{"id":"court_sdny_716_2","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":716,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2025-07-28","title":"SDNY ECF 716","summary_zh":"扣押令申请附具宣誓书（附件B）——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118，附于 ECF #716（2025年7月28日提交；原始宣誓书出自2022年9月的另一独立扣押令卷宗 22 MAG 7580）。FBI 特别探员 Anthony Alecci 就多个 Silvergate Bank、GETTR USA 及 FV Bank/Metropolitan Commercial Bank 名下、与“喜马拉雅”系列实体相关的银行账户宣誓作证，主张相关账户资金系电信欺诈、银行欺诈及洗钱犯罪所得或涉案财产，据此申请扣押令。","summary_en":"Affidavit in support of seizure warrant (Exhibit B) — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, filed as part of ECF #716 (submitted July 28, 2025; the underlying affidavit originates from a separate September 2022 seizure-warrant docket, 22 MAG 7580). FBI Special Agent Anthony Alecci swears out this affidavit describing multiple bank accounts at Silvergate Bank, GETTR USA, and FV Bank/Metropolitan Commercial Bank tied to the 'Himalaya' family of entities, asserting the funds constitute proceeds of wire fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering, and requests issuance of a seizure warrant for those accounts.","body_en":"Exhibit B\n\n22 MAG 7580\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTO BE FILED UNDER SEAL\n-v.-\nAffidavit in Support of Seizure\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate Warrant\nBank account 5090037739, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-1”), Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 984\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090037705, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-2”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090037754, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-3”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090037713, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-4”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090042770, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-5”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090042762, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-6”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090042820, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-7”),\n\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090042747, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-8”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090030288, held by Hamilton\nInvestment Management Ltd. (“Target Account-\n9”), and all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAny and all monies and funds up to and\nincluding the sum of $16,000,000.00 contained\nin Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. account\n9878904409, held by GETTR USA, Inc.\n(“Target Account-10”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest; and\nAll monies and funds contained in Metropolitan\nCommercial Bank account 0299006891, held\nFor Benefit Of FV Bank (“Target Account-11”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest (collectively, the “Target\nProperty”).\nDefendant-in-rem.\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:\nAnthony Alecci, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, being duly sworn,\ndeposes and says:\nI. Introduction\n1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI” or\n“Investigating Agency”). I have been a Special Agent with the FBI since in or about August 2020.\nSince in or about September 2021, I have been assigned to the FBI’s Complex Financial Crimes\n2\n\nsquad. During my time with the FBI, I have participated in investigations of securities and wire\nfraud schemes, bank fraud, and money laundering, and have, among other things, conducted or\nparticipated in debriefings of witnesses, reviews of financial records, and the execution of search\nwarrants. In particular, I have participated in the execution of search warrants involving physical\npremises, electronic devices, and other electronic evidence.\n2. This affidavit is submitted in support of the United States of America’s Application\nfor the issuance of a seizure warrant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 984:\na. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090037739,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-1”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nb. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090037705,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-2”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nc. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090037754,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-3”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nd. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090037713,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-4”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\ne. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090042770,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-5”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nf. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090042762,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-6”), and all funds traceable thereto,\n3\n\nincluding accrued interest;\ng. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090042820,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-7”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nh. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090042747,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-8”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest; and\ni. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090030288,\nheld by Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. (“Target Account-9”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest;\nj. Any and all monies and funds up to and including the sum of\n$16,000,000.00 contained in Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. account 9878904409, held by\nGETTR USA, Inc. (“Target Account-10”), and all funds traceable thereto, including accrued\ninterest; and\nk. All monies and funds contained in Metropolitan Commercial Bank account\n0299006891, held For Benefit Of (“FBO”) FV Bank (“Target Account-11”), and all funds\ntraceable thereto, including accrued interest (collectively, the “Target Property”).\n3. The Target Property constitutes the proceeds of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343\n(wire fraud); 1344 (bank fraud); and 1956 (money laundering and conspiracy to commit money\nlaundering) (together, the “Target Offenses”), as described below.\n4. This affidavit is based on, among other sources of information: (i) my personal\nknowledge; (ii) information provided by personnel at the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission\n(“SEC”) participating in a parallel investigation; (iii) my review of publicly available promotional\nmaterials relating to, among other ventures, “G Club” and the “Himalaya Exchange;” (iv) my\n4\n\nreview of the publicly available websites for GTV Media Group, Inc. (“GTV”), the Himalaya\nExchange, and “G Club,” and materials available on those websites; (v) open-source research that\nI have conducted on the Internet; (vi) my review of digital videos posted on www.gnews.org\n(“GNews”) by GTV Media Group, Inc. and its employees and agents; (vii) my participation in\nvarious witness interviews; (viii) my review of electronic evidence obtained pursuant to\nsubpoenas, orders issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) for non-content information, and\njudicially authorized search warrants; (ix) the review and analysis of various bank account records,\nincluding financial records obtained from financial institutions pursuant to subpoenas and other\nrequests, conducted by myself and financial analysts at the FBI and SEC; (xi) my conversations\nwith other law enforcement officers; and (x) my training and experience concerning the\ncommission of financial crimes. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose\nof establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts that I have learned during the course\nof my investigation. Where dates, figures, and calculations are set forth herein, they are\napproximate. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of\nothers are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise\nindicated.\n5. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that the Target Property is\nsubject to seizure and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), (C) & (D) and 18 U.S.C.\n§981(b) as property involved in violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and/or the proceeds of\nviolations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1344, or property traceable thereto. In summary, the evidence\nreveals a series of fraudulent investment schemes (the “Investment Schemes”) that pertain to\nseveral interrelated companies and their affiliated entities, including GTV Media Group Inc., G\nFashion (“G Fashion”), the Himalaya Farm Alliance (the “Farms”), Himalaya International\nClearing Ltd. (“Himalaya International Clearing”), G Club Operations LLC (“G Club”), Hamilton\n5\n\nInvestment Management Ltd. (“Hamilton”), ACA Capital Group Ltd. (“ACA Capital”), and Crane\nAdvisory Group LLC (“Crane”). As set forth in more detail below, the leaders of the fraudulent\ninvestment schemes are Miles Guo, a/k/a “Guo Wengui,” a/k/a “Miles Kwok” (“GUO”) and\nWilliam Je, a/k/a Je Kin Ming (“JE”).\n6. Analysts at the FBI and SEC and I have traced the flow of certain fraud proceeds\nfrom victims of the Investment Schemes to the Target Property.\nII. Statutory Basis for Forfeiture\n7. The statutory provisions pursuant to which the Target Property is subject to civil\nseizure and forfeiture are as follows:\nMoney Laundering Offenses\n8. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(A), subjects to civil forfeiture:\nAny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in\nviolation of section 1956, 1957 or 1960 of this title, or any property traceable to such\nproperty.\n9. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) provides that any person who:\nknowing that the property involved in a financial transaction\ninvolves the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts\nor attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact\ninvolves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity –\n(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in\npart—\n(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the\nsource, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds\nof specified unlawful activity [shall be guilty of a\ncrime.]\n10. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that any person who:\ntransports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit,\nor transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the\nUnited States to or through a place outside the United States or to a\nplace in the United States from or through a place outside the\n6\n\nUnited States—\n(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in\nthe transportation, transmission, or transfer represent\nthe proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that\nsuch transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or\nin part—\n(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,\nthe ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified\nunlawful activity [shall be guilty of a crime.]\n11. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) further provides that “[a]ny person who conspires to commit\nany offense defined in [Section 1956] shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for\nthe offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.”\nBank and Wire Fraud Offenses\n12. For purposes of Section 1956, “specified unlawful activity,” defined in 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1956(c)(7), includes, among other things, violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1344. See 18\nU.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7) and 1961(1).\n13. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), subjects to civil forfeiture any\nproperty, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation\nof . . . any offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of\nthis title), or a conspiracy to commit such offense.”\nSeizure Warrants\n14. The Court is empowered by 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) to issue a seizure warrant for any\nproperty subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) & (C). Section 981(b)(2)\nprovides that such a seizure may be made “pursuant to a warrant obtained in the same manner as\nprovided for a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” In addition, Section\n981(b)(3) provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\n41(a), a seizure warrant may be issued pursuant to Section 981(b) by a judicial officer in any\n7\n\ndistrict in which a forfeiture action against the property may be filed under Title 28, United States\nCode, Section 1355(b). Under Section 1355(b)(1)(A), a forfeiture action or proceeding may be\nbrought in the district in which any of the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred.\nAs set forth below, the offenses underlying the requested seizure warrant included acts or\nomissions occurring in the Southern District of New York.\n15. With respect to fungible property, including cash and funds deposited in a financial\ninstitution, 18 U.S.C. § 984 provides, in relevant part, that:\n(a)(1) In any forfeiture action in rem in which the subject property is cash, monetary\ninstruments in bearer form, funds deposited in an account in a financial institution . . . , or\nprecious metals:\n(A) it shall not be necessary for the Government to identify the specific property\ninvolved in the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture; and\n(B) it shall not be a defense that the property involved in such an offense has\nbeen removed and replaced by identical property.\n(2) Except as provided in subsection (b), any identical property found in the same place\nor account as the property involved in the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture shall\nbe subject to forfeiture under this section.\n(b) No action pursuant to this section to forfeit property not traceable directly to the\noffense that is the basis for the forfeiture may be commenced more than 1 year from the\ndate of the offense.\nIII. Probable Cause\nA. Probable Cause Regarding Commission of the Subject Offenses\nOverview of the Fraudulent Investment Schemes\n16. Since in or around May 2020, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern\nDistrict of New York (“SDNY”) and the FBI, among other law enforcement agencies, have been\ninvestigating a series of interrelated fraudulent investment schemes that pertain to several\ncompanies that are owned or operated by, or otherwise affiliated with, GUO, JE, and their\nassociates (collectively, the “Investment Schemes”). To date, the investigation (“Investigation”)\n8\n\nhas revealed that the Investment Schemes involve the solicitation and subsequent investment\nand/or misappropriation of hundreds of millions of dollars. GUO and JE are leaders of the\nInvestment Schemes.\n17. The Investment Schemes are conducted through various, interrelated offerings, all\nof which exhibit features that are consistent with fraud. For example, investors are promised\nunrealistic, outsized returns on their investments; investors are induced to invest on the basis of\nnumerous misrepresentations; a large portion of the investment money is misappropriated; and\nwith respect to the sale of digital asset securities, those currencies have never been tradable on a\npublic exchange, despite representations that they would be.\n18. Certain of the interrelated Investment Schemes are historical, while others are\nongoing. Specifically:\na. The GTV stock offering and the G Coin offering described below\n(collectively, the “Unregistered Stock Offerings”) operated between in or about April 2020 and in\nor about July 2020. As a result of the Unregistered Stock Offerings, whose proceeds were\ncommingled, companies affiliated with GUO, JE, and others collectively raised at least\napproximately $487 million from more than 5,000 investors, including individuals in the United\nStates.\nb. Starting at least in or about July 2020, the leaders of the scheme began to\npitch investors on a new set of investment opportunities, marketed as an opportunity to convert\ntheir existing investments in GTV into a “loan” to GTV (the “Convertible Loan Offering”). The\nConvertible Loan Offering was carried out by the Guo-backed Himalaya Farm Alliance, which\nconsists of informal groups, or “Farms,” of Chinese expatriates located in various cities around the\nworld. Between in or about August 2020 and March 2021, the U.S.-based Farms raised\napproximately $148 million from the Convertible Loan Offering.