{"id":"court_sdny_677_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":677,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2025-04-08","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA","summary_zh":"第三方请愿书 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #677（2025 年 4 月 8 日立案）。申请人通过律师代理，根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)，主张对 Silvergate Bank 账户中资金的法律权益，认为被告 Yvette Wang 对这些资金无任何权益，因此对该账户资金的没收令对申请人的财产无效。申请人请求法院修改没收令以排除其财产并下令立即返还该财产，并请求律师费用赔偿。","summary_en":"Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Interest in Forfeited Property —— United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (a/k/a Miles Guo, Guo Wengui), SDNY Case 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #677 (filed April 8, 2025). Petitioner, represented by counsel, files under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n), asserting legal right, title, and interest in funds held in a Silvergate Bank account. Petitioner contends that defendant Yvette Wang has no legal interest in these funds and therefore the forfeiture order is invalid as to petitioner's property. Petitioner seeks amendment to the forfeiture order excluding the property, immediate return of the property, and recovery of attorney's fees.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\n## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n- v. -\n\nYVETTE WANG a/k/a \"Yanping.\" a/k/a \"Y,\"\n\nDefendant.\n\nTHIRD-PARTY PETITION TO ADJUDICATE PETITIONER'S INTEREST IN FORFEITED PROPERTY AND TO AMEND THE PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE - VERIFIED CLAIM OF\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nPetitioner (\"Petitioner\") files this Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) (the \"Petition\"). Petitioner seeks the return of funds in which Petitioner has a legal right, title, and/or interest (\"Petitioner's Property\") (as more fully defined below) and that the United States Government (the \"Government\") improperly seized as part of an order of forfeiture entered into with Defendant Yvette Wang (\"Defendant Wang\"). Specifically, Petitioner's Property was improperly seized by the Government when the Government seized all the funds in bank account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank held in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Account 2770\"). However, any order of forfeiture reaching the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, was unlawful and improper as Defendant Wang has no legal right, title, or interest in either Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. The Forfeiture Order (as more fully defined below) is therefore rendered invalid as to Petitioner's Property because right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property was vested in the Petitioner rather than Defendant Wang, and was\n\nsuperior to any right, title, or interest of Defendant Wang at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the Forfeiture Order (as defined below). As such, this Court should amend the Forfeiture Order to remove Petitioner's Property from the Forfeiture Order that the Government immediately return Petitioner's Property to Petitioner. In support of Petitioner's claim, Petitioner states as follows:\n\n#### L PRELIMINARY STATEMENT\n\nIt appears that the funds in Account 2770, including Petitioner's Property, were purely \"collateral damage\" in the Government's seizure of assets prior to its prosecution of Defendant Wang and Miles Guo (\"Defendant Guo\"). It has been over two and a half years since the seizure of Account 2770, and in that time span, there has never been any explanation as to how Account 2770 (including Petitioner's Property) is related to any of the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty, a necessary prerequisite to a valid forfeiture order under the law. There was never any showing that any proceeds of any unlawful activity to which Defendant Wang pled guilty were ever deposited in Account 2770; no showing that any proceeds of such activity were ever commingled with Petitioner's Property; and, indeed, no showing that Defendant Wang ever had anything to do with Account 2770 or even knew of its existence.\n\nAs will be shown below, Petitioner is a beneficiary of a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property and Petitioner's Property cannot be seized by the Government in this case. Neither Defendant Wang, nor the Government who now stands in her shoes, have ever demonstrated that they have any interest whatsoever in Petitioner's Property in Account 2770 or in Account 2770 in general. While Defendant Wang consented to the forfeiture of \"all her right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 (and thus, Petitioner's Property) in the Forfeiture Order (ECF No. 488 at 2-3), her consent has no legal bearing as to Account 2770 or Petitioner's Property. Defendant Wang never had such \"right, title, and interest\" in Account 2770 - there is no evidence that she was a signatory\n\non Account 2770, ever deposited money into Account 2770, or otherwise had any control over Account 2770, and there is no evidence that Defendant Wang ever directed anyone, directly or indirectly, to deposit any money into Account 2770. Defendant Wang cannot forfeit property that she does not own, and in which she has no interest. In fact, it appears that the Court never established that Petitioner's Property is even subject to forfeiture in the first instance, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\nFor all the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons demonstrated below, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\n#### II. BACKGROUND FACTS\n\n#### A. Petitioner's Property\n\n1. Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Hamilton Opportunity Fund\"), a Cayman Islands Segregated Portfolio Company, provided Petitioner with an Offering Memorandum (the \"Offering Memorandum\") dated January 20, 2022. A true and correct copy of the Offering Memorandum is attached hereto as Exhibit A.\n\n2. by the Investment Manager [as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum] with a view to long-term capital gains.\" Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 33. The Investment Manager (as that term is defined in the Offering Memorandum) had identified an opportunity to invest in a bank (the \"Digital Bank\") (as more fully described in Offering Memorandum at 33). In connection with this investment, Hamilton Opportunity Fund sought to raise capital by issuing various classes of shares. Id. at 34.\n\n3. The Offering Memorandum offered Petitioner an opportunity to acquire Class B Shares attributed to a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund - Hamilton M&A Fund SP (the \"M&A Fund\").