{"id":"court_sdny_716_5","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":716,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2025-07-28","title":"SDNY ECF 716","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"Exhibit E\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n22 MAG 8279\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTO BE FILED UNDER SEAL\n-v.-\nAffidavit in Support of Seizure\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile Warrant\nBank International account MBI10103-0000,\nheld by G Club International Ltd. (“Target Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 984\nAccount-1”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10133-0000,\nheld by Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.\n(“Target Account-2”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10137-0000,\nheld by Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd. (“Target\nAccount-3”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10138-0000,\nheld by Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.\n(“Target Account-4”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10139-0000,\nheld by Himalaya International Financial Group\nLtd. (“Target Account-5”), and all funds\ntraceable thereto, including accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10171-0000,\nheld by Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.\n(“Target Account-6”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10172-0000,\nheld by G Fashion International Limited\n\n(“Target Account-7”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest; and\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10183-0000,\nheld by Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd.\n(“Target Account-8”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest (collectively,\nthe “Target Property”).\nDefendants-in-rem.\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:\nAnthony Alecci, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, being duly sworn,\ndeposes and says:\nI. Introduction\n1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI” or\n“Investigating Agency”). I have been a Special Agent with the FBI since in or about August 2020.\nSince in or about September 2021, I have been assigned to the FBI’s Complex Financial Crimes\nsquad. During my time with the FBI, I have participated in investigations of securities and wire\nfraud schemes, bank fraud, and money laundering, and have, among other things, conducted or\nparticipated in debriefings of witnesses, reviews of financial records, and the execution of search\nwarrants. In particular, I have participated in the execution of search warrants involving physical\npremises, electronic devices, and other electronic evidence.\n2. This affidavit is submitted in support of the United States of America’s Application\nfor the issuance of a seizure warrant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 984, for:\na. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10103-0000, held by G Club International Ltd. (“Target Account-1”), and all funds traceable\n2\n\nthereto, including accrued interest;\nb. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10133-0000, held by Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. (“Target Account-2”), and all\nfunds traceable thereto, including accrued interest;\nc. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10137-0000, held by Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd. (“Target Account-3”), and all funds\ntraceable thereto, including accrued interest;\nd. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10138-0000, held by Himalaya International Reserves Ltd. (“Target Account-4”), and all\nfunds traceable thereto, including accrued interest;\ne. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10139-0000, held by Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd. (“Target Account-5”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including accrued interest;\nf. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10171-0000, held by Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. (“Target Account-6”), and all\nfunds traceable thereto, including accrued interest;\ng. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10172-0000, held by G Fashion International Limited (“Target Account-7”), and all funds\ntraceable thereto, including accrued interest; and\nh. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10183-0000, held by Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd. (“Target Account-8,” together\nwith Target Account-1 through -7, the “Target Accounts”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest (collectively, the “Target Property”).\n3. The Target Property constitutes the proceeds of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343\n3\n\n(wire fraud) and 1956 (money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering) (together,\nthe “Target Offenses”), as described below.