{"id":"court_sdny_716_4","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":716,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2025-07-28","title":"SDNY ECF 716","summary_zh":"附件（FBI特工宣誓扣押令申请书，文件内编为“附件D”）—— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #716（2025年7月28日提交）。同由 FBI 特工 Anthony Alecci 出具，就 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC、Himalaya International Financial Group 等喜马拉雅系关联主体名下的一批银行账户申请扣押令，主张相关资金系郭文贵、William Je 主导投资项目所涉电信欺诈、银行欺诈及洗钱行为的收益或涉案财产。","summary_en":"Exhibit (FBI special agent's sworn affidavit in support of a seizure-warrant application, labeled \"Exhibit D\" in the filing) — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui / Miles Kwok), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #716 (filed July 28, 2025). Also by FBI Special Agent Anthony Alecci, this affidavit seeks warrants to seize a set of bank accounts held by Himalaya-affiliated entities, including Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC and Himalaya International Financial Group, alleging the funds are proceeds of, or property involved in, wire fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering tied to schemes led by Miles Guo and William Je.","body_en":"Exhibit D\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 22 MAG 7684\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTO BE FILED UNDER SEAL\n-v.-\nAffidavit in Support of Seizure\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate Warrant\nBank account 5090042853, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-1”), Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 984\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in FV Bank\naccount 7801000589, held by Himalaya\nInternational Financial Group, Ltd. (“Target\nAccount-2”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in FV Bank\naccount 7801000590, held by Himalaya\nInternational Reserves, Ltd. (“Target Account-\n3”), and all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest; and\nAll monies and funds contained in FV Bank\naccount 7801000254, held by Himalaya\nInternational Clearing, Ltd. (“Target Account-\n4”), and all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest (collectively, the “Target\nProperty”).\nDefendants-in-rem.\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:\nAnthony Alecci, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, being duly sworn,\ndeposes and says:\nI. Introduction\n1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI” or\n“Investigating Agency”). I have been a Special Agent with the FBI since in or about August 2020.\n\nSince in or about September 2021, I have been assigned to the FBI’s Complex Financial Crimes\nsquad. During my time with the FBI, I have participated in investigations of securities and wire\nfraud schemes, bank fraud, and money laundering, and have, among other things, conducted or\nparticipated in debriefings of witnesses, reviews of financial records, and the execution of search\nwarrants. In particular, I have participated in the execution of search warrants involving physical\npremises, electronic devices, and other electronic evidence.\n2. This affidavit is submitted in support of the United States of America’s Application\nfor the issuance of a seizure warrant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 984, for:\na. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090042853,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-1”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nb. All monies and funds contained in FV Bank account 7801000589, held by\nHimalaya International Financial Group, Ltd. (“Target Account-2”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest;\nc. All monies and funds contained in FV Bank account 7801000590, held by\nHimalaya International Reserves, Ltd. (“Target Account-3”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest; and\nd. All monies and funds contained in FV Bank account 7801000254, held by\nHimalaya International Clearing, Ltd. (“Target Account-4”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest (collectively, the “Target Property”).\n3. The Target Property constitutes the proceeds of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343\n(wire fraud); 1344 (bank fraud); and 1956 (money laundering and conspiracy to commit money\nlaundering) (together, the “Target Offenses”), as described below.\n4. This affidavit is based on, among other sources of information: (i) my personal\n2\n\nknowledge; (ii) information provided by personnel at the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission\n(“SEC”) participating in a parallel investigation; (iii) my review of publicly available promotional\nmaterials relating to, among other ventures, “G Club” and the “Himalaya Exchange;” (iv) my\nreview of the publicly available websites for GTV Media Group, Inc. (“GTV”), the Himalaya\nExchange, and “G Club,” and materials available on those websites; (v) open-source research that\nI have conducted on the Internet; (vi) my review of digital videos posted on www.gnews.org\n(“GNews”) by GTV Media Group, Inc. and its employees and agents; (vii) my participation in\nvarious witness interviews; (viii) my review of electronic evidence obtained pursuant to\nsubpoenas, orders issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) for non-content information, and\njudicially authorized search warrants; (ix) the review and analysis of various bank account records,\nincluding financial records obtained from financial institutions pursuant to subpoenas and other\nrequests, conducted by myself and financial analysts at the FBI and SEC; (xi) my conversations\nwith other law enforcement officers; and (x) my training and experience concerning the\ncommission of financial crimes. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose\nof establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts that I have learned during the course\nof my investigation. Where dates, figures, and calculations are set forth herein, they are\napproximate. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of\nothers are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise\nindicated.\n5. As set forth herein, there is probable cause to believe that the Target Property is\nsubject to seizure and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), (C) & (D) and 18 U.S.C.\n§ 981(b) as property involved in violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and/or the proceeds of\nviolations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1344, or property traceable thereto. In summary, the evidence\nreveals a series of fraudulent investment schemes (the “Investment Schemes”) that pertain to\n3\n\nseveral interrelated companies and their affiliated entities, including GTV Media Group Inc., G\nFashion (“G Fashion”), the Himalaya Farm Alliance (the “Farms”), Himalaya International\nClearing Ltd. (“Himalaya International Clearing”), G Club Operations LLC (“G Club”), Hamilton\nInvestment Management Ltd. (“Hamilton”), ACA Capital Group Ltd. (“ACA Capital”), and Crane\nAdvisory Group LLC (“Crane”). As set forth in more detail below, the leaders of the fraudulent\ninvestment schemes are Miles Guo, a/k/a “Guo Wengui,” a/k/a “Miles Kwok” (“GUO”) and\nWilliam Je, a/k/a Je Kin Ming (“JE”).\n6. Analysts at the FBI and SEC and I have traced the flow of certain fraud proceeds\nfrom victims of the Investment Schemes to the Target Property.\nII. Statutory Basis for Forfeiture\n7. The statutory provisions pursuant to which the Target Property is subject to civil\nseizure and forfeiture are as follows:\nMoney Laundering Offenses\n8. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(A), subjects to civil forfeiture:\nAny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in\nviolation of section 1956, 1957 or 1960 of this title, or any property traceable to such\nproperty.\n9. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) provides that any person who:\nknowing that the property involved in a financial transaction\ninvolves the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts\nor attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact\ninvolves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity –\n(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in\npart—\n(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the\nsource, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds\nof specified unlawful activity [shall be guilty of a\ncrime.]\n4\n\n10. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that any person who:\ntransports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit,\nor transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the\nUnited States to or through a place outside the United States or to a\nplace in the United States from or through a place outside the\nUnited States—\n(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in\nthe transportation, transmission, or transfer represent\nthe proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that\nsuch transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or\nin part—\n(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,\nthe ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified\nunlawful activity [shall be guilty of a crime.]\n11. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) further provides that “[a]ny person who conspires to commit\nany offense defined in [Section 1956] shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for\nthe offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.”\nBank and Wire Fraud Offenses\n12. For purposes of Section 1956, “specified unlawful activity,” defined in 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1956(c)(7), includes, among other things, violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1344. See 18\nU.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7) and 1961(1).\n13. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), subjects to civil forfeiture any\nproperty, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation\nof . . . any offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of\nthis title), or a conspiracy to commit such offense.”\nSeizure Warrants\n14. The Court is empowered by 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) to issue a seizure warrant for any\nproperty subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) & (C). Section 981(b)(2)\nprovides that such a seizure may be made “pursuant to a warrant obtained in the same manner as\n5\n\nprovided for a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” In addition, Section\n981(b)(3) provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\n41(a), a seizure warrant may be issued pursuant to Section 981(b) by a judicial officer in any\ndistrict in which a forfeiture action against the property may be filed under Title 28, United States\nCode, Section 1355(b). Under Section 1355(b)(1)(A), a forfeiture action or proceeding may be\nbrought in the district in which any of the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred.\nAs set forth below, the offenses underlying the requested seizure warrant included acts or\nomissions occurring in the Southern District of New York.\n15. With respect to fungible property, including cash and funds deposited in a financial\ninstitution, 18 U.S.C. § 984 provides, in relevant part, that:\n(a)(1) In any forfeiture action in rem in which the subject property is cash, monetary\ninstruments in bearer form, funds deposited in an account in a financial institution . . . , or\nprecious metals:\n(A) it shall not be necessary for the Government to identify the specific property\ninvolved in the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture; and\n(B) it shall not be a defense that the property involved in such an offense has\nbeen removed and replaced by identical property.\n(2) Except as provided in subsection (b), any identical property found in the same place\nor account as the property involved in the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture shall\nbe subject to forfeiture under this section.\n(b) No action pursuant to this section to forfeit property not traceable directly to the\noffense that is the basis for the forfeiture may be commenced more than 1 year from the\ndate of the offense.\nIII. Probable Cause\nA. Probable Cause Regarding Commission of the Subject Offenses\n16. On or about September 17, 2022, I submitted an affidavit in support of seizure\nwarrants for approximately 11 bank accounts, including approximately one Metropolitan\nCommercial Bank (“MCB”) account, held at For Benefit Of FV Bank, and approximately nine\n6\n\nSilvergate Bank (“Silvergate”) accounts, held by William JE in the name of Hamilton Opportunity\nFund SPC or Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. (the “September 17 Affidavit”). The\nSeptember 17 Affidavit is incorporated herein as Exhibit A. On or about September 18, 2022, the\nHonorable Stewart D. Aaron issued seizure warrants for those 11 accounts, including a warrant to\nSilvergate for the nine Silvergate accounts (the “Silvergate Warrant”) and a warrant to MCB for\nthe one MCB account held For Benefit Of FV Bank (the “MCB Warrant”).\n17. In coordinating with Silvergate in anticipation of the service and execution of the\nSilvergate Warrant, Silvergate provided updated account balances for all Silvergate accounts in\nthe name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC and/or Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.\nBased on my review of account balance summaries, additional documents provided by Silvergate\nBank, open-source information, and my conversations with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the\nSouthern District of New York, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. Silvergate operates an intra-bank network called the Silvergate Exchange\nNetwork, or “SEN.” Active bank clients with Silvergate can participate in SEN, which enables\nSilvergate clients themselves to transfer money between their Silvergate accounts and the accounts\nof other Silvergate clients.\nb. The Silvergate business deposit account master agreement for the Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC relationship at Silvergate lists Target Account-1 as a SEN account. Based\non information provided by Silvergate, I have learned that the account balance of Target Account-\n1 as of on or about August 31, 2022 was $0.\nc. As reflected in the September 17 Affidavit, the balance of the Hamilton\nInvestment Opportunity Fund SPC account at Silvergate ending in -2762 (i.e., “Target Account-\n6” in the September 17 Affidavit, or the “2762 Account”) was approximately $76,690,856.60. On\nor about September 8, 2022, the 2762 Account received incoming transfers from HCHK\n7\n\nTechnologies Inc. and HCHK Property Management Inc., respectively, each in the amount of $5\nmillion.\nd. On or about September 15, 2022, the Target Subjects transferred\napproximately $85,899,889.20—nearly the entire balance—from the 2762 Account to Target\nAccount-1. As described in the September 17 Affidavit, the nature of the transfers of funds into\nthe 2762 Account had been consistent with money laundering, including layering funds through\ndifferent entities and concealing their true source and/or purpose. See Sept. Aff. at ¶ 56(b)(v), (f).\n18. In coordinating with MCB and counsel for FV Bank in anticipation of the service\nand execution of the MCB Warrant, counsel for both MCB and FV Bank advised law enforcement\nof the following, in sum and substance:\na. The funds held in the pooled MCB account FBO FV Bank (i.e., “Target\nAccount-11” in the September 17, 2022 Affidavit) include funds belonging to all FV Bank’s\ncustomers, not only the Himalaya entities. See Sept. Aff. at ¶¶ 59(i)(3), 62.\nb. The funds that were the target of the MCB Warrant, held in the MCB pooled\naccount, were also identified by three particular FV Bank account numbers: Target Account-2\n(i.e., FV Bank account 7801000589, held by Himalaya International Financial Group, Ltd.),\nTarget Account-3 (i.e., FV Bank account 7801000590, held by Himalaya International Reserves,\nLtd., and Target Account-4 (i.e., FV Bank account 7801000254, held by Himalaya International\nClearing, Ltd.).\n19. Based on the foregoing information, law enforcement will not execute the MCB\nWarrant and instead seeks to direct the warrant to FV Bank.\nIII. Conclusion\n20. Based on the information set forth in the September 17 Affidavit and the foregoing,\nI submit that there is probable cause to believe that funds held in the Target Property are subject\n8\n\nto forfeiture as proceeds of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud) and § 1344 (bank fraud),\nand/or as property involved in violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and\n1956(h) (money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering).\n21. Accordingly, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(b), I respectfully request that the Court\nissue a warrant authorizing the seizure of the Target Property.\n_/s_/_ A__n_th_o_n_y_ _A_l_e_cc_i_, _b_y_ S_D__A_ _w_i_th_ permission\nANTHONY ALECCI\nSpecial Agent\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nSworn to me through the transmission of this\nAffidavit by reliable electronic means, pursuant to\nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(d)(3) and 4.1, this\n2_0_ day of September, 2022\n_____________________________________\nTHE HONORABLE STEWART D. AARON\nUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n9\n\nEXHIBIT A\n\n22 MAG 7580\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTO BE FILED UNDER SEAL\n-v.-\nAffidavit in Support of Seizure\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate Warrant\nBank account 5090037739, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-1”), Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 984\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090037705, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-2”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090037754, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-3”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090037713, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-4”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090042770, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-5”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090042762, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-6”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090042820, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-7”),\n\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090042747, held by Hamilton\nOpportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-8”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Silvergate\nBank account 5090030288, held by Hamilton\nInvestment Management Ltd. (“Target Account-\n9”), and all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest;\nAny and all monies and funds up to and\nincluding the sum of $16,000,000.00 contained\nin Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. account\n9878904409, held by GETTR USA, Inc.\n(“Target Account-10”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest; and\nAll monies and funds contained in Metropolitan\nCommercial Bank account 0299006891, held\nFor Benefit Of FV Bank (“Target Account-11”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including\naccrued interest (collectively, the “Target\nProperty”).\nDefendant-in-rem.\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:\nAnthony Alecci, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, being duly sworn,\ndeposes and says:\nI. Introduction\n1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI” or\n“Investigating Agency”). I have been a Special Agent with the FBI since in or about August 2020.\nSince in or about September 2021, I have been assigned to the FBI’s Complex Financial Crimes\n2\n\nsquad. During my time with the FBI, I have participated in investigations of securities and wire\nfraud schemes, bank fraud, and money laundering, and have, among other things, conducted or\nparticipated in debriefings of witnesses, reviews of financial records, and the execution of search\nwarrants. In particular, I have participated in the execution of search warrants involving physical\npremises, electronic devices, and other electronic evidence.