\n\n4. Defendant Wang was not a director or member of, and otherwise lacked any corporate or equity interest in, the M&A Fund or Hamilton Opportunity Fund. The evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n5. evidentiary record is devoid of any evidence to the contrary.\n\n6. On January 23, 2022, Petitioner submitted an application (the \"Subscription Agreement\") to Hamilton Opportunity Fund for a subscription for \\$200,000.00 worth of Class B Shares in the M&A Fund. A true and correct copy of the Subscription Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit B.\n\n7. approved and accepted the Subscription Agreement. See Exhibit B, Subscription Agreement at 15.\n\n8. On January 31, 2022, pursuant to the terms of the Subscription Agreement, Petitioner wired \\$200,000.00 (the \"Petitioner Property\") to Account Number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank. A true and correct copy of the wire confirmation is attached hereto as Exhibit C.\n\n9.\n\n10. Pursuant to the terms of the Offering Memorandum, Petitioner is entitled to redemption of Petitioner's shares at the Petitioner's option. Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 17; see also id. at 53 (stating that subject to certain limitations, \"Class B Shares may be redeemed\n\nat the option of the Shareholder on any Redemption Day\").\n\n11. The assets of Hamilton Opportunity Fund are \"kept segregated, separate and separately identifiable from those of any other segregated portfolios of the Fund and any general assets of the Fund.\" Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 12. In addition, pursuant to the laws of the Cayman Islands, it is the duty of Hamilton Opportunity Fund to \"segregate, and keep segregated, portfolio assets of each segregated portfolio separately identifiable from segregated portfolio assets of any other segregated portfolio.\" Exhibit A, Offering Memorandum at 22-23 (citing the Companies Act (Revised) of Cayman Islands, Part XIV, 219(6)(b)).\n\n### B. Seizure of Account 2770\n\n12. Account 2770.\n\n13. Jo date, there are no documents available publicly as to what probable cause the Government had to seize the funds in Account 2770.\n\n# C. The Criminal Case Against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo and the Forfeiture Order\n\n14. On March 6, 2023, the Government filed an indictment against Defendant Wang and Defendant Guo, and a third defendant, William Je, who has never been arraigned. ECF No. 2.\n\n15. On May 3, 2024, the Government filed a superseding information (the \"Superseding Information\") against Defendant Wang. ECF No. 325. The Superseding Information charged Defendant Wang with one count of Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud (Count I) (Superseding Information at 1-2) and one count of Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering (Count II) (Superseding Information at 2-4). The Superseding Information also contained a Forfeiture Allegation (the \"Forfeiture Allegation\"). Superseding Information at 4.\n\n16.\n\nII as charged in the Superseding Information.\n\n17. Also on May 3, 2024, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (\"Original Forfeiture Order\"). ECF No. 329.\n\n18. In the Original Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all her right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the (Superseding) Information.\" Original Forfeiture Order at 2-6 (emphasis added).\n\n19. Defendant Guo did not plead guilty to any of the offenses charged against him. Accordingly, a jury trial was held between May 22, 2024 and July 16, 2024 (the \"Guo Trial\"). On July 16, 2024, the jury found Defendant Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit securities fraud, securities fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. ECF No. 395. As of the date of this Petition, Defendant Guo has not yet been sentenced.\n\n20. On January 6, 2025, Defendant Wang was sentenced.\n\n21. O On January 7, 2025, this Court entered a Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture as to Specific Property/Money Judgment (the \"Forfeiture Order\") ECF No. 488. As it pertains to Petitioner, the Forfeiture Order is substantially similar to the Original Forfeiture Order in all material respects. In the Forfeiture Order, Defendant Wang consented to forfeit, \"all her right, title, and interest in\" certain assets, including Account 2770, because such property \"constitute[ed] proceeds of the offenses charged in Count One that the Defendant personally obtained and/or property involved in offense charged in Count Two of the [Superseding] Information.\" Forfeiture Order at 2-11 (emphasis added).\n\n22. The assets in Account 2770 are described in both the Original Forfeiture Order and\n\nthe Forfeiture Order as follows:\n\n\\$89,992,861.75 in United States currency formerly on deposit in account number 5090042770 at Silvergate Bank, held in the name of \"Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\" and seized by the Government on or about September 18, 2022 (23-FB1-000074).\n\nOriginal Forfeiture Order at 3; Forfeiture Order at 3.\n\n#### III. ARGUMENT\n\n23. In an ancillary criminal forfeiture proceeding pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c)(1), this Court must determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether a petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property to be forfeited, and whether such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid, in whole or in part, because such interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant, or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\n\n24. Here, Petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) by virtue of a constructive trust over such property. Moreover, Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property was both vested in Petitioner and was superior to any right Defendant Wang had in Petitioner's Property because Defendant Wang had no legal right, title or, interest in either Petitioner's Property or Account 2770. In other words, Defendant Wang could not forfeit her interest in Account 2770 because she had no interest that was properly subject to criminal forfeiture. Accordingly, the Forfeiture Order should be modified to remove Petitioner's Property, and Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner.\n\n# A. The Government Failed to Demonstrate that the Funds in Account 2770. Including Petitioner's Property, Were Properly Subject to Forfeiture in the First Instance, Making the Forfeiture Order Improper as to Such Funds\n\n25. J The Government has no legal cause to retain Petitioner's Property because there is no evidence that the Government has ever demonstrated that Petitioner's Property, and Account 2770 in general, is actually forfeitable property, as required by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A).