{"id":"court_sdny_656_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":656,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-07","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方没收异议申请书 —— 美国诉Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵/Guo Wengui/Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #656（2025年4月7日提交）。申请人Zhang Peng对Hamilton Opportunity Fund账户的没收令提出异议，声称拥有受信权益，被告Wang从未对该账户有过任何法律权利或实际控制。","summary_en":"Third-party petition to challenge forfeiture —— United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #656 (filed April 7, 2025). Petitioner Zhang Peng claims a constructive trust interest in the seized account, asserting that defendant Wang possessed no legal right, title, or actual control necessary to forfeit petitioner's property.","body_en":"# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\n**THIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE - VERIFIED CLAIM OF**\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner Zhang Peng (\"Petitioner\") files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the \"Petition\"). Petitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest (\"Petitioner's Property\") (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government (the \"Government\") improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with Defendant Yvette Wang (\"Defendant Wang\"). Specifically, Petitioner's Property was improperly seized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in bank account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Account 2770\"). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or interest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. The Forfeiture Order (as more fully defined below) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner's Property because right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property was vested in the Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was\n\nsuperior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the Forfeiture Order (as defined below). As such, this Court should amend the Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner's Property from the Forfeiture Order and order that the Government immediately return Petitioner's Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner's claim, Petitioner states as follows:\n\n### **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nIt appears that the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, were purely \"collateral damage\" in the Government's seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant Wang and Miles Guo (\"Defendant Guo\"). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure of Account 2770, and in that time span, there has never been any explanation as to how Account 2770 (including Petitioner's Property) is related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any showing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were ever deposited in Account 2770; no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever commingled with Petitioner's Property; and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had anything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\n\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is a beneficiary of a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property and Petitioner's Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither Defendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, have ever demonstrated that they have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner's Property in Account 2770 or in Account 2770 in general. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of \"all her right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 (and thus, Petitioner's Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), her consent has no legal bearing as to Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. Defendant Wang never had such \"right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 – there is no evidence that she was a signatory on Account 2770, ever deposited money into Account 2770, or otherwise had any control over Account 2770, and there is no evidence that Defendant Wang ever directed anyone, directly or indirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that she does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never established that Petitioner's Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\n# **II. BACKGROUND FACTS**\n\n### **A. Petitioner's Property**\n\n1. Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Hamilton Opportunity Fund\"), a Cayman Islands Segregated Portfolio Company, provided Petitioner with an Offering Memorandum (the \"Offering Memorandum\") dated January 20, 2022. A true and correct copy of the Offering Memorandum is attached hereto as **Exhibit A.**\n\n2. Hamilton Opportunity Fund is a \"fund specializing in equity investments selected by the Investment Manager [as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum] with a view to long-term capital gains.\" **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 33. The Investment Manager (as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum) had identified an opportunity to invest in a bank (the \"Digital Bank\") (as more fully described in Offering Memorandum at 33). In connection with this investment, Hamilton Opportunity Fund sought to raise capital by issuing various classes of\n\nshares. *Id.* at 34.\n\n3. The Offering Memorandum offered Petitioner an opportunity to acquire Class B Shares attributed to a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund - Hamilton M&A Fund SP (the \"M&A Fund\").\n\n4. Defendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any corporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund or Hamilton Opportunity Fund. The evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n5. Defendant Wang did not make any investments in the M&A Fund; again, the evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n6. On January 25, 2022, Petitioner submitted an application (the \"Subscription Agreement\") to Hamilton Opportunity Fund for a subscription for \\$200,000.00 worth of Class B Shares in the M&A Fund. A true and correct copy of the Subscription Agreement is attached hereto as **Exhibit B.