\n2. This affidavit is submitted in support of the United States of America’s Application\nfor the issuance of a seizure warrant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 984:\na. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090037739,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-1”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nb. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090037705,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-2”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nc. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090037754,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-3”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nd. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090037713,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-4”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\ne. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090042770,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-5”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nf. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090042762,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-6”), and all funds traceable thereto,\n3\n\nincluding accrued interest;\ng. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090042820,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-7”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nh. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090042747,\nheld by Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Target Account-8”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest; and\ni. All monies and funds contained in Silvergate Bank account 5090030288,\nheld by Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. (“Target Account-9”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest;\nj. Any and all monies and funds up to and including the sum of\n$16,000,000.00 contained in Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. account 9878904409, held by\nGETTR USA, Inc. (“Target Account-10”), and all funds traceable thereto, including accrued\ninterest; and\nk. All monies and funds contained in Metropolitan Commercial Bank account\n0299006891, held For Benefit Of (“FBO”) FV Bank (“Target Account-11”), and all funds\ntraceable thereto, including accrued interest (collectively, the “Target Property”).\n3. The Target Property constitutes the proceeds of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343\n(wire fraud); 1344 (bank fraud); and 1956 (money laundering and conspiracy to commit money\nlaundering) (together, the “Target Offenses”), as described below.\n4. This affidavit is based on, among other sources of information: (i) my personal\nknowledge; (ii) information provided by personnel at the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission\n(“SEC”) participating in a parallel investigation; (iii) my review of publicly available promotional\nmaterials relating to, among other ventures, “G Club” and the “Himalaya Exchange;” (iv) my\n4\n\nreview of the publicly available websites for GTV Media Group, Inc. (“GTV”), the Himalaya\nExchange, and “G Club,” and materials available on those websites; (v) open-source research that\nI have conducted on the Internet; (vi) my review of digital videos posted on www.gnews.org\n(“GNews”) by GTV Media Group, Inc. and its employees and agents; (vii) my participation in\nvarious witness interviews; (viii) my review of electronic evidence obtained pursuant to\nsubpoenas, orders issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) for non-content information, and\njudicially authorized search warrants; (ix) the review and analysis of various bank account records,\nincluding financial records obtained from financial institutions pursuant to subpoenas and other\nrequests, conducted by myself and financial analysts at the FBI and SEC; (xi) my conversations\nwith other law enforcement officers; and (x) my training and experience concerning the\ncommission of financial crimes. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose\nof establishing probable cause, it does not include all the facts that I have learned during the course\nof my investigation. Where dates, figures, and calculations are set forth herein, they are\napproximate. Where the contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of\nothers are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise\nindicated.\n5. As set forth below, there is probable cause to believe that the Target Property is\nsubject to seizure and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), (C) & (D) and 18 U.S.C.\n§981(b) as property involved in violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and/or the proceeds of\nviolations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1344, or property traceable thereto. In summary, the evidence\nreveals a series of fraudulent investment schemes (the “Investment Schemes”) that pertain to\nseveral interrelated companies and their affiliated entities, including GTV Media Group Inc., G\nFashion (“G Fashion”), the Himalaya Farm Alliance (the “Farms”), Himalaya International\nClearing Ltd. (“Himalaya International Clearing”), G Club Operations LLC (“G Club”), Hamilton\n5\n\nInvestment Management Ltd. (“Hamilton”), ACA Capital Group Ltd. (“ACA Capital”), and Crane\nAdvisory Group LLC (“Crane”). As set forth in more detail below, the leaders of the fraudulent\ninvestment schemes are Miles Guo, a/k/a “Guo Wengui,” a/k/a “Miles Kwok” (“GUO”) and\nWilliam Je, a/k/a Je Kin Ming (“JE”).\n6. Analysts at the FBI and SEC and I have traced the flow of certain fraud proceeds\nfrom victims of the Investment Schemes to the Target Property.\nII. Statutory Basis for Forfeiture\n7. The statutory provisions pursuant to which the Target Property is subject to civil\nseizure and forfeiture are as follows:\nMoney Laundering Offenses\n8. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(A), subjects to civil forfeiture:\nAny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in\nviolation of section 1956, 1957 or 1960 of this title, or any property traceable to such\nproperty.\n9. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) provides that any person who:\nknowing that the property involved in a financial transaction\ninvolves the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts\nor attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact\ninvolves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity –\n(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in\npart—\n(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the\nsource, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds\nof specified unlawful activity [shall be guilty of a\ncrime.]\n10. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that any person who:\ntransports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit,\nor transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the\nUnited States to or through a place outside the United States or to a\nplace in the United States from or through a place outside the\n6\n\nUnited States—\n(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in\nthe transportation, transmission, or transfer represent\nthe proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that\nsuch transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or\nin part—\n(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,\nthe ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified\nunlawful activity [shall be guilty of a crime.]\n11. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) further provides that “[a]ny person who conspires to commit\nany offense defined in [Section 1956] shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for\nthe offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.”\nBank and Wire Fraud Offenses\n12. For purposes of Section 1956, “specified unlawful activity,” defined in 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1956(c)(7), includes, among other things, violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1344. See 18\nU.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7) and 1961(1).\n13. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), subjects to civil forfeiture any\nproperty, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation\nof . . . any offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of\nthis title), or a conspiracy to commit such offense.”\nSeizure Warrants\n14. The Court is empowered by 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) to issue a seizure warrant for any\nproperty subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) & (C). Section 981(b)(2)\nprovides that such a seizure may be made “pursuant to a warrant obtained in the same manner as\nprovided for a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” In addition, Section\n981(b)(3) provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\n41(a), a seizure warrant may be issued pursuant to Section 981(b) by a judicial officer in any\n7\n\ndistrict in which a forfeiture action against the property may be filed under Title 28, United States\nCode, Section 1355(b). Under Section 1355(b)(1)(A), a forfeiture action or proceeding may be\nbrought in the district in which any of the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred.\nAs set forth below, the offenses underlying the requested seizure warrant included acts or\nomissions occurring in the Southern District of New York.\n15. With respect to fungible property, including cash and funds deposited in a financial\ninstitution, 18 U.S.C. § 984 provides, in relevant part, that:\n(a)(1) In any forfeiture action in rem in which the subject property is cash, monetary\ninstruments in bearer form, funds deposited in an account in a financial institution . . . , or\nprecious metals:\n(A) it shall not be necessary for the Government to identify the specific property\ninvolved in the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture; and\n(B) it shall not be a defense that the property involved in such an offense has\nbeen removed and replaced by identical property.\n(2) Except as provided in subsection (b), any identical property found in the same place\nor account as the property involved in the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture shall\nbe subject to forfeiture under this section.\n(b) No action pursuant to this section to forfeit property not traceable directly to the\noffense that is the basis for the forfeiture may be commenced more than 1 year from the\ndate of the offense.\nIII. Probable Cause\nA. Probable Cause Regarding Commission of the Subject Offenses\nOverview of the Fraudulent Investment Schemes\n16. Since in or around May 2020, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern\nDistrict of New York (“SDNY”) and the FBI, among other law enforcement agencies, have been\ninvestigating a series of interrelated fraudulent investment schemes that pertain to several\ncompanies that are owned or operated by, or otherwise affiliated with, GUO, JE, and their\nassociates (collectively, the “Investment Schemes”). To date, the investigation (“Investigation”)\n8\n\nhas revealed that the Investment Schemes involve the solicitation and subsequent investment\nand/or misappropriation of hundreds of millions of dollars. GUO and JE are leaders of the\nInvestment Schemes.\n17. The Investment Schemes are conducted through various, interrelated offerings, all\nof which exhibit features that are consistent with fraud. For example, investors are promised\nunrealistic, outsized returns on their investments; investors are induced to invest on the basis of\nnumerous misrepresentations; a large portion of the investment money is misappropriated; and\nwith respect to the sale of digital asset securities, those currencies have never been tradable on a\npublic exchange, despite representations that they would be.\n18. Certain of the interrelated Investment Schemes are historical, while others are\nongoing. Specifically:\na. The GTV stock offering and the G Coin offering described below\n(collectively, the “Unregistered Stock Offerings”) operated between in or about April 2020 and in\nor about July 2020. As a result of the Unregistered Stock Offerings, whose proceeds were\ncommingled, companies affiliated with GUO, JE, and others collectively raised at least\napproximately $487 million from more than 5,000 investors, including individuals in the United\nStates.\nb. Starting at least in or about July 2020, the leaders of the scheme began to\npitch investors on a new set of investment opportunities, marketed as an opportunity to convert\ntheir existing investments in GTV into a “loan” to GTV (the “Convertible Loan Offering”). The\nConvertible Loan Offering was carried out by the Guo-backed Himalaya Farm Alliance, which\nconsists of informal groups, or “Farms,” of Chinese expatriates located in various cities around the\nworld. Between in or about August 2020 and March 2021, the U.S.-based Farms raised\napproximately $148 million from the Convertible Loan Offering.\n9\n\nc. GUO, JE, and others continue to conduct the Investment Schemes,\nincluding relating to G Club (which has been operating since in or about October 2020) and the\nHimalaya Exchange (which has been operating since in or about April 2021). As described below,\nG Club and the Himalaya Exchange have raised at least approximately $664 million between in or\nabout September 2020 and the present.\nBackground on GUO and JE\n19. Based on my participation in this investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of documents, records, videos that were posted on social media\nplatforms, and public source research that I have conducted on the Internet, as well as my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. GUO is a purported billionaire and a Chinese national who allegedly fled\nChina for the United States in 2014, after learning that an associate had been arrested on corruption\ncharges.\nb. GUO is involved with various entities relevant to the Investment Schemes,\nas described in greater detail below, including GTV, G Music LLC (“G Music”), G Club, G\nFashion (“G Fashion”), and GETTR USA, Inc. (“Gettr”). GUO does not hold formal titles or\npositions at these entities.\nc. In or about 2018, GUO founded organizations named the Rule of Law\nFoundation (“ROLF”) and Rule of Law Society (“ROLS”). Based on my review of publicly\navailable information, I have learned that the Rule of Law projects were underway by December\n2018.1 ROLF and ROLS are purportedly organizations dedicated to exposing and combatting\ncorruption in China by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”). At times, the board members for\n1 See http\n(describing Guo and Bannon’s involvement in the “Rule of Law Fund”).\n10\n\nROLF and/or ROLS have included Stephen K. Bannon (“Bannon”) and Kyle Bass (“Bass”). GUO\ndoes not hold a formal position at ROLF or ROLS; however, on the ROLS website, GUO is\ndescribed as “the founder, a promoter and a spokesperson” and a sponsor.\nd. JE, a close associate of GUO, has been described as a financier and\nentrepreneur. JE is involved with various other entities relevant to the Investment Schemes, as\ndescribed in greater detail below. Specifically:\ni. JE is the CEO of Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.\n(“Hamilton”), a purported global fund management company.2 Hamilton is headquartered in the\nBritish Virgin Islands and was incorporated on or about February 5, 2018. JE was formally\nappointed Director of Hamilton on or about March 20, 2019.\nii. JE is the Director of ACA Capital Group Ltd. (“ACA Capital”), a\npurported Hong Kong-based investment firm3 that was incorporated in the United Kingdom on or\nabout July 10, 2020.\niii. JE is listed as the founder and Chairman of Himalaya Exchange, a\npurported cryptocurrency “ecosystem.” JE is the 100% beneficial owner of various entities that\noperate Himalaya Exchange, including Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. (“Himalaya\nClearing”), Major Lead International Ltd., Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd.\n(“Himalaya Financial”), and Himalaya International Reserves Ltd. (“Himalaya Reserves”).\nGTV Stock Offering\n20. Between approximately April 20, 2020 and June 2, 2020, GTV, its parent company\nSaraca Media Group, Inc. (“Saraca”), and Voice of Guo Media, Inc. (“VOG”; collectively, the\n2 See http\n3 See http\n11\n\n“Companies”) solicited thousands of individuals to invest in an offering of GTV common stock\n(the “GTV Stock Offering”). During that time period, more than approximately 5,000 investors\n(including many in the United States) collectively paid approximately $452 million for purported\nGTV common stock.\n21. Based on my review of the GTV Stock Offering’s information memorandum dated\nApril 20, 2020 (the “Memorandum”), interviews of witnesses, and review of public source\ninformation, as well as documents and records obtained during the course of the investigation, I\nhave learned the following, among other things:\na. GTV was founded on or about April 17, 2020, as a Delaware corporation\nand a wholly owned subsidiary of Saraca. GTV’s principal place of business was located in the\nSouthern District of New York, in a townhouse located at 162 E. 64th St., New York, NY, 10065\n(the “Townhouse”).\nb. According to the Memorandum, GUO was the “sponsor” of both Saraca and\nGTV, as well as the “adviser[sic]” and “key host” of GTV. The Memorandum also stated that\nGUO was a billionaire, successful businessman, and dissident in China. According to various\nwitnesses, as well as social media content, GUO consistently presented himself as the founder and\nface of GTV.\nc. The Memorandum and a separate letter to prospective investors outlining\n“Investment Procedures Guidelines” listed GUO’s phone number as the contact number for\ninquiries from potential investors.\nd. At the time of the GTV Stock Offering, the Companies had recently\nlaunched a news-focused social media platform called GTV, including the website www.gtv.org.\nThe Memorandum claimed GTV would be “the first ever platform which w[ould] combine the\npower of citizen journalism and social news with state-of-the-art technology, big data, artificial\n12\n\nintelligence, block-chain technology and real-time interactive communication” and that GTV\nwould be “the only uncensored and independent bridge between China and the Western world.”\nThe Memorandum also claimed that GTV would “be a bridge between China and the Western\nworld . . . allowing for free and open communication, business transactions and trading,\nuncensored by the Chinese government.” The Memorandum boasted that GTV’s platform would\nbe so powerful as to “expos[e] corruption, obstruction, illegality, brutality, harassment, and\ninhumanity in China.” The Memorandum also indicated that GTV would compete with companies\nsuch as Zoom, WeChat, TikTok, YouTube, Cisco, Citrix, Alibaba, Amazon, and eBay.\ne. The Memorandum listed Yvette Y. Wang, Max Krasner, and Daniel\nPodhaskie as GTV’s Executive Directors.\nf. The Memorandum highlighted the credentials of GTV’s Non-executive\nDirectors, including, among others, Bannon, Bass, and Darren Blanton (“Blanton”). As described\nabove, Bannon and Bass were also board members of the ROLF and/or ROLS.\ng. The Memorandum stated that investor funds would be used for the\nfollowing, among other purposes: acquisition of companies; upgrading GTV technology and\nsecurity; and marketing. The Memorandum did not contemplate that investor funds would be used\nto invest in hedge funds or any similar type of financial investment, or that investor funds would\nbe given to other companies, such as Saraca.\nh. Based on my conversations with a source of information (“SOI4”) involved\nwith the ROLF, the Companies, the GTV Stock Offering, and the Phoenix Farm, as well as my\n4 The SOI is providing information to law enforcement in hopes of entering into a cooperation\nagreement and receiving leniency at sentencing. The SOI has provided reliable information that\nhas been corroborated by, among other things, electronic evidence, videos, cellphone records, and\nsubpoena and search warrant returns.