\n\n26. \" \"When the government seeks to obtain an order of forfeiture, 'Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1) ... requires the sentencing court to determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute. \"\" U.S. v. Watts, 786 F. 3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir.2007)). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2, \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.\" Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); Watts, 786 F.3d at 172. \"At various points in the proceedings, the government bears the burden of proving this legal conclusion to varying degrees of certainty: as a matter of probable cause at a post-indictment hearing. . . or by a preponderance of the evidence at a bench trial or before a jury.\" Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). \"Only if the government meets the relevant legal threshold, however, may the property in question be considered 'subject to forfeiture' in any legal sense. Prior to that, while the government has simply announced its intent to seek forfeiture through the indictment, the property is seen merely as 'potentially forfeitable' . . . or 'potentially subject to forfeiture.\" Id. (internal citations omitted).\n\n27. J This means that before the court reaches the question of whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the property under §853(n), it is necessary to determine if the property in dispute is actually forfeitable in the first instance. If not, the government had no statutory authority to seize the property. If the property was improperly seized, the government must return the\n\naccounts seized regardless of whether the petitioner can meet the criteria set forth in §853(n). See e.g. United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991).\n\n28. Jull and complete Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.(b)(1)(A) inquiry is critical to the fair administration of justice. The entire forfeiture system rests upon the supposition that a court has conducted an inquiry and determined that the property is subject to forfeiture. In enacting ancillary proceeding statutes, Congress chose to place the burden of proof on the third-party during an ancillary proceeding, since \"the United States will have already proven its forfeiture allegations in the criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt.\" S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392.\n\n29. In this matter, there has never been a determination of whether there exists a nexus between Account 2770 and any of the offenses Defendant Wang was charged with (and pled guilty to), and, as a result, Petitioner is forced to file this Petition. Based on all the information contained in the publicly-available documents in both Defendant Wang's and Defendant Guo's criminal case, the Government cannot prevail with respect to Account 2770.\n\n30. Here, in the Superseding Information, the Government included a Forfeiture Allegation as to both Count II and sought forfeiture of specific property. Superseding Information at 4. There is no evidence in the record that the Government even attempted to show, let alone that it met its burden to show, a nexus between Account 2770, and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n31. As to Count I, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the wire fraud offense alleged in Count One of this Superseding Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United\n\nStates Code, Section[] 981(a)(1)(C) . . . and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any and all property, real and personal, that constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. The Government must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1). Moreover, \"if the Government's theory of forfeiture is that the property was used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense, or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense, the Government shall establish that there was a substantial connection between the property and the offense.\" 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3).\n\n32. The record is devoid of any allegations pertaining to how funds in Account 2770 are, or are derived from, proceeds traceable to Defendant Wang's conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The Superseding Information alleges that \"[f]rom at least in or about 2018 until at least on or about March 15, 2023, coconspirators made false representations to investors that they would receive stock in exchange for their investments in GTV, the Himalaya Farm Alliance organization, and GClubs, and that they would receive cryptocurrency in exchange for their investments in the Himalaya Exchange [(the \"Fraud Scheme\")]. Through the [Fraud Scheme], YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping,\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, and her coconspirators, including Miles Guo, induced investors to invest more than \\$1 billion into entities Guo controlled.\" Superseding Information at 2. There are no allegations in the Superseding Information regarding Defendant Wang depositing any proceeds from the Fraud Scheme into Account 2770. Similarly, there are no allegations in the Superseding Information that as a result of the Fraud Scheme, any investors deposited money into\n\n<sup>1 18</sup> U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) provides that \"[a]ny property, real or personal, [is subject to forfeiture] which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation of\" various specified offenses, including violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, wire fraud, as charged against Defendant Wang in Count L\n\nAccount 2770. Nor can there be any such allegations, as the only deposits into Account 2770 were from investors who were investing in the Digital Bank - an investment that is not implicated in any way by the \"Fraud Scheme\" described in the Superseding Information. To be sure, Petitioner affirms that Petitioner was never a victim of any conduct by Defendant Wang alleged in the Superseding Information and does not believe that any of Petitioner's Property was ever used in any unlawful activity.\n\n33. Finally, there was no relevant testimony during Defendant Guo's trial concerning Account 2770. There was no testimony regarding whether any of the proceeds of the Fraud Scheme were ever deposited into Account 2770, nor, for that matter, whether Defendant Wang ever deposited any money into Account 2770. Simply put, there is nothing in the record that would indicate there is a nexus between Account 2770 and Defendant Wang's wire fraud charge, let alone sufficient evidence to determine that the Government met its burden of showing, and the Court properly adjudicated, that the appropriate nexus exists for forfeiture of Account 2770 to be proper.