part XIV, 219(6)(b)).\nB. Seizure of Account 2770\n12.\nOn September 18, 2022, the Government seized the entire balance of the funds in\nAccount 2770.\n13.\nTo date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the\nGovernment had to seize the funds in Account 2770.\nC. The Criminal Case Against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the\nForfeiture Order\n14.\nOn March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang\nand Defendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n15.\nOn May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the\n“Superseding Information”) against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information\ncharged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I)\n(Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering\n(Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a\nForfeiture Allegation (the “Forfeiture Allegation”). Superseding Information at 4.\n16.\nOn the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count\n\n---\n\n6\n\nII as charged in the Superseding Information.\n17.\nAlso on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture\nas to Specific Property/Money Judgment (“Original Forfeiture Order”). ECF No. 329.\n18.\nIn the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, “all her\nright, title, and interest in” certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property\n“constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally\nobtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding]\nInformation.” Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n19.\nDefendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him.\nAccordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the “Guo Trial”). On\nJuly 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to\ncommit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities\nfraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this\nPetition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n20.\nOn January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n21.\nOn January 7, 2025, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture\nas to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the “Forfeiture Order”) ECF No. 488. As it pertains to\nPetitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all\nmaterial respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, “all her right, title,\nand interest in” certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property “constitute[ed]\nproceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or\nproperty involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.” Forfeiture\nOrder at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n---\n\n7\n\n22.\nThe assets in Account 2770 are described in both the Original Forfeiture Order and\nthe Forfeiture Order as follows:\n$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account\nnumber 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September\n18, 2022 (23-FBl-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\nIII.\nARGUMENT\n23.\nIn an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of\nthe evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited,\nand whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part,\nbecause such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any\nright, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to\nthe forfeiture of the property. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n24.\nHere, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner’s Property pursuant\nto 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of a constructive trust over such property. Moreover,\nPetitioner’s interest in Petitioner’s Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any\nright Defendant Wang had in Petitioner’s Property because Defendant Wang had no legal right,\ntitle or, interest in either Petitioner’s Property or Account 2770. In other words, Defendant Wang\ncould not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject\nto criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner’s\nProperty, and Petitioner’s Property should be returned to Petitioner.\n\n---\n\n8\n\nA. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770,\nIncluding Petitioner’s Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First\nInstance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds\n25.\nThe Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner’s Property because there is\nno evidence that the Government has ever demonstrated that Petitioner’s Property, and Account\n2770 in general, is actually forfeitable property, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n26.\n“When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, ‘Federal Rule of\nCriminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is\nsubject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.’” U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)\n(citing U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, “if\nthe government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must determine whether the\ngovernment has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.”\nFed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); Watts, 786 F.3d at 172. “At various points in the\nproceedings, the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion to varying\ndegrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . .or by a\npreponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal\ncitations omitted). “Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the\nproperty in question be considered ‘subject to forfeiture’ in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the\ngovernment has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property\nis seen merely as ‘potentially forfeitable’ . . . or ‘potentially subject to forfeiture.’” Id. (internal\ncitations omitted).