\n9\n\nc. GUO, JE, and others continue to conduct the Investment Schemes,\nincluding relating to G Club (which has been operating since in or about October 2020) and the\nHimalaya Exchange (which has been operating since in or about April 2021). As described below,\nG Club and the Himalaya Exchange have raised at least approximately $664 million between in or\nabout September 2020 and the present.\nBackground on GUO and JE\n19. Based on my participation in this investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of documents, records, videos that were posted on social media\nplatforms, and public source research that I have conducted on the Internet, as well as my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. GUO is a purported billionaire and a Chinese national who allegedly fled\nChina for the United States in 2014, after learning that an associate had been arrested on corruption\ncharges.\nb. GUO is involved with various entities relevant to the Investment Schemes,\nas described in greater detail below, including GTV, G Music LLC (“G Music”), G Club, G\nFashion (“G Fashion”), and GETTR USA, Inc. (“Gettr”). GUO does not hold formal titles or\npositions at these entities.\nc. In or about 2018, GUO founded organizations named the Rule of Law\nFoundation (“ROLF”) and Rule of Law Society (“ROLS”). Based on my review of publicly\navailable information, I have learned that the Rule of Law projects were underway by December\n2018.1 ROLF and ROLS are purportedly organizations dedicated to exposing and combatting\ncorruption in China by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”). At times, the board members for\n1 See http\n(describing Guo and Bannon’s involvement in the “Rule of Law Fund”).\n10\n\nROLF and/or ROLS have included Stephen K. Bannon (“Bannon”) and Kyle Bass (“Bass”). GUO\ndoes not hold a formal position at ROLF or ROLS; however, on the ROLS website, GUO is\ndescribed as “the founder, a promoter and a spokesperson” and a sponsor.\nd. JE, a close associate of GUO, has been described as a financier and\nentrepreneur. JE is involved with various other entities relevant to the Investment Schemes, as\ndescribed in greater detail below. Specifically:\ni. JE is the CEO of Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.\n(“Hamilton”), a purported global fund management company.2 Hamilton is headquartered in the\nBritish Virgin Islands and was incorporated on or about February 5, 2018. JE was formally\nappointed Director of Hamilton on or about March 20, 2019.\nii. JE is the Director of ACA Capital Group Ltd. (“ACA Capital”), a\npurported Hong Kong-based investment firm3 that was incorporated in the United Kingdom on or\nabout July 10, 2020.\niii. JE is listed as the founder and Chairman of Himalaya Exchange, a\npurported cryptocurrency “ecosystem.” JE is the 100% beneficial owner of various entities that\noperate Himalaya Exchange, including Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. (“Himalaya\nClearing”), Major Lead International Ltd., Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd.\n(“Himalaya Financial”), and Himalaya International Reserves Ltd. (“Himalaya Reserves”).\nGTV Stock Offering\n20. Between approximately April 20, 2020 and June 2, 2020, GTV, its parent company\nSaraca Media Group, Inc. (“Saraca”), and Voice of Guo Media, Inc. (“VOG”; collectively, the\n2 See http\n3 See http\n11\n\n“Companies”) solicited thousands of individuals to invest in an offering of GTV common stock\n(the “GTV Stock Offering”). During that time period, more than approximately 5,000 investors\n(including many in the United States) collectively paid approximately $452 million for purported\nGTV common stock.\n21. Based on my review of the GTV Stock Offering’s information memorandum dated\nApril 20, 2020 (the “Memorandum”), interviews of witnesses, and review of public source\ninformation, as well as documents and records obtained during the course of the investigation, I\nhave learned the following, among other things:\na. GTV was founded on or about April 17, 2020, as a Delaware corporation\nand a wholly owned subsidiary of Saraca. GTV’s principal place of business was located in the\nSouthern District of New York, in a townhouse located at 162 E. 64th St., New York, NY, 10065\n(the “Townhouse”).\nb. According to the Memorandum, GUO was the “sponsor” of both Saraca and\nGTV, as well as the “adviser[sic]” and “key host” of GTV. The Memorandum also stated that\nGUO was a billionaire, successful businessman, and dissident in China. According to various\nwitnesses, as well as social media content, GUO consistently presented himself as the founder and\nface of GTV.\nc. The Memorandum and a separate letter to prospective investors outlining\n“Investment Procedures Guidelines” listed GUO’s phone number as the contact number for\ninquiries from potential investors.\nd. At the time of the GTV Stock Offering, the Companies had recently\nlaunched a news-focused social media platform called GTV, including the website www.gtv.org.\nThe Memorandum claimed GTV would be “the first ever platform which w[ould] combine the\npower of citizen journalism and social news with state-of-the-art technology, big data, artificial\n12\n\nintelligence, block-chain technology and real-time interactive communication” and that GTV\nwould be “the only uncensored and independent bridge between China and the Western world.”\nThe Memorandum also claimed that GTV would “be a bridge between China and the Western\nworld . . . allowing for free and open communication, business transactions and trading,\nuncensored by the Chinese government.” The Memorandum boasted that GTV’s platform would\nbe so powerful as to “expos[e] corruption, obstruction, illegality, brutality, harassment, and\ninhumanity in China.” The Memorandum also indicated that GTV would compete with companies\nsuch as Zoom, WeChat, TikTok, YouTube, Cisco, Citrix, Alibaba, Amazon, and eBay.\ne. The Memorandum listed Yvette Y. Wang, Max Krasner, and Daniel\nPodhaskie as GTV’s Executive Directors.\nf. The Memorandum highlighted the credentials of GTV’s Non-executive\nDirectors, including, among others, Bannon, Bass, and Darren Blanton (“Blanton”). As described\nabove, Bannon and Bass were also board members of the ROLF and/or ROLS.\ng. The Memorandum stated that investor funds would be used for the\nfollowing, among other purposes: acquisition of companies; upgrading GTV technology and\nsecurity; and marketing. The Memorandum did not contemplate that investor funds would be used\nto invest in hedge funds or any similar type of financial investment, or that investor funds would\nbe given to other companies, such as Saraca.\nh. Based on my conversations with a source of information (“SOI4”) involved\nwith the ROLF, the Companies, the GTV Stock Offering, and the Phoenix Farm, as well as my\n4 The SOI is providing information to law enforcement in hopes of entering into a cooperation\nagreement and receiving leniency at sentencing. The SOI has provided reliable information that\nhas been corroborated by, among other things, electronic evidence, videos, cellphone records, and\nsubpoena and search warrant returns.\n13\n\nreview of the metadata of the Memorandum, I have learned that JE was a primary author of the\nMemorandum.\nG Coin Offering\n22. During the same period of April 2020 through June 2020, GTV and Saraca also\nsolicited GTV Investors to invest in a companion digital asset security that was referred to as either\nG-Coins or G-Dollars (the “G Coin Offering”).\n23. Based on my participation in this investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of bank records and videos that were posted on social media\nplatforms, as well as my review of reports of interviews with GTV Investors and conversations\nwith others, including law enforcement, I have learned the following, among other things, about\nthe G Coin Offering:\na. From approximately in or about April 2020, through at least in or about June\n2020, I have learned that the Companies, as well as representatives for the Companies, such as\nGUO, marketed the sale of G-Coins and G-Dollars to the public through online videos on\nYouTube, Twitter, and other video-sharing and social media platforms.\nb. The Companies’ online promotions set forth that G-Coins (which the\nCompanies indicated would eventually be merged into G-Dollars, forming a single digital asset),\nand G-Dollars would be usable to purchase goods or services or exchange for gold or fiat currency\non an online platform. As part of its solicitation of G-Coin and G-Dollar investors, the Companies\ndid not provide investors with financial information about the plan to develop any digital asset or\nplatform, or any written offering materials, including, for example, a whitepaper or private\nplacement memorandum.\nc. The Companies collected at least approximately $31 million from the G-\nCoin and G-Dollar Investors, pooling the proceeds in bank accounts associated with the\n14\n\nCompanies and commingling them with proceeds from the GTV Stock Offering. As part of the G\nCoin Offering, many investors received a purported 20% discount on the $.01 purchase price for\nG-Coins and G-Dollars. Investors participated in the G Coin Offering by transferring funds\ndirectly to the Companies’ U.S. bank accounts, by making payments to the Companies’ accounts\non online payment platforms, by making purchases via the Apple App Store, or by writing checks.\n24. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, and review of\ntranslations of statements that were made by GUO regarding the G Coin Offering, as well as my\nconversations with others, I have learned that GUO made numerous false statements in order to\nsolicit investments for the G Coin Offering. Examples of some those statements are described\nbelow, in substance and in part:\na. In a statement contained within a video by GUO on or about May 9, 2020,\nGuo stated that G-Coins could be exchanged into U.S. dollars or physical gold.\nb. In another statement contained within a video on or about May 16, 2020,\nGUO stated that the G-Coin and G-Dollar currencies could be exchanged with gold.\n25. Based on my participation in this investigation, I believe that the above-described\nstatements regarding G-Coins and G-Dollar are false. In particular, during the course of the\ninvestigation, I have not found any evidence that there is or has ever been an exchange where G-\nCoins or G-Dollars could be exchanged for U.S. dollars or gold.\n26. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of bank records, and review of videos that were posted on social media\nplatforms, as well as my review of reports of interviewed individuals who invested in GTV (the\n“GTV Investors”) and my conversations with others, including other law enforcement officers, I\nhave learned the following, among other things, about the solicitation of investments for the GTV\nStock Offering and G Coin Offering:\n15\n\na. GTV disseminated information about the two offerings to the general public\nthrough publicly-available videos on websites affiliated with the Companies, including\nwww.gtv.org and www.gnews.org, as well as on social media platforms such as YouTube and\nTwitter. The first solicitation video, posted on YouTube on April 21, 2020, was entitled, as\ntranslated into English, “GTV Private Placement Subscription Instructions” (the “Launch Video”).\nThe Launch Video described the investment terms for the GTV Stock Offering and provided a\nmobile phone number for potential investors to use for inquiries about the offering. The Launch\nVideo has had over 3,000 views. None of the GTV Stock Offering solicitation videos, including\nthe Launch Video, were password protected or placed any restriction on who could view them or\nany limitations on their ability to be shared. As a result, the general public, including prospective\nU.S. investors, were able to access the online marketing videos about the GTV Stock Offering\nthrough, for example, independent online research, social media, or referrals from other investors.\nb. GUO led the effort to solicit investors for the GTV Stock Offering. GUO,\nwho is a prolific user of social media and has an enormous social media following, used various\nsocial media platforms to attract followers and to solicit investors for the GTV Stock Offering.\nThose social media platforms included WhatsApp and Discord, both of which have end-to-end\nencrypted chat services.5 Among other things, the Companies sent the Launch Video via phone\nmessages to hundreds of prospective individual investors with a link to a Google Drive folder that\ncontained additional offering material for the GTV Stock Offering, including the subscription\nagreement and investment instructions. GUO also assured potential investors that they would\n5 End-to-end encryption is a system of communication where only the communicating users can\nread the messages. End-to-end encryption prevents law enforcement authorities from intercepting\nsuch communications through wiretaps or through search warrants on the service provider, such\nas WhatsApp.\n16\n\nrealize enormous returns, at one point suggesting that they would receive 1,000 times their\ninvestment, see infra ¶ 40(c). In another statement, in or about June 2020, GUO stated in substance\nand in part that GTV stock was worth 30 times what it had been worth before.\nc. Based on my review of a GTV confidentiality agreement, I have learned\nthat in order to participate in the GTV Stock Offering, GTV Investors were required to sign a\nconfidentiality agreement that required them to keep all information concerning GTV confidential,\nincluding the existence of the confidentiality agreement.\nd. The GTV Stock Offering was structured as a private placement offering of\n10% into GTV, with the remaining 90% of GTV to be controlled by Saraca, which was its parent\ncompany. According to due diligence records from an investment fund, Saraca is a wholly-owned\nsubsidiary of Hudson Diamond Holding, Inc. (“Hudson BVI”), a British Virgin Islands company.\nHudson is in turn wholly owned by Qiang Guo (“QIANG GUO”). Based on my review of open-\nsource material, I have learned that QIANG GUO is GUO’S son.\ne. By early June 2020, banks began to suspect that the Companies were\nengaged in potentially unlawful activity and started to close accounts that were linked to Saraca,\nGTV, and GUO. Around that same time period, GTV Investors began to express concerns about\nGTV’s use of their money, and the legitimacy of their investments. Some of those investors\nexpressed their concerns directly to GUO and many investors requested that their money be\nreturned. In response, GUO and his associates often attempted to shun and ostracize the investors.\nFor example, GUO suggested that one investor was a spy for the CCP and that other investors\nshould not interact with that investor\nMisappropriation of Unregistered Stock Offering Funds\n27. A significant portion of the investor funds collected through the Unregistered Stock\nOfferings (collectively, “Offering Funds”) were misappropriated through investments.\n17\n\n28. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of bank records and subpoena returns, as well as my conversations\nwith others, including law enforcement and witnesses, I have learned the following, among other\nthings:\na. GUO, JE, and others arranged for approximately $100 million of the\nOfferings Funds to get invested on behalf of GTV’s parent company, Saraca, in a high-risk hedge\nfund investment managed by a firm named Hayman Capital Management L.P. (“Hayman”).\nAccording to its website, Hayman is an SEC-registered asset management firm that was founded\nby Bass, who was a non-executive director of GTV at the time of the transfer.\nb. In or about May 2020, Bass facilitated GUO’s and JE’s investment in a\nhigh-risk investment fund called the Hayman Hong Kong Opportunities Fund (the “Hayman\nFund”), which was operated by Hayman.\nc. JE coordinated with Hayman regarding the investment. For example, in a\nMay 29, 2020 email from JE to a Hayman representative (“Hayman Rep-1”), JE wrote, in\nsubstance and in part: “We will have one onshore and one offshore vehicle. The onshore one will\ninvest USD100m and the offshore one will invest USD1m. The address of the onshore vehicle is:\n162 E64th St., New York, NY 10065 United States.” On or about May 31, 2020, JE wrote, in\nsubstance and in part, “The $1m will come from my personal account and I owned[sic] 100% of\nHamilton Investment Management Ltd.”\ni. The address JE provided for the “onshore” vehicle is the address of\nthe Townhouse. See supra ¶ 21(a).\nii. Based on my participation in this Investigation, review of bank\nrecords and subpoena returns, as well as my conversations with others, including law enforcement\nand witnesses, I have learned that the Townhouse has been listed on corporate documents and/or\n18\n\nbank account documentation as the business address for at least seven GUO-affiliated entities;\nspecifically: Saraca, GTV, Golden Spring, Hudson Diamond NY, Greenwich Land, ROLF (until\napproximately May 2022), and ROLS (until approximately May 2022).