**\n\n7. On January 25, 2022, Hamilton Opportunity Fund, on behalf of the M&A Fund, approved and accepted the Subscription Agreement. *See* **Exhibit B**, Subscription Agreement at 15.\n\n8. On February 17, 2022, pursuant to the terms of the Subscription Agreement, Petitioner wired \\$200,000.00 (the \"Petitioner Property\") to Account Number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank. A true and correct copy of the wire confirmation is attached hereto as **Exhibit C**.\n\n9. The account to which Petitioner wired Petitioner Property to is Account 2770.\n\n10. Pursuant to the terms of the Offering Memorandum, Petitioner is entitled to redemption of Petitioner's shares at the Petitioner's option. **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 17; *see also id.* at 53 (stating that subject to certain limitations, \"Class B Shares may be redeemed\n\nat the option of the Shareholder on any Redemption Day\").\n\n11. The assets of Hamilton Opportunity Fund are \"kept segregated, separate and separately identifiable from those of any other segregated portfolios of the Fund and any general assets of the Fund.\" **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 12. In addition, pursuant to the laws of the Cayman Islands, it is the duty of Hamilton Opportunity Fund to \"segregate, and keep segregated, portfolio assets of each segregated portfolio separate and separately identifiable from segregated portfolio assets of any other segregated portfolio.\" **Exhibit A**, Offering Memorandum at 22-23 (citing the Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands, Part XIV, 219(6)(b)).\n\n### **B. Seizure of Account 2770**\n\n12. On September 18, 2022, the Government seized the entire balance of the funds in Account 2770.\n\n13. To date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the Government had to seize the funds in Account 2770.\n\n# **C. The Criminal Case Against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the Forfeiture Order**\n\n14. On March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n\n15. On May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the \"Superseding Information\") against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information charged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I) (Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering (Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a Forfeiture Allegation (the \"Forfeiture Allegation\"). Superseding Information at 4.\n\n16. On the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count\n\nII as charged in the Superseding Information.\n\n17. Also on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (\"Original Forfeiture Order\"). ECF No. 329.\n\n18. In the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her*  right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n\n19. Defendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him. Accordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the \"Guo Trial\"). On July 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this Petition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n\n20. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n\n21. On January 7, 2025, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Forfeiture Order\") ECF No. 488. As it pertains to Petitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all material respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her* right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Forfeiture Order at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n22. The assets in Account 2770 are described in both the Original Forfeiture Order and\n\nthe Forfeiture Order as follows:\n\n\\$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September 18, 2022 (23-FBl-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\n\n# **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n23. In an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited, and whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part, because such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n\n24. Here, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of a constructive trust over such property. Moreover, Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any right Defendant Wang had in Petitioner's Property because Defendant Wang had *no* legal right, title or, interest in either Petitioner's Property or Account 2770. In other words, Defendant Wang could not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject to criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner's Property, and Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner.\n\n# **A. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770, Including Petitioner's Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First Instance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds**\n\n25. The Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner's Property because there is no evidence that the Government has ever demonstrated that Petitioner's Property, and Account 2770 in general, is actually forfeitable property, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\n26. \"When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, 'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.'\" *U.S. v. Watts*, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing *U.S. v. Capoccia*, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court *must* determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.\" Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); *Watts*, 786 F.3d at 172. \"At various points in the proceedings, *the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion* to varying degrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . .or by a preponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.\" *Id.* (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). \"Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the property in question be considered 'subject to forfeiture' in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the government has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property is seen merely as 'potentially forfeitable' . . . or 'potentially subject to forfeiture.'