{"id":"court_sdny_674_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":674,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-07","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方没收异议申请书 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #674（2025年4月7日提交）。Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 依 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及联邦刑事诉讼规则32.2(c)提出异议，主张此前对被告 Yvette Wang（Yanping Wang）名下资产作出的没收令中，涉及 Silvergate Bank 一处账户的资金系其自有财产、与 Wang 认罪的犯罪行为无关，请求法院修正没收令将该资金排除并发还，以便转付给相关的 M&A Fund 投资者。","summary_en":"Third-party petition contesting forfeiture — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF No. 674 (filed April 7, 2025). Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC petitions under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c) to amend the forfeiture order entered against co-defendant Yvette Wang (Yanping Wang), arguing that funds in a Silvergate Bank account are Hamilton's own property unrelated to Wang's offense conduct, and asking the court to exclude and return those funds so they can be passed on to the underlying M&A Fund investors.","body_en":"# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\n# **THIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE**\n\n**- VERIFIED CLAIM OF HAMILTON OPPORTUNITY FUND SPC WITH REGARD TO FUNDS IN ACCOUNT NUMBER 5090042770 SEIZED FROM SILVERGATE BANK**\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Hamilton\" or the \"Petitioner\") files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the \"Petition\"). Petitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest – more specifically, the funds in bank account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank (\"Account 2770\") (\"Petitioner's Property\") and that the United States Government (the \"Government\") improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with Defendant Yvette Wang (\"Defendant Wang\"). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770 was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal\n\nright, title, or interest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. The Forfeiture Order[1](#page-1-0) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner's Property because right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property was vested in Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was superior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the Forfeiture Order (as defined below).\n\nThe funds in this account were segregated as required by Cayman Islands law and belonged solely to the legitimate investors in Class B shares of Hamilton's segregated portfolio, Hamilton M&A Fund SP (the \"M&A Fund\"). Such investors (collectively, the \"Investors\") lost access to their funds after the Government improperly seized Account 2770, and the M&A Fund could not close on the Digital Bank investment (as more fully argued below). Many of the individual Investors have already filed petitions with this Court for the return of the funds that they invested in the M&A Fund (the \"Petitioning Investors\"). Hamilton supports those petitions and agrees with the arguments stated therein. It files this Petition only out of an abundance of caution, in the event the Court does not agree with the Petitioning Investors' arguments regarding a constructive trust and, instead, determines that the Investors' money should still be considered the property of Hamilton, as well as to assist any Investors who do not file petitions. In the event that this Court determines that, for the purpose of these proceedings, the Investors' money is the property of Hamilton, Hamilton affirms that if this Petition is granted, it will return the Investors' money in accordance with the provisions of the Subscription Agreement (as defined below). As\n\n<span id=\"page-1-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> Reference is to the Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Forfeiture Order\") that this Court entered on January 7, 2025, with consent from Defendant Wang. ECF No. 488.\n\nsuch, this Court should amend the Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner's Property[2](#page-2-0) and order that the Government immediately return Petitioner's Property to Petitioner so that Petitioner can return the funds to their rightful owners: the Investors. In support of Petitioner's claim, Petitioner states as follows:\n\n## **I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**\n\nIt appears that Petitioner's Property – meaning, the funds in Account 2770 – were purely \"collateral damage\" in the Government's seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant Wang and Miles Guo (\"Defendant Guo\"). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure of Account 2770, and in that time span, there has never been any explanation as to how funds in Account 2770 are related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any showing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were ever deposited in Account 2770, no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever commingled with Petitioner's Property, and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had anything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\n\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is the named owner on Account 2770 and thus has a vested, legal, right, title and interest in the funds therein – Petitioner's Property – and Petitioner's Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither Defendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, has ever demonstrated that they have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner's Property. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of \"all her\n\n<span id=\"page-2-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> To be clear, the use of the term \"Petitioner's Property\" is not meant to assert that Hamilton's claim to such funds is superior to that of the Investors; to the contrary, as stated above, Hamilton endorses the legal theory of constructive trust set forth in the petitions of the Petitioning Investors. Again, this petition is filed by Hamilton in the alternative to that of the Petitioning Investors, in case the Court deems that Account 2770 remains the legal property of Hamilton, rather than the Investors.\n\nright, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 (and thus, Petitioner's Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), Defendant Wang never had such \"right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 or any funds therein. That is because Petitioner is the legal and sole owner of Account 2770. Defendant Wang was not a signatory on Account 2770, never deposited money into Account 2770, and had no control over Account 2770. There is also no evidence that Defendant Wang ever directed anyone, directly or indirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. It is axiomatic that Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that she does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never established that Petitioner's Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A).\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to the Investors or, in the alternative, to = Petitioner to return to the Investors; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\n## **II. BACKGROUND FACTS**\n\n## **A. Petitioner's Property**\n\n1. Petitioner is a Cayman Islands Segregated Portfolio Company operating as a mutual fund and registered with the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority under Section 4(3) of the Mutual Funds Act (Revised) of the Cayman Islands. More specifically, the Fund is a fund specializing in equity investments selected by its investment manager (the \"Investment Manager\") with a view to long-term capital gains.\n\n2. Sometime in 2021, the Investment Manager identified an opportunity to invest in a\n\nbank (the \"Digital Bank\"). In connection with this investment, Petitioner sought to raise capital by issuing two classes of shares: Class A shares and Class B shares. This Petition specifically concerns the Class B shares for which the Investors wired money into Account 2770. To be sure, Account 2770 contains only the funds wired by Investors, and does not contain any funds from any other sources.\n\n3. Accordingly, in furtherance of this investment opportunity, on or about January 20, 2022, Petitioner provided a group of investors a confidential Offering Memorandum (the \"Offering Memorandum\"). A true and correct copy of the Offering Memorandum is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**. The Offering Memorandum described the investment opportunity and offered investors an opportunity to acquire the Class A and Class B Shares attributed to a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund – the M&A Fund.\n\n4. Defendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any corporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund or Petitioner. The evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n5. Defendant Wang did not make any investments in the M&A Fund; again, the evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n6. Interested investors in the M&A Fund's Class B shares submitted their applications (the \"Subscription Agreement\") to Petitioner. Upon completing a Know-Your-Customer (\"KYC\") and Anti-Money-Laundering (\"AML\") process done by NAV Fund Services, the largest independent fund administrator in the world, and upon approval from Petitioner, the Investors then wired money into Account 2770 pursuant to the terms of the Subscription Agreement. *Id.*\n\n7. Pursuant to laws of the Cayman Islands, funds of each class of each individual segregated portfolio of Petitioner, including the M&A Fund, are kept segregated, separate, and\n\nseparately identifiable from, those of any other segregated portfolios of the Petitioner and any general assets of the Petitioner.\n\n8. There was a total of 324 Investors in the Class B Shares of the M&A Fund. Each Investor's individual investment is specific only to the investment in the Digital Bank, and each investment amount is fully identifiable and properly recorded by the independent fund administrator after stringent KYC and AML processes.\n\n## **B. Seizure of Account 2770**\n\n9. On September 18, 2022, the Government seized the entire balance of the funds in Account 2770.\n\n10. As a result of the seizure, the Investors' funds did not go through to acquire Digital Bank on the transaction's closing date as had been promised. Accordingly, the Investors not only lost access to the funds they wired to Account 2770 for the investment in Digital Bank, but also did not get the investment in Digital Bank for which they bargained.\n\n11. To date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the Government had to seize the funds in Account 2770.