\nd. Three days after the close of the GTV Stock Offering, on or about June 5,\n2020, $100 million of the Offering Funds were transferred from a particular JP Morgan Chase\nbank account to an onshore bank account associated with Hayman for the purpose of investing in\nthe Hayman Fund. The funds were transferred on behalf of Saraca; as noted above, Saraca was\nthe parent company to GTV and was 100% owned by GUO’s son, QIANG QUO.\ne. Three days later, on or about June 8, 2020, $1 million was transferred on\nbehalf of Hamilton,6 JE’s company, from a bank account in the name of JE to an offshore bank\naccount associated with Hayman, also for the purpose of investing in the Hayman Fund.\nf. The transfer of Offering Funds to Hayman was completely inconsistent with\nGTV’s representations to the GTV Investors about how their funds would be used.\n29. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of\ndocuments and records, as well as my conversations with others, including law enforcement, I\nhave learned that on or about September 13, 2021, the SEC announced settled charges against\nthe Companies, based on their violations of the registration requirements for the Unregistered\nStock Offerings (i.e., the GTV Stock Offering and the associated digital asset G Coin Offering).\nThe SEC’s settlement required the Companies to pay more than $539 million in disgorgement\nand penalties.\nThe Convertible Loan Offering\n6 In April 2018, JE submitted on behalf of Hamilton an account opening document to a U.K. bank\nthat claimed that he owns 100% of Hamilton and that the company “does not involve itself in\ninvestments.”\n19\n\n30. After the Unregistered Stock Offerings described above were discovered by banks\nand numerous bank accounts were frozen, leaders of the schemes began to pitch investors on a\nnew set of investment opportunities. One new investment scheme launched in or about July 2020\nwas marketed to prospective investors as an opportunity to convert their existing investments in\nGTV into a “loan” to GTV. The Convertible Loan Offering was carried out by the “Himalaya\nFarm Alliance,” a collective of informal groups—known as “Farms”—of Chinese expatriates\nlocated in various cities around the world, including New York and Phoenix. The Himalaya Farm\nAlliance’s purported purpose was to assist the Chinese pro-democracy movement; the Himalaya\nFarm Alliance existed primarily as private groups on social media platforms such as Discord. The\nFarms were typically referred to by the names of preexisting companies that they affiliated\nthemselves with for banking purposes; e.g., Mountains of Spices LLC and Davy & Tony\nInternational Limited for the New York Farm, and Maywind Trading LLC, Medical Supply\nSystem International LLC and Santel LLC for the Phoenix Farm.\n31. In connection with the Convertible Loan Offering, the Farms provided prospective\ninvestors with a “Loan Agreement” that disclosed that the loan would be made to the individual\nFarm (e.g., “Phoenix Farm (Maywind Trading LLC)”) and that the loaned funds would be used by\nthat specific Farm for “general working capital purposes.” Investors executed the Loan Agreement\nand sent it to their Farm leaders after transferring their funds to the Farm, but were not provided\ncounter-executed copies of the agreement.\n32. Between in or about August 2020 and in or about March 2021, the U.S.-based\nFarms collectively raised approximately $148 million from the Convertible Loan Offering (the\n“Loan Funds”). Investors agreed to provide loans to the Farms for the purpose of acquiring GTV\nshares (once the three-year note had matured). Once the funds were collected by the U.S. Farms,\nthey were transferred to domestic and foreign accounts owned by different legal entities, including\n20\n\nan Abu Dhabi bank account in the name of ACA Capital (the “UAE ACA Capital Account”),\nwhich is owned and controlled by JE.\nMisappropriation of Convertible Loan Offering Funds\n33. A significant portion of the Loan Funds collected through the Convertible Loan\nOffering were misappropriated, as described below.\n34. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of bank records and subpoena returns, as well as my conversations\nwith others, including law enforcement and witnesses, I have learned the following, among other\nthings:\na. JE was sole signatory of the UAE ACA Capital Account. JE wired\napproximately $33.3 million of the Loan Funds out of the UAE ACA Capital Account to Swiss\nand UK accounts belonging to himself, his wife (Sin Ring Rong), and his company, Hamilton.\nThe wires to his and his wife’s personal accounts—which amounted to more than approximately\n$10 million—were described as dividends, salary or director fees. However, JE was not a director\nor employee of GTV, Saraca, or other affiliated entities.\nb. JE arranged for approximately $34 million in transfers from UAE ACA\nCapital Account to U.S. bank accounts in the names of three companies that are each 100% owned\nby GUO’s family members; specifically:\ni. Approximately $5 million to Greenwich Land LLC, which is owned\nby GUO’s wife, Hing Chi Ngok;\nii. Approximately $18 million to Hudson Diamond NY LLC, which is\nowned by Guo’s daughter, Mei Guo; and\niii. Approximately $11 million to Lamp Capital LLC, which is owned\nby Guo’s son, QIANG GUO.\n21\n\nc. The $34 million was commingled with other investor funds, including GTV\nOffering Funds. Based on my review of bank account records, I have learned that much of this\nGTV Investor money was used to fund lavish lifestyle expenses (e.g., approximately $2.3 million\nin expenses relating to GUO’s yacht, and approximately $600,000 for the purchase of luxury\nautomobiles).\nd. JE also arranged for large transfers from UAE ACA Capital Account to other\ncompanies with ties to GUO; specifically:\ni. Approximately $19 million to Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.\n(“Lexington Property”), which is owned by former GTV Treasurer, Anthony DiBattista\n(“DiBattista”). The registered address of Lexington Property is 750 Lexington Avenue, New\nYork, NY;\nii. Approximately $32 million to Savio Law LLC (as escrow agent),\npursuant to a purported loan agreement between ACA Capital and Saraca (which is owned by\nGUO’s son, QIANG GUO); and\niii. Approximately $1 million to Bannon Film Industries, Inc., a\ncompany owned by Steve Bannon. As described above, Bannon was listed in the Memorandum\nas a non-executive GTV Director and was a Director of the ROLF / ROLS.\nThe G Club Operations LLC Scheme\n35. Some of the Farms recruited investors to invest in GTV through the purchase of “G\nClub” memberships. As described in greater detail below, law enforcement believes G Club is an\nongoing fraudulent scheme operated by GUO, JE, and others.\n36. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of the\nwebsites, subpoena returns, records and documents, including operating agreements and articles\n22\n\nof incorporation, open-source research I have conducted on the Internet, and my conversations\nwith others, including law enforcement, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. In or about October 2020, G Club Operations LLC (“G Club”) was\nregistered in Puerto Rico. According to the Operating Agreement, the purpose of G Club is to\n“provide[] Membership Concierge services with exclusive offers and discounts for luxury hotels\nand retailers for High Net Worth individuals from the Asian market.”\nb. An image from the G Club website (“G Club Website”), viewable at\nhttp is shown below:\n37. G Club purportedly offers five membership tiers: Tier 5 Membership ($50,000\nannually); Tier 4 Membership ($40,000 annually); Tier 3 Membership ($30,000 annually); Tier 2\nMembership ($20,000 annually); and Tier 1 Membership ($10,000 annually). According to the G\nClub Membership Agreement, “A Member may subsequently elect a higher tier of membership,”\nbut “may not subsequently elect a lower tier of Membership.” The annual fee for the desired\nmembership tier must be paid in full with the submission of the G Club membership application,\nand G Club reserves the right to reject any membership application within 30 days at its sole and\n23\n\nabsolute discretion. The Membership Agreement further states: “If an Application is rejected and\nmembership denied, G Clubs shall return the Membership Fee within ten (10) calendar days of\nsuch rejection . . . in the form of the original payment of the Membership Fee or, at the option of\nG Clubs, by check.”\n38. One photograph posted to the G Club Website depicted GUO living a lavish\nlifestyle; specifically, he is shown standing on top of what appears to be a large yacht smoking a\ncigar. The G Club Website also states that:\nG Clubs memberships provide its members with access to a concierge customer\nservice with Mandarin and English access and support. G Clubs members will have\nthe opportunity to attend the annual G Summit meeting which may occur in person\nor virtually. G Clubs members will also get exclusive early access to the latest\nfashion collections and special member pricing on purchases made on the G\nFashion website.\n39. In a video summary posted on GNews on or about July 8, 2021, Guo claimed that\nG Club had approximately 25,000 members, and predicted that G Club would grow to at least 100\nmillion users, attracting $16 trillion of investment.\n40. Despite the representations on the G Club Website about purported membership\nbenefits, law enforcement believes that G Club is being used, at least in part, to perpetuate the\nfraud schemes, including by soliciting and receiving investments while evading regulatory\nrequirements. Specifically, based on my review of an interview report of an August 2, 2021\ninterview (the “August 2, 2021 Interview”) conducted by others of a GTV investor (“Investor-1”),\nI have learned that Investor-1 stated the following, in substance and in part, during that interview:\na. Investor-1 invested $200,000 USD in GTV in or around May 2020.\nInvestor-1’s money came from Investor-1’s savings.\nb. Investor-1 came to believe that GTV was a scam because Investor-1 did not\nreceive any GTV shares, and when Investor-1 asked for a refund, no one responded to Investor-1.\n24\n\nc. Investor-1 invested in GTV because: 1) there were a lot of American\npoliticians supporting Guo; (2) Guo said it was original stock and there would be at least 1,000x\ngrowth; and (3) Investor-1 thought Investor-1 would make money on the GTV stock because Guo\nsaid this in videos. Investor-1 did not think Investor-1 would lose money because Guo promised\nthe GTV investment would make money.\nd. Investor-1 thought that GTV would use the money to build a website like\nYouTube, Facebook and Twitter, but did not know for certain what it would be used for.\ne. Investor-1 subsequently invested in the Convertible Loan Program through\nthe “Canada Farm” in or around August 2020. Specifically, Investor-1 sent approximately $71,019\nto “Canada Himalayan Club Medica Inc.” as a loan. Investor-1 believed that the loan was for 3-5\nyears, with 3% interest and that at the end of that period Investor-1 would receive the money or\nGTV stock. Investor-1 never received an executed copy of the investment contract. The money\nInvestor-1 sent was frozen by the Canadian SEC.\nf. Investor-1 attempted to invest in GTV again in or around March 2021\nthrough G Club. Specifically, Investor-1 was instructed to send Investor-1’s investment funds to\n“Crane Advisory Group,” who in turn would send the money to G Club. Investor-1 sent\napproximately $100,015 to Crane Advisory Group for the purchase of GTV shares at the price of\n$1 per ten shares.\ng. In or around July 2021, Investor-1 attempted to initiate a refund by\ncontacting G Club online customer service department. In response to Investor-1’s refund request,\nG Club, through “notices@gclubs.com,” sent the following email:\nYou recently made a payment with respect to your G|CLUBS membership through\nCrane. Your wire payment transfer exceeded the amount of a single membership\nand you have not applied for multiple memberships. We received $100,015.00 via\nwire. You had applied for one Tier 5 membership and filled out the KYC package\nindicating the total amount was for multi membership of G|CLUBS (see attached).\n25\n\nTo credit the total amount to you, you must apply for additional memberships.\nPlease fill and sign the attached, advising how many memberships you wish to\npurchase and their tier.\nIf sending the excess funds was an error and you wish an immediate return of\n$50,015, please immediately advise. We sincerely apologize for any inconvenience\ncaused.\nh. In response, Investor-1 informed G Club that Investor-1 had sent the $100,015.00\nin funds not to purchase a G Club membership, but rather to invest in GTV. Investor-1 requested\nthat all of Investor-1’s funds be returned. In a subsequent email, Investor-1 also noted that it would\nnot have made sense for Investor-1 to send a sum of $100,015.00, given that the most expensive\nG Club membership cost $50,000. Investor-1 also explained in another email that, in a phone\nconversation with a representative of G Club, the representative had made it clear that Investor-\n1’s funds were going to be used for an investment in GTV, not for the purchase of a G Club\nmembership.\ni. Investor-1 had not received any of Investor-1’s $100,015 investment back as of the\ndate of the interview.\n41. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, my review of\ndocuments, records, and email search warrant returns, as well as my conversations with others,\nincluding witnesses, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. An individual named Alex Hadjicharalambous (“Hadjicharalambous”), whose title\nwas the Financial Controller for G Club, was the authorized signer listed on multiple bank accounts\nin the name of G Club. On July 13, 2021, Hadjicharalambous received an email at his G Club\nemail account (alexh@gclubs.com) from a G Fashion IT Manager entitled “HCHKTech email”\nthat read, in substance and in part: “Hello Alex, As you know we now work for HCHK\nTechnologies. Use the credentials in this email and follow the steps below to log into your new\nemail account.”\n26\n\nb. Based on my review of open-source material on the Internet and subpoena returns,\nI have learned the following, among other things:\ni. On or about April 29, 2021, HCHK Technologies, Inc. (“HCHK\nTechnologies”) was incorporated in the State of Delaware. At the time of incorporation, Anthony\nDiBattista was director of HCHK Technologies. Between on or about May 27, 2021 and\nNovember 10, 2021, DiBattista was Treasurer of HCHK Technologies. On or about December\n13, 2021, DiBattista resigned as President, CEO, and Director of HCHK Technologies.\nc. On or about August 18, 2021, HCHK Property Management, Inc. (“HCHK\nProperty”) was incorporated in Delaware. Yvette Wang was elected as the initial director of\nHCHK Property. See ¶ 21(e). On or about December 15, 2021, by written consent of the Board\nof Directors of HCHK Property (i.e., Wang), DiBattista was appointed Treasurer of HCHK\nProperty. On or about January 1, 2022, Wang resigned and DiBattista was appointed as President,\nCEO, and Director of HCHK Property.\nd. DiBattista’s roles with various of the other GUO-affiliated entities included, among\nothers, Treasurer of GTV, authorized signatory of Lexington Property bank accounts, and\nTreasurer of G Music LLC.\ne. Based on my review of subpoena returns and my conversations with others, I have\nlearned that on or about July 18, 2021, a G Fashion HR employee sent a “transition memo” to Alex\nHadjicharalambous that, “[e]ffective as of July 19, 2021, all GFashion employees will have the\noption to transfer to GFashion’s staffing company, HCHK Technologies, Inc.,” which would\n“thereafter serve the role of staffing company for GFashion and other enterprises.” The transition\nmemo further reflected that an employee’s failure to execute the transition memo that same day\nwould result in termination.\n27\n\nf. Based on my review of open-source Internet research and subpoena returns, I have\nlearned that one of the Directors of HCHK Technologies is also the Director and Chairman of the\nAudit Committee of Gettr,7 a social media platform that reportedly evolved from GTV Media. I\nhave further learned that JE’s company, Hamilton, owns 95% of Gettr and contributed $35 million\nto Gettr in capital contribution.\ng. Based on the foregoing, I have learned that starting on or about July 19, 2021,\ncertain employees of G Fashion, Gettr, and other GUO-affiliated entities began to operate under\nthe company names HCHK Technologies and/or HCHK Property.\nThe Himalaya Exchange Scheme\n42. As described above, JE founded a purported cryptocurrency exchange platform\ncalled Himalaya Exchange, available at http (the “Himalaya Exchange\nWebsite”). Similar to the link between G-Coin / G-Dollar and the Unregistered Stock Offerings,\nHimalaya Coin (ticker: HCO or HCN) and Himalaya Dollar (ticker: HDO) (together, the\n“Himalaya Assets”) were initially offered as a companion digital asset security for investors in the\nConvertible Loan Program.