\n\n34. Jo As to Count II, the Forfeiture Allegation states that, \"[a]s a result of committing the money laundering offense alleged in Count Two of this Information, YVETTE WANG, a/k/a \"Yanping\" a/k/a \"Y,\" the defendant, shall forfeit to the United States pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1)2, any and all property, real and personal, involved in said offense, or any property traceable to such property, including but not limited to a sum of money in United States currency representing the amount of property involved in said offense.\" Superseding Information at 4. As to Count II, The Government \"must prove the elements of forfeiture under 18\n\n<sup>2 18</sup> U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides that \"[t]he court, imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956 [the money-laundering statute] of this title . . . shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property.\" 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (emphasis added).\n\nU.S.C. § 982(a)(1) by a preponderance of the evidence.\" U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015).\n\n35. J The Superseding Information alleges that Defendant Wang committed conspiracy to launder money because Defendant Wang \"knowing that the property involved in certain financial transactions represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, would and did conduct and attempt to conduct such financial transactions. . . and which in fact involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, to wit, proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One of this Information.\" Superseding Information at 3.\n\n36. It is unclear how Account 2770 could be forfeited for the money laundering charge in Count II. From the allegations, the charge of money laundering arises from Defendant Wang engaging in financial transactions with the \"proceeds of the wire fraud scheme alleged in Count One.\" Superseding Information at 3. As argued above, there is no evidence that funds in Account 2770 had any relation to the Fraud Scheme alleged in Count I (see ¶ 31-33, above) - there is no evidence that such funds \"constitute|d| or [were] derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of\" wire fraud. See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). Since funds in Account 2770 were not Fraud Scheme proceeds nor were they derived from Fraud Scheme proceeds, such funds could not serve as the basis for the money laundering charge in Count II and cannot be forfeited as part of Defendant Wang's conviction for Count II.\n\n37. I The overt acts that the Government alleges to support the money laundering charge further fail to show how the funds in Account 2770 can be forfeitable. In the Superseding Information, the Government sets forth two acts evidencing money laundering. Superseding Information at 3. Although the Government states that these two overt acts were \"among others\" that Defendant Wang committed in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to launder money\n\n(Superseding Information at 3), these other acts were never identified.\n\n38. First, per the Superseding Information, on May 20, 2020, Defendant Wang opened a bank account in the name of GTV, which, notably, Account 2770 was not. Superseding Information at 3. On June 2, 2020, Defendant Wang transferred approximately \\$200 million to that account. Id. The funds transferred into the GTV account were from a JP Morgan Chase Bank account held by Saraca Media Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\") (Guo Trial, 05/31/2024, 953:25-954:4; Guo Trial, 06/26/2024, 4359:1-14), not from Account 2770. There was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into the Saraca JP Morgan Chase Bank account to then be transferred to the GTV account cited in the Superseding Information. Moreover, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n39. The second act the Government alleges is that \"on or about June 5, 2020,\" Defendant Wang \"authorized a wire transfer of \\$100 million from GTV's parent company, Saraca, to a high-risk hedge fund, for the benefit of Saraca and its ultimate beneficial owner, Defendant Guo's son.\" Superseding Information at 3-4. First, this plainly alleges that the money was transferred from a Saraca account, which Account 2770 was demonstrably not. Also, again, there was never any testimony that any money from Account 2770 ever went into a Saraca account. Moreover, once again, Account 2770 did not even exist in 2020.\n\n40. Jo As seen from the above argument, there are no allegations or testimony regarding Account 2770 whatsoever. The only reference in the record to Account 2770 is Defendant Wang's consent to forfeit it. However, \"a defendant's consent to forfeiture [does not] abrogate the requirement that a nexus exist between the property sought for forfeiture and the conviction of offense.\" Beltramea, 785 F.3d at 291. As the Eighth Circuit stressed, \"[t]he district court had an independent duty to ensure that the required nexus exists.\" Id. (emphasis added).\n\n41. Here, there are no factual allegations in the Superseding Information, in the Original Forfeiture Order or the Forfeiture Order as to even an alleged nexus between Account 2770 and the offenses to which Defendant Wang pled guilty.\n\n42. J The Government's continued retention of the funds in Account 2770, without showing that there is a nexus, is wrong and inequitable. Should the Government retain the funds in Account 2770, it will be unjustly enriched, since the funds belong to third parties, including Petitioner, who are (1) not Defendant Wang or Defendant Guo; and (2) not involved the Fraud Scheme, let alone victims of such a scheme. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998) (explaining that a criminal \"forfeiture serves no remedial purpose, is designed to punish the offender, and cannot be imposed upon innocent owners.\") (emphasis added).\n\n# B. Petitioner Has Interest in Petitioner's Property Because There Exists a Constructive Trust Over Such Property\n\n43. Even putting aside the Government's failure to properly demonstrate that the funds in Account 2770 were part of any activity alleged in the Superseding Information, Petitioner's Property should be returned to Petitioner because Petitioner has a greater interest in it than does Defendant Wang, or, now, the Government.\n\n44. Under the doctrine of constructive trusts, Petitioner's Property is protected and remains the property of Petitioner regardless of any other ownership claims, including Defendant\n\nWang's or the Government, standing in her shoes. The Second Circuit3 has held that \"a constructive trust qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011).