\n\n## **C. The Criminal Case of Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the Forfeiture Order**\n\n12. On March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang, Defendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n\n13. On May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the \"Superseding Information\") against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information charged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I) (Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering (Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a\n\nForfeiture Allegation (the \"Forfeiture Allegation\"). Superseding Information at 4.\n\n14. On the same day, May 3, 2024, Defendant Wang pled guilty to Count I and Count II as charged in the Superseding Information.\n\n15. Also on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Original Forfeiture Order\"). ECF No. 329.\n\n16. In the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her*  right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property purportedly \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n\n17. Defendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him. Accordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the \"Guo Trial\"). On July 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this Petition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n\n18. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n\n19. On January 7, 2025, this Court entered the Forfeiture Order. ECF No. 488. As it pertains to Petitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all material respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all *her*  right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding]\n\nInformation.\" Forfeiture Order at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n20. Petitioner's Property is described in both the Original Forfeiture Order and the\n\nForfeiture Order as follows:\n\n\\$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September 18, 2022 (23-FBl-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\n\n## **III. ARGUMENT**\n\n21. In an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited, and whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part, because such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property. *See* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n\n22. Here, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of being the named account owner of Account 2770 and by virtue of having full dominion and control over the funds therein. Moreover, Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any right Defendant Wang had in Petitioner's Property because Defendant Wang had *no* legal right, title or, interest in either Petitioner's Property or Account 2770 generally. In other words, Defendant Wang could not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject to criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner's Property, and Petitioner's Property should be returned to either the Investors or to the Petitioner, for the benefit of the Investors.\n\n# **A. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770, Including Petitioner's Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First Instance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds**\n\n23. The Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner's Property because it has failed to present evidence demonstrating that Petitioner's Property is actually forfeitable property as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A).\n\n24. \"When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, 'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.'\" *United States v. Watts*, 786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing *United States v. Capoccia*, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court *must* determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.\" Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); *U.S. v. Watts*, 786 F.3d at 172. \"At various points in the proceedings, *the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion* to varying degrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . .or by a preponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.\" *Id.* (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). \"Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the property in question be considered 'subject to forfeiture' in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the government has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property is seen merely as 'potentially forfeitable' . . . or 'potentially subject to forfeiture.'\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted).\n\n25. This means that before the court even reaches the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in dispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory\n\nauthority to seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the accounts seized regardless of whether the claimant can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). *See e.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co*., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n\n26. A full and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair administration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has conducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary proceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an ancillary proceeding, since \"the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.\" S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392.