{"id":"court_sdny_673_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":673,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-07","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方资产追回申请（Hamilton Investment Management） —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #673（2025年4月7日提交）。Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 申请，声称其作为账户名义所有人的资产被政府非法没收。申请人主张 Yvette Wang 对该账户无控制权或权益，申请修改没收令、返还财产并赔付诉讼费用。","summary_en":"Third-Party Petition for Return of Forfeited Property (Hamilton Investment Management) —— United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #673 (filed April 7, 2025). Hamilton Investment Management, Ltd. petitions as the named owner of accounts, arguing that the Government unlawfully seized its property. Petitioner contends Defendant Yvette Wang has no control over or interest in the accounts and seeks amendment of the forfeiture order, return of property, and recovery of attorney's fees.","body_en":"# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\n# **THIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE -**\n\n# **VERIFIED CLAIM OF HAMILTON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LTD.**\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner Hamilton Investment Management, Ltd. (\"Petitioner\") files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the \"Petition\"). Petitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest (\"Petitioner's Property\") (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government (the \"Government\") improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with Defendant Yvette Wang (\"Defendant Wang\"). Specifically, Petitioner's Property was improperly seized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in the Accounts (as more fully defined and described below). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in the Accounts was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or interest in the Accounts or the funds therein. The Forfeiture Order[1](#page-0-0) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner's Property because the right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property was vested in\n\n<span id=\"page-0-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> Reference is to the Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Forfeiture Order\") that this Court entered on January 7, 2025, with consent from Defendant Wang. ECF No. 488.\n\nPetitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was superior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the Forfeiture Order. As such, this Court should amend the Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner's Property from the Forfeiture Order and order that the Government immediately return Petitioner's Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner's claim, Petitioner respectfully states as follows:\n\n## **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nIt appears that Petitioner's Property – the funds in the Accounts – was purely \"collateral damage\" in the Government's seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant Wang and Miles Guo (\"Defendant Guo\"). Since the seizure of the Accounts in the Fall of 2022 and Spring of 2023, there has never been any explanation as to how funds in the Accounts are related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any showing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were ever deposited in the Accounts; no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever commingled with Petitioner's Property; and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had anything to do with the Accounts.\n\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is the named owner on the Accounts and thus has a vested, legal, right, title and interest in the funds therein – Petitioner's Property – and Petitioner's Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither Defendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, has ever demonstrated that they have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner's Property. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of \"all her right, title, and interest\" in the Accounts (and thus, Petitioner's Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), Defendant Wang never had such \"right, title, and interest\" in the Accounts or any funds therein – she was not a signatory on the Accounts, she never deposited money into the Accounts, and did not otherwise have any control over the Accounts. It is axiomatic that\n\nDefendant Wang cannot forfeit property that she does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never established that Petitioner's Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner, less any funds that were returned to other petitioners seeking the return of their investment directly; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\n## **II. BACKGROUND FACTS**\n\n## **A. Background on Petitioner**\n\n1. Petitioner is an investment management company registered in the British Virgin Islands.