\n13\n\nreview of the metadata of the Memorandum, I have learned that JE was a primary author of the\nMemorandum.\nG Coin Offering\n22. During the same period of April 2020 through June 2020, GTV and Saraca also\nsolicited GTV Investors to invest in a companion digital asset security that was referred to as either\nG-Coins or G-Dollars (the “G Coin Offering”).\n23. Based on my participation in this investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of bank records and videos that were posted on social media\nplatforms, as well as my review of reports of interviews with GTV Investors and conversations\nwith others, including law enforcement, I have learned the following, among other things, about\nthe G Coin Offering:\na. From approximately in or about April 2020, through at least in or about June\n2020, I have learned that the Companies, as well as representatives for the Companies, such as\nGUO, marketed the sale of G-Coins and G-Dollars to the public through online videos on\nYouTube, Twitter, and other video-sharing and social media platforms.\nb. The Companies’ online promotions set forth that G-Coins (which the\nCompanies indicated would eventually be merged into G-Dollars, forming a single digital asset),\nand G-Dollars would be usable to purchase goods or services or exchange for gold or fiat currency\non an online platform. As part of its solicitation of G-Coin and G-Dollar investors, the Companies\ndid not provide investors with financial information about the plan to develop any digital asset or\nplatform, or any written offering materials, including, for example, a whitepaper or private\nplacement memorandum.\nc. The Companies collected at least approximately $31 million from the G-\nCoin and G-Dollar Investors, pooling the proceeds in bank accounts associated with the\n14\n\nCompanies and commingling them with proceeds from the GTV Stock Offering. As part of the G\nCoin Offering, many investors received a purported 20% discount on the $.01 purchase price for\nG-Coins and G-Dollars. Investors participated in the G Coin Offering by transferring funds\ndirectly to the Companies’ U.S. bank accounts, by making payments to the Companies’ accounts\non online payment platforms, by making purchases via the Apple App Store, or by writing checks.\n24. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, and review of\ntranslations of statements that were made by GUO regarding the G Coin Offering, as well as my\nconversations with others, I have learned that GUO made numerous false statements in order to\nsolicit investments for the G Coin Offering. Examples of some those statements are described\nbelow, in substance and in part:\na. In a statement contained within a video by GUO on or about May 9, 2020,\nGuo stated that G-Coins could be exchanged into U.S. dollars or physical gold.\nb. In another statement contained within a video on or about May 16, 2020,\nGUO stated that the G-Coin and G-Dollar currencies could be exchanged with gold.\n25. Based on my participation in this investigation, I believe that the above-described\nstatements regarding G-Coins and G-Dollar are false. In particular, during the course of the\ninvestigation, I have not found any evidence that there is or has ever been an exchange where G-\nCoins or G-Dollars could be exchanged for U.S. dollars or gold.\n26. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of bank records, and review of videos that were posted on social media\nplatforms, as well as my review of reports of interviewed individuals who invested in GTV (the\n“GTV Investors”) and my conversations with others, including other law enforcement officers, I\nhave learned the following, among other things, about the solicitation of investments for the GTV\nStock Offering and G Coin Offering:\n15\n\na. GTV disseminated information about the two offerings to the general public\nthrough publicly-available videos on websites affiliated with the Companies, including\nwww.gtv.org and www.gnews.org, as well as on social media platforms such as YouTube and\nTwitter. The first solicitation video, posted on YouTube on April 21, 2020, was entitled, as\ntranslated into English, “GTV Private Placement Subscription Instructions” (the “Launch Video”).\nThe Launch Video described the investment terms for the GTV Stock Offering and provided a\nmobile phone number for potential investors to use for inquiries about the offering. The Launch\nVideo has had over 3,000 views. None of the GTV Stock Offering solicitation videos, including\nthe Launch Video, were password protected or placed any restriction on who could view them or\nany limitations on their ability to be shared. As a result, the general public, including prospective\nU.S. investors, were able to access the online marketing videos about the GTV Stock Offering\nthrough, for example, independent online research, social media, or referrals from other investors.\nb. GUO led the effort to solicit investors for the GTV Stock Offering. GUO,\nwho is a prolific user of social media and has an enormous social media following, used various\nsocial media platforms to attract followers and to solicit investors for the GTV Stock Offering.\nThose social media platforms included WhatsApp and Discord, both of which have end-to-end\nencrypted chat services.5 Among other things, the Companies sent the Launch Video via phone\nmessages to hundreds of prospective individual investors with a link to a Google Drive folder that\ncontained additional offering material for the GTV Stock Offering, including the subscription\nagreement and investment instructions. GUO also assured potential investors that they would\n5 End-to-end encryption is a system of communication where only the communicating users can\nread the messages. End-to-end encryption prevents law enforcement authorities from intercepting\nsuch communications through wiretaps or through search warrants on the service provider, such\nas WhatsApp.\n16\n\nrealize enormous returns, at one point suggesting that they would receive 1,000 times their\ninvestment, see infra ¶ 40(c). In another statement, in or about June 2020, GUO stated in substance\nand in part that GTV stock was worth 30 times what it had been worth before.\nc. Based on my review of a GTV confidentiality agreement, I have learned\nthat in order to participate in the GTV Stock Offering, GTV Investors were required to sign a\nconfidentiality agreement that required them to keep all information concerning GTV confidential,\nincluding the existence of the confidentiality agreement.\nd. The GTV Stock Offering was structured as a private placement offering of\n10% into GTV, with the remaining 90% of GTV to be controlled by Saraca, which was its parent\ncompany. According to due diligence records from an investment fund, Saraca is a wholly-owned\nsubsidiary of Hudson Diamond Holding, Inc. (“Hudson BVI”), a British Virgin Islands company.\nHudson is in turn wholly owned by Qiang Guo (“QIANG GUO”). Based on my review of open-\nsource material, I have learned that QIANG GUO is GUO’S son.\ne. By early June 2020, banks began to suspect that the Companies were\nengaged in potentially unlawful activity and started to close accounts that were linked to Saraca,\nGTV, and GUO. Around that same time period, GTV Investors began to express concerns about\nGTV’s use of their money, and the legitimacy of their investments. Some of those investors\nexpressed their concerns directly to GUO and many investors requested that their money be\nreturned. In response, GUO and his associates often attempted to shun and ostracize the investors.\nFor example, GUO suggested that one investor was a spy for the CCP and that other investors\nshould not interact with that investor\nMisappropriation of Unregistered Stock Offering Funds\n27. A significant portion of the investor funds collected through the Unregistered Stock\nOfferings (collectively, “Offering Funds”) were misappropriated through investments.\n17\n\n28. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of bank records and subpoena returns, as well as my conversations\nwith others, including law enforcement and witnesses, I have learned the following, among other\nthings:\na. GUO, JE, and others arranged for approximately $100 million of the\nOfferings Funds to get invested on behalf of GTV’s parent company, Saraca, in a high-risk hedge\nfund investment managed by a firm named Hayman Capital Management L.P. (“Hayman”).\nAccording to its website, Hayman is an SEC-registered asset management firm that was founded\nby Bass, who was a non-executive director of GTV at the time of the transfer.\nb. In or about May 2020, Bass facilitated GUO’s and JE’s investment in a\nhigh-risk investment fund called the Hayman Hong Kong Opportunities Fund (the “Hayman\nFund”), which was operated by Hayman.\nc. JE coordinated with Hayman regarding the investment. For example, in a\nMay 29, 2020 email from JE to a Hayman representative (“Hayman Rep-1”), JE wrote, in\nsubstance and in part: “We will have one onshore and one offshore vehicle. The onshore one will\ninvest USD100m and the offshore one will invest USD1m. The address of the onshore vehicle is:\n162 E64th St., New York, NY 10065 United States.” On or about May 31, 2020, JE wrote, in\nsubstance and in part, “The $1m will come from my personal account and I owned[sic] 100% of\nHamilton Investment Management Ltd.”\ni. The address JE provided for the “onshore” vehicle is the address of\nthe Townhouse. See supra ¶ 21(a).\nii. Based on my participation in this Investigation, review of bank\nrecords and subpoena returns, as well as my conversations with others, including law enforcement\nand witnesses, I have learned that the Townhouse has been listed on corporate documents and/or\n18\n\nbank account documentation as the business address for at least seven GUO-affiliated entities;\nspecifically: Saraca, GTV, Golden Spring, Hudson Diamond NY, Greenwich Land, ROLF (until\napproximately May 2022), and ROLS (until approximately May 2022).\nd. Three days after the close of the GTV Stock Offering, on or about June 5,\n2020, $100 million of the Offering Funds were transferred from a particular JP Morgan Chase\nbank account to an onshore bank account associated with Hayman for the purpose of investing in\nthe Hayman Fund. The funds were transferred on behalf of Saraca; as noted above, Saraca was\nthe parent company to GTV and was 100% owned by GUO’s son, QIANG QUO.\ne. Three days later, on or about June 8, 2020, $1 million was transferred on\nbehalf of Hamilton,6 JE’s company, from a bank account in the name of JE to an offshore bank\naccount associated with Hayman, also for the purpose of investing in the Hayman Fund.\nf. The transfer of Offering Funds to Hayman was completely inconsistent with\nGTV’s representations to the GTV Investors about how their funds would be used.\n29. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of\ndocuments and records, as well as my conversations with others, including law enforcement, I\nhave learned that on or about September 13, 2021, the SEC announced settled charges against\nthe Companies, based on their violations of the registration requirements for the Unregistered\nStock Offerings (i.e., the GTV Stock Offering and the associated digital asset G Coin Offering).\nThe SEC’s settlement required the Companies to pay more than $539 million in disgorgement\nand penalties.\nThe Convertible Loan Offering\n6 In April 2018, JE submitted on behalf of Hamilton an account opening document to a U.K. bank\nthat claimed that he owns 100% of Hamilton and that the company “does not involve itself in\ninvestments.”\n19\n\n30. After the Unregistered Stock Offerings described above were discovered by banks\nand numerous bank accounts were frozen, leaders of the schemes began to pitch investors on a\nnew set of investment opportunities. One new investment scheme launched in or about July 2020\nwas marketed to prospective investors as an opportunity to convert their existing investments in\nGTV into a “loan” to GTV. The Convertible Loan Offering was carried out by the “Himalaya\nFarm Alliance,” a collective of informal groups—known as “Farms”—of Chinese expatriates\nlocated in various cities around the world, including New York and Phoenix. The Himalaya Farm\nAlliance’s purported purpose was to assist the Chinese pro-democracy movement; the Himalaya\nFarm Alliance existed primarily as private groups on social media platforms such as Discord. The\nFarms were typically referred to by the names of preexisting companies that they affiliated\nthemselves with for banking purposes; e.g., Mountains of Spices LLC and Davy & Tony\nInternational Limited for the New York Farm, and Maywind Trading LLC, Medical Supply\nSystem International LLC and Santel LLC for the Phoenix Farm.\n31. In connection with the Convertible Loan Offering, the Farms provided prospective\ninvestors with a “Loan Agreement” that disclosed that the loan would be made to the individual\nFarm (e.g., “Phoenix Farm (Maywind Trading LLC)”) and that the loaned funds would be used by\nthat specific Farm for “general working capital purposes.” Investors executed the Loan Agreement\nand sent it to their Farm leaders after transferring their funds to the Farm, but were not provided\ncounter-executed copies of the agreement.\n32. Between in or about August 2020 and in or about March 2021, the U.S.-based\nFarms collectively raised approximately $148 million from the Convertible Loan Offering (the\n“Loan Funds”). Investors agreed to provide loans to the Farms for the purpose of acquiring GTV\nshares (once the three-year note had matured). Once the funds were collected by the U.S. Farms,\nthey were transferred to domestic and foreign accounts owned by different legal entities, including\n20\n\nan Abu Dhabi bank account in the name of ACA Capital (the “UAE ACA Capital Account”),\nwhich is owned and controlled by JE.\nMisappropriation of Convertible Loan Offering Funds\n33. A significant portion of the Loan Funds collected through the Convertible Loan\nOffering were misappropriated, as described below.\n34. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of bank records and subpoena returns, as well as my conversations\nwith others, including law enforcement and witnesses, I have learned the following, among other\nthings:\na. JE was sole signatory of the UAE ACA Capital Account. JE wired\napproximately $33.3 million of the Loan Funds out of the UAE ACA Capital Account to Swiss\nand UK accounts belonging to himself, his wife (Sin Ring Rong), and his company, Hamilton.\nThe wires to his and his wife’s personal accounts—which amounted to more than approximately\n$10 million—were described as dividends, salary or director fees. However, JE was not a director\nor employee of GTV, Saraca, or other affiliated entities.\nb. JE arranged for approximately $34 million in transfers from UAE ACA\nCapital Account to U.S. bank accounts in the names of three companies that are each 100% owned\nby GUO’s family members; specifically:\ni. Approximately $5 million to Greenwich Land LLC, which is owned\nby GUO’s wife, Hing Chi Ngok;\nii. Approximately $18 million to Hudson Diamond NY LLC, which is\nowned by Guo’s daughter, Mei Guo; and\niii. Approximately $11 million to Lamp Capital LLC, which is owned\nby Guo’s son, QIANG GUO.\n21\n\nc. The $34 million was commingled with other investor funds, including GTV\nOffering Funds. Based on my review of bank account records, I have learned that much of this\nGTV Investor money was used to fund lavish lifestyle expenses (e.g., approximately $2.3 million\nin expenses relating to GUO’s yacht, and approximately $600,000 for the purchase of luxury\nautomobiles).\nd. JE also arranged for large transfers from UAE ACA Capital Account to other\ncompanies with ties to GUO; specifically:\ni. Approximately $19 million to Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.\n(“Lexington Property”), which is owned by former GTV Treasurer, Anthony DiBattista\n(“DiBattista”). The registered address of Lexington Property is 750 Lexington Avenue, New\nYork, NY;\nii. Approximately $32 million to Savio Law LLC (as escrow agent),\npursuant to a purported loan agreement between ACA Capital and Saraca (which is owned by\nGUO’s son, QIANG GUO); and\niii. Approximately $1 million to Bannon Film Industries, Inc., a\ncompany owned by Steve Bannon. As described above, Bannon was listed in the Memorandum\nas a non-executive GTV Director and was a Director of the ROLF / ROLS.\nThe G Club Operations LLC Scheme\n35. Some of the Farms recruited investors to invest in GTV through the purchase of “G\nClub” memberships. As described in greater detail below, law enforcement believes G Club is an\nongoing fraudulent scheme operated by GUO, JE, and others.\n36. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of the\nwebsites, subpoena returns, records and documents, including operating agreements and articles\n22\n\nof incorporation, open-source research I have conducted on the Internet, and my conversations\nwith others, including law enforcement, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. In or about October 2020, G Club Operations LLC (“G Club”) was\nregistered in Puerto Rico. According to the Operating Agreement, the purpose of G Club is to\n“provide[] Membership Concierge services with exclusive offers and discounts for luxury hotels\nand retailers for High Net Worth individuals from the Asian market.”\nb. An image from the G Club website (“G Club Website”), viewable at\nhttp is shown below:\n37. G Club purportedly offers five membership tiers: Tier 5 Membership ($50,000\nannually); Tier 4 Membership ($40,000 annually); Tier 3 Membership ($30,000 annually); Tier 2\nMembership ($20,000 annually); and Tier 1 Membership ($10,000 annually). According to the G\nClub Membership Agreement, “A Member may subsequently elect a higher tier of membership,”\nbut “may not subsequently elect a lower tier of Membership.” The annual fee for the desired\nmembership tier must be paid in full with the submission of the G Club membership application,\nand G Club reserves the right to reject any membership application within 30 days at its sole and\n23\n\nabsolute discretion. The Membership Agreement further states: “If an Application is rejected and\nmembership denied, G Clubs shall return the Membership Fee within ten (10) calendar days of\nsuch rejection . . . in the form of the original payment of the Membership Fee or, at the option of\nG Clubs, by check.”\n38. One photograph posted to the G Club Website depicted GUO living a lavish\nlifestyle; specifically, he is shown standing on top of what appears to be a large yacht smoking a\ncigar. The G Club Website also states that:\nG Clubs memberships provide its members with access to a concierge customer\nservice with Mandarin and English access and support. G Clubs members will have\nthe opportunity to attend the annual G Summit meeting which may occur in person\nor virtually. G Clubs members will also get exclusive early access to the latest\nfashion collections and special member pricing on purchases made on the G\nFashion website.\n39. In a video summary posted on GNews on or about July 8, 2021, Guo claimed that\nG Club had approximately 25,000 members, and predicted that G Club would grow to at least 100\nmillion users, attracting $16 trillion of investment.\n40. Despite the representations on the G Club Website about purported membership\nbenefits, law enforcement believes that G Club is being used, at least in part, to perpetuate the\nfraud schemes, including by soliciting and receiving investments while evading regulatory\nrequirements. Specifically, based on my review of an interview report of an August 2, 2021\ninterview (the “August 2, 2021 Interview”) conducted by others of a GTV investor (“Investor-1”),\nI have learned that Investor-1 stated the following, in substance and in part, during that interview:\na. Investor-1 invested $200,000 USD in GTV in or around May 2020.\nInvestor-1’s money came from Investor-1’s savings.\nb. Investor-1 came to believe that GTV was a scam because Investor-1 did not\nreceive any GTV shares, and when Investor-1 asked for a refund, no one responded to Investor-1.