\n\n27. In this matter, there has never been a determination that there exists a nexus between Account 2770 and any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty, and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained in the publicly available documents in both Defendant Wang's and Defendant Guo's criminal case, the Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n\n28. Here, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture Allegation as to both Counts I and Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding Information at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show, let alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n29. As to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the wire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United\n\nStates Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C)[3](#page-10-0) . . .and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, \"if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n\n30. The record is devoid of any allegations regarding how the funds in Account 2770 are, or were derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang's conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Superseding Information alleges that \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about March 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive stock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and GClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the Himalaya Exchange [(the \"Fraud Scheme\")]. Through the [Fraud Scheme], YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced investors to invest more than \\$1 billion into entities Guo controlled.\" Superseding Information at 2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing any proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into Account 2770. Similarly, there are no allegations in the Superseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into\n\n<span id=\"page-10-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that \"[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture] which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of\" various specified offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang in Count I.\n\nAccount 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits into Account 2770 were from investors who were investing in the Digital Bank – an investment that is not implicated in any way by the \"Fraud Scheme\" described in the Superseding Information. To be sure, Petitioner affirms that Petitioner was never a victim of any conduct by Defendant Wang alleged in the Superseding Information and does not believe that any of Petitioner's Property was ever used in any unlawful activity.\n\n31. Finally, there was no relevant evidence during Defendant Guo's trial about Account 2770. There was testimony during Defendant Guo's trial from Mr. James Robert Collins, the CEO of Mercantile Bank, that - Petitioner understands - alluded to Account 2770. However, this testimony had nothing to do with Defendant Wang or these forfeiture proceedings. If anything, this testimony underscored the *legitimacy* of the Digital Bank investment and, therefore, assists the Petitioner's argument herein. Mr. Collins testified that the Investors' funds were wired to Mercantile Bank for the acquisition of the Digital Bank on the closing date of the transaction; however, they never made it to Mercantile Bank because the Government seized Account 2770. *See* Guo Trial, Jun. 17, 2024, 2796:16-2798:5. The legitimacy of the acquisition of the Digital Bank has not been challenged, and there was no other relevant evidence regarding Account 2770; regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme were ever deposited into Account 2770; or, for that matter, regarding whether Defendant Wang ever deposited *any* money into Account 2770 (she did not). Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would indicate there is a nexus between Account 2770 and Defendant Wang's wire fraud charge, let alone sufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing, and the Court properly adjudicated, that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of Account 2770 to be proper.\n\n32. As to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the\n\nmoney laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1)[4](#page-12-0) , any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense, or any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United States currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. As to Count II, The Government \"must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.\" *U.S. v. Beltramea*, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n33. The Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy to launder money because Defendant Wang \"knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . .and which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One of this Information.\" Superseding Information at 3.\n\n34. It is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited as a result of the money laundering charge in Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang engaging in financial transactions with the \"proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One.\" Superseding Information at 3. As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account 2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (*see* ¶¶ 29-31, above) – there is no evidence that such funds \"constitute[d] or [were] derived from proceeds\n\n<span id=\"page-12-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that \"[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, *involved in such offense*, or any property *traceable to such property*.