\n27.\nThis means that before the court reaches the question of whether the petitioner is\nentitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in\ndispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority\nto seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the\n\n---\n\n9\n\naccounts seized regardless of whether the petitioner can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). See\ne.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n28.\nA full and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair\nadministration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has\nconducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary\nproceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an\nancillary proceeding, since “the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in\nthe criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.” S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,\n3392.\n29.\nIn this matter, there has never been a determination of whether there exists a nexus\nbetween Account 2770 and any of the offenses Defendant Wang was charged with (and pled guilty\nto), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained\nin the publicly-available documents in both Defendant Wang’s and Defendant Guo’s criminal case,\nthe Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n30.\nHere, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture\nAllegation as to both Counts I and Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding\nInformation at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show,\nlet alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which\nDefendant Wang pled guilty.\n31.\nAs to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, “[a]s a result of committing the\nwire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a\n“Yanping” a/k/a “Y,” the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United\n\n---\n\n10\n\nStates Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C)1. . .and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and\nall property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the\ncommission of said offense.” Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the\nelements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18\nU.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, “if the Government’s theory of forfeiture is that the property was\nused to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the\ncommission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial\nconnection between the property and the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n32.\nThe record is devoid of any allegations pertaining to how funds in Account 2770\nare, or are derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang’s conspiracy to commit wire fraud.\nThe Superseding Information alleges that “[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about\nMarch 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive\nstock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and\nGClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the\nHimalaya Exchange [(the “Fraud Scheme”)]. Through the [Fraud Scheme], YVETTE WANG,\na/k/a “Yanping,” a/k/a “Y,” the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced\ninvestors to invest more than $1 billion into entities Guo controlled.” Superseding Information at\n2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing\nany proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into Account 2770. Similarly, there are no allegations in the\nSuperseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into\n\n1 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that “[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture]\nwhich constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of” various specified\noffenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang\nin Count I.\n\n---\n\n11\n\nAccount 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits into Account 2770 were\nfrom investors who were investing in the Digital Bank – an investment that is not implicated in\nany way by the “Fraud Scheme” described in the Superseding Information.  To be sure, Petitioner\naffirms that Petitioner was never a victim of any conduct by Defendant Wang alleged in the\nSuperseding Information and does not believe that any of Petitioner’s Property was ever used in\nany unlawful activity.\n33.\nFinally, there was no relevant testimony during Defendant Guo’s trial concerning\nAccount 2770. There was no testimony regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme\nwere ever deposited into Account 2770, nor, for that matter, whether Defendant Wang ever\ndeposited any money into Account 2770. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would\nindicate there is a nexus between Account 2770 and Defendant Wang’s wire fraud charge, let alone\nsufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing, and the Court\nproperly adjudicated, that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of Account 2770 to be proper.\n34.