\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n27. This means that before the court reaches the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in dispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority to seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the\n\naccounts seized regardless of whether the petitioner can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). *See e.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co*., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n\n28. A full and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair administration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has conducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary proceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an ancillary proceeding, since \"the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.\" S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392.\n\n29. In this matter, there has never been a determination of whether there exists a nexus between Account 2770 and any of the offenses Defendant Wang was charged with (and pled guilty to), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained in the publicly-available documentsin both Defendant Wang's and Defendant Guo's criminal case, the Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n\n30. Here, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture Allegation as to both Counts I and Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding Information at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show, let alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n31. As to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation statesthat, \"[a]s a result of committing the wire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United\n\nStates Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C)[1](#page-9-0). . .and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, \"if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n\n32. The record is devoid of any allegations pertaining to how funds in Account 2770 are, or are derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang's conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Superseding Information alleges that \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about March 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive stock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and GClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the Himalaya Exchange [(the \"Fraud Scheme\")]. Through the [Fraud Scheme], YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced investors to invest more than \\$1 billion into entities Guo controlled.\" Superseding Information at 2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing any proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into Account 2770. Similarly, there are no allegations in the Superseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that \"[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture] which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of\" various specified offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang in Count I.\n\nAccount 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits into Account 2770 were from investors who were investing in the Digital Bank – an investment that is not implicated in any way by the \"Fraud Scheme\" described in the Superseding Information. To be sure, Petitioner affirms that Petitioner was never a victim of any conduct by Defendant Wang alleged in the Superseding Information and does not believe that any of Petitioner's Property was ever used in any unlawful activity.\n\n33. Finally, there was no relevant testimony during Defendant Guo's trial concerning Account 2770. There was no testimony regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme were ever deposited into Account 2770, nor, for that matter, whether Defendant Wang ever deposited any money into Account 2770. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would indicate there is a nexus between Account 2770 and Defendant Wang's wire fraud charge, let alone sufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing, and the Court properly adjudicated, that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of Account 2770 to be proper.\n\n34. As to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation statesthat, \"[a]s a result of committing the money laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1)[2](#page-10-0), any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense, or any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United States currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. As to Count II, The Government \"must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18\n\n<span id=\"page-10-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that \"[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, *involved in such offense*, or any property *traceable to such property*.\" 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\nU.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.\" *U.S. v. Beltramea*, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n35. The Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy to launder money because Defendant Wang \"knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . .and which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One of this Information.\" Superseding Information at 3.\n\n36. It is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited for the money laundering charge in Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang engaging in financial transactions with the \"proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One.\" Superseding Information at 3. As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account 2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (*see* ¶¶ 31-33, above) – there is no evidence that such funds \"constitute[d] or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of\" wire fraud. *See e.g.* 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were not Fraud Scheme proceeds nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could not serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part of Defendant Wang's conviction for Count II.