\" 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\ntraceable to the commission of\" wire fraud. *See e.g.* 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were not Fraud Scheme proceeds, nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could not serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part of Defendant Wang's conviction for Count II.\n\n35. The overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge further fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be subject to forfeiture. In the Superseding Information, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering.[5](#page-13-0) Superseding Information at 3.\n\n36. First, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened a bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was *not*. Superseding Information at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately \\$200 million to that account. *Id.* The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank account held by Saraca Media, Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\") (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo Trial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), *not* from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be transferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information. Moreover, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n37. The second act the Government alleges is that \"on or about June 5, 2020,\" Defendant Wang \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from GTV's parent company, Saraca Media, Group, Inc., to a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Guo's son.\" Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was\n\n<span id=\"page-13-0\"></span><sup>5</sup> Although the Government states that these two overt acts were \"among others\" that Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money (Superseding Information at 3), these other acts have never been indentified.\n\ntransferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account. Moreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n38. As seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or relevant trial testimony regarding Account 2770 whatsoever, outside of Mr. Collins' testimony which, to the extent it is relevant at all, supports Petitioner's claim. The *only* actual reference in the record to Account 2770 as it relates to the Government's seizure is Defendant Wang's purported consent to forfeit it. However, \"a defendant's consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the requirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of offense.\" *Beltramea*, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, \"[t]he district court had an independent duty to *ensure* that the required nexus exists.\" *Id.* (emphasis added).\n\n39. Here, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the Original Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account 2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n## **B. Petitioner Has an Interest in Petitioner's Property Because Hamilton is the Legal Account Owner**\n\n40. Even putting aside the Government's failure to properly demonstrate that the funds in Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does Defendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n\n41. Here, the Petitioner has a legal interest and right in the funds in Account 2770 by virtue of being the named owner of Account 2770 and having complete dominion and control over the funds in Account 2770. Thus, Petitioner has standing to challenge the Forfeiture Order.\n\n## **C. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner's Property**\n\n42. Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property is absolutely superior to any interest that the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner's Property.\n\n43. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner's interest in the forfeited property, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's interest \"renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner *rather than the defendant* or was superior to any right, title, or interest *of the defendant* at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section.\" 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n\n44. Here, as set forth above, Defendant Wang never had any interest in Petitioner's Property or Account 2770; indeed, the record is entirely silent as to what the relationship is between Defendant Wang, the Fraud Scheme, and Account 2770.\n\n45. It is axiomatic that neither the Government nor Defendant Wang can argue that they have a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Likewise, Defendant Wang cannot forfeit her interest in a property in which she had no interest.\n\n## **D. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys' Fees**\n\n46. The Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to file this petition asserting Petitioner's right to Petitioner's Property and to challenge the forfeiture of Petitioner's Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner's costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (\"EAJA\"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the purposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney's fees under the EAJA. *See United States v. Cox*, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Douglas*, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995); *U.S. v. Bailey*, 2015 WL 1893610 at \\*20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\n\n## **IV. CONCLUSION**\n\n47. For the reasons stated above, the Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner's Property, which renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. *See e.g.