\nAs to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, “[a]s a result of committing the\nmoney laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a\n“Yanping” a/k/a “Y,” the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United\nStates Code, Section 982(a)(1)2, any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense,\nor any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United\nStates currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.” Superseding\nInformation at 4. As to Count II, The Government “must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18\n\n2 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that “[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an\noffense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that\nthe person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or\nany property traceable to such property.” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\n---\n\n12\n\nU.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.” U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th\nCir. 2015).\n35.\nThe Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy\nto launder money because Defendant Wang “knowing that the property involved in certain\nfinancial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did\nconduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . .and which in fact involved the\nproceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count\nOne of this Information.” Superseding Information at 3.\n36.\nIt is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited for the money laundering charge\nin Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang\nengaging in financial transactions with the “proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count\nOne.” Superseding Information at 3.  As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account\n2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (see ¶¶ 31-33, above) – there is no\nevidence that such funds “constitute[d] or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the\ncommission of” wire fraud. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were\nnot Fraud Scheme proceeds nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could\nnot serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part\nof Defendant Wang’s conviction for Count II.\n37.\nThe overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge\nfurther fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be forfeitable. In the Superseding\nInformation, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding\nInformation at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were “among others”\nthat Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money\n\n---\n\n13\n\n(Superseding Information at 3), these other acts were never identified.\n38.\nFirst, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened\na bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was not. Superseding\nInformation at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately $200 million to\nthat account. Id. The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank\naccount held by Saraca Media Group, Inc. (“Saraca”) (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo\nTrial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), not from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any\nmoney from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be\ntransferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information. Moreover, Account 2770 did\nnot even exist in 2020.\n39.\nThe second act the Government alleges is that “on or about June 5, 2020,”\nDefendant Wang “authorized a wire transfer of $100 million from GTV’s parent company, Saraca,\nto a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Defendant\nGuo’s son.” Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was\ntransferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there\nwas never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account.\nMoreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n40.\nAs seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding\nAccount 2770 whatsoever. The only reference in the record to Account 2770 is Defendant Wang’s\nconsent to forfeit it. However, “a defendant’s consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the\nrequirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of\noffense.” Beltramea, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, “[t]he district court had an\nindependent duty to ensure that the required nexus exists.” Id. (emphasis added).\n\n---\n\n14\n\n41.\nHere, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the\nOriginal Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account\n2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n42.\nThe Government’s continued retention of the funds in Account 2770, without\nshowing that there is a nexus, is wrong and inequitable. Should the Government retain the funds\nin Account 2770, it will be unjustly enriched, since the funds belong to third parties, including\nPetitioner, who are (1) not Defendant Wang or Defendant Guo; and (2) not involved the Fraud\nScheme, let alone victims of such a scheme.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)\n(explaining that a criminal “forfeiture serves no remedial purpose, is designed to punish the\noffender, and cannot be imposed upon innocent owners.”) (emphasis added).\nB. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner’s Property Because There Exists a\nConstructive Trust Over Such Property\n43.\nEven putting aside the Government’s failure to properly demonstrate that the funds\nin Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner’s\nProperty should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does\nDefendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n44.