\n43. Based on my participation in this investigation, training, experience, review of the\nHimalaya Exchange Website, videos posted on GNews, bank records and subpoena returns, and\nopen-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, as well as my conversations with\nothers, including law enforcement and witnesses, I have learned the following, among other things:\n7 See http\n(last visited July 6, 2022). Based on my conversations with others, I have learned that Gettr is one\nof the companies for which HCHK Technologies provides purported staffing services.\n28\n\na. The Himalaya Exchange is described as a global digital exchange with a\nfull ecosystem, that includes (or will include) a stablecoin (Himalaya Dollar),8 a trading coin\n(Himalaya Coin), and a blockchain payment application called “Himalaya Pay.”\nb. JE is described as the founder and Chairman of the Himalaya Exchange.\nc. As described above, JE is also the founder and CEO of BVI-based\nHamilton and the Director of Hong Kong-based ACA Capital.\nd. An image from the Himalaya Exchange Website, viewable at\nhttp is shown below:\n44. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of the\nHimalaya Exchange Website, videos posted on GNews, bank records and subpoena returns, and\nopen-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, as well as my conversations with\nothers, including law enforcement and witnesses, I have learned, among other things, that investors\n8 A stablecoin is a cryptocurrency that seeks to peg itself to a stable currency, typically the U.S.\ndollar.\n29\n\nwere misled about how and when they would be able to trade their cryptocurrency assets.\nSpecifically:\na. When the Himalaya Exchange Website was launched, investors were told\nthat, as of June 2021, they would be able to exchange and withdraw their cryptocurrency. An\nimage of the website from May 2021 depicting this representation is shown below:\nb. The Himalaya Exchange Website later changed its “trade” date to September 2021.\nBased on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I have learned that it is\ncommon for fraudulent cryptocurrencies to use similar tactics to those used here; specifically it is\ncommon for fraudulent cryptocurrencies to: (1) not be tradable on a public exchange; and\n(2)induce investors to purchase the cryptocurrencies through false promises that the\ncryptocurrency will be available to trade on a public exchange soon.\nc. The initial coin offering (“ICO”) of the Himalaya Assets purportedly took place on\nthe Himalaya Exchange Website or about November 1, 2021. According to data on the Himalaya\nExchange Website, the price of a Himalaya Asset increased from 10 cents at the time of the ICO\nto $27 approximately two weeks later, resulting in a purported $27 billion valuation by mid-\nNovember 2021, as reflected in the graph below from the Himalaya Exchange Website:\n30\n\nd. According to Himalaya Exchange’s promotional materials, the value of the\nHimalaya Dollar is pegged to the U.S. Dollar. “Credits” are used to secure positions within the\nHimalaya Ecosystem, which positions correspond to a particular type of crypto asset. Promotional\nmaterials also state that “[c]redits can only be used on the Himalaya Exchange or within the\nHimalaya Ecosystem, representing a right to participating in trading on the Himalaya\nExchange and do not carry any right to require their exchange for fiat currency or crypto-assets.”\nPromotional materials clarify that references to Himalaya Coin, Himalaya Dollar, “or any other\ntype of asset on an account at the Himalaya Exchange or through the Himalaya Pay App are\nreferences to Credits corresponding to that asset.”\ne. According to the Himalaya Dollar whitepaper dated April 2021 (the “Whitepaper”),\navailable on the Himalaya Exchange Website, Himalaya Dollar is an Ethereum-\nbased token “structured with the aim of maintaining its value 1-to-1 to the United States Dollar.\n31\n\nHimalaya Dollar Credits benefit from potential liquidity support which may be provided through\nthe [Himalaya] Reserve which will be managed with the aim of maintaining its value at a level\nequal in value in U.S. dollars to the value of Himalaya Dollars in circulation as described below.”\nf. The Whitepaper further states that Himalaya Reserves, the issuer of Himalaya\nDollar, “intends to create and hold in the Reserve a mix of United States dollars or other currencies\nin cash and cash equivalents,” and further states, “it is intended to make the Reserve transparent\nto the public. The Issuer intends to have the Reserve audited annually by independent auditors.\nThe results of those audits will be made publicly available with details of the then-current\ncomposition of the Reserve and the market value of the assets as at[sic] the time of publication.”\nTo date, no such audit results have been published.\ng. As described above, the Himalaya Assets have never traded on an open exchange,\nand instead purport to trade only on the private Himalaya Exchange. Himalaya Exchange restrains\nthe flow of real currency out of the Himalaya Exchange by its members, as described above. Thus,\nthe ability to convert Himalaya Dollars and Himalaya Coins back into U.S. currency was limited.\n45. Based on my participation in this investigation, training, experience, review of the\nHimalaya Exchange Website, videos posted on GNews, and public source research that I have\nconducted on the Internet, as well as my conversations with others, I have learned the following,\namong other things:\na. As described above, Himalaya Dollar purports to be a “stablecoin” that is\npegged 1-to-1 to the value of the U.S. dollar. Other major stablecoins include TerraUSD, Tether,\nand USD Coin.\nb. In a video summary posted on GNews in November 2021, GUO\nrepresented, in sum and substance, that Himalaya Coin was backed by the U.S. dollar through\n32\n\nstablecoin Himalaya Dollar, and further stated that Himalaya Coin is backed by a reserve of 20%\nof the proceeds in gold.\nc. In or about May 2022, there was a global stablecoin collapse that began\nwhen a particular stablecoin called TerraUSD lost its peg (i.e., no longer had sufficient hard-asset\nreserves to back its cryptocurrency at a 1-to-1 ratio to the U.S. dollar). As a result, the\ncryptocurrency market lost approximately $300 billion in value. The valuation of TerraUSD\nthrough May 10, 2022 is reflected in the graph below:\nd. In contrast, data on the Himalaya Exchange Website reflects very little\nfluctuation or decrease in the purported value of the Himalaya Assets during the same time period,\nas reflected in the graph below from the Himalaya Exchange Website:\n33\n\n46. I have reviewed the graph displayed above in paragraphs 44(c), showing the value\nof the Himalaya Assets’ purported value between approximately November 1, 2021 and December\n31, 2021. The graph is consistent with the purported price of the Himalaya Assets being falsified—\nspecifically, it reflects a steep increase in price over the first two weeks and then an apparent\nfluctuation in price, but all within a narrow band.\n47. I have also reviewed the graphs displayed above in paragraphs 45(c) and (d),\nreflecting the price of stablecoin TerraUSD and the purported price of a Himalaya Asset between\nApril 2021 and May 10, 2021. The data reflected in the Himalaya Asset graph is inconsistent with\nthe valuation of other stablecoins, including TerraUSD, during the stablecoin crash.9\n9 On or about June 15, 2022, it was reported that William Je said the following: “Despite the\ncryptocurrency market’s recent dip, HDO has constantly remained stable with the US dollar 1:1\nwithout fluctuation. Impressively, this makes HDO the only stable coin in the world to maintain\n100% during this time-period of uncertainty.” See http\nreleases/iconic-ferrari-f1-car-sold-by-rm-sotheby-s-using-cryptocurrency-himalaya-dollar-\n883914213.html (last visited July 6, 2022)\n34\n\nOverview of the Scheme to Launder Fraud Proceeds\n48. As described in greater detail herein, since at least in or about 2020, GUO, JE, and\nothers have operated the Investment Schemes, i.e., various interrelated fraudulent investment\nschemes. The Investment Schemes involve entities affiliated with GUO and/or JE, including GTV,\nG Fashion, G Club, Crane, Lamp Capital LLC, Hudson Diamond NY, Greenwich Land LLC,\nHCHK Technologies, the Himalaya Farms, the Himalaya Exchange, Hamilton, and ACA Capital,\namong others.\n49. As described above, between in or about April 2020 and June 2020, GUO, JE, and\nothers fraudulently obtained more than approximately $635 million in purported investments\nthrough the Unregistered Stock Offerings and Convertible Loan Offering. See supra ¶ 18.\nRecords that I or others have reviewed in the course of the Investigation show that, between in or\nabout November 2020 and June 2022, G Club has generated more than approximately $221 million\nin purported G Club membership fees.\n50. As detailed below, the evidence demonstrates that between at least approximately\nApril 2020 and the present, GUO, JE, and others have been engaged in a scheme to launder fraud\nproceeds from the Investment Schemes (which include the Unregistered Stock Offerings, the\nConvertible Loan Offering, G Club, and the Himalaya Exchange) (collectively, the “Investment\nScheme Funds”).\n51. As part of the money laundering scheme, JE and others have conducted financial\ntransactions totaling more than approximately $1.04 billion, as described in greater detail below.\n52. As a further part of the money laundering scheme, at least approximately $252\nmillion of the Investment Scheme Funds were remitted, either directly or indirectly, to bank\naccounts in the United States and the Bahamas held in the name of JE’s companies—Hamilton,\nACA Capital, and Himalaya Exchange—or otherwise controlled by JE.\n35\n\n53. In particular, as described below, JE opened certain of the Target Accounts and\nother bank accounts at Silvergate Bank, a bank in La Jolla, California that markets itself as “the\nleading bank for innovative business in fintech and cryptocurrency.” Target Accounts-1 through\n-8 are in the name of a Cayman Islands-registered hedge fund, Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC;\nTarget Account-9 is in the name of JE’s company, Hamilton Investment Management Ltd., which\ncompany is the investment manager of the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC. JE is the principal\nof Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. and an authorized signer on the Silvergate Target\nAccounts.\n54. As further described below, JE opened three accounts at FV Bank, a bank in Puerto\nRico that markets itself as “The Global Digital Bank.” The FV Bank accounts are in the names\nof various legal entities through which JE and others operate the Himalaya Exchange—Himalaya\nClearing, Himalaya Financial, and Himalaya Reserves. JE is the ultimate beneficial owner of those\nHimalaya legal entities, see supra ¶ 19(d), and is an authorized signer on the FV accounts.\n55. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into and among the Target Accounts\nin ways that, based on my training and experience, are indicative of money laundering.\nSpecifically, the tracing of the funds reflects, among other things: (a) transfers of Investment\nScheme Funds from U.S. bank accounts to bank accounts located overseas (including the UAE\nand the Bahamas) in high risk jurisdictions that are frequent havens for money laundering;\n(b)layering of Investment Scheme Funds through a series of entities and bank accounts, in some\ncases pursuant to purported loan agreements or other financial arrangements, in a manner\nconsistent with concealment of the nature, source, or origin of the funds; (c) investments in real\nestate or other business interests that have no apparent connection with the stated purposes of the\nbusinesses controlling the bank accounts; and (d) the transfer of Investment Scheme Funds\nbetween multiple banks, as well as among multiple accounts within the same bank, in a single day.\n36\n\nUse of Multiple Banks and Financial Institutions to Conceal Investment Scheme Funds\n56. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. To date, law enforcement has identified more than at least 80 bank accounts\nbeing used by GUO, JE, and others to process Investment Scheme Funds, which include, among\nothers:\ni. At least approximately 19 bank accounts in the name of G Club\nentities (i.e., G Club International Limited or G Club Operations LLC) at approximately seven\ndifferent financial institutions;\nii. At least approximately 16 bank accounts in the name of Crane (i.e.,\nCrane Advisory Group LLC) at approximately six different financial institutions;\niii. At least approximately 28 bank accounts in the name of Farm\nentities at approximately six different financial institutions;\niv. At least approximately eight bank accounts in the name of G Fashion\nat approximately six different financial institutions;\nv. At least approximately 14 bank accounts in the name of Hamilton\nentities (e.g., Hamilton Investment Management Inc. or Hamilton Opportunity Funds SPC) at\nSilvergate Bank in California; and\nvi. At least approximately three bank accounts in the name of Himalaya\nentities (i.e., Himalaya Reserve, Himalaya Financial, and Himalaya Clearing) at FV Bank in Puerto\nRico.\n37\n\nb. In addition to utilizing bank accounts held in the names of entities owned or\ncontrolled by JE and others directly involved in the Investment Schemes, GUO, JE, and others\nlayer Investment Scheme Funds through accounts at other financial institutions and third-party\npayment management entities to conceal the nature and source of the funds. For example, and as\ndescribed in greater detail herein:\ni. BSI Group LLC (“BSI Group”) is a Missouri-based company that\noffers payment agreement services. Based on my conversations with others, I have learned that\nBSI Group effectively operates as a wholesaler and opens bank accounts at U.S.-based financial\ninstitutions for its customers. U.S. banks that BSI Group contracts with include Capital One, The\nReserve Trust Company (“Reserve Trust”), Prime Trust LLC (“Prime Trust”), and a Puerto Rico-\nbased financial institution called Mercantile Bank International Corp. and its affiliated entities\n(“Mercantile Bank” or “MBI”). BSI Group is a client of Capital One, Reserve Trust, and Prime\nTrust, among other entities, while MBI is one of BSI Group’s customers.\nii. BSI Group manages transactions on behalf of its own customers,\nincluding MBI. BSI Group’s customers direct the movement of their funds—which are held in\naccounts in the name of BSI Group and/or Reserve Trust and Prime Trust—by requesting\ntransactions through BSI Group’s website (e.g., indicating the originator, payee, and amount for a\nspecific transaction).\niii. GUO, JE, and others have laundered more than approximately $300\nmillion in Investment Scheme Funds through bank accounts held in the names of various financial\nintermediary companies, including BSI Group, Reserve Trust, and Prime Trust. GUO, JE, and\nothers have also layered Investment Scheme Funds through bank accounts held at various different\nfinancial institutions.\n38\n\niv. For example, on or about May 20, 2021, G Club’s financial\ncontroller, Alex Hadjicharalambolous, exchanged emails with employees at Puerto Rico-based\nfinancial institutions Medici Bank and MBI regarding a $15 million wire transfer of G Club\nInvestment Scheme Funds from a bank account in the name of BSI Group to a bank account in the\nname of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC at Deltec Bank & Trust (“Deltec”), which is located in\nthe Bahamas (the “Hamilton Bahamas Account”). The next day, David Fallon (the President of\nHamilton) emailed Hajicharalmbous to advise that Hamilton could not credit the wire to G Club,\nbecause the wire reflected that the sender was “BSI Group.”\nv. Hadjicharalambous forwarded the email to an MBI employee, who\nthen responded to Hadjicharalmbous (copying Fallon) with the following explanation, in substance\nand in part:\nHI guys, so flow of funds is as follows. It’s a little detailed here so apologies.\nThe wire comes from BSI group ( MBIs corresponding bank partner)to Deltec\n(Hamilton)\nThe accounts are as follows\nBSI/MBI have an account at Capital one, it is an MBI Bank escrow account owned\nby MBI. BSI does the processing for us.\nMedici is a client of MBI for this 15mm dollar transaction, Medici has an account\nwith MBI at Capital one\nGCLUB is a client of Medici.\nGclubs clients send money to the MBI account at Capital one denoted for GClub\n(through medici). Medici ledgers each wire as they come into the bank.\nTo solve below request, what exactly do you need to show the fund admin? Proof\nof account ownership or money inflow (source of funds)\nFor going forward activity, GClub is now a direct client of MBI, so wires will be\nsent from GClubs account at MBI, but the wires will always come from BSI as the\nMBI corresponding bank . We (MBI bank) will have the flow of funds from GClub\nclient to the account, so we will have the ability to trace the full flow of funds in\nand out of the GCLUB account.