* 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Defendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property, and never did. Petitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that the Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner's Property.\n\n48. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to the M&A Fund Investors or, in the alternative, to the Petitioner to return to the M&A Fund Investors; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant other relief that is necessary and just.\n\nDated: April 7, 2025\n\nDated: April 7, 2025 Respectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman Jeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq. Jeremy W. Schulman, Esq. SCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC 6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425 North Bethesda, MD 20852 (240) 356-8550 [jgavenman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jgavenman@schulmanbh.com) [jschulman@schulmanbh.com](mailto:jschulman@schulmanbh.com)\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler Paul W. Butler, Esq. BUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES 1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531 Washington, D.C. 20036 [paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com](mailto:paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com) *Counsel for Petitioner*\n\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I attest and declare under penalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided in support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.\n\nExecuted on this 7th day of April, 2025\n\n# HAMILTON OPPORTUNITY FUND SPC\n\nBy: E. Mosub,\n\n| Labels | Values |\\n| :--- | :--- |\\n| Name | Ehsan Masud |\n\nTitle: Chief Financial Officer","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\n裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收令的第三方请愿书\n\n- HAMILTON OPPORTUNITY FUND SPC 就从 SILVERGATE BANK（银门银行）扣押的账号为 5090042770 账户内的资金提出的经核实权利主张\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n请愿人 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“Hamilton”或“请愿人”）依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 以及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c) 条，提交本《裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益及修改初步没收令的第三方请愿书》（下称“《请愿书》”）。请愿人请求归还请愿人拥有合法权利、所有权和/或权益的资金——具体而言，即位于 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090042770 的银行账户（下称“2770 账户”）内的资金（下称“请愿人财产”），该资金系由美国政府（下称“政府”）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平）（下称“被告王”）达成的没收令的一部分而不当扣押的。然而，任何涉及 2770 账户内资金的没收令均属违法且不当，因为被告王对 2770 账户或请愿人财产均无任何合法权利、所有权或权益。因此，该《没收令》[1]就请愿人财产而言归于无效，因为请愿人财产的权利、所有权或权益归属于请愿人而非被告王，且在引发《没收令》（定义见下文）的作为发生时，请愿人的权益优于被告王的任何权利、所有权或权益。\n\n该账户内的资金已按 Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）法律的要求进行了隔离，且仅属于 Hamilton 的隔离组合 Hamilton M&A Fund SP（下称“并购基金”）的 B 类股份合法投资者。在政府不当扣押 2770 账户后，该等投资者（统称“投资者”）失去了使用其资金的途径，导致并购基金无法完成对 Digital Bank（数字银行）的投资交割（下文对此有更详尽的论述）。许多个人投资者已就其在并购基金中投资资金的归还向本院提交了请愿书（下称“请愿投资者”）。Hamilton 支持该等请愿书并赞同其中陈述的论点。Hamilton 提交本《请愿书》仅出于极为谨慎的考虑，以防本院不采纳请愿投资者关于拟制信托的论点，而是判定投资者的资金仍应被视为 Hamilton 的财产；同时也旨在协助任何未提交请愿书的投资者。若本院认定就本案程序而言，投资者的资金属于 Hamilton 的财产，则 Hamilton 确认，如果本《请愿书》获得准许，其将根据《认购协议》（定义见下文）的规定向投资者归还资金。因此，本院应修改《没收令》以剔除请愿人财产[2]，并命令政府立即向请愿人归还请愿人财产，以便请愿人能够将资金归还给其合法所有者：投资者。为支持请愿人的权利主张，请愿人陈述如下：\n\n[1] 指本院于 2025 年 1 月 7 日经被告王同意作出的《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（下称“《没收令》”）。ECF No. 488。\n\n[2] 需要澄清的是，使用“请愿人财产”一词并非旨在主张 Hamilton 对该等资金的权利主张优于投资者；相反，如上所述，Hamilton 赞同请愿投资者的请愿书中所述的拟制信托法律理论。在此再次说明，本请愿书系 Hamilton 作为请愿投资者的备位选择而提交，以防法院认定 2770 账户在法律上仍为 Hamilton 而非投资者的财产。\n\nI. 初步陈述\n\n请愿人财产（即 2770 账户中的资金）似乎纯属政府在起诉被告王和 Miles Guo（郭文贵）（下称“被告郭”）之前扣押资产过程中的“附带损害”。自 2770 账户被扣押以来已有两年半之久，在此期间，从未有任何关于 2770 账户中的资金如何与被告王认罪的任何罪行相关联的解释，而这是法律上有效没收令的必要前提条件。从未有任何证据表明被告王认罪的任何非法活动的任何收益曾存入 2770 账户，没有证据表明该等活动的任何收益曾与请愿人财产发生混同，而且事实上，也没有任何证据表明被告王曾与 2770 账户有任何关联，甚至都不能证明其知晓该账户的存在。\n\n如下文所示，请愿人是 2770 账户的指定所有权人，因此对其中的资金——请愿人财产——享有既得的、合法的权利、所有权和权益，且在本案中政府不得扣押请愿人财产。无论被告王，还是如今承袭其法律地位的政府，均未曾证明过他们对请愿人财产享有任何权益。虽然被告王在《没收令》（ECF No. 488 第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在 2770 账户（并因此及于请愿人财产）中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，但被告王在 2770 账户或其中的任何资金中从未拥有过此类“权利、所有权和权益”。这是因为请愿人是 2770 账户的合法且唯一的所有人。被告王不是 2770 账户的签字人，从未向 2770 账户存入过资金，对 2770 账户也没有任何控制权。亦无证据表明被告王曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770 账户存入任何款项。被告王不能没收其并不拥有且在其中没有任何权益的财产，这是不言自明的原则。事实上，法院似乎从未依法依规（根据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1)(A) 条的规定）在初审程序中认定过请愿人财产应予没收。\n\n基于上述所有理由以及下文阐明的理由，请愿人谨请求本院：(1) 准许本《请愿书》；(2) 修改《没收令》以排除请愿人财产；(3) 命令立即将请愿人财产归还给投资者，或作为替代方案，归还给请愿人以便转交投资者；(4) 裁定请愿人有权获得因本《请愿书》而产生的请愿人律师费及诉讼费用，并准许请愿人提交该等律师费及诉讼费用的申请；以及 (5) 准许其他必要且公正的救济。\n\nII. 背景事实\n\nA. 请愿人财产\n\n1. 请愿人是一家开曼群岛隔离组合公司，作为共同基金运作，并根据开曼群岛《共同基金法（修订版）》第 4(3) 条在 Cayman Islands Monetary Authority（开曼群岛金融管理局）注册。更具体而言，该基金是一家专门从事由其投资经理（下称“投资经理”）选定以实现长期资本增值为目的的股权投资的基金。\n\n2. 2021 年的某个时候，投资经理发现了一个投资某银行（下称“数字银行”）的机会。就该项投资而言，请愿人寻求通过发行两类股份来募集资本：A 类股份和 B 类股份。本《请愿书》专门涉及投资者将资金电汇至 2770 账户所认购的 B 类股份。必须指出的是，2770 账户仅包含投资者电汇的资金，不包含来自任何其他来源的任何资金。\n\n3. 因此，为推进该投资机会，请愿人于 2022 年 1 月 20 日左右向一组投资者提供了一份保密的《发售备忘录》（下称“《发售备忘录》”）。《发售备忘录》的真实准确副本作为附件 A 附于本请愿书之后。《发售备忘录》描述了该投资机会，并为投资者提供了认购属于 Hamilton Opportunity Fund 的隔离组合——并购基金——的 A 类和 B 类股份的机会。