{"id":"court_sdny_668_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":668,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-07","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方没收财产上诉 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵/Guo Wengui/Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #668（2025年4月7日提交）。请愿人通过Archiwoods Investment Value Fund在Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC的M&A Fund中投资，持有Class B Shares，就该财产遭没收提起上诉，声称其拥有合法权益而Yvette Wang无权，要求法院修改没收令、返还财产并赔偿律师费。","summary_en":"Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Interest in Forfeited Property — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #668 (filed April 7, 2025). Petitioner, having invested in M&A Fund Class B Shares of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC through Archiwoods Investment Value Fund, petitions to challenge forfeiture of that property, asserting legal interest and title superior to any claim of Yvette Wang, and seeking amendment of the forfeiture order, return of property, and recovery of attorney's fees.","body_en":"# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\n**THIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE - VERIFIED CLAIM OF**\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner The (\"Petitioner\") files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the \"Petition\"). Petitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest (\"Petitioner's Property\") (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government (the \"Government\") improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with Defendant Yvette Wang (\"Defendant Wang\"). Specifically, Petitioner's Property was improperly seized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in bank account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Account 2770\"). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or interest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. The Forfeiture Order (as more fully defined below) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner's Property because right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property was vested in the Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was superior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the acts that gave rise to the Forfeiture Order (as defined below). As such, this Court should amend the Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner's Property from the Forfeiture Order and order that the Government immediately return Petitioner's Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner's claim, Petitioner states as follows:\n\n# **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nIt appears that the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, were purely \"collateral damage\" in the Government's seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant Wang and Miles Guo (\"Defendant Guo\"). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure of Account 2770, and in that time span, there has never been any explanation as to how Account 2770 (including Petitioner's Property) is related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any showing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were ever deposited in Account 2770; no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever commingled with Petitioner's Property; and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had anything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\n\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is a beneficiary of a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property and Petitioner's Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither Defendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, have ever demonstrated that they have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner's Property in Account 2770 or in Account 2770 in general. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of \"all her right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 (and thus, Petitioner's Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), her consent has no legal bearing as to Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. Defendant Wang never had such \"right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 – there is no evidence that she was a signatory on Account 2770, ever deposited money into Account 2770, or otherwise had any control over Account 2770, and there is no evidence that Defendant Wang ever directed anyone, directly or indirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that she does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never established that Petitioner's Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\n## **II. BACKGROUND FACTS**\n\n## **A. Petitioner's Property**\n\n1. Archiwoods Investment Value Fund (\"Archiwoods\") prepared an Information Option Memorandum (the \"Option Memorandum\"), dated February 14, 2022, outlining an investment opportunity in the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Hamilton Opportunity Fund\"), a Cayman Islands Segregated Portfolio Company. Archiwoods gave this Option Memorandum to prospective investors, including Petitioner. A true and correct copy of the Option Memorandum is attached hereto as **Exhibit A.**\n\n2. Investing in the Hamilton M&A Fund SP (the \"M&A Fund\"), was \"identified by the investment manager with a view to high value creation and long-term capital gain.\" **Exhibit A**, Option Memorandum at 4. The Investment Manager (defined as \"Archiwoods Investment Management Pty Ltd\" in the Option Memorandum) had identified an opportunity to invest in a\n\nbank (the \"Investment Strategy\"), **Exhibit A**, at 4, 8, and solicited investments, including from Petitioner, to take advantage of this opportunity.\n\n3. The Option Memorandum offered Petitioner an opportunity to acquire Class B Shares attributed to the M&A Fund, a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund . A true and correct copy of the standard Offering Memorandum provided by the Hamilton Opportunity Fund to potential investors in the M&A Fund, dated January 20, 2022, is attached hereto as **Exhibit**\n\n**B**.\n\n4. Defendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any corporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund, the Hamilton Opportunity Fund, or Archiwoods. The evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n5. Defendant Wang did not make any investments in the M&A Fund or Archiwoods; again, the evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n6. Prior to May 31, 2022, Lei Zhang submitted an application on behalf of Petitioner to invest in Archiwoods and agreed to invest \\$120,000.00. Petitioner's agreement to invest this sum was on the express condition that the entirety of the investment would be used to purchase shares in the M&A Fund. On May 31, 2022, Petitioner received confirmation of their investment in Archiwoods. A true and correct copy of Petitioner's investment confirmation is attached hereto as **Exhibit C.