\nUnder the doctrine of constructive trusts, Petitioner’s Property is protected and\nremains the property of Petitioner regardless of any other ownership claims, including Defendant\n\n---\n\n15\n\nWang’s or the Government, standing in her shoes. The Second Circuit3 has held that “a\nconstructive trust qualifies as a ‘legal right, title, or interest in the property’ that ‘may be a superior\ninterest’ to a defendant’s interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. §\n853(n)(6)(A).” Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).\n45.\n“A constructive trust is an equitable remedy, necessarily flexible to accomplish its\npurpose.” Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). “Its\npurpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate\nthe performance of a wrongful act. . .What is necessary is that the court identify a party who is\nholding property under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to\nretain it.” Id. (internal citations omitted).\n46.\n“Whether a party is unjustly enriched is a legal conclusion reached through the\napplication of principles of equity. . . A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound\nby no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief. . . Unjust\nenrichment results when a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the transfer\nand considering the relationship of the parties, it would be inequitable to retain.” Id. (internal\n\n3 “The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the\ngreatest interest in the litigation.” In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d\nCir. 1992), aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., No. 89 CIV. 3071\n(WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). Here, there are three competing jurisdictions\nwhose laws could apply: New York, California, and Cayman Islands. Petitioner’s payment of\nPetitioner’s Property was pursuant to the Subscription Agreement, which is governed by Cayman\nIslands law. See Exhibit B, Subscription Agreement at 8, ¶ 2(s). Account 2770 was an account in\na California bank when Petitioner deposited Petitioner’s Property. Since Account 2770 was seized\n(pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a court in New York state), the funds are now\nin possession of the Government in New York. New York is the forum state of this case. From\nthese facts, New York has the greatest interest in this litigation, and its laws should apply to an\nimposition of a constructive trust. However, to the extent that the Government challenges this\nchoice-of-law determination, Petitioner reserves all rights to request that this Court impose a\nconstructive trust over Petitioner’s Property under California and/or Cayman Islands law.\n\n---\n\n16\n\ncitations omitted).\n47.\nThe New York Court of Appeals outlined several factors to be considered in\ndetermining whether a constructive trust should be imposed in certain circumstances, including\n“(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4)\nunjust enrichment.” Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976). However, New York courts\nhave long held that “these factors are merely useful guides and are not talismanic.” Counihan, 194\nF.3d at 362 (citing to a plethora of New York state cases that have stated this proposition).\n48.\nHere, there is a constructive trust for the benefit of Petitioner over Petitioner’s\nProperty as of the date that it was deposited into Account 2770.\n49.\nPetitioner entered into a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship4 with Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund when Petitioner executed the Subscription Agreement in order to acquire certain\nClass B shares in Hamilton M&A Fund SP.  Per the Subscription Agreement, Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC made a promise to Petitioner that Petitioner’s Property would be invested\nin the Digital Bank. In reliance on this promise, the Petitioner wired Petitioner’s Property to\nAccount 2770 as instructed in the Subscription Agreement. The Government’s improper seizure\nof Account 2770 forced a breach of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC’s promise to invest\nPetitioner’s Property into the Digital Bank. Because of Government’s seizure, Petitioner is not\neven able to exercise his Right of Redemption to obtain back Petitioner’s Property. This would\n\n4 Even if the Court determines that the relationship was not confidential and/or there was no\nfiduciary relationship between Hamilton Opportunity Fund and Petitioner, such would not be\ndeterminative, as the absence of a fiduciary relationship does not preclude the Court from finding\na constructive trust exists. See Koreag, 961 F.2d at 353 (stating that “[w]e do not believe, however,\nthat the lack of a fiduciary relationship between [the parties] automatically defeats [a] claim of\nconstructive trust. Although a fiduciary relationship is one of the factors cited by New York courts,\nthe absence of any one factor will not itself defeat the imposition of a constructive trust when\notherwise required by equity”).\n\n---\n\n17\n\nresult in unjust enrichment to the benefit of the Government since the Government is now retaining\nPetitioner’s Property without any legal cause to do so. See, e.g., U.S. v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 340\n(2nd Cir. 1995) (finding that imposition of a constructive trust was proper where, amongst other\nreasons, Government’s forfeiture caused a breach of an implied promise); Torres v. $36,256.80\nU.