\n39\n\nvi. Similarly, on or about July 1, 2021, Hadjicharalambolous sent an\nemail to an employee at Medici Bank, directing Medici Bank to transfer approximately $4 million\nfrom a G Club Medici Bank account to a G Club MBI account. The wire instructions attached to\nthe email identify MBI as the beneficiary entity, but list Reserve Trust as the beneficiary bank.\nvii. Based on my participation in this Investigation, I believe that the\nforegoing explanation is an example of the manner in which GUO, JE, and others launder\nInvestment Scheme Funds through multiple financial institutions in an effort to, among other\nthings, conceal their source. See ¶ 56(b)(3).\nTracing of Fraudulent Proceeds\n57. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. Investors participate in the Investment Schemes by either wiring money\ndirectly to a bank account controlled or used by entities affiliated with GUO, JE, and others\n(including the Farms, G Club, or the Himalaya Exchange), or by wiring or otherwise transferring\nmoney to other entities at the direction of the Target Subjects (including, for example, Crane, BSI\nGroup, Reserve Trust, or Prime Trust), which funds are then transmitted to bank accounts\nultimately controlled by GUO, GUO’s associates, and JE. I have discovered accounts located in\nthe UAE, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Bahamas, and the British Virgin Islands,\nwhich GUO, JE, and other Target Subjects have used for the purpose of receiving investment funds\nfrom investors in the Unregistered Stock Offerings, the Convertible Loan Offering, G Club, and\nthe Himalaya Exchange.\n40\n\nb. To date, I and analysts at the FBI and SEC have identified and attempted to\ntrace more than approximately $1.04 billion in Investment Scheme Fund transactions, a substantial\npart of which has been laundered through financial institutions located in at least four different\ncountries, including the United States, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, and the UAE.\nFraud Proceeds are Combined in Hamilton Bahamas Account Before Transfer to Certain of the\nSilvergate Target Accounts\n58. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. Between in or about May 2021 and June 2021, approximately $100 million\nin Investment Scheme Funds were transferred from G Club bank accounts into the Hamilton\nBahamas Account. Before the approximately $100 million was combined in the Hamilton\nBahamas Account, the Investment Scheme Funds were layered through a series of entities at\nvarious different banks in a manner that, based on my training and experience, is indicative of\nmoney laundering. Specifically:\ni. As described above, certain prospective Investment Scheme\ninvestors were instructed to send funds intended as an investment in GTV (for example) to a bank\naccount in the name of Crane. See supra at ¶ 40(f). Approximately $78.2 million of Investment\nScheme Funds was sent from individual or institutional investors in China and elsewhere to two\nCrane Advisory bank accounts (the “Crane Citibank Accounts”) between in or about November\n2020 and April 2021.\n41\n\nii. Approximately $60 million of those Investment Scheme Funds were\nthen transferred from the Crane Citibank Accounts to approximately five different bank accounts\nat MSSB held in the name of Crane (together, the “Crane MSSB Accounts”).\niii. The approximately $60 million in Investment Scheme Funds from\nthe Crane MSSB Accounts was combined with approximately $49 million in other Investment\nScheme Funds that had been transferred into the Crane MSSB Accounts from two Crane accounts\nat a different bank, Capital One (together, the “Crane Capital One Accounts”), raising the total\ncombined balance in the Crane MSSB Accounts to approximately $109 million.\niv. Approximately $79 million of those approximately $109 million in\nInvestment Scheme Funds in the Crane MSSB Accounts were then transferred to accounts at the\nsame bank (i.e., MSSB), but in the name of G Club (i.e., the G Club MSSB Accounts). The\napproximately $79 million was combined with approximately $79.7 million in other Investment\nScheme Funds that had been transferred into the G Club MSSB Accounts from individual G Club\nInvestors and from G Club bank accounts at Signature Bank, First Bank of Puerto Rico, and City\nNational Bank, raising the total combined balance of Investment Scheme Funds in the G Club\nMSSB Accounts to more than approximately $158 million.\nv. Approximately $85 million of Investment Scheme Funds was\ntransferred from the G Club MSSB Accounts to the Hamilton Bahamas Account, and combined\nwith approximately $15 million in other Investment Scheme Funds (relating to G Club and the\nHimalaya Assets) sourced from a bank account in the name of BSI Group. See ¶ 56(b)(v). Thus,\nthe $100 million of Investment Scheme Funds in the Hamilton Bahamas Account consisted of\n42\n\nfunds transferred from the G Club MSSB Accounts and other accounts containing Investment\nScheme Funds.\nFraud Proceeds are Transferred to Silvergate Bank\n59. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. On or about July 5, 2021, JE submitted a business bank account application\nto Silvergate Bank (the “Silvergate Application”) in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Funds\nSPC. JE’s company, Hamilton, is the investment manager of the Cayman Islands-registered hedge\nfund, Hamilton Investment Opportunity SPC. Between in or about July 2021 and the present, JE\nopened more than approximately 14 bank accounts at Silvergate Bank in the name of various\nHamilton-affiliated hedge funds or entities, including Hamilton Investment Opportunity SPC and\nHamilton Digital Assets Fund SP, and at least four bank accounts at Silvergate Bank in the name\nof Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. See ¶ 19(d)(iii).\nb. Between on or about September 1, 2021 and on or about July 5, 2022, JE-\ncontrolled Silvergate Bank accounts received approximately $664 million in Investment Scheme\nFunds. Specifically:\ni. In or about September 2021, approximately $85 million of the\nInvestment Scheme Funds was transferred from the Hamilton Bahamas Account, see supra at\n¶ 56(b)(iv), to a Silvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending\nin 9306 (the “9306 Silvergate Account”). The approximately $85 million was combined with\napproximately $25 million in Investment Scheme Funds sourced from a bank account in the name\n43\n\nof Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. at a bank in the Bahamas (the “Himalaya Bahamas\nAccount”). Thus, as of in or about late September 2021, the 9306 Silvergate Account held at least\napproximately $110 million in Investment Scheme Funds.\nii. On or about October 27, 2021, approximately $59 million of the\napproximately $110 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the 9306 Silvergate\nAccount to a Silvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Digital Assets, ending in 7747 (the\n“7747 Silvergate Account”). Later that same day, the approximately $59 million was transferred\nfrom the 7747 Silvergate Account to Target Account-1 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the\nname of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 7739).\niii. Also on or about October 27, 2021, approximately $25 million of\nthe approximately $110 million was transferred from the 9306 Silvergate Account to Target\nAccount-2 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC,\nending in 7705). As described in greater detail below, once received in Target Account-2, the\nmonies were combined with approximately $50 million in Himalaya Asset Investor Funds sourced\nfrom an FV Bank account in the name of Himalaya International Clearing Ltd., ending in 3763\n(the “3763 FV Account”).\n1. Approximately $30 million of the $50 million transferred\nfrom the 3763 FV Account into Target Account-2 can be traced to the approximately $110 million\nin Investment Scheme Funds that had been held in the 9306 Silvergate Account. That is, while\napproximately $25 million of the $110 million was transferred directly to Target Account-2 on\nor about October 27, 2021, an additional $30 million of the approximately $110 million was\ntransferred into Target Account-2 only after passing through three other bank accounts: the 7747\nSilvergate Account (held in the name of Hamilton Digital Assets), then Target Account-1 (held\n44\n\nin the name Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC), and finally the 3763 FV Account (held in the name\nof Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.).\niv. Also on or about October 27, 2021, approximately $26 million of\nthe approximately $110 million was transferred from the 9306 Silvergate Account to a Silvergate\nBank account in the name of Hamilton Diversified Trading Fund, ending in 7762 (the “7762\nSilvergate Account”). Later that same day, the approximately $26 million was transferred from\nthe 7762 Silvergate Account to Target Account-3 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the name of\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 7754). Approximately two months later, on or about\nJanuary 4, 2022, approximately $26 million was transferred from Target Account-3 to the UAE\nACA Capital Account (i.e., an offshore bank account controlled by JE). See ¶¶ 32, 34.\nc. On or about December 2, 2021, approximately $46.5 million in Investment\nScheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-1 to Target Account-4 (i.e., a Silvergate\nBank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 7713). Once received in\nTarget Account-4, the monies were combined with approximately $5.6 million in Investment\nScheme Funds sourced from the Himalaya Bahamas Account (which funds passed through a\nSilvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton PE Fund SP, ending in 7721), raising the\ncombined balance of Target Account-4 to approximately $52.1 million.\nd. On or about December 17, 2021, approximately $24.5 million of the\napproximately $52.1 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-\n4 to a bank account in the name of Insight Title Services LLC Trust AC; the stated purpose of the\ntransaction was for the purchase of residential property in Mahwah, New Jersey on behalf of an\nentity called Taurus Fund SP. Based on my review of a corporate resolution signed by JE, I have\nlearned that Taurus Fund SP is a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (i.e.,\nthat JE controls Taurus Fund SP).\n45\n\ne. Between at least on or about January 24, 2022 and on or about April 4, 2022,\napproximately $73.8 million of Investment Scheme Funds was transferred into Target Account-\n5 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 2770).\nThe incoming transfers into Target Account-5 consisted primarily of wires ranging between\napproximately $1,100 to approximately $3 million from Chinese individuals, with some\nindividuals sending multiple incoming wires. Based on my participation in this investigation and\nmy training and experience, I believe the transfers into Target Account-5 are consistent with\nmoney laundering, including layering funds through different entities—for example, directing\ninvestor funds into a bank account in the names of an entity other than the intended investment\nvehicle, which here would be G Club or Himalaya Exchange. I further believe that the incoming\ntransfers are consistent with G Club investors purchasing multiple memberships, and therefore are\nfraud proceeds. See ¶ 40(g).\nf. Between on or about March 10, 2022 and on or about April 1, 2022,\napproximately $77,998,889.20 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from bank\naccounts in the name of HCHK Technologies or HCHK Property into Target Account-6 (i.e., a\nSilvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 2762). As\ndescribed above, starting in or about July 2021, various GUO-affiliated entities began to operate\nunder the newly-formed companies HCHK Technologies and HCHK Property. See ¶ 41. Based\non my participation in this investigation and my training and experience, and as described above,\nI believe the nature of the transfers into Target Account-6 are consistent with money laundering,\nincluding layering funds through different entities and concealing their true source and/or purpose.\nSee, e.g., ¶ 56(b)(v).\ng. The Investment Scheme Funds were traced into Target Account-7 and\nTarget Account-8 in the following manner:\n46\n\ni. On or about January 31, 2022, approximately $5.1 million in\nInvestment Scheme Funds was transferred from a bank account in the name of a particular Chinese\ninvestor (“Investor-2”) into Target Account-7 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the name of\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 2820).\nii. Between on or about January 31, 2022 and on or about February 4,\n2022, approximately $1 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from bank accounts\nin the names of two particular Chinese investors (“Investor-3” and “Investor-4”) into Target\nAccount-8 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC,\nending in 2747).\niii. Based on my review of subpoena returns and search warrant returns,\nI have learned that Investor-2 through -4 had previously invested in the GTV Stock Offering and/or\nthe other Investment Schemes. Specifically:\n1. According to a spreadsheet GTV maintained of more than\napproximately 1,200 investors in the GTV Stock Offering, Investor-2, Investor-3, and Investor-4\neach purchased GTV stock; Investor-2 purchased approximately 3.3 million shares, Investor-3\npurchased approximately 2 million shares, and Investor-4 purchased approximately 800,000\nshares.\n2. On or about January 25, 2021, the President of Crane\nemailed “onboarding profiles” for Investor-2, Investor-3, and Investor-4 to MSSB. As described\nabove, see ¶ 40(f), potential investors in the Investment Schemes were directed to send their\ninvestments to Crane, which purportedly served as payment processor for GTV, G Club, and/or\nHimalaya Exchange.\n3. On or about June 15, 2021, Investor-2 emailed a wire\ntransfer request to MSSB that stated the following, in substance and in part: “I’d like to invest [in]\n47\n\na company called Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.” The email requested a wire of\napproximately $3.4M to a Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. account at Metropolitan\nCommercial Bank. See infra ¶ 59(h).\nh. Based on my participation in this Investigation and my training and\nexperience, and as described above, I believe the approximately $5.1M in transfers from Investor-\n2 into Target Account-7 and the approximately $1 million in transfers from Investor-3 and\nInvestor-4 into Target Account-8 are the proceeds of wire fraud and money laundering, because\nthey are funds Investors-2 through-4 paid with the intent to purchase additional G Club\nmemberships and/or Himalaya Assets, but which GUO, JE and others instead directed into JE’s\nhedge fund bank account to conceal their true source and/or purpose. See, e.g., ¶ 56(b)(v).\ni. On or about June 11, 2021, JE opened Target Account-9 (i.e., a Silvergate\nBank account in the name of JE’s company, Hamilton Investment Management Ltd., ending in\n0288). Between at least in or about January 2022 and in or about June 2022, at least approximately\n$50.4 million of Investment Scheme Funds was transferred into Target Account-9 over the course\nof approximately five incoming wire transfers; specifically:\n1. On or about January 13, 2022, Target Account-9 received an\nincoming wire of approximately $10.8 million in Investment Scheme Funds from a Signature Bank\naccount in the name of Prime Trust, ending in 6126 (the “Prime Trust Signature Account”). See\n¶ 56(b)(i)-(iii).\n2. On or about February 10, 2022, Target Account-9 received an\nincoming wire of approximately $11.7 million in Investment Scheme Funds from the Prime Trust\nSignature Account.\n3. On or about June 13, 2022, Target Account-9 received an incoming\nwire of approximately $8 million in Investment Scheme Funds from a particular bank account at\n48\n\nMetropolitan Commercial Bank (“MCB”), ending in 6891 (the “6891 MCB Account”).\nTransaction details provided by Silvergate Bank list “FV Bank – Himalaya International” as the\nPayer on the transaction, and identify MCB as the name of the “Payer” financial institution. FV\nBank records, in turn, reflect that the transfer was from the 3763 FV Account, but do not reflect\nany involvement of MCB as an intermediary for the transaction. Based on information provided\nby MCB, I have learned that the 6891 MCB Account was a pooled funds account for FV Bank,\nand have further learned that MCB processes transactions for FV Bank’s account holders (as\nrelevant here, the Himalaya entities) in USD.\nj. On or about June 14, 2022, Target Account-9 received an incoming wire\nof approximately $10 million in Investment Scheme Funds from the 6891 MCB Account. FV\nBank account records reflect that the transfer was actually from the 3763 FV Account, but do not\nreflect any involvement of MCB as an intermediary for the transaction.