\n24\n\nc. Investor-1 invested in GTV because: 1) there were a lot of American\npoliticians supporting Guo; (2) Guo said it was original stock and there would be at least 1,000x\ngrowth; and (3) Investor-1 thought Investor-1 would make money on the GTV stock because Guo\nsaid this in videos. Investor-1 did not think Investor-1 would lose money because Guo promised\nthe GTV investment would make money.\nd. Investor-1 thought that GTV would use the money to build a website like\nYouTube, Facebook and Twitter, but did not know for certain what it would be used for.\ne. Investor-1 subsequently invested in the Convertible Loan Program through\nthe “Canada Farm” in or around August 2020. Specifically, Investor-1 sent approximately $71,019\nto “Canada Himalayan Club Medica Inc.” as a loan. Investor-1 believed that the loan was for 3-5\nyears, with 3% interest and that at the end of that period Investor-1 would receive the money or\nGTV stock. Investor-1 never received an executed copy of the investment contract. The money\nInvestor-1 sent was frozen by the Canadian SEC.\nf. Investor-1 attempted to invest in GTV again in or around March 2021\nthrough G Club. Specifically, Investor-1 was instructed to send Investor-1’s investment funds to\n“Crane Advisory Group,” who in turn would send the money to G Club. Investor-1 sent\napproximately $100,015 to Crane Advisory Group for the purchase of GTV shares at the price of\n$1 per ten shares.\ng. In or around July 2021, Investor-1 attempted to initiate a refund by\ncontacting G Club online customer service department. In response to Investor-1’s refund request,\nG Club, through “notices@gclubs.com,” sent the following email:\nYou recently made a payment with respect to your G|CLUBS membership through\nCrane. Your wire payment transfer exceeded the amount of a single membership\nand you have not applied for multiple memberships. We received $100,015.00 via\nwire. You had applied for one Tier 5 membership and filled out the KYC package\nindicating the total amount was for multi membership of G|CLUBS (see attached).\n25\n\nTo credit the total amount to you, you must apply for additional memberships.\nPlease fill and sign the attached, advising how many memberships you wish to\npurchase and their tier.\nIf sending the excess funds was an error and you wish an immediate return of\n$50,015, please immediately advise. We sincerely apologize for any inconvenience\ncaused.\nh. In response, Investor-1 informed G Club that Investor-1 had sent the $100,015.00\nin funds not to purchase a G Club membership, but rather to invest in GTV. Investor-1 requested\nthat all of Investor-1’s funds be returned. In a subsequent email, Investor-1 also noted that it would\nnot have made sense for Investor-1 to send a sum of $100,015.00, given that the most expensive\nG Club membership cost $50,000. Investor-1 also explained in another email that, in a phone\nconversation with a representative of G Club, the representative had made it clear that Investor-\n1’s funds were going to be used for an investment in GTV, not for the purchase of a G Club\nmembership.\ni. Investor-1 had not received any of Investor-1’s $100,015 investment back as of the\ndate of the interview.\n41. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, my review of\ndocuments, records, and email search warrant returns, as well as my conversations with others,\nincluding witnesses, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. An individual named Alex Hadjicharalambous (“Hadjicharalambous”), whose title\nwas the Financial Controller for G Club, was the authorized signer listed on multiple bank accounts\nin the name of G Club. On July 13, 2021, Hadjicharalambous received an email at his G Club\nemail account (alexh@gclubs.com) from a G Fashion IT Manager entitled “HCHKTech email”\nthat read, in substance and in part: “Hello Alex, As you know we now work for HCHK\nTechnologies. Use the credentials in this email and follow the steps below to log into your new\nemail account.”\n26\n\nb. Based on my review of open-source material on the Internet and subpoena returns,\nI have learned the following, among other things:\ni. On or about April 29, 2021, HCHK Technologies, Inc. (“HCHK\nTechnologies”) was incorporated in the State of Delaware. At the time of incorporation, Anthony\nDiBattista was director of HCHK Technologies. Between on or about May 27, 2021 and\nNovember 10, 2021, DiBattista was Treasurer of HCHK Technologies. On or about December\n13, 2021, DiBattista resigned as President, CEO, and Director of HCHK Technologies.\nc. On or about August 18, 2021, HCHK Property Management, Inc. (“HCHK\nProperty”) was incorporated in Delaware. Yvette Wang was elected as the initial director of\nHCHK Property. See ¶ 21(e). On or about December 15, 2021, by written consent of the Board\nof Directors of HCHK Property (i.e., Wang), DiBattista was appointed Treasurer of HCHK\nProperty. On or about January 1, 2022, Wang resigned and DiBattista was appointed as President,\nCEO, and Director of HCHK Property.\nd. DiBattista’s roles with various of the other GUO-affiliated entities included, among\nothers, Treasurer of GTV, authorized signatory of Lexington Property bank accounts, and\nTreasurer of G Music LLC.\ne. Based on my review of subpoena returns and my conversations with others, I have\nlearned that on or about July 18, 2021, a G Fashion HR employee sent a “transition memo” to Alex\nHadjicharalambous that, “[e]ffective as of July 19, 2021, all GFashion employees will have the\noption to transfer to GFashion’s staffing company, HCHK Technologies, Inc.,” which would\n“thereafter serve the role of staffing company for GFashion and other enterprises.” The transition\nmemo further reflected that an employee’s failure to execute the transition memo that same day\nwould result in termination.\n27\n\nf. Based on my review of open-source Internet research and subpoena returns, I have\nlearned that one of the Directors of HCHK Technologies is also the Director and Chairman of the\nAudit Committee of Gettr,7 a social media platform that reportedly evolved from GTV Media. I\nhave further learned that JE’s company, Hamilton, owns 95% of Gettr and contributed $35 million\nto Gettr in capital contribution.\ng. Based on the foregoing, I have learned that starting on or about July 19, 2021,\ncertain employees of G Fashion, Gettr, and other GUO-affiliated entities began to operate under\nthe company names HCHK Technologies and/or HCHK Property.\nThe Himalaya Exchange Scheme\n42. As described above, JE founded a purported cryptocurrency exchange platform\ncalled Himalaya Exchange, available at http (the “Himalaya Exchange\nWebsite”). Similar to the link between G-Coin / G-Dollar and the Unregistered Stock Offerings,\nHimalaya Coin (ticker: HCO or HCN) and Himalaya Dollar (ticker: HDO) (together, the\n“Himalaya Assets”) were initially offered as a companion digital asset security for investors in the\nConvertible Loan Program.\n43. Based on my participation in this investigation, training, experience, review of the\nHimalaya Exchange Website, videos posted on GNews, bank records and subpoena returns, and\nopen-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, as well as my conversations with\nothers, including law enforcement and witnesses, I have learned the following, among other things:\n7 See http\n(last visited July 6, 2022). Based on my conversations with others, I have learned that Gettr is one\nof the companies for which HCHK Technologies provides purported staffing services.\n28\n\na. The Himalaya Exchange is described as a global digital exchange with a\nfull ecosystem, that includes (or will include) a stablecoin (Himalaya Dollar),8 a trading coin\n(Himalaya Coin), and a blockchain payment application called “Himalaya Pay.”\nb. JE is described as the founder and Chairman of the Himalaya Exchange.\nc. As described above, JE is also the founder and CEO of BVI-based\nHamilton and the Director of Hong Kong-based ACA Capital.\nd. An image from the Himalaya Exchange Website, viewable at\nhttp is shown below:\n44. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of the\nHimalaya Exchange Website, videos posted on GNews, bank records and subpoena returns, and\nopen-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, as well as my conversations with\nothers, including law enforcement and witnesses, I have learned, among other things, that investors\n8 A stablecoin is a cryptocurrency that seeks to peg itself to a stable currency, typically the U.S.\ndollar.\n29\n\nwere misled about how and when they would be able to trade their cryptocurrency assets.\nSpecifically:\na. When the Himalaya Exchange Website was launched, investors were told\nthat, as of June 2021, they would be able to exchange and withdraw their cryptocurrency. An\nimage of the website from May 2021 depicting this representation is shown below:\nb. The Himalaya Exchange Website later changed its “trade” date to September 2021.\nBased on my training, experience, and participation in this investigation, I have learned that it is\ncommon for fraudulent cryptocurrencies to use similar tactics to those used here; specifically it is\ncommon for fraudulent cryptocurrencies to: (1) not be tradable on a public exchange; and\n(2)induce investors to purchase the cryptocurrencies through false promises that the\ncryptocurrency will be available to trade on a public exchange soon.\nc. The initial coin offering (“ICO”) of the Himalaya Assets purportedly took place on\nthe Himalaya Exchange Website or about November 1, 2021. According to data on the Himalaya\nExchange Website, the price of a Himalaya Asset increased from 10 cents at the time of the ICO\nto $27 approximately two weeks later, resulting in a purported $27 billion valuation by mid-\nNovember 2021, as reflected in the graph below from the Himalaya Exchange Website:\n30\n\nd. According to Himalaya Exchange’s promotional materials, the value of the\nHimalaya Dollar is pegged to the U.S. Dollar. “Credits” are used to secure positions within the\nHimalaya Ecosystem, which positions correspond to a particular type of crypto asset. Promotional\nmaterials also state that “[c]redits can only be used on the Himalaya Exchange or within the\nHimalaya Ecosystem, representing a right to participating in trading on the Himalaya\nExchange and do not carry any right to require their exchange for fiat currency or crypto-assets.”\nPromotional materials clarify that references to Himalaya Coin, Himalaya Dollar, “or any other\ntype of asset on an account at the Himalaya Exchange or through the Himalaya Pay App are\nreferences to Credits corresponding to that asset.”\ne. According to the Himalaya Dollar whitepaper dated April 2021 (the “Whitepaper”),\navailable on the Himalaya Exchange Website, Himalaya Dollar is an Ethereum-\nbased token “structured with the aim of maintaining its value 1-to-1 to the United States Dollar.\n31\n\nHimalaya Dollar Credits benefit from potential liquidity support which may be provided through\nthe [Himalaya] Reserve which will be managed with the aim of maintaining its value at a level\nequal in value in U.S. dollars to the value of Himalaya Dollars in circulation as described below.”\nf. The Whitepaper further states that Himalaya Reserves, the issuer of Himalaya\nDollar, “intends to create and hold in the Reserve a mix of United States dollars or other currencies\nin cash and cash equivalents,” and further states, “it is intended to make the Reserve transparent\nto the public. The Issuer intends to have the Reserve audited annually by independent auditors.\nThe results of those audits will be made publicly available with details of the then-current\ncomposition of the Reserve and the market value of the assets as at[sic] the time of publication.”\nTo date, no such audit results have been published.\ng. As described above, the Himalaya Assets have never traded on an open exchange,\nand instead purport to trade only on the private Himalaya Exchange. Himalaya Exchange restrains\nthe flow of real currency out of the Himalaya Exchange by its members, as described above. Thus,\nthe ability to convert Himalaya Dollars and Himalaya Coins back into U.S. currency was limited.\n45. Based on my participation in this investigation, training, experience, review of the\nHimalaya Exchange Website, videos posted on GNews, and public source research that I have\nconducted on the Internet, as well as my conversations with others, I have learned the following,\namong other things:\na. As described above, Himalaya Dollar purports to be a “stablecoin” that is\npegged 1-to-1 to the value of the U.S. dollar. Other major stablecoins include TerraUSD, Tether,\nand USD Coin.\nb. In a video summary posted on GNews in November 2021, GUO\nrepresented, in sum and substance, that Himalaya Coin was backed by the U.S. dollar through\n32\n\nstablecoin Himalaya Dollar, and further stated that Himalaya Coin is backed by a reserve of 20%\nof the proceeds in gold.\nc. In or about May 2022, there was a global stablecoin collapse that began\nwhen a particular stablecoin called TerraUSD lost its peg (i.e., no longer had sufficient hard-asset\nreserves to back its cryptocurrency at a 1-to-1 ratio to the U.S. dollar). As a result, the\ncryptocurrency market lost approximately $300 billion in value. The valuation of TerraUSD\nthrough May 10, 2022 is reflected in the graph below:\nd. In contrast, data on the Himalaya Exchange Website reflects very little\nfluctuation or decrease in the purported value of the Himalaya Assets during the same time period,\nas reflected in the graph below from the Himalaya Exchange Website:\n33\n\n46. I have reviewed the graph displayed above in paragraphs 44(c), showing the value\nof the Himalaya Assets’ purported value between approximately November 1, 2021 and December\n31, 2021. The graph is consistent with the purported price of the Himalaya Assets being falsified—\nspecifically, it reflects a steep increase in price over the first two weeks and then an apparent\nfluctuation in price, but all within a narrow band.\n47. I have also reviewed the graphs displayed above in paragraphs 45(c) and (d),\nreflecting the price of stablecoin TerraUSD and the purported price of a Himalaya Asset between\nApril 2021 and May 10, 2021. The data reflected in the Himalaya Asset graph is inconsistent with\nthe valuation of other stablecoins, including TerraUSD, during the stablecoin crash.9\n9 On or about June 15, 2022, it was reported that William Je said the following: “Despite the\ncryptocurrency market’s recent dip, HDO has constantly remained stable with the US dollar 1:1\nwithout fluctuation. Impressively, this makes HDO the only stable coin in the world to maintain\n100% during this time-period of uncertainty.” See http\nreleases/iconic-ferrari-f1-car-sold-by-rm-sotheby-s-using-cryptocurrency-himalaya-dollar-\n883914213.html (last visited July 6, 2022)\n34\n\nOverview of the Scheme to Launder Fraud Proceeds\n48. As described in greater detail herein, since at least in or about 2020, GUO, JE, and\nothers have operated the Investment Schemes, i.e., various interrelated fraudulent investment\nschemes. The Investment Schemes involve entities affiliated with GUO and/or JE, including GTV,\nG Fashion, G Club, Crane, Lamp Capital LLC, Hudson Diamond NY, Greenwich Land LLC,\nHCHK Technologies, the Himalaya Farms, the Himalaya Exchange, Hamilton, and ACA Capital,\namong others.\n49. As described above, between in or about April 2020 and June 2020, GUO, JE, and\nothers fraudulently obtained more than approximately $635 million in purported investments\nthrough the Unregistered Stock Offerings and Convertible Loan Offering. See supra ¶ 18.\nRecords that I or others have reviewed in the course of the Investigation show that, between in or\nabout November 2020 and June 2022, G Club has generated more than approximately $221 million\nin purported G Club membership fees.\n50. As detailed below, the evidence demonstrates that between at least approximately\nApril 2020 and the present, GUO, JE, and others have been engaged in a scheme to launder fraud\nproceeds from the Investment Schemes (which include the Unregistered Stock Offerings, the\nConvertible Loan Offering, G Club, and the Himalaya Exchange) (collectively, the “Investment\nScheme Funds”).\n51. As part of the money laundering scheme, JE and others have conducted financial\ntransactions totaling more than approximately $1.04 billion, as described in greater detail below.\n52. As a further part of the money laundering scheme, at least approximately $252\nmillion of the Investment Scheme Funds were remitted, either directly or indirectly, to bank\naccounts in the United States and the Bahamas held in the name of JE’s companies—Hamilton,\nACA Capital, and Himalaya Exchange—or otherwise controlled by JE.\n35\n\n53. In particular, as described below, JE opened certain of the Target Accounts and\nother bank accounts at Silvergate Bank, a bank in La Jolla, California that markets itself as “the\nleading bank for innovative business in fintech and cryptocurrency.” Target Accounts-1 through\n-8 are in the name of a Cayman Islands-registered hedge fund, Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC;\nTarget Account-9 is in the name of JE’s company, Hamilton Investment Management Ltd., which\ncompany is the investment manager of the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC. JE is the principal\nof Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. and an authorized signer on the Silvergate Target\nAccounts.\n54. As further described below, JE opened three accounts at FV Bank, a bank in Puerto\nRico that markets itself as “The Global Digital Bank.” The FV Bank accounts are in the names\nof various legal entities through which JE and others operate the Himalaya Exchange—Himalaya\nClearing, Himalaya Financial, and Himalaya Reserves. JE is the ultimate beneficial owner of those\nHimalaya legal entities, see supra ¶ 19(d), and is an authorized signer on the FV accounts.\n55. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into and among the Target Accounts\nin ways that, based on my training and experience, are indicative of money laundering.\nSpecifically, the tracing of the funds reflects, among other things: (a) transfers of Investment\nScheme Funds from U.S. bank accounts to bank accounts located overseas (including the UAE\nand the Bahamas) in high risk jurisdictions that are frequent havens for money laundering;\n(b)layering of Investment Scheme Funds through a series of entities and bank accounts, in some\ncases pursuant to purported loan agreements or other financial arrangements, in a manner\nconsistent with concealment of the nature, source, or origin of the funds; (c) investments in real\nestate or other business interests that have no apparent connection with the stated purposes of the\nbusinesses controlling the bank accounts; and (d) the transfer of Investment Scheme Funds\nbetween multiple banks, as well as among multiple accounts within the same bank, in a single day.\n36\n\nUse of Multiple Banks and Financial Institutions to Conceal Investment Scheme Funds\n56. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. To date, law enforcement has identified more than at least 80 bank accounts\nbeing used by GUO, JE, and others to process Investment Scheme Funds, which include, among\nothers:\ni. At least approximately 19 bank accounts in the name of G Club\nentities (i.e., G Club International Limited or G Club Operations LLC) at approximately seven\ndifferent financial institutions;\nii. At least approximately 16 bank accounts in the name of Crane (i.e.,\nCrane Advisory Group LLC) at approximately six different financial institutions;\niii. At least approximately 28 bank accounts in the name of Farm\nentities at approximately six different financial institutions;\niv. At least approximately eight bank accounts in the name of G Fashion\nat approximately six different financial institutions;\nv. At least approximately 14 bank accounts in the name of Hamilton\nentities (e.g., Hamilton Investment Management Inc. or Hamilton Opportunity Funds SPC) at\nSilvergate Bank in California; and\nvi. At least approximately three bank accounts in the name of Himalaya\nentities (i.e., Himalaya Reserve, Himalaya Financial, and Himalaya Clearing) at FV Bank in Puerto\nRico.