\n\n2. Petitioner is regulated by the Financial Services Commission of the British Virgin Islands. In addition, it is also required to register in the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority to manage the regulated funds in the Cayman Islands.\n\n3. Petitioner is a technology-focused, value-oriented investment management firm serving institutional and high net worth investors who invest in a broad spectrum of asset classes. Petitioner adopts a multi-strategy approach to investing in order to generate an optimal risk-return profile while ensuring that it captures the most compelling investment opportunities across different investment products and geographical markets.\n\n4. In view of the above, Petitioner was appointed to provide investment management services for the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Hamilton Opportunity Fund\") and its\n\nsegregated portfolios.\n\n5. Hamilton Opportunity Fund is a Cayman Islands Segregated Portfolio Company operating as a mutual fund and registered with the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority under Section 4(3) of the Mutual Funds Act (Revised) of the Cayman Islands.\n\n6. In order to maintain independence and the highest industry standard, Petitioner, as the fund manager, engaged NAV Fund Services, the largest fund administrator in the world, to be its fund administrator to be responsible for all the customer on-boarding, Know-Your-Customer (\"KYC\") and Anti-Money-Laundering (\"AML\") checks for all its customers, accounting and fund administration works. The fund managers only focus on selection and investment of investment products.\n\n7. The fund managers employed by Petitioner have decades of experience in the sector and adhere to the highest compliance and investment standard.\n\n8. Petitioner has investment management agreements with each of the segregated portfolios of Hamilton Opportunity Fund, charges annual management fees based on the market value of each portfolio, and shares in the profits when the segregated portfolio funds are profitable. The fee rates charged are either the same as the market standard (which is normally 2% annual fees on the total value of the portfolio and 20% profit sharing) or substantially lower than the market rates.\n\n9. The Accounts that are the subject of this Petition were Petitioner's operating accounts.\n\n## **B. The Seizure of the Accounts**\n\n10. The Government seized funds from two of Petitioner's bank accounts. The first bank account seized by the Government is as follows:\n\n\\$48,230,709.62 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number 509003 0288 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton Investment Management, Ltd.\" and seized by the Government on or about September 18, 2022 (23-FB 1-000072)\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order[2](#page-4-0) at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3. The second bank account seized by the\n\nGovernment is as follows.\n\n\\$1,187,278.87 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number MBl10171-0000 at Mercantile Bank International, held in the name of \"Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.\" and seized by the Government between on or about October 16, 2022, and on or about March 10, 2023 (23-FBl-000184)\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 4; Forfeiture Order at 3. Hereinafter, these two accounts are referred\n\nto as the \"Accounts.\"\n\n# **C. The Criminal Case of Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo**\n\n11. On March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang,\n\nDefendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n\n12. On May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the \"Superseding Information\") against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information charged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I) (Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering (Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a Forfeiture Allegation (the \"Forfeiture Allegation\"). Superseding Information at 4.\n\n13. On the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count II as charged in the Superseding Information.\n\n14. Also on May 3, 2024, this Court entered the Original Forfeiture Order. ECF No.\n\n<span id=\"page-4-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (\"Original Forfeiture Order\") entered by this Court on May 3, 2024, as consented to by Defendant Wang. ECF No. 329.\n\n329.\n\n15. In the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her*  right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including the Accounts, because such property purportedly \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n\n16. Defendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him. Accordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the \"Guo Trial\"). On July 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this Petition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n\n17. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n\n18. On January 7, 2025, this Court entered the Forfeiture Order. ECF No. 488. As it pertains to Petitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all material respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her*  right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including the Accounts, because such property purportedly \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Forfeiture Order at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n# **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n19. In an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited,\n\nand whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part, because such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n\n20. Here, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of being the named account owner of the Accounts and by virtue of having full dominion and control over the funds therein. Moreover, Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any right Defendant Wang had in Petitioner's Property because Defendant Wang had *no* legal right, title or interest in Petitioner's Property. In other words, Defendant Wang could not forfeit her interest in the Accounts because she had no interest that was properly subject to criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner's Property, and Petitioner's Property should be returned to the Petitioner.\n\n# **A. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in the Accounts Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First Instance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds**\n\n21. The Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner's Property because the Government has failed to present any evidence to demonstrate that Petitioner's Property constitutes forfeitable property as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A).\n\n22. \"When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, 'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.'\" *United States v. Watts*, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing *United States v. Capoccia*, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court *must* determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and\n\nthe offense.\" Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); *U.S. v. Watts*, 786 F.3d at 172. \"At various points in the proceedings, *the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion* to varying degrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . .or by a preponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.\" *Id.* (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). \"Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the property in question be considered 'subject to forfeiture' in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the government has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property is seen merely as 'potentially forfeitable' . . . or 'potentially subject to forfeiture.'\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n23. This means that before the court even reaches the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in dispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority to seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the accounts seized regardless of whether the claimant can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). *See e.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co*., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n\n24. A full and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair administration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has conducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary proceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an ancillary proceeding, since \"the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.\" S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392.\n\n25. In this matter, there has never been a determination that there exists a nexus\n\nbetween the Accounts and any of the offenses with which Defendant Wang was charged (and to which she pled guilty), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition.\n\n26. As to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the wire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C)[3](#page-8-0)...and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, \"if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n\n27. The record simply does not contain evidence sufficient to determine that the funds in the Accounts are, or were derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang's conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Superseding Information alleges that \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about March 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive stock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and GClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the Himalaya Exchange [(the \"Fraud Scheme\")]. Through the [Fraud Scheme],\n\n<span id=\"page-8-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that \"[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture] which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of\" various specified offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang in Count I.