\n4. This affidavit is based on, among other sources of information: (i) my personal\nknowledge; (ii) information provided by personnel at the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission\n(“SEC”) participating in a parallel investigation; (iii) my review of publicly available promotional\nmaterials relating to, among other ventures, “G Club” and the “Himalaya Exchange;” (iv) my\nreview of the publicly available websites for GTV Media Group, Inc. (“GTV”), the Himalaya\nExchange, and “G Club,” and materials available on those websites; (v) open-source research that\nI have conducted on the Internet; (vi) my review of digital videos posted on www.gnews.org\n(“GNews”) by GTV Media Group, Inc. and its employees and agents; (vii) my participation in\nvarious witness interviews; (viii) my review of electronic evidence obtained pursuant to\nsubpoenas, orders issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) for non-content information, and\njudicially authorized search warrants; (ix) the review and analysis of various bank account records,\nincluding financial records obtained from financial institutions pursuant to subpoenas and other\nrequests, conducted by myself and financial analysts at the FBI and SEC; (x) my review of\ndocuments provided by counsel for, among other entities, G Club, HCHK Technologies Inc.,\nHamilton Investment Management Ltd., and Major Lead International ROM (the parent entity of\nthe “Himalaya Exchange”); (xi) my conversations with other law enforcement officers; and\n(xi) my training and experience concerning the commission of financial crimes. Because this\naffidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not\ninclude all the facts that I have learned during the course of my investigation. Where dates, figures,\nand calculations are set forth herein, they are approximate. Where the contents of documents and\nthe actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in\nsubstance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.\n4\n\n5. As set forth herein, there is probable cause to believe that the Target Property is\nsubject to seizure and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), (C) & (D) and 18 U.S.C.\n§981(b) as property involved in violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and/or the proceeds of\nviolations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, or property traceable thereto. In summary, the evidence reveals a\nseries of fraudulent investment schemes that pertain to several interrelated companies and their\naffiliated entities, including GTV Media Group Inc. (“GTV”), G Fashion (“G Fashion”), the\nHimalaya Farm Alliance (the “Farms”), the Himalaya Exchange (“Himalaya”), G Club Operations\nLLC (“G Club”), Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. (“Hamilton”), ACA Capital Group Ltd.\n(“ACA Capital”), and Crane Advisory Group LLC (“Crane”). As set forth in more detail below,\nthe leaders of the fraudulent investment schemes are Miles Guo, a/k/a “Guo Wengui,” a/k/a “Miles\nKwok” (“GUO”) and William Je, a/k/a Je Kin Ming (“JE”).\n6. Analysts at the FBI and SEC and I have traced the flow of certain fraud proceeds\nfrom victims of the investment schemes to the Target Property.\nII. Statutory Basis for Forfeiture\n7. The statutory provisions pursuant to which the Target Property is subject to civil\nseizure and forfeiture are as follows:\nMoney Laundering Offenses\n8. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(A), subjects to civil forfeiture:\nAny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in\nviolation of section 1956, 1957 or 1960 of this title, or any property traceable to such\nproperty.\n9. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) provides that any person who:\nknowing that the property involved in a financial transaction\ninvolves the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts\nor attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact\ninvolves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity –\n5\n\n(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in\npart—\n(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the\nsource, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds\nof specified unlawful activity [shall be guilty of a\ncrime.]\n10. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that any person who:\ntransports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit,\nor transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the\nUnited States to or through a place outside the United States or to a\nplace in the United States from or through a place outside the\nUnited States—\n(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in\nthe transportation, transmission, or transfer represent\nthe proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that\nsuch transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or\nin part—\n(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,\nthe ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified\nunlawful activity [shall be guilty of a crime.]\n11. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) further provides that “[a]ny person who conspires to commit\nany offense defined in [Section 1956] shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for\nthe offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.”\nWire Fraud Offenses\n12. For purposes of Section 1956, “specified unlawful activity,” defined in 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1956(c)(7), includes, among other things, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. See 18 U.S.C.\n§§ 1956(c)(7) and 1961(1).\n13. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), subjects to civil forfeiture any\nproperty, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation\nof . . . any offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of\nthis title), or a conspiracy to commit such offense.”\n6\n\nSeizure Warrants\n14. The Court is empowered by 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) to issue a seizure warrant for any\nproperty subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) & (C). Section 981(b)(2)\nprovides that such a seizure may be made “pursuant to a warrant obtained in the same manner as\nprovided for a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” In addition, Section\n981(b)(3) provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\n41(a), a seizure warrant may be issued pursuant to Section 981(b) by a judicial officer in any\ndistrict in which a forfeiture action against the property may be filed under Title 28, United States\nCode, Section 1355(b). Under Section 1355(b)(1)(A), a forfeiture action or proceeding may be\nbrought in the district in which any of the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred.\nAs set forth below, the offenses underlying the requested seizure warrant included acts or\nomissions occurring in the Southern District of New York.\n15. With respect to fungible property, including cash and funds deposited in a financial\ninstitution, 18 U.S.C. § 984 provides, in relevant part, that:\n(a)(1) In any forfeiture action in rem in which the subject property is cash, monetary\ninstruments in bearer form, funds deposited in an account in a financial institution . . . , or\nprecious metals:\n(A) it shall not be necessary for the Government to identify the specific property\ninvolved in the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture; and\n(B) it shall not be a defense that the property involved in such an offense has\nbeen removed and replaced by identical property.\n(2) Except as provided in subsection (b), any identical property found in the same place\nor account as the property involved in the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture shall\nbe subject to forfeiture under this section.\n(b) No action pursuant to this section to forfeit property not traceable directly to the\noffense that is the basis for the forfeiture may be commenced more than 1 year from the\ndate of the offense.\n7\n\nIII. Probable Cause\nA. Probable Cause Regarding Commission of the Subject Offenses\nThe Prior Seizure Warrants\n16. On or about September 17, 2022, I submitted (under seal) an affidavit in support of\nseizure warrants for funds held in 11 bank accounts, including all funds in one Metropolitan\nCommercial Bank (“MCB”) account, held For Benefit Of FV Bank, and all funds in nine Silvergate\nBank (“Silvergate”) accounts, held by William JE in the names of Hamilton Opportunity Fund\nSPC or Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. (the “September 17 Affidavit1”). The September\n17 Affidavit is incorporated herein as Exhibit A. On or about September 18, 2022, the Honorable\nStewart D. Aaron, United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of New York, issued\nseizure warrants for those 11 accounts, including a warrant to Silvergate for the nine Silvergate\naccounts (“Silvergate Warrant-1”) and a warrant to MCB for the one MCB account held For\nBenefit Of FV Bank (the “MCB Warrant”).\n17. Also on or about September 17, 2022, I submitted (under seal) an affidavit in\nsupport of a seizure warrant for approximately one U.S. Bank account, held in the name of G\nFashion (the “G Fashion Affidavit”). The G Fashion Affidavit is incorporated herein as Exhibit\nB. On or about September 18, 2022, Judge Aaron issued a seizure warrant for that U.S. Bank\naccount (the “U.S. Bank Warrant”).\n18. On or about September 20, 2022, I submitted (under seal) an affidavit in support of\nseizure warrants for four additional bank accounts, specifically, one Silvergate account, held in the\nname of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, and three FV Bank accounts, held in the names of\nHimalaya International Financial Group, Ltd., Himalaya International Reserves, Ltd., and\n1 The September 17 Affidavit also supported the seizure of up to $16 million contained in a\nManufacturers & Traders Trust Co. held by GETTR USA, Inc.\n8\n\nHimalaya International Clearing, Ltd. (the “September 20 Affidavit.”) The September 20\nAffidavit is incorporated herein as Exhibit C. On or about September 20, 2022, Judge Aaron\nissued seizure warrants for (a) that Silvergate account (“Silvergate Warrant-2”), and (b) those three\nFV Bank accounts (the “FV Warrant,” together with Silvergate Warrant-1, Silvergate Warrant-2,\nand the U.S. Bank Warrant, the “Prior Seizure Warrants”).\nOverview of the Fraudulent Investment Schemes\n19. Since in or around May 2020, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern\nDistrict of New York (“SDNY”) and the FBI, among other law enforcement agencies, have been\ninvestigating a series of interrelated fraudulent investment schemes that pertain to several\ncompanies that are owned or operated by, or otherwise affiliated with, GUO, JE, and their\nassociates (collectively, the “Investment Schemes”). To date, the investigation (“Investigation”)\nhas revealed that the Investment Schemes involve the solicitation and subsequent investment\nand/or misappropriation of hundreds of millions of dollars. GUO and JE are leaders of the\nInvestment Schemes.\n20. The Investment Schemes are conducted through various, interrelated investment\nofferings, all of which exhibit features that are consistent with fraud. For example, investors are\npromised unrealistic, outsized returns on their investments; investors are induced to invest on the\nbasis of numerous misrepresentations; a large portion of the investment money is misappropriated;\nand with respect to the sale of digital asset securities, those currencies have never been tradable on\na public exchange, despite representations that they would be.\n21. Certain of the interrelated Investment Schemes are historical, while others are\nongoing. Specifically:\na. The GTV stock offering and the G Coin offering (collectively, the\n“Unregistered Stock Offerings”) operated between in or about April 2020 and in or about July\n9\n\n2020. As a result of the Unregistered Stock Offerings, the proceeds of which were commingled,\ncompanies affiliated with GUO, JE, and others (the “Target Subjects”) collectively raised at least\napproximately $487 million from more than 5,000 investors, including individuals in the United\nStates. The Unregistered Stock Offerings are described in greater detail in the September 17\nAffidavit. See Ex. A at ¶¶ 20-29.