\n\n45. purpose.\" Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). \"Its purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment, although unjust enrichment does not necessarily implicate the performance of a wrongful act. . What is necessary is that the court identify a party who is holding property under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience he ought not to retain it.\" Id. (internal citations omitted).\n\n46. \" \"Whether a party is unjustly enriched is a legal conclusion reached through the application of principles of equity. . . A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief. . . Unjust enrichment results when a person retains a benefit which, under the circumstances of the transfer and considering the relationship of the parties, it would be inequitable to retain.\" Id. (internal\n\n<sup>3 &</sup>quot;The federal common law choice-of-law rule is to apply the jurisdiction having the greatest interest in the litigation.\" In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992). Here, there are three competing jurisdictions whose laws could apply: New York, California, and Cayman Islands. Petitioner's payment of Petitioner's Property was pursuant to the Subscription Agreement, which is governed by Cayman Islands law. See Exhibit B, Subscription Agreement at 8, ¶2(s). Account 2770 was an account in a California bank when Petitioner deposited Petitioner's Property. Since Account 2770 was seized (pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a court in New York state), the funds are now in possession of the Government in New York. New York is the forum state of this case. From these facts, New York has the greatest interest in this litigation, and its laws should apply to an imposition of a constructive trust. However, to the extent that the Government challenges this choice-of-law determination, Petitioner reserves all rights to request that this Court impose a constructive trust over Petitioner's Property under California and/or Cayman Islands law.\n\ncitations omitted).\n\n47. The New York Court of Appeals outlined several factors to be considered in determining whether a constructive trust should be imposed in certain circumstances, including \"(1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment.\" Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976). However, New York courts have long held that \"these factors are merely useful guides and are not talismanic.\" Counihan, 194 F.3d at 362 (citing to a plethora of New York state cases that have stated this proposition).\n\n48. Here, there is a constructive trust for the benefit of Petitioner over Petitioner's Property as of the date that it was deposited into Account 2770.\n\n49. J Petitioner entered into a confidential and/or fiduciary relationship4 with Hamilton Opportunity Fund when Petitioner executed the Subscription Agreement in order to acquire certain Class B shares in Hamilton M&A Fund SP. Per the Subscription Agreement, Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC made a promise to Petitioner that Petitioner's Property would be invested in the Digital Bank. In reliance on this promise, the Petitioner wired Petitioner's Property to Account 2770 as instructed in the Subscription Agreement. The Government's improper seizure of Account 2770 forced a breach of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC's promise to invest Petitioner's Property into the Digital Bank. Because of Government's seizure, Petitioner is not even able to exercise his Right of Redemption to obtain back Petitioner's Property. This would\n\n<sup>4</sup> Even if the Court determines that the relationship was not confidential and/or there was no fiduciary relationship between Hamilton Opportunity Fund and Petitioner, such would not be determinative, as the absence of a fiduciary relationship does not preclude the Court from finding a constructive trust exists. See Koreag, 961 F.2d at 353 (stating that \"[w]e do not believe, however, that the lack of a fiduciary relationship between [the parties] automatically defeats [a] claim of constructive trust. Although a fiduciary relationship is one of the factors cited by New York courts, the absence of any one factor will not itself defeat the imposition of a constructive trust when otherwise required by equity\").\n\nresult in unjust enrichment to the Government since the Government is now retaining Petitioner's Property without any legal cause to do so. See, e.g., U.S. v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995) (finding that imposition of a constructive trust was proper where, amongst other reasons, Government's forfeiture caused a breach of an implied promise); Torres v. \\$36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a constructive trust appropriate where \"The government's forfeiture forced a breach of that may result in a potentially unjust enrichment of the government (and commensurate unjust impoverishment of [the plaintif]).\")).\")).\")).\")).\")).\")).\")).\"\n\n50. Petitioner's Property. Such a constructive trust \"qualifies as a 'legal right, title, or interest in the property' that 'may be a superior interest' to a defendant's interest for the purposes of a forfeiture statute analogous to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A).\" Willis, 652 F.3d at 242.\n\n51. easily traceable. See Exhibit C.\n\n52. if the Government contends that others are owed restitution from any forfeited property. \"When a party can directly trace its assets, without resorting to fictions or presumptions, a constructive trust is available even in cases involving multiple fraud victims.\" U.S. v. Ovid, 2012 WL 2087084, \\*7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012). \"[C]ourts are not free to disregard the law of constructive trusts when a claimant can directly trace its property, even if this leaves one innocent victim better off than another equally innocent victim.\" Id. The \"orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases\" is to \"return[] identifiable assets to their owners, turning to pro rata distribution only when specific identification or transactional tracing is impossible.\" Id. at \\*8 (citing Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, § 59 Reporter's Note G, at 437).\n\n### C. Petitioner Has a Superior Interest in the Petitioner's Property\n\n53. Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property is absolutely superior to any interest that the Government or Defendant Wang may have in Petitioner's Property.