\n37\n\nb. In addition to utilizing bank accounts held in the names of entities owned or\ncontrolled by JE and others directly involved in the Investment Schemes, GUO, JE, and others\nlayer Investment Scheme Funds through accounts at other financial institutions and third-party\npayment management entities to conceal the nature and source of the funds. For example, and as\ndescribed in greater detail herein:\ni. BSI Group LLC (“BSI Group”) is a Missouri-based company that\noffers payment agreement services. Based on my conversations with others, I have learned that\nBSI Group effectively operates as a wholesaler and opens bank accounts at U.S.-based financial\ninstitutions for its customers. U.S. banks that BSI Group contracts with include Capital One, The\nReserve Trust Company (“Reserve Trust”), Prime Trust LLC (“Prime Trust”), and a Puerto Rico-\nbased financial institution called Mercantile Bank International Corp. and its affiliated entities\n(“Mercantile Bank” or “MBI”). BSI Group is a client of Capital One, Reserve Trust, and Prime\nTrust, among other entities, while MBI is one of BSI Group’s customers.\nii. BSI Group manages transactions on behalf of its own customers,\nincluding MBI. BSI Group’s customers direct the movement of their funds—which are held in\naccounts in the name of BSI Group and/or Reserve Trust and Prime Trust—by requesting\ntransactions through BSI Group’s website (e.g., indicating the originator, payee, and amount for a\nspecific transaction).\niii. GUO, JE, and others have laundered more than approximately $300\nmillion in Investment Scheme Funds through bank accounts held in the names of various financial\nintermediary companies, including BSI Group, Reserve Trust, and Prime Trust. GUO, JE, and\nothers have also layered Investment Scheme Funds through bank accounts held at various different\nfinancial institutions.\n38\n\niv. For example, on or about May 20, 2021, G Club’s financial\ncontroller, Alex Hadjicharalambolous, exchanged emails with employees at Puerto Rico-based\nfinancial institutions Medici Bank and MBI regarding a $15 million wire transfer of G Club\nInvestment Scheme Funds from a bank account in the name of BSI Group to a bank account in the\nname of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC at Deltec Bank & Trust (“Deltec”), which is located in\nthe Bahamas (the “Hamilton Bahamas Account”). The next day, David Fallon (the President of\nHamilton) emailed Hajicharalmbous to advise that Hamilton could not credit the wire to G Club,\nbecause the wire reflected that the sender was “BSI Group.”\nv. Hadjicharalambous forwarded the email to an MBI employee, who\nthen responded to Hadjicharalmbous (copying Fallon) with the following explanation, in substance\nand in part:\nHI guys, so flow of funds is as follows. It’s a little detailed here so apologies.\nThe wire comes from BSI group ( MBIs corresponding bank partner)to Deltec\n(Hamilton)\nThe accounts are as follows\nBSI/MBI have an account at Capital one, it is an MBI Bank escrow account owned\nby MBI. BSI does the processing for us.\nMedici is a client of MBI for this 15mm dollar transaction, Medici has an account\nwith MBI at Capital one\nGCLUB is a client of Medici.\nGclubs clients send money to the MBI account at Capital one denoted for GClub\n(through medici). Medici ledgers each wire as they come into the bank.\nTo solve below request, what exactly do you need to show the fund admin? Proof\nof account ownership or money inflow (source of funds)\nFor going forward activity, GClub is now a direct client of MBI, so wires will be\nsent from GClubs account at MBI, but the wires will always come from BSI as the\nMBI corresponding bank . We (MBI bank) will have the flow of funds from GClub\nclient to the account, so we will have the ability to trace the full flow of funds in\nand out of the GCLUB account.\n39\n\nvi. Similarly, on or about July 1, 2021, Hadjicharalambolous sent an\nemail to an employee at Medici Bank, directing Medici Bank to transfer approximately $4 million\nfrom a G Club Medici Bank account to a G Club MBI account. The wire instructions attached to\nthe email identify MBI as the beneficiary entity, but list Reserve Trust as the beneficiary bank.\nvii. Based on my participation in this Investigation, I believe that the\nforegoing explanation is an example of the manner in which GUO, JE, and others launder\nInvestment Scheme Funds through multiple financial institutions in an effort to, among other\nthings, conceal their source. See ¶ 56(b)(3).\nTracing of Fraudulent Proceeds\n57. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. Investors participate in the Investment Schemes by either wiring money\ndirectly to a bank account controlled or used by entities affiliated with GUO, JE, and others\n(including the Farms, G Club, or the Himalaya Exchange), or by wiring or otherwise transferring\nmoney to other entities at the direction of the Target Subjects (including, for example, Crane, BSI\nGroup, Reserve Trust, or Prime Trust), which funds are then transmitted to bank accounts\nultimately controlled by GUO, GUO’s associates, and JE. I have discovered accounts located in\nthe UAE, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Bahamas, and the British Virgin Islands,\nwhich GUO, JE, and other Target Subjects have used for the purpose of receiving investment funds\nfrom investors in the Unregistered Stock Offerings, the Convertible Loan Offering, G Club, and\nthe Himalaya Exchange.\n40\n\nb. To date, I and analysts at the FBI and SEC have identified and attempted to\ntrace more than approximately $1.04 billion in Investment Scheme Fund transactions, a substantial\npart of which has been laundered through financial institutions located in at least four different\ncountries, including the United States, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, and the UAE.\nFraud Proceeds are Combined in Hamilton Bahamas Account Before Transfer to Certain of the\nSilvergate Target Accounts\n58. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. Between in or about May 2021 and June 2021, approximately $100 million\nin Investment Scheme Funds were transferred from G Club bank accounts into the Hamilton\nBahamas Account. Before the approximately $100 million was combined in the Hamilton\nBahamas Account, the Investment Scheme Funds were layered through a series of entities at\nvarious different banks in a manner that, based on my training and experience, is indicative of\nmoney laundering. Specifically:\ni. As described above, certain prospective Investment Scheme\ninvestors were instructed to send funds intended as an investment in GTV (for example) to a bank\naccount in the name of Crane. See supra at ¶ 40(f). Approximately $78.2 million of Investment\nScheme Funds was sent from individual or institutional investors in China and elsewhere to two\nCrane Advisory bank accounts (the “Crane Citibank Accounts”) between in or about November\n2020 and April 2021.\n41\n\nii. Approximately $60 million of those Investment Scheme Funds were\nthen transferred from the Crane Citibank Accounts to approximately five different bank accounts\nat MSSB held in the name of Crane (together, the “Crane MSSB Accounts”).\niii. The approximately $60 million in Investment Scheme Funds from\nthe Crane MSSB Accounts was combined with approximately $49 million in other Investment\nScheme Funds that had been transferred into the Crane MSSB Accounts from two Crane accounts\nat a different bank, Capital One (together, the “Crane Capital One Accounts”), raising the total\ncombined balance in the Crane MSSB Accounts to approximately $109 million.\niv. Approximately $79 million of those approximately $109 million in\nInvestment Scheme Funds in the Crane MSSB Accounts were then transferred to accounts at the\nsame bank (i.e., MSSB), but in the name of G Club (i.e., the G Club MSSB Accounts). The\napproximately $79 million was combined with approximately $79.7 million in other Investment\nScheme Funds that had been transferred into the G Club MSSB Accounts from individual G Club\nInvestors and from G Club bank accounts at Signature Bank, First Bank of Puerto Rico, and City\nNational Bank, raising the total combined balance of Investment Scheme Funds in the G Club\nMSSB Accounts to more than approximately $158 million.\nv. Approximately $85 million of Investment Scheme Funds was\ntransferred from the G Club MSSB Accounts to the Hamilton Bahamas Account, and combined\nwith approximately $15 million in other Investment Scheme Funds (relating to G Club and the\nHimalaya Assets) sourced from a bank account in the name of BSI Group. See ¶ 56(b)(v). Thus,\nthe $100 million of Investment Scheme Funds in the Hamilton Bahamas Account consisted of\n42\n\nfunds transferred from the G Club MSSB Accounts and other accounts containing Investment\nScheme Funds.\nFraud Proceeds are Transferred to Silvergate Bank\n59. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. On or about July 5, 2021, JE submitted a business bank account application\nto Silvergate Bank (the “Silvergate Application”) in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Funds\nSPC. JE’s company, Hamilton, is the investment manager of the Cayman Islands-registered hedge\nfund, Hamilton Investment Opportunity SPC. Between in or about July 2021 and the present, JE\nopened more than approximately 14 bank accounts at Silvergate Bank in the name of various\nHamilton-affiliated hedge funds or entities, including Hamilton Investment Opportunity SPC and\nHamilton Digital Assets Fund SP, and at least four bank accounts at Silvergate Bank in the name\nof Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. See ¶ 19(d)(iii).\nb. Between on or about September 1, 2021 and on or about July 5, 2022, JE-\ncontrolled Silvergate Bank accounts received approximately $664 million in Investment Scheme\nFunds. Specifically:\ni. In or about September 2021, approximately $85 million of the\nInvestment Scheme Funds was transferred from the Hamilton Bahamas Account, see supra at\n¶ 56(b)(iv), to a Silvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending\nin 9306 (the “9306 Silvergate Account”). The approximately $85 million was combined with\napproximately $25 million in Investment Scheme Funds sourced from a bank account in the name\n43\n\nof Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. at a bank in the Bahamas (the “Himalaya Bahamas\nAccount”). Thus, as of in or about late September 2021, the 9306 Silvergate Account held at least\napproximately $110 million in Investment Scheme Funds.\nii. On or about October 27, 2021, approximately $59 million of the\napproximately $110 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the 9306 Silvergate\nAccount to a Silvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Digital Assets, ending in 7747 (the\n“7747 Silvergate Account”). Later that same day, the approximately $59 million was transferred\nfrom the 7747 Silvergate Account to Target Account-1 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the\nname of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 7739).\niii. Also on or about October 27, 2021, approximately $25 million of\nthe approximately $110 million was transferred from the 9306 Silvergate Account to Target\nAccount-2 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC,\nending in 7705). As described in greater detail below, once received in Target Account-2, the\nmonies were combined with approximately $50 million in Himalaya Asset Investor Funds sourced\nfrom an FV Bank account in the name of Himalaya International Clearing Ltd., ending in 3763\n(the “3763 FV Account”).\n1. Approximately $30 million of the $50 million transferred\nfrom the 3763 FV Account into Target Account-2 can be traced to the approximately $110 million\nin Investment Scheme Funds that had been held in the 9306 Silvergate Account. That is, while\napproximately $25 million of the $110 million was transferred directly to Target Account-2 on\nor about October 27, 2021, an additional $30 million of the approximately $110 million was\ntransferred into Target Account-2 only after passing through three other bank accounts: the 7747\nSilvergate Account (held in the name of Hamilton Digital Assets), then Target Account-1 (held\n44\n\nin the name Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC), and finally the 3763 FV Account (held in the name\nof Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.).\niv. Also on or about October 27, 2021, approximately $26 million of\nthe approximately $110 million was transferred from the 9306 Silvergate Account to a Silvergate\nBank account in the name of Hamilton Diversified Trading Fund, ending in 7762 (the “7762\nSilvergate Account”). Later that same day, the approximately $26 million was transferred from\nthe 7762 Silvergate Account to Target Account-3 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the name of\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 7754). Approximately two months later, on or about\nJanuary 4, 2022, approximately $26 million was transferred from Target Account-3 to the UAE\nACA Capital Account (i.e., an offshore bank account controlled by JE). See ¶¶ 32, 34.\nc. On or about December 2, 2021, approximately $46.5 million in Investment\nScheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-1 to Target Account-4 (i.e., a Silvergate\nBank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 7713). Once received in\nTarget Account-4, the monies were combined with approximately $5.6 million in Investment\nScheme Funds sourced from the Himalaya Bahamas Account (which funds passed through a\nSilvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton PE Fund SP, ending in 7721), raising the\ncombined balance of Target Account-4 to approximately $52.1 million.\nd. On or about December 17, 2021, approximately $24.5 million of the\napproximately $52.1 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-\n4 to a bank account in the name of Insight Title Services LLC Trust AC; the stated purpose of the\ntransaction was for the purchase of residential property in Mahwah, New Jersey on behalf of an\nentity called Taurus Fund SP. Based on my review of a corporate resolution signed by JE, I have\nlearned that Taurus Fund SP is a segregated portfolio of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (i.e.,\nthat JE controls Taurus Fund SP).\n45\n\ne. Between at least on or about January 24, 2022 and on or about April 4, 2022,\napproximately $73.8 million of Investment Scheme Funds was transferred into Target Account-\n5 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 2770).\nThe incoming transfers into Target Account-5 consisted primarily of wires ranging between\napproximately $1,100 to approximately $3 million from Chinese individuals, with some\nindividuals sending multiple incoming wires. Based on my participation in this investigation and\nmy training and experience, I believe the transfers into Target Account-5 are consistent with\nmoney laundering, including layering funds through different entities—for example, directing\ninvestor funds into a bank account in the names of an entity other than the intended investment\nvehicle, which here would be G Club or Himalaya Exchange. I further believe that the incoming\ntransfers are consistent with G Club investors purchasing multiple memberships, and therefore are\nfraud proceeds. See ¶ 40(g).\nf. Between on or about March 10, 2022 and on or about April 1, 2022,\napproximately $77,998,889.20 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from bank\naccounts in the name of HCHK Technologies or HCHK Property into Target Account-6 (i.e., a\nSilvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 2762). As\ndescribed above, starting in or about July 2021, various GUO-affiliated entities began to operate\nunder the newly-formed companies HCHK Technologies and HCHK Property. See ¶ 41. Based\non my participation in this investigation and my training and experience, and as described above,\nI believe the nature of the transfers into Target Account-6 are consistent with money laundering,\nincluding layering funds through different entities and concealing their true source and/or purpose.\nSee, e.g., ¶ 56(b)(v).\ng. The Investment Scheme Funds were traced into Target Account-7 and\nTarget Account-8 in the following manner:\n46\n\ni. On or about January 31, 2022, approximately $5.1 million in\nInvestment Scheme Funds was transferred from a bank account in the name of a particular Chinese\ninvestor (“Investor-2”) into Target Account-7 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the name of\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, ending in 2820).\nii. Between on or about January 31, 2022 and on or about February 4,\n2022, approximately $1 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from bank accounts\nin the names of two particular Chinese investors (“Investor-3” and “Investor-4”) into Target\nAccount-8 (i.e., a Silvergate Bank account in the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC,\nending in 2747).\niii. Based on my review of subpoena returns and search warrant returns,\nI have learned that Investor-2 through -4 had previously invested in the GTV Stock Offering and/or\nthe other Investment Schemes. Specifically:\n1. According to a spreadsheet GTV maintained of more than\napproximately 1,200 investors in the GTV Stock Offering, Investor-2, Investor-3, and Investor-4\neach purchased GTV stock; Investor-2 purchased approximately 3.3 million shares, Investor-3\npurchased approximately 2 million shares, and Investor-4 purchased approximately 800,000\nshares.\n2. On or about January 25, 2021, the President of Crane\nemailed “onboarding profiles” for Investor-2, Investor-3, and Investor-4 to MSSB. As described\nabove, see ¶ 40(f), potential investors in the Investment Schemes were directed to send their\ninvestments to Crane, which purportedly served as payment processor for GTV, G Club, and/or\nHimalaya Exchange.\n3. On or about June 15, 2021, Investor-2 emailed a wire\ntransfer request to MSSB that stated the following, in substance and in part: “I’d like to invest [in]\n47\n\na company called Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.” The email requested a wire of\napproximately $3.4M to a Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. account at Metropolitan\nCommercial Bank. See infra ¶ 59(h).\nh. Based on my participation in this Investigation and my training and\nexperience, and as described above, I believe the approximately $5.1M in transfers from Investor-\n2 into Target Account-7 and the approximately $1 million in transfers from Investor-3 and\nInvestor-4 into Target Account-8 are the proceeds of wire fraud and money laundering, because\nthey are funds Investors-2 through-4 paid with the intent to purchase additional G Club\nmemberships and/or Himalaya Assets, but which GUO, JE and others instead directed into JE’s\nhedge fund bank account to conceal their true source and/or purpose. See, e.g., ¶ 56(b)(v).\ni. On or about June 11, 2021, JE opened Target Account-9 (i.e., a Silvergate\nBank account in the name of JE’s company, Hamilton Investment Management Ltd., ending in\n0288). Between at least in or about January 2022 and in or about June 2022, at least approximately\n$50.4 million of Investment Scheme Funds was transferred into Target Account-9 over the course\nof approximately five incoming wire transfers; specifically:\n1. On or about January 13, 2022, Target Account-9 received an\nincoming wire of approximately $10.8 million in Investment Scheme Funds from a Signature Bank\naccount in the name of Prime Trust, ending in 6126 (the “Prime Trust Signature Account”). See\n¶ 56(b)(i)-(iii).\n2. On or about February 10, 2022, Target Account-9 received an\nincoming wire of approximately $11.7 million in Investment Scheme Funds from the Prime Trust\nSignature Account.\n3. On or about June 13, 2022, Target Account-9 received an incoming\nwire of approximately $8 million in Investment Scheme Funds from a particular bank account at\n48\n\nMetropolitan Commercial Bank (“MCB”), ending in 6891 (the “6891 MCB Account”).