\n\n4. 被告王不是并购基金或请愿人的董事或成员，并且对并购基金或请愿人不享有任何其他公司或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n5. 被告王未在并购基金中进行任何投资；同样，证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n6. 对并购基金 B 类股份感兴趣的投资者向请愿人提交了其申请（下称“《认购协议》”）。在全球最大的独立基金行政管理人 NAV Fund Services 完成“了解你的客户”（下称“KYC”）和“反洗钱”（下称“AML”）程序，并获得请愿人批准后，投资者随后根据《认购协议》的条款将资金电汇至 2770 账户。同前。\n\n7. 根据开曼群岛的法律，请愿人各个独立隔离组合（包括并购基金）的每个股份类别的资金，均与请愿人任何其他隔离组合的资金以及请愿人的任何普通资产保持隔离、分开且可单独识别。\n\n8. 并购基金 B 类股份共有 324 名投资者。每位投资者的单笔投资仅针对对数字银行的投资，且在经过严格的 KYC 和 AML 程序后，每笔投资金额均由独立基金行政管理人完全识别并妥善记录。\n\nB. 2770 账户的扣押\n\n9. 2022 年 9 月 18 日，政府扣押了 2770 账户内的全部资金余额。\n\n10. 由于该扣押，投资者的资金未能在交易交割日按承诺用于收购数字银行。因此，投资者不仅失去了使用其为投资数字银行而电汇至 2770 账户的资金的途径，而且也没有获得他们议定的对数字银行的投资。\n\n11. 迄今为止，没有任何公开可得的文件说明政府扣押 2770 账户资金具有何种合理根据。\n\nC. 被告王与被告郭的刑事案件及《没收令》\n\n12. 2023 年 3 月 6 日，政府对被告王、被告郭以及第三名从未被传讯的被告 William Je（余建明）提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n13. 2024 年 5 月 3 日，政府对被告王提起了替代控告书（下称“《替代控告书》”）。ECF No. 325。《替代控告书》指控被告王犯有一项共谋电汇诈骗罪（第一项罪名）（《替代控告书》第 1-2 页）以及一项共谋洗钱罪（第二项罪名）（《替代控告书》第 2-4 页）。《替代控告书》还包含一项没收指控（下称“没收指控”）。《替代控告书》第 4 页。\n\n14. 同日，即 2024 年 5 月 3 日，被告王就《替代控告书》所指控的第一项罪名和第二项罪名认罪。\n\n15. 同样在 2024 年 5 月 3 日，本院作出了《关于特定财产/金钱判决的同意初步没收令》（下称“《原没收令》”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n16. 在《原没收令》中，被告王同意没收其在某些资产中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”（包括 2770 账户），因为该等财产据称“构成被告个人取得的第一项罪名所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及［《替代控告书》］第二项罪名所指控罪行的财产”。《原没收令》第 2-6 页（重点为原文所加）。\n\n17. 被告Guo（郭文贵）对其被指控的任何罪行均未作认罪答辩。因此，陪审团审判于2024年5月22日至2024年7月16日期间进行（即“Guo审判”）。2024年7月16日，陪审团裁定被告郭文贵犯有共谋敲诈勒索罪、共谋实施电汇欺诈罪、共谋实施洗钱罪、共谋实施证券欺诈罪、证券欺诈罪、电汇欺诈罪以及洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本申诉书提交之日，被告郭文贵尚未被判刑。\n\n18. 2025年1月6日，被告Wang（王雁平）被判刑。\n\n19. 2025年1月7日，本法院作出了没收裁定。ECF No. 488。就涉及申诉人的部分而言，该没收裁定在所有实质性方面与原没收裁定大体相似。在没收裁定中，被告王雁平同意没收其在某些资产中的“全部权利、所有权和权益”，其中包括2770号账户，因为该等财产“构成被告个人取得的罪名单一所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及替代起诉书罪名二所指控罪行的财产”。没收裁定第2-11页（重点为后加）。\n\n20. 申诉人的财产在原没收裁定和没收裁定中均被描述如下：\n\n存放于Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号为5090042770、开户名义为“Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC”的账户中，并由政府于2022年9月18日左右扣押的89,992,861.75美元货币（23-FBl-000074）。\n\n原没收裁定第3页；没收裁定第3页。\n\nIII. 论证\n\n21. 在依据21 U.S.C. § 853(n)及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(c)(1)条进行的附随刑事没收程序中，本法院必须根据优势证据标准判定：申诉人对待没收财产是否享有合法权利、所有权或权益；以及该等权利、所有权或权益是否导致没收裁定全部或部分无效，盖因在导致财产被没收的行为发生之时，该等权益归属于申诉人而非被告，或者优先于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n22. 在本案中，申诉人依据21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)对申诉人财产享有合法权利、所有权或权益，这是基于其为2770号账户的名义账户所有者，且对其中的资金拥有完全的支配权和控制权。此外，申诉人在申诉人财产中的权益既已归属于申诉人，又优先于被告王雁平在申诉人财产中享有的任何权利，因为被告王雁平无论在申诉人财产中还是就2770号账户整体而言，均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。换言之，被告王雁平无法没收其在2770号账户中的权益，因为她根本没有任何应受刑事没收管辖的权益。因此，应当对没收裁定予以修改以剔除申诉人的财产，并应将申诉人的财产返还给投资者，或返还给申诉人以用于投资者的利益。\n\nA. 政府未能证明2770号账户中的资金（包括申诉人的财产）自始即正当地属于应予没收的财产，导致没收裁定针对该等资金而言是不当的\n\n23. 政府无合法理由保留申诉人的财产，因为其未能按照 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 的要求提出证据证明申诉人的财产实际上是可予没收的财产。\n\n24. “当政府寻求获取没收裁定时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2(b)(1)条……要求量刑法院确定根据适用法规哪些财产属于应予没收的财产。’”United States v. Watts，786 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（援引 United States v. Capoccia，503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2007)）。根据 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院必须确定政府是否已确立财产与犯罪之间必要的关联性。”Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（重点为后加）；U.S. v. Watts，786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的各个阶段，政府承担以不同程度的确定性证明这一法律结论的举证责任：在起诉后听证会上以合理根据为标准……或在无陪审团法官审判中或在陪审团面前以优势证据为标准。”同上（重点为后加）（内部引文省略）。“然而，只有在政府达到相关法律门槛的情况下，涉案财产才能在任何法律意义上被视为‘应予没收的财产’。在此之前，当政府仅是通过起诉书宣布其寻求没收的意图时，该财产仅被视为‘潜在可予没收的’……或‘潜在属于应予没收的’。”同上（内部引文省略）。\n\n25. 这意味着，在法院触及申诉人是否有权根据第853(n)条获得财产返还这一问题之前，必须首先确定争议财产自始是否实际上属于可予没收的财产。若非如此，政府便没有扣押该财产的法定职权。若财产系被不当扣押，则无论权利主张人是否能够满足第853(n)条所规定的标准，政府都必须返还被扣押的账户。参见例如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co.，772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)。\n\n26. 依据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 进行全面且完整的调查对于司法的公正实施至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已进行调查并认定该财产属于应予没收财产这一假定之上。在制定附随程序法规时，国会选择在附随程序期间将举证责任置于第三方，是因为“美国在刑事案件中已排除合理怀疑地证明了其没收指控。”S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n27. 在本案中，从未有过关于2770号账户与被告王雁平认罪的任何罪行之间存在关联性的认定，因此，申诉人被迫提起本申诉。基于被告王雁平和被告郭文贵的刑事案件中公开可获取的文件所包含的所有信息，政府在涉及2770号账户的问题上无法胜诉。\n\n28. 在本案中，政府在替代起诉书中包含了针对罪名单一和罪名二的没收指控，并寻求没收特定财产。替代起诉书第4页。案卷记录中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明、更不用说已完成其举证责任来证明2770号账户与被告王雁平认罪的罪行之间存在关联性。\n\n29. 关于罪名单一，没收指控载明，“由于实施了本替代起诉书罪名单一中所指控的电汇欺诈罪行，被告YVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，应依据《美国法典》第18编第981(a)(1)(C)条[注3]……及《美国法典》第28编第2461(c)条，向美国没收构成或源自可追溯至实施上述罪行之收益的任何及所有不动产和动产。”替代起诉书第4页。政府必须根据优势证据标准证明18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)项下的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收理论是该财产被用于实施或便利实施刑事犯罪，或参与了刑事犯罪的实施，政府应证明该财产与犯罪之间存在重大联系。”18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n30. 案卷记录中完全没有任何关于2770号账户中的资金如何构成或源自可追溯至被告王雁平共谋实施电汇欺诈罪之收益的指控。替代起诉书指控称，“至少在2018年左右至至少2023年3月15日左右，共谋人向投资者作出虚假陈述，称其投资GTV、Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）组织和GClubs将获得股票，投资Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）将获得加密货币[（即‘欺诈计划’）]。通过该[欺诈计划]，被告王雁平（又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’）及其共谋人（包括Miles Guo（郭文贵））诱使投资者向郭文贵控制的实体投资了超过10亿美元。”替代起诉书第2页。替代起诉书中没有任何关于被告王雁平将欺诈计划的任何收益存入2770号账户的指控。同样，替代起诉书中也没有任何指控称由于该欺诈计划，有任何投资者将资金存入了\n\n注3 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)规定，“构成或源自可追溯至违反”各种指定罪行（包括违反18 U.S.C. § 1343电汇欺诈罪，如罪名单一中对被告王雁平所指控的）之收益的“任何不动产或动产[均应予以没收]”。