**\n\n7. On February 16, 2022, and February 17, 2022, pursuant to the terms of the Option Memorandum, Petitioner wired \\$122,500.00 (the \"Petitioner Property\") to a bank account belonging to Archiwoods. A true and correct copy of Petitioner's wire information is attached hereto as **Exhibit D**.\n\n8. Pursuant to the terms of the Option Memorandum, Archiwoods entered into an\n\nagreement with Hamilton Opportunity Fund, acting on behalf of the M&A Fund. Upon information and belief, Archiwoods invested a monetary sum (including the entirety of Petitioner's Property) with the Hamilton Opportunity Fund for the acquisition of Class B shares in the Hamilton M&A Fund SP, a Segregated Portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund.\n\n9. Upon information and belief, Archiwoods wired its full investment amount (including Petitioner's Property) into Account 2770, which is the only account in which Hamilton Opportunity Fund held funds meant for the acquisition of Class B Shares.\n\n10. The Offering Agreement that all investors sign and that governs the terms of his or her investment into the Hamilton Opportunity Fund (including the M&A Fund), entitles investors to redeem their shares at the investor's option. **Exhibit B**, at 17; *see also id.* at 53 (stating that subject to certain limitations, \"Class B Shares may be redeemed at the option of the Shareholder on any Redemption Day\"). In turn, Petitioner had the right to redeem his investment with Archiwoods at the end of the investment term (the \"Right of Redemption\"). **Exhibit A**, at 4-5.\n\n11. The assets of each segregated portfolio of the Hamilton Opportunity Fund are \"kept segregated, separate and separately identifiable from those of any other segregated portfolios of the Fund and any general assets of the Fund.\" *See* **Exhibit B**, at 12; *see also* **Exhibit A**, at 4. In addition, pursuant to the laws of the Cayman Islands, it is the duty of Hamilton Opportunity Fund to \"segregate, and keep segregated, portfolio assets of each segregated portfolio separate and separately identifiable from segregated portfolio assets of any other segregated portfolio.\" **Exhibit B**, at 22-23 (citing The Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands, Part XIV, 219(6)(b)).\n\n# **B. Seizure of Account 2770**\n\n12. On September 18, 2022, the Government seized the entire balance of the funds in Account 2770, which included Petitioner's Property.\n\n13. To date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the\n\nGovernment had to seize the funds in Account 2770.\n\n# **C. The Criminal Case Against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the Forfeiture Order**\n\n14. On March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n\n15. On May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the \"Superseding Information\") against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information charged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I) (Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering (Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a Forfeiture Allegation (the \"Forfeiture Allegation\"). Superseding Information at 4.\n\n16. On the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count II as charged in the Superseding Information.\n\n17. Also on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (\"Original Forfeiture Order\"). ECF No. 329.\n\n18. In the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her*  right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n\n19. Defendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him. Accordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the \"Guo Trial\"). On July 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to\n\ncommit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this Petition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n\n20. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n\n21. On January 7, 2025, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Forfeiture Order\") ECF No. 488. As it pertains to Petitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all material respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her* right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Forfeiture Order at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n22. The assets in Account 2770 are described in both the Original Forfeiture Order and the Forfeiture Order as follows:\n\n> \\$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September 18, 2022 (23-FBl-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\n\n#### **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n23. In an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited, and whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part, because such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any\n\nright, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n\n24. Here, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of a constructive trust over such property. Moreover, Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any right Defendant Wang had in Petitioner's Property because Defendant Wang had *no* legal right, title or, interest in either Petitioner's Property or Account 2770. In other words, Defendant Wang could not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject to criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner's Property, and Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner.\n\n# **A. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770, Including Petitioner's Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First Instance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds**\n\n25. The Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner's Property because there is no evidence that the Government has ever demonstrated that Petitioner's Property, and Account 2770 in general, is actually forfeitable property, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\n26. \"When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, 'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.'\" *U.S. v. Watts*, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing *U.S. v. Capoccia*, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court *must* determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.\" Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); *Watts*, 786 F.3d at 172. \"At various points in the proceedings, *the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion* to varying degrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . .or by a preponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.\" *Id.* (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). \"Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the property in question be considered 'subject to forfeiture' in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the government has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property is seen merely as 'potentially forfeitable' . . . or 'potentially subject to forfeiture.'\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n27. This means that before the court reaches the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in dispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority to seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the accounts seized regardless of whether the petitioner can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). *See e.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co*., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n\n28. A full and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair administration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has conducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary proceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an ancillary proceeding, since \"the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.\" S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392.\n\n29. In this matter, there has never been a determination of whether there exists a nexus between Account 2770 and any of the offenses Defendant Wang was charged with (and pled guilty to), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained in the publicly-available documentsin both Defendant Wang's and Defendant Guo's criminal case,\n\nthe Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n\n30. Here, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture Allegation as to both Counts I and Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding Information at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show, let alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n31. As to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the wire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C)[1](#page-9-0). . .and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, \"if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n\n32. The record is devoid of any allegations pertaining to how funds in Account 2770 are, or are derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang's conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Superseding Information alleges that \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that \"[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture] which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of\" various specified offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang in Count I.\n\nMarch 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive stock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and GClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the Himalaya Exchange [(the \"Fraud Scheme\")]. Through the [Fraud Scheme], YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced investors to invest more than \\$1 billion into entities Guo controlled.\" Superseding Information at 2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing any proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into Account 2770. Similarly, there are no allegations in the Superseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into Account 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits from Archiwoods into Account 2770 were from investors who were investing in the Digital Bank pursuant to the Investment Strategy – an investment that is not implicated in any way by the \"Fraud Scheme\" described in the Superseding Information. To be sure, Petitioner affirms that Petitioner was never a victim of any conduct by Defendant Wang alleged in the Superseding Information and does not believe that any of Petitioner's Property was ever used in any unlawful activity.\n\n33. Finally, there was no relevant testimony during Defendant Guo's trial concerning Account 2770. There was no testimony regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme were ever deposited into Account 2770, nor, for that matter, whether Defendant Wang ever deposited any money into Account 2770. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would indicate there is a nexus between Account 2770 and Defendant Wang's wire fraud charge, let alone sufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing, and the Court properly adjudicated, that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of Account 2770 to be proper.\n\n34. As to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the\n\nmoney laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1)[2](#page-11-0), any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense, or any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United States currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. As to Count II, The Government \"must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.\" *U.S. v. Beltramea*, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n35. The Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy to launder money because Defendant Wang \"knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . .and which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One of this Information.\" Superseding Information at 3.\n\n36. It is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited for the money laundering charge in Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang engaging in financial transactions with the \"proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One.\" Superseding Information at 3. As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account 2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (*see* ¶¶ 31-33, above) – there is no evidence that such funds \"constitute[d] or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the\n\n<span id=\"page-11-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that \"[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, *involved in such offense*, or any property *traceable to such property*.\" 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\ncommission of\" wire fraud. *See e.g.* 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were not Fraud Scheme proceeds nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could not serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part of Defendant Wang's conviction for Count II.