\nTransaction details provided by Silvergate Bank list “FV Bank – Himalaya International” as the\nPayer on the transaction, and identify MCB as the name of the “Payer” financial institution. FV\nBank records, in turn, reflect that the transfer was from the 3763 FV Account, but do not reflect\nany involvement of MCB as an intermediary for the transaction. Based on information provided\nby MCB, I have learned that the 6891 MCB Account was a pooled funds account for FV Bank,\nand have further learned that MCB processes transactions for FV Bank’s account holders (as\nrelevant here, the Himalaya entities) in USD.\nj. On or about June 14, 2022, Target Account-9 received an incoming wire\nof approximately $10 million in Investment Scheme Funds from the 6891 MCB Account. FV\nBank account records reflect that the transfer was actually from the 3763 FV Account, but do not\nreflect any involvement of MCB as an intermediary for the transaction.\nk. On or about June 22, 2022, Target Account-9 received an incoming wire\nof approximately $10 million in Investment Scheme Funds from the 6891 MCB Account. FV\nBank account records reflect that the transfer was from the 3763 FV Account, but do not reflect\nany involvement of MCB as an intermediary for the transaction.\nFraud Proceeds are Used to Fund GUO-Affiliated Companies\n60. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. As described above, JE’s company owns approximately 95% of Gettr. See\nsupra at ¶ 41(f).\n49\n\nb. On or about June 30, 2022, approximately $3 million was transferred from\nTarget Account-4 to Target Account-10 (i.e., a Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. bank account\nheld in the name of GETTR USA, Inc., ending in 4409). The wire details reflect that the transfer\nwas for “CAPITAL CALL JUNE 3M USD.”\nc. On or about July 27, 2022, approximately $3 million was transferred from\nTarget Account-4 to Target Account-10. The wire details reflect that the transfer was for\n“CAPITAL CALL JULY 3M USD.”\nd. On or about August 29, 2022, approximately $5 million was transferred\nfrom Target Account-4 to Target Account-10. The wire details reflect that the transfer was for\n“CAPITAL CALL AUGUST 10M USD (X2 5M).”\ne. On or about August 30, 2022, an additional approximately $5 million was\ntransferred from Target Account-4 to Target Account-10. The wire details reflect that the\ntransfer was for “CAPITAL CALL AUGUST 5M USD (10M TRA NSFER 2 of 2).”\nf. Based on the foregoing, I believe that JE and others are using fraud proceeds\nto fund Gettr.\nFraud Proceeds are Layered Through Various Banking Institutions\n61. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. As described herein, GUO, JE, and others have layered fraud proceeds\nthrough accounts at various entities, including, among others: certain accounts at MCB maintained\n50\n\nFBO FV Bank’s account holders (i.e., the Himalaya entities); and accounts held by BSI Group in\nthe name of various entities. See ¶ 56(b).\nb. As further described herein, FV Bank holds Investment Scheme Funds in\ncorrespondent bank accounts, or FBO accounts, at MCB.\n62. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned that, starting at least in or about February 2022, JE and\nothers began to layer more than approximately $300 million in Investment Scheme Funds through\ncertain bank accounts. Specifically:\na. Between on or about February 15, 2022 and on or about March 29, 2022,\napproximately $160 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the 3763 FV\nAccount to a Royal Business Bank account in the name of Prime Trust LLC, ending in 6050 (the\n“Prime Trust RBB Account”) in the course of approximately 16 wire transactions.\nb. On or about March 21, 2022, JE opened an FV Bank account in the name\nof Himalaya International Financial Group, ending in 2119 (the “2119 FV Account”) and an FV\nBank account in the name of Himalaya International Reserves Ltd., ending in 8239 (the “8239 FV\nAccount”).\nc. Between on or about March 21, 2022 and on or about May 13, 2022,\napproximately $190 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the 3763 FV\nAccount (i.e., the Himalaya Clearing FV Bank account ending in 3763) to the 2119 FV Account\nand the 8239 FV Account in the course of approximately 12 wire transactions. For example:\n51\n\ni. Between on or about March 21, 2022 and on or March 29, 2022,\napproximately $100 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the 3763 FV\nAccount to the 2119 FV Account and/or the 8239 FV Account in the course of approximately 10\nwire transactions.\nii. On or about May 13, 2022, approximately $30 million in Investment\nScheme Funds was transferred from the 3763 FV Account to the 2119 FV Account in a single wire\ntransaction, and approximately $60 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the\n3763 FV Account to the 8239 FV Account in a single wire transaction.\nd. On or about May 24, 2022, approximately $44.6 million in Investment\nScheme Funds was transferred from the 2119 FV Account to the 8239 FV Account in a single wire\ntransaction.\ni. The approximately $44.6 million was part of approximately $80\nmillion that had been transferred from the 3763 FV Account to the 2119 FV Account. See\n¶ 62(c)(i)(ii).\nii. That is, while approximately $110 million was transferred directly\nfrom the 3763 FV Account to the 8239 FV Account, an additional approximately $44.6 million of\nthe approximately $190 million was transferred into the 8239 FV Account only after passing\nthrough the 2119 FV Account.\ne. On or about August 15, 2022, an employee of MCB sent email correspondence\nconfirming MCB’s relationship with FV Bank regarding Target Account-11, which is an MCB\naccount FBO FV Bank customers. The MCB employee confirmed that Target Account-11 is a\npooled account that contains funds for the Himalaya entities (i.e., the 3763 FV Account, the 2119\nFV Account, and the 8239 FV Account).\n52\n\n63. Based on my review of information provided by Silvergate, I have learned that\nTarget Account-1 through Target Account-9 held a combined total of approximately\n$292,407,029.22 as of on or about August 31, 2022, as reflected in the table below:\nTarget Account Account Number Balance\nTarget Account-1 5090037739 $1,800,000.00\nTarget Account-2 5090037705 $75,000,000.00\nTarget Account-3 5090037754 $467,343.00\nTarget Account-4 5090037713 $167,826.87\nTarget Account-5 5090042770 $83,872,761.75\nTarget Account-6 5090042762 $76,690,856.60\nTarget Account-7 5090042820 $5,106,100.00\nTarget Account-8 5090042747 $1,026,000.00\nTarget Account-9 5090030288 $48,276,141.00\nTotal $292,407,029.22\n64. Based on my review of information from Silvergate, I have learned that Target\nAccount-10 received a total of approximately $16,000,000.00 from Target Account-4 between\non or about June 30, 2022 and on or about August 30, 2022.\n65. Based on my review of information provided by FV Bank and MCB, I have learned\nthat Target Account-11 held a combined total of approximately $13,613,172.71 as of on or about\nAugust 15, 2022.\nIII. Conclusion\n66. Based on the foregoing, I submit that there is probable cause to believe that funds\nheld in the accounts constituting the Target Property are subject to forfeiture as proceeds of\nviolations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud) and § 1344 (bank fraud), and/or as property involved\nin violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and 1956(h) (money laundering\nand conspiracy to commit money laundering).\n53\n\n67. Accordingly, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(b), I respectfully request that the Court\nissue a warrant authorizing the seizure of the Target Property.\n/s/ Anthony Alecci, by SDA with permission\n_____________________________________\nANTHONY ALECCI\nSpecial Agent\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nSworn to me through the transmission of this\nAffidavit by reliable electronic means, pursuant to\nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(d)(3) and 4.1,\nthis 18th day of September, 2022\n_____________________________________\nTHE HONORABLE STEWART D. AARON\nUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n54","body_zh":"物证 D\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院） 22 MAG 7684\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\n美利坚合众国\n密封归档\n-诉-\n支持扣押令的宣誓书\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 所持有的 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账户 5090042853 中包含的所有款项和资金（“目标账户-1”），以及可追溯至该账户的所有资金，包括应计利息；依据 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 及 984\nHimalaya International Financial Group, Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际金融集团有限公司）所持有的 FV Bank 账户 7801000589 中包含的所有款项和资金（“目标账户-2”），以及可追溯至该账户的所有资金，包括应计利息；\nHimalaya International Reserves, Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际储备有限公司）所持有的 FV Bank 账户 7801000590 中包含的所有款项和资金（“目标账户-3”），以及可追溯至该账户的所有资金，包括应计利息；以及\nHimalaya International Clearing, Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司）所持有的 FV Bank 账户 7801000254 中包含的所有款项和资金（“目标账户-4”），以及可追溯至该账户的所有资金，包括应计利息（统称“目标财产”）。\n对物诉讼被告。\n\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）) ss.:\n\nFederal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局）特别探员 Anthony Alecci 经正式宣誓，作证并陈述如下：\n\nI. 引言\n\n1. 我是 Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局）（“FBI”或“调查机构”）的一名特别探员。我自 2020 年 8 月左右起一直担任 FBI 的特别探员。\n\n自大约 2021 年 9 月起，我一直被分配至 FBI（联邦调查局）的 Complex Financial Crimes（复杂金融犯罪）小队。在 FBI 任职期间，我参与了针对证券及电汇欺诈计划、银行欺诈和洗钱活动的调查，除其他事项外，我还主持或参与了对证人的询问、财务记录的审查以及搜查令的执行。特别是，我参与了涉及实体场所、电子设备和其他电子证据的搜查令执行。\n\n2. 本宣誓书旨在支持 the United States of America（美利坚合众国）依据 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 及 984 申请签发扣押令，以扣押：\n\na. 由 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金 SPC）持有的 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账户 5090042853（“目标账户-1”）中所包含的所有金钱和资金，以及可追溯至该账户的所有资金，包括应计利息；\n\nb. 由 Himalaya International Financial Group, Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际金融集团有限公司）持有的 FV Bank（FV 银行）账户 7801000589（“目标账户-2”）中所包含的所有金钱和资金，以及可追溯至该账户的所有资金，包括应计利息；\n\nc. 由 Himalaya International Reserves, Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际储备有限公司）持有的 FV Bank 账户 7801000590（“目标账户-3”）中所包含的所有金钱和资金，以及可追溯至该账户的所有资金，包括应计利息；以及\n\nd. 由 Himalaya International Clearing, Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司）持有的 FV Bank 账户 7801000254（“目标账户-4”）中所包含的所有金钱和资金，以及可追溯至该账户的所有资金，包括应计利息（合称“目标财产”）。\n\n3. 如下所述，目标财产构成违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343（电汇欺诈）、1344（银行欺诈）和 1956（洗钱及共谋洗钱）（合称“目标罪行”）的所得收益。\n\n4. 本宣誓书基于以下信息来源等：(i) 我的个人知情；(ii) 参与平行调查的 U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会，简称“SEC”）人员提供的信息；(iii) 我对涉及“G Club（G 俱乐部）”和“Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）”等企业的公开宣传材料的审查；(iv) 我对 GTV Media Group, Inc.（GTV 传媒集团有限公司，简称“GTV”）、喜马拉雅交易所和“G 俱乐部”的公开网站以及这些网站上可用材料的审查；(v) 我在互联网上进行的开源情报调查；(vi) 我对 GTV 传媒集团有限公司及其雇员和代理人发布在 www.gnews.org（“GNews”）上的数字视频的审查；(vii) 我参与的各类证人访谈；(viii) 我对依据传票、依据 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) 就非内容信息签发的命令以及司法授权的搜查令所获取的电子证据的审查；(ix) 我本人以及 FBI 和 SEC 的金融分析师对各类银行账户记录进行的审查与分析，包括依据传票和其他请求从金融机构获取的财务记录；(xi) 我与其他执法人员的交谈；以及 (x) 我在金融犯罪实施方面的培训与经验。由于提交本宣誓书的有限目的在于确立合理根据（probable cause），因此它并未包含我在调查过程中获悉的全部事实。文中所列日期、数字和计算均为近似值。文中所报告的文件内容以及他人的行为、陈述和谈话，除另有说明外，均按其实质和部分予以报告。\n\n5. 如下文所述，有合理根据认为，目标财产应依据 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)、(C) 与 (D) 以及 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) 予以扣押和没收，因其属于涉及违反 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) 的财产，和/或属于违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 及 1344 的所得收益，或是可追溯至上述违法行为的财产。总括而言，证据揭示了一系列欺诈性投资计划（“投资计划”），涉及数家相互关联的公司及其附属实体，包括 GTV 传媒集团有限公司、G Fashion（“G 时尚”）、Himalaya Farm Alliance（“农场联盟”，简称“农场”）、Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.（“喜马拉雅国际清算”）、G Club Operations LLC（“G 俱乐部”）、Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（“汉密尔顿”）、ACA Capital Group Ltd.（“ACA 资本”）以及 Crane Advisory Group LLC（“Crane”）。如下文更详细所述，这些欺诈性投资计划的头目为 Miles Guo，又名“郭文贵”，又名“Miles Kwok”（“郭”），以及 William Je，又名 Je Kin Ming（余建明，“余”）。\n\n6. FBI 和 SEC 的分析师与我已经将某些欺诈所得从投资计划受害者追踪流向至目标财产。\n\nII. Statutory Basis for Forfeiture（二、没收的法定依据）\n\n7. 目标财产据以适用民事扣押和没收的法定条款如下：\n\nMoney Laundering Offenses（洗钱罪行）\n\n8. 《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(A) 条规定，下列财产应予以民事没收：\n涉及违反本编第 1956、1957 或 1960 条的交易或企图交易的任何不动产或动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产。\n\n9. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) 规定，任何人如果：\n明知金融交易中涉及的财产系某种形式的非法活动所得收益，而进行或企图进行实际上涉及特定非法活动所得收益的该等金融交易——\n(B) 明知该交易之设计全部或部分旨在——\n(i) 隐匿或掩饰特定非法活动所得收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权[即构成犯罪。]\n\n10. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) 规定，任何人如果：\n将货币工具或资金从美国境内某地运输、传送或转移，或企图运输、传送或转移至美国境外某地或途经美国境外某地，或从美国境外某地或途经美国境外某地运输、传送或转移至美国境内某地——\n(B) 明知运输、传送或转移中涉及的货币工具或资金代表某种形式的非法活动所得收益，且明知该等运输、传送或转移之设计全部或部分旨在——\n(i) 隐匿或掩饰特定非法活动所得收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权[即构成犯罪。]\n\n11. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) 进一步规定：“任何人共谋实施[第 1956 条]所定义的任何罪行，应受到与实施作为该共谋目的之罪行所规定的相同处罚。”\n\nBank and Wire Fraud Offenses（银行和电汇欺诈罪行）\n\n12. 就第 1956 条而言，18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) 中定义的“特定非法活动”除其他事项外，包括违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 及 1344 的行为。参见 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7) 及 1961(1)。\n\n13. 《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条规定，任何构成或源自可追溯至违反……构成‘特定非法活动’的任何罪行（定义见本编第 1956(c)(7) 条）或共谋实施该等罪行的收益的不动产或动产，均应予以民事没收。\n\nSeizure Warrants（扣押令）\n\n14. 法院依 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) 获权就依据 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) 及 (C) 应予没收的任何财产签发扣押令。第 981(b)(2) 条规定，此类扣押可“依据按照《联邦刑事诉讼规则》中搜查令规定的相同方式获取的令状”进行。此外，第 981(b)(3) 条规定，尽管有《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 41(a) 条之规定，扣押令可由依据《美国法典》第 28 编第 1355(b) 条可对该财产提起没收诉讼的任何地区的司法官员依据第 981(b) 条签发。根据第 1355(b)(1)(A) 条，没收诉讼或程序可在引起没收的任何作为或不作为发生地所在的地区提起。如下文所述，所申请扣押令背后的罪行包括发生在 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）的作为或不作为。\n\n15. 关于种类物财产，包括存放在金融机构中的现金和资金，18 U.S.C. § 984 在相关部分规定：\n(a)(1) 在标的财产为现金、无记名货币工具、存放在金融机构账户中的资金……或贵金属的任何对物没收诉讼中：\n(A) 政府无需指明作为没收依据的罪行中所涉及的具体财产；且\n(B) 该罪行中涉及的财产已被移走并由同等财产替代，不得作为抗辩理由。\n(2) 除 (b) 款另有规定外，在作为没收依据的罪行所涉财产的同一地点或账户中发现的任何同等财产，均应依本条予以没收。\n(b) 依据本条针对不可直接追溯至作为没收依据之罪行的财产提起没收诉讼，自犯罪之日起不得超过 1 年。\n\nIII. Probable Cause（三、合理根据）\n\nA. Probable Cause Regarding Commission of the Subject Offenses（关于实施标的罪行的合理根据）\n\n16. 2022 年 9 月 17 日左右，我提交了一份宣誓书，以支持对大约 11 个银行账户签发扣押令，其中包括由 FV Bank 受益持有的约一个 Metropolitan Commercial Bank（大都会商业银行，简称“MCB”）账户，以及由 William JE（余建明）以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 或 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 名义持有的约九个 Silvergate Bank（银门银行，简称“Silvergate”）账户（即“9 月 17 日宣誓书”）。9 月 17 日宣誓书作为附件 A 纳入本文。2022 年 9 月 18 日左右，Honorable Stewart D. Aaron（斯图尔特·D·亚伦法官阁下）就这 11 个账户签发了扣押令，包括向 Silvergate 签发的针对九个 Silvergate 账户的令状（“Silvergate 令状”）以及向 MCB 签发的针对为 FV Bank 受益持有的一个 MCB 账户的令状（“MCB 令状”）。\n\n17. 在与 Silvergate 协调以准备送达和执行 Silvergate 令状的过程中，Silvergate 提供了以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 和/或 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 名义开立的所有 Silvergate 账户的最新账户余额。基于我对账户余额摘要、Silvergate Bank 提供的补充文件、公开来源信息的审查，以及我与 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区检察官办公室）的交谈，我除其他事项外获知了以下情况：\n\na. Silvergate 运营着一个名为 Silvergate Exchange Network（银门交易网络，简称“SEN”）的行内网络。Silvergate 的活跃银行客户可以参与 SEN，该网络使 Silvergate 客户自身能够在自己的 Silvergate 账户与其他 Silvergate 客户的账户之间转移资金。\n\nb. Silvergate 针对 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 在 Silvergate 的业务往来签署的企业存款账户主协议中，将目标账户-1 列为 SEN 账户。根据 Silvergate 提供的信息，我获知截至 2022 年 8 月 31 日左右，目标账户-1 的账户余额为 0 美元。\n\nc. 如 9 月 17 日宣誓书所反映，Hamilton Investment Opportunity Fund SPC 在 Silvergate 尾号为 -2762 的账户（即 9 月 17 日宣誓书中的“目标账户-6”，或称“2762 账户”）的余额约为 76,690,856.60 美元。2022 年 9 月 8 日左右，2762 账户分别收到了来自 HCHK Technologies Inc.（HCHK 科技公司）和 HCHK Property Management Inc.（HCHK 物业管理公司）的转入款项，金额各为 500 万美元。\n\nd.\n\n2022年9月15日或该日前后，目标主体（Target Subjects）将约85,899,889.20美元——几乎是全部余额——从2762账户转入目标账户-1（Target Account-1）。正如9月17日宣誓书（September 17 Affidavit）中所述，转入2762账户的资金性质一直符合洗钱特征，包括通过不同实体对资金进行分层转移，并隐瞒其真实来源和/或目的。参见《9月宣誓书》（Sept. Aff.）第56(b)(v)、(f)段。\n\n18. 在预期送达并执行MCB搜查令（MCB Warrant）而与MCB（大都会商业银行）以及FV Bank（FV银行）的律师进行协调时，MCB和FV Bank双方的律师向执法部门通报了以下主要内容：\n\na. 在MCB为FV Bank利益持有的联集账户（即2022年9月17日宣誓书中的“目标账户-11”）中持有的资金，包括属于FV Bank所有客户的资金，而不仅仅属于喜马拉雅各实体（Himalaya entities）。参见《9月宣誓书》第59(i)(3)、62段。\n\nb. 作为MCB搜查令目标且存放在MCB联集账户中的资金，也可以通过FV Bank的三个特定账号进行识别：目标账户-2（即由Himalaya International Financial Group, Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际金融集团有限公司）持有的FV Bank账户7801000589）、目标账户-3（即由Himalaya International Reserves, Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际储备有限公司）持有的FV Bank账户7801000590），以及目标账户-4（即由Himalaya International Clearing, Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司）持有的FV Bank账户7801000254）。\n\n19. 基于上述信息，执法部门将不执行MCB搜查令，而是寻求直接向FV Bank签发搜查令。\n\nIII. 结论\n\n20. 基于9月17日宣誓书中所载信息及上述内容，我认为有相当理由相信，在目标财产（Target Property）中持有的资金属于因违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343（电信欺诈）和 § 1344（银行欺诈）所得的收益，和/或属于涉及违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)、1956(a)(2)(B)(i) 及 1956(h)（洗钱及共谋洗钱）的财产，应予没收。\n\n21. 据此，依据 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)，我谨请求法院签发搜查令，授权扣押目标财产。\n\n/s/ Anthony Alecci，经许可由SDA代签\nANTHONY ALECCI\n特别特工（Special Agent）\nFederal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局）\n\n依据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure）第41(d)(3)条及第4.1条，本宣誓书于2022年9月20日通过可靠的电子方式向我宣誓签署\n\nSTEWART D. AARON（斯图尔特·D·亚伦）阁下\nUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE（美国联邦治安法官）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\n附件 A\n\n22 MAG 7580\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n密封归档\n-诉-\n支持扣押令的宣誓书\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名下 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号 5090037739（“目标账户-1”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\n依据 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 和 984\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名下 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号 5090037705（“目标账户-2”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名下 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号 5090037754（“目标账户-3”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名下 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号 5090037713（“目标账户-4”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名下 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号 5090042770（“目标账户-5”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名下 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号 5090042762（“目标账户-6”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至此的资金，包括应计利息；\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名下 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号 5090042820（“目标账户-7”）内包含的所有款项与资金，\n\n及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-8”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）账号为 5090042747 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；以 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（“目标账户-9”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090030288 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；以 GETTR USA, Inc.（“目标账户-10”）名义开立于 Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. 账号为 9878904409 的账户内最高达且包含 16,000,000.00 美元金额的任何及所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；以及为 FV Bank 利益持有（“目标账户-11”）而开立于 Metropolitan Commercial Bank 账号为 0299006891 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息（统称“目标财产”）。对物诉讼被告。\n\n纽约南区（SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK）) 宣誓声明：\n\nAnthony Alecci，Federal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局）特别探员，经正式宣誓，作证并陈述如下：\n\nI. 引言\n\n1. 我是 Federal Bureau of Investigation（“FBI”或“调查机构”）的一名特别探员。我自 2020 年 8 月前后起担任 FBI 特别探员。自 2021 年 9 月前后起，我被指派至 FBI 的复杂金融犯罪调查组。在 FBI 任职期间，我参与了针对证券和电汇诈骗计划、银行诈骗及洗钱活动的调查，并开展或参与了（除其他工作外）证人询问、财务记录审查以及搜查令的执行。特别是，我参与了涉及实体场所、电子设备及其他电子证据的搜查令执行。\n\n2. 本宣誓书旨在支持美利坚合众国根据 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 和 984 申请签发扣押令：\na. 以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-1”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090037739 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\nb. 以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-2”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090037705 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\nc. 以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-3”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090037754 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\nd. 