\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) is clear that, in addition to Petitioner's interest in the forfeited property, that Petitioner must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's interest \"renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which give rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section.\" 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) (emphasis added).\n\n55. Here, as set forth above, Defendant Wang never had any interest in Petitioner's Property or Account 2770; indeed, the record is entirely silent as to what the relationship is between Defendant Wang, the Fraud Scheme, and Account 2770.\n\n56. have a superior interest in a property in which they never had an interest. Likewise, Defendant Wang cannot forfeit her interest in a property in which she had no interest.\n\n## D. Petitioner is Entitled to Costs and Attorneys' Fees\n\n57. The Petitioner has been required to retain legal counsel and has incurred costs to file this petition asserting Petitioner's right to Petitioner's Property and to challenge the forfeiture of Petitioner's Property. Upon prevailing in this proceeding, Petitioner reserves all rights to recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and may recover Petitioner's costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (\"EAJA\"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Federal courts have consistently held that § 853(n) proceedings are civil for the purposes of allowing a successful claimant to collect attorney's fees under the EAJA. See United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th\n\nCir. 1995); U.S. v. Bailey, 2015 WL 1893610 at \\*20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015).\n\n#### CONCLUSION IV.\n\n58. For the reasons stated above, Petitioner has an interest in Petitioner's Property, which renders the Forfeiture Order invalid as to such property. See e.g. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Defendant Wang does not have any right, title, or interest in Petitioner's Property, and never did. Petitioner has proven, and can prove at any necessary hearing, by preponderance of evidence that the Forfeiture Order needs to be amended to exclude Petitioner's Property.\n\n59. Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: (1) grant this Petition; (2) amend the Forfeiture Order to exclude Petitioner's Property; (3) order the immediate return of Petitioner's Property to Petitioner; (4) order that Petitioner is entitled to recover Petitioner's attorneys' fees and costs incurred in connection with this Petition and grant Petitioner leave to submit an application for such attorneys' fees and costs; and (5) grant such and other relief that is necessary and just.\n\nDated: April 2, 2025\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman Jeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq. Jeremy W. Schulman, Esq. SCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC 6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425 North Bethesda, MD 20852 (240) 356-8550 jgavenman@schulmanbh.com jschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler Paul W. Butler, Esq. Butler legal strategies 1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531 Washington, D.C. 20036 paul@butlerlegalstrategies.com Counsel for Petitioner\n\n# ATTESTATION AND OATH\n\nPursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3), I, \\_ttest and declare under penalty of perjury that my claim to this property is not frivolous and that the information provided in support of this claim is true and correct, to the best of my knowledge and belief.\n\nExecuted on this \\_ ol \\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_\n\nSignatu***\\_***\\_","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n\n- v. -（诉）\n\nYVETTE WANG（王雁平），又名“Yanping”，又名“Y”，\n\n被告。\n\n第三方请求裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益并修改初步没收令之请愿书——核实权利主张书\n\nS4 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n请愿人（“请愿人”）依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c) 条提起本《第三方请求裁定请愿人对被没收财产之权益并修改初步没收令之请愿书》（“本请愿书”）。请愿人请求返还请愿人拥有合法权利、所有权和/或权益的资金（“请愿人财产”）（定义详见下文），且该资金系由美国政府（“政府”）作为与被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平被告）达成的没收裁定之一部分而不当扣押的。具体而言，当政府扣押了以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名义在 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）开立的账号为 5090042770 的银行账户中的全部资金（“2770 账户”）时，请愿人财产即被政府不当扣押。然而，任何涉及 2770 账户中资金（包括请愿人财产）的没收裁定均属非法和不当，因为王雁平被告对 2770 账户或请愿人财产均不享有任何合法权利、所有权或权益。因此，没收令（定义详见下文）就请愿人财产而言归于无效，因为对请愿人财产的权利、所有权或权益归属于请愿人而非王雁平被告，且在产生没收令（定义见下文）的行为发生之时，该权益即优于王雁平被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。据此，本法院应修改没收令，将请愿人财产从没收令中剔除，并责令政府立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人。为支持请愿人的主张，请愿人陈述如下：\n\nI. 引言\n\n2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）似乎纯粹是政府在起诉王雁平被告及 Miles Guo（郭文贵被告）之前扣押资产过程中的“附带损害”。自 2770 账户被扣押以来已过去两年半有余，在此期间，从未有任何解释说明 2770 账户（包括请愿人财产）与王雁平被告认罪的任何罪行有何关联，而这是依法作出有效没收裁定的必要前提。从未有任何证据表明王雁平被告认罪的任何非法活动的任何收益曾存入 2770 账户；没有证据表明此类活动的任何收益曾与请愿人财产发生混同；而且，事实上，也没有证据表明王雁平被告曾与 2770 账户有任何牵连，甚至没有证据表明她知晓该账户的存在。\n\n如下文所示，请愿人是对请愿人财产享有推定信托的受益人，在本案中政府不得扣押请愿人财产。无论是王雁平被告，还是如今代位主张权利的政府，均未曾证明其对 2770 账户中的请愿人财产或对 2770 账户本身享有任何权益。虽然王雁平被告在没收令（ECF No. 488 第 2-3 页）中同意没收其在 2770 账户（并进而包括请愿人财产）中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，但她的同意对 2770 账户或请愿人财产没有任何法律效力。王雁平被告从未在 2770 账户中拥有此类“权利、所有权和权益”——没有证据表明她是 2770 账户的签字人、曾向 2770 账户存入资金，或对 2770 账户具有任何控制权，也没有证据表明王雁平被告曾直接或间接指示任何人向 2770 账户存入任何资金。王雁平被告不能没收她并不拥有且不享有任何权益的财产。事实上，法院似乎从未按照《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1)(A) 条的要求，在一开始就认定请愿人财产是否属于应予没收的财产。\n\n基于上述所有理由以及下文阐明的理由，请愿人谨请求本法院：(1) 批准本请愿书；(2) 修改没收令以排除请愿人财产；(3) 责令立即将请愿人财产返还给请愿人；(4) 裁定请愿人有权追索因本请愿书而发生的律师费和诉讼费用，并准许请愿人提交此类律师费和诉讼费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予其他必要且公正的救济。\n\nII. 背景事实\n\nA. 请愿人财产\n\n1. 开曼群岛独立投资组合公司 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“汉密尔顿机会基金”）向请愿人提供了一份日期为 2022 年 1 月 20 日的发售备忘录（“发售备忘录”）。发售备忘录的真实且准确的副本作为附件 A 附于本请愿书之后。\n\n2. “……由投资管理人［按发售备忘录中的定义］基于长期资本收益进行管理。”附件 A，发售备忘录第 33 页。投资管理人（按发售备忘录中的定义）已发现一项投资于一家银行（“数字银行”）的机会（详见发售备忘录第 33 页）。就该项投资而言，汉密尔顿机会基金试图通过发行各类股份来筹集资金。同上，第 34 页。\n\n3. 发售备忘录向请愿人提供了认购汉密尔顿机会基金的一个独立投资组合——Hamilton M&A Fund SP（“并购基金”）的 B 类股份的机会。\n\n4. 王雁平被告并非并购基金或汉密尔顿机会基金的董事或成员，并且对并购基金或汉密尔顿机会基金不享有任何公司或股权权益。证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n5. 证据记录中没有任何相反的证据。\n\n6. 2022 年 1 月 23 日，请愿人向汉密尔顿机会基金提交了一份申请（“认购协议”），以认购价值 $200,000.00 的并购基金 B 类股份。认购协议的真实且准确的副本作为附件 B 附于本请愿书之后。\n\n7. 批准并接受了认购协议。参见附件 B，认购协议第 15 页。\n\n8. 2022 年 1 月 31 日，依据认购协议的条款，请愿人向 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号为 5090042770 的账户电汇了 $200,000.00（“请愿人财产”）。电汇确认书的真实且准确的副本作为附件 C 附于本请愿书之后。\n\n9.\n\n10. 依据发售备忘录的条款，请愿人有权自主选择赎回请愿人的股份。附件 A，发售备忘录第 17 页；另见同上，第 53 页（说明在符合特定限制的情况下，“B 类股份可在任何赎回日由股东自主选择赎回”）。\n\n11. 汉密尔顿机会基金的资产“与该基金任何其他独立投资组合的资产以及该基金的任何普通资产保持隔离、分开并可分别识别”。附件 A，发售备忘录第 12 页。