\nk. On or about June 22, 2022, Target Account-9 received an incoming wire\nof approximately $10 million in Investment Scheme Funds from the 6891 MCB Account. FV\nBank account records reflect that the transfer was from the 3763 FV Account, but do not reflect\nany involvement of MCB as an intermediary for the transaction.\nFraud Proceeds are Used to Fund GUO-Affiliated Companies\n60. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. As described above, JE’s company owns approximately 95% of Gettr. See\nsupra at ¶ 41(f).\n49\n\nb. On or about June 30, 2022, approximately $3 million was transferred from\nTarget Account-4 to Target Account-10 (i.e., a Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. bank account\nheld in the name of GETTR USA, Inc., ending in 4409). The wire details reflect that the transfer\nwas for “CAPITAL CALL JUNE 3M USD.”\nc. On or about July 27, 2022, approximately $3 million was transferred from\nTarget Account-4 to Target Account-10. The wire details reflect that the transfer was for\n“CAPITAL CALL JULY 3M USD.”\nd. On or about August 29, 2022, approximately $5 million was transferred\nfrom Target Account-4 to Target Account-10. The wire details reflect that the transfer was for\n“CAPITAL CALL AUGUST 10M USD (X2 5M).”\ne. On or about August 30, 2022, an additional approximately $5 million was\ntransferred from Target Account-4 to Target Account-10. The wire details reflect that the\ntransfer was for “CAPITAL CALL AUGUST 5M USD (10M TRA NSFER 2 of 2).”\nf. Based on the foregoing, I believe that JE and others are using fraud proceeds\nto fund Gettr.\nFraud Proceeds are Layered Through Various Banking Institutions\n61. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. As described herein, GUO, JE, and others have layered fraud proceeds\nthrough accounts at various entities, including, among others: certain accounts at MCB maintained\n50\n\nFBO FV Bank’s account holders (i.e., the Himalaya entities); and accounts held by BSI Group in\nthe name of various entities. See ¶ 56(b).\nb. As further described herein, FV Bank holds Investment Scheme Funds in\ncorrespondent bank accounts, or FBO accounts, at MCB.\n62. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned that, starting at least in or about February 2022, JE and\nothers began to layer more than approximately $300 million in Investment Scheme Funds through\ncertain bank accounts. Specifically:\na. Between on or about February 15, 2022 and on or about March 29, 2022,\napproximately $160 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the 3763 FV\nAccount to a Royal Business Bank account in the name of Prime Trust LLC, ending in 6050 (the\n“Prime Trust RBB Account”) in the course of approximately 16 wire transactions.\nb. On or about March 21, 2022, JE opened an FV Bank account in the name\nof Himalaya International Financial Group, ending in 2119 (the “2119 FV Account”) and an FV\nBank account in the name of Himalaya International Reserves Ltd., ending in 8239 (the “8239 FV\nAccount”).\nc. Between on or about March 21, 2022 and on or about May 13, 2022,\napproximately $190 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the 3763 FV\nAccount (i.e., the Himalaya Clearing FV Bank account ending in 3763) to the 2119 FV Account\nand the 8239 FV Account in the course of approximately 12 wire transactions. For example:\n51\n\ni. Between on or about March 21, 2022 and on or March 29, 2022,\napproximately $100 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the 3763 FV\nAccount to the 2119 FV Account and/or the 8239 FV Account in the course of approximately 10\nwire transactions.\nii. On or about May 13, 2022, approximately $30 million in Investment\nScheme Funds was transferred from the 3763 FV Account to the 2119 FV Account in a single wire\ntransaction, and approximately $60 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the\n3763 FV Account to the 8239 FV Account in a single wire transaction.\nd. On or about May 24, 2022, approximately $44.6 million in Investment\nScheme Funds was transferred from the 2119 FV Account to the 8239 FV Account in a single wire\ntransaction.\ni. The approximately $44.6 million was part of approximately $80\nmillion that had been transferred from the 3763 FV Account to the 2119 FV Account. See\n¶ 62(c)(i)(ii).\nii. That is, while approximately $110 million was transferred directly\nfrom the 3763 FV Account to the 8239 FV Account, an additional approximately $44.6 million of\nthe approximately $190 million was transferred into the 8239 FV Account only after passing\nthrough the 2119 FV Account.\ne. On or about August 15, 2022, an employee of MCB sent email correspondence\nconfirming MCB’s relationship with FV Bank regarding Target Account-11, which is an MCB\naccount FBO FV Bank customers. The MCB employee confirmed that Target Account-11 is a\npooled account that contains funds for the Himalaya entities (i.e., the 3763 FV Account, the 2119\nFV Account, and the 8239 FV Account).\n52\n\n63. Based on my review of information provided by Silvergate, I have learned that\nTarget Account-1 through Target Account-9 held a combined total of approximately\n$292,407,029.22 as of on or about August 31, 2022, as reflected in the table below:\nTarget Account Account Number Balance\nTarget Account-1 5090037739 $1,800,000.00\nTarget Account-2 5090037705 $75,000,000.00\nTarget Account-3 5090037754 $467,343.00\nTarget Account-4 5090037713 $167,826.87\nTarget Account-5 5090042770 $83,872,761.75\nTarget Account-6 5090042762 $76,690,856.60\nTarget Account-7 5090042820 $5,106,100.00\nTarget Account-8 5090042747 $1,026,000.00\nTarget Account-9 5090030288 $48,276,141.00\nTotal $292,407,029.22\n64. Based on my review of information from Silvergate, I have learned that Target\nAccount-10 received a total of approximately $16,000,000.00 from Target Account-4 between\non or about June 30, 2022 and on or about August 30, 2022.\n65. Based on my review of information provided by FV Bank and MCB, I have learned\nthat Target Account-11 held a combined total of approximately $13,613,172.71 as of on or about\nAugust 15, 2022.\nIII. Conclusion\n66. Based on the foregoing, I submit that there is probable cause to believe that funds\nheld in the accounts constituting the Target Property are subject to forfeiture as proceeds of\nviolations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud) and § 1344 (bank fraud), and/or as property involved\nin violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and 1956(h) (money laundering\nand conspiracy to commit money laundering).\n53\n\n67. Accordingly, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(b), I respectfully request that the Court\nissue a warrant authorizing the seizure of the Target Property.\n/s/ Anthony Alecci, by SDA with permission\n_____________________________________\nANTHONY ALECCI\nSpecial Agent\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nSworn to me through the transmission of this\nAffidavit by reliable electronic means, pursuant to\nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(d)(3) and 4.1,\nthis 18th day of September, 2022\n_____________________________________\nTHE HONORABLE STEWART D. AARON\nUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n54","body_zh":"证物 B\n\n22 MAG 7580\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n密件归档\n诉\n支持扣押令的宣誓书\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 所持有的 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号 5090037739 内包含的所有金钱与资金（“目标账户-1”），依据 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 和 984\n以及可追溯至该处的所有资金，包括应计利息；\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 所持有的 Silvergate Bank 账号 5090037705 内包含的所有金钱与资金（“目标账户-2”），\n以及可追溯至该处的所有资金，包括应计利息；\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 所持有的 Silvergate Bank 账号 5090037754 内包含的所有金钱与资金（“目标账户-3”），\n以及可追溯至该处的所有资金，包括应计利息；\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 所持有的 Silvergate Bank 账号 5090037713 内包含的所有金钱与资金（“目标账户-4”），\n以及可追溯至该处的所有资金，包括应计利息；\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 所持有的 Silvergate Bank 账号 5090042770 内包含的所有金钱与资金（“目标账户-5”），\n以及可追溯至该处的所有资金，包括应计利息；\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 所持有的 Silvergate Bank 账号 5090042762 内包含的所有金钱与资金（“目标账户-6”），\n以及可追溯至该处的所有资金，包括应计利息；\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 所持有的 Silvergate Bank 账号 5090042820 内包含的所有金钱与资金（“目标账户-7”），\n\n及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账户 5090042747 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户由 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）（“目标账户-8”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；Silvergate Bank 账户 5090030288 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户由 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（汉密尔顿投资管理有限公司）（“目标账户-9”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co.（制造商与贸易商信托公司）账户 9878904409 中包含的、最高不超过且包括 16,000,000.00 美元金额的任何及所有金钱和资金，该账户由 GETTR USA, Inc.（“目标账户-10”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；以及 Metropolitan Commercial Bank（大都会商业银行）账户 0299006891 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户为 FV Bank 的利益持有（“目标账户-11”），及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息（统称“目标财产”）。对物被告。\n\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）) ss.:\n\nFederal Bureau of Investigation（美国联邦调查局）特别探员 Anthony Alecci 经正式宣誓，作证并陈述如下：\n\nI. 导言\n\n1. 我是 Federal Bureau of Investigation（“FBI”或“调查机构”）的一名特别探员。我自 2020 年 8 月前后起担任 FBI 特别探员。自 2021 年 9 月前后起，我被指派至 FBI 的复杂金融犯罪小组。在 FBI 任职期间，我参与了针对证券及电汇欺诈计划、银行欺诈和洗钱的调查，并开展或参与了（除其他事项外）对证人的询问、对财务记录的审查以及搜查令的执行。特别是，我参与了涉及实体场所、电子设备和其他电子证据的搜查令执行。\n\n2. 本宣誓书系为支持美利坚合众国依据 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 和 984 申请签发查扣令而提交：\na. Silvergate Bank 账户 5090037739 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户由 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-1”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\nb. Silvergate Bank 账户 5090037705 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户由 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-2”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\nc. Silvergate Bank 账户 5090037754 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户由 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-3”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\nd. Silvergate Bank 账户 5090037713 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户由 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-4”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\ne. Silvergate Bank 账户 5090042770 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户由 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-5”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\nf. Silvergate Bank 账户 5090042762 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户由 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-6”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\ng. Silvergate Bank 账户 5090042820 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户由 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-7”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\nh. Silvergate Bank 账户 5090042747 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户由 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-8”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；以及\ni. Silvergate Bank 账户 5090030288 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户由 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（“目标账户-9”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\nj. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. 账户 9878904409 中包含的、最高不超过且包括 16,000,000.00 美元金额的任何及所有金钱和资金，该账户由 GETTR USA, Inc.（“目标账户-10”）持有，及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；以及\nk. Metropolitan Commercial Bank 账户 0299006891 中包含的所有金钱和资金，该账户为 FV Bank 的利益持有（“FBO”）（“目标账户-11”），及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息（统称“目标财产”）。\n\n3. 如下所述，目标财产构成违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343（电汇欺诈）；1344（银行欺诈）；以及 1956（洗钱及共谋洗钱）（统称“目标罪行”）的收益。\n\n4. 本宣誓书基于（除其他信息来源外）：(i) 我的个人知情；(ii) 参与平行调查的 U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会，“SEC”）人员提供的信息；(iii) 我对涉及（除其他项目外）“G Club”和“Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）”的公开宣传材料的审查；(iv) 我对 GTV Media Group, Inc.（“GTV”）、Himalaya Exchange 和“G Club”公开网站以及这些网站上可用材料的审查；(v) 我在互联网上开展的开源网络研究；(vi) 我对 GTV Media Group, Inc. 及其雇员和代理人在 www.gnews.org（“GNews”）上发布的数字视频的审查；(vii) 我对多名证人询问的参与；(viii) 我对依据传票、依据 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) 针对非内容信息签发的命令以及司法授权的搜查令所获得的电子证据的审查；(ix) 我本人以及 FBI 和 SEC 的财务分析师对各种银行账户记录的审查和分析，包括依据传票和其他请求从金融机构获取的财务记录；(xi) 我与其他执法人员的交谈；以及 (x) 我关于实施金融犯罪方面的培训和经验。由于提交本宣誓书的有限目的仅为确立合理根据，因此并未包含我在调查过程中了解到的所有事实。凡在此载明日期的、数字和计算，均为近似值。凡在此报告文件内容以及他人的行动、陈述和谈话的，除另有说明外，均按其实质和部分予以报告。\n\n5. 如下所述，存在合理根据相信目标财产作为涉及违反 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) 的财产，和/或违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 和 1344 的收益，或可追溯至此的财产，依据 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)、(C) 和 (D) 以及 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) 应当予以查扣和没收。总括而言，证据揭示了一系列欺诈性投资计划（“投资计划”），涉及多家相互关联的公司及其关联实体，包括 GTV Media Group Inc.、G Fashion（“G Fashion”）、Himalaya Farm Alliance（“农场”）、Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.（“喜马拉雅国际清算”）、G Club Operations LLC（“G Club”）、Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（“Hamilton”）、ACA Capital Group Ltd.（“ACA Capital”）以及 Crane Advisory Group LLC（“Crane”）。如下文更详细所述，欺诈性投资计划的头目是 Miles Guo（又名“Guo Wengui [郭文贵]”，又名“Miles Kwok”）（“GUO”）和 William Je（又名 Je Kin Ming [余建明]）（“JE”）。\n\n6. FBI 和 SEC 的分析师与我已将来自投资计划受害者的某些欺诈收益追踪至目标财产。\n\nII. 没收的法定依据\n\n7. 目标财产应予民事查扣和没收所依据的法定条款如下：\n\n洗钱罪行\n\n8. 《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(A) 条规定，以下财产应予民事没收：\n涉及违反本编第 1956、1957 或 1960 条的交易或未遂交易的任何不动产或动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产。\n\n9. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) 规定，任何人若：\n明知涉及某项金融交易的财产涉及某种形式非法活动的收益，仍进行或试图进行该等在事实上涉及特定非法活动收益的金融交易——\n(B) 明知该交易在全部或部分上的设计目的为——\n(i) 隐瞒或掩饰特定非法活动收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权[即构成犯罪。]\n\n10. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) 规定，任何人若：\n从美国境内某地向美国境外某地或通过美国境外某地，或从美国境外某地向美国境内某地或通过美国境外某地，运输、传送或转移，或试图运输、传送或转移货币工具或资金——\n(B) 明知涉及该运输、传送或转移的货币工具或资金代表某种形式非法活动的收益，且明知该等运输、传送或转移在全部或部分上的设计目的为——\n(i) 隐瞒或掩饰特定非法活动收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权[即构成犯罪。]\n\n11. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) 进一步规定，“凡共谋实施[第 1956 条]所界定的任何罪行的人，均应受到针对作为共谋目标的罪行所规定的同等处罚。”\n\n银行和电汇欺诈罪行\n\n12. 就第 1956 条而言，18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) 中界定的“特定非法活动”包括（除其他事项外）违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 和 1344 的行为。参见 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7) 和 1961(1)。\n\n13. 《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条规定，对“构成或源自可追溯至违反……构成‘特定非法活动’（如本编第 1956(c)(7) 条所界定）的任何罪行或共谋实施该等罪行的收益的任何不动产或动产”予以民事没收。\n\n查扣令\n\n14. 法院依 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) 获赋权就依据 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) 和 (C) 应予没收的任何财产签发查扣令。第 981(b)(2) 条规定，该等查扣可“依据按照《联邦刑事诉讼规则》为搜查令规定的相同方式获得的令状进行”。此外，第 981(b)(3) 条规定，尽管有《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 41(a) 条的规定，司法官仍可依据第 981(b) 条，在可依据《美国法典》第 28 编第 1355(b) 条对该财产提起没收诉讼的任何地区签发查扣令。依据第 1355(b)(1)(A) 条，没收诉讼或程序可在引起没收的任何作为或不作为发生地所在的地区提起。如下所述，作为所申请查扣令之基础的罪行包括在纽约南区发生的作为或不作为。\n\n15. 关于种类物（包括现金及存入金融机构的资金），18 U.S.C. § 984 在相关部分中规定：\n(a)(1) 在标的财产为现金、无记名货币工具、存入金融机构账户的资金……或贵金属的任何对物没收诉讼中：\n(A) 政府无需指认涉及作为没收基础的罪行的特定财产；且\n(B) 涉及该等罪行的财产已被转移并被同等财产替代，不得作为抗辩理由。\n(2) 除 (b) 款另有规定外，在涉及作为没收基础的罪行的财产所在的同一地点或账户中发现的任何同等财产，均应依据本条予以没收。\n\n(b) 依据本条规定对无法直接追溯至作为没收基础之犯罪行为的财产提起没收诉讼的，自犯罪行为发生之日起超过 1 年的，不得提起。\n\nIII. 相当理由\n\nA. 关于实施涉案犯罪行为的相当理由\n\n欺诈性投资计划概述\n\n16. 自 2020 年 5 月前后起，United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦检察官办公室，简称“SDNY”）与 FBI（联邦调查局）以及其他执法机构，一直在对一系列相互关联的欺诈性投资计划进行调查，该等计划涉及由 GUO（郭文贵）、JE（余建明）及其同伙拥有、运营或以其他方式关联的数家公司（统称“投资计划”）。迄今为止，调查（“调查”）显示，上述投资计划涉及数亿美元的招揽募资以及随后的投资和/或侵占挪用。GUO 和 JE 是该等投资计划的头目。\n\n17. 上述投资计划是通过各种相互关联的发售项目进行的，所有这些项目均表现出符合欺诈特征的情形。例如，向投资者承诺不切实际的巨额投资回报；基于大量虚假陈述诱导投资者进行投资；大部分投资款项被挪用侵占；且就数字资产证券的销售而言，尽管曾陈述称该等货币可在公开交易所交易，但它们从未能够在公开交易所进行交易。\n\n18. 上述相互关联的投资计划中，部分属于过去的计划，而另一些目前仍在进行中。具体而言：\n\na. 下文所述的 GTV 股票发售及 G 币（G Coin）发售（统称“未注册股票发售”）于 2020 年 4 月前后至 2020 年 7 月前后期间运作。由于收益被混同的未注册股票发售，与 GUO、JE 及其他人关联的公司共同从 5,000 多名投资者（包括位于 United States（美国）的个人）处募集了至少约 4.87 亿美元。\n\nb. 至少自 2020 年 7 月前后起，该计划的头目开始向投资者推销一套新的投资机会，宣传称这是将其在 GTV 的现有投资转换为对 GTV 的“借款”的机会（即“可转换借款发售”）。该可转换借款发售由郭支持的 Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）实施，该联盟由分布在世界各城市的中国海外侨民非正式群体即“农场”（Farms）组成。在 2020 年 8 月前后至 2021 年 3 月期间，设在美国的农场通过可转换借款发售募集了约 1.48 亿美元。\n\nc. GUO、JE 和其他人继续开展上述投资计划，包括与 G Club（自 2020 年 10 月前后开始运营）和 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所，自 2021 年 4 月前后开始运营）相关的计划。如下文所述，在 2020 年 9 月前后至今，G Club 和喜马拉雅交易所已募集了至少约 6.64 亿美元。\n\nGUO 与 JE 的背景情况\n\n19. 基于我参与本次调查的情况、专业培训、工作经验、对执法报告的审查、对社交媒体平台上发布的文档、记录和视频的审查，以及我在互联网上进行的公开来源检索，并结合我与他人的交谈，除其他事项外，我获悉了以下内容：\n\na. GUO 是一名自称的亿万富翁，且为中国国籍公民，据称其在获悉一名同伙因腐败指控被捕后，于 2014 年逃往美国。\n\nb. GUO 卷入了与上述投资计划相关的多家实体，详情见下文所述，其中包括 GTV、G Music LLC（G 音乐有限公司，简称“G Music”）、G Club、G Fashion（G 时尚，简称“G Fashion”）以及 GETTR USA, Inc.（盖特美国公司，简称“Gettr”）。GUO 在这些实体中并不担任正式头衔或职务。