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a constructive trust appropriate  where\n“The government’s forfeiture forced a breach of that promise that may result in a potentially unjust\nenrichment of the government (and commensurate unjust impoverishment of [the plaintiff]).”)\n50.\nAccordingly, Petitioner has shown that a constructive trust should be imposed over\nPetitioner’s Property. Such a constructive trust “qualifies as a ‘legal right, title, or interest in the\nproperty’ that ‘may be a superior interest’ to a defendant’s interest for the purposes of a forfeiture\nstatute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).” Willis, 652 F.3d at 242.\n51.\nThe property upon which the constructive trust is sought – Petitioners Property - is\neasily traceable. See Exhibit C.\n52.\nMoreover, the imposition of a constructive trust is fully available to Petitioner, even\nif the Government contends that others are owed restitution from any forfeited property. “When a\nparty can directly trace its assets, without resorting to fictions or presumptions, a constructive trust\nis available even in cases involving multiple fraud victims.” U.S. v. Ovid, 2012 WL 2087084, *7\n(E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012). “[C]ourts are not free to disregard the law of constructive trusts when a\nclaimant can directly trace its property, even if this leaves one innocent victim better off than\nanother equally innocent victim.” Id. The “orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases” is to\n“return[] identifiable assets to their owners, turning to pro rata distribution only when specific\nidentification or transactional tracing is impossible.” Id. at *8 (citing Restatement (Third) of\nRestitution & Unjust Enrichment, § 59 Reporter’s Note G, at 437).\n\n---\n\n18\n\nC. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner’s Property\n53.\nPetitioner’s interest in Petitioner’s Property is absolutely superior to any interest\nthat the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner’s Property.\n54.\n21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner’s interest in the forfeited\nproperty, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner’s\ninterest “renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest\nwas vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest\nof the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the\nproperty under this section.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n55.\nHere, as set forth above, Defendant Wang never had any interest in Petitioner’s\nProperty or Account 2770; indeed, the record is entirely silent as to what the relationship is\nbetween Defendant Wang, the Fraud Scheme, and Account 2770.\n56.\nIt is axiomatic that neither the Government nor Defendant Wang can argue that they\nhave a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Likewise, Defendant\nWang cannot forfeit her interest in a property in which she had no interest.\nD. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys’ Fees\n57.\nThe Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to\nfile this petition asserting Petitioner’s right to Petitioner’s Property and to challenge the forfeiture\nof Petitioner’s Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover\nattorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner’s\ncosts and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28\nU.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the\npurposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney’s fees under the EAJA. See United\nStates v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th\n\n---\n\n19\n\nCir. 1995); U.S. v. Bailey, 2015 WL 1893610 at *20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\nIV.\nCONCLUSION\n58.\nFor the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner’s Property,\nwhich renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. See e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\nDefendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner’s Property, and never did.\nPetitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that\nthe Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner’s Property.\n59.\nTherefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition;\n(2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner’s Property; (3) order the immediate return of\nPetitioner’s Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner’s\nattorneys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to\nsubmit an application for such attorneys’ fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is\nnecessary and just.\nDated: April 2, 2025\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\n\nJeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq.\nJeremy W. Schulman, Esq.\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\n\nPaul W. Butler, Esq.\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\nCounsel for Petitioner\n\n---\n\n20\nATTESTATION AND OATH\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I,\n attest and declare under\npenalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided\nin support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.\nExecuted on this _05_____ day of April, 2025\nSignature","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n-  诉 -\n\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平）\n又名“Yanping”\n又名“Y”\n\n被告。