\n\n2770号账户。也不可能有任何此类指控，因为存入2770号账户的唯一款项来自投资Digital Bank（数字银行）的投资者——该投资与替代起诉书中所述的“欺诈计划”没有任何关联。可以肯定的是，申诉人申明申诉人从未是被告王雁平在替代起诉书中所指控的任何行为的受害者，且不认为申诉人的任何财产曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n31. 最后，在被告郭文贵的审判期间，没有关于2770号账户的相关证据。在被告郭文贵审判期间，曾有Mercantile Bank（商业银行）首席执行官James Robert Collins先生的证词——据申诉人理解——暗指了2770号账户。然而，该证词与被告王雁平或本案没收程序毫无关系。如果说该证词有什么作用的话，那就是它强调了数字银行投资的合法性，并因此支持了申诉人在本案中的论点。Collins先生作证称，投资者的资金在交易交割日被电汇至商业银行用于收购数字银行；然而，由于政府扣押了2770号账户，该笔款项从未到达商业银行。参见 Guo审判，2024年6月17日，2796:16-2798:5。收购数字银行的合法性未受到质疑，且没有其他关于2770号账户的相关证据；没有关于欺诈计划的任何收益是否曾存入2770号账户的相关证据；或者就此而言，也没有关于被告王雁平是否曾向2770号账户存入过任何资金的相关证据（她并未存入）。简而言之，案卷记录中没有任何内容表明2770号账户与被告王雁平的电汇欺诈指控之间存在关联，更不用说有充分的证据用以判定政府已完成了证明存在适当关联的举证责任、以及法院已适当裁定存在使没收2770号账户成立的适当关联。\n\n32. 关于罪名二，没收指控载明，“由于实施了\n\n本起诉书第二项罪名所指控的洗钱罪，被告 YVETTE WANG（王艳平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，应依据《美国法典》第 18 编第 982(a)(1) 条[4](#page-12-0)，向美国没收涉及上述罪行的任何及所有不动产与动产，或任何可追溯至该等财产的财产，包括但不限于代表涉及上述罪行之财产数额的以美元计价的一笔款项。”《替代起诉书》第 4 页。关于第二项罪名，政府“必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定的没收要件。”见 U.S. v. Beltramea（美国诉贝尔特拉梅亚案），785 F.3d 287, 290（8th Cir. 2015（第八巡回法院 2015 年））。\n\n33. 《替代起诉书》指控被告王犯有共谋洗钱罪，因为被告王“明知涉及某些金融交易的财产代表某种形式的非法活动收益，将进行并确实进行且企图进行该等金融交易……且该等交易实际上涉及指定非法活动的收益，即本起诉书第一项罪名所指控的电汇诈骗方案的收益。”《替代起诉书》第 3 页。\n\n34. 目前尚不清楚 2770 账户何以因第二项罪名中的洗钱指控而被没收。根据指控，洗钱指控源于被告王使用“第一项罪名所指控的电汇诈骗方案的收益”从事金融交易。《替代起诉书》第 3 页。如上所述，没有任何证据表明 2770 账户中的资金与第一项罪名所指控的诈骗方案有任何关联（见上文第 29-31 段）——没有任何证据表明该等资金“构成或源自可追溯至实施”电汇诈骗的收益。参见例如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。鉴于 2770 账户中的资金并非诈骗方案的收益，亦非源自诈骗方案的收益，该等资金不能作为第二项罪名中洗钱指控的依据，亦不能作为被告王就第二项罪名定罪的一部分而被没收。\n\n4 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定：“法院在对被判犯有违反本编第 1956 条[洗钱成文法]之罪行的人判刑时……应命令该人向美国没收涉及该罪行的任何不动产或动产，或任何可追溯至该等财产的财产。”18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调为后加）。\n\n35. 政府为支持洗钱指控而指控的公开行为，亦进一步未能表明 2770 账户中的资金何以可被没收。在《替代起诉书》中，政府列出了两项证明洗钱的行为。[5](#page-13-0)《替代起诉书》第 3 页。\n\n36. 第一，根据《替代起诉书》，2020 年 5 月 20 日，被告王以 GTV 的名义开设了一个银行账户，值得注意的是，2770 账户并非该账户。《替代起诉书》第 3 页。2020 年 6 月 2 日，被告王向该账户转账约 2 亿美元。同上。转入该 GTV 账户的资金来自 Saraca Media, Group, Inc.（萨拉卡媒体集团有限公司，简称“Saraca”）持有的 JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）账户（Guo 审判，2024 年 5 月 31 日，953:25-954:4；Guo 审判，2024 年 6 月 26 日，4359:1-14），而非来自 2770 账户。从未有任何证词证明 2770 账户的任何款项曾进入过 Saraca 的摩根大通银行账户并随后被转入《替代起诉书》所引用的 GTV 账户。此外，2770 账户在 2020 年甚至根本不存在。\n\n37. 政府指控的第二项行为是，“在 2020 年 6 月 5 日或前后”，被告王“授权从 GTV 的母公司 Saraca Media, Group, Inc. 向一家高风险对冲基金电汇 1 亿美元，以谋取 Saraca 及其最终实益拥有人 Guo 之子的利益。”《替代起诉书》第 3-4 页。首先，这明确指控了资金是\n\n5 尽管政府称这两项公开行为是被告王为推进所指控的共谋洗钱罪而实施的“其中包括”的行为（《替代起诉书》第 3 页），但这些其他行为从未被明确指出。\n\n从 Saraca 账户转出的，而 2770 账户显而易见不是该账户。而且，同样地，从未有任何证词表明 2770 账户的任何款项曾进入过 Saraca 账户。此外，再次说明，2770 账户在 2020 年甚至根本不存在。\n\n38. 从上述论证可以看出，除柯林斯先生（Mr. Collins）的证词（就其具有任何相关性而言，该证词支持请求人的主张）之外，根本没有任何关于 2770 账户的指控或相关审判证词。记录中关于 2770 账户与政府扣押相关的唯一实际提述，是被告王据称同意没收该账户。然而，“被告对没收的同意[并不]废除在寻求没收的财产与被定罪罪行之间存在关联性的要求。”Beltramea 案，785 F.3d at 291。正如第八巡回法院所强调的那样，“地区法院负有独立职责以确保所要求的关联性确实存在。”同上（强调为后加）。\n\n39. 在本案中，在《替代起诉书》、原《没收裁定》或《没收裁定》中，均不存在关于 2770 账户与被告王认罪之罪行之间甚至所谓关联性的事实指控。\nB. 请求人对请求人财产享有权益，因为 Hamilton 是合法的账户所有人\n\n40. 即使撇开政府未能妥善证明 2770 账户中的资金属于《替代起诉书》中所指控的任何活动的一部分不谈，请求人财产也应当归还给请求人，因为请求人对该财产享有的权益大于被告王，或现今政府所享有的权益。\n\n41. 在本案中，请求人凭借作为 2770 账户的具名所有人，并对 2770 账户中的资金拥有完全的支配权和控制权，对 2770 账户中的资金享有法律上的权益和权利。因此，请求人具备对《没收裁定》提出异议的主体资格。\nC. 请求人对请求人财产享有优先权益\n\n42. 请求人对请求人财产享有的权益，绝对优先于政府或被告王对请求人财产可能享有的任何权益。\n\n43. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 明确规定，除请求人对被没收财产享有权益外，请求人还必须以优势证据证明，请求人的权益“使得没收裁定全部或部分无效，因为在该等导致依据本条没收财产的行为发生时，该权利、所有权或权益属于请求人而非被告，或优先于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。”21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（强调为后加）。\n\n44. 在本案中，如上所述，被告王对请求人财产或 2770 账户从未享有过任何权益；事实上，记录对于被告王、诈骗方案与 2770 账户之间的关系完全未予提及。\n\n45. 显而易见的是，无论是政府还是被告王，都不能主张他们对一项从未享有过权益的财产拥有优先权益。同样地，被告王也不能没收其并无权益的财产中的权益。\nD. 请求人有权获得诉讼费用和律师费\n\n46. 请求人已被迫聘请法律顾问，并为提交本请求书以主张请求人对请求人财产的权利并对没收请求人财产提出异议而产生了费用。在本次程序胜诉后，请求人保留追索因本请求书而产生的律师费和费用的所有权利，并可依据《平等获取司法机会法》（“EAJA”），28 U.S.C. § 2412，追索请求人的费用和合理律师费。联邦法院一贯认定，出于允许成功索赔人依据 EAJA 收取律师费之目的，§ 853(n) 程序属于民事程序。参见 United States v. Cox（美国诉考克斯案），575 F.3d 352, 355（4th Cir. 2009（第四巡回法院 2009 年））；United States v. Douglas（美国诉道格拉斯案），55 F.3d 584, 588（11th Cir. 1995（第十一巡回法院 1995 年））；U.S. v. Bailey（美国诉贝利案），2015 WL 1893610 at *20（W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015（北卡罗来纳西区联邦地区法院 2015 年 4 月 27 日））。\nIV. 结论\n\n47. 基于上述理由，请求人对请求人财产享有权益，从而使得《没收裁定》就该等财产而言无效。参见例如 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告王对请求人财产不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。请求人已经证明，并能在任何必要听证会上以优势证据证明，需要对《没收裁定》进行修改以排除请求人财产。\n\n48. 因此，请求人谨请求本法院：(1) 支持本请求书；(2) 修改《没收裁定》以排除请求人财产；(3) 命令立即将请求人财产归还给并购基金投资者（M&A Fund Investors），或者命令将其归还给请求人以转交还给并购基金投资者；(4) 命令请求人有权追索因本请求书而产生的请求人的律师费和费用，并准许请求人提交关于该等律师费和费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予其他必要且公正的救济。\n\n日期：2025 年 4 月 7 日\n\n日期：2025 年 4 月 7 日 谨此提交，\n\n/签名/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\nJeffrey S. Gavenman，律师\nJeremy W. Schulman，律师\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/签名/ Paul W. Butler\nPaul W. Butler，律师\nBUTLER LEGAL STRATEGIES\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n请求人之法律顾问\n\n依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，我在此作证并声明，在接受伪证罪处罚的前提下，我对该财产的主张并非无理取闹，且就我所知所信，为支持该主张所提供的信息均属真实无误。\n\n签署于 2025 年 4 月 7 日\nHAMILTON OPPORTUNITY FUND SPC\n\n签署人：E. Mosub\n姓名：Ehsan Masud\n\n职务：首席财务官","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":5343,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-07","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:43:54"}