\n\nc. 2018 年前后，GUO 创立了名为 Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金，简称“ROLF”）和 Rule of Law Society（法治社会，简称“ROLS”）的组织。根据我对公开信息的审查，我获悉法治项目在 2018 年 12 月前已在开展。1 ROLF 和 ROLS 据称是致力于揭露和打击 Chinese Communist Party（中国共产党，简称“CCP”）在华腐败的组织。有时，ROLF 和/或 ROLS 的董事会成员包括 Stephen K. Bannon（斯蒂芬·K·班农，简称“Bannon”）和 Kyle Bass（凯尔·巴斯，简称“Bass”）。GUO 在 ROLF 或 ROLS 中不担任正式职务；然而，在 ROLS 网站上，GUO 被称为“创始人、推动者兼发言人”以及赞助人。\n1 参见 http（描述郭和班农参与“法治基金”的情况）。\n\nd. JE 作为 GUO 的亲密同伙，被称为金融家和企业家。JE 卷入了与上述投资计划相关的其他多家实体，详情见下文所述。具体而言：\n\ni. JE 是 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（汉密尔顿投资管理有限公司，简称“Hamilton”）的首席执行官（CEO），该公司据称是一家全球基金管理公司。2 Hamilton 总部设在英属维尔京群岛，于 2018 年 2 月 5 日前后注册成立。JE 于 2019 年 3 月 20 日前后被正式任命为 Hamilton 的董事。\n2 参见 http\n\nii. JE 是 ACA Capital Group Ltd.（阿卡资本集团有限公司，简称“ACA Capital”）的董事，该公司据称是一家总部位于香港的投资公司3，于 2020 年 7 月 10 日前后在英国注册成立。\n3 参见 http\n\niii. JE 被列为喜马拉雅交易所的创始人兼主席，该交易所据称是一个加密货币“生态系统”。JE 是运营喜马拉雅交易所的多家实体的 100% 实益拥有人，包括 Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司，简称“Himalaya Clearing”）、Major Lead International Ltd.（领航国际有限公司）、Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际金融集团有限公司，简称“Himalaya Financial”）以及 Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际储备有限公司，简称“Himalaya Reserves”）。\n\nGTV 股票发售\n\n20. 在约 2020 年 4 月 20 日至 2020 年 6 月 2 日期间，GTV、其母公司 Saraca Media Group, Inc.（萨拉卡传媒集团公司，简称“Saraca”）以及 Voice of Guo Media, Inc.（郭之声传媒公司，简称“VOG”；统称“涉案诸公司”）向成千上万名个人招揽投资，认购 GTV 普通股发售（“GTV 股票发售”）。在此期间，约 5,000 多名投资者（包括许多在美国的投资者）总共支付了约 4.52 亿美元用于认购所谓的 GTV 普通股。\n\n21. 根据我对日期为 2020 年 4 月 20 日的 GTV 股票发售信息备忘录（“备忘录”）的审查、对证人的询问、对公开来源信息的审查，以及在调查过程中获取的文件和记录，除其他事项外，我获悉了以下内容：\n\na. GTV 于 2020 年 4 月 17 日前后作为特拉华州公司成立，是 Saraca 的全资子公司。GTV 的主要营业地点位于纽约南区，坐落于 162 E. 64th St., New York, NY, 10065 的一栋联排别墅内（“联排别墅”）。\n\nb. 根据备忘录，GUO 是 Saraca 和 GTV 两家公司的“赞助人”，同时也是 GTV 的“顾问[原文如此]”和“关键主持人”。备忘录还载明，GUO 是一位亿万富翁、成功的商业人士及中国的持不同政见者。根据多名证人的说法以及社交媒体内容，GUO 一贯将自己展现为 GTV 的创始人和代言人面孔。\n\nc. 备忘录以及一份向潜在投资者概述“投资程序指引”的单独函件中，列出了 GUO 的电话号码作为潜在投资者咨询的联络号码。\n\nd. 在 GTV 股票发售期间，涉案诸公司刚刚推出了一个名为 GTV 的以新闻为主的社交媒体平台，包括网站 www.gtv.org。备忘录声称 GTV 将成为“首个将公民新闻和社会新闻的力量与尖端技术、大数据、人工智能、区块链技术和实时互动通信相结合的平台”，并且 GTV 将成为“中国与西方世界之间唯一不受审查且独立的桥梁”。备忘录还声称 GTV 将“成为中国与西方世界之间的桥梁……允许进行不受中国政府审查的自由开放交流、商业交易与贸易”。备忘录夸耀称 GTV 的平台功能将极其强大，以至于能够“揭露在中国的腐败、阻挠、非法、残暴、骚扰和不人道行为”。备忘录还指出，GTV 将与 Zoom、WeChat（微信）、TikTok、YouTube、Cisco（思科）、Citrix、Alibaba（阿里巴巴）、Amazon（亚马逊）和 eBay 等公司展开竞争。\n\ne. 备忘录将 Yvette Y. Wang（王雁平）、Max Krasner 和 Daniel Podhaskie 列为 GTV 的执行董事。\n\nf. 备忘录着重强调了 GTV 非执行董事的资历，其中包括 Bannon、Bass 和 Darren Blanton（达伦·布兰顿，简称“Blanton”）等人。如上文所述，Bannon 和 Bass 当时也是 ROLF 和/或 ROLS 的董事会成员。\n\ng. 备忘录载明，投资者资金将用于包括但不限于以下用途：收购公司；升级 GTV 技术与安全性；以及市场营销。备忘录并未设想将投资者资金用于投资对冲基金或任何类似类型的金融投资，亦未设想将投资者资金提供给其他公司（如 Saraca）。\n\nh. 根据我与参与 ROLF、涉案诸公司、GTV 股票发售及凤凰农场（Phoenix Farm）的信息源（“SOI4”）的交谈，以及我对备忘录元数据的审查，我获悉 JE 是备忘录的主要撰写人。\n4 该 SOI 正在向执法机关提供信息，以期达成合作协议并在量刑时获得宽大处理。该 SOI 提供了可靠的信息，这些信息已得到电子证据、视频、手机记录以及传票和搜查令执行回执等材料的印证。\n\nG 币发售\n\n22. 在 2020 年 4 月至 2020 年 6 月的同一时期，GTV 和 Saraca 还向 GTV 投资者招揽投资于一种被称为 G 币（G-Coins）或 G 美元（G-Dollars）的附随数字资产证券（即“G 币发售”）。\n\n23. 基于我参与本次调查的情况、专业培训、工作经验、对执法报告的审查、对银行记录和发布在社交媒体平台上的视频的审查，以及我对 GTV 投资者询问报告的审查和与包括执法人员在内的其他人的交谈，关于 G 币发售，除其他事项外，我获悉了以下内容：\n\na. 我获悉，自约 2020 年 4 月前后起，至至少约 2020 年 6 月前后止，涉案诸公司以及涉案诸公司的代表（如 GUO）通过 YouTube、Twitter（推特）以及其他视频分享和社交媒体平台上的在线视频，向公众推销 G 币和 G 美元的发售。\n\nb. 涉案诸公司的在线宣传表明，G 币（涉案诸公司指出其最终将并入 G 美元，形成单一数字资产）和 G 美元将可用于在在线平台上购买商品或服务，或兑换黄金或法定货币。作为其招揽 G 币和 G 美元投资者的一部分，涉案诸公司未向投资者提供有关开发任何数字资产或平台计划的财务信息，亦未提供任何书面发售材料，包括例如白皮书或私募备忘录。\n\nc. 涉案诸公司从 G 币和 G 美元投资者处筹集了至少约 3,100 万美元，将收益汇集在与涉案诸公司关联的银行账户中，并将其与来自 GTV 股票发售的收益相混同。作为 G 币发售的一部分，许多投资者在购买 G 币和 G 美元时获得了所谓的每枚 0.01 美元购买价格的 20% 折扣。投资者通过直接向涉案诸公司的美国转账资金参与 G 币发售\n\n银行账户、向各公司在线支付平台账户付款、通过 Apple App Store（苹果应用商店）购买，或通过开具支票。\n\n24. 根据我参与本项调查的情况、培训、经验，并审查了 GUO（郭文贵）就 G Coin Offering（G币发售）所作陈述的翻译件，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉郭文贵为了为 G币发售招揽投资而作出了多项虚假陈述。部分此类陈述的要点及摘录如下：\n\na. 在郭文贵于 2020年5月9日左右的一段视频中包含的陈述中，郭文贵声称 G币可以兑换为美元或实物黄金。\n\nb. 在 2020年5月16日左右的一段视频中包含的另一项陈述中，郭文贵声称 G币和 G-Dollar（G美元）货币可以与黄金进行兑换。\n\n25. 根据我参与本项调查的情况，我认为上述关于 G币和 G美元的陈述是虚假的。具体而言，在调查过程中，我未发现任何证据表明存在或曾经存在过可以将 G币或 G美元兑换为美元或黄金的交易所。\n\n26. 根据我参与本项调查的情况、培训、经验，审查执法报告、审查银行记录、审查发布在社交媒体平台上的视频，以及我审查对投资 GTV 的个人（即“GTV 投资者”）的访谈报告，以及我与他人（包括其他执法人员）的交谈，我获悉了以下关于为 GTV Stock Offering（GTV 股票发售）和 G币发售招揽投资等方面的情况：\n\na. GTV 通过各公司关联网站（包括 www.gtv.org 和 www.gnews.org）上公开可获取的视频，以及在 YouTube 和 Twitter 等社交媒体平台上向公众传播了有关这两项发售的信息。2020年4月21日发布在 YouTube 上的首个招揽视频，英文翻译标题为《GTV 私募认购说明》（即“发布视频”）。该发布视频描述了 GTV 股票发售的投资条款，并提供了一个供潜在投资者用于咨询该发售的移动电话号码。该发布视频的观看次数已超过 3,000 次。包括该发布视频在内的所有 GTV 股票发售招揽视频均未设置密码保护，也未对谁可以观看或分享能力设置任何限制。因此，公众（包括潜在的美国投资者）能够通过例如独立在线搜索、社交媒体或来自其他投资者的推荐等方式访问有关 GTV 股票发售的在线营销视频。\n\nb. 郭文贵主导了为 GTV 股票发售招揽投资者的工作。郭文贵是一名活跃的社交媒体用户，拥有庞大的社交媒体关注者群体，他利用各种社交媒体平台来吸引关注者并为 GTV 股票发售招揽投资者。这些社交媒体平台包括 WhatsApp 和 Discord，两者均具有端到端加密聊天服务。5 除其他事项外，各公司通过手机短信向数百名潜在个人投资者发送了该发布视频，并附带一个指向 Google Drive（谷歌云端硬盘）文件夹的链接，该文件夹包含 GTV 股票发售的其他发售材料，包括认购协议和投资说明。郭文贵还向潜在投资者保证他们将获得巨额回报，一度暗示他们将获得相当于投资额 1,000 倍的回报，参见下文第 40(c) 段。在 2020年6月左右的另一项陈述中，郭文贵在要点和摘录中声称 GTV 股票的价值是其先前价值的 30 倍。\n\n5 端到端加密是一种通信系统，其中仅通信用户可以读取消息。端到端加密可防止执法机关通过窃听或向服务提供商（如 WhatsApp）出具搜查令来拦截此类通信。\n\nc. 根据我对一份 GTV 保密协议的审查，我获悉，为了参与 GTV 股票发售，GTV 投资者被要求签署一份保密协议，要求他们对有关 GTV 的所有信息保密，包括该保密协议的存在本身。\n\nd. GTV 股票发售被构建为对 GTV 10% 股权的私募发售，其余 90% 的 GTV 股权由其母公司 Saraca 控制。根据一家投资基金的尽职调查记录，Saraca 是 Hudson Diamond Holding, Inc.（“Hudson BVI”，一家英属维尔京群岛公司）的全资子公司。Hudson 继而由 Qiang Guo（郭强）全资拥有。根据我对开源材料的审查，我获悉郭强是郭文贵的儿子。\n\ne. 截至 2020年6月初，银行开始怀疑各公司从事潜在的非法活动，并开始关闭与 Saraca、GTV 和郭文贵关联的账户。大约在同一时期，GTV 投资者开始对 GTV 使用其资金的情况以及其投资的合法性表示担忧。其中一些投资者直接向郭文贵表达了担忧，许多投资者要求退还资金。作为回应，郭文贵及其同伙经常试图回避并排挤这些投资者。例如，郭文贵暗示一名投资者是中共间谍，其他投资者不应与该投资者互动。\n\n挪用未注册股票发售资金\n\n27. 通过未注册股票发售募集的投资者资金（统称为“发售资金”）中有很大一部分通过投资被挪用。\n\n28. 根据我参与本项调查的情况、培训、经验，审查执法报告、审查银行记录和传票回执，以及我与他人（包括执法人员和证人）的交谈，我获悉了以下各项情况：\n\na. 郭文贵、JE 及其他人安排了约 1 亿美元的发售资金，代表 GTV 的母公司 Saraca 投资于一家名为 Hayman Capital Management L.P.（“Hayman”）的公司管理的高风险对冲基金投资项目中。根据其网站，Hayman 是一家在 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）注册的资产管理公司，由 Bass 创立，Bass 在转账时担任 GTV 的非执行董事。\n\nb. 2020年5月左右，Bass 协助郭文贵和 JE 投资于名为 Hayman Hong Kong Opportunities Fund（“Hayman 基金”）的高风险投资基金，该基金由 Hayman 运营。\n\nc. JE 就该投资与 Hayman 进行了协调。例如，在 2020年5月29日 JE 发给一名 Hayman 代表（“Hayman 代表-1”）的电子邮件中，JE 在要点及摘录中写道：“我们将设立一个在岸工具和一个离岸工具。在岸工具将投资 1 亿美元，离岸工具将投资 100 万美元。在岸工具的地址是：162 E64th St., New York, NY 10065 United States。”在 2020年5月31日左右，JE 在要点及摘录中写道：“这 100 万美元将来自我的个人账户，并且我拥有[原文如此] Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 100% 的股份。”\n\ni. JE 为“在岸”工具提供的地址是联排别墅的地址。参见上文第 21(a) 段。\n\nii. 根据我参与本项调查的情况、审查银行记录和传票回执，以及我与他人（包括执法人员和证人）的交谈，我获悉该联排别墅已被至少七家与郭文贵关联的实体在公司文件和/或银行账户文件中列为营业地址；具体包括：Saraca、GTV、Golden Spring、Hudson Diamond NY、Greenwich Land、ROLF（直至约 2022年5月）以及 ROLS（直至约 2022年5月）。\n\nd. 在 GTV 股票发售结束三天后，即 2020年6月5日左右，1 亿美元的发售资金从一个特定的摩根大通银行账户转账至与 Hayman 关联的在岸银行账户，用于投资 Hayman 基金。该款项系代表 Saraca 转账；如上所述，Saraca 是 GTV 的母公司，由郭文贵的儿子郭强 100% 拥有。\n\ne. 三天后，即 2020年6月8日左右，100 万美元代表 Hamilton（6 即 JE 的公司）从以 JE 名义开立的银行账户转账至与 Hayman 关联的离岸银行账户，同样用于投资 Hayman 基金。\n\nf. 将发售资金转账给 Hayman 与 GTV 向 GTV 投资者所作关于其资金将如何使用的陈述完全不符。\n\n29. 根据我参与本项调查的情况、培训、经验，审查文件和记录，以及我与他人（包括执法人员）的交谈，我获悉在 2021年9月13日左右，SEC 宣布就各公司违反未注册股票发售（即 GTV 股票发售及相关的数字资产 G币发售）的注册要求达成和解指控。SEC 的和解协议要求各公司支付超过 5.39 亿美元的非法所得没收和罚金。\n\n可转换贷款发售\n\n6 2018年4月，JE 代表 Hamilton 向一家英国银行提交了一份开户文件，其中声称其拥有 Hamilton 100% 的股份，且该公司“不参与投资活动”。\n\n30. 在上述未注册股票发售被银行发现且多个银行账户被冻结后，该计划的头目开始向投资者推销一套新的投资机会。2020年7月左右启动的一项新投资计划向潜在投资者推销称，这是一个将其现有在 GTV 的投资转换为向 GTV 提供的“贷款”的机会。该 Convertible Loan Offering（可转换贷款发售）由“Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）”实施，该联盟是由位于世界各地各个城市（包括纽约和菲尼克斯）的被称为“农场”的中国海外侨民非正式团体组成的集体。喜马拉雅农场联盟声称的宗旨是协助中国民主运动；喜马拉雅农场联盟主要作为私人社群存在于 Discord 等社交媒体平台上。这些农场通常以它们为了银行目的而挂靠的先前已存在的公司名称来称呼；例如，纽约农场的 Mountains of Spices LLC 和 Davy & Tony International Limited，以及菲尼克斯农场的 Maywind Trading LLC、Medical Supply System International LLC 和 Santel LLC。\n\n31. 就可转换贷款发售而言，各农场向潜在投资者提供了一份《贷款协议》，该协议披露贷款将提供给各个农场（例如“菲尼克斯农场（Maywind Trading LLC）”），且借入的资金将由该特定农场用于“一般营运资金目的”。投资者签署了该《贷款协议》，并在向农场转账资金后将其发送给各自的农场头目，但未收到由对方签署的协议副本。\n\n32. 在 2020年8月左右至 2021年3月左右期间，设在美国的各农场总共从可转换贷款发售中筹集了约 1.48 亿美元（即“贷款资金”）。投资者同意向农场提供贷款，以便（在三年期票据到期后）获取 GTV 股份。一旦资金被各美国农场收取，它们便被转账至不同法律实体拥有的境内和境外账户，包括以 ACA Capital 名义开立的阿布扎比银行账户（即“阿联酋 ACA Capital 账户”），该账户由 JE 拥有和控制。\n\n挪用可转换贷款发售资金\n\n33.\n\n通过可转换贷款发售（Convertible Loan Offering）募集的贷款资金（Loan Funds）有很大一部分被挪用，具体如下文所述。34. 根据本人参与本次调查的情况、培训背景、工作经验、对执法报告的审查、对银行记录和传票回执的审查，以及本人与包括执法人员和证人在内的其他人士的谈话，本人获悉（除其他事项外）以下内容：\n\na. JE 是 UAE ACA Capital Account（阿联酋 ACA 资本账户）的唯一签署人。JE 将阿联酋 ACA 资本账户中约 3330 万美元的贷款资金电汇至属于其本人、其妻子 Sin Ring Rong 以及其公司 Hamilton 的瑞士和英国账户。电汇至其本人及妻子个人账户的款项（总计超过约 1000 万美元）被描述为股息、工资或董事费。然而，JE 并非 GTV、Saraca 或其他关联实体的董事或雇员。\n\nb. JE 安排从阿联酋 ACA 资本账户向以三家公司名义开立的美国银行账户转账约 3400 万美元，这三家公司均由 GUO（郭文贵）的家族成员 100% 持股；具体为：\n\ni. 向 Greenwich Land LLC 转账约 500 万美元，该公司由郭的妻子 Hing Chi Ngok 所有；\n\nii. 向 Hudson Diamond NY LLC 转账约 1800 万美元，该公司由郭的女儿 Mei Guo 所有；以及\n\niii. 向 Lamp Capital LLC 转账约 1100 万美元，该公司由郭的儿子 QIANG GUO 所有。\n\nc. 这 3400 万美元与其他投资者资金（包括 GTV 发售资金）进行了混同。根据本人对银行账户记录的审查，本人获悉这些 GTV 投资者资金的大部分被用于资助奢华的生活方式开销（例如，约 230 万美元用于郭的游艇相关费用，约 60 万美元用于购买豪华汽车）。\n\nd. JE 还安排从阿联酋 ACA 资本账户向与郭有关联的其他公司进行了大额转账；具体为：\n\ni. 向 Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（“Lexington Property”）转账约 1900 万美元，该公司由 GTV 前财务主管 Anthony DiBattista（“DiBattista”）所有。Lexington Property 的注册地址为 750 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY；\n\nii. 根据 ACA Capital 与 Saraca（由郭的儿子 QIANG GUO 所有）之间所谓的一份贷款协议，向 Savio Law LLC（作为托管代理人）转账约 3200 万美元；以及\n\niii. 向 Steve Bannon（斯蒂夫·班农）拥有的公司 Bannon Film Industries, Inc. 转账约 100 万美元。如上所述，班农在备忘录中被列为 GTV 的非执行董事，并且曾是 ROLF / ROLS 的董事。\n\nG Club Operations LLC 骗局\n\n35. 部分农场招募投资者通过购买“G Club”会员资格来向 GTV 投资。如下文更详细所述，执法部门认为 G Club 是由郭、JE 及其他人运作的一个持续进行的欺诈骗局。\n\n36. 根据本人参与本次调查的情况、培训背景、工作经验、对网站、传票回执、记录和文件（包括运营协议和公司章程）的审查、本人在互联网上进行的开源研究，以及本人与包括执法人员在内的其他人士的谈话，本人获悉（除其他事项外）以下内容：\n\na. 在 2020 年 10 月前后，G Club Operations LLC（“G Club”）在波多黎各注册。根据其《运营协议》，G Club 的宗旨是“为来自亚洲市场的高净值人士提供会员礼宾服务，包含豪华酒店和零售商的专属优惠和折扣”。\n\nb. G Club 网站（“G Club Website”）的一张图片如下所示（可在 http 查看）：\n\n37. G Club 据称提供五个会员等级：5 级会员（每年 50,000 美元）；4 级会员（每年 40,000 美元）；3 级会员（每年 30,000 美元）；2 级会员（每年 20,000 美元）；以及 1 级会员（每年 10,000 美元）。根据《G Club 会员协议》，“会员随后可选择更高等级的会员资格”，但“随后不得选择更低等级的会员资格”。所选会员等级的年费必须在提交 G Club 会员申请时全额支付，且 G Club 保留在 30 天内自行绝对决定拒绝任何会员申请的权利。该《会员协议》进一步规定：“如果申请被拒绝且会员资格被拒，G Clubs 应在此类拒绝发生后十（10）个日历日内退还会员费……退款形式按原支付会员费的方式，或者由 G Clubs 选择以支票方式退还。”\n\n38. G Club 网站上发布的一张照片描绘了郭过着奢华的生活方式；具体而言，照片显示他站在一艘看似大型游艇的顶部抽着雪茄。G Club 网站还声明：\n\nG Clubs 会员资格为其会员提供普通话和英语的礼宾客户服务渠道与支持。G Clubs 会员将有机会参加可能以线下或线上形式举行的 G Summit 年度峰会。G Clubs 会员还将获得最新时装系列的独家抢先体验资格，并在 G Fashion 网站上购物时享受特殊会员价格。\n\n39. 在 2021 年 7 月 8 日前后发布在 GNews 上的视频摘要中，郭声称 G Club 拥有约 25,000 名会员，并预测 G Club 将增长至至少 1 亿用户，吸引 16 万亿美元的投资。\n\n40. 尽管 G Club 网站对所谓的会员福利作出了陈述，但执法部门认为 G Club 至少在一定程度上被用于维持欺诈骗局，包括通过在规避监管要求的同时招揽和接收投资。具体而言，根据本人对他人于 2021 年 8 月 2 日对一名 GTV 投资者（“Investor-1”）进行的访谈报告（“2021 年 8 月 2 日访谈”）的审查，本人获悉 Investor-1 在该访谈中实质上且部分陈述了以下内容：\n\na. Investor-1 在 2020 年 5 月前后向 GTV 投资了 200,000 美元。Investor-1 的资金来自 Investor-1 的储蓄。\n\nb. Investor-1 逐渐认为 GTV 是一个骗局，因为 Investor-1 没有收到任何 GTV 股份，并且当 Investor-1 要求退款时，没有人回复 Investor-1。\n\nc. Investor-1 投资 GTV 的原因是：1）有很多美国政界人士支持郭；（2）郭说这是原始股，会有至少 1000 倍的增长；以及（3）Investor-1 认为 Investor-1 会在 GTV 股票上赚钱，因为郭在视频中这么说过。Investor-1 认为 Investor-1 不会亏钱，因为郭承诺过投资 GTV 会赚钱。\n\nd. Investor-1 以为 GTV 会用这笔钱建立一个类似 YouTube、Facebook 和 Twitter 的网站，但并不确切知道这笔钱将用于何处。\n\ne. Investor-1 随后在 2020 年 8 月前后通过“加拿大农场”投资了可转换贷款项目（Convertible Loan Program）。具体而言，Investor-1 向“Canada Himalayan Club Medica Inc.”汇出了约 71,019 美元作为贷款。Investor-1 以为该贷款期限为 3-5 年，利率为 3%，期满后 Investor-1 将收到该笔款项或 GTV 股票。Investor-1 从未收到已签署的投资合同副本。Investor-1 汇出的款项被加拿大证券交易委员会（Canadian SEC）冻结。\n\nf. Investor-1 在 2021 年 3 月前后试图通过 G Club 再次投资 GTV。具体而言，Investor-1 被指示将 Investor-1 的投资资金汇至“Crane Advisory Group”，后者随后将把资金转入 G Club。Investor-1 向 Crane Advisory Group 汇出了约 100,015 美元，用于以每十股 1 美元的价格购买 GTV 股份。\n\ng. 在 2021 年 7 月前后，Investor-1 试图通过联系 G Club 在线客服部门申请退款。针对 Investor-1 的退款请求，G Club 通过“notices@gclubs.com”发送了以下电子邮件：\n\n您最近通过 Crane 支付了与您的 G|CLUBS 会员资格相关的款项。您的电汇付款金额超过了单份会员资格的金额，且您并未申请多份会员资格。我们通过电汇收到了 100,015.00 美元。您申请了一份 5 级会员资格，并填写了 KYC（了解您的客户）材料，注明总金额用于 G|CLUBS 的多份会员资格（见附件）。\n\n为将总金额计入您的账户，您必须申请额外的会员资格。请填写并签署附件，告知您希望购买多少份会员资格及其等级。\n\n如果汇出多余资金属于失误且您希望立即退还 50,015 美元，请立即告知。对由此造成的任何不便，我们深表歉意。\n\nh. 作为回应，Investor-1 告知 G Club，Investor-1 汇出 100,015.00 美元资金不是为了购买 G Club 会员资格，而是为了投资 GTV。Investor-1 要求退还 Investor-1 的全部资金。在随后的一封电子邮件中，Investor-1 还指出，鉴于最贵的 G Club 会员资格费用为 50,000 美元，Investor-1 汇出 100,015.00 美元是没有道理的。Investor-1 还在另一封电子邮件中解释称，在与 G Club 一名代表的电话交谈中，该代表明确表示 Investor-1 的资金将用于投资 GTV，而不是用于购买 G Club 会员资格。\n\ni. 截至访谈之日，Investor-1 尚未收回 Investor-1 的 100,015 美元投资款中的任何部分。\n\n41. 根据本人参与本次调查的情况、培训背景、工作经验、本人对文件、记录和电子邮件搜查令回执的审查，以及本人与包括证人在内的其他人士的谈话，本人获悉（除其他事项外）以下内容：\n\na. 一名名为 Alex Hadjicharalambous（“Hadjicharalambous”）的个人（其职务为 G Club 的财务总监）是列在以 G Club 名义开立的多个银行账户上的授权签署人。2021 年 7 月 13 日，Hadjicharalambous 在其 G Club 电子邮箱（alexh@gclubs.com）收到一封来自 G Fashion IT 经理的电子邮件，题为“HCHKTech 邮箱”，其内容实质上且部分为：“你好 Alex，如你所知，我们现在为 HCHK Technologies 工作。请使用本邮件中的凭据，并按照以下步骤登录你的新邮箱账户。”\n\nb. 根据本人对互联网上开源资料及传票回执的审查，本人获悉（除其他事项外）以下内容：\n\ni. 在 2021 年 4 月 29 日前后，HCHK Technologies, Inc.（“HCHK Technologies”）在特拉华州注册成立。成立时，Anthony DiBattista 担任 HCHK Technologies 的董事。在约 2021 年 5 月 27 日至 2021 年 11 月 10 日期间，DiBattista 担任 HCHK Technologies 的财务主管。在 2021 年 12 月 13 日前后，DiBattista 辞去 HCHK Technologies 的总裁、首席执行官（CEO）及董事职务。\n\nc. 在 2021 年 8 月 18 日前后，HCHK Property Management, Inc.（“HCHK Property”）在特拉华州注册成立。Yvette Wang（王雁平）当选为 HCHK Property 的首任董事。参见第 21(e) 段。在 2021 年 12 月 15 日前后，经 HCHK Property 董事会（即王）书面同意，DiBattista 被任命为 HCHK Property 的财务主管。在 2022 年 1 月 1 日前后，王辞职，DiBattista 被任命为 HCHK Property 的总裁、首席执行官及董事。\n\nd. DiBattista 在其他各个与郭关联的实体中所担任的职务包括（除其他外）GTV 财务主管、Lexington Property 银行账户授权签署人以及 G Music LLC 财务主管。\n\ne.\n\n基于我对传票回复文件的审查以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉，在2021年7月18日或前后，一名 G Fashion 人力资源员工向 Alex Hadjicharalambous（亚历克斯·哈吉查拉兰布斯）发送了一份“过渡备忘录”，其中称，“自2021年7月19日起生效，所有 GFashion 员工将可以选择转入 GFashion 的人力派遣公司 HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）”，该公司“此后将担任 GFashion 及其他企业的人力派遣公司”。过渡备忘录还进一步表明，员工若未能在当天签署该过渡备忘录，将导致被解雇。\n\nf. 基于我对互联网公开来源调查和传票回复文件的审查，我获悉，HCHK Technologies 的一名董事同时也是 Gettr（盖特）7 的董事兼审计委员会主席，Gettr 是一个据报道由 GTV Media（GTV传媒）演变而来的社交媒体平台。我进一步获悉，JE（余建明）的公司 Hamilton（汉密尔顿）持有 Gettr 95%的股份，并向 Gettr 出资3500万美元。\n\ng. 基于前述情况，我获悉，自2021年7月19日或前后开始，G Fashion、Gettr 以及其他 GUO（郭文贵）关联实体的某些员工开始以 HCHK Technologies 和/或 HCHK Property（HCHK物业）的公司名义开展运作。\n\n喜马拉雅交易所方案（The Himalaya Exchange Scheme）\n\n42. 如上所述，JE 创立了一个名为 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的声称的加密货币交易平台，网址为 http（“喜马拉雅交易所网站”）。类似于 G-Coin / G-Dollar 与未注册股票发售之间的联系，Himalaya Coin（喜币，代码：HCO 或 HCN）和 Himalaya Dollar（喜美元，代码：HDO）（合称“喜马拉雅资产”）最初是作为可转换贷款计划中投资者的配套数字资产证券进行发售的。\n\n43. 基于我参与本案调查、培训、经验、对喜马拉雅交易所网站的审查、发布在 GNews（G新闻）上的视频、银行记录和传票回复文件，以及我在互联网上进行的公开来源调查，并结合我与包括执法人员和证人在内的他人的交谈，我除其他事项外获悉了以下内容：\n\n7 见 http（最后访问日期：2022年7月6日）。基于我与他人的交谈，我获悉 Gettr 是 HCHK Technologies 为其提供声称的人力派遣服务的公司之一。\n\na. 喜马拉雅交易所被描述为一个拥有完整生态系统的全球数字交易所，其中包括（或将包括）一种稳定币（喜美元）8、一种交易代币（喜币）以及一个名为“Himalaya Pay”（喜支付）的区块链支付应用程序。\n\nb. JE 被描述为喜马拉雅交易所的创始人兼主席。\n\nc. 如上所述，JE 亦是设在英属维尔京群岛的 Hamilton 的创始人兼首席执行官，以及设在香港的 ACA Capital（阿曼达资本）的董事。\n\nd. 喜马拉雅交易所网站上的一张图片（可在 http 查看）如下所示：\n\n44. 基于我参与本案调查、培训、经验、对喜马拉雅交易所网站的审查、发布在 GNews 上的视频、银行记录和传票回复文件，以及我在互联网上进行的公开来源调查，并结合我与包括执法人员和证人在内的他人的交谈，我除其他事项外获悉，投资者就其如何以及何时能够交易其加密货币资产受到了误导。具体而言：\n\n8 稳定币是一种旨在将其自身与稳定货币（通常为美元）挂钩的加密货币。\n\na. 当喜马拉雅交易所网站上线时，投资者被告知，自2021年6月起，他们将能够兑换和提现其加密货币。该网站2021年5月显示此陈述的一张图片如下所示：\n\nb. 喜马拉雅交易所网站随后将其“交易”日期更改为2021年9月。基于我的培训、经验以及参与本案调查，我获悉，欺诈性加密货币通常会采用与此处类似的策略；具体而言，欺诈性加密货币通常会：(1) 无法在公开交易所上进行交易；以及 (2) 通过虚假承诺该加密货币很快将在公开交易所上市交易，诱导投资者购买加密货币。\n\nc. 喜马拉雅资产的首次代币发售（“ICO”）据称于2021年11月1日或前后在喜马拉雅交易所网站上进行。根据喜马拉雅交易所网站上的数据，喜马拉雅资产的价格从 ICO 时的10美分上涨到大约两周后的27美元，导致截至2021年11月中旬产生声称的270亿美元估值，如下方来自喜马拉雅交易所网站的图表所示：\n\nd. 根据喜马拉雅交易所的宣传材料，喜美元的价值与美元挂钩。“积分”（Credits）用于保障喜马拉雅生态系统内的仓位，该等仓位对应于特定类型的加密资产。宣传材料还指出，“积分只能在喜马拉雅交易所上或喜马拉雅生态系统内使用，代表参与喜马拉雅交易所交易的权利，并不附带任何要求将其兑换为法定货币或加密资产的权利”。宣传材料阐明，提及喜币、喜美元“或喜马拉雅交易所账户上或通过喜支付应用程序的任何其他类型资产，均指代对应于该资产的积分”。\n\ne. 根据喜马拉雅交易所网站上日期为2021年4月的喜美元白皮书（“白皮书”），喜美元是一种基于以太坊的代币，“其结构旨在维持其与美元1比1的价值。喜美元积分受益于可能通过[喜马拉雅]储备金提供的潜在流动性支持，该储备金的管理旨在将其美元价值维持在与下述流通中的喜美元价值相等的水平”。\n\nf. 白皮书进一步指出，喜美元的发行方 Himalaya Reserves（喜马拉雅储备）“打算在储备金中创建并持有美元或其他货币的现金及现金等价物组合”，并进一步指出，“其目的是使储备金对公众透明。发行方打算让独立审计师对储备金进行年度审计。这些审计的结果将连同当时储备金构成的细节以及截至发布时[原文如此]资产的市场价值一并向公众公布。”迄今为止，尚未公布此类审计结果。\n\ng. 如上所述，喜马拉雅资产从未在公开交易所交易，而是声称仅在私密的喜马拉雅交易所交易。如上所述，喜马拉雅交易所限制其成员将真实货币流出喜马拉雅交易所。因此，将喜美元和喜币兑换回美元货币的能力受到限制。\n\n45. 基于我参与本案调查、培训、经验、对喜马拉雅交易所网站的审查、发布在 GNews 上的视频，以及我在互联网上进行的公开来源调查，并结合我与他人的交谈，我除其他事项外获悉了以下内容：\n\na. 如上所述，喜美元声称是一种与美元价值以1比1挂钩的“稳定币”。其他主要稳定币包括 TerraUSD、Tether 和 USD Coin。\n\nb. 在2021年11月发布于 GNews 的一段视频摘要中，GUO 实质上陈述称，喜币通过稳定币喜美元由美元支持，并进一步表示喜币由占收益20%的黄金储备支持。\n\nc. 在2022年5月或前后，全球发生了一场稳定币崩盘，起因是一种名为 TerraUSD 的特定稳定币脱锚（即不再拥有充足的硬资产储备来以1比1的比例支持其加密货币与美元挂钩）。结果，加密货币市场缩水了约3000亿美元的市值。截至2022年5月10日 TerraUSD 的估值反映在下方图表中：\n\nd. 相比之下，喜马拉雅交易所网站上的数据反映出，在同一时间段内，喜马拉雅资产的声称价值几乎没有波动或下降，如下方来自喜马拉雅交易所网站的图表所示：\n\n46. 我审查了上文第44(c)段中显示的图表，该图表显示了喜马拉雅资产在大约2021年11月1日至2021年12月31日期间的声称价值。该图表与喜马拉雅资产的声称价格系伪造相吻合——具体而言，它反映出价格在最初两周内急剧上涨，随后出现表面上的价格波动，但全都在一个狭窄的区间内。\n\n47. 我还审查了上文第45(c)和(d)段中显示的图表，该等图表反映了稳定币 TerraUSD 的价格以及喜马拉雅资产在2021年4月至2021年5月10日期间的声称价格。喜马拉雅资产图表中反映的数据与稳定币崩盘期间其他稳定币（包括 TerraUSD）的估值不一致。9\n\n9 在2022年6月15日或前后，据报道 William Je（余建明）发表了如下言论：“尽管近期加密货币市场下跌，但 HDO 始终与美元保持1:1稳定，未发生波动。令人印象深刻的是，这使得 HDO 成为全球唯一在这一不确定时期维持100%的稳定币。”见 http releases/iconic-ferrari-f1-car-sold-by-rm-sotheby-s-using-cryptocurrency-himalaya-dollar-883914213.html（最后访问日期：2022年7月6日）\n\n洗钱欺诈所得方案概述（Overview of the Scheme to Launder Fraud Proceeds）\n\n48. 