\n\n裁定请愿人对被没收财产权益并修改初步没收令之第三方请愿书\n- 经核实之主张\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n请愿人（“请愿人”）根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c) 条，提交本《裁定请愿人对被没收财产权益并修改初步没收令之第三方请愿书》（“本请愿书”）。请愿人请求返还请愿人享有合法权利、所有权和/或权益的资金（“请愿人财产”）（定义详见下文），且该资金系由 United States Government（美国政府）（“政府”）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平）（“被告王”）达成的没收令的一部分而不当扣押。具体而言，当政府扣押了以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名义在 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）开立的账号为 5090042770 的银行账户（“2770账户”）中的所有资金时，请愿人财产即遭到了政府的不当扣押。然而，任何涉及 2770 账户内资金（包括请愿人财产）的没收令均属违法且不当，因为被告王对 2770 账户或请愿人财产均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。因此，没收令（定义详见下文）就请愿人财产而言归于无效，因为对请愿人财产的权利、所有权或权益自始归属于请愿人而非被告王，并且在产生没收令（定义见下文）的作为发生时，该等权益即优于被告王的任何权利、所有权或权益。据此，本法院应当修改没收令，将请愿人财产从没收令中剔除，并命令政府立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人。为支持请愿人的主张，请愿人陈述如下：\n\nI.\n初步声明\n\n2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）显然纯属政府在起诉被告王及 Miles Guo（郭文贵）（“被告郭”）之前扣押资产时的“附带损害”。自 2770 账户被扣押以来已有两年半以上的时间，在这一时间跨度内，从未有任何解释说明 2770 账户（包括请愿人财产）如何与被告王认罪答辩的任何罪行相关联，而这在法律上是构成有效没收令的必要前提条件。从未有任何证据表明被告王认罪答辩的任何非法活动的收益曾存入 2770 账户；没有证据表明此类活动的任何收益曾与请愿人财产混同；事实上，也没有证据表明被告王曾与 2770 账户有任何关系，甚至不知晓其存在。\n\n如下文所述，请愿人是对请愿人财产设立的推定信托的受益人，本案中政府不得扣押请愿人财产。无论被告王，还是现承继其地位的政府，均未曾证明其对 2770 账户中的请愿人财产或对 2770 账户本身享有任何权益。尽管被告王在没收令（ECF No. 488，第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在 2770 账户（从而包括请愿人财产）中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，但她的同意对 2770 账户或请愿人财产不具有任何法律效力。被告王在 2770 账户中从未拥有过此类“权利、所有权和权益”——没有任何证据表明她是 2770 账户的签字人、曾向 2770 账户存入资金，或以其他方式对 2770 账户拥有任何控制权，也没有证据表明被告王曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770 账户存入任何资金。被告王不能没收她并不拥有且在其中不享有任何权益的财产。事实上，本法院似乎自始至终从未根据 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) 的要求，认定请愿人财产属于应予没收的财产。\n\n基于所有前述理由及下文所阐明的理由，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 批准本请愿书；(2) 修改没收令以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追索因本请愿书而发生的律师费及费用，并准予请愿人提交该等律师费及费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的其他救济。\n\nII.\n背景事实\n\nA. 请愿人财产\n\n1.\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“汉密尔顿机会基金”），一家开曼群岛独立投资组合公司，向请愿人提供了一份日期为 2022 年 1 月 20 日的发售备忘录（“发售备忘录”）。发售备忘录的真实准确副本作为附件 A 附于本请愿书后。\n\n2.\n汉密尔顿机会基金是“一家专门从事由投资经理［定义见发售备忘录］挑选的股权投资以期获得长期资本收益的基金”。附件 A，发售备忘录第 33 页。投资经理（定义见发售备忘录）已发现投资一家银行（“数字银行”）的机会（详见发售备忘录第 33 页）。结合该项投资，汉密尔顿机会基金寻求通过发行各类股份来募集资金。同上，第 34 页。\n\n3.\n发售备忘录向请愿人提供了认购属于汉密尔顿机会基金下设之独立投资组合——Hamilton M&A Fund SP（“并购基金”）的 B 类股份的机会。\n\n4.\n被告王不是并购基金或汉密尔顿机会基金的董事或成员，且对并购基金或汉密尔顿机会基金亦不享有任何公司或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n5.\n被告王未对并购基金进行任何投资；证据记录中同样没有任何相反的证据。\n\n6.\n2022 年 2 月 2 日，请愿人向汉密尔顿机会基金提交了一份申请（“认购协议”），用于认购价值 $110,000 的并购基金 B 类股份。认购协议的真实准确副本作为附件 B 附于本请愿书后。\n\n7.\n2022 年 2 月 2 日，汉密尔顿机会基金代表并购基金批准并接受了认购协议。见附件 B，认购协议第 15 页。\n\n8.\n2022 年 2 月 2 日，根据认购协议的条款，请愿人向 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号为 5090042770 的账户汇款 $110,050（“请愿人财产”）。汇款确认书的真实准确副本作为附件 C 附于本请愿书后。\n\n9.\n请愿人将请愿人财产汇入的账户即为 2770 账户。\n\n10.\n根据发售备忘录的条款，请愿人有权依其选择赎回其股份。附件 A，发售备忘录第 17 页；亦见同上第 53 页（规定在受某些限制的前提下，“股东可选择在任何赎回日赎回 B 类股份”）。\n\n11.\n汉密尔顿机会基金的资产“与该基金任何其他独立投资组合的资产及该基金的任何通用资产保持隔离、分开且可单独识别”。附件 A，发售备忘录第 12 页。此外，根据开曼群岛法律，汉密尔顿机会基金有责任“将各独立投资组合的投资组合资产与任何其他独立投资组合的投资组合资产隔离并保持隔离，且保持分开和可单独识别”。附件 A，发售备忘录第 22-23 页（引述《开曼群岛公司法（修订版）》第 XIV 部第 219(6)(b) 条）。\n\nB. 扣押 2770 账户\n\n12.\n2022 年 9 月 18 日，政府扣押了 2770 账户中的全部资金余额。\n\n13.\n截至目前，对于政府扣押 2770 账户资金具有何种相当理由，尚无任何公开文件。\n\nC. 针对被告王与被告郭的刑事案件及没收令\n\n14.\n2023 年 3 月 6 日，政府对被告王、被告郭以及第三名从未被提讯的被告 William Je（余建明）提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n15.\n2024 年 5 月 3 日，政府对被告王提交了替代起诉书（“替代起诉书”）。ECF No. 325。替代起诉书指控被告王犯有一项共谋电汇欺诈罪（罪名项 I）（替代起诉书第 1-2 页）以及一项共谋洗钱罪（罪名项 II）（替代起诉书第 2-4 页）。替代起诉书还包含一项没收指控（“没收指控”）。替代起诉书第 4 页。\n\n16.\n同日，即 2024 年 5 月 3 日，被告王就替代起诉书中所指控的罪名项 I 及罪名项 II 作出认罪答辩。\n\n17.\n同样在 2024 年 5 月 3 日，本法院签署了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（“原没收令”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n18.\n在原没收令中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，包括 2770 账户，原因为该等财产“构成被告个人取得的罪名项一所指控罪行的收益和/或涉及［替代］起诉书罪名项二所指控罪行的财产”。原没收令第 2-6 页（后加强调）。\n\n19.\n被告郭未对其被指控的任何罪名进行认罪答辩。因此，陪审团审判于 2024 年 5 月 22 日至 2024 年 7 月 16 日期间进行（“郭案审判”）。2024 年 7 月 16 日，陪审团裁定被告郭犯有敲诈勒索共谋、共谋电汇欺诈、共谋洗钱、共谋证券欺诈、证券欺诈、电汇欺诈及洗钱罪名成立。ECF No. 395。截至本请愿书提交之日，被告郭尚未被判刑。\n\n20.\n2025 年 1 月 6 日，被告王被判刑。\n\n21.\n2025 年 1 月 7 日，本法院签署了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（“没收令”）ECF No. 488。在涉及请愿人的部分，没收令在所有实质方面均与原没收令大体相同。在没收令中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，包括 2770 账户，原因为该等财产“构成被告个人取得的罪名项一所指控罪行的收益和/或涉及［替代］起诉书罪名项二所指控罪行的财产”。没收令第 2-11 页（后加强调）。\n\n22.\n原没收令及没收令中对 2770 账户内资产的描述如下：\n\n此前存放在 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090042770、以“Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC”名义开立并于 2022 年 9 月 18 日前后被政府扣押的 $89,992,861.75 美元资金（23-FBI-000074）。\n\n原没收裁定第 3 页；没收裁定第 3 页。\n\nIII.\n辩论理由\n\n23.\n在依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 和《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c)(1) 条进行的附随刑事没收程序中，本院必须依据优势证据标准确定，请愿人是否对拟没收的财产享有合法权利、所有权或权益，以及该等权利、所有权或权益是否使没收裁定全部或部分无效，理由是该权益归属于请愿人而非被告，或者在导致该财产被没收的作为发生时优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n24.\n在此，请愿人依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 并凭借对请愿人财产设立的推定信托，对请愿人财产享有合法权利、所有权或权益。此外，请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益既归属于请愿人，又优于被告 Wang（王艳平）在请愿人财产中享有的任何权利，因为被告王在请愿人财产或 2770 账户中均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。换言之，被告王不可能没收其在 2770 账户中的权益，因为她没有任何适于作为刑事没收对象的权益。因此，应当修改没收裁定以剔除请愿人财产，并将请愿人财产归还给请愿人。\n\nA. 政府未能在一开始证明 2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）适于作为没收对象，从而导致针对该等资金的没收裁定不当\n\n25.\n政府没有合法理由扣押请愿人财产，因为没有任何证据表明政府曾按照 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 的要求，证明请愿人财产以及整个 2770 账户在事实上属于可没收财产。