\n\n37. The overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge further fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be forfeitable. In the Superseding Information, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding Information at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were \"among others\" that Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money\n\n(Superseding Information at 3), these other acts were never identified.\n\n38. First, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened a bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was *not*. Superseding Information at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately \\$200 million to that account. *Id.* The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank account held by Saraca Media Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\") (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo Trial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), *not* from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be transferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information.Moreover, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n39. The second act the Government alleges is that \"on or about June 5, 2020,\" Defendant Wang \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from GTV's parent company, Saraca, to a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Defendant Guo's son.\" Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was transferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account. Moreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n40. As seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding Account 2770 whatsoever. The *only* reference in the record to Account 2770 is Defendant Wang's consent to forfeit it. However, \"a defendant's consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the requirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of offense.\" *Beltramea*, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, \"[t]he district court had an independent duty to *ensure* that the required nexus exists.\" *Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n41. Here, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the Original Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account 2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n42. The Government's continued retention of the funds in Account 2770, without showing that there is a nexus, is wrong and inequitable. Should the Government retain the funds in Account 2770, it will be unjustly enriched, since the funds belong to third parties, including Petitioner, who are (1) not Defendant Wang or Defendant Guo; and (2) not involved the Fraud Scheme, let alone victims of such a scheme. *See, e.g., U.S. v. Bajakajian*, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (explaining that a criminal \"forfeiture serves no remedial purpose, is designed to punish the offender, *and cannot be imposed upon innocent owners*.\") (emphasis added).\n\n# **B. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner's Property Because There Exists a Constructive Trust Over Such Property**\n\n43. Even putting aside the Government's failure to properly demonstrate that the funds in Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does Defendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n\n44. Under the doctrine of constructive trusts, Petitioner's Property is protected and remains the property of Petitioner regardless of any other ownership claims, including Defendant\n\nWang's or the Government, standing in her shoes. The Second Circuit [3](#page-14-0) has held that \"a constructive trust qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" *Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States*, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n45. \"A constructive trust is an equitable remedy, *necessarily flexible to accomplish its purpose*.\" *Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co*., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). \"Its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate the performance of a wrongful act. . .What is necessary is that the court identify a party who is holding property *under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it*.\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n46. \"Whether a party is unjustly enriched is a legal conclusion reached through the application of principles of equity. . . A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief. . . Unjust enrichment results when a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the transfer and considering the relationship of the parties, it would be inequitable to retain.\" *Id.* (internal\n\n<span id=\"page-14-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> \"The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation.\" *In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.*, 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), *aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A*., No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). Here, there are three competing jurisdictions whose laws could apply: New York, California, and Cayman Islands. Petitioner's payment of Petitioner's Property was pursuant to the Subscription Agreement, which is governed by Cayman Islands law. *See* **Exhibit B**, Subscription Agreement at 8, ¶ 2(s). Account 2770 *was* an account in a California bank when Petitioner deposited Petitioner's Property. Since Account 2770 was seized (pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a court in New York state), the funds are now in possession of the Government in New York. New York is the forum state of this case. From these facts, New York has the greatest interest in this litigation, and its laws should apply to an imposition of a constructive trust. However, to the extent that the Government challenges this choice-of-law determination, Petitioner reserves all rights to request that this Court impose a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property under California and/or Cayman Islands law.\n\ncitations omitted).\n\n47. The New York Court of Appeals outlined several factors to be considered in determining whether a constructive trust should be imposed in certain circumstances, including \"(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment.\" *Sharp v. Kosmalski*, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976). However, New York courts have long held that \"these factors are merely useful guides and are not talismanic.\" *Counihan*, 194 F.3d at 362 (citing to a plethora of New York state cases that have stated this proposition).\n\n48. Here, there is a constructive trust for the benefit of Petitioner over Petitioner's Property as of the date that it was deposited into Account 2770.\n\n49. Petitioner entered into a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship[4](#page-15-0) with Hamilton Opportunity Fund when Petitioner executed the Subscription Agreement in order to acquire certain Class B shares in Hamilton M&A Fund SP. Per the Subscription Agreement, Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC made a promise to Petitioner that Petitioner's Property would be invested in the Digital Bank. In reliance on this promise, the Petitioner wired Petitioner's Property to Account 2770 as instructed in the Subscription Agreement. The Government's improper seizure of Account 2770 forced a breach of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC's promise to invest Petitioner's Property into the Digital Bank. Because of Government's seizure, Petitioner is not even able to exercise his Right of Redemption to obtain back Petitioner's Property. This would\n\n<span id=\"page-15-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> Even if the Court determines that the relationship was not confidential and/or there was no fiduciary relationship between Hamilton Opportunity Fund and Petitioner, such would not be determinative, as the absence of a fiduciary relationship does not preclude the Court from finding a constructive trust exists. *See Koreag,* 961 F.2d at 353 (stating that \"[w]e do not believe, however, that the lack of a fiduciary relationship between [the parties] automatically defeats [a] claim of constructive trust.Although a fiduciary relationship is one of the factors cited by New York courts, the absence of any one factor will not itself defeat the imposition of a constructive trust when otherwise required by equity\").\n\nresult in unjust enrichment to the benefit of the Government since the Government is now retaining Petitioner's Property without any legal cause to do so. *See, e.g., U.S. v. Coluccio*, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding that imposition of a constructive trust was proper where, amongst other reasons, Government's forfeiture caused a breach of an implied promise); *Torres v. \\$36,256.80 U.S. Currency*, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a constructive trust appropriate where \"The government's forfeiture forced a breach of that promise that may result in a potentially unjust enrichment of the government (and commensurate unjust impoverishment of [the plaintiff]).\")\n\n50. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown that a constructive trust should be imposed over Petitioner's Property. Such a constructive trust \"qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" *Willis*, 652 F.3d at 242.\n\n51. The property upon which the constructive trust is sought – Petitioners Property - is easily traceable. *See* **Exhibit C***.*\n\n52. Moreover, the imposition of a constructive trust is fully available to Petitioner, even if the Government contends that others are owed restitution from any forfeited property. \"When a party can directly trace its assets, without resorting to fictions or presumptions, a constructive trust is available even in cases involving multiple fraud victims.\" *U.S. v. Ovid,* 2012 WL 2087084, \\*7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012). \"[C]ourts are not free to disregard the law of constructive trusts when a claimant can directly trace its property, even if this leaves one innocent victim better off than another equally innocent victim.\" *Id.* The \"orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases\" is to \"return[] identifiable assets to their owners, turning to pro rata distribution only when specific identification or transactional tracing is impossible.\" *Id.* at \\*8 (citing *Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment*, § 59 Reporter's Note G, at 437).\n\n#### **C. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner's Property**\n\n53. Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property is absolutely superior to any interest that the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner's Property.\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner's interest in the forfeited property, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's interest \"renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner *rather than the defendant* or was superior to any right, title, or interest *of the defendant* at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section.\" 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n\n55. Here, as set forth above, Defendant Wang never had any interest in Petitioner's Property or Account 2770; indeed, the record is entirely silent as to what the relationship is between Defendant Wang, the Fraud Scheme, and Account 2770.\n\n56. It is axiomatic that neither the Government nor Defendant Wang can argue that they have a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Likewise, Defendant Wang cannot forfeit her interest in a property in which she had no interest.\n\n### **D. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys' Fees**\n\n57. The Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to file this petition asserting Petitioner's right to Petitioner's Property and to challenge the forfeiture of Petitioner's Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner's costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (\"EAJA\"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the purposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney's fees under the EAJA. *See United States v. Cox*, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Douglas*, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th\n\nCir. 1995); *U.S. v. Bailey*, 2015 WL 1893610 at \\*20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\n\n# **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\n58. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner's Property, which renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. *See e.g.* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Defendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property, and never did. Petitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that the Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner's Property.\n\n59. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\nDated: April 2, 2025\n\nDated: April 2, 2025 Respectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman Jeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq. Jeremy W. Schulman, Esq. SCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC 6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425 North Bethesda, MD 20852 (240) 356-8550 [jgavenman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jgavenman@schulmanbh.com) [jschulman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jschulman@schulmanbh.com)\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler Paul W. Butler, Esq. BUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES 1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531 Washington, D.C. 20036 [paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com](mailto:paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com) *Counsel for Petitioner*\n\n# **ATTESTATION AND OATH**\n\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I, \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_, attest and declare under penalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided in support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief. ZHANG PENG 7\n\nExecuted on this \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ day of April, 2025\n\nZP\n\nSignature","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名「Yanping」，又名「Y」，\n\nDefendant（被告）。\n\n裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收裁定之第三方请愿书——经核实的主张\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n请愿人 Zhang Peng（张鹏）（「请愿人」）依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c) 条提起本《裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收裁定之第三方请愿书》（「请愿书」）。请愿人请求归还请愿人拥有合法权利、所有权和/或权益的资金（「请愿人财产」）（定义详见下文），且该资金系由 United States Government（美国政府）（「政府」）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平）（「被告王」）达成没收命令之一部分而不当扣押的。具体而言，当政府扣押以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名义在 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）开立的账号为 5090042770 的银行账户（「2770 账户」）内的全部资金时，请愿人财产被政府不当扣押。然而，任何涉及 2770 账户内资金（包括请愿人财产）的没收裁定均属非法和不当，因为被告王在 2770 账户或请愿人财产中均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。因此，没收裁定（定义详见下文）就请愿人财产而言归于无效，因为在引发没收裁定（定义见下文）的行为发生之时，请愿人财产的权利、所有权或权益归属于请愿人而非被告王，且优于被告王的任何权利、所有权或权益。因此，本法院应当修改没收裁定以将请愿人财产从没收裁定中剔除，并命令政府立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人。为支持请愿人的主张，请愿人陈述如下：\n\nI. 引言\n\n2770 账户内的资金（包括请愿人财产）似乎纯属政府在起诉被告王和 Miles Guo（郭文贵）（「被告郭」）之前扣押资产过程中的「附带损害」。自 2770 账户被扣押以来已有两年半以上的时间，在此期间，从未有任何关于 2770 账户（包括请愿人财产）与被告王认罪的任何罪行之间存在何种关联的解释，而这是依法作出有效没收裁定的必要前提。从未有任何证据表明被告王认罪的任何非法活动的任何收益曾被存入 2770 账户；没有证据表明此类活动的任何收益曾与请愿人财产混同；事实上，也没有证据表明被告王曾与 2770 账户有任何关系，甚至不知道其存在。\n\n如下文所示，请愿人是对请愿人财产设立的拟制信托的受益人，请愿人财产在本案中不得被政府扣押。无论是被告王，还是如今继承其地位的政府，都从未证明他们对 2770 账户中的请愿人财产或一般的 2770 账户享有任何权益。尽管被告王在没收裁定（ECF No. 488，第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在 2770 账户（从而包括请愿人财产）中的「所有权利、所有权和权益」，但她的同意对 2770 账户或请愿人财产不具有法律效力。被告王在 2770 账户中从未拥有此类「权利、所有权和权益」——没有任何证据表明她是 2770 账户的签字人、曾向 2770 账户存入资金，或以其他方式对 2770 账户拥有任何控制权，也没有证据表明被告王曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770 账户存入任何资金。被告王不能没收她并不拥有且不享有任何权益的财产。事实上，本法院似乎自始至终从未根据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1)(A) 条的规定，确定请愿人财产属于应予没收的财产。\n\n基于上述所有理由以及下文阐明的理由，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 批准本请愿书；(2) 修改没收裁定以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人；(4) 命令请愿人有权收回与本请愿书相关的请愿人律师费及开支，并准许请愿人提交此类律师费及开支的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的其他救济。\n\nII. 背景事实\n\nA. 请愿人财产\n\n1. Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司，以下简称「汉密尔顿机会基金」），一家开曼群岛独立投资组合公司，向请愿人提供了一份日期为 2022 年 1 月 20 日的发售备忘录（「发售备忘录」）。发售备忘录的真实且正确的副本作为附件 A 附于本请愿书。\n\n2. 汉密尔顿机会基金是一家「专门从事由投资管理人 [定义见发售备忘录] 出于长期资本增值目的而选定的股权投资的基金」。附件 A，发售备忘录第 33 页。投资管理人（定义见发售备忘录）已发现投资一家银行（「数字银行」）的机会（详见发售备忘录第 33 页）。结合该项投资，汉密尔顿机会基金拟通过发行各类股份来筹集资金。同上，第 34 页。\n\n3. 发售备忘录向请愿人提供了认购属于汉密尔顿机会基金某一独立投资组合——Hamilton M&A Fund SP（汉密尔顿并购基金独立投资组合，以下简称「并购基金」）的 B 类股份的机会。\n\n4. 被告王并非并购基金或汉密尔顿机会基金的董事或成员，亦不享有并购基金或汉密尔顿机会基金的任何公司权益或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n5. 被告王未向并购基金进行任何投资；同样，证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n6. 2022 年 1 月 25 日，请愿人向汉密尔顿机会基金提交了一份认购价值 $200,000.00 的并购基金 B 类股份的申请（「认购协议」）。认购协议的真实且正确的副本作为附件 B 附于本请愿书。\n\n7. 2022 年 1 月 25 日，汉密尔顿机会基金代表并购基金批准并接受了该认购协议。参见附件 B，认购协议第 15 页。\n\n8. 2022 年 2 月 17 日，根据认购协议的条款，请愿人向 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号为 5090042770 的账户电汇了 $200,000.00（「请愿人财产」）。电汇确认单的真实且正确的副本作为附件 C 附于本请愿书。\n\n9. 请愿人汇入请愿人财产的账户即为 2770 账户。\n\n10. 根据发售备忘录的条款，请愿人有权自行选择赎回请愿人的股份。附件 A，发售备忘录第 17 页；另见同上，第 53 页（声明在符合特定限制的前提下，「B 类股份可在任何赎回日由股东自行选择赎回」）。\n\n11. 汉密尔顿机会基金的资产「与本基金任何其他独立投资组合的资产及本基金的任何普通资产保持隔离、分开且可单独识别」。附件 A，发售备忘录第 12 页。此外，根据开曼群岛法律，汉密尔顿机会基金有责任「将每个独立投资组合的投资组合资产与任何其他独立投资组合的独立投资组合资产相隔离，并保持隔离、分开且可单独识别」。附件 A，发售备忘录第 22-23 页（引用《开曼群岛公司法（修订版）》第 XIV 部分第 219(6)(b) 条）。\n\nB. 扣押 2770 账户\n\n12. 2022 年 9 月 18 日，政府扣押了 2770 账户中的全部资金余额。\n\n13. 迄今为止，没有任何公开文件说明政府扣押 2770 账户内资金所依据的合理根据。\n\nC. 针对被告王和被告郭的刑事案件及没收裁定\n\n14. 2023 年 3 月 6 日，政府对被告王、被告郭以及第三名从未被传讯的被告 William Je（余建明）提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n15. 2024 年 5 月 3 日，政府对被告王提起了替代控告书（「替代控告书」）。ECF No. 325。替代控告书指控被告王犯有一项共谋电汇欺诈罪（罪名项 I）（替代控告书第 1-2 页）和一项共谋洗钱罪（罪名项 II）（替代控告书第 2-4 页）。替代控告书还包含一项没收指控（「没收指控」）。替代控告书第 4 页。\n\n16. 就在同一天，即 2024 年 5 月 3 日，被告王就替代控告书中所指控的罪名项 I 和罪名项 II 进行了认罪答辩。\n\n17. 同样在 2024 年 5 月 3 日，本法院作出了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收裁定》（「原没收裁定」）。ECF No. 329。\n\n18. 在原没收裁定中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产（包括 2770 账户）中的「所有权利、所有权和权益」，因为此类财产「构成了被告人个人获取的第一项罪名中所指控之罪行的收益和/或涉及 [替代] 控告书第二项罪名中所指控之罪行的财产」。原没收裁定第 2-6 页（强调为原文所加）。\n\n19. 被告郭对其被指控的任何罪名均未作认罪答辩。因此，陪审团审理于 2024 年 5 月 22 日至 2024 年 7 月 16 日期间进行（「郭案审判」）。2024 年 7 月 16 日，陪审团裁定被告郭犯有共谋敲诈勒索罪、共谋电汇欺诈罪、共谋洗钱罪、共谋证券欺诈罪、证券欺诈罪、电汇欺诈罪和洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本请愿书提交之日，被告郭尚未被判刑。\n\n20. 2025 年 1 月 6 日，被告王被判刑。\n\n21. 2025 年 1 月 7 日，本法院作出了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收裁定》（「没收裁定」）ECF No. 488。在涉及请愿人的方面，没收裁定在所有实质方面与原没收裁定基本相同。