\n\nYVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced investors to invest more than \\$1 billion into entities Guo controlled.\" Superseding Information at 2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing any proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into the Accounts. Similarly, there are no allegations in the Superseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into the Accounts.\n\n28. Finally, there was no relevant evidence during Defendant Guo's trial about the Accounts either. There was no evidence regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme were ever deposited into the Accounts, nor, for that matter, whether Defendant Wang ever deposited *any* money into the Accounts. Simply put, the record does not indicate that there is a nexus between the Accounts and Defendant Wang's wire fraud charge. There is insufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of the Accounts to be proper, and the Court has not properly adjudicated otherwise.\n\n29. As to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the money laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1)[4](#page-9-0), any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense, or any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United States currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.\" Superseding\n\n<span id=\"page-9-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that \"[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, *involved in such offense*, or any property *traceable to such property*.\" 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\nInformation at 4. As to Count II, The Government \"must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.\" *U.S. v. Beltramea*, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n30. The Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy to launder money because Defendant Wang \"knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . .and which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One of this Information.\" Superseding Information at 3.\n\n31. It is unclear how the Accounts could be forfeited as a result of the money laundering charge in Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang engaging in financial transactions with the \"proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One.\" Superseding Information at 3. As argued above, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that the funds in the Accounts had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (*see* ¶¶ 27-29, above) – there is insufficient evidence to show that such funds \"constitute[d] or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of\" wire fraud. *See e.g.* 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). As the funds in the Accounts were not, in fact, Fraud Scheme proceeds, nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could not serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part of Defendant Wang's conviction for Count II.\n\n32. The overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge further fail to show how the funds in the Accounts can be subject to forfeiture. In the Superseding Information, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding\n\nInformation at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were \"among others\" that Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money (Superseding Information at 3), these other acts are not stated.\n\n33. First, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened a bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, the Accounts was *not*. Superseding Information at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately \\$200 million to that account. *Id.* The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank account held by Saraca Media, Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\") (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo Trial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), *not* from the Accounts. There was never any testimony that any money from the Accounts ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be transferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information.\n\n34. The second act the Government alleges is that \"on or about June 5, 2020,\" Defendant Wang \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from GTV's parent company, Saraca Media, Group, Inc., to a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Guo's son.\" Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was transferred from a Saraca account, which the Accounts were demonstrably not. Also, again, there was never any testimony at Guo's Trial that any money from the Accounts ever went into a Saraca account.\n\n35. As seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding the Accounts whatsoever. The *only* concrete reference in the record as to the Accounts is Defendant Wang's consent to forfeit these funds. However, \"a defendant's consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the requirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of offense.\" *Beltramea*, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, \"[t]he district\n\ncourt had an independent duty to *ensure* that the required nexus exists.\" *Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n36. Here, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, the Original Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to an alleged nexus between the Accounts and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n# **B. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner's Property Because It is the Named Owner of the Accounts**\n\n37. Here, Petitioner has a legal interest and right in the funds in the Accounts by virtue of being the named owner of the Accounts and having complete dominion and control over the funds in the Accounts. Thus, Petitioner has standing to challenge the Forfeiture Order.\n\n# **C. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner's Property**\n\n38. Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property is superior to any interest that the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner's Property.\n\n39. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner's interest in the forfeited property, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's interest \"renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner *rather than the defendant* or was superior to any right, title, or interest *of the defendant* at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n\n40. Here, as set forth above, the Government never met their burden of proof to show that the Accounts were property that would be properly subject to forfeiture in Defendant Wang's case. As such, the Government never demonstrated that its interest in the Accounts is superior to the Petitioner's.\n\n41. To be sure, \"[u]nlike a civil forfeiture action, which is an *in rem* proceeding brought against the property sought to be forfeited, criminal forfeiture is an *in personam* proceeding. . .[it]\n\nis a sanction against the individual defendant rather than a judgment against the property itself. . . Thus, in a criminal forfeiture proceeding, the Government acquires only the *defendant's* interest in the property. Because criminal forfeiture follows the defendant as part of his penalty, the Government may seize any of the *defendant's* property that is traceable to the proceeds of criminal conduct.\" *U.S. v. Bailey*, No. 1:11CR10, 2012 WL 569744, at \\*14 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 22, 2012) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).\n\n42. It is axiomatic that neither the Government nor Defendant Wang can argue that they have a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Accordingly, Petitioner's interest in the Accounts is superior to that of Defendant Wang and the Government.\n\n## **D. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys' Fees**\n\n43. Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to file this petition asserting Petitioner's right to Petitioner's Property and to challenge the forfeiture of Petitioner's Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner's costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (\"EAJA\"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the purposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney's fees under the EAJA. *See United States v. Cox*, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Douglas*, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995); *U.S. v. Bailey*, 2015 WL 1893610 at \\*20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\n\n## **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\n44. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner's Property, which renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. *See e.g.* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Defendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property, and never did. Petitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that\n\nthe Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner's Property.\n\n45. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\nDated: April 7, 2025\n\nDated: April 7, 2025 Respectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman Jeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq. Jeremy W. Schulman, Esq. SCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC 6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425 North Bethesda, MD 20852 (240) 356-8550 [jgavenman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jgavenman@schulmanbh.com) [jschulman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jschulman@schulmanbh.com)\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler Paul W. Butler, Esq. BUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES 1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531 Washington, D.C. 20036 [paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com](mailto:paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com)\n\n*Counsel for Petitioner*\n\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I attest and declare under penalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided in support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.\n\nHAMILTON INVESMENT\nMANAGEMENT, LTD.\n\nBy: E.M.R.d\n\n| Labels | Values      |\n|--------|-------------|\n| Name   | Ehsan Masud |\n\n| Labels | Values |\\n|---|---|\\n| Title | Chief Financial Officer |\n\nDate: 7th April 2024","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n- v. -（诉）\n\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\nTHIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE - VERIFIED CLAIM OF HAMILTON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LTD.（关于裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收令的第三方请愿书——HAMILTON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LTD. 经核实之权利主张）\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n请愿人 Hamilton Investment Management, Ltd.（“请愿人”）根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第 32.2(c) 条的规定，提出本《关于裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收令的第三方请愿书》（“本请愿书”）。请愿人请求归还请愿人拥有法定权利、所有权和/或权益的资金（“请愿人财产”）（定义详见下文），该等资金系由 United States Government（美国政府）（“政府”）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平）（“被告王”）达成的没收裁定之一部分而不当扣押的。具体而言，政府在扣押相关账户（定义及描述详见下文）中的全部资金时，不当扣押了请愿人财产。然而，任何涉及该等账户内资金的没收令均属违法且不当，因为被告王对该等账户或其中的资金不享有任何法定权利、所有权或权益。因此，没收令[1]就请愿人财产而言归于无效，因为对请愿人财产的权利、所有权或权益系归属于\n\n[1] 指本法院在被告王同意下于 2025年1月7日 作出的《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（“没收令”）。ECF No. 488。\n\n请愿人而非被告王，且在引发该没收令之行为发生时，该等权利、所有权或权益优于被告王的任何权利、所有权或权益。因此，本法院应当修改没收令，将请愿人财产从没收令中剔除，并命令政府立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人。为支持请愿人之主张，请愿人谨陈述如下：\n\nI. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT（引言）\n\n请愿人财产——即相关账户中的资金——显然纯粹是政府在起诉被告王及 Miles Guo（郭文贵）（“被告郭”）之前扣押资产过程中的“附带损害”。自 2022年秋季 及 2023年春季 扣押相关账户以来，对于该等账户中的资金如何与被告王认罪的任何罪行相关联，从未有过任何解释，而根据法律，该等关联是有效没收令的必要前提。从未有任何证据表明被告王认罪的任何非法活动的收益曾存入过该等账户；没有证据表明该等活动的任何收益曾与请愿人财产发生混同；而且事实上，亦无任何证据表明被告王曾与该等账户有任何干系。\n\n如下文所示，请愿人是相关账户的指定所有人，因此对其中的资金——请愿人财产——享有既得的、合法的权利、所有权和权益，且在本案中请愿人财产不得被政府扣押。无论是被告王，还是如今代位其地位的政府，均未曾证明其对请愿人财产享有任何权益。尽管被告王在没收令（ECF No. 488 第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在相关账户（以及请愿人财产）中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，但被告王在该等账户或其中的任何资金中从未拥有过此类“权利、所有权和权益”——她不是该等账户的签字人，她从未向该等账户存入过资金，亦未以其他方式对该等账户拥有任何控制权。显而易见的是，\n\n被告王不能没收其并不拥有且在其中不享有任何权益的财产。事实上，本法院似乎从一开始就未曾依法（根据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1)(A) 条的规定）认定请愿人财产是否属于应予没收的财产。\n\n基于上述全部理由以及下文阐明的理由，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 准许本请愿；(2) 修改没收令以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产归还给请愿人，扣除已直接归还给其他寻求退还其投资的请愿人的资金；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追索因本请愿所产生的律师费和诉讼费用，并准许请愿人提交关于该等律师费和费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的其他救济。\n\nII. BACKGROUND FACTS（背景事实）\n\nA. Background on Petitioner（关于请愿人的背景）\n\n1. 请愿人是一家在 British Virgin Islands（英属维尔京群岛）注册的投资管理公司。\n\n2. 请愿人受 Financial Services Commission of the British Virgin Islands（英属维尔京群岛金融服务委员会）监管。此外，其还须在 Cayman Islands Monetary Authority（开曼群岛金融管理局）注册，以管理开曼群岛的受监管基金。\n\n3. 请愿人是一家以技术为核心、以价值为导向的投资管理机构，服务于投资广泛资产类别的机构和高净值投资者。请愿人采取多策略投资方法，以产生最佳的风险回报特征，同时确保其能够捕捉不同投资产品和地域市场中最具吸引力的投资机会。\n\n4. 鉴于上述情况，请愿人获委任为 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“Hamilton Opportunity Fund”）及其\n\n各独立投资组合提供投资管理服务。\n\n5. Hamilton Opportunity Fund 是一家开曼群岛独立投资组合公司，作为共同基金运作，并根据开曼群岛《共同基金法（修订版）》（Mutual Funds Act (Revised)）第 4(3) 条在开曼群岛金融管理局注册。\n\n6. 为保持独立性及最高的行业标准，请愿人作为基金管理人，聘请了全球最大的基金行政管理人 NAV Fund Services 担任其基金行政管理人，负责其所有客户的入职指引、了解你的客户（“KYC”）以及反洗钱（“AML”）审查、会计和基金行政管理工作。基金经理仅专注于投资产品的挑选和投资。\n\n7. 请愿人雇用的基金经理在该行业拥有数十年经验，并恪守最高的合规与投资标准。\n\n8. 请愿人与 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的各个独立投资组合均订有投资管理协议，根据每个投资组合的市值收取年度管理费，并在独立投资组合基金盈利时分享利润。所收取的费率要么与市场标准相同（通常为投资组合总价值的 2% 年费及 20% 利润分成），要么大幅低于市场费率。\n\n9. 作为本请愿书标的之相关账户为请愿人的运营账户。\n\nB. The Seizure of the Accounts（账户的扣押）\n\n10. 政府扣押了请愿人两个银行账户中的资金。政府扣押的第一个银行账户如下：\n\n原存放在 Silvergate Bank、账户号为 509003 0288、户名为“Hamilton Investment Management, Ltd.”的 48,230,709.62 美元货币，由政府于 2022年9月18日 或前后扣押 (23-FB 1-000072)\n\n原没收令[2] 第 3 页；没收令第 3 页。政府扣押的第二个银行账户如下：\n\n原存放在 Mercantile Bank International、账户号为 MBl10171-0000、户名为“Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.”的 1,187,278.87 美元货币，由政府在 2022年10月16日 或前后至 2023年3月10日 或前后期间扣押 (23-FBl-000184)\n\n原没收令第 4 页；没收令第 3 页。下文中，该两个账户统称为“相关账户”。\n\nC. The Criminal Case of Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo（被告王与被告郭的刑事案件）\n\n11. 