\n\n37. The overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge further fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be forfeitable. In the Superseding Information, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding Information at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were \"among others\" that Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money (Superseding Information at 3), these other acts were never identified.\n\n38. First, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened a bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was *not*. Superseding Information at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately \\$200 million to that account. *Id.* The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank account held by Saraca Media Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\") (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo Trial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), *not* from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be transferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information. Moreover, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n39. The second act the Government alleges is that \"on or about June 5, 2020,\" Defendant Wang \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from GTV's parent company, Saraca, to a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Defendant Guo's son.\" Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was\n\ntransferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account. Moreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n40. As seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding Account 2770 whatsoever. The *only* reference in the record to Account 2770 is Defendant Wang's consent to forfeit it. However, \"a defendant's consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the requirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of offense.\" *Beltramea*, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, \"[t]he district court had an independent duty to *ensure* that the required nexus exists.\" *Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n41. Here, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the Original Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account 2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n42. The Government's continued retention of the funds in Account 2770, without showing that there is a nexus, is wrong and inequitable. Should the Government retain the funds in Account 2770, it will be unjustly enriched, since the funds belong to third parties, including Petitioner, who are (1) not Defendant Wang or Defendant Guo; and (2) not involved the Fraud Scheme, let alone victims of such a scheme. *See, e.g., U.S. v. Bajakajian*, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (explaining that a criminal \"forfeiture serves no remedial purpose, is designed to punish the offender, *and cannot be imposed upon innocent owners*.\") (emphasis added).\n\n# **B. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner's Property Because There Exists a Constructive Trust Over Such Property**\n\n43. Even putting aside the Government's failure to properly demonstrate that the funds in Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does\n\nDefendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n\n44. Under the doctrine of constructive trusts, Petitioner's Property is protected and remains the property of Petitioner regardless of any other ownership claims, including Defendant Wang's or the Government, standing in her shoes. The Second Circuit[3](#page-14-0) has held that \"a constructive trust qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" *Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States*, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n45. \"A constructive trust is an equitable remedy, *necessarily flexible to accomplish its purpose*.\" *Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co*., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). \"Its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate the performance of a wrongful act. . .What is necessary is that the court identify a party who is holding property *under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it*.\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n<span id=\"page-14-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> \"The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the law of the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation.\" *In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.*, 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), *aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A*., No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). Here, there are four competing jurisdictions whose laws could apply: Australia, New York, California, and Cayman Islands. Petitioner's payment of Petitioner's Property was pursuant to the Option Memorandum. The Option Memorandum makes clear that Archiwoods would then enter into some agreement with the Hamilton Opportunity Fund on Petitioner's behalf. On information and belief, any agreement between Archiwoods and the Hamilton Opportunity Fund is governed by Cayman Islands law. Account 2770 *was* an account in a California bank when Petitioner deposited Petitioner's Property. Since Account 2770 was seized (pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a court in New York state), the funds are now in possession of the Government in New York and the California bank no longer exists. New York is the forum state of this case. From these facts, New York has the greatest interest in this litigation, and its laws should apply to an imposition of a constructive trust. However, to the extent that the Government challenges this choice-of-law determination, Petitioner reserves all rights to request that this Court impose a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property under California, Australia, and/or Cayman Islands law.\n\n46. \"Whether a party is unjustly enriched is a legal conclusion reached through the application of principles of equity. . . A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief. . . Unjust enrichment results when a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the transfer and considering the relationship of the parties, it would be inequitable to retain.\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n47. The New York Court of Appeals outlined several factors to be considered in determining whether a constructive trust should be imposed in certain circumstances, including \"(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment.\" *Sharp v. Kosmalski*, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976). However, New York courts have long held that \"these factors are merely useful guides and are not talismanic.\" *Counihan*, 194 F.3d at 362 (citing to a plethora of New York state cases that have stated this proposition).\n\n48. Here, there is a constructive trust for the benefit of Petitioner over Petitioner's Property as of the date that it was deposited into Account 2770 by Archiwoods.\n\n49. Petitioner, through Archiwoods, who acted as Petitioner's agent and/or intermediary, entered into a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship[4](#page-15-0) with Archiwoods and/or Hamilton Opportunity Fund when Petitioner invested in Archiwoods, who then executed an agreement on Petitioner's behalf in order to acquire certain Class B shares in Hamilton M&A Fund\n\n<span id=\"page-15-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> Even if the Court determines that the relationship was not confidential and/or there was no fiduciary relationship between Archiwoods and/or Hamilton Opportunity Fund and Petitioner, such would not be determinative, as the absence of a fiduciary relationship does not preclude the Court from finding a constructive trust exists. *See Koreag,* 961 F.2d at 353 (stating that \"[w]e do not believe, however, that the lack of a fiduciary relationship between [the parties] automatically defeats [a] claim of constructive trust. Although a fiduciary relationship is one of the factors cited by New York courts, the absence of any one factor will not itself defeat the imposition of a constructive trust when otherwise required by equity\").\n\nSP using Petitioner's Property. Per the Option Memorandum, Archiwoods made a promise to Petitioner that Petitioner's Property would be invested in the Digital Bank pursuant to the Investment Strategy. **Exhibit A**, at 4. In reliance on this promise, the Petitioner wired Petitioner's Property to Archiwoods, who then, upon information and belief, wired it to Account 2770. The Government's improper seizure of Account 2770 forced a breach of Archiwoods' promise to invest Petitioner's Property into the Digital Bank pursuant to the Investment Strategy. Because of Government's seizure, Petitioner is not even able to exercise his Right of Redemption to reobtain Petitioner's Property at the appropriate time. This would result in unjust enrichment to the benefit of the Government since the Government is now retaining Petitioner's Property without any legal cause to do so. *See, e.g., U.S. v. Coluccio*, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding that imposition of a constructive trust was proper where, amongst other reasons, Government's forfeiture caused a breach of an implied promise); *Torres v. \\$36,256.80 U.S. Currency*, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a constructive trust appropriate where \"The government's forfeiture forced a breach of that promise that may result in a potentially unjust enrichment of the government (and commensurate unjust impoverishment of [the plaintiff]).\")\n\n50. Accordingly, Petitioner has shown that a constructive trust should be imposed over Petitioner's Property. Such a constructive trust \"qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" *Willis*, 652 F.3d at 242.\n\n51. The property upon which the constructive trust is sought – Petitioner's Property is easily traceable. *See* **Exhibit D***.*\n\n52. Moreover, the imposition of a constructive trust is fully available to Petitioner, even if the Government contends that others are owed restitution from any forfeited property. \"When a\n\nparty can directly trace its assets, without resorting to fictions or presumptions, a constructive trust is available even in cases involving multiple fraud victims.\" *U.S. v. Ovid,* 2012 WL 2087084, \\*7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012). \"[C]ourts are not free to disregard the law of constructive trusts when a claimant can directly trace its property, even if this leaves one innocent victim better off than another equally innocent victim.\" *Id.* The \"orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases\" is to \"return[] identifiable assets to their owners, turning to pro rata distribution only when specific identification or transactional tracing is impossible.\" *Id.* at \\*8 (citing *Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment*, § 59 Reporter's Note G, at 437).\n\n#### **C. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner's Property**\n\n53. Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property is absolutely superior to any interest that the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner's Property.\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner's interest in the forfeited property, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's interest \"renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner *rather than the defendant* or was superior to any right, title, or interest *of the defendant* at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section.\" 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n\n55. Here, as set forth above, Defendant Wang never had any interest in Petitioner's Property or Account 2770; indeed, the record is entirely silent as to what the relationship is between Defendant Wang, the Fraud Scheme, and Account 2770.\n\n56. It is axiomatic that neither the Government nor Defendant Wang can argue that they have a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Likewise, Defendant Wang cannot forfeit her interest in a property in which she had no interest.\n\n#### **D. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys' Fees**\n\n57. The Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to file this petition asserting Petitioner's right to Petitioner's Property and to challenge the forfeiture of Petitioner's Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner's costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (\"EAJA\"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the purposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney's fees under the EAJA. *See United States v. Cox*, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Douglas*, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995); *U.S. v. Bailey*, 2015 WL 1893610 at \\*20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\n\n## **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\n58. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner's Property, which renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. *See e.g.* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Defendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property, and never did. Petitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that the Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner's Property.\n\n59. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\nDated: April 3, 2025\n\nDated: April 3, 2025 Respectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman Jeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq. Jeremy W. Schulman, Esq. SCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC 6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425 North Bethesda, MD 20852 (240) 356-8550 [jgavenman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jgavenman@schulmanbh.com) [jschulman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jschulman@schulmanbh.com)\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler Paul W. Butler, Esq. BUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES 1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531 Washington, D.C. 20036 [paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com](mailto:paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com) *Counsel for Petitioner*\n\n# **ATTESTATION AND OATH**\n\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I, \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_, attest and declare under penalty of perjury that the Zhang Family Trust's claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided in support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.\n\nExecuted on this \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_ day of April, 2025\n\n![](_page_20_Picture_4.jpeg)\n\nSignature\n\n![](_page_20_Picture_6.jpeg)","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n- v. -（诉）\n\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\n第三人关于裁定申请人对没收财产所享权益及修改初步没收令的请愿书——核实权利主张\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n申请人 The（“申请人”）依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 和《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c) 条，提出本《第三人关于裁定申请人对没收财产所享权益及修改初步没收令的请愿书》（“本请愿书”）。申请人请求返还其享有合法权利、所有权和/或权益的资金（“申请人财产”）（下文作更详尽定义），该等资金系由 United States Government（美国政府，下称“政府”）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平，下称“被告王”）达成的没收令的一部分而不当扣押。具体而言，当政府扣押了以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义在 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）开立的账号为 5090042770 的银行账户（“2770 账户”）内的全部资金时，申请人财产即被政府不当扣押。然而，涉及 2770 账户内资金（包括申请人财产）的任何没收令均属违法且不当，因为被告王在 2770 账户或申请人财产中均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。因此，没收令（下文作更详尽定义）就申请人财产而言自始无效，因为在导致作出该没收令（定义见下文）的行为发生时，对申请人财产的权利、所有权或权益均归属于申请人而非被告王，且优于被告王的任何权利、所有权或权益。据此，本法院应修改该没收令以从中排除申请人财产，并命令政府立即将申请人财产返还给申请人。为支持申请人的权利主张，申请人陈述如下：\n\nI. 绪言\n\n2770 账户内的资金（包括申请人财产）显系政府在起诉被告王和 Miles Guo（郭文贵，下称“被告郭”）之前扣押资产时造成的纯粹“附带损害”。自扣押 2770 账户至今已有两年半之久，在此期间，从未有任何解释说明 2770 账户（包括申请人财产）与被告王认罪答辩的任何罪行有何关联，而这正是法律上有效没收令的必要前提条件。从未有任何证据表明被告王认罪答辩的任何非法活动的任何收益曾存入 2770 账户；没有证据表明此类活动的任何收益曾与申请人财产相混同；事实上，也没有任何证据表明被告王曾与 2770 账户有任何关系，甚至不知晓其存在。\n\n如下文所述，申请人是对申请人财产设立的拟制信托的受益人，本案中申请人财产不得由政府扣押。无论是被告王，还是如今代位行使权利的政府，均未曾证明其在 2770 账户中的申请人财产或对一般的 2770 账户享有任何权益。尽管被告王在没收令（ECF No. 488，第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在 2770 账户（并进而包括申请人财产）中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，但她的同意对 2770 账户或申请人财产不具有法律效力。被告王对 2770 账户从未拥有过此类“权利、所有权和权益”——没有证据表明她是 2770 账户的签字人、曾向 2770 账户存入资金或以其他方式对 2770 账户具有任何控制权，也没有证据表明被告王曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770 账户存入任何资金。被告王不能没收其并不拥有且不享有任何权益的财产。事实上，本法院似乎在最初也从未依《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1)(A) 条的规定，确立过申请人财产属于可予没收的财产。\n\n基于上述全部理由以及下文阐明的理由，申请人谨请求本法院：(1) 准予本请愿书；(2) 修改没收令以排除申请人财产；(3) 命令立即将申请人财产返还给申请人；(4) 命令申请人有权获得与本请愿书相关的律师费及支出，并准予申请人提交该等律师费及支出的申请；以及 (5) 准予其他必要且公正的救济。\n\nII. 背景事实\n\nA. 申请人财产\n\n1. Archiwoods Investment Value Fund（“Archiwoods”）编制了一份日期为 2022 年 2 月 14 日的《期权信息备忘录》（“《期权备忘录》”），概述了对 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“Hamilton Opportunity Fund”，开曼群岛独立投资组合公司）的投资机会。Archiwoods 将该《期权备忘录》提供给了包括申请人在内的潜在投资者。《期权备忘录》的真实准确副本作为证据 A 附于本请愿书后。\n\n2. 投资于 Hamilton M&A Fund SP（“并购基金”），系“由投资经理着眼于创造高价值和长期资本收益而确定”。证据 A，《期权备忘录》第 4 页。投资经理（在《期权备忘录》中定义为“Archiwoods Investment Management Pty Ltd”）确定了一项投资于某家银行的机会（“投资策略”），见证据 A 第 4、8 页，并向包括申请人在内的对象募集投资以把握该机会。\n\n3. 《期权备忘录》为申请人提供了认购属于并购基金（Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的一个独立投资组合）的 B 类股份的机会。Hamilton Opportunity Fund 于 2022 年 1 月 20 日向并购基金的潜在投资者提供的标准《发售备忘录》的真实准确副本作为证据 B 附于本请愿书后。\n\n4. 被告王既不是并购基金、Hamilton Opportunity Fund 或 Archiwoods 的董事或成员，亦对三者不享有任何公司或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反证据。\n\n5. 被告王并未向并购基金或 Archiwoods 进行任何投资；同样，证据记录中没有任何相反证据。\n\n6. 在 2022 年 5 月 31 日之前，Lei Zhang（张磊）代表申请人提交了投资 Archiwoods 的申请，并同意投资 $120,000.00。申请人同意投资该笔款项的明示条件是该投资将全部用于购买并购基金的股份。2022 年 5 月 31 日，申请人收到了其在 Archiwoods 投资的确认函。申请人投资确认函的真实准确副本作为证据 C 附于本请愿书后。\n\n7. 2022 年 2 月 16 日和 2022 年 2 月 17 日，根据《期权备忘录》的条款，申请人向属于 Archiwoods 的银行账户电汇了 $122,500.00（“申请人财产”）。申请人电汇信息的真实准确副本作为证据 D 附于本请愿书后。\n\n8. 根据《期权备忘录》的条款，Archiwoods 与代表并购基金行事的 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 签订了协议。据信，Archiwoods 向 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 投资了一笔款项（包括申请人财产的全部），用于认购 Hamilton M&A Fund SP（Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的一个独立投资组合）的 B 类股份。\n\n9. 据信，Archiwoods 将其全部投资金额（包括申请人财产）电汇到了 2770 账户，该账户是 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 持有用以收购 B 类股份的资金的唯一账户。\n\n10. 所有投资者均签署并约束其对 Hamilton Opportunity Fund（包括并购基金）投资条款的《发售协议》规定，投资者有权自主选择赎回其股份。证据 B，第 17 页；另见同前引，第 53 页（载明在满足若干限制的前提下，“股东可在任何赎回日自行选择赎回 B 类股份”）。相应地，申请人有权在投资期结束时赎回其在 Archiwoods 的投资（“赎回权”）。证据 A，第 4-5 页。\n\n11. Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的每个独立投资组合的资产均“与本基金任何其他独立投资组合的资产以及本基金的任何一般资产保持隔离、分开并可单独识别”。参见证据 B，第 12 页；另见证据 A，第 4 页。此外，根据开曼群岛法律，Hamilton Opportunity Fund 有义务“将每个独立投资组合的组合资产隔离，并使其与其他任何独立投资组合的投资组合资产保持隔离、分开且可单独识别”。证据 B，第 22-23 页（引用 The Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands（《开曼群岛公司法（修订版）》）第 XIV 部分第 219(6)(b) 条）。\n\nB. 扣押 2770 账户\n\n12. 2022 年 9 月 18 日，政府扣押了 2770 账户内的全部资金余额，其中包含申请人财产。\n\n13. 迄今为止，关于政府基于何种相当理由扣押 2770 账户内的资金，没有任何公开文件。\n\nC. 针对被告王和被告郭的刑事案件及没收令\n\n14. 2023 年 3 月 6 日，政府对被告王、被告郭以及第三名从未被提审的被告 William Je（余建明）提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n15. 2024 年 5 月 3 日，政府针对被告王提交了一份替代控告书（“《替代控告书》”）。ECF No. 325。《替代控告书》指控被告王犯有一项共谋电汇欺诈罪（罪名项 I）（《替代控告书》第 1-2 页）和一项共谋洗钱罪（罪名项 II）（《替代控告书》第 2-4 页）。《替代控告书》中还包含一项没收指控（“没收指控”）。《替代控告书》第 4 页。\n\n16. 同日，即 2024 年 5 月 3 日，被告王就《替代控告书》中所指控的罪名项 I 和罪名项 II 进行了认罪答辩。\n\n17. 同样在 2024 年 5 月 3 日，本法院作出了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（“原没收令”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n18. 在原没收令中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产（包括 2770 账户）中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，因为该等财产“构成了被告个人取得的第一项罪名中所指控犯罪的收益，和/或属于涉及［替代］控告书第二项罪名中所指控犯罪的财产”。