\n\n26.\n“当政府试图取得没收裁定时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1) 条……要求量刑法院根据适用法律确定哪些财产属于可没收财产。’”U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（援引 U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2007)）。根据 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2，“如果政府申请没收特定财产，法院必须确定政府是否已确立财产与犯罪行为之间所必需的关联性。”Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（强调为原文所加）；Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的不同阶段，政府承担以不同确定程度证明该法律结论的举证责任：在起诉后听证会上达到合理根据的标准……或在无陪审团审判或陪审团审判中达到优势证据的标准。”同上（强调为原文所加）（引文省略）。“然而，唯有在政府达到相关法律门槛的情况下，涉案财产才能在任何法律意义上被视为‘属于可没收财产’。在此之前，当政府仅通过起诉书宣布其寻求没收的意图时，该财产仅被视为‘可能可没收的’……或‘可能属于可没收对象的’。”同上（引文省略）。\n\n27.\n这意味着，在法院探讨请愿人是否有权依据 § 853(n) 获得财产返还之前，必须首先确定争议财产在第一时间内是否确实属于可没收财产。若非如此，政府便没有扣押该财产的法定职权。如果财产系被不当扣押，则无论请愿人能否满足 § 853(n) 规定的标准，政府都必须返还被扣押的账户。参见例如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)。\n\n28.\n进行全面且完整的 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 审查，对于司法的公正实施至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已进行审查并认定该财产属于可没收财产的假设之上。在制定附随程序成文法时，国会选择在附随程序中将举证责任置于第三方，因为“美国在刑事案件中已经排除合理怀疑地证明了其没收指控。”S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n29.\n在本案中，从未就 2770 账户与被告王被指控（并认罪）的任何犯罪行为之间是否存在关联作出过认定，其结果是，请愿人被迫提交本请愿书。基于被告王和被告 Guo（郭文贵）刑事案件中所有公开文件中包含的信息，政府在 2770 账户问题上不可能胜诉。\n\n30.\n在此，在替代起诉书（Superseding Information）中，政府就罪名项一和罪名项二均列入了没收指控，并寻求没收特定财产。替代起诉书第 4 页。案卷中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明——更不用说达到其举证责任来证明——2770 账户与被告王认罪的罪行之间存在关联。\n\n31.\n关于罪名项一，没收指控载明，“由于实施了本替代起诉书罪名项一所指控的电信欺诈犯罪，被告 YVETTE WANG，又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，应当依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条注1……以及《美国法典》第 28 编第 2461(c) 条向美国没收构成或源自可追溯至实施上述罪行的收益的任何及所有不动产和动产。”替代起诉书第 4 页。政府必须以优势证据标准证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 项下的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收理论是该财产被用于实施或协助实施刑事犯罪，或参与了刑事犯罪的实施，则政府应确立该财产与该犯罪之间存在实质性关联。”18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n脚注 1：18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定，“构成或源自可追溯至违反”各种特定罪行（包括违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 电信欺诈，即罪名项一中对被告王的指控）“的收益的任何不动产或动产[均应予以没收]”。\n\n32.\n案卷中没有任何关于 2770 账户中的资金如何构成或源自可追溯至被告王共谋实施电信欺诈之收益的指控。替代起诉书指控称，“至少在 2018 年前后至至少 2023 年 3 月 15 日前后，共谋者向投资者进行虚假陈述，称其对 GTV、喜马拉雅农场联盟组织（Himalaya Farm Alliance）和 GClubs 的投资将换取股票，且其对喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）的投资将换取加密货币[（下称“欺诈计划”）]。通过[欺诈计划]，被告 YVETTE WANG，又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，及其包括 Miles Guo 在内的共谋者，诱使投资者向郭控制的实体投资了超过 10 亿美元。”替代起诉书第 2 页。替代起诉书中没有任何关于被告王将欺诈计划的任何收益存入 2770 账户的指控。同样，替代起诉书中也没有任何关于任何投资者因欺诈计划而将资金存入 2770 账户的指控。也不可能有任何此类指控，因为 2770 账户中仅有的存款来自于投资数字银行（Digital Bank）的投资者——而该投资与替代起诉书中所描述的“欺诈计划”没有任何关联。可以肯定的是，请愿人确认请愿人绝不是替代起诉书中所指控的被告王任何行为的受害者，并且不认为请愿人财产中的任何部分曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n33.\n最后，在被告郭的审判期间，没有关于 2770 账户的相关证言。没有任何关于欺诈计划的任何收益是否曾被存入 2770 账户的证言，就此而言，也没有关于被告王是否曾将任何资金存入 2770 账户的证言。简而言之，案卷中没有任何内容表明 2770 账户与被告王的电信欺诈指控之间存在关联，更没有足够的证据来认定政府已达到证明存在使 2770 账户适于被没收之适当关联的举证责任且法院已据此作出正当裁决。\n\n34.\n关于罪名项二，没收指控载明，“由于实施了本起诉书罪名项二所指控的洗钱犯罪，被告 YVETTE WANG，又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，应当依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 982(a)(1) 条注2 向美国没收参与上述犯罪的任何及所有不动产和动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产，包括但不限于代表参与上述犯罪的财产金额的一笔美元货币款项。”替代起诉书第 4 页。关于罪名项二，政府“必须以优势证据标准证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 项下的没收要件。”U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015)。\n\n脚注 2：18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定，“对被判犯有违反本编第 1956 条[洗钱法条]罪行的人进行量刑的法院……应当命令该人向美国没收参与该罪行的任何不动产或动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产。”18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调为原文所加）。\n\n35.\n替代起诉书指控被告王犯有共谋洗钱罪，因为被告王“明知参与某些金融交易的财产代表某种形式非法活动的收益，仍将要并确实进行和企图进行该等金融交易……且该等交易事实上涉及特定非法活动的收益，即本起诉书罪名项一所指控的电信欺诈计划的收益。”替代起诉书第 3 页。\n\n36.\n目前尚不清楚 2770 账户何以能因罪名项二的洗钱指控而被没收。从指控来看，洗钱指控源于被告王利用“罪名项一所指控的电信欺诈计划的收益”进行金融交易。替代起诉书第 3 页。如上所述，没有任何证据表明 2770 账户中的资金与罪名项一指控的欺诈计划有任何关联（参见上文第 31-33 段）——没有任何证据表明该等资金“构成或源自可追溯至实施”电信欺诈“的收益”。参见例如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。由于 2770 账户中的资金既不是欺诈计划的收益，也不是源自欺诈计划的收益，该等资金不能作为罪名项二洗钱指控的基础，也不能作为被告王在罪名项二中被定罪的一部分而被没收。\n\n37.\n政府为支持洗钱指控所主张的公开行为（overt acts），进一步未能证明 2770 账户中的资金如何能够属于可没收财产。在替代起诉书中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项作为。替代起诉书第 3 页。尽管政府声称这两项公开行为是被告王为推进涉嫌共谋洗钱而实施的作为“之一部分”\n\n---\n（Superseding Information《替代起诉书》第 3 页），这些其他行为从未被指明。\n\n38.\n首先，根据《替代起诉书》，2020年5月20日，被告 Wang（王雁平）以 GTV 的名义开设了一个银行账户，显而易见的是，Account 2770（2770号账户）并非该账户。Superseding Information 第 3 页。2020年6月2日，被告王雁平向该账户转账约 2 亿美元。同上。转入 GTV 账户的资金来自 Saraca Media Group, Inc.（“Saraca”，萨拉卡媒体集团公司）所持有的 JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）账户（Guo Trial，05/31/2024，953:25-954:4；Guo Trial，06/26/2024，4359:1-14），而非来自 2770号账户。从未有任何证词表明 2770号账户中的任何资金曾流入 Saraca 的摩根大通银行账户并随后转入《替代起诉书》中所引述的 GTV 账户。此外，2770号账户在2020年甚至根本不存在。\n\n39.\n政府指控的第二项行为是“在2020年6月5日或前后”，被告王雁平“批准将 1 亿美元从 GTV 的母公司 Saraca 电汇至一家高风险对冲基金，以使 Saraca 及其最终实益拥有人即被告 Guo（郭文贵）的儿子受益。”Superseding Information 第 3-4 页。首先，这清楚地指控资金是从 Saraca 账户转出的，显而易见 2770号账户并非该账户。此外，再次强调，从未有任何证词表明 2770号账户中的任何资金曾流入 Saraca 账户。而且，再次指出，2770号账户在2020年甚至根本不存在。\n\n40.\n从上述论证可见，完全没有任何关于 2770号账户的指控或证词。记录中对 2770号账户的唯一提及是被告王雁平同意没收该账户。然而，“被告对没收的同意[并不能]免除申请没收的财产与被定罪罪行之间必须存在关联的要求。”Beltramea, 785 F.3d at 291。正如 Eighth Circuit（第八巡回上诉法院）所强调的那样，“地区法院负有独立职责，以确保存在所要求的关联。”同上（强调为后加）。\n\n---\n41.\n在本案中，《替代起诉书》、Original Forfeiture Order（《原没收命令》）或 Forfeiture Order（《没收命令》）中均无任何事实指控，表明 2770号账户与被告王雁平认罪答辩所涉及的罪行之间甚至存在任何所谓的关联。\n\n42.\n政府在未证明存在关联的情况下继续扣留 2770号账户中的资金，是不当且不公平的。