2023年3月6日，政府对被告王、被告郭及第三名从未被提审的被告 William Je 提起了起诉书（indictment）。ECF No. 2。\n\n12. 2024年5月3日，政府对被告王提起了替代起诉书（Superseding Information）（“替代起诉书”）。ECF No. 325。该替代起诉书指控被告王犯有一项共谋电汇欺诈罪（罪名项一）（替代起诉书第 1-2 页）和一项共谋洗钱罪（罪名项二）（替代起诉书第 2-4 页）。该替代起诉书还包含一项没收指控（“没收指控”）。替代起诉书第 4 页。\n\n13. 同日，即 2024年5月3日，被告王就替代起诉书中所指控的罪名项一和罪名项二作出了认罪答辩（pled guilty）。\n\n14. 同样在 2024年5月3日，本法院作出了原没收令。ECF No.\n\n[2] 指本法院在被告王同意下于 2024年5月3日 作出的《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（“原没收令”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n329。\n\n15. 在原没收令中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产（包括相关账户）中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，因为据称该等财产“构成了被告个人获取的在第一项罪名中所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及在[替代]起诉书第二项罪名中所指控罪行的财产”。原没收令第 2-6 页（后加强调）。\n\n16. 被告郭对其被指控的任何罪名均未作认罪答辩。因此，在 2024年5月22日 至 2024年7月16日 期间举行了陪审团审理（“郭案审理”）。2024年7月16日，陪审团裁定被告郭犯有共谋敲诈勒索罪、共谋电汇欺诈罪、共谋洗钱罪、共谋证券欺诈罪、证券欺诈罪、电汇欺诈罪和洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本请愿书递交之日，被告郭尚未被判刑。\n\n17. 2025年1月6日，被告王被判刑。\n\n18. 2025年1月7日，本法院作出了没收令。ECF No. 488。在涉及请愿人的部分，没收令在所有实质方面均与原没收令基本相似。在没收令中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产（包括相关账户）中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，因为据称该等财产“构成了被告个人获取的在第一项罪名中所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及在[替代]起诉书第二项罪名中所指控罪行的财产”。没收令第 2-11 页（后加强调）。\n\nIII. ARGUMENT（抗辩理由）\n\n19. 在根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c)(1) 条进行的附随刑事没收程序中，本法院必须依据优势证据标准确定请愿人是否对拟没收的财产享有法定权利、所有权或权益，\n\n以及该等权利、所有权或权益是否导致没收令全部或部分无效，原因在于该等权益归属于请愿人而非被告，或者在引发财产没收之行为发生时优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n20. 在本案中，根据 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A)，Petitioner（请愿人/申诉人）因系涉案账户（the Accounts）的指定账户所有人，且对其中的资金享有完全的支配权和控制权，因而对 Petitioner's Property（申诉人财产）享有合法权利、所有权或利益。此外，申诉人对申诉人财产的利益既已归属于申诉人，又优于 Defendant Wang（被告王雁平）在申诉人财产中享有的任何权利，因为被告王雁平对申诉人财产享有“毫无”合法权利、所有权或利益。换言之，被告王雁平不可能被没收其在涉案账户中的利益，因为她并不享有依法应受刑事没收的任何利益。因此，没收裁定（Forfeiture Order）应当予以修改，以剔除申诉人财产，并将申诉人财产归还给申诉人。\n\nA. 政府未能证明涉案账户中的资金自始属于应予没收的财产，导致针对该等资金的没收裁定不当\n\n21. 政府无合法理由扣押申诉人财产，因为政府未能按照《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Fed.R.Crim.P.）第 32.2(b)(1)(A) 条的规定提出任何证据证明申诉人财产构成应予没收的财产。\n\n22. “当政府寻求获得没收裁定时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1) 条……要求量刑法院确定根据适用成文法哪些财产属于应予没收的财产。’”United States v. Watts（美国诉瓦茨案）, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（援引 United States v. Capoccia（美国诉卡波西亚案）, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)）。根据 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院‘必须’确定政府是否已确立该财产与该罪行之间存在必要的关联。”Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（强调为原文所加）；U.S. v. Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的各个阶段，‘政府承担证明这一法律结论的举证责任’，且需达到不同程度的确信标准：在起诉后听证会上需达到相当理由（probable cause）的标准……在法官审理或陪审团审理中需达到优势证据（preponderance of the evidence）的标准。”同上案（强调为原文所加）（内部引文省略）。“然而，唯有在政府达到相关法律标准时，涉案财产才可在任何法律意义上被视为‘应予没收’。在此之前，当政府仅通过起诉书宣布其寻求没收的意图时，该财产仅被视为‘可能应予没收’……或‘可能属于应予没收’。”同上案（内部引文省略）。\n\n23. 这意味着，在法院触及申诉人是否有权根据 §853(n) 获得财产返还这一问题之前，必须首先确定争议财产自始是否确属应予没收的财产。如果不是，政府即无扣押该财产的成文法授权。如果财产系被不当扣押，则无论权利主张人是否符合 §853(n) 规定的标准，政府都必须返还所扣押的账户。参见如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co.（美国诉德尔科电线电缆公司案）, 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)。\n\n24. 开展全面且完整的 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 审查对于司法公正至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已进行审查并判定该财产属于应予没收之财产的假定之上。在制定附属程序（ancillary proceeding）成文法时，国会选择在附属程序中将举证责任置于第三方，乃是因为“美国在刑事案件中已排除合理怀疑地证明了其没收指控。”S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n25. 在本案中，从未有判定认定涉案账户与被告王雁平被指控（且其已认罪答辩）的任何罪行之间存在关联，因此，申诉人被迫提起本申诉书（Petition）。\n\n26. 就 Count I（罪名项一）而言，没收指控（Forfeiture Allegation）指出：“由于实施了本替代起诉书（Superseding Information）罪名项一中所指控的电信诈骗罪行，被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平，又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）应根据《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条[3]……及《美国法典》第 28 编第 2461(c) 条向美国没收构成实施上述罪行所得收益或源自可追溯至实施上述罪行所得收益的任何及所有不动产与动产。”替代起诉书第 4 页。政府必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“若政府的没收理论是该财产被用于实施或便利实施犯罪，或涉及实施犯罪，政府应证明该财产与该罪行之间存在实质性联系。”18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n27. 案卷记录中根本不包含足以认定涉案账户中的资金属于或源自可追溯至被告王雁平共谋电信诈骗所得收益的证据。替代起诉书指控：“至少在约 2018 年至至少在约 2023 年 3 月 15 日期间，同谋向投资者作出虚假陈述，称其投资 GTV、Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）组织和 GClubs 将获得股票作为回报，且投资 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）将获得加密货币作为回报[（以下称‘诈骗计划’）]。通过该[诈骗计划]，\n\n脚注 3：18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定，“构成或源自可追溯至违反”多项特定罪行所得收益的“任何不动产或动产[均应予以没收]”，包括违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343（电信诈骗罪）之规定，正如罪名项一中对被告王雁平的指控。\n\n被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平，又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）及其包括 Miles Guo（郭文贵）在内的同谋诱使投资者向郭文贵控制的实体投资超过 10 亿美元。”替代起诉书第 2 页。替代起诉书中没有任何关于被告王雁平将诈骗计划所得收益存入涉案账户的指控。同样，替代起诉书中也没有任何指控称由于该诈骗计划有任何投资者将资金存入涉案账户。\n\n28. 最后，在 Defendant Guo（被告郭文贵）的审理过程中，也没有关于涉案账户的任何相关证据。没有任何证据表明诈骗计划的任何收益曾被存入涉案账户，而且就此而言，也没有任何证据表明被告王雁平是否曾向涉案账户存入过“任何”资金。简而言之，案卷记录并未表明涉案账户与被告王雁平的电信诈骗指控之间存在关联。没有充分的证据可以认定政府已履行其举证责任证明存在适当关联从而使没收涉案账户合法，且法院亦未依法作出相反的裁决。