以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-4”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090037713 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\ne. 以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-5”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090042770 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\nf. 以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-6”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090042762 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\ng. 以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-7”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090042820 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\nh. 以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“目标账户-8”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090042747 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；以及\ni. 以 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（“目标账户-9”）名义开立于 Silvergate Bank 账号为 5090030288 的账户内的所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\nj. 以 GETTR USA, Inc.（“目标账户-10”）名义开立于 Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. 账号为 9878904409 的账户内最高达且包含 16,000,000.00 美元金额的任何及所有款项和资金，及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；以及\nk. 为 FV Bank 利益持有（“FBO”）而开立于 Metropolitan Commercial Bank 账号为 0299006891 的账户内的所有款项和资金（“目标账户-11”），及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息（统称“目标财产”）。\n\n3. 如下所述，目标财产构成违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343（电汇诈骗）；1344（银行诈骗）；及 1956（洗钱及共谋洗钱）（合称“目标犯罪”）的收益。\n\n4. 本宣誓书基于（除其他信息来源外）：(i) 我的个人知情；(ii) 参与平行调查的 U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission（“SEC”，美国证券交易委员会）工作人员提供的信息；(iii) 我对涉及（除其他项目外）“G Club”和“Himalaya Exchange”（喜马拉雅交易所）的公开宣传材料的审查；(iv) 我对 GTV Media Group, Inc.（“GTV”）、Himalaya Exchange 和“G Club”公开网站以及这些网站上可用材料的审查；(v) 我在互联网上进行的开源情报调查；(vi) 我对 GTV Media Group, Inc. 及其员工和代理人发布在 www.gnews.org（“GNews”）上的数字视频的审查；(vii) 我对多名证人询问的参与；(viii) 我对根据传票、根据 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) 针对非内容信息签发的命令以及司法授权搜查令获取的电子证据的审查；(ix) 我本人以及 FBI 和 SEC 的财务分析师对各项银行账户记录进行的审查与分析，包括根据传票和其他要求从金融机构获取的财务记录；(xi) 我与其他执法人员的交谈；以及 (x) 我关于金融犯罪实施的培训和经验。由于本宣誓书提交的有限目的是为了确立相当理由（probable cause），因此并未包含我在调查过程中获悉的全部事实。本宣誓书中所载的日期、数字和计算均为近似值。本宣誓书中所报告的文件内容以及他人的行为、陈述和谈话，除另有说明外，均系实质性且部分报告。\n\n5. 如下文所述，有相当理由相信，目标财产根据 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)、(C) & (D) 及 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) 应当予以扣押和没收，因其属于涉及违反 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) 的财产，和/或属于违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 及 1344 的收益或可追溯至该收益的财产。总括而言，证据揭示了一系列涉及数家相互关联公司及其附属实体的欺诈性投资计划（“投资计划”），这些实体包括 GTV Media Group Inc.、G Fashion（“G Fashion”）、Himalaya Farm Alliance（“Farms”，农场联盟）、Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.（“Himalaya International Clearing”）、G Club Operations LLC（“G Club”）、Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（“Hamilton”）、ACA Capital Group Ltd.（“ACA Capital”）以及 Crane Advisory Group LLC（“Crane”）。如下文更详细所述，欺诈性投资计划的头目为 Miles Guo，又名“Guo Wengui（郭文贵）”，又名“Miles Kwok”（“GUO”），以及 William Je，又名 Je Kin Ming（余建明）（“JE”）。\n\n6. FBI 和 SEC 的分析师与我本人已追踪到某些诈骗收益从投资计划受害者流向目标财产的过程。\n\nII. 没收的法定依据\n\n7. 目标财产据以应当予以民事扣押和没收的法律条文如下：\n\n洗钱犯罪\n\n8. 《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(A) 条规定，下列财产应当予以民事没收：\n涉及违反本编第 1956、1957 或 1960 条的交易或未遂交易的任何不动产或动产，或可追溯至此类财产的任何财产。\n\n9. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) 规定，任何人若：\n明知涉及金融交易的财产含有某种形式非法活动的收益，仍进行或企图进行实际上含有特定非法活动收益的此类金融交易——\n(B) 明知该交易的设计全部或部分旨在——\n(i) 隐瞒或掩饰特定非法活动收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权[即构成犯罪。]\n\n10. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) 规定，任何人若：\n将货币工具或资金从美国境内某地运输、传送或转移至美国境外某地或途经美国境外某地，或从美国境外某地或途经美国境外某地运输、传送或转移至美国境内某地，或企图进行上述运输、传送或转移——\n(B) 明知该运输、传送或转移所涉及的货币工具或资金代表某种形式非法活动的收益，且明知此类运输、传送或转移的设计全部或部分旨在——\n(i) 隐瞒或掩饰特定非法活动收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权[即构成犯罪。]\n\n11. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) 进一步规定：“任何人共谋实施[第 1956 条]中定义的任何犯罪，均应受到与共谋目标所指犯罪所规定的相同处罚。”\n\n银行及电汇诈骗犯罪\n\n12. 就第 1956 条而言，18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) 中定义的“特定非法活动”包括（除其他事项外）违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 和 1344 的行为。参见 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7) 和 1961(1)。\n\n13. 《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条规定，构成或源自可追溯至违反……构成“特定非法活动”（定义见本编第 1956(c)(7) 条）的任何犯罪或共谋实施此类犯罪的收益的任何不动产或动产，均应予以民事没收。\n\n扣押令\n\n14. 法院根据 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) 有权对根据 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) & (C) 应当予以没收的任何财产签发扣押令。第 981(b)(2) 条规定，此类扣押可“依照根据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》获取搜查令的相同方式所获得的令状”执行。此外，第 981(b)(3) 条规定，尽管有《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 41(a) 条的规定，司法官员仍可在根据《美国法典》第 28 编第 1355(b) 条可对该财产提起没收之诉的任何司法管辖区，根据第 981(b) 条签发扣押令。根据第 1355(b)(1)(A) 条，没收诉讼或程序可在引起没收的任何作为或不作为发生地的司法区提起。如下文所述，作为所申请扣押令基础的犯罪包括发生在纽约南区的作为或不作为。\n\n15. 关于种类物财产，包括存放在金融机构中的现金和资金，18 U.S.C. § 984 在相关部分规定：\n(a)(1) 在以现金、无记名形式的货币工具、存放在金融机构账户中的资金……或贵金属为标的财产的任何对物没收诉讼中：\n(A) 政府无需指明作为没收依据的犯罪中所涉及的特定财产；且\n(B) 涉案犯罪中所涉及的财产已被移走并被相同财产所替代，不得作为抗辩理由。\n(2) 除 (b) 款另有规定外，在作为没收依据的犯罪所涉及财产的同一地点或账户中发现的任何相同财产，均应根据本条予以没收。\n\n(b) 依据本条提起诉讼以没收无法直接追溯至作为该没收依据之犯罪行为的财产的，不得在犯罪行为发生之日起超过 1 年后提起。\n\nIII. 相当理由\n\nA. 关于实施涉案罪名的相当理由\n\n欺诈性投资计划概述\n\n16. 自 2020 年 5 月前后起，United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦检察官办公室，简称“SDNY”）与 FBI（联邦调查局）以及其他执法机构，一直在调查一系列相互关联的欺诈性投资计划，这些计划涉及由 GUO（郭文贵）、JE（余建明）及其同伙所拥有、经营或以其他方式关联的数家公司（统称“投资计划”）。迄今为止，调查（“调查”）显示，这些投资计划涉及招揽以及随后对数亿美元的投资和/或挪用。郭文贵与余建明是这些投资计划的头目。\n\n17. 这些投资计划是通过各种相互关联的发售进行的，所有这些发售均呈现出与欺诈相一致的特征。例如，向投资者承诺其投资可获得不切实际的超额回报；诱导投资者依据大量虚假陈述进行投资；大笔投资款项被挪用；并且在出售数字资产证券方面，尽管曾陈述这些货币可在公开交易所交易，但它们从未能在公开交易所交易。\n\n18. 某些相互关联的投资计划属于过去发生的，而其他一些目前仍在进行中。具体而言：\n\na. 下文所述的 GTV 股票发售及 G 币发售（统称“未注册股票发售”）在 2020 年 4 月前后至 2020 年 7 月前后期间运作。由于收益被混同的未注册股票发售，与郭文贵、余建明等人关联的公司总共从 5,000 多名投资者（包括位于美国的个人）处筹集了至少约 $487 million。\n\nb. 至少从 2020 年 7 月前后开始，该计划的头目开始向投资者推销一套新的投资机会，该机会被宣传为将其在 GTV 的现有投资转换为对 GTV 的“贷款”的机会（即“可转换贷款发售”）。可转换贷款发售由郭文贵支持的 Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）执行，该联盟由位于全球各城市的中国海外侨民组成的非正式团体或称“农场”构成。在 2020 年 8 月前后至 2021 年 3 月之间，设在美国的各农场通过可转换贷款发售筹集了约 $148 million。\n\nc. 郭文贵、余建明等人继续实施这些投资计划，包括与 G Club（自 2020 年 10 月前后起一直运营）和 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所，自 2021 年 4 月前后起一直运营）相关的计划。如下所述，G Club 和喜马拉雅交易所在 2020 年 9 月前后至目前之间已筹集了至少约 $664 million。\n\n郭文贵与余建明的背景\n\n19. 基于我参与本次调查、所受培训、经验、对执法报告的审查、对社交媒体平台上发布的文档、记录、视频的审查，以及我在互联网上进行的公开来源调查，并结合我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容等：\n\na. 郭文贵据称是一名亿万富翁及中国公民，据称在其得知一名同伙因腐败指控被捕后，于 2014 年逃往美国。\n\nb. 郭文贵参与了与投资计划相关的各个实体，详见下文，包括 GTV、G Music LLC（“G Music”）、G Club、G Fashion（“G Fashion”）以及 GETTR USA, Inc.（“Gettr”）。郭文贵在这些实体中不担任正式头衔或职务。\n\nc. 在 2018 年前后，郭文贵创立了名为 Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金，简称“ROLF”）和 Rule of Law Society（法治社会，简称“ROLS”）的组织。基于我对公开信息的审查，我获悉法治项目在 2018 年 12 月之前就已在开展。1 ROLF 和 ROLS 据称是致力于揭露和打击 Chinese Communist Party（中国共产党，简称“CCP”）在中国的腐败的组织。有时，ROLF 和/或 ROLS 的董事会成员曾包括 Stephen K. Bannon（班农，简称“Bannon”）和 Kyle Bass（巴斯，简称“Bass”）。郭文贵在 ROLF 或 ROLS 不担任正式职务；然而，在 ROLS 网站上，郭文贵被描述为“创始人、推广人和发言人”以及赞助人。\n\n1 见 http\n（描述郭文贵和班农在“法治基金”中的参与情况）。\n\nd. 余建明是郭文贵的密友，被描述为金融家和企业家。余建明参与了与投资计划相关的其他各个实体，详见下文。具体而言：\n\ni. 余建明是 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（“Hamilton”）的首席执行官，该公司据称是一家全球基金管理公司。2 Hamilton 总部位于英属维尔京群岛，于 2018 年 2 月 5 日前后注册成立。余建明于 2019 年 3 月 20 日前后被正式任命为 Hamilton 的董事。\n\n2 见 http\n\nii. 余建明是 ACA Capital Group Ltd.（“ACA Capital”）的董事，该公司据称是一家总部位于香港的投资公司3，于 2020 年 7 月 10 日前后在英国注册成立。\n\n3 见 http\n\niii. 余建明被列为喜马拉雅交易所的创始人兼主席，该交易所据称是一个加密货币“生态系统”。余建明是运营喜马拉雅交易所的各个实体的 100% 实际受益人，这些实体包括 Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.（“Himalaya Clearing”）、Major Lead International Ltd.、Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd.（“Himalaya Financial”）以及 Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.（“Himalaya Reserves”）。\n\nGTV 股票发售\n\n20. 在大约 2020 年 4 月 20 日至 2020 年 6 月 2 日之间，GTV、其母公司 Saraca Media Group, Inc.（“Saraca”）以及 Voice of Guo Media, Inc.（“VOG”；统称“各公司”）招揽数千名个人投资 GTV 普通股的发售（“GTV 股票发售”）。在此期间，超过大约 5,000 名投资者（包括许多在美国的投资者）总共为所谓的 GTV 普通股支付了约 $452 million。\n\n21. 基于我对日期为 2020 年 4 月 20 日的 GTV 股票发售信息备忘录（“备忘录”）的审查、对证人的询问、对公开来源信息的审查，以及在调查过程中获得的文档和记录，我获悉了以下内容等：\n\na. GTV 于 2020 年 4 月 17 日前后注册成立为一家特拉华州公司，是 Saraca 的全资子公司。GTV 的主要营业地位于纽约南区，位于 162 E. 64th St., New York, NY, 10065 的一栋联排别墅内（“联排别墅”）。\n\nb. 根据备忘录，郭文贵是 Saraca 和 GTV 的“赞助人”，也是 GTV 的“顾问[原文如此]”和“主要主持人”。备忘录还指出，郭文贵是亿万富翁、成功的商人和中国的异见人士。根据多名证人以及社交媒体内容，郭文贵一直将自己塑造成 GTV 的创始人和代言人。\n\nc. 备忘录以及一份概述“投资程序指引”的致潜在投资者的单独信函中，将郭文贵的电话号码列为潜在投资者咨询的联系电话。\n\nd. 在 GTV 股票发售时，各公司刚推出一个名为 GTV 的主打新闻的社交媒体平台，包括网站 www.gtv.org。备忘录声称 GTV 将是“有史以来第一个将公民新闻和社交新闻的力量与最先进的技术、大数据、人工智能、区块链技术和实时互动通信相结合的平台”，且 GTV 将是“中国与西方世界之间唯一未经审查的独立桥梁”。备忘录还声称 GTV 将“成为中国与西方世界之间的桥梁……允许不受中国政府审查的自由开放的交流、商业交易和贸易”。备忘录夸耀 GTV 的平台功能强大，足以“揭露中国的腐败、阻挠、非法、残暴、骚扰和不人道”。备忘录还表明 GTV 将与 Zoom、WeChat（微信）、TikTok、YouTube、Cisco、Citrix、Alibaba（阿里巴巴）、Amazon（亚马逊）和 eBay 等公司竞争。\n\ne. 备忘录将 Yvette Y. Wang（王雁平）、Max Krasner 和 Daniel Podhaskie 列为 GTV 的执行董事。\n\nf. 备忘录重点介绍了 GTV 非执行董事的资历，其中包括班农、巴斯和 Darren Blanton（布兰顿，简称“Blanton”）等人。如上所述，班农和巴斯也是 ROLF 和/或 ROLS 的董事会成员。\n\ng. 备忘录指出，投资者资金将用于以下用途等：收购公司；升级 GTV 技术和安全性；以及市场营销。备忘录并未设想将投资者资金用于投资对冲基金或任何类似类型的金融投资，也未设想将投资者资金提供给其他公司（如 Saraca）。\n\nh. 基于我与参与 ROLF、各公司、GTV 股票发售和凤凰城农场的信息源（“SOI4”）的交谈，以及我对备忘录元数据的审查，我获悉余建明是备忘录的主要作者。\n\n4 该信息源（SOI）正在向执法部门提供信息，以期达成合作协议并在量刑时获得宽大处理。该信息源提供了可靠的信息，这些信息已得到电子证据、视频、手机记录以及传票和搜查令回执等证据的佐证。\n\nG 币发售\n\n22. 在 2020 年 4 月至 2020 年 6 月的同一时期，GTV 和 Saraca 还招揽 GTV 投资者投资一种被称为 G 币或 G 美元的配套数字资产证券（“G 币发售”）。\n\n23. 基于我参与本次调查、所受培训、经验、对执法报告的审查、对银行记录及社交媒体平台上发布的视频的审查，以及我对 GTV 投资者询问报告的审查和与包括执法人员在内的其他人的交谈，关于 G 币发售，我获悉了以下内容等：\n\na. 从大约 2020 年 4 月前后起，至至少 2020 年 6 月前后止，我获悉各公司以及各公司的代表（如郭文贵）通过 YouTube、Twitter 及其他视频分享和社交媒体平台上的在线视频，向公众推销 G 币和 G 美元的出售。\n\nb. 各公司的在线宣传载明，G 币（各公司表示其最终将并入 G 美元，形成单一数字资产）和 G 美元将可用于在在线平台上购买商品或服务，或兑换黄金或法定货币。作为向 G 币和 G 美元投资者进行招揽的一部分，各公司并未向投资者提供关于开发任何数字资产或平台的计划的财务信息，也未提供任何书面发售材料（例如白皮书或私募备忘录）。\n\nc. 各公司从 G 币和 G 美元投资者处收取了至少约 $31 million，将收益汇集在与各公司相关的银行账户中，并将其与来自 GTV 股票发售的收益混同。作为 G 币发售的一部分，许多投资者在 G 币和 G 美元 $.01 的购买价格上获得了据称 20% 的折扣。投资者通过将资金直接转入各公司的美国\n\n银行账户，通过在线支付平台向上述公司（Companies）的账户付款，通过 Apple App Store（苹果应用商店）进行购买，或通过开具支票付款。24. 基于本人参与本项调查（Investigation）、专业培训、工作经验以及对 GUO（郭文贵）就 G Coin（G币）发售所作陈述的翻译文本的审查，并结合本人与他人的谈话，本人获悉，郭文贵为推销 G币发售后进行了大量虚假陈述。其中部分陈述的实质内容和局部摘录如下：\n\na. 在郭文贵于 2020年5月9日左右发布的一段视频中包含的陈述中，郭文贵声称 G币可以兑换为美元或实物黄金。\n\nb. 在 2020年5月16日左右发布的另一段视频中包含的陈述中，郭文贵声称 G-Coin（G币）和 G-Dollar（G美元）货币可以兑换黄金。\n\n25. 基于本人参与本项调查，本人认为上述关于 G币和 G美元的陈述是虚假的。具体而言，在调查过程中，本人未发现任何证据表明存在或曾经存在过可以将 G币或 G美元兑换为美元或黄金的交易所。\n\n26. 基于本人参与本项调查、专业培训、工作经验、对执法报告的审查、对银行记录的审查、对社交媒体平台上发布的视频的审查，以及本人对投资 GTV 的受访个人（即“GTV 投资者”（GTV Investors））报告的审查和本人与包括其他执法人员在内的他人的谈话，本人获悉关于 GTV Stock Offering（GTV 股票发售）和 G币发售推销活动的以下情况等：\n\na. GTV 通过上述公司旗下网站（包括 www.gtv.org 和 www.gnews.org）以及 YouTube 和 Twitter（推特）等社交媒体平台上公开发布的视频，向公众传播有关这两次发售的信息。第一段推销视频于 2020年4月21日发布在 YouTube 上，英译标题为“GTV Private Placement Subscription Instructions”（《GTV 私募认购说明》）（即“启动视频”（Launch Video））。该启动视频描述了 GTV 股票发售的投资条款，并提供了一个供潜在投资者咨询发售信息的手机号码。该启动视频的观看量已超过 3,000次。包括启动视频在内的所有 GTV 股票发售推销视频均未设置密码保护，也未对观看人群设定任何限制，或对其分享能力设定任何限制。因此，包括美国潜在投资者在内的公众，能够通过例如独立网络搜索、社交媒体或来自其他投资者的推荐，访问有关 GTV 股票发售的在线营销视频。\n\nb. 郭文贵主导了 GTV 股票发售的投资者招揽工作。郭文贵是一位活跃的社交媒体用户，拥有庞大的社交媒体追随者，他利用各种社交媒体平台吸引追随者，并为 GTV 股票发售招揽投资者。这些社交媒体平台包括 WhatsApp 和 Discord，两者均具有端到端加密聊天服务。5 除其他事项外，上述公司通过手机短信向数百名潜在个人投资者发送了启动视频，其中包含指向一个 Google Drive（谷歌云端硬盘）文件夹的链接，该文件夹包含 GTV 股票发售的额外发售资料，包括认购协议和投资说明。郭文贵还向潜在投资者保证他们将获得巨额回报，曾一度暗示他们将获得相当于投资额 1,000倍的回报，参见下文 ¶ 40(c)。在 2020年6月左右的另一项陈述中，郭文贵的实质陈述包括 GTV 股票的价值是以前的 30倍。\n\n5 端到端加密是一种通信系统，其中只有通信用户才能读取消息。端到端加密可防止执法机关通过窃听或对 WhatsApp 等服务提供商发出搜查令来截获此类通信。\n\nc. 基于本人对一份 GTV 保密协议的审查，本人获悉，为了参与 GTV 股票发售，GTV 投资者被要求签署一份保密协议，该协议要求他们对有关 GTV 的所有信息保密，包括保密协议本身的存在。\n\nd. GTV 股票发售的架构为向 GTV 进行 10% 的私募发售，GTV 其余 90% 的股份由其母公司 Saraca（萨拉卡）控制。根据一家投资基金的尽职调查记录，Saraca 是 Hudson Diamond Holding, Inc.（哈德逊钻石控股有限公司，即“Hudson BVI（哈德逊英属维尔京群岛公司）”）的全资子公司，后者是一家英属维尔京群岛公司。Hudson 则由 Qiang Guo（郭强，即“QIANG GUO”）全资拥有。基于本人对开源材料的审查，本人获悉郭强是郭文贵的儿子。\n\ne. 截至 2020年6月初，银行开始怀疑上述公司从事潜在的非法活动，并开始关闭与 Saraca、GTV 和郭文贵关联的账户。大约在同一时期，GTV 投资者开始对 GTV 对其资金的使用情况以及其投资的合法性表示担忧。其中一些投资者直接向郭文贵表达了担忧，许多投资者要求退还资金。作为回应，郭文贵及其同伙往往试图回避和排斥这些投资者。例如，郭文贵暗示一名投资者是中共（CCP）的间谍，其他投资者不应与该投资者接触\n\n挪用未注册股票发售资金\n\n27. 通过未注册股票发售（统称“发售资金”（Offering Funds））募集的相当一部分投资者资金通过投资被挪用。\n\n28. 基于本人参与本项调查、专业培训、工作经验、对执法报告的审查、对银行记录和传票传唤材料的审查，以及本人与包括执法人员和证人在内的他人的谈话，本人获悉以下情况等：\n\na. 郭文贵、JE（余建明）等人安排将大约 1亿美元的发售资金代表 GTV 的母公司 Saraca 投资于由一家名为 Hayman Capital Management L.P.（海曼资本管理有限合伙，即“Hayman”）的公司管理的高风险对冲基金投资中。根据其网站，Hayman 是一家在 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）注册的资产管理公司，由 Bass（巴斯）创立，巴斯在资金转移时担任 GTV 的非执行董事。\n\nb. 在 2020年5月左右，巴斯促成了郭文贵和余建明对由 Hayman 运营的名为 Hayman Hong Kong Opportunities Fund（海曼香港机会基金，即“Hayman 基金”）的高风险投资基金的投资。\n\nc. 余建明就该投资与 Hayman 进行了协调。例如，在 2020年5月29日由余建明发送给 Hayman 代表（“Hayman Rep-1（海曼代表-1）”）的一封电子邮件中，余建明的实质陈述包括：“我们将设立一个在岸工具和一个离岸工具。在岸工具将投资 1亿美元，离岸工具将投资 100万美元。在岸工具的地址是：162 E64th St., New York, NY 10065 United States。”在 2020年5月31日左右，余建明的实质陈述包括：“这 100万美元将来自我的个人账户，且本人曾拥有（原文如此）Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（汉密尔顿投资管理有限公司）100% 的股份。”\n\ni. 余建明为“在岸”工具提供的地址即是联排别墅（Townhouse）的地址。参见上文 ¶ 21(a)。\n\nii. 基于本人参与本项调查、对银行记录和传票传唤材料的审查，以及本人与包括执法人员和证人在内的他人的谈话，本人获悉，该联排别墅在公司文件和/或银行账户文件中已被列为至少七家郭文贵关联实体的营业地址；具体包括：Saraca、GTV、Golden Spring（金泉）、Hudson Diamond NY（哈德逊钻石纽约）、Greenwich Land（格林威治土地）、ROLF（直至大约 2022年5月）和 ROLS（直至大约 2022年5月）。\n\nd. 在 GTV 股票发售结束三天后，即 2020年6月5日左右，1亿美元的发售资金从一个特定的摩根大通（JP Morgan Chase）银行账户转移到与 Hayman 关联的在岸银行账户，目的是投资于 Hayman 基金。该笔资金是代表 Saraca 转移的；如上所述，Saraca 是 GTV 的母公司，由郭文贵的儿子郭强 100% 拥有。\n\ne. 三天后，即 2020年6月8日左右，100万美元代表余建明的公司 Hamilton（汉密尔顿）6 从余建明名下的银行账户转移到与 Hayman 关联的离岸银行账户，同样是为了投资于 Hayman 基金。\n\nf. 将发售资金转移给 Hayman 与 GTV 向 GTV 投资者就其资金将如何使用所作的陈述完全不符。\n\n29. 基于本人参与本项调查、专业培训、工作经验、对文件和记录的审查，以及本人与包括执法人员在内的他人的谈话，本人获悉，在 2021年9月13日左右，SEC 宣布针对上述公司就其违反未注册股票发售（即 GTV 股票发售及关联的数字资产 G币发售）登记要求的行为达成和解指控。SEC 的和解要求上述公司支付超过 5.39亿美元的非法所得没收（disgorgement）和民事罚款。\n\n可转换贷款发售\n\n6 2018年4月，余建明代表 Hamilton 向一家英国银行提交了一份开户文件，声称其拥有 Hamilton 100% 的股份，且该公司“不参与投资业务”。\n\n30. 在上述未注册股票发售被银行发现且大量银行账户被冻结后，该方案的头目们开始向投资者推介一套新的投资机会。在 2020年7月左右推出的一项新投资方案向潜在投资者推销为将其在 GTV 的现有投资转换为向 GTV 提供的“贷款”的机会。该可转换贷款发售（Convertible Loan Offering）由“Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）”实施，该联盟是由位于世界各地（包括纽约和凤凰城）不同城市的中国海外侨民组成的非正式群体（被称为“农场（Farms）”）的集合体。喜马拉雅农场联盟据称的宗旨是协助中国民主运动；喜马拉雅农场联盟主要作为私密群组存在于 Discord 等社交媒体平台上。农场通常以它们出于银行业务目的而与之关联的预先存在的公司名称来指代；例如，New York Farm（纽约农场）对应 Mountains of Spices LLC（香料之山有限责任公司）和 Davy & Tony International Limited（戴维与托尼国际有限公司），Phoenix Farm（凤凰城农场）对应 Maywind Trading LLC（五月风贸易有限责任公司）、Medical Supply System International LLC（国际医疗供应系统有限责任公司）和 Santel LLC（桑特尔有限责任公司）。\n\n31. 就可转换贷款发售而言，各农场向潜在投资者提供了一份“贷款协议”（Loan Agreement），其中披露贷款将提供给各具体农场（例如“凤凰城农场（五月风贸易有限责任公司）”），且出借的资金将由该特定农场用于“一般营运资金用途”。投资者签署了贷款协议，并在将资金转移给农场后将其发送给各自的农场负责人，但并未收到经对方签署的协议副本。\n\n32. 在 2020年8月左右至 2021年3月左右期间，位于美国的各农场通过可转换贷款发售总共筹集了大约 1.48亿美元（即“贷款资金”（Loan Funds））。投资者同意向各农场提供贷款，目的是（在三年期票据到期后）获取 GTV 股份。资金由美国各农场收取后，被转移至不同法律实体拥有的境内和境外账户，包括以 ACA Capital（ACA 资本）名义开立的阿布扎比银行账户（即“阿联酋 ACA 资本账户”（UAE ACA Capital Account）），该账户由余建明拥有并控制。\n\n挪用可转换贷款发售资金\n\n33.\n\n通过可转股贷款发行（Convertible Loan Offering）筹集的大笔贷款资金被挪用，如下所述。34. 根据本人参与本项调查的情况、培训、经验、对执法报告的审查、对银行记录和传票回执的审查，以及本人与包括执法人员和证人在内的其他人士的交谈，本人得知了以下情况等：\na. JE是阿联酋ACA Capital账户（UAE ACA Capital Account）的唯一签字人。JE从阿联酋ACA Capital账户电汇了大约3330万美元的贷款资金至属于他本人、其妻子（Sin Ring Rong）及其公司Hamilton的瑞士和英国账户。电汇至他及其妻子个人账户的款项（总额超过约1000万美元）被定性为股息、薪酬或董事酬金。然而，JE并非GTV、Saraca或其他关联实体的董事或雇员。b. JE安排了从阿联酋ACA Capital账户向三家公司的美国银行账户转账约3400万美元，这三家公司均由GUO（郭文贵）的家族成员100%持有；具体而言：\ni. 向Greenwich Land LLC转账约500万美元，该公司由郭的妻子Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝）拥有；ii. 向Hudson Diamond NY LLC转账约1800万美元，该公司由郭的女儿Mei Guo（郭美）拥有；以及\niii. 向Lamp Capital LLC转账约1100万美元，该公司由郭的儿子QIANG GUO（郭强）拥有。c. 这3400万美元与其他投资者资金混同，包括GTV发售资金。根据本人对银行账户记录的审查，本人了解到这些GTV投资者资金的大部分被用于资助奢华的生活方式支出（例如，约230万美元用于与郭的游艇相关的支出，约60万美元用于购买豪车）。d. JE还安排了从阿联酋ACA Capital账户向与郭有联系的其他公司进行大额转账；具体而言：\ni. 向Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（“Lexington Property”）转账约1900万美元，该公司由前GTV财务总监Anthony DiBattista（“DiBattista”）拥有。Lexington Property的注册地址为New York, NY（纽约州纽约市）Lexington Avenue 750号；ii. 根据ACA Capital与Saraca（由郭的儿子郭强拥有）之间的一份据称的贷款协议，向Savio Law LLC（作为托管代理）转账约3200万美元；以及\niii. 向Bannon Film Industries, Inc.（由Steve Bannon拥有的一家公司）转账约100万美元。如上所述，班农在备忘录中被列为GTV非执行董事，并且曾是ROLF / ROLS的董事。G Club Operations LLC方案\n35. 部分农场招募投资者通过购买“G Club”会员资格来投资GTV。如下文更详细所述，执法部门认为G Club是由郭、JE等人运作的持续欺诈方案。36. 根据本人参与本项调查的情况、培训、经验、对网站、传票回执、记录和文件（包括运营协议和公司注册章程）的审查、本人在互联网上进行的开源情报调查，以及本人与包括执法人员在内的其他人士的交谈，本人得知了以下情况等：\na. 2020年10月前后，G Club Operations LLC（“G Club”）在Puerto Rico（波多黎各）注册。根据《运营协议》，G Club的宗旨是“为来自亚洲市场的高净值人士提供会员礼宾服务，并提供豪华酒店和零售商的独家优惠和折扣。”\nb. G Club网站（“G Club Website”）的一张图片如下所示，可在http查看：\n37. 据称G Club提供五个会员级别：5级会员（每年50,000美元）；4级会员（每年40,000美元）；3级会员（每年30,000美元）；2级会员（每年20,000美元）；以及1级会员（每年10,000美元）。根据《G Club会员协议》，“会员随后可选择更高的会员级别”，但“随后不得选择更低的会员级别”。所选会员级别的年费必须在提交G Club会员申请时全额支付，且G Club保留在30天内自行绝对酌情决定拒绝任何会员申请的权利。《会员协议》进一步规定：“若申请被拒绝且会员资格被否决，G Club应在此类拒绝后十（10）个日历天内……以原支付方式或由G Club选择以支票形式退还会员费。”\n38. 发布在G Club网站上的一张照片描绘了郭过着奢华的生活；具体而言，照片显示他站在一艘看似大型游艇的顶部抽雪茄。G Club网站还声明：\nG Club会员资格为其会员提供全天候提供中文普通话和英文支持的礼宾客户服务。G Club会员将有机会参加可能以线下或线上形式举行的年度G峰会。G Club会员还将获得最新时尚系列的独家抢先体验权，以及在G Fashion网站上购物的特别会员价格。39. 在2021年7月8日前后发布在GNews上的一段视频摘要中，郭声称G Club拥有约25,000名会员，并预测G Club将增长到至少1亿用户，吸引16万亿美元的投资。40. 尽管G Club网站对所谓的会员福利作出了陈述，但执法部门认为G Club至少在一定程度上被用于延续欺诈方案，包括在规避监管要求的同时招揽和接收投资。具体而言，根据本人对他人对一名GTV投资者（“投资者-1”）进行的2021年8月2日访谈（“2021年8月2日访谈”）记录报告的审查，本人得知投资者-1在访谈期间陈述了实质上及部分如下的内容：\na. 投资者-1于2020年5月前后向GTV投资了200,000美元。投资者-1的资金来自投资者-1的储蓄。b. 投资者-1逐渐认为GTV是一场骗局，因为投资者-1没有收到任何GTV股份，且当投资者-1要求退款时，没有人回复投资者-1。c. 投资者-1投资GTV的原因是：1）有很多美国政客支持郭；（2）郭称这是原始股，会有至少1,000倍的增长；以及（3）投资者-1认为投资者-1会在GTV股票上赚钱，因为郭在视频中这么说过。投资者-1并不认为投资者-1会亏钱，因为郭承诺GTV投资会赚钱。d. 投资者-1以为GTV会把这些钱用来建立一个类似YouTube、Facebook和Twitter的网站，但并不确切知道这些钱会被用来做什么。e. 投资者-1随后于2020年8月前后通过“加拿大农场”投资了可转股贷款项目。具体而言，投资者-1向“Canada Himalayan Club Medica Inc.”汇出了大约71,019美元作为贷款。投资者-1认为该贷款期限为3-5年，年利率为3%，且在该期满后投资者-1将收回资金或获得GTV股票。投资者-1从未收到过已签署的投资合同副本。投资者-1汇出的款项被Canadian SEC（加拿大证券交易委员会）冻结。f. 投资者-1于2021年3月前后试图通过G Club再次投资GTV。具体而言，投资者-1被指示将投资者-1的投资款项汇至“Crane Advisory Group”，后者随后会将款项转交G Club。投资者-1向Crane Advisory Group汇出了大约100,015美元，用于以每十股1美元的价格购买GTV股份。g. 2021年7月前后，投资者-1试图通过联系G Club在线客户服务部门发起退款。针对投资者-1的退款请求，G Club通过“notices@gclubs.com”发送了以下电子邮件：\n您近期通过Crane为您在G|CLUBS的会员资格支付了一笔款项。您的电汇付款金额超过了单个会员资格的金额，且您尚未申请多个会员资格。我们通过电汇收到了$100,015.00美元。您曾申请了一个5级会员资格，并填写了KYC资料包，表明该总金额是用于G|CLUBS的多项会员资格（见附件）。为了将总金额计入您的账户，您必须申请额外的会员资格。请填写并签署附件，告知您希望购买多少个会员资格及其级别。如果汇出超额资金系误操作且您希望立即退还$50,015美元，请立即告知。对由此造成的任何不便，我们深表歉意。h. 作为回应，投资者-1告知G Club，投资者-1汇出这笔$100,015.00美元资金并非为了购买G Club会员资格，而是为了投资GTV。投资者-1要求退还投资者-1的全部资金。在随后的一封电子邮件中，投资者-1还指出，鉴于最贵的G Club会员资格费用为50,000美元，投资者-1汇出100,015.00美元的总额是没有道理的。投资者-1在另一封电子邮件中还解释称，在与G Club的一名代表通电话时，该代表明确表示投资者-1的资金将被用于投资GTV，而非购买G Club会员资格。i. 截至访谈之日，投资者-1尚未收回其100,015美元投资中的任何款项。41. 根据本人参与本项调查的情况、培训、经验、本人对文件、记录和电子邮件搜查令回执的审查，以及本人与包括证人在内的其他人士的交谈，本人得知了以下情况等：\na. 一名名为Alex Hadjicharalambous（“Hadjicharalambous”）的人士（其头衔为G Club的财务总监）是以G Club名义开立的多个银行账户上列明的授权签字人。2021年7月13日，Hadjicharalambous在其G Club电子邮箱（alexh@gclubs.com）收到了一封来自G Fashion IT经理的电子邮件，标题为“HCHKTech email”，其内容实质上及部分如下：“你好Alex，如你所知，我们现在为HCHK Technologies工作。使用这封邮件中的凭证并按照以下步骤登录你的新邮箱账户。”\nb. 根据本人对互联网上开源材料和传票回执的审查，本人得知了以下情况等：\ni. 2021年4月29日前后，HCHK Technologies, Inc.（“HCHK Technologies”）在State of Delaware（特拉华州）注册成立。注册成立时，Anthony DiBattista担任HCHK Technologies的董事。在2021年5月27日前后至2021年11月10日期间，DiBattista担任HCHK Technologies的财务总监。2021年12月13日前后，DiBattista辞去HCHK Technologies总裁、首席执行官及董事职务。c. 2021年8月18日前后，HCHK Property Management, Inc.（“HCHK Property”）在特拉华州注册成立。Yvette Wang（王雁平）当选为HCHK Property的首任董事。参见第21(e)段。2021年12月15日前后，经HCHK Property董事会（即王）书面同意，DiBattista被任命为HCHK Property的财务总监。2022年1月1日前后，王辞职，DiBattista被任命为HCHK Property的总裁、首席执行官及董事。d. DiBattista在其他多个与郭关联的实体中的职务包括：GTV财务总监、Lexington Property银行账户授权签字人以及G Music LLC财务总监等。e.\n\n根据我对传票回执的审查以及我与他人的交谈，我得知在2021年7月18日左右，G Fashion的一名人力资源员工向Alex Hadjicharalambous发送了一份“过渡备忘录”，其中称，“自2021年7月19日起，所有GFashion员工均可选择转入GFashion的人力派遣公司HCHK Technologies, Inc.（HCHK科技公司）”，该公司“此后将担任GFashion及其他企业的人力派遣公司”。过渡备忘录进一步表明，如果员工未能在当天签署该过渡备忘录，将被予以解雇。\n\nf. 根据我对互联网开源信息的研究和传票回执的审查，我得知HCHK Technologies的董事之一也是Gettr（盖特）7的董事兼审计委员会主席，据报道Gettr是一个由GTV Media演变而来的社交媒体平台。我还得知JE（余建明）的公司Hamilton拥有Gettr 95%的股份，并向Gettr出资3500万美元。\n\ng. 基于上述情况，我得知自2021年7月19日左右开始，G Fashion、Gettr及其他GUO（郭文贵）关联实体的某些员工开始以HCHK Technologies和/或HCHK Property（HCHK置业）的公司名义开展运营。\n\n喜马拉雅交易所方案（The Himalaya Exchange Scheme）\n\n42. 如上所述，JE创立了一个名为Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的所谓加密货币交易平台，网址为http（“喜马拉雅交易所网站”）。