如果政府保留 2770号账户中的资金，将构成不当得利，因为这些资金属于第三方，包括 Petitioner（请愿人），他们（1）既不是被告王雁平也不是被告郭文贵；且（2）未卷入欺诈计划，更不用说是此类计划的受害者。参见例如 U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)（解释刑事“没收不具有补偿目的，旨在惩罚违法者，且不能强加于无辜所有者。”）（强调为后加）。\n\nB. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，因为该等财产上存在推定信托\n\n43.\n即使撇开政府未能妥善证明 2770号账户中的资金属于《替代起诉书》中指控的任何活动的一部分不谈，请愿人财产也应当归还给请愿人，因为请愿人对该财产享有的权益大于被告王雁平或如今代位受让其权益的政府。\n\n44.\n根据推定信托原则，无论存在任何其他所有权主张，包括被告\n\n---\n王雁平或代位受让其权益的政府的主张，请愿人财产均受到保护并仍属请愿人所有。Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）3 已经裁定，“对于类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法条而言，推定信托构成对财产的‘合法权利、所有权或权益’，其‘可能优于’被告的权益。”Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n45.\n“推定信托是一种衡平法救济，具有实现其目的所必需的灵活性。”Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999)（强调为后加）。“其目的在于防止不当得利，尽管不当得利并不一定牵涉不法行为的实施……必要的是，法院确定持有财产的一方处于根据衡平法和良知其不应保留该财产的情形。”同上（内部引用省略）。\n\n46.\n“一方是否构成不当得利，是通过适用衡平法原则得出的法律结论……衡平法院在裁定设立推定信托时不受任何僵化公式的约束。交易的公平性必须决定救济的限度……当一个人保留了一项利益，而根据转让的情形并考虑到当事人之间的关系，保留该利益是不公平的，即构成不当得利。”同上（内部\n\n3 “联邦普通法冲突法规则是适用与诉讼具有最大利益关联的司法管辖区的法律。”In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992)。在本案中，有三个法律可能适用的竞合司法管辖区：New York（纽约州）、California（加利福尼亚州）和 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）。请愿人支付请愿人财产是依据 Subscription Agreement（《认购协议》）进行的，该协议受开曼群岛法律管辖。参见 Exhibit B，《认购协议》第 8 页，¶ 2(s)。在请愿人存入请愿人财产时，2770号账户是加利福尼亚州一家银行的账户。自 2770号账户被扣押（根据纽约州法院签发的搜查和扣押令）以来，该笔资金目前由政府在纽约占有。纽约是本案的法院地州。根据这些事实，纽约与本诉讼具有最大的利益关联，其法律应当适用于设立推定信托。然而，若政府对该法律选择裁定提出异议，请愿人保留要求本法院根据加利福尼亚州和/或开曼群岛法律对请愿人财产设立推定信托的一切权利。\n\n---\n引用省略）。\n\n47.\nNew York Court of Appeals（纽约州上诉法院）概述了在确定特定情形下是否应当设立推定信托时应考虑的若干因素，包括“（1）保密或信义关系，（2）承诺，（3）基于对该承诺的信赖而进行的转让，以及（4）不当得利。”Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976)。然而，纽约州法院长期以来一直认为“这些因素仅仅是有益的指导，并非绝对的标准。”Counihan, 194 F.3d at 362（引用了阐明该主张的大量纽约州判例）。\n\n48.\n在此，自请愿人财产存入 2770号账户之日起，即存在为请愿人利益而就该财产设立的推定信托。\n\n49.\n当请愿人签署《认购协议》以收购 Hamilton M&A Fund SP 中的特定 B 类股份时，请愿人与 Hamilton Opportunity Fund（汉密尔顿机会基金）建立了保密和/或信义关系 4。根据《认购协议》，Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）向请愿人作出承诺，请愿人财产将被投资于 Digital Bank（数字银行）。基于对该承诺的信赖，请愿人按照《认购协议》的指示将请愿人财产电汇至 2770号账户。政府对 2770号账户的不当扣押，迫使汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司违反了将请愿人财产投资于数字银行的承诺。由于政府的扣押，请愿人甚至无法行使其 Right of Redemption（赎回权）以取回请愿人财产。这将导致\n\n4 即使法院认定汉密尔顿机会基金与请愿人之间不存在保密关系和/或不存在信义关系，该认定也不具有决定性，因为缺乏信义关系并不妨碍法院认定存在推定信托。参见 Koreag, 961 F.2d at 353（指出“然而，我们不认为[各方]之间缺乏信义关系会自动击败推定信托的权利主张。尽管信义关系是纽约州法院引述的因素之一，但当衡平法另有要求时，缺乏任何单一因素本身并不会阻碍推定信托的设立”）。\n\n---\n产生有利于政府的不当得利，因为政府目前在没有任何合法理由的情况下保留请愿人财产。参见例如 U.S. v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995)（认定设立推定信托是恰当的，除其他原因外，政府的没收导致了对默示承诺的违反）；Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994)（认定推定信托是恰当的，其中指出“政府的没收迫使该承诺被违背，这可能导致政府潜在的不当得利（以及[原告]相应的不当受损）。”）\n\n50.\n因此，请愿人已证明应当对请愿人财产设立推定信托。对于类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法条而言，该等推定信托“构成对财产的‘合法权利、所有权或权益’，其‘可能优于’被告的权益。”Willis, 652 F.3d at 242。\n\n51.\n申请设立推定信托所指向的财产——即请愿人财产——是易于追溯的。参见 Exhibit C。\n\n52.\n此外，即使政府主张其他主体应从任何被没收的财产中获得赔偿，对请愿人设立推定信托也是完全可行的。“当一方能够直接追溯其资产而无需诉诸拟制或推定，即使在涉及多名欺诈受害者的案件中，推定信托亦属可用。”U.S. v. Ovid, 2012 WL 2087084, *7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012)。“当权利主张人能够直接追溯其财产时，法院无权无视推定信托法，即使这会使一名无辜受害者的处境好于另一名同样无辜的受害者。”同上。处理“多重欺诈案件的正统方法”是“将可识别的资产归还给其所有者，仅在无法进行具体识别或交易追溯时才转向按比例分配。”同上 at *8（引用 Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment《第三次返还法与不当得利重述》§ 59 报告人说明 G，第 437 页）。\n\nC. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有优先权益\n\n53.\n请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益，绝对优于政府或被告 Wang（王）可能对请愿人财产享有的任何权益。\n\n54.\n21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 明确规定，除请愿人对被没收财产享有权益外，请愿人还必须以优势证据证明，请愿人的权益“致使没收令全部或部分无效，因为该权利、所有权或权益在引发依据本条对该财产予以没收的行为发生时归属于请愿人而非被告，或优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益”。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（强调为后加）。\n\n55.\n在此，如上所述，被告王从未对请愿人财产或 2770 账户享有任何权益；事实上，记录中对被告王、欺诈计划与 2770 账户之间的关系完全未作任何说明。\n\n56.\n显而易见的是，政府和被告王都不能主张他们对一项从未享有过权益的财产拥有优先权益。同样，被告王也不能没收其并无权益的财产中的权益。\n\nD. 请愿人有权获得诉讼费用和律师费\n\n57.\n请愿人被迫聘请法律顾问并产生了提起本请愿书以主张请愿人对请愿人财产的权利并对没收请愿人财产提出异议的费用。在本次程序中胜诉后，请愿人保留追回与本请愿书相关的律师费和诉讼费用的所有权利，并可根据 Equal Access to Justice Act（《平等获取司法机会法》，“EAJA”），28 U.S.C. § 2412 追回请愿人的诉讼费用和合理律师费。联邦法院一贯认定，出于允许胜诉主张人根据 EAJA 收取律师费的目的，§ 853(n) 程序属于民事性质。参见 United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009)；United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995)；U.S. v. Bailey, 2015 WL 1893610 at *20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015)。\n\nIV.\n结论\n\n58.\n基于上述理由，请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，该权益致使没收令就该等财产而言无效。参见例如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告王对请愿人财产没有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。请愿人已经以优势证据证明，并可在任何必要听证会上证明，没收令需要进行修改以排除请愿人财产。\n\n59.\n因此，请愿人谨请本法院：(1) 准予本请愿书；(2) 修改没收令以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追回与本请愿书相关的请愿人律师费和诉讼费用，并准予请愿人提交该等律师费和诉讼费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的该等及其他救济。\n\n日期：2025年4月2日\n谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\n\nJeffrey S. Gavenman 律师\nJeremy W. Schulman 律师\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\n\nPaul W. Butler 律师\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n请愿人代理律师\n\n证明与宣誓\n\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人\n 在受伪证罪处罚的规定下证明并声明，本人对该财产的主张绝非无理取闹，且就本人所知所信，为支持该主张所提供的信息均属真实准确。\n\n于 2025年4月 05 日签署\n签名","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Torres","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":5994,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-06 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-06","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:46:08"}