此外，依据开曼群岛法律，汉密尔顿机会基金有责任“将每个独立投资组合的投资组合资产予以隔离并保持隔离，使其可与任何其他独立投资组合的独立投资组合资产分别识别”。附件 A，发售备忘录第 22-23 页（引用《开曼群岛公司法（修订版）》第 XIV 部分第 219(6)(b) 条）。\n\nB. 2770 账户的扣押\n\n12. 2770 账户。\n\n13. 迄今为止，公开渠道尚无任何文件显示政府因何合理根据扣押了 2770 账户中的资金。\n\nC. 针对王雁平被告及郭文贵被告的刑事案件以及没收令\n\n14. 2023 年 3 月 6 日，政府对王雁平被告、郭文贵被告以及第三名从未被提审的被告 William Je（余建明）提起了起诉书。ECF No. 2。\n\n15. 2024 年 5 月 3 日，政府对王雁平被告提起了替代起诉书（“替代起诉书”）。ECF No. 325。替代起诉书指控王雁平被告犯有一项共谋电汇欺诈罪（第一项罪名）（替代起诉书第 1-2 页）及一项共谋洗钱罪（第二项罪名）（替代起诉书第 2-4 页）。替代起诉书中还包含一项没收指控（“没收指控”）。替代起诉书第 4 页。\n\n16.\n\n替代起诉书中所指控的第二项罪名。\n\n17. 同样在 2024 年 5 月 3 日，本法院作出了一份《针对特定财产的合意初步没收令/金钱判决》（“原没收令”）。ECF No. 329。\n\n18. 在原没收令中，王雁平被告同意没收其在某些资产（包括 2770 账户）中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，因为该等财产“构成被告个人取得的第一项罪名中所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及［替代］起诉书第二项罪名中所指控罪行的财产”。原没收令第 2-6 页（后加强调）。\n\n19. 郭文贵被告未对其被指控的任何罪行作认罪答辩。据此，于 2024 年 5 月 22 日至 2024 年 7 月 16 日期间进行了陪审团审理（“郭案审理”）。2024 年 7 月 16 日，陪审团裁定郭文贵被告犯有诈骗敲诈勒索共谋罪、共谋电汇欺诈罪、共谋洗钱罪、共谋证券欺诈罪、证券欺诈罪、电汇欺诈罪及洗钱罪。ECF No. 395。截至本请愿书递交之日，郭文贵被告尚未被判刑。\n\n20. 2025 年 1 月 6 日，王雁平被告被判刑。\n\n21. 2025 年 1 月 7 日，本法院作出了一份《针对特定财产的合意初步没收令/金钱判决》（“没收令”），ECF No. 488。就涉及请愿人的部分而言，该没收令在所有实质方面与原没收令基本一致。在没收令中，王雁平被告同意没收其在某些资产（包括 2770 账户）中的“所有权利、所有权和权益”，因为该等财产“构成被告个人取得的第一项罪名中所指控罪行的收益，和/或涉及［替代］起诉书第二项罪名中所指控罪行的财产”。没收令第 2-11 页（后加强调）。\n\n22. 2770 账户中的资产在原没收令及没收令中均被描述如下：\n\n此前存放于 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号为 5090042770、以“Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC”名义开立的账户中，并由政府于 2022 年 9 月 18 日前后扣押的 $89,992,861.75 美元货币 (23-FB1-000074)。\n\n原没收令第 3 页；没收令第 3 页。\n\nIII. 论证\n\n23. 在依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c)(1) 条进行的附带刑事没收程序中，本法院必须以优势证据标准判定请愿人对拟没收财产是否享有合法权利、所有权或权益，以及该等权利、所有权或权益是否导致没收裁定全部或部分无效，因为该等权益归属于请愿人而非被告，或者在导致财产没收的行为发生之时优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。\n\n24. 在本案中，根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)，基于对请愿人财产设立的推定信托，请愿人对请愿人财产拥有合法权利、所有权或权益。此外，请愿人对请愿人财产的权益既已归属于请愿人，亦优于被告 Wang（王雁平）对请愿人财产可能拥有的任何权利，因为被告王对请愿人财产或 2770 账户均无任何合法权利、所有权或权益。换言之，被告王不可能没收其在 2770 账户中的权益，因为她没有任何属于正当刑事没收对象的权益。因此，应修改没收令以剔除请愿人财产，并将请愿人财产归还给请愿人。\n\nA. 政府未能证明 2770 账户中的资金（包括请愿人财产）自始即属于正当没收的对象，致使针对该等资金的没收令不当\n\n25. 政府没有扣留请愿人财产的合法事由，因为没有任何证据表明政府曾按照 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1)(A) 条）的要求，证明请愿人财产以及 2770 账户总体上确实属于可没收财产。\n\n26. “当政府寻求获得没收令时，‘《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1) 条……要求量刑法院根据适用法律确定何种财产属于可没收财产。’”U.S. v. Watts, 786 F. 3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2015)（援引 U.S. v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2007)）。根据 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2，“如果政府寻求没收特定财产，法院必须确定政府是否已确立财产与犯罪之间必要的关联性。”Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（强调为原文所加）；Watts, 786 F.3d at 172。“在诉讼程序的各个阶段，政府承担着以不同确信程度证明这一法律结论的举证责任：在起诉后听证会上达到合理根据的标准……或者在无陪审团审判或陪审团审判中达到优势证据的标准。”同上（强调为原文所加）（省略内部引用）。“然而，唯有当政府达到相关的法定门槛时，涉案财产才能在任何法律意义上被视为‘应予没收’。在此之前，虽然政府仅通过起诉书宣布了寻求没收的意图，该财产仅被视为‘潜在可没收’……或‘潜在应予没收’。”同上（省略内部引用）。\n\n27. 这意味着，在法院触及请愿人是否有权根据 § 853(n) 获准返还财产这一问题之前，有必要首先确定争议财产是否自始即确实属于可没收财产。若非如此，政府便没有扣押该财产的法定职权。如果财产被不当扣押，无论请愿人是否能够符合 § 853(n) 规定的标准，政府都必须返还被扣押的账户。参见如 United States v. Delco Wire & Cable Co., 772 F. Supp. 1511, 1518 (E.D.PA, 1991)（美国宾夕法尼亚东区联邦地区法院，1991年）。\n\n28. 完整且全面的 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) 审查对于司法公正至关重要。整个没收制度均建立在法院已进行审查并判定该财产应予没收的假设之上。在制定附随程序成文法时，国会选择在附随程序中将举证责任置于第三方，因为“美国在刑事案件中已排除合理怀疑地证明了其没收指控。”S. REP. 98-225, 209, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3392。\n\n29. 在本案中，从未判定过 2770 账户与被告王被指控（并已认罪）的任何罪行之间是否存在关联性，因此，请愿人被迫提交本请愿书。根据被告王和被告 Guo（郭文贵）刑事案件中所有公开文件所包含的全部信息，政府在 2770 账户问题上均不可能胜诉。\n\n30. 在本案中，在替代起诉书中，政府将没收指控列入了罪名项二，并寻求没收特定财产。替代起诉书第 4 页。记录中没有任何证据表明政府曾试图证明、更谈不上已完成其举证责任证明 2770 账户与被告王认罪的罪行之间存在关联。\n\n31. 关于罪名项一，没收指控称：“作为实施本替代起诉书罪名项一所指控的电汇诈骗罪的结果，被告 YVETTE WANG，又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，应根据 Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C)（《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条）……及 Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c)（《美国法典》第 28 编第 2461(c) 条），向美国没收构成或源自可追溯至实施上述罪行之收益的任何及所有不动产与动产。”替代起诉书第 4 页。政府必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 下的没收要件。18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1)。此外，“如果政府的没收理论是该财产被用于实施或便利实施刑事犯罪，或参与了刑事犯罪的实施，政府应证明该财产与犯罪之间存在实质性联系。”18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)。\n\n32. 记录中没有任何关于 2770 账户中的资金如何构成或源自可追溯至被告王共谋实施电汇诈骗之收益的指控。替代起诉书指控：“至少在约 2018 年至至少在约 2023 年 3 月 15 日期间，同谋向投资者作出虚假陈述，称其投资 GTV、喜马拉雅农场联盟组织和 GClubs 将获得股票，投资喜马拉雅交易所将获得加密货币[（下称‘诈骗计划’）]。通过该[诈骗计划]，被告 YVETTE WANG，又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，及其包括 Miles Guo 在内的同谋，诱使投资者向郭控制的实体投资超过 10 亿美元。”替代起诉书第 2 页。替代起诉书中没有任何关于被告王将诈骗计划的任何收益存入 2770 账户的指控。同样，替代起诉书中也没有任何指控称，由于该诈骗计划，有任何投资者将资金存入 2770 账户。1 也根本不可能存在任何此类指控，因为存入 2770 账户的唯一资金来自投资数字银行的投资者——而这项投资与替代起诉书中所述的“诈骗计划”没有任何牵连。诚然，请愿人确认，请愿人从未是被告王在替代起诉书中所指控的任何行为的受害者，且不认为请愿人的任何财产曾被用于任何非法活动。\n\n1 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 规定，“构成或源自可追溯至违反”各项特定罪行之收益的“任何不动产或动产[均属于没收对象]”，包括违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 电汇诈骗罪，正如在罪名项一中对被告王所指控的那样。\n\n33. 最后，在被告郭的庭审期间，没有任何关于 2770 账户的相关证言。没有任何证言提及诈骗计划的任何收益是否曾被存入 2770 账户，更不用说被告王是否曾将任何款项存入 2770 账户。简而言之，记录中没有任何内容表明 2770 账户与被告王的电汇诈骗指控之间存在关联，更没有充分的证据来判定政府已完成了其举证责任以证明、且法院已正当裁判存在适当的关联性以使没收 2770 账户具备正当性。\n\n34. 关于罪名项二，没收指控称：“作为实施本起诉书罪名项二所指控的洗钱罪的结果，被告 YVETTE WANG，又名‘Yanping’，又名‘Y’，应根据 Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(1)（《美国法典》第 18 编第 982(a)(1) 条）2，向美国没收涉及上述罪行的任何及所有不动产与动产，或可追溯至此类财产的任何财产，包括但不限于代表涉及上述罪行之财产数额的以美元计价的款项。”替代起诉书第 4 页。关于罪名项二，政府“必须以优势证据证明 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 下的没收要件。”U.S. v. Beltramea, 785 F.3d 287, 290 (8th Cir. 2015)。\n\n2 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 规定，“对被判犯有违反本编第 1956 条[洗钱成文法]之罪行的人判处刑罚的法院……应命令该人向美国没收涉及该罪行的任何不动产或动产，或可追溯至该财产的任何财产。”18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)（强调为原文所加）。\n\n35. 替代起诉书指控被告王犯有共谋洗钱罪，因为被告王“明知涉及某些金融交易的财产代表某种形式非法活动的收益，将实施并确实实施及试图实施此类金融交易……而这些交易实际上涉及特定非法活动的收益，即本起诉书罪名项一中所指控的电汇诈骗计划的收益。”替代起诉书第 3 页。\n\n36. 目前尚不清楚 2770 账户如何能够因罪名项二中的洗钱指控而被没收。从指控来看，洗钱罪名源于被告王使用“罪名项一中所指控的电汇诈骗计划的收益”进行金融交易。替代起诉书第 3 页。如上所述，没有任何证据表明 2770 账户中的资金与罪名项一中指控的诈骗计划有任何关系（参见上文第 31-33 段）——没有任何证据表明此类资金“构成或源自可追溯至实施”电汇诈骗的收益。参见如 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)。由于 2770 账户中的资金既非诈骗计划的收益，亦非源自诈骗计划的收益，该等资金不能作为罪名项二中洗钱指控的基础，也不能作为被告王在罪名项二定罪的一部分予以没收。\n\n37. 政府指控用以支持洗钱罪名的公开行为进一步未能表明 2770 账户中的资金如何能够被没收。在替代起诉书中，政府列出了证明洗钱的两项行为。替代起诉书第 3 页。尽管政府声称这两项公开行为是被告王为推进涉嫌共谋洗钱而实施的“包括其他行为在内”的行为（替代起诉书第 3 页），但这些其他行为从未被明确指明。\n\n38. 首先，根据《替代起诉书》（Superseding Information），2020年5月20日，被告Wang（王）以GTV的名义开立了一个银行账户，值得注意的是，2770号账户并非该账户。Superseding Information第3页。2020年6月2日，被告王向该账户转账约2亿美元。Id.。转入GTV账户的资金来自Saraca Media Group, Inc.（“Saraca”）（萨拉卡媒体集团股份有限公司）持有的JP Morgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）账户（Guo Trial，05/31/2024，953:25-954:4；Guo Trial，06/26/2024，4359:1-14），而非来自2770号账户。没有任何证词表明曾有任何资金从2770号账户流入Saraca的摩根大通银行账户，进而再转入《替代起诉书》中提及的GTV账户。