\n\n29. 就 Count II（罪名项二）而言，没收指控指出：“由于实施了本起诉书罪名项二中所指控的洗钱罪行，被告 YVETTE WANG（王雁平，又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）应根据《美国法典》第 18 编第 982(a)(1) 条[4]向美国没收涉及上述罪行的任何及所有不动产与动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产，包括但不限于代表涉及上述罪行之财产金额的一笔美元货币。”替代\n\n脚注 4：18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定：“法院对被判定违反本编第 1956 条[洗钱成文法]罪名的人判处刑罚时……应命令该人向美国没收‘涉及该罪行的’任何不动产或动产，或‘可追溯至该等财产的’任何财产。”18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调为原文所加）。\n\n起诉书第 4 页。就罪名项二而言，政府“必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定的没收要件。”U.S. v. Beltramea（美国诉贝尔特拉梅亚案）, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015)。\n\n30. 替代起诉书指控被告王雁平犯有共谋洗钱罪，因为被告王雁平“明知某些金融交易所涉财产代表某种形式的非法活动收益，仍意图进行并实际进行了及企图进行此类金融交易……且该等交易实际上涉及特定非法活动的收益，即本起诉书罪名项一所指控的电信诈骗计划的收益。”替代起诉书第 3 页。\n\n31. 目前尚不清楚涉案账户何以能因罪名项二中的洗钱指控而被没收。从指控来看，洗钱指控源于被告王雁平使用“罪名项一中所指控的电信诈骗计划的收益”从事金融交易。替代起诉书第 3 页。如上所述，案卷记录中没有充分的证据表明涉案账户中的资金与罪名项一中所指控的诈骗计划有任何关联（参见上文第 27 至 29 段）——没有充分的证据表明该等资金“构成或源自可追溯至实施”电信诈骗所得收益。参见如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。由于涉案账户中的资金事实上并非诈骗计划收益，亦非源自诈骗计划收益，因此该等资金不能作为罪名项二中洗钱指控的基础，也不能作为被告王雁平在罪名项二定罪的一部分而被没收。\n\n32. 政府为主张洗钱指控而指控的公开行为（overt acts）进一步未能证明涉案账户中的资金何以能被没收。在替代起诉书中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项行为。替代\n\n起诉书第 3 页。尽管政府声称这两项公开行为是被告王雁平为推进涉嫌洗钱共谋而实施的“诸行为之一”（替代起诉书第 3 页），但并未说明这些其他行为。\n\n33. 首先，根据替代起诉书，2020 年 5 月 20 日，被告王雁平以 GTV 的名义开设了一个银行账户，值得注意的是，涉案账户“并非”该账户。替代起诉书第 3 页。2020 年 6 月 2 日，被告王雁平向该账户转账约 2 亿美元。同上。转入 GTV 账户的资金来自 Saraca Media, Group, Inc.（萨拉卡传媒集团公司，简称“Saraca”）持有的 JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）账户（郭案审理记录，2024 年 5 月 31 日，953:25-954:4；郭案审理记录，2024 年 6 月 26 日，4359:1-14），而“非”来自涉案账户。从未有任何证词证明涉案账户中的任何资金曾进入 Saraca 的摩根大通银行账户进而被转入替代起诉书所提及的 GTV 账户。\n\n34. 政府指控的第二项行为是“在约 2020 年 6 月 5 日”，被告王雁平“授权从 GTV 的母公司 Saraca Media, Group, Inc. 向一家高风险对冲基金电汇 1 亿美元，用于 Saraca 及其最终实益所有人即郭文贵的儿子的利益。”替代起诉书第 3-4 页。首先，这明确指控资金是从 Saraca 账户转出的，而显而易见涉案账户并非 Saraca 账户。此外，同样，在郭案审理中从未有任何证词表明涉案账户中的任何资金曾进入过 Saraca 账户。\n\n35. 从上述论证可见，关于涉案账户（Accounts）没有任何指控或证词。记录中关于涉案账户的唯一具体提及就是被告 Wang（王）同意没收这些资金。然而，“被告对没收的同意[并不]免除没收标的财产与被定罪罪行之间必须存在关联的要求。”Beltramea 案，785 F.3d at 291。正如第八巡回上诉法院所强调的那样，“地方法院负有独立职责去确保所要求的关联存在。”同上（加重强调）。\n\n36. 在本案中，在替代起诉书（Superseding Information）、原始没收裁定（Original Forfeiture Order）或没收裁定（Forfeiture Order）中，均没有关于涉案账户与被告 Wang 认罪的罪行之间存在所称关联的事实指控。\n\nB. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，因为其为涉案账户的记名所有人\n\n37. 在此，请愿人凭借作为涉案账户的记名所有人并对涉案账户内的资金拥有完全的支配权和控制权，对涉案账户内的资金享有合法权益和权利。因此，请愿人具有质疑没收裁定的诉讼主体资格。\n\nC. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有优位权益\n\n38. 请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益优于政府或被告 Wang 对请愿人财产可能享有的任何权益。\n\n39. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 明确规定，除请愿人对被没收财产享有权益外，请愿人还必须以优势证据证明，请愿人的权益“使得没收裁定全部或部分无效，因为在该权利、所有权或权益在发生引起根据本条没收财产的行为发生之时，归属于请愿人而非被告，或优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。”21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（加重强调）。\n\n40. 在此，如上所述，政府从未履行其举证责任以证明涉案账户属于在被告 Wang 案件中适格予以没收的财产。因此，政府从未证明其对涉案账户的权益优于请愿人的权益。\n\n41. 诚然，“与针对拟没收财产提起的对物诉讼（in rem）民事没收程序不同，刑事没收是对人诉讼（in personam）程序……其是对单个被告人的制裁，而非对财产本身的判决……因此，在刑事没收程序中，政府仅获得被告人在财产中的权益。因为刑事没收作为其刑罚的一部分跟随被告人，政府可以扣押任何可追溯至犯罪行为收益的被告人财产。”U.S. v. Bailey 案，No. 1:11CR10, 2012 WL 569744, at *14 (W.D.N.C. 2012年2月22日)（内部引用省略）（原文强调）。\n\n42. 显而易见的是，政府和被告 Wang 都不能主张他们对一项从未享有过权益的财产拥有优位权益。因此，请愿人对涉案账户的权益优于被告 Wang 和政府的权益。\n\nD. 请愿人有权获得诉讼费用和律师费\n\n43. 请愿人被迫聘请法律顾问，并为提交本请愿书以主张请愿人对请愿人财产的权利及质疑请愿人财产的没收而产生了费用。在本程序胜诉后，请愿人保留收回与本请愿书相关的律师费和费用的所有权利，并可根据《平等获取司法机会法》（Equal Access to Justice Act，简称“EAJA”），28 U.S.C. § 2412，收回请愿人的费用和合理的律师费。联邦法院一贯认为，为了允许胜诉的索赔人根据 EAJA 收取律师费，§ 853(n) 程序具有民事性质。参见 United States v. Cox 案，575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009)；United States v. Douglas 案，55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995)；U.S. v. Bailey 案，2015 WL 1893610 at *20 (W.D.N.C. 2015年4月27日)。\n\nIV. 结论\n\n44. 基于上述理由，请愿人对请愿人财产享有权益，该权益使得关于该财产的没收裁定归于无效。参见例如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告 Wang 对请愿人财产不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。请愿人已通过优势证据证明，并可在任何必要的主审庭审中证明，没收裁定需要被修改以排除请愿人财产。\n\n45. 因此，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 批准本请愿书；(2) 修改没收裁定以排除请愿人财产；(3) 裁定立即向请愿人返还请愿人财产；(4) 裁定请愿人有权收回因本请愿书而产生的请愿人律师费和费用，并准许请愿人提交关于该等律师费和费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予必要且公正的其他救济。\n\n日期：2025年4月7日\n\n日期：2025年4月7日 谨呈，\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\nJeffrey S. Gavenman，律师\nJeremy W. Schulman，律师\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\nPaul W. Butler，律师\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n\n请愿人代理律师\n\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人作证并声明，在接受伪证罪处罚的前提下，本人对该财产的主张并非无理取闹，且就本人所知和所信，支持该主张所提供的信息均属真实准确。\n\nHAMILTON INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, LTD.（汉密尔顿投资管理有限公司）\n\n签署人：E.M.R.d\n\n姓名：Ehsan Masud\n\n职务：首席财务官\n\n日期：2024年4月7日","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":4616,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-07","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:38:16"}