在没收裁定中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产（包括 2770 账户）中的「所有权利、所有权和权益」，因为此类财产「构成了被告人个人获取的第一项罪名中所指控之罪行的收益和/或涉及 [替代] 控告书第二项罪名中所指控之罪行的财产」。没收裁定第 2-11 页（强调为原文所加）。\n\n22. 2770 账户中的资产在原没收裁定和没收裁定中均被描述如下：\n\n原先存放在 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号为 5090042770 的账户中、以「Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）」名义开立并由政府于 2022 年 9 月 18 日或前后扣押的 $89,992,861.75 美元货币 (23-FBl-000074)。\n\n原没收裁定第 3 页；没收裁定第 3 页。\n\nIII. 论辩理由\n\n23. 在依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c)(1) 条进行的附随刑事没收程序中，本法院必须依据优势证据标准判定：请愿人（petitioner）对拟没收的财产是否拥有合法权利、所有权或权益，以及该等权利、所有权或权益是否使没收命令全部或部分无效，理由是该等权益属于请愿人而非被告所有，或者在导致财产被没收的作为发生时优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n24. 在本案中，依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)，请愿人凭借对该等财产的推定信托（constructive trust），对请愿人财产（Petitioner's Property）拥有合法权利、所有权或权益。此外，请愿人在请愿人财产中的权益既归属于请愿人，亦优于被告 Wang（王雁平）在请愿人财产中的任何权利，因为被告王在请愿人财产或 2770 账户（Account 2770）中均无任何合法权利、所有权或权益。换言之，被告王不可能被没收其在 2770 账户中的权益，因为她没有任何应受刑事没收的合法权益。因此，应当对没收命令予以变更以剔除请愿人财产，并将请愿人财产归还给请愿人。\n\nA. 政府未能初步证明 2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）属于应予没收的财产，导致没收命令就该等资金而言是不当的\n\n25. 政府没有扣押请愿人财产的合法理由，因为没有任何证据表明政府曾依 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 的规定证明请愿人财产以及整个 2770 账户实际属于可没收财产。\n\n26. “当政府寻求获得没收命令时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1) 条……要求量刑法院根据适用法律判定哪些财产属于应予没收的财产。’” U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（援引 U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2007)）。依据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院必须判定政府是否已确立财产与犯罪之间必要的关联性。”Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（强调为原文所加）；Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的不同阶段，政府承担证明此法律结论的不同程度的确信标准举证责任：在起诉后听证会上达到合理根据（probable cause）标准……或者在无陪审团审判（bench trial）中或陪审团面前达到优势证据标准。”同上（强调为原文所加）（内部引文省略）。“然而，唯有政府达到相关的法定门槛，涉案财产方可在任何法律意义上被视为‘应予没收’。在此之前，虽然政府仅通过起诉书宣布了寻求没收的意图，但该财产仅被视为‘潜在可没收’……或‘潜在应予没收’。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n27. 这意味着在法院审理请愿人是否有权依据 § 853(n) 获返还财产这一问题之前，必须首先判定争议财产在最初是否实际属于可没收财产。若非如此，政府便没有扣押该财产的法定职权。若财产系不当扣押，则无论请愿人能否满足 § 853(n) 规定的标准，政府均必须归还被扣押的账户。参见例如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)。\n\n28. 依据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 进行全面而完整的审查，对于司法的公正实施至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已开展审查并判定财产属于应予没收这一假定之上。在制定附随程序法条时，国会选择在附随程序中将举证责任置于第三方，因为“美国在刑事案件中本应已经排除合理怀疑地证明了其没收指控。”S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n29. 在本案中，从未就 2770 账户与被告王被指控（并已认罪答辩）的任何罪行之间是否存在关联性作出过判定，因此，请愿人被迫提交本请愿书（Petition）。根据被告王和被告 Guo（郭文贵）刑事案件中所有公开可得文件所载的信息，政府在涉及 2770 账户的问题上无法胜诉。\n\n30. 在本案中，在替代起诉书（Superseding Information）中，政府就罪名项一（Count I）和罪名项二（Count II）均列入了没收指控（Forfeiture Allegation），并寻求没收特定财产。见《替代起诉书》第 4 页。案卷中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明、更不用说达到其举证责任来证明 2770 账户与被告王认罪答辩的罪行之间存在关联性。\n\n31. 关于罪名项一，没收指控载明：“由于实施了本替代起诉书罪名项一所指控的电信诈骗罪，被告 YVETTE WANG（又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）应依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条[1]……及《美国法典》第 28 编第 2461(c) 条向美国没收构成或源自可追溯至实施上述罪行所得收益的任何及所有不动产与动产。”见《替代起诉书》第 4 页。政府必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 项下的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收理论是该财产被用于实施或便利实施刑事犯罪，或卷入实施刑事犯罪，政府应确立该财产与犯罪之间存在实质性联系。”18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n32. 案卷中没有任何关于 2770 账户中的资金如何构成或源自可追溯至被告王共谋实施电信诈骗所得收益的指控。《替代起诉书》指控：“自至少大约 2018 年起直至至少大约 2023 年 3 月 15 日，共谋人向投资者作出虚假陈述，称其在 GTV、Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）组织以及 GClubs 的投资将获得股票作为回报，且其在 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的投资将获得加密货币作为回报[（即‘诈骗计划’）]。通过该[诈骗计划]，被告 YVETTE WANG（又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）及其共谋人（包括 Miles Guo）诱使投资者向郭控制的实体投资超过 10 亿美元。”见《替代起诉书》第 2 页。《替代起诉书》中没有关于被告王将诈骗计划的任何收益存入 2770 账户的指控。同样，《替代起诉书》中也没有任何关于因该诈骗计划导致任何投资者将资金存入 2770 账户的指控。\n\n[1] 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定：“构成或源自可追溯至违反”各项特定罪行“所得收益的任何不动产或动产[均应予以没收]”，其中包括在罪名项一中针对被告王指控的违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 电信诈骗罪。\n\n也不会有任何此类指控，因为 2770 账户中唯一的存款均来自投资于数字银行（Digital Bank）的投资者——该项投资与《替代起诉书》中所述的“诈骗计划”没有任何牵涉。诚然，请愿人申明：请愿人从未是被告王在《替代起诉书》中所被指控的任何行为的受害者，且不认为请愿人的任何财产曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n33. 最后，在被告郭的审判期间，没有任何涉及 2770 账户的相关证言。既没有任何关于该诈骗计划的任何收益是否曾存入 2770 账户的证言，就此而言，也没有关于被告王是否曾向 2770 账户存入任何款项的证言。简而言之，案卷中没有任何内容表明 2770 账户与被告王的电信诈骗指控之间存在关联，更没有充分的证据来认定政府已达到其举证责任证明（且法院已正当裁决）存在适当的关联性以使没收 2770 账户具有合法性。\n\n34. 关于罪名项二，没收指控载明：“由于实施了本起诉书罪名项二所指控的洗钱罪，被告 YVETTE WANG（又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）应依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 982(a)(1) 条[2]向美国没收卷入上述罪行的任何及所有不动产与动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产，包括但不限于代表卷入上述罪行财产金额的美元款项。”见《替代起诉书》第 4 页。关于罪名项二，政府“必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 项下的没收要件。”U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015)。\n\n[2] 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定：“对被判定犯有违反本编第 1956 条[洗钱法条]之罪的人进行量刑的法院……应命令该人向美国没收卷入该罪行的任何不动产或动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产。”18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调为原文所加）。\n\n35. 《替代起诉书》指控被告王犯有共谋洗钱罪，因为被告王“明知卷入某些金融交易的财产代表某种形式非法活动的收益，仍意图并确实进行及试图进行该等金融交易……且该等交易实际上卷入了特定非法活动的收益，即本起诉书罪名项一所指控的电信诈骗计划的收益。”见《替代起诉书》第 3 页。\n\n36. 尚不清楚 2770 账户如何能够因罪名项二的洗钱指控而被没收。从指控来看，洗钱罪名源于被告王利用“罪名项一所指控的电信诈骗计划的收益”进行金融交易。见《替代起诉书》第 3 页。如上所述，没有任何证据表明 2770 账户中的资金与罪名项一所指控的诈骗计划有任何关联（参见上文第 31-33 段）——没有任何证据表明该等资金“构成或源自可追溯至实施”电信诈骗所得的收益。参见例如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。由于 2770 账户中的资金既非诈骗计划的收益，亦非源自诈骗计划的收益，因此该等资金不能作为罪名项二洗钱指控的事实依据，且不能作为被告王在罪名项二定罪的一部分予以没收。\n\n37. 政府为支持洗钱指控所主张的公开作为（overt acts）进一步未能证明 2770 账户中的资金何以属于可没收财产。在《替代起诉书》中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项作为。见《替代起诉书》第 3 页。尽管政府声称这两项公开作为是被告王为推进涉嫌共谋洗钱而实施的作为“之一等”，\n\n（见《替代起诉书》第 3 页），这些其他行为从未被指明。\n\n38. 首先，根据《替代起诉书》，2020年5月20日，被告王开立了一个以 GTV 名义开立的银行账户，值得注意的是，2770 账户*并非*该账户。《替代起诉书》第 3 页。2020年6月2日，被告王向该账户转账约 2 亿美元。同上。转入该 GTV 账户的资金来自 Saraca Media Group, Inc.（萨拉卡媒体集团公司，简称“Saraca”）持有的摩根大通银行（JP Morgan Chase Bank）账户（Guo 庭审，2024年5月31日，953:25-954:4；Guo 庭审，2024年6月26日，4359:1-14），而*非*来自 2770 账户。没有任何证词表明 2770 账户中的任何款项曾进入过 Saraca 的摩根大通银行账户，进而再转入《替代起诉书》中所述的 GTV 账户。况且，2770 账户在 2020 年时甚至根本不存在。\n\n39. 政府指控的第二项行为是，“在 2020年6月5日或前后”，被告王“授权从 GTV 的母公司 Saraca 电汇 1 亿美元至一家高风险对冲基金，以使 Saraca 及其最终实益拥有人即被告郭的儿子获益”。《替代起诉书》第 3-4 页。首先，这明确指控了资金是从 Saraca 的账户转出的，而事实证明 2770 账户并非该账户。此外，再次强调，没有任何证词表明 2770 账户中的任何资金曾进入过 Saraca 的账户。况且，再一次说明，2770 账户在 2020 年时甚至根本不存在。\n\n40. 从上述论证可以看出，根本没有任何关于 2770 账户的指控或证词。