此外，2770号账户在2020年甚至根本不存在。\n\n39. 政府指控的第二项行为是，“在2020年6月5日或前后”，被告王“批准从GTV的母公司Saraca向一家高风险对冲基金电汇1亿美元，以谋取Saraca及其最终受益所有人（即被告Guo［郭］之子）的利益”。Superseding Information第3-4页。首先，这明确指控资金是从Saraca的账户转出的，而显而易见2770号账户并非该账户。同样，再次强调，没有任何证词表明曾有任何资金从2770号账户流入Saraca的账户。此外，再次说明，2770号账户在2020年甚至根本不存在。\n\n40. 从上述论证可以看出，根本没有任何关于2770号账户的指控或证词。记录中对2770号账户的唯一提及是被告王同意将其没收。然而，“被告对没收的同意［并未］废除寻求没收的财产与被定罪罪行之间必须存在关联性的要求”。Beltramea, 785 F.3d at 291。正如第八巡回上诉法院（Eighth Circuit）所强调的那样，“［地区法院负有独立职责以确保所要求的关联性存在］”。Id.（强调为原文所加）。\n\n41. 在本案中，《替代起诉书》、原《没收令》（Original Forfeiture Order）或《没收令》（Forfeiture Order）中均未包含任何事实指控，用以证明2770号账户与被告王认罪答辩的罪行之间甚至存在哪怕是所谓的关联。\n\n42. 政府在未能证明存在关联性的情况下继续扣留2770号账户中的资金，是不当且不公平的。如果政府保留2770号账户中的资金，将构成不当得利，因为这些资金属于包括申请人（Petitioner）在内的第三方，而这些第三方（1）既非被告王也非被告郭；且（2）并未参与该欺诈计划（Fraud Scheme），更不是该计划的受害者。参见，例如，U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 332 (1998)（阐明刑事“没收不具有救济目的，旨在惩罚犯罪者，且不能强加于无辜所有权人身上。”）（强调为原文所加）。\n\nB. 申请人对申请人财产享有权益，因为该等财产上存在拟制信托\n\n43. 即使抛开政府未能妥善证明2770号账户中的资金属于《替代起诉书》所指控之任何活动的一部分不谈，申请人的财产（Petitioner's Property）也应归还给申请人，因为申请人对该财产享有的权益高于被告王，或高于如今承继其地位的政府。\n\n44. 根据拟制信托原则，无论存在何种其他所有权主张，包括被告王或处于其地位的政府的主张，申请人的财产均受保护且仍属申请人的财产。第二巡回上诉法院（Second Circuit）3裁定，“就类似于21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)的没收法规而言，拟制信托构成了‘对该财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益”。Willis Mgmt. (Vermont), Ltd. v. United States, 652 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2011)。\n\n45. 目的。”Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999)（强调为原文所加）。“其目的在于防止不当得利，尽管不当得利并不必然涉及实施不法行为。……法院所需要做的是确定持有财产的一方，其持有财产的情形在衡平法和良知上使其不应予以保留。”Id.（引文省略）。\n\n46. “一方是否构成不当得利是通过适用衡平法原则得出的法律结论。……衡平法院在判定设立拟制信托时不受固定僵化公式的束缚。交易的衡平性必须决定救济的尺度。……当一人保留了一项利益，而根据转让时的具体情况并考虑到各方之间的关系，保留该利益显失公平时，即构成不当得利。”Id.（内部\n\n3 “联邦普通法的法律适用规则是适用对诉讼具有最大利益之管辖区的法律。”In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1992), aff'd in part sub nom. Refco F/X Assocs., Inc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., No. 89 CIV. 3071 (WK), 1992 WL 200748 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1992)。在本案中，有三个竞争管辖区的法律可以适用：New York（纽约州）、California（加利福尼亚州）和Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）。申请人支付申请人财产是依据《认购协议》（Subscription Agreement）进行的，该协议受开曼群岛法律管辖。见证据项 B（Exhibit B），Subscription Agreement第8页第2(s)段。当申请人存入申请人财产时，2770号账户是加利福尼亚州一家银行的账户。自2770号账户被扣押（根据纽约州法院签发的搜查与扣押令）以来，该等资金目前由政府在纽约占有。纽约是本案的法院所在地。从这些事实来看，纽约对本诉讼具有最大利益，其法律应适用于拟制信托的设立。但是，在政府对该法律适用决定提出异议的范围内，申请人保留请求本法院根据加利福尼亚州和/或开曼群岛法律对申请人财产设立拟制信托的所有权利。\n\n引文省略）。\n\n47. New York Court of Appeals（纽约州上诉法院）概述了在确定某些特定情况下是否应设立拟制信托时应考虑的若干因素，包括“（1）保密或受信关系，（2）承诺，（3）信赖该承诺而进行的转让，以及（4）不当得利”。Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121 (1976)。然而，纽约州法院长期以来一直认为“这些因素仅仅是有用的指导，并非神圣不可变通的法宝”。Counihan, 194 F.3d at 362（援引陈述该观点的诸多纽约州案件）。\n\n48. 在本案中，自申请人的财产存入2770号账户之日起，即存在一项为申请人利益而对申请人财产设立的拟制信托。\n\n49. 申请人在签署《认购协议》以获取Hamilton M&A Fund SP的某些B类股份时，与Hamilton Opportunity Fund建立了保密和/或受信关系4。根据《认购协议》，Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC向申请人作出承诺，申请人的财产将被投资于数字银行（Digital Bank）。基于对该承诺的信赖，申请人按照《认购协议》的指示将申请人的财产电汇至2770号账户。政府对2770号账户的不当扣押，迫使Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC违背了将申请人的财产投资于数字银行的承诺。由于政府的扣押，申请人甚至无法行使其赎回权（Right of Redemption）以取回申请人的财产。这将\n\n4 即使法院认定Hamilton Opportunity Fund与申请人之间不存在保密关系和/或不存在受信关系，该认定也不具有决定性，因为缺乏受信关系并不妨碍法院认定存在拟制信托。参见 Koreag, 961 F.2d at 353（陈述称“然而，我们并不认为［各方］之间缺乏受信关系就会自动击败拟制信托的主张。尽管受信关系是纽约法院引用的因素之一，但在衡平法另有要求时，缺少任何单一因素本身并不会阻碍拟制信托的设立”）。\n\n导致政府的不当得利，因为政府目前在没有任何合法理由的情况下保留申请人的财产。参见，例如，U.S. v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 340 (2nd Cir. 1995)（认定设立拟制信托是正当的，原因包括政府的没收导致了对默示承诺的违反）；Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994)（认定拟制信托是适当的，其中“政府的没收迫使违约……这可能导致政府的潜在不当得利（以及［原告］相应的不当受损）”）。\n\n50. 申请人的财产。该等拟制信托“构成了‘对该财产的合法权利、所有权或权益’，且‘可能优于’被告的权益，以适用类似于21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)的没收法规”。Willis, 652 F.3d at 242。\n\n51. 易于追踪。见证据项 C（Exhibit C）。\n\n52. 即使政府主张其他人员应从任何被没收财产中获得赔偿。“当一方当事人可以直接追踪其资产而无需借助虚构或推定时代，即使在涉及多名欺诈受害者的案件中，亦可适用拟制信托”。U.S. v. Ovid, 2012 WL 2087084, *7 (E.D.N.Y., Jun. 8, 2012)。“当权利主张人能够直接追踪其财产时，法院不得随意忽视拟制信托法，即使这会使一名无辜受害者处于比另一名同样无辜的受害者更有利的境地”。Id.。处理“多重欺诈案件的正统方法”是“将可识别资产归还给其所有权人，仅在特定识别或交易追踪不可行时，才采取按比例分配”。Id. at *8（援引《重述（第三版）返还法与不当得利》（Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment）第59条说明人附注G，第437页）。\n\nC. 申请人对申请人财产享有优先权益\n\n53. 申请人对申请人财产享有的权益绝对优于政府或被告王在申请人财产中可能享有的任何权益。\n\n54. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)明确规定，除申请人在被没收财产中享有的权益外，申请人还必须以优势证据证明，申请人的权益“使没收令全部或部分无效，因为在该等导致依据本条没收财产的行为发生时，该权利、所有权或权益属于申请人而非被告，或者优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益”。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)（强调为原文所加）。\n\n55. 在本案中，如上所述，被告王在申请人的财产或2770号账户中从未享有任何权益；事实上，记录中关于被告王、欺诈计划与2770号账户之间存在何种关系完全没有任何记载。\n\n56. 对其从未享有过权益的财产享有优先权益。同样，被告王也不能没收其毫无权益的财产中的权益。\n\nD. 申请人有权获得诉讼费用及律师费\n\n57. 申请人已被迫聘请法律顾问并已产生费用以提起本请愿书，主张申请人对申请人财产的权利并对申请人财产的没收提出异议。在本程序中胜诉后，申请人保留就本请愿书追索所产生律师费和费用的全部权利，并可根据《Equal Access to Justice Act（平等获取司法机会法）》（简称「EAJA」），28 U.S.C. § 2412 追索申请人的费用和合理律师费。联邦法院一贯认定，为使胜诉索赔人能够根据 EAJA 收取律师费，§ 853(n) 程序属于民事性质。参见 United States v. Cox, 575 F.3d 352, 355 (4th Cir. 2009)；United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995)；U.S. v. Bailey, 2015 WL 1893610 at *20 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2015)。\n\n四、结论\n\n58. 基于上述理由，申请人对申请人财产享有权益，这使得没收裁定就该等财产而言归于无效。例如参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A)。被告 Wang（王）对申请人财产不享有任何权利、所有权或权益，且从未享有过。申请人已以优势证据证明，且能在任何必要的听证会上证明，没收裁定需要进行修改以排除申请人财产。\n\n59. 因此，申请人谨请求本法院：(1) 准予本请愿书；(2) 修改没收裁定以排除申请人财产；(3) 裁定立即将申请人财产归还给申请人；(4) 裁定申请人有权追索与本请愿书相关的申请人律师费和费用，并准予申请人提交该等律师费和费用的申请；以及 (5) 准予其他必要且公正的救济。\n\n日期：April 2, 2025\n\n谨呈，\n\n/s/ Jeffrey S. Gavenman\nJeffrey S. Gavenman, Esq.\nJeremy W. Schulman, Esq.\nSCHULMAN BHATTACHARYA, LLC\n6116 Executive Boulevard, Suite 425\nNorth Bethesda, MD 20852\n(240) 356-8550\njgavenman@schulmanbh.com\njschulman@schulmanbh.com\n\n/s/ Paul W. Butler\nPaul W. Butler, Esq.\nButler legal strategies\n1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 531\nWashington, D.C. 20036\npaul@butlerlegalstrategies.com\n申请人律师\n\n证明与誓词\n\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(3)，本人 [姓名] 在受作伪证受罚的前提下作证并声明，本人对该财产的主张并非无理缠诉，且据本人所知所信，为支持该主张所提供的信息均属真实准确。\n\n签署于 2025 年 ___ 月 ___ 日 __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________\n\n签名：____________________","key_entities":["forfeiture","Guo","Je","853(n)","Saraca","GTV","Gavenman","Miles Guo","Himalaya","William Je","Torres","Himalaya Exchange"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":325,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":329,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":488,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":5822,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-04-08 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-04-08","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:45:13"}