原没收令第 2-6 页（强调由原文所加）。\n\n19. 被告郭对其被指控的任何罪名均未作认罪答辩。因此，法院于 2024 年 5 月 22 日至 2024 年 7 月 16 日期间进行了陪审团审理（“郭案审理”）。2024 年 7 月 16 日，陪审团裁定被告郭犯有共谋敲诈勒索罪、共谋电汇欺诈罪、共谋洗钱罪、共谋证券欺诈罪、证券欺诈罪、电汇欺诈罪及洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本请愿书出具之日，被告郭尚未被判刑。\n\n20. 2025 年 1 月 6 日，被告王被判刑。\n\n21. 2025年1月7日，本院作出了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment，以下简称“《没收令》”），ECF No. 488。就涉及请愿人的部分而言，《没收令》在所有实质方面均与《原没收令》（Original Forfeiture Order）大体相同。在《没收令》中，被告 Wang 同意没收其在某些资产中的“全部权利、权属和权益”，包括2770账户（Account 2770），理由是该等财产“构成了被告个人获取的第一项罪名中所指控罪行的收益，及/或涉及［替代］起诉书（[Superseding] Information）第二项罪名中所指控的罪行”。《没收令》第2-11页（强调为后加）。\n\n22. 《原没收令》和《没收令》中对2770账户内资产的描述如下：\n\n存放于 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号为5090042770、户名为“Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC”的账户中，并由政府于2022年9月18日或前后扣押的89,992,861.75美元（23-FBl-000074）。\n\n《原没收令》第3页；《没收令》第3页。\n\nIII. 论证\n\n23. 在依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第32.2(c)(1)条进行的刑事没收附随程序中，本院必须根据优势证据标准判定：请愿人对拟被没收的财产是否拥有合法权利、权属或权益；以及该等权利、权属或权益是否导致没收令全部或部分无效，原因在于该等权益在导致财产被没收的行为发生时归属于请愿人而非被告，或优于被告的任何权利、权属或权益。见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n24. 在本案中，根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)，请愿人凭借对请愿人财产（Petitioner's Property）享有的拟制信托，对该财产拥有合法权利、权属或权益。此外，请愿人在请愿人财产中所享有的权益既归属于请愿人，亦优于被告 Wang 在请愿人财产中所拥有的任何权利，因为被告 Wang 对请愿人财产或2770账户均无任何合法权利、权属或权益。换言之，被告 Wang 无法没收其在2770账户中的权益，因为她根本没有任何依法应受刑事没收的权益。因此，应当对《没收令》予以修改以剔除请愿人财产，并将请愿人财产返还给请愿人。\n\nA. 政府未能在初始阶段证明2770账户内的资金（包括请愿人财产）依法应当予以没收，从而使得《没收令》就该等资金而言是不当的\n\n25. 政府没有继续扣押请愿人财产的法定事由，因为没有任何证据表明政府曾按照 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 的要求，证明请愿人财产以及整个2770账户属于实际应予没收的财产。\n\n26. “当政府寻求获得没收令时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(b)(1)条……要求量刑法院根据适用法规确定哪些财产应予以没收。’”U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（援引 U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2007)）。根据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院必须确定政府是否已证明该财产与犯罪之间存在必要的关联。”Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（强调为后加）；Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的各个阶段，政府均承担以不同确信程度证明此项法律结论的举证责任：在起诉后的听证会上须达到合理根据的标准……而在法官审理或陪审团审理中则须达到优势证据标准。”同上（强调为后加）（内部引文省略）。“然而，只有在政府达到相关的法定门槛时，涉案财产才能在任何法律意义上被视为‘应予没收’。在此之前，当政府仅是通过起诉书宣布其寻求没收的意图时，该财产仅被视为‘潜在可没收的’……或‘潜在应予没收的’。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n27. 这意味着，在法院进入审理请愿人是否有权根据 § 853(n) 获得财产返还这一问题之前，有必要首先确定争议财产在初始阶段是否属于实际应予没收的财产。如果不是，政府便缺乏扣押该财产的法定职权。如果财产属于不当扣押，则无论请愿人是否符合 § 853(n) 规定的标准，政府都必须返还所扣押的账户资产。参见例如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)。\n\n28. 依照 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 进行全面且完整的审查，对于公正司法至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已进行审查并判定该财产属于应予没收之财产的假定之上。在制定附随程序法规时，国会之所以选择在附随程序中将举证责任置于第三方，是因为“美国政府在刑事案件中已经以排除合理怀疑的标准证明了其没收指控”。S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n29. 在本案中，从未就2770账户与被告 Wang 被指控（并已认罪）的任何罪行之间是否存在关联作出过判定，因此，请愿人被迫提起本请愿。根据被告 Wang 和被告 Guo（郭文贵）刑事案件中所有公开文件所载的信息，政府在2770账户问题上无法胜诉。\n\n30. 在本案中，政府在《替代起诉书》中就第一项和第二项罪名均列入了没收指控（Forfeiture Allegation），并寻求没收特定财产。《替代起诉书》第4页。案卷记录中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明——更不用说达到其举证责任来证明——2770账户与被告 Wang 认罪的罪行之间存在关联。\n\n31. 关于第一项罪名，没收指控称：“由于实施了本《替代起诉书》第一项罪名所指控的电汇诈骗罪行，被告 YVETTE WANG（又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）应依据《美国法典》第18篇第981(a)(1)(C)条1……以及《美国法典》第28篇第2461(c)条向美国政府没收任何及所有构成实施上述罪行所得收益或源自可追溯至上述罪行收益的不动产和动产。”《替代起诉书》第4页。政府必须以优势证据标准证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 项下的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收理论主张该财产被用于实施或协助实施刑事犯罪，或者参与了刑事犯罪的实施，则政府应证明该财产与犯罪之间存在重大关联。”18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n32. 案卷记录中完全没有任何指控说明2770账户中的资金如何构成被告 Wang 串谋实施电汇诈骗的可追溯收益或源自该等收益。《替代起诉书》指控称：“至少在约2018年至至少在约2023年3月15日期间，同谋者向投资者进行虚假陈述，称其投资 GTV、Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）组织和 GClubs 将获得股票作为回报，且投资 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）将获得加密货币作为回报［（以下简称‘欺诈计划’）］。通过该［欺诈计划］，被告 YVETTE WANG（又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）及其同谋者（包括 Miles Guo）诱使投资者向郭控制的实体投资超过10亿美元。”《替代起诉书》第2页。《替代起诉书》中没有任何关于被告 Wang 将欺诈计划的任何收益存入2770账户的指控。同样，《替代起诉书》中也没有任何指控称由于该欺诈计划，有任何投资者将资金存入了2770账户。也不可能有任何此类指控，因为从 Archiwoods 存入2770账户的唯一款项，是来自根据《投资策略》（Investment Strategy）投资于 Digital Bank（数字银行）的投资者——该项投资与《替代起诉书》中描述的“欺诈计划”没有任何关联。可以确定的是，请愿人确认其从未是被告 Wang 在《替代起诉书》中所涉任何行为的受害者，且不认为请愿人的任何财产曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n1 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定：“任何构成或源自可追溯至违反”各项特定罪行所得收益的“不动产或动产［均应予以没收］”，其中包括违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 电汇诈骗罪（即第一项罪名中对被告 Wang 的指控）。\n\n33. 最后，在被告郭的审理过程中，没有任何关于2770账户的相关证言。没有任何关于欺诈计划的任何收益是否曾存入2770账户的证言，更没有任何关于被告 Wang 是否曾将任何资金存入2770账户的证言。简而言之，案卷记录中没有任何内容表明2770账户与被告 Wang 的电汇诈骗指控之间存在关联，更缺乏充分的证据来判定政府已完成了其举证责任，以及法院已适当裁定存在正当没收2770账户所需的相应关联。\n\n34. 关于第二项罪名，没收指控称：“由于实施了本《起诉书》第二项罪名所指控的洗钱罪行，被告 YVETTE WANG（又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）应依据《美国法典》第18篇第982(a)(1)条2向美国政府没收参与上述罪行的任何及所有不动产和动产，或任何可追溯至该等财产的财产，包括但不限于代表参与上述罪行财产数额的美元金额。”《替代起诉书》第4页。就第二项罪名而言，政府“必须以优势证据标准证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 项下的没收要件。”U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015)。\n\n35. 《替代起诉书》指控被告 Wang 犯有串谋洗钱罪，因为被告 Wang “在明知涉及某些金融交易的财产代表某种形式非法活动的收益的情况下，将要且确实进行并企图进行该等金融交易……且该等交易实际上涉及特定非法活动的收益，即本《起诉书》第一项罪名所指控的电汇诈骗计划的收益。”《替代起诉书》第3页。\n\n36. 目前尚不清楚2770账户如何能因第二项罪名中的洗钱指控而被没收。根据各项指控，洗钱指控源于被告 Wang 利用“第一项罪名所指控的电汇诈骗计划的收益”进行金融交易。《替代起诉书》第3页。如上文所述，没有任何证据表明2770账户中的资金与第一项罪名中指控的欺诈计划有任何关联（见上文第31-33段）——没有任何证据表明该等资金“构成［或］源自可追溯至……的收益”\n\n2 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定，“[法]院在对被判犯有违反本编第 1956 条[洗钱法规]罪行的人判刑时……应命令该人向美国没收涉及该罪行的任何动产或不动产，或可追溯至该财产的任何财产”。18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调为后加）。\n\n实施”电汇欺诈。参见如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。鉴于 2770 账户中的资金既非欺诈方案收益，亦非源自欺诈方案收益，此类资金不能作为罪名项 II 中洗钱指控的依据，也不能作为 Defendant Wang（王雁平被告）就罪名项 II 认罪定罪的一部分予以没收。\n\n37. 政府为支持洗钱指控所主张的公开行为，同样未能证明 2770 账户中的资金何以应当被没收。在 Superseding Information（替代起诉书）中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项行为。替代起诉书第 3 页。尽管政府声称这两项公开行为是王被告为推进涉嫌洗钱共谋而实施的“各项行为之一”（替代起诉书第 3 页），但这些其他行为从未被明确指明。\n\n38. 首先，根据替代起诉书，2020年5月20日，王被告以 GTV 的名义开立了一个银行账户，值得注意的是，2770 账户绝非该账户。替代起诉书第 3 页。2020年6月2日，王被告向该账户转账约 200,000,000 美元。同上。转入 GTV 账户的资金来自 Saraca Media Group, Inc.（萨拉卡媒体集团公司，简称“Saraca”）在 JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）开立的账户（Guo 审判案，2024年5月31日，953:25-954:4；Guo 审判案，2024年6月26日，4359:1-14），而非来自 2770 账户。没有任何证词证明 2770 账户中的任何款项曾流入 Saraca 摩根大通银行账户并随后转入替代起诉书所引用的 GTV 账户。此外，2770 账户在 2020 年甚至根本不存在。\n\n39. 政府指控的第二项行为是，“在 2020年6月5日或前后”，王被告“授权从 GTV 的母公司 Saraca 向一家高风险对冲基金电汇 100,000,000 美元，用于为 Saraca 及其最终实益所有人 Defendant Guo（郭文贵被告）之子的利益”。替代起诉书第 3-4 页。首先，这明确指控资金是从 Saraca 账户转出的，而 2770 账户显然不是该账户。同样，再次强调，没有任何证词证明 2770 账户中的任何款项曾流入 Saraca 账户。此外，再次重申，2770 账户在 2020 年根本不存在。\n\n40. 从上述论证可以看出，根本没有任何关于 2770 账户的指控或证词。记录中对 2770 账户的唯一提及是王被告同意将其没收。