记录中对 2770 账户的*唯一*提及，就是被告王同意将其没收。然而，“被告对没收的同意[并不能]免除在拟没收的财产与被定罪的罪行之间必须存在关联的要求。”见 Beltramea 案，785 F.3d at 291。正如第八巡回上诉法院（Eighth Circuit）所强调的，“地方法院负有一项独立职责，以*确保*存在所要求的关联。”同上（后加重点）。\n\n41. 在本案中，无论是在《替代起诉书》、在《原没收命令》还是在《没收命令》中，对于 2770 账户与被告王认罪的罪行之间哪怕是声称存在的关联，都没有任何事实指控。\n\n42. 政府在未证明存在关联的情况下继续扣留 2770 账户中的资金，是错误的且不符合衡平原则的。如果政府保留 2770 账户中的资金，其将构成不当得利，因为这些资金属于包括请愿人在内的第三方，而他们（1）不是被告王或被告郭；且（2）未参与该欺诈计划，更非该计划的受害者。参见，例如，U.S. v. Bajakajian 案，524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)（解释刑事“没收不具有救济目的，旨在惩罚违法者，*且不得强加于无辜的所有人*。”）（后加重点）。\n\nB. 请愿人对请愿人财产拥有权益，因为对该等财产存在推定信托\n\n43. 即使抛开政府未能恰当证明 2770 账户中的资金属于《替代起诉书》中指控的任何活动的一部分不谈，请愿人财产也应当归还给请愿人，因为请愿人对该财产享有的权益大于被告王，或大于如今处于其地位的政府。\n\n44. 根据推定信托法理，请愿人财产受到保护，并且无论存在任何其他所有权主张，包括被告王的主张或代其行事的政府的主张，该财产仍属于请愿人的财产。第二巡回上诉法院 [3] 已认定，“就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，推定信托符合‘对该财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益。”见 Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States 案，652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n45. “推定信托是一种衡平救济，*为了实现其目的必然具有灵活性*。”见 Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co. 案，194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999)（后加重点）。“其目的在于防止不当得利，尽管不当得利并不一定牵涉不当行为的实施……所必需的是法院确认某一方持有财产*的情形依据衡平和良心其本不应当保留该财产*。”同上（引文省略）。\n\n46. “一方是否构成不当得利是通过适用衡平法原则得出的法律结论……衡平法院在判令推定信托时不受死板公式的约束。交易的衡平性必须决定救济的限度……当一个人保留了一项利益，而根据转让的情形并考虑到当事人之间的关系，保留该利益是不公平时，即产生不当得利。”同上（引文\n\n[脚注] 3 “联邦普通法的法律适用规则是适用对诉讼具有重大利益的管辖区的法律。”见 In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A. 案，961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992)，部分维持原判 sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A.，No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK)，1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992)。在本案中，有三个可能适用其法律的竞合管辖区：纽约州、加利福尼亚州和开曼群岛。请愿人支付请愿人财产是依据受开曼群岛法律管辖的《认购协议》。见证据 B，《认购协议》第 8 页，第 2(s) 款。在请愿人存入请愿人财产时，2770 账户*曾是*加利福尼亚州一家银行的账户。自 2770 账户被扣押以来（依据纽约州一家法院签发的搜查与扣押令），这些资金现由位于纽约的政府占有。纽约是本案的受诉地。根据这些事实，纽约对本诉讼具有重大利益，其法律应适用于推定信托的设立。但是，在政府质疑此法律选择决定的范围内，请愿人保留要求本法院根据加利福尼亚州和/或开曼群岛法律对请愿人财产设立推定信托的所有权利。\n\n省略）。\n\n47. 纽约州上诉法院（New York Court of Appeals）概述了在确定是否应在特定情形下设立推定信托时应考虑的若干因素，包括“（1）保密或信义关系，（2）承诺，（3）基于对此产生的信赖而进行的转让，以及（4）不当得利。”见 Sharp v. Kosmalski 案，40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976)。然而，纽约州法院长期以来一直认为“这些因素仅仅是有用的指引，而非不可变通的准则。”见 Counihan 案，194 F.3d at 362（援引大量陈述此主张的纽约州案件）。\n\n48. 在本案中，自请愿人财产存入 2770 账户之日起，即存在以请愿人为受益人的对请愿人财产的推定信托。\n\n49. 当请愿人签署《认购协议》以购买 Hamilton M&A Fund SP 的特定 B 类股份时，请愿人与 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 建立了保密和/或信义关系 [4]。根据《认购协议》，Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 向请愿人做出承诺，即请愿人财产将被投资于数字银行（Digital Bank）。基于对该承诺的信赖，请愿人按照《认购协议》中的指示将请愿人财产电汇至 2770 账户。政府对 2770 账户的不当扣押迫使 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 违背了将请愿人财产投资于数字银行的承诺。由于政府的扣押，请愿人甚至无法行使其赎回权以收回请愿人财产。这将\n\n[脚注] 4 即使法院认定 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 与请愿人之间不存在保密关系和/或不存在信义关系，这也不具有决定性，因为缺乏信义关系并不妨碍法院认定存在推定信托。参见 Koreag 案，961 F.2d at 353（指出“然而，我们不认为[当事人之间]缺乏信义关系会自动击败推定信托的[主张]。尽管信义关系是纽约州法院引用的因素之一，但在衡平法另有要求时，缺少任何单一因素本身并不会击败推定信托的设立”）。\n\n导致政府获得不当得利，因为政府目前在没有任何合法理由的情况下保留着请愿人财产。参见，例如，U.S. v. Coluccio 案，51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995)（认定设立推定信托是恰当的，除其他原因外，政府的没收导致了对默示承诺的违反）；Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency 案，25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994)（认定推定信托是恰当的，其中“政府的没收迫使违背了该承诺，这可能导致政府潜在的不当得利（以及[原告]相应的不当受损）。”）\n\n50. 据此，请愿人已证明应当对请愿人财产设立推定信托。就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，该推定信托“符合‘对该财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益。”见 Willis 案，652 F.3d at 242。\n\n51. 申请设立推定信托的财产——即请愿人财产——是容易追溯的。见证据 C。\n\n52. 此外，即使政府主张其他主体应从任何被没收财产中获得赔偿，设立推定信托对请愿人而言亦完全适用。“当一方能够直接追溯其资产而无需借助拟制或推定手段时，即使在涉及多个欺诈受害者的案件中，推定信托也是适用的。”见 U.S. v. Ovid 案，2012 WL 2087084, *7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012)。“当权利人能够直接追溯其财产时，法院不能随意忽视推定信托法，即使这会让一个无辜受害者处于比另一个同样无辜的受害者更好的境地。”同上。涉及多起欺诈案件的“传统做法”是“将可识别的资产归还给其所有权人，仅在无法进行具体识别或交易追溯时才采用按比例分配。”同上，*8（援引《第三次侵权法重述：赔偿与不当得利》（Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment），§ 59 报告人说明 G，第 437 页）。\n\nC. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有优先权益\n\n53. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益绝对优于政府或被告王对请愿人财产可能享有的任何权益。\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 明确规定，除了请愿人对被没收财产享有的权益之外，请愿人还必须以优势证据证明，请愿人的权益“使得没收命令全部或部分无效，因为该权利、所有权或权益在引发根据本条没收财产的行为实施之时归属于请愿人*而非被告*，或者优于*被告的*任何权利、所有权或权益。”21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（后加重点）。\n\n55. 在本案中，如上所述，被告王对请愿人财产或 2770 账户从未拥有过任何权益；事实上，记录中对于被告王、欺诈计划与 2770 账户之间的关系完全未作任何说明。\n\n56. 不言自明的是，政府和被告 Wang（王）均不能主张其对一项其从未拥有过权益的财产享有优先权益。同样，被告王也不能放弃其不曾拥有任何权益的财产中的权益。\n\nD. 请愿人有权获得诉讼费用和律师费\n\n57. 请愿人被迫聘请法律顾问，并为提交本请愿书主张请愿人对请愿人财产的权利以及对请愿人财产的没收提出异议而产生了费用。在本程序中胜诉后，请愿人保留追索与本请愿书相关发生的所有律师费和诉讼费用的全部权利，并可根据《Equal Access to Justice Act（平等获取司法机会法）》（“EAJA”），28 U.S.C. § 2412，追索请愿人的诉讼费用和合理律师费。联邦法院一贯认为，为了允许胜诉的权利主张人根据 EAJA 收取律师费之目的，§ 853(n) 程序属于民事性质。参见 United States v. Cox，575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009)；United States v. Douglas，55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995)；U.S. v. Bailey，2015 WL 1893610 at *20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015)。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n58. 基于上述理由，请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，这使得《没收命令》就该财产而言无效。参见例如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告王在请愿人财产中不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。请愿人已经证明，并能够在任何必要的听证会上以优势证据证明，需要对《没收命令》进行修正以排除请愿人财产。\n\n59. 因此，请愿人谨请本法院：(1) 批准本请愿书；(2) 修正《没收命令》以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追索因本请愿书而发生的请愿人律师费和诉讼费用，并准予请愿人就此类律师费和诉讼费用提交申请；以及 (5) 准予其他必要且公正的救济。\n\n日期：2025年4月2日\n\n日期：2025年4月2日 谨此提交，\n\n/签名/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\nJeffrey S. Gavenman（律师）\nJeremy W. Schulman（律师）\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/签名/ Paul W. Butler\nPaul W. Butler（律师）\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n请愿人代理律师\n\n证明与宣誓\n\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人_________________在此证明并在接受作伪证将受处罚的前提下声明，本人对该财产的主张并非无理取闹，且就本人所知所信，为支持该主张所提供的信息均属真实、准确。ZHANG PENG（张鹏） 7\n\n签署于2025年4月________日\n\nZP\n\n签名","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Torres","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":5979,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-07","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:55:19"}