类似于G-Coin / G-Dollar与未注册股票发行之间的关联，Himalaya Coin（喜马拉雅币，代码：HCO或HCN）和Himalaya Dollar（喜马拉雅美元，代码：HDO）（统称“喜马拉雅资产”）最初是作为可转换贷款计划投资者的配套数字资产证券提供的。\n\n43. 基于我参与本次调查的情况、我的培训、经验、对喜马拉雅交易所网站的审查、发布在GNews上的视频、银行记录和传票回执，以及我在互联网上进行的开源研究，加之我与包括执法人员和证人在内的其他人的交谈，除其他事项外，我得知了以下情况：\n\n7 参见 http（最后访问日期为2022年7月6日）。根据我与他人的交谈，我得知Gettr是HCHK Technologies为其提供所谓人力派遣服务的公司之一。\n\na. 喜马拉雅交易所被描述为一个具有完整生态系统的全球数字交易所，其中包括（或将包括）一种稳定币（喜马拉雅美元）8、一种交易币（喜马拉雅币）以及一个名为“Himalaya Pay（喜马拉雅支付）”的区块链支付应用程序。\n\nb. JE被描述为喜马拉雅交易所的创始人兼主席。\n\nc. 如上所述，JE也是英属维尔京群岛（BVI）Hamilton的创始人兼首席执行官，以及总部位于香港的ACA Capital的董事。\n\nd. 来自喜马拉雅交易所网站（可在 http 查看）的一幅图片如下所示：\n\n44. 基于我参与本次调查的情况、我的培训、经验、对喜马拉雅交易所网站的审查、发布在GNews上的视频、银行记录和传票回执，以及我在互联网上进行的开源研究，加之我与包括执法人员和证人在内的其他人的交谈，除其他事项外，我得知投资者在关于如何以及何时能够交易其加密货币资产方面受到了误导。具体而言：\n\n8 稳定币是一种旨在将自身与一种稳定货币（通常是美元）挂钩的加密货币。\n\na. 喜马拉雅交易所网站上线时，投资者被告知，自2021年6月起，他们将能够兑换并提取其加密货币。该网站2021年5月显示此陈述的一幅图片如下所示：\n\nb. 喜马拉雅交易所网站随后将其“交易”日期更改为2021年9月。根据我的培训、经验以及参与本次调查的情况，我得知欺诈性加密货币通常会使用与此处类似的策略；具体而言，欺诈性加密货币通常会：(1) 无法在公开交易所交易；以及 (2) 通过虚假承诺加密货币很快将可以在公开交易所交易来诱导投资者购买该加密货币。\n\nc. 喜马拉雅资产的首次代币发行（“ICO”）据称于2021年11月1日左右在喜马拉雅交易所网站上进行。根据喜马拉雅交易所网站上的数据，喜马拉雅资产的价格从ICO时的10美分上涨至大约两周后的27美元，导致到2021年11月中旬其估值据称达到270亿美元，如下方来自喜马拉雅交易所网站的图表所示：\n\nd. 根据喜马拉雅交易所的宣传材料，喜马拉雅美元的价值与美元挂钩。“积分”（Credits）用于保障喜马拉雅生态系统内的持仓头寸，这些头寸对应于特定类型的加密资产。宣传材料还指出，“[积]分只能在喜马拉雅交易所或喜马拉雅生态系统内使用，代表参与喜马拉雅交易所交易的权利，并不附带任何要求将其兑换为法定货币或加密资产的权利。”宣传材料阐明，所提及的喜马拉雅币、喜马拉雅美元“或喜马拉雅交易所账户中或通过Himalaya Pay App（喜马拉雅支付应用）呈现的任何其他类型的资产，均是指对应于该资产的积分”。\n\ne. 根据喜马拉雅交易所网站上日期为2021年4月的喜马拉雅美元白皮书（“白皮书”），喜马拉雅美元是一种基于以太坊的代币，“其结构旨在维持其与美元1比1的价值。喜马拉雅美元积分受益于可能通过[喜马拉雅]储备金提供的潜在流动性支持，该储备金的管理旨在维持其价值处于在美元价值上等于下文所述流通中喜马拉雅美元价值的水平。”\n\nf. 白皮书进一步指出，喜马拉雅美元的发行方Himalaya Reserves（喜马拉雅储备）“打算在储备金中创建并持有现金及现金等价物形式的美元或其他货币的组合”，并进一步指出，“其意图是使储备金向公众透明。发行方打算每年由独立审计师对储备金进行审计。这些审计的结果将公开发布，并附有发布时储备金当时构成的详细信息以及资产的市场价值[原文如此]。”迄今为止，尚未发布此类审计结果。\n\ng. 如上所述，喜马拉雅资产从未在公开交易所交易，而是据称仅在私有的喜马拉雅交易所进行交易。如上所述，喜马拉雅交易所限制其会员将真实货币流出喜马拉雅交易所。因此，将喜马拉雅美元和喜马拉雅币兑换回美国货币的能力受到了限制。\n\n45. 基于我参与本次调查的情况、我的培训、经验、对喜马拉雅交易所网站的审查、发布在GNews上的视频，以及我在互联网上进行的公开来源研究，加之我与他人的交谈，除其他事项外，我得知了以下情况：\n\na. 如上所述，喜马拉雅美元据称是一种与美元价值以1比1挂钩的“稳定币”。其他主要稳定币包括TerraUSD、Tether和USD Coin。\n\nb. 在2021年11月发布于GNews的一段视频摘要中，GUO陈述的要旨和实质内容为，喜马拉雅币通过稳定币喜马拉雅美元获得美元支持，并进一步表示喜马拉雅币拥有20%收益的黄金储备支持。\n\nc. 在2022年5月左右，发生了一场全球性的稳定币崩溃，起因是一种名为TerraUSD的特定稳定币脱锚（即不再拥有足够的硬资产储备来以1比1的比例支持其与美元挂钩的加密货币）。结果，加密货币市场损失了约3000亿美元的价值。截至2022年5月10日的TerraUSD估值反映在下方图表中：\n\nd. 相比之下，喜马拉雅交易所网站上的数据反映出，在同一时间段内，喜马拉雅资产的所谓价值几乎没有任何波动或下降，如下方来自喜马拉雅交易所网站的图表所示：\n\n46. 我审查了上文第44(c)段中展示的图表，该图表显示了大约在2021年11月1日至2021年12月31日期间喜马拉雅资产的所谓价值。该图表与喜马拉雅资产的所谓价格系伪造这一情况相一致——具体而言，它反映了前两周价格急剧上涨，随后出现表面上的价格波动，但均在一个狭窄的区间内。\n\n47. 我还审查了上文第45(c)和(d)段中展示的图表，这些图表反映了稳定币TerraUSD的价格以及2021年4月至2021年5月10日期间喜马拉雅资产的所谓价格。喜马拉雅资产图表中反映的数据与稳定币崩盘期间包括TerraUSD在内的其他稳定币的估值不一致。9\n\n9 2022年6月15日左右，据报道William Je（余建明）发表了如下言论：“尽管加密货币市场近期出现下跌，但HDO始终与美元保持1:1的稳定，没有波动。令人印象深刻的是，这使得HDO成为世界上唯一在这个充满不确定性的时期保持100%稳定的币种。”参见 http/releases/iconic-ferrari-f1-car-sold-by-rm-sotheby-s-using-cryptocurrency-himalaya-dollar-883914213.html（最后访问日期为2022年7月6日）。\n\n洗钱欺诈收益方案概述（Overview of the Scheme to Launder Fraud Proceeds）\n\n48. 如本文更详细所述，至少自2020年左右开始，GUO、JE等人一直在运作各项投资方案（Investment Schemes），即各种相互关联的欺诈性投资方案。这些投资方案涉及与GUO和/或JE关联的实体，其中包括GTV、G Fashion、G Club、Crane、Lamp Capital LLC、Hudson Diamond NY、Greenwich Land LLC、HCHK Technologies、喜马拉雅农场（the Himalaya Farms）、喜马拉雅交易所、Hamilton以及ACA Capital等。\n\n49. 如上所述，在大约2020年4月至2020年6月期间，GUO、JE等人通过未注册股票发行和可转换贷款发行，以所谓投资的方式欺诈性地获取了超过约6.35亿美元。见上文第18段。我和其他人在调查过程中审查的记录显示，在大约2020年11月至2022年6月期间，G Club已产生超过约2.21亿美元的所谓G Club会员费。\n\n50. 如下文详述，证据表明，至少在约2020年4月至目前期间，GUO、JE等人一直参与一项洗钱方案，旨在清洗来自各项投资方案（包括未注册股票发行、可转换贷款发行、G Club和喜马拉雅交易所）的欺诈收益（统称“投资方案资金”）。\n\n51. 作为洗钱方案的一部分，JE等人进行了总计超过约10.4亿美元的金融交易，具体情况如下文更详细所述。\n\n52. 作为洗钱方案的进一步组成部分，投资方案资金中至少有约2.52亿美元被直接或间接汇入位于美国和巴哈马的银行账户，这些账户是以JE的公司——Hamilton、ACA Capital和喜马拉雅交易所——的名义开设，或以其他方式受JE控制。\n\n53. 特别是，如下文所述，JE在Silvergate Bank（银门银行）开设了某些目标账户和其他银行账户，该银行是位于加利福尼亚州拉霍亚（La Jolla）的一家银行，其自我宣传为“金融科技和加密货币创新业务的领先银行”。目标账户-1至目标账户-8是以在开曼群岛注册的对冲基金Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC的名义开设的；\n\n目标账户-9（Target Account-9）以JE的公司Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（汉密尔顿投资管理有限公司）的名义开设，该公司是Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机遇基金独立投资组合公司）的投资管理人。JE是Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.的负责人，并且是Silvergate（银门银行）目标账户的授权签字人。54. 如下文进一步所述，JE在FV Bank（FV银行）开设了三个账户，该银行是一家位于Puerto Rico（波多黎各）的银行，自诩为“全球数字银行”。FV Bank账户以JE等人运营Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）所通过的各个法律实体的名义开设——即Himalaya Clearing（喜马拉雅清算）、Himalaya Financial（喜马拉雅金融）以及Himalaya Reserves（喜马拉雅储备）。JE是这些Himalaya法律实体的最终实益拥有人，见前文第19(d)段，并且是FV账户的授权签字人。55. 投资计划资金（Investment Scheme Funds）已被追踪进入各目标账户并在其间流转，根据我的训练和经验，其流转方式具有洗钱的特征。具体而言，对资金的追踪反映出（除其他事项外）：(a) 投资计划资金从美国银行账户转移至位于海外（包括阿联酋和巴哈马）的高风险司法管辖区银行账户，这些司法管辖区是常见的洗钱避税港；(b) 投资计划资金通过一系列实体和银行账户进行分层转移（layering），在某些情况下是依据声称的贷款协议或其他财务安排进行的，其方式与隐瞒资金的性质、来源或出处相一致；(c) 对房地产或其他商业利益进行投资，而这些投资与控制相关银行账户的企业的既定业务宗旨无明显关联；以及 (d) 投资计划资金在单日内于多家银行之间以及同一银行内的多个账户之间转移。使用多家银行和金融机构隐瞒投资计划资金\n\n56. 基于我参与本项调查、我的训练、经验、对我以及FBI（联邦调查局）和SEC（美国证券交易委员会）财务分析师所执行的各类银行账户记录和财务分析的审查与分析、我在互联网上进行的开源情报调查、我对根据传票和法院授权搜查令所获证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容（除其他事项外）：\n\na. 迄今为止，执法部门已确定至少80多个被GUO（郭文贵）、JE等人用于处理投资计划资金的银行账户，其中包括（除其他外）：\n\ni. 在大约七家不同金融机构以G Club实体（即G Club International Limited或G Club Operations LLC）名义开设的至少约19个银行账户；\n\nii. 在大约六家不同金融机构以Crane（即Crane Advisory Group LLC）名义开设的至少约16个银行账户；\n\niii. 在大约六家不同金融机构以Farm（农场）实体名义开设的至少约28个银行账户；\n\niv. 在大约六家不同金融机构以G Fashion名义开设的至少约8个银行账户；\n\nv. 在California（加利福尼亚州）的Silvergate Bank以Hamilton实体（例如Hamilton Investment Management Inc.或Hamilton Opportunity Funds SPC）名义开设的至少约14个银行账户；以及\n\nvi. 在Puerto Rico的FV Bank以Himalaya实体（即Himalaya Reserve、Himalaya Financial和Himalaya Clearing）名义开设的至少约3个银行账户。\n\nb. 除了使用以直接参与投资计划的JE等人拥有或控制的实体名义持有的银行账户外，GUO、JE等人还通过其他金融机构和第三方支付管理实体的账户对投资计划资金进行分层转移，以隐瞒资金的性质和来源。例如，且如本文更详细所述：\n\ni. BSI Group LLC（“BSI Group”）是一家总部位于Missouri（密苏里州）提供支付协议服务的公司。根据我与他人的交谈，我了解到BSI Group实际上扮演批发商角色，并为其客户在位于美国的金融机构开设银行账户。与BSI Group签约的美国银行包括Capital One（第一资本银行）、The Reserve Trust Company（“Reserve Trust”）、Prime Trust LLC（“Prime Trust”）以及一家名为Mercantile Bank International Corp.的波多黎各金融机构及其关联实体（“Mercantile Bank”或“MBI”）。BSI Group是Capital One、Reserve Trust和Prime Trust等实体的客户，而MBI是BSI Group的客户之一。\n\nii. BSI Group代表其自身客户（包括MBI）管理交易。BSI Group的客户通过在BSI Group的网站上请求交易（例如，指明特定交易的付款人、收款人和金额），来指示其资金（存放在以BSI Group和/或Reserve Trust及Prime Trust名义开设的账户中）的划转。\n\niii. GUO、JE等人已通过以各类金融中介公司（包括BSI Group、Reserve Trust和Prime Trust）名义持有的银行账户清洗了超过约3亿美元的投资计划资金。GUO、JE等人还通过在各类不同金融机构持有的银行账户对投资计划资金进行了分层转移。\n\niv. 例如，在2021年5月20日或前后，G Club的财务总监Alex Hadjicharalambous与波多黎各金融机构Medici Bank及MBI的员工互通电子邮件，涉及将一笔1500万美元的G Club投资计划资金从BSI Group名下的银行账户电汇至位于Bahamas（巴哈马）的Deltec Bank & Trust（“Deltec”）以Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC名义开设的银行账户（即“Hamilton巴哈马账户”）。次日，Hamilton总裁David Fallon向Hadjicharalambous发送电子邮件告知，Hamilton无法将该笔电汇记入G Club名下，因为电汇记录显示汇款人为“BSI Group”。\n\nv. Hadjicharalambous将该邮件转发给一名MBI员工，该员工随后回复Hadjicharalambous（抄送Fallon），并在实质上和部分内容中作出如下解释：\n嗨，各位，资金流向如下。这里有点详细，请见谅。电汇来自BSI Group（MBI的代理银行合作伙伴）至Deltec（Hamilton）\n账户如下\nBSI/MBI在Capital One设有一个账户，这是由MBI所有的MBI Bank托管账户。BSI为我们进行处理。\n对于这笔1500万美元的交易，Medici是MBI的客户，Medici与MBI在Capital One共同设有账户\nGCLUB是Medici的客户。G Club的客户将款项汇入Capital One中指定给GClub的MBI账户（通过Medici）。Medici在每笔电汇进入银行时进行记账。\n为了解决下面的要求，您究竟需要向基金行政管理人出示什么？账户所有权证明还是资金流入证明（资金来源）\n对于今后的业务，GClub现在是MBI的直接客户，因此电汇将从GClub在MBI的账户发出，但电汇将始终来自作为MBI代理银行的BSI。我们（MBI银行）将掌握从GClub客户到该账户的资金流向，因此我们将有能力追踪进出GCLUB账户的完整资金流向。\n\nvi. 同样，在2021年7月1日或前后，Hadjicharalambous向Medici Bank的一名员工发送电子邮件，指示Medici Bank将约400万美元从G Club的Medici Bank账户转移至G Club的MBI账户。随邮件附带的电汇指令将MBI列为受益实体，但将Reserve Trust列为受益银行。\n\nvii. 基于我参与本项调查，我认为上述解释正体现了GUO、JE等人为了（除其他目的外）隐瞒资金来源而通过多家金融机构清洗投资计划资金的方式。见第56(b)(3)段。欺诈收益的追踪\n\n57. 基于我参与本项调查、我的训练、经验、对我以及FBI和SEC财务分析师所执行的各类银行账户记录和财务分析的审查与分析、我在互联网上进行的开源情报调查、我对根据传票和法院授权搜查令所获证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容（除其他事项外）：\n\na. 投资者参与投资计划的方式，要么是直接将款项电汇至由GUO、JE等人关联实体（包括Farms、G Club或Himalaya Exchange）控制或使用的银行账户，要么是按照目标主体（Target Subjects）的指示将款项电汇或以其他方式转移至其他实体（例如包括Crane、BSI Group、Reserve Trust或Prime Trust），随后这些资金被转入最终由GUO、GUO的同伙以及JE控制的银行账户。我发现了位于阿联酋、United Kingdom（英国）、United States（美国）、Bahamas（巴哈马）以及British Virgin Islands（英属维尔京群岛）的账户，GUO、JE和其他目标主体曾使用这些账户接收来自未注册股票发行（Unregistered Stock Offerings）、可转换贷款发行（Convertible Loan Offering）、G Club和Himalaya Exchange投资者的投资资金。\n\nb. 迄今为止，我和FBI及SEC的分析师已查明并试图追踪超过约10.4亿美元的投资计划资金交易，其中相当大一部分已通过位于至少四个不同国家（包括美国、巴哈马、英属维尔京群岛和阿联酋）的金融机构进行了洗钱。在转移至特定Silvergate目标账户之前欺诈收益在Hamilton巴哈马账户中汇集\n\n58. 基于我参与本项调查、我的训练、经验、对我以及FBI和SEC财务分析师所执行的各类银行账户记录和财务分析的审查与分析、我在互联网上进行的开源情报调查、我对根据传票和法院授权搜查令所获证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容（除其他事项外）：\n\na. 在2021年5月至2021年6月期间或前后，约1亿美元的投资计划资金从G Club银行账户转移至Hamilton巴哈马账户。在这笔约1亿美元的资金在Hamilton巴哈马账户中汇集之前，投资计划资金通过各家不同银行的一系列实体进行了分层转移，根据我的训练和经验，这种方式具有洗钱的特征。具体而言：\n\ni. 如上文所述，某些预期的投资计划投资者被指示将拟用于投资GTV（例如）的资金发送至以Crane名义开设的银行账户。见前文第40(f)段。在2020年11月至2021年4月期间或前后，来自中国及其他地方的个人或机构投资者向两个Crane Advisory银行账户（即“Crane花旗银行账户”）汇入了约7820万美元的投资计划资金。\n\nii. 随后，这些投资计划资金中的约6000万美元从Crane花旗银行账户转移至MSSB以Crane名义持有的约五个不同银行账户（统称“Crane MSSB账户”）。\n\niii. 来自Crane MSSB账户的约6000万美元投资计划资金与从另一家银行Capital One的两个Crane账户（统称“Crane Capital One账户”）转入Crane MSSB账户的约4900万美元其他投资计划资金进行了合并，使Crane MSSB账户的总合并余额增加至约1.09亿美元。\n\niv. 随后，Crane MSSB账户中这笔约1.09亿美元投资计划资金中的约7900万美元被转移至同一家银行（即MSSB）但以G Club名义开设的账户（即G Club MSSB账户）。\n\n上述约7900万美元与转入G Club MSSB账户的约7970万美元其他投资计划资金合并，这些资金来自G Club个人投资者以及G Club在Signature Bank（签名银行）、First Bank of Puerto Rico（波多黎各第一银行）和City National Bank（城市国家银行）开设的银行账户，从而使G Club MSSB账户中的投资计划资金合并总余额增至约1.58亿美元以上。\n\nv. 约8500万美元的投资计划资金从G Club MSSB账户转至Hamilton Bahamas Account（汉密尔顿巴哈马账户），并与来自以BSI Group（BSI集团）名义开设的银行账户的约1500万美元其他投资计划资金（涉及G Club及Himalaya Assets（喜马拉雅资产））相合并。参见第56(b)(v)段。因此，汉密尔顿巴哈马账户中的1亿美元投资计划资金由从G Club MSSB账户及包含投资计划资金的其他账户转入的资金构成。\n\n欺诈收益被转入Silvergate Bank（银门银行）\n\n59. 根据我参与本调查的情况、专业培训、经验、对多份银行账户记录的审查与分析、我本人以及FBI（联邦调查局）和SEC（美国证券交易委员会）的财务分析师所进行的财务分析、我在互联网上进行的公开来源情报检索、我对根据传票及法院授权搜查令所获证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，除其他事项外，我得知以下内容：\n\na. 2021年7月5日或该日前后，JE（余建明）以Hamilton Opportunity Funds SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）的名义向银门银行提交了一份商业银行账户申请（“银门申请”）。JE的公司Hamilton（汉密尔顿）是注册于Cayman Islands（开曼群岛）的对冲基金Hamilton Investment Opportunity SPC（汉密尔顿投资机会独立投资组合公司）的投资管理人。在约2021年7月至目前期间，JE以各汉密尔顿关联对冲基金或实体的名义在银门银行开设了约14个以上的银行账户，包括汉密尔顿投资机会独立投资组合公司和Hamilton Digital Assets Fund SP（汉密尔顿数字资产基金独立投资组合），并以Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司）的名义在银门银行开设了至少4个银行账户。参见第19(d)(iii)段。\n\nb. 在2021年9月1日或该日前后至2022年7月5日或该日前后期间，JE控制的银门银行账户接收了约6.64亿美元的投资计划资金。具体如下：\n\ni. 2021年9月或该月前后，约8500万美元的投资计划资金从汉密尔顿巴哈马账户（参见上文第56(b)(iv)段）转至以Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司）名义开设、尾号为9306的银门银行账户（“9306银门账户”）。该笔约8500万美元的资金与来自以喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司名义在巴哈马某银行开设的账户（“喜马拉雅巴哈马账户”）的约2500万美元投资计划资金相合并。因此，截至2021年9月下旬或该日前后，9306银门账户中持有至少约1.1亿美元的投资计划资金。\n\nii. 2021年10月27日或该日前后，9306银门账户中约1.1亿美元投资计划资金中的约5900万美元被转至以Hamilton Digital Assets（汉密尔顿数字资产）名义开设、尾号为7747的银门银行账户（“7747银门账户”）。同日晚些时候，该笔约5900万美元的资金从7747银门账户转至Target Account-1（目标账户-1，即以汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司名义开设、尾号为7739的银门银行账户）。\n\niii. 同样在2021年10月27日或该日前后，约1.1亿美元资金中的约2500万美元从9306银门账户转至Target Account-2（目标账户-2，即以汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司名义开设、尾号为7705的银门银行账户）。如下文更详细所述，资金一旦进入目标账户-2，便与来自以喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司名义在FV Bank（FV银行）开设、尾号为3763的账户（“3763 FV账户”）的约5000万美元喜马拉雅资产投资者资金相合并。\n\n1. 从3763 FV账户转入目标账户-2的5000万美元中，有约3000万美元可追溯至此前存放于9306银门账户中的约1.1亿美元投资计划资金。也就是说，虽然约1.1亿美元中的约2500万美元于2021年10月27日或该日前后被直接转入目标账户-2，但约1.1亿美元中额外的3000万美元是在先后流经另外三个银行账户后才转入目标账户-2的：先是7747银门账户（以汉密尔顿数字资产名义持有），接着是目标账户-1（以汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司名义持有），最后是3763 FV账户（以喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司名义持有）。\n\niv. 同样在2021年10月27日或该日前后，约1.1亿美元资金中的约2600万美元从9306银门账户转至以Hamilton Diversified Trading Fund（汉密尔顿多元化交易基金）名义开设、尾号为7762的银门银行账户（“7762银门账户”）。同日晚些时候，该笔约2600万美元的资金从7762银门账户转至Target Account-3（目标账户-3，即以汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司名义开设、尾号为7754的银门银行账户）。约两个月后，即2022年1月4日或该日前后，约2600万美元从目标账户-3转至UAE ACA Capital Account（阿联酋ACA资本账户，即由JE控制的离岸银行账户）。参见第32、34段。\n\nc. 2021年12月2日或该日前后，约4650万美元的投资计划资金从目标账户-1转至Target Account-4（目标账户-4，即以汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司名义开设、尾号为7713的银门银行账户）。资金一旦进入目标账户-4，便与来自喜马拉雅巴哈马账户的约560万美元投资计划资金（该笔资金流经了以Hamilton PE Fund SP（汉密尔顿私募股权基金独立投资组合）名义开设、尾号为7721的银门银行账户）相合并，使目标账户-4的合并余额增至约5210万美元。\n\nd. 2021年12月17日或该日前后，目标账户-4中约5210万美元投资计划资金中的约2450万美元被转至以Insight Title Services LLC Trust AC（Insight产权服务有限责任公司信托账户）名义开设的银行账户；该交易申报的用途是代表名为Taurus Fund SP（金牛基金独立投资组合）的实体购买位于New Jersey（新泽西州）Mahwah（马瓦）的住宅房产。根据我对JE签署的公司决议的审查，我获悉金牛基金独立投资组合是汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司的一个独立投资组合（即JE控制金牛基金独立投资组合）。\n\ne. 至少在2022年1月24日或该日前后至2022年4月4日或该日前后期间，约7380万美元的投资计划资金被转入Target Account-5（目标账户-5，即以汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司名义开设、尾号为2770的银门银行账户）。转入目标账户-5的款项主要由中国籍个人电汇汇入，金额在约1100美元至约300万美元之间，部分个人进行了多次电汇。基于我参与本调查的情况以及我的专业培训和经验，我认为转入目标账户-5的资金流转符合洗钱特征，包括通过不同实体进行资金分层——例如，将投资者资金导入非拟定投资工具实体的银行账户，在此处即为G Club或Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）。我进一步认为，这些汇入款项与G Club投资者购买多份会员资格相吻合，因此属于欺诈收益。参见第40(g)段。\n\nf. 在2022年3月10日或该日前后至2022年4月1日或该日前后期间，以HCHK Technologies（HCHK科技）或HCHK Property（HCHK置业）名义开设的银行账户中约77,998,889.20美元的投资计划资金被转入Target Account-6（目标账户-6，即以汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司名义开设、尾号为2762的银门银行账户）。如上文所述，自约2021年7月开始，多个GUO（郭文贵）关联实体开始在新建公司HCHK科技和HCHK置业旗下运营。参见第41段。基于我参与本调查的情况以及我的专业培训和经验，并如上文所述，我认为转入目标账户-6的交易性质符合洗钱特征，包括通过不同实体进行资金分层以及掩饰其真实来源和/或用途。参见例如第56(b)(v)段。\n\ng. 投资计划资金按以下方式被追溯至Target Account-7（目标账户-7）和Target Account-8（目标账户-8）：\n\ni. 2022年1月31日或该日前后，约510万美元的投资计划资金从某特定中国投资者（“Investor-2（投资者-2）”）名下的银行账户转入目标账户-7（即以汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司名义开设、尾号为2820的银门银行账户）。\n\nii. 在2022年1月31日或该日前后至2022年2月4日或该日前后期间，约100万美元的投资计划资金从两名特定中国投资者（“Investor-3（投资者-3）”和“Investor-4（投资者-4）”）名下的银行账户转入目标账户-8（即以汉密尔顿机会基金独立投资组合公司名义开设、尾号为2747的银门银行账户）。\n\niii. 根据我对传票回函和搜查令回执的审查，我获悉投资者-2至投资者-4此前曾投资于GTV Stock Offering（GTV股票发行）和/或其他投资计划。具体如下：\n\n1. 根据GTV维护的一份包含GTV股票发行中约1200多名投资者的电子表格，投资者-2、投资者-3和投资者-4均购买了GTV股票；投资者-2购买了约330万股，投资者-3购买了约200万股，投资者-4购买了约80万股。\n\n2. 2021年1月25日或该日前后，Crane（克兰公司）总裁通过电子邮件将投资者-2、投资者-3和投资者-4的“入职建档资料”发送给MSSB。如上文所述（参见第40(f)段），投资计划的潜在投资者被指示将其投资款汇至克兰公司，该公司据称担任GTV、G Club和/或喜马拉雅交易所的支付处理机构。\n\n3. 2021年6月15日或该日前后，投资者-2向MSSB发送了一份电汇申请电子邮件，其要点及部分内容如下：“我想投资[于]一家名为喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司的公司。”该邮件要求向喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司在Metropolitan Commercial Bank（大都会商业银行）开设的账户电汇约340万美元。参见下文第59(h)段。\n\nh. 基于我参与本调查的情况以及我的专业培训和经验，并如上文所述，我认为从投资者-2转入目标账户-7的约510万美元款项，以及从投资者-3和投资者-4转入目标账户-8的约100万美元款项，均属电汇欺诈和洗钱收益，因为这些资金是投资者-2至投资者-4出于购买更多G Club会员资格和/或喜马拉雅资产的意图而支付的，但郭文贵、余建明等人却将其导入余建明的对冲基金银行账户，以掩饰其真实来源和/或用途。参见例如第56(b)(v)段。\n\ni. 2021年6月11日或该日前后，JE开设了Target Account-9（目标账户-9，即以JE的公司Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（汉密尔顿投资管理有限公司）名义开设、尾号为0288的银门银行账户）。至少在约2022年1月至约2022年6月期间，至少约5040万美元的投资计划资金通过约五笔汇入电汇转入了目标账户-9；具体如下：\n\n1. 2022年1月13日或该日前后，目标账户-9收到一笔从以Prime Trust（Prime Trust公司）名义在签名银行开设、尾号为6126的账户（“Prime Trust签名账户”）汇入的约1080万美元投资计划资金电汇。参见第56(b)(i)-(iii)段。\n\n2.\n\n在2022年2月10日或该日左右，目标账户-9（Target Account-9）从 Prime Trust Signature Account 收到了一笔约1170万美元的投资计划资金（Investment Scheme Funds）汇入款项。3. 在2022年6月13日或该日左右，目标账户-9从 Metropolitan Commercial Bank（大都会商业银行，简称“MCB”）尾号为6891的特定银行账户（即“6891 MCB Account”）收到了一笔约800万美元的投资计划资金汇入款项。由 Silvergate Bank（银门银行）提供的交易明细将“FV Bank – Himalaya International”列为该笔交易的付款人（Payer），并将 MCB 确定为“付款人”金融机构的名称。反过来，FV Bank（FV银行）的记录显示该笔转账来自 3763 FV Account，但并未显示 MCB 作为该笔交易的中介机构有任何参与。根据 MCB 提供的信息，我获悉 6891 MCB Account 是 FV Bank 的资金池账户，并进一步获悉 MCB 以美元为 FV Bank 的账户持有人（在与本案相关的情况下，即喜马拉雅各实体）处理交易。j. 在2022年6月14日或该日左右，目标账户-9从 6891 MCB Account 收到了一笔约1000万美元的投资计划资金汇入款项。FV Bank 的账户记录显示该笔转账实际上来自 3763 FV Account，但并未显示 MCB 作为该笔交易的中介机构有任何参与。k. 在2022年6月22日或该日左右，目标账户-9从 6891 MCB Account 收到了一笔约1000万美元的投资计划资金汇入款项。FV Bank 的账户记录显示该笔转账来自 3763 FV Account，但并未显示 MCB 作为该笔交易的中介机构有任何参与。\n\n诈骗收益被用于资助郭氏关联公司\n\n60. 基于我参与本案调查（Investigation）、我的培训、经验、对多项银行账户记录的审查与分析，以及由我和 FBI（联邦调查局）与 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）的财务分析师进行的财务分析、我在互联网上进行的开源情报调查、我对依照传票和司法授权搜查令所获证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容（除其他事项外）：\n\na. 如上所述，JE 的公司拥有 Gettr 约95%的股份。参见上文第 41(f) 段。\n\nb. 在2022年6月30日或该日左右，约300万美元从目标账户-4（Target Account-4）转账至目标账户-10（Target Account-10，即以 GETTR USA, Inc. 名义在 Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. 开立的尾号为4409的银行账户）。电汇明细显示该笔转账的备注为“CAPITAL CALL JUNE 3M USD”（6月资本金催缴 300万美元）。\n\nc. 在2022年7月27日或该日左右，约300万美元从目标账户-4转账至目标账户-10。电汇明细显示该笔转账的备注为“CAPITAL CALL JULY 3M USD”（7月资本金催缴 300万美元）。\n\nd. 在2022年8月29日或该日左右，约500万美元从目标账户-4转账至目标账户-10。电汇明细显示该笔转账的备注为“CAPITAL CALL AUGUST 10M USD (X2 5M)”（8月资本金催缴 1000万美元 [2笔各500万]）。\n\ne. 在2022年8月30日或该日左右，另外约500万美元从目标账户-4转账至目标账户-10。电汇明细显示该笔转账的备注为“CAPITAL CALL AUGUST 5M USD (10M TRA NSFER 2 of 2)”（8月资本金催缴 500万美元 [1000万转账之第2笔]）。\n\nf. 基于前述事实，我相信 JE 和其他人正在使用诈骗收益资助 Gettr。\n\n诈骗收益通过多家银行机构进行分层转移\n\n61. 基于我参与本案调查、我的培训、经验、对多项银行账户记录的审查与分析，以及由我和 FBI 与 SEC 的财务分析师进行的财务分析、我在互联网上进行的开源情报调查、我对依照传票和司法授权搜查令所获证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容（除其他事项外）：\n\na. 如本文所述，GUO（郭文贵）、JE 和其他人通过在各实体的账户对诈骗收益进行了分层转移（layered），其中包括（除其他之外）：在 MCB 开立的用于 FV Bank 账户持有人（即喜马拉雅各实体）利益（FBO）的特定账户；以及由 BSI Group 以各实体名义持有的账户。参见第 56(b) 段。\n\nb. 如本文进一步所述，FV Bank 将投资计划资金存放在 MCB 的代理银行账户或 FBO 账户中。\n\n62. 基于我参与本案调查、我的培训、经验、对多项银行账户记录的审查与分析，以及由我和 FBI 与 SEC 的财务分析师进行的财务分析、我在互联网上进行的开源情报调查、我对依照传票和司法授权搜查令所获证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉，至少自2022年2月前后开始，JE 和其他人开始通过某些银行账户对超过约3亿美元的投资计划资金进行分层转移。具体而言：\n\na. 在2022年2月15日或该日左右至2022年3月29日或该日左右期间，在约16笔电汇交易中，约1.6亿美元的投资计划资金从 3763 FV Account 转账至以 Prime Trust LLC 名义在 Royal Business Bank（皇佳商业银行）开立的尾号为6050的账户（即“Prime Trust RBB Account”）。\n\nb. 在2022年3月21日或该日左右，JE 以 Himalaya International Financial Group 名义开立了尾号为2119的 FV Bank 账户（即“2119 FV Account”），并以 Himalaya International Reserves Ltd. 名义开立了尾号为8239的 FV Bank 账户（即“8239 FV Account”）。\n\nc. 在2022年3月21日或该日左右至2022年5月13日或该日左右期间，在约12笔电汇交易中，约1.9亿美元的投资计划资金从 3763 FV Account（即 Himalaya Clearing 尾号为3763的 FV Bank 账户）转账至 2119 FV Account 和 8239 FV Account。例如：\n\ni. 在2022年3月21日或该日左右至2022年3月29日或该日左右期间，在约10笔电汇交易中，约1亿美元的投资计划资金从 3763 FV Account 转账至 2119 FV Account 和/或 8239 FV Account。\n\nii. 在2022年5月13日或该日左右，在单笔电汇交易中，约3000万美元的投资计划资金从 3763 FV Account 转账至 2119 FV Account；在单笔电汇交易中，约6000万美元的投资计划资金从 3763 FV Account 转账至 8239 FV Account。\n\nd. 在2022年5月24日或该日左右，在单笔电汇交易中，约4460万美元的投资计划资金从 2119 FV Account 转账至 8239 FV Account。\n\ni. 该笔约4460万美元的款项是此前从 3763 FV Account 转账至 2119 FV Account 的约8000万美元的一部分。参见第 62(c)(i)(ii) 段。\n\nii. 也就是说，虽然有约1.1亿美元是直接从 3763 FV Account 转账至 8239 FV Account，但在该笔约1.9亿美元中，另外约4460万美元是在先流经 2119 FV Account 之后才转入 8239 FV Account 的。\n\ne. 在2022年8月15日或该日左右，MCB 的一名雇员发送了电子邮件通信，确认了 MCB 就目标账户-11（Target Account-11，即一个为 FV Bank 客户利益开立的 MCB 账户）与 FV Bank 的关系。该 MCB 雇员确认，目标账户-11是一个资金池账户，其中包含喜马拉雅各实体（即 3763 FV Account、2119 FV Account 和 8239 FV Account）的资金。\n\n63. 基于我对 Silvergate 提供信息的审查，我获悉，截至2022年8月31日或该日左右，目标账户-1至目标账户-9持有的资金合计约为292,407,029.22美元，如下表所示：\n\n目标账户 账号 余额\n目标账户-1 5090037739 $1,800,000.00\n目标账户-2 5090037705 $75,000,000.00\n目标账户-3 5090037754 $467,343.00\n目标账户-4 5090037713 $167,826.87\n目标账户-5 5090042770 $83,872,761.75\n目标账户-6 5090042762 $76,690,856.60\n目标账户-7 5090042820 $5,106,100.00\n目标账户-8 5090042747 $1,026,000.00\n目标账户-9 5090030288 $48,276,141.00\n合计 $292,407,029.22\n\n64. 基于我对来自 Silvergate 的信息的审查，我获悉，在2022年6月30日或该日左右至2022年8月30日或该日左右期间，目标账户-10从目标账户-4共计收到了约16,000,000.00美元。\n\n65. 基于我对 FV Bank 和 MCB 所提供信息的审查，我获悉，截至2022年8月15日或该日左右，目标账户-11持有的资金合计约为13,613,172.71美元。\n\nIII. 结论\n\n66. 基于前述事实，我认为有相当理由（probable cause）相信，构成目标财产（Target Property）的各账户中所持有的资金，作为违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343（电信诈骗）和 § 1344（银行诈骗）的犯罪收益，和/或作为涉及违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)、1956(a)(2)(B)(i) 以及 1956(h)（洗钱及共谋洗钱）的财产，应予没收。\n\n67. 因此，依据 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)，我谨请求法院签发搜查扣押令，授权扣押目标财产。\n\n/签名/ Anthony Alecci，经许可由特别助理检察官代签\n\nANTHONY ALECCI（安东尼·阿莱奇）\nSpecial Agent（特别探员）\nFederal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局）\n\n根据 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(d)(3) and 4.1（《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第41条(d)(3)款及第4.1条），本宣誓书于2022年9月18日通过可靠电子方式向我宣誓并提交\n\nTHE HONORABLE STEWART D. AARON（斯图尔特·D·亚伦阁下）\nUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE（美国联邦治安法官）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":17290,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-07-28 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-07-28","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:24:40"}