然而，“被告对没收的同意[并不]废除寻求没收的财产与被定罪的罪行之间必须存在关联的要求”。Beltramea，785 F.3d 291。正如 Eighth Circuit（第八巡回上诉法院）所强调的那样，“地区法院负有独立职责，以确保存在所要求的关联”。同上（强调为后加）。\n\n41. 在本案中，在替代起诉书、Original Forfeiture Order（原没收令）或 Forfeiture Order（没收令）中，根本没有任何关于 2770 账户与王被告认罪答辩所涉及罪行之间存在哪怕是涉嫌关联的事实指控。\n\n42. 政府在未证明存在关联的情况下继续扣留 2770 账户中的资金，是错误且不公的。如果政府保留 2770 账户中的资金，将构成不当得利，因为这些资金属于第三方，包括 Petitioner（申诉人），他们（1）不是王被告或郭被告；并且（2）未参与欺诈方案，更非此类方案的受害者。参见如 U.S. v. Bajakajian，524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)（解释刑事“没收不具有补偿目的，旨在惩罚犯罪者，且不能强加于无辜所有权人”）（强调为后加）。\n\nB. 申诉人对申诉人财产享有权益，因为该财产之上存在推定信托\n\n43. 即使抛开政府未能恰当证明 2770 账户中的资金属于替代起诉书所指控的任何活动的一部分不谈，申诉人财产亦应返还给申诉人，因为申诉人对其享有的权益优于王被告，或目前处于其地位的政府。\n\n44. 根据推定信托原则，申诉人财产受到保护，无论存在任何其他所有权主张（包括王被告或代位处于其地位的政府），该财产始终属于申诉人。Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）认定，“就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，推定信托构成‘对财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，该权益‘可能优于’被告的权益”。Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States，652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n45. “推定信托是一种衡平法救济，为实现其目的必然具有灵活性”。Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co.，194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999)（强调为后加）。“其目的是防止不当得利，尽管不当得利并不必然涉及不法行为的实施……法院所必需做的是确认一方当事人在衡平法和良知上不应予以保留的情况下持有该财产”。同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n3 “联邦普通法冲突法规则是适用对诉讼具有最大利益的司法管辖区的法律”。In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A.，961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992)，部分维持原判，别名案为 Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A.，No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992)。在本案中，有四个可能适用其法律的竞争性司法管辖区：澳大利亚、纽约州、加利福尼亚州和开曼群岛。申诉人支付申诉人财产是依据 Option Memorandum（期权备忘录）进行的。期权备忘录明确表明，Archiwoods 随后将代表申诉人与 Hamilton Opportunity Fund（汉密尔顿机会基金）签订某项协议。据知悉与相信，Archiwoods 与汉密尔顿机会基金之间的任何协议均受开曼群岛法律管辖。在申诉人存入申诉人财产时，2770 账户是加利福尼亚州一家银行的账户。自 2770 账户被扣押以来（依据纽约州某法院签发的搜查和扣押令），这些资金目前由纽约的政府控制，且该加利福尼亚州银行已不复存在。纽约州是本案的法院地法域。从这些事实来看，纽约州对本案诉讼享有最大利益，设立推定信托应适用其法律。然而，在政府质疑此项法律适用决定的范围内，申诉人保留根据加利福尼亚州、澳大利亚和/或开曼群岛法律请求本法院对申诉人财产设立推定信托的一切权利。\n\n46. “一方当事人是否构成不当得利是适用衡平法原则得出的法律结论……衡平法院在裁定推定信托时不受任何僵化公式的束缚。交易的衡平性必须决定救济的限度……当一人保留了一项利益，而根据转让的情形并考虑到当事人之间的关系，保留该利益是不公平时，即产生不当得利”。同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n47. New York Court of Appeals（纽约州上诉法院）概述了在确定某些情况下是否应设立推定信托时应考虑的若干因素，包括“(1) 保密或信义关系，(2) 允诺，(3) 基于对其信赖的转让，以及 (4) 不当得利”。Sharp v. Kosmalski，40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976)。然而，纽约州法院长期以来一直认为，“这些因素仅仅是有用的指引，而非不可变通的法宝”。Counihan，194 F.3d 362（引用了大量阐述该观点的纽约州案件）。\n\n48. 在本案中，自 Archiwoods 将申诉人财产存入 2770 账户之日起，即存在为申诉人利益就申诉人财产设立的推定信托。\n\n49. 申诉人通过作为申诉人代理人和/或中间人的 Archiwoods，在申诉人向 Archiwoods 投资时，与 Archiwoods 和/或汉密尔顿机会基金建立了保密和/或信义关系，Archiwoods 随后代表申诉人签署了一项协议，以便使用申诉人财产收购 Hamilton M&A Fund SP（汉密尔顿并购基金SP）的某些 B 类股份。\n\n4 即使法院认定 Archiwoods 和/或汉密尔顿机会基金与申诉人之间不存在保密关系和/或不存在信义关系，这亦非决定性的，因为信义关系的缺失并不妨碍法院认定存在推定信托。参见 Koreag，961 F.2d 353（指出“[然]而，我们不认为[当事人]之间缺乏信义关系会自动击败关于推定信托的主张。尽管信义关系是纽约州法院引用的因素之一，但当衡平法另有要求时，任何单一因素的缺失本身并不会击败推定信托的设立”）。\n\n根据期权备忘录，Archiwoods 向申诉人作出允诺，申诉人财产将根据 Investment Strategy（投资策略）投资于 Digital Bank（数字银行）。证物 A，第 4 页。基于对该允诺的信赖，申诉人将申诉人财产电汇给 Archiwoods，据知悉与相信，Archiwoods 随后将其电汇至 2770 账户。政府对 2770 账户的不当扣押，迫使 Archiwoods 违背了根据投资策略将申诉人财产投资于数字银行的允诺。由于政府的扣押，申诉人甚至无法行使其 Right of Redemption（赎回权）以在适当的时间重新获得申诉人财产。这将导致政府获得不当得利，因为政府目前在没有任何合法理由的情况下保留申诉人财产。参见如 U.S. v. Coluccio，51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995)（认定设立推定信托是正当的，其中包括因为政府的没收导致了对默示允诺的违背）；Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency，25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994)（认定推定信托是适当的，其中指出“政府的没收迫使违背了该允诺，这可能导致政府潜在的不当得利（以及[原告]相应的不当受损）”）。\n\n50. 因此，申诉人已证明应当对申诉人财产设立推定信托。此类推定信托“就类似于 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) 的没收法规而言，符合‘对财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，该权益‘可能优于’被告的权益”。Willis，652 F.3d 242。\n\n51. 寻求设立推定信托所指向的财产——即申诉人财产——是容易追溯的。参见证物 D。\n\n52. 此外，即使政府主张任何被没收财产需向他人支付赔偿，申诉人亦完全有权主张设立推定信托。“当一项\n\n当一方能够直接追踪其资产而无需借助虚构或推定手法时，即使在涉及多名欺诈受害人的案件中，也可以适用拟制信托。」U.S. v. Ovid，2012 WL 2087084，*7（E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区），2012年6月8日）。「当权利主张人能够直接追踪其财产时，法院无权忽视拟制信托法，即使这会让一名无辜受害人的处境好于另一名同样无辜的受害人。」同上。处理多起欺诈案件的「正统做法」是「将可识别的资产归还给其所有权人，只有在无法进行特定识别或交易追踪时才采用按比例分配。」同上，*8（援引 Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment（《第三次返还与不当得利法重述》）§ 59 报告人注释 G，第437页）。\n\nC. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有优先权益\n\n53. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益，绝对优于政府或被告 Wang 在请愿人财产中可能享有的任何权益。\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 明确规定，除请愿人在被没收财产中享有的权益外，请愿人还必须以优势证据证明，请愿人的权益「使没收裁定全部或部分无效，因为该权利、所有权或权益在导致本条项下财产被没收的行为发生时归属于请愿人而非被告，或优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。」21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（强调为后加）。\n\n55. 在本案中，如上所述，被告 Wang 从未在请愿人财产或 2770 账户中享有任何权益；事实上，案卷记录对被告 Wang、欺诈计划以及 2770 账户之间的关系完全未予提及。\n\n56. 显而易见的是，政府和被告 Wang 都不能主张他们对一项从未享有过权益的财产拥有优先权益。同样，被告 Wang 也不能没收其本就不享有任何权益的财产中的权益。\n\nD. 请愿人有权获得诉讼费用和律师费\n\n57. 请愿人不得不聘请法律顾问并产生了提起本请愿书以主张请愿人对请愿人财产的权利及对请愿人财产的没收提出异议的费用。在本次程序中胜诉后，请愿人保留追索与本请愿书相关发生的所有律师费和诉讼费用的全部权利，并可根据 Equal Access to Justice Act（《司法机会均等法》，简称「EAJA」）28 U.S.C. § 2412 追索请愿人的诉讼费用和合理律师费。联邦法院一贯认定，出于允许胜诉权利主张人依据 EAJA 收取律师费的目的，§ 853(n) 程序属于民事性质。参见 United States v. Cox，575 F.3d 352, 355（第4巡回法院 2009年）；United States v. Douglas，55 F.3d 584, 588（第11巡回法院 1995年）；U.S. v. Bailey，2015 WL 1893610，*20（W.D.N.C.（北卡罗来纳西区）2015年4月27日）。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n58. 基于上述理由，请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，该权益使得没收裁定就该等财产而言无效。参见例如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告 Wang 对请愿人财产不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。请愿人已经证明，并能够在任何必要的听证会上以优势证据证明，没收裁定需要进行修改以排除请愿人财产。\n\n59. 因此，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 批准本请愿书；(2) 修改没收裁定以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追索与本请愿书相关的请愿人律师费和诉讼费用，并准许请愿人提交该等律师费和诉讼费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的该等及其他救济。\n\n日期：2025年4月3日\n\n日期：2025年4月3日 谨此提交，\n\n/签名/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\nJeffrey S. Gavenman 律师\nJeremy W. Schulman 律师\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC（舒尔曼巴塔查里亚有限责任公司）\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/签名/ Paul W. Butler\nPaul W. Butler 律师\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES（巴特勒法律策略公司）\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n请愿人代理律师\n\n证明与宣誓\n\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人 ______ 证明并如受伪证罪处罚般声明：Zhang Family Trust（张氏家族信托）对该财产的主张绝非无理取闹，且据本人所知所信，为支持该主张所提供的信息均属真实准确。\n\n于 2025年4月 ____ 日签署\n\n[图片]\n\n签名\n\n[图片]","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Torres","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":6253,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-07","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:03:50"}