如本文件更详细所述，至少自2020年或前后起，GUO、JE 及其他人运作了投资方案，即各项相互关联的欺诈性投资方案。该等投资方案涉及与 GUO 和/或 JE 关联的实体，包括 GTV、G Fashion、G Club、Crane、Lamp Capital LLC、Hudson Diamond NY、Greenwich Land LLC、HCHK Technologies、Himalaya Farms（喜马拉雅农场）、Himalaya Exchange、Hamilton 以及 ACA Capital 等。\n\n49. 如上所述，在2020年4月至2020年6月或前后，GUO、JE 及其他人通过未注册股票发售和可转换贷款发售，欺诈性地获取了超过约6.35亿美元的声称投资款。见上文 ¶ 18。我或他人在调查过程中审查的记录显示，在2020年11月至2022年6月或前后，G Club 产生了超过约2.21亿美元的声称 G Club 会员费。\n\n50. 如下文详述，证据表明，至少在约2020年4月至目前，GUO、JE 及其他人一直参与一项方案，以清洗来自投资方案（其中包括未注册股票发售、可转换贷款发售、G Club 以及喜马拉雅交易所）的欺诈所得（合称“投资方案资金”）。\n\n51. 作为洗钱方案的一部分，JE 及其他人开展了总额超过约10.4亿美元的金融交易，如下文更详细所述。\n\n52. 作为洗钱方案的进一步组成部分，投资方案资金中至少有约2.52亿美元被直接或间接汇入在美国和巴哈马开设的、以 JE 的公司——Hamilton、ACA Capital 和 Himalaya Exchange——名义持有或以其他方式由 JE 控制的银行账户。\n\n53. 特别是，如下文所述，JE 在 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）开设了某些目标账户和其他银行账户，该银行是位于加利福尼亚州拉霍亚（La Jolla, California）的一家银行，其将自身营销为“金融科技和加密货币领域创新型企业的领先银行”。目标账户-1至-8是以一家开曼群岛注册的对冲基金 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 的名义开设；\n\n目标账户-9以 JE 的公司 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 的名义开设，该公司是 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 的投资管理人。JE 是 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 的负责人，也是 Silvergate 目标账户的授权签字人。54. 如下文进一步所述，JE 在 FV Bank 开设了三个账户，FV Bank 是波多黎各的一家自称为“全球数字银行”的银行。这些 FV Bank 账户是以各种法律实体的名义开设的，JE 及其他人通过这些实体运营喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）——即 Himalaya Clearing、Himalaya Financial 和 Himalaya Reserves。JE 是这些喜马拉雅法律实体的最终实益拥有人，参见上文第 19(d) 段，并且是 FV 账户的授权签字人。55. 投资计划资金已被追查流入目标账户并在目标账户之间流转，根据我的培训和经验，这些方式表明存在洗钱行为。具体而言，对资金的追查除其他事项外反映出：(a) 将投资计划资金从美国银行账户转移至位于海外（包括阿联酋和巴哈马）的高风险司法管辖区的银行账户，这些司法管辖区是常见的洗钱避难所；(b) 依照据称的贷款协议或其他财务安排，通过一系列实体和银行账户对投资计划资金进行分层转移，其方式与隐瞒资金的性质、来源或出处相一致；(c) 对房地产或其他商业利益进行投资，而这些投资与控制银行账户的企业的既定宗旨没有明显联系；以及 (d) 在同一天内在多家银行之间以及在同一银行内的多个账户之间转移投资计划资金。使用多家银行和金融机构隐瞒投资计划资金\n\n56. 基于我参与本次调查的情况、培训、经验、对我以及联邦调查局（FBI）和证券交易委员会（SEC）的财务分析师进行的各种银行账户记录的审查和分析以及财务分析、我在互联网上进行的开源研究、我对根据传票和经司法授权的搜查令获得的证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，除其他事项外，我获悉了以下内容：\n\na. 迄今为止，执法部门已确认至少有80多个银行账户被郭（GUO，即郭文贵）、JE 及其他人用于处理投资计划资金，其中包括但不限于：\n\ni. 以 G Club 实体（即 G Club International Limited 或 G Club Operations LLC）名义在约七家不同金融机构开设的至少约19个银行账户；\n\nii. 以 Crane（即 Crane Advisory Group LLC）名义在约六家不同金融机构开设的至少约16个银行账户；\n\niii. 以农场（Farm）实体名义在约六家不同金融机构开设的至少约28个银行账户；\n\niv. 以 G Fashion 名义在约六家不同金融机构开设的至少约八个银行账户；\n\nv. 以 Hamilton 实体（例如 Hamilton Investment Management Inc. 或 Hamilton Opportunity Funds SPC）名义在加利福尼亚州 Silvergate Bank 开设的至少约14个银行账户；以及\n\nvi. 以 Himalaya 实体（即 Himalaya Reserve、Himalaya Financial 和 Himalaya Clearing）名义在波多黎各 FV Bank 开设的至少约三个银行账户。\n\nb. 除了使用以直接参与投资计划的 JE 及其他人所拥有或控制的实体名义持有的银行账户外，郭、JE 及其他人还通过在其他金融机构和第三方支付管理实体处的账户对投资计划资金进行分层转移，以隐瞒资金的性质和来源。例如，正如本文中更详细描述的：\n\ni. BSI Group LLC（“BSI Group”）是一家位于密苏里州、提供支付协议服务的公司。根据我与他人的交谈，我获悉 BSI Group 实际上充当批发商，为其客户在位于美国的金融机构开设银行账户。与 BSI Group 签约的美国银行包括 Capital One、The Reserve Trust Company（“Reserve Trust”）、Prime Trust LLC（“Prime Trust”）以及一家名为 Mercantile Bank International Corp. 及其关联实体的波多黎各金融机构（“Mercantile Bank”或“MBI”）。BSI Group 是 Capital One、Reserve Trust 和 Prime Trust 等实体的客户，而 MBI 是 BSI Group 的客户之一。\n\nii. BSI Group 代表其自身客户（包括 MBI）管理交易。BSI Group 的客户通过 BSI Group 的网站请求交易（例如，指明特定交易的发起人、收款人和金额），来指导其资金的流动——这些资金存放在以 BSI Group 和/或 Reserve Trust 及 Prime Trust 名义开设的账户中。\n\niii. 郭、JE 及其他人通过以各种金融中介公司（包括 BSI Group、Reserve Trust 和 Prime Trust）名义持有的银行账户清洗了超过约3亿美元的投资计划资金。郭、JE 及其他人还通过在各家不同金融机构持有的银行账户对投资计划资金进行了分层转移。\n\niv. 例如，在2021年5月20日或前后，G Club 的财务主管 Alex Hadjicharalambolous 就一笔1500万美元的 G Club 投资计划资金电汇与位于波多黎各的金融机构 Medici Bank 和 MBI 的员工进行了电子邮件往来，该笔资金从以 BSI Group 名义开设的银行账户电汇至位于巴哈马的 Deltec Bank & Trust（“Deltec”）以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义开设的银行账户（即“Hamilton 巴哈马账户”）。次日，David Fallon（Hamilton 总裁）向 Hajicharalmbous 发送电子邮件告知，Hamilton 无法将该笔电汇计入 G Club 贷方，因为电汇显示汇款人为“BSI Group”。\n\nv. Hadjicharalambous 将该电子邮件转寄给了一名 MBI 员工，该员工随后回复了 Hadjicharalambous（抄送 Fallon），提供了实质上和部分如下的解释：\n大家好，资金流向如下。这里有点详细，请见谅。电汇来自 BSI group（MBI 的代理银行合作伙伴）至 Deltec\n（Hamilton）\n账户如下\nBSI/MBI 在 Capital one 设有一个账户，该账户是由 MBI 拥有的 MBI Bank 托管账户。BSI 为我们进行处理。Medici 是 MBI 这笔1500万美元交易的客户，Medici 在 Capital one 与 MBI 共同设有一个账户\nGCLUB 是 Medici 的客户。Gclubs 客户将款项汇入 Capital one 专门用于 GClub 的 MBI 账户\n（通过 medici）。Medici 对进入银行的每笔电汇进行记账。为解决下述请求，您究竟需要向基金行政管理人出示什么？账户所有权证明还是资金流入证明（资金来源）\n对于今后的业务活动，GClub 现已成为 MBI 的直接客户，因此电汇将从 GClubs 在 MBI 的账户发出，但电汇将始终来自作为 MBI 代理银行的 BSI。我们（MBI 银行）将掌握从 GClub 客户到该账户的资金流向，因此我们将有能力追踪进出 GCLUB 账户的完整资金流向。\n\nvi. 同样，在2021年7月1日或前后，Hadjicharalambolous 向 Medici Bank 的一名员工发送了一封电子邮件，指示 Medici Bank 将约400万美元从 G Club Medici Bank 账户转移至 G Club MBI 账户。电子邮件附带的电汇说明将 MBI 确定为受益实体，但将 Reserve Trust 列为受益银行。\n\nvii. 基于我参与本次调查的情况，我认为上述解释是郭、JE 及其他人通过多家金融机构清洗投资计划资金以力图隐瞒其来源（除其他目的外）的一个例证。参见第 56(b)(3) 段。追查欺诈收益\n\n57. 基于我参与本次调查的情况、培训、经验、对我以及联邦调查局和证券交易委员会的财务分析师进行的各种银行账户记录的审查和分析以及财务分析、我在互联网上进行的开源研究、我对根据传票和经司法授权的搜查令获得的证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，除其他事项外，我获悉了以下内容：\n\na. 投资者通过以下方式参与投资计划：直接向郭、JE 及其他人关联实体（包括农场、G Club 或喜马拉雅交易所）控制或使用的银行账户电汇资金，或按照目标对象（包括例如 Crane、BSI Group、Reserve Trust 或 Prime Trust）的指示向其他实体电汇或以其他方式转移资金，随后这些资金被转交至最终由郭、郭的同伙以及 JE 控制的银行账户。我发现了位于阿联酋、英国、美国、巴哈马和英属维尔京群岛的账户，郭、JE 和其他目标对象使用这些账户来接收来自未注册股票发行、可转换贷款发行、G Club 和喜马拉雅交易所的投资者的投资资金。\n\nb. 迄今为止，我和联邦调查局及证券交易委员会的分析师已查明并试图追查超过约10.4亿美元的投资计划资金交易，其中相当大一部分资金已通过位于至少四个不同国家（包括美国、巴哈马、英属维尔京群岛和阿联酋）的金融机构进行了清洗。在转至某些 Silvergate 目标账户之前，欺诈收益在 Hamilton 巴哈马账户中进行合并\n\n58. 基于我参与本次调查的情况、培训、经验、对我以及联邦调查局和证券交易委员会的财务分析师进行的各种银行账户记录的审查和分析以及财务分析、我在互联网上进行的开源研究、我对根据传票和经司法授权的搜查令获得的证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，除其他事项外，我获悉了以下内容：\n\na. 在约2021年5月至2021年6月期间，约1亿美元的投资计划资金从 G Club 银行账户转移至 Hamilton 巴哈马账户。在约1亿美元合并入 Hamilton 巴哈马账户之前，投资计划资金通过各家不同银行的一系列实体进行了分层转移，根据我的培训和经验，这种方式表明存在洗钱行为。具体而言：\n\ni. 如上所述，某些潜在的投资计划投资者被指示将拟用于投资 GTV（例如）的资金发送至以 Crane 名义开设的银行账户。参见上文第 40(f) 段。在约2020年11月至2021年4月期间，约7820万美元的投资计划资金由中国及其他地方的个人或机构投资者发送至两个 Crane Advisory 银行账户（即“Crane 花旗银行账户”）。\n\nii. 随后，这笔投资计划资金中的约6000万美元从 Crane 花旗银行账户转移至 MSSB 以 Crane 名义持有的约五个不同银行账户（合称“Crane MSSB 账户”）。\n\niii. 来自 Crane MSSB 账户的约6000万美元投资计划资金与从另一家银行 Capital One 的两个 Crane 账户（合称“Crane Capital One 账户”）转移至 Crane MSSB 账户的约4900万美元其他投资计划资金合并，使 Crane MSSB 账户中的合并总余额升至约1.09亿美元。\n\niv. Crane MSSB 账户中约1.09亿美元投资计划资金中的约7900万美元随后被转移至同一家银行（即 MSSB）但以 G Club 名义开设的账户（即 G Club MSSB 账户）。\n\n该约 7900 万美元与转入 G 俱乐部 MSSB 账户（G Club MSSB Accounts）的来自个别 G 俱乐部投资者以及来自 G 俱乐部在签名银行（Signature Bank）、波多黎各第一银行（First Bank of Puerto Rico）和国家城市银行（City National Bank）的银行账户的约 7970 万美元其他投资计划资金（Investment Scheme Funds）进行了合并，使得 G 俱乐部 MSSB 账户中投资计划资金的总合并余额增加至约 1.58 亿多美元。v. 约 8500 万美元投资计划资金从 G 俱乐部 MSSB 账户转入汉密尔顿巴哈马账户（Hamilton Bahamas Account），并与源自名为 BSI Group 的银行账户的约 1500 万美元其他投资计划资金（涉及 G 俱乐部和喜马拉雅资产（Himalaya Assets））合并。参见第 56(b)(v) 段。因此，汉密尔顿巴哈马账户中的 1 亿美元投资计划资金由从 G 俱乐部 MSSB 账户转入的资金以及包含投资计划资金的其他账户转入的资金组成。诈骗收益被转入银门银行（Silvergate Bank）\n\n59. 基于我参与本次调查、受训经历、经验、对我以及联邦调查局（FBI，Federal Bureau of Investigation）和证券交易委员会（SEC，Securities and Exchange Commission）的金融分析师所进行的各种银行账户记录审查与金融分析、我在互联网上进行的开源调查、我对依据传票和司法授权搜查令所获证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，除其他事项外，我得知了以下情况：\n\na. 2021 年 7 月 5 日或前后，JE 以 Hamilton Opportunity Funds SPC 的名义向银门银行提交了商业银行账户申请（“银门申请”）。JE 的公司汉密尔顿（Hamilton）是开曼群岛注册对冲基金 Hamilton Investment Opportunity SPC 的投资管理人。在约 2021 年 7 月至目前期间，JE 以各汉密尔顿关联对冲基金或实体的名义在银门银行开设了 14 个以上的银行账户，包括 Hamilton Investment Opportunity SPC 和 Hamilton Digital Assets Fund SP，并以喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司（Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.）的名义在银门银行开设了至少四个银行账户。参见第 19(d)(iii) 段。\n\nb. 在 2021 年 9 月 1 日或前后至 2022 年 7 月 5 日或前后期间，JE 控制的银门银行账户收到了约 6.64 亿美元的投资计划资金。具体而言：\n\ni. 2021 年 9 月或前后，约 8500 万美元的投资计划资金从汉密尔顿巴哈马账户（参见上文第 56(b)(iv) 段）转入以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义开设、尾号为 9306 的银门银行账户（“9306 银门账户”）。该约 8500 万美元与源自巴哈马某银行以喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司名义开设的银行账户（“喜马拉雅巴哈马账户”）的约 2500 万美元投资计划资金合并。因此，截至约 2021 年 9 月下旬，9306 银门账户持有至少约 1.1 亿美元的投资计划资金。\n\nii. 2021 年 10 月 27 日或前后，9306 银门账户中约 1.1 亿美元投资计划资金中的约 5900 万美元被转入以 Hamilton Digital Assets 名义开设、尾号为 7747 的银门银行账户（“7747 银门账户”）。同日稍晚时候，该约 5900 万美元从 7747 银门账户转入目标账户-1（Target Account-1，即以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义开设、尾号为 7739 的银门银行账户）。\n\niii. 同样在 2021 年 10 月 27 日或前后，该约 1.1 亿美元中的约 2500 万美元从 9306 银门账户转入目标账户-2（Target Account-2，即以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义开设、尾号为 7705 的银门银行账户）。如下文更详细所述，在目标账户-2收到款项后，这些款项与源自以喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司名义开设、尾号为 3763 的 FV 银行（FV Bank）账户（“3763 FV 账户”）的约 5000 万美元喜马拉雅资产投资者资金合并。\n\n1. 从 3763 FV 账户转入目标账户-2的 5000 万美元中，约有 3000 万美元可追溯至曾存放于 9306 银门账户中的约 1.1 亿美元投资计划资金。也就是说，虽然在 2021 年 10 月 27 日或前后，1.1 亿美元中的约 2500 万美元直接转入了目标账户-2，但该约 1.1 亿美元中的另外 3000 万美元是在流经另外三个银行账户后才转入目标账户-2的：先是 7747 银门账户（以 Hamilton Digital Assets 名义持有），然后是目标账户-1（以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义持有），最后是 3763 FV 账户（以喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司名义持有）。\n\niv. 同样在 2021 年 10 月 27 日或前后，该约 1.1 亿美元中的约 2600 万美元从 9306 银门账户转入以 Hamilton Diversified Trading Fund 名义开设、尾号为 7762 的银门银行账户（“7762 银门账户”）。同日稍晚时候，该约 2600 万美元从 7762 银门账户转入目标账户-3（Target Account-3，即以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义开设、尾号为 7754 的银门银行账户）。约两个月后，即 2022 年 1 月 4 日或前后，约 2600 万美元从目标账户-3转入阿联酋 ACA Capital 账户（UAE ACA Capital Account，即由 JE 控制的离岸银行账户）。参见第 32、34 段。\n\nc. 2021 年 12 月 2 日或前后，约 4650 万美元的投资计划资金从目标账户-1转入目标账户-4（Target Account-4，即以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义开设、尾号为 7713 的银门银行账户）。在目标账户-4收到款项后，这些款项与源自喜马拉雅巴哈马账户的约 560 万美元投资计划资金（该资金流经了以 Hamilton PE Fund SP 名义开设、尾号为 7721 的银门银行账户）合并，使目标账户-4的合并余额增加至约 5210 万美元。\n\nd. 2021 年 12 月 17 日或前后，目标账户-4中约 5210 万美元投资计划资金中的约 2450 万美元被转入以 Insight Title Services LLC Trust AC 名义开设的银行账户；该交易载明的目的是代表名为 Taurus Fund SP 的实体在纽泽西州马瓦（Mahwah, New Jersey）购买住宅房产。基于我对 JE 签署的公司决议的审查，我得知 Taurus Fund SP 是 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 的独立投资组合（即 JE 控制 Taurus Fund SP）。\n\ne. 至少在 2022 年 1 月 24 日或前后至 2022 年 4 月 4 日或前后期间，约 7380 万美元的投资计划资金被转入目标账户-5（Target Account-5，即以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义开设、尾号为 2770 的银门银行账户）。转入目标账户-5的进账款项主要由中国籍个人汇出的约 1,100 美元至约 300 万美元不等的电汇组成，其中一些个人发送了多笔汇入电汇。基于我参与本次调查以及我的受训经历和经验，我相信转入目标账户-5的交易与洗钱行为一致，包括通过不同实体对资金进行分层转移——例如，将投资者资金引导至非既定投资工具名义开设的银行账户（在此处即为 G 俱乐部或喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange））。我还认为，汇入交易与 G 俱乐部投资者购买多份会员资格的情况一致，因此属于诈骗收益。参见第 40(g) 段。\n\nf. 在 2022 年 3 月 10 日或前后至 2022 年 4 月 1 日或前后期间，约 77,998,889.20 美元的投资计划资金从以 HCHK Technologies 或 HCHK Property 名义开设的银行账户转入目标账户-6（Target Account-6，即以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义开设、尾号为 2762 的银门银行账户）。如上文所述，自 2021 年 7 月或前后开始，郭（GUO）关联的各个实体开始在新成立的 HCHK Technologies 和 HCHK Property 公司名下运作。参见第 41 段。基于我参与本次调查以及我的受训经历和经验，且如上文所述，我相信转入目标账户-6的交易性质与洗钱行为一致，包括通过不同实体对资金进行分层转移并隐瞒其真实来源和/或目的。参见例如第 56(b)(v) 段。\n\ng. 投资计划资金按以下方式追溯至目标账户-7和目标账户-8：\n\ni. 2022 年 1 月 31 日或前后，约 510 万美元的投资计划资金从以某特定中国投资者（“投资者-2”）名义开设的银行账户转入目标账户-7（Target Account-7，即以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义开设、尾号为 2820 的银门银行账户）。\n\nii. 在 2022 年 1 月 31 日或前后至 2022 年 2 月 4 日或前后期间，约 100 万美元的投资计划资金从以两名特定中国投资者（“投资者-3”和“投资者-4”）名义开设的银行账户转入目标账户-8（Target Account-8，即以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义开设、尾号为 2747 的银门银行账户）。\n\niii. 基于我对传票回执和搜查令回执的审查，我得知投资者-2至-4此前曾投资于 GTV 股票发行（GTV Stock Offering）和/或其他投资计划。具体而言：\n\n1. 根据 GTV 维护的包含 GTV 股票发行中 1,200 多名投资者的电子表格，投资者-2、投资者-3和投资者-4均购买了 GTV 股票；投资者-2购买了约 330 万股，投资者-3购买了约 200 万股，投资者-4购买了约 80 万股。\n\n2. 2021 年 1 月 25 日或前后，Crane 总裁通过电子邮件向 MSSB 发送了投资者-2、投资者-3和投资者-4的“入职档案”。如上文所述（参见第 40(f) 段），投资计划的潜在投资者被指示将其投资款汇至 Crane，据称该公司担任 GTV、G 俱乐部和/或喜马拉雅交易所的支付处理机构。\n\n3. 2021 年 6 月 15 日或前后，投资者-2向 MSSB 发送了一份电汇申请电子邮件，其要点及部分内容如下：“我想投资[于]一家名为喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司的公司。”该电子邮件请求向大都会商业银行（Metropolitan Commercial Bank）的喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司账户电汇约 340 万美元。参见下文第 59(h) 段。\n\nh. 基于我参与本次调查以及我的受训经历和经验，且如上文所述，我相信从投资者-2转入目标账户-7的约 510 万美元转账，以及从投资者-3和投资者-4转入目标账户-8的约 100 万美元转账是电汇诈骗和洗钱的收益，因为它们是投资者-2至-4意图购买额外 G 俱乐部会员资格和/或喜马拉雅资产而支付的资金，但郭（GUO）、JE 及其他人却将其引导至 JE 的对冲基金银行账户，以隐瞒其真实来源和/或目的。参见例如第 56(b)(v) 段。\n\ni. 2021 年 6 月 11 日或前后，JE 开设了目标账户-9（Target Account-9，即以 JE 的公司 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 名义开设、尾号为 0288 的银门银行账户）。至少在约 2022 年 1 月至约 2022 年 6 月期间，至少约 5040 万美元的投资计划资金通过约五笔汇入电汇转入目标账户-9；具体而言：\n\n1. 2022 年 1 月 13 日或前后，目标账户-9收到了一笔约 1080 万美元投资计划资金的汇入电汇，该资金来自以 Prime Trust 名义开设、尾号为 6126 的签名银行账户（“Prime Trust 签名账户”）。参见第 56(b)(i)-(iii) 段。\n\n2.\n\n2022年2月10日或前后，目标账户-9（Target Account-9）从Prime Trust Signature账户（Prime Trust Signature Account）收到一笔约1170万美元投资计划资金（Investment Scheme Funds）的汇入电汇。i. 2022年6月13日或前后，目标账户-9从Metropolitan Commercial Bank（大都会商业银行，下称“MCB”）尾号为6891的特定银行账户（下称“6891 MCB账户”）收到一笔约800万美元投资计划资金的汇入电汇。Silvergate Bank（银门银行）提供的交易详情将“FV Bank – Himalaya International”（FV Bank – 喜马拉雅国际）列为该笔交易的付款人（Payer），并将MCB确定为“付款人”金融机构的名称。FV Bank的记录则反映该笔转账来自3763 FV账户（3763 FV Account），但并未反映MCB作为该交易的中介机构有任何参与。根据MCB提供的信息，我获悉6891 MCB账户是FV Bank的资金池账户，并进一步获悉MCB以美元为FV Bank的账户持有人（在与本案相关的情况下为喜马拉雅实体）处理交易。j. 2022年6月14日或前后，目标账户-9从6891 MCB账户收到一笔约1000万美元投资计划资金的汇入电汇。FV Bank账户记录反映该转账实际上来自3763 FV账户，但并未反映MCB作为该交易的中介机构有任何参与。k. 2022年6月22日或前后，目标账户-9从6891 MCB账户收到一笔约1000万美元投资计划资金的汇入电汇。FV Bank账户记录反映该转账来自3763 FV账户，但并未反映MCB作为该交易的中介机构有任何参与。\n\n欺诈收益被用于资助GUO关联公司\n\n60. 基于我对此项调查（Investigation）的参与、培训、经验、对各类银行账户记录的审查与分析、我本人以及联邦调查局（FBI）和证券交易委员会（SEC）的财务分析师所进行的财务分析、我在互联网上开展的开源研究、我对依据传票和法院授权搜查令所获证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，除其他事项外，我获悉以下情况：\n\na. 如上文所述，JE的公司拥有Gettr（盖特）约95%的股份。参见上文第41(f)段。\n\nb. 2022年6月30日或前后，约300万美元从目标账户-4转入目标账户-10（即以GETTR USA, Inc.名义开立于Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co.、尾号为4409的银行账户）。电汇详情反映该笔转账系用于“CAPITAL CALL JUNE 3M USD”（2022年6月资本金催缴 300万美元）。\n\nc. 2022年7月27日或前后，约300万美元从目标账户-4转入目标账户-10。电汇详情反映该笔转账系用于“CAPITAL CALL JULY 3M USD”（2022年7月资本金催缴 300万美元）。\n\nd. 2022年8月29日或前后，约500万美元从目标账户-4转入目标账户-10。电汇详情反映该笔转账系用于“CAPITAL CALL AUGUST 10M USD (X2 5M)”（2022年8月资本金催缴 1000万美元（2笔 各500万））。\n\ne. 2022年8月30日或前后，又有约500万美元从目标账户-4转入目标账户-10。电汇详情反映该笔转账系用于“CAPITAL CALL AUGUST 5M USD (10M TRA NSFER 2 of 2)”（2022年8月资本金催缴 500万美元（1000万转账 第2笔 共2笔））。\n\nf. 基于前述情况，我相信JE等人正在利用欺诈收益来资助Gettr。\n\n欺诈收益通过多家银行机构进行分层转移\n\n61. 基于我对此项调查的参与、培训、经验、对各类银行账户记录的审查与分析、我本人以及FBI和SEC的财务分析师所进行的财务分析、我在互联网上开展的开源研究、我对依据传票和法院授权搜查令所获证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，除其他事项外，我获悉以下情况：\n\na. 如本文所述，GUO（郭文贵）、JE等人通过各实体的账户对欺诈收益进行了分层转移，其中包括但不限于：MCB为FV Bank账户持有人（即喜马拉雅实体）利益开立的某些账户；以及BSI Group（BSI集团）以各实体名义持有的账户。参见第56(b)段。\n\nb. 如本文进一步所述，FV Bank在MCB的代理行账户或受托账户（FBO accounts）中持有投资计划资金。\n\n62. 基于我对此项调查的参与、培训、经验、对各类银行账户记录的审查与分析、我本人以及FBI和SEC的财务分析师所进行的财务分析、我在互联网上开展的开源研究、我对依据传票和法院授权搜查令所获证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉，至少自2022年2月前后开始，JE等人开始通过某些银行账户对超过约3亿美元的投资计划资金进行分层转移。具体而言：\n\na. 在2022年2月15日或前后至2022年3月29日或前后期间，约1.6亿美元的投资计划资金通过约16笔电汇交易从3763 FV账户转入以Prime Trust LLC名义开立于Royal Business Bank（皇佳商业银行）、尾号为6050的账户（下称“Prime Trust RBB账户”）。\n\nb. 2022年3月21日或前后，JE以Himalaya International Financial Group（喜马拉雅国际金融集团）的名义开立了一个尾号为2119的FV Bank账户（下称“2119 FV账户”），并以Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际储备有限公司）的名义开立了一个尾号为8239的FV Bank账户（下称“8239 FV账户”）。\n\nc. 在2022年3月21日或前后至2022年5月13日或前后期间，约1.9亿美元的投资计划资金通过约12笔电汇交易从3763 FV账户（即尾号为3763的喜马拉雅清算FV Bank账户）转入2119 FV账户和8239 FV账户。例如：\n\ni. 在2022年3月21日或前后至2022年3月29日或前后期间，约1亿美元的投资计划资金通过约10笔电汇交易从3763 FV账户转入2119 FV账户和/或8239 FV账户。\n\nii. 2022年5月13日或前后，约3000万美元的投资计划资金通过单笔电汇交易从3763 FV账户转入2119 FV账户，且约6000万美元的投资计划资金通过单笔电汇交易从3763 FV账户转入8239 FV账户。\n\nd. 2022年5月24日或前后，约4460万美元的投资计划资金通过单笔电汇交易从2119 FV账户转入8239 FV账户。\n\ni. 该笔约4460万美元的资金是此前从3763 FV账户转入2119 FV账户的约8000万美元的一部分。参见第62(c)(i)(ii)段。\n\nii. 也就是说，虽然有约1.1亿美元是直接从3763 FV账户转入8239 FV账户的，但在约1.9亿美元中，另有约4460万美元是在先流经2119 FV账户之后才转入8239 FV账户的。\n\ne. 2022年8月15日或前后，MCB的一名员工发送了电子邮件信件，确认了MCB与FV Bank就目标账户-11的相关业务关系；目标账户-11是MCB为FV Bank客户利益开立的账户。该MCB员工确认目标账户-11是一个资金池账户，其中包含喜马拉雅实体（即3763 FV账户、2119 FV账户和8239 FV账户）的资金。\n\n63. 基于我对Silvergate提供信息的审查，我获悉，截至2022年8月31日或前后，目标账户-1至目标账户-9合计持有约292,407,029.22美元，如下表所示：\n\n目标账户 账号 余额\n目标账户-1 5090037739 $1,800,000.00\n目标账户-2 5090037705 $75,000,000.00\n目标账户-3 5090037754 $467,343.00\n目标账户-4 5090037713 $167,826.87\n目标账户-5 5090042770 $83,872,761.75\n目标账户-6 5090042762 $76,690,856.60\n目标账户-7 5090042820 $5,106,100.00\n目标账户-8 5090042747 $1,026,000.00\n目标账户-9 5090030288 $48,276,141.00\n总计 $292,407,029.22\n\n64. 基于我对来自Silvergate信息的审查，我获悉，在2022年6月30日或前后至2022年8月30日或前后期间，目标账户-10从目标账户-4共计收到约16,000,000.00美元。\n\n65. 基于我对FV Bank和MCB提供信息的审查，我获悉，截至2022年8月15日或前后，目标账户-11合计持有约13,613,172.71美元。\n\n三、结论\n\n66. 基于前述情况，我认为有相当理由相信，构成目标财产（Target Property）的各账户中所持有的资金，作为违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343（电汇欺诈）及 § 1344（银行欺诈）所得的收益，和/或作为涉及违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)、1956(a)(2)(B)(i) 及 1956(h)（洗钱及共谋洗钱）的财产，应予没收。\n\n67. 因此，依据 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)，我谨请求法院签发令状，授权扣押目标财产。\n\n/签名/ Anthony Alecci，经许可由SDA代签\n\nANTHONY ALECCI（安东尼·阿莱奇）\nSpecial Agent（特别探员）\nFederal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局）\n\n根据《Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure》（联邦刑事诉讼规则）第 41(d)(3) 条和第 4.1 条，于 2022 年 9 月 18 日通过可靠的电子方式传输本宣誓书向我宣誓\n\nTHE HONORABLE STEWART D. AARON（斯图尔特·D·亚伦阁下）\nUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE（美国联邦治安法官）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":14824,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-07-28 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-07-28","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:20:15"}