\nb. Starting at least in or about July 2020, the leaders of the Investment\nSchemes began to pitch investors on a new set of investment opportunities, marketed as an\nopportunity to convert their existing investments in GTV into a “loan” to GTV (the “Convertible\nLoan Offering”). The Convertible Loan Offering was carried out by the Guo-backed Himalaya\nFarm Alliance, which consists of informal groups, or “Farms,” of Chinese expatriates located in\nvarious cities around the world. Between in or about August 2020 and March 2021, the U.S.-\nbased Farms raised approximately $148 million from the Convertible Loan Offering. The\nConvertible Loan Offering is described in greater detail in the September 17 Affidavit. See Ex. A\nat ¶¶ 30-34.\nc. Starting in or about October 2020, the leaders of the Investment Schemes\nbegan to pitch investors on a purported luxury, exclusive concierge service called G Club (the “G\nClub Membership Offering”). The G Club Website, viewable at http advertises\n“An Exclusive Membership to a First-Class Tomorrow.” G Club purportedly offers five\nmembership tiers, ranging from $10,000 to $50,000 annually. The annual fee for the desired\nmembership tier must be paid in full with the submission of the G Club membership application,\nand G Club reserves the right to reject any membership application within 30 days at its sole and\nabsolute discretion. According to the G Club Website, G Club memberships provide, among other\nthings, “access to a concierge customer service with Mandarin and English access and support”\nand “exclusive early access to [the] latest fashion collections, including special member pricing on\n10\n\npurchases, extended video blogging time and early access to select music.” The G Club\nMembership Offering is described in greater detail in the September 17 Affidavit. See Ex. A at\n¶¶ 35-41. G Club is an ongoing investment scheme.\nd. In or about 2021, JE founded and began to market a purported\ncryptocurrency exchange platform called the Himalaya Exchange, available at\nhttp Similar to the link between G-Coin / G-Dollar and the Unregistered\nStock Offerings, the purported cryptocurrencies Himalaya Coin (“HCO” or “HCN”) and Himalaya\nDollar (“HDO”) (together, the “Himalaya Assets”) were initially offered as purported companion\ndigital asset securities for investors in the Convertible Loan Program. When the Himalaya\nExchange Website was launched, prospective investors were told that they would be able to\nexchange and withdraw their Himalaya cryptocurrency as of June 2021. However, the initial coin\noffering (“ICO”) of the Himalaya Assets was delayed several times, with the ICO taking place on\nNovember 1, 2021. The Himalaya Exchange is described in greater detail in the September 17\nAffidavit, see Ex. A ¶¶ 42-47, and herein. See infra at ¶¶ 41-47. The Himalaya Exchange is an\nongoing investment scheme.\n22. As described in the September 17 Affidavit, JE and others have raised at least\napproximately $664 million between in or about September 2020 and the present through G Club\nand the Himalaya Exchange.\nBackground on GUO and JE\n23. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of documents, records, videos that were posted on social media\nplatforms, and public source research that I have conducted on the Internet, as well as my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\n11\n\na. GUO is a purported billionaire and a Chinese national who allegedly fled\nChina for the United States in 2014, after learning that an associate had been arrested on corruption\ncharges.\nb. GUO is involved with various entities relevant to the Investment Schemes,\nincluding GTV, G News, G Music LLC (“G Music”), G Club, G Fashion (“G Fashion”), and\nGETTR USA, Inc. (“Gettr”). GUO does not hold formal titles or positions at these entities.\nHowever, Guo publicly promotes these entities, including in videos he posts for his “followers”\non GTV, G News, and GETTR.2\nc. In or about 2018, GUO founded organizations named the Rule of Law\nFoundation (“ROLF”) and the Rule of Law Society (“ROLS”). Based on my review of publicly\navailable information, I have learned that the Rule of Law projects were underway by in or about\nDecember 2018.3 ROLF and ROLS are purportedly organizations dedicated to exposing and\ncombatting corruption in China by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”). At times, the board\nmembers for ROLF and/or ROLS have included Stephen K. Bannon (“Bannon”) and Kyle Bass\n(“Bass”). GUO does not hold a formal position at ROLF or ROLS; however, on the ROLS website,\nGUO is described as “the founder, a promoter and a spokesperson,” and a sponsor.\nd. JE, a close associate of GUO, has been described as a financier and\nentrepreneur. JE is involved with various entities relevant to the Investment Schemes, as described\nin greater detail below. Specifically:\n2 See, e.g., gnews.org/articles/992 and http\n3 See http\n(describing Guo and Bannon’s involvement in the “Rule of Law Fund”).\n12\n\ni. JE is the CEO of Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.\n(“Hamilton”), a purported global fund management company.4 Hamilton is headquartered in the\nBritish Virgin Islands and was incorporated on or about February 5, 2018. JE was formally\nappointed Director of Hamilton on or about March 20, 2019.\nii. JE is the Director of ACA Capital Group Ltd. (“ACA Capital”), a\npurported Hong Kong-based investment firm5 that was incorporated in the United Kingdom on or\nabout July 10, 2020.\ne. JE is listed as the founder and Chairman of the Himalaya Exchange, a\npurported cryptocurrency “ecosystem.” JE is the 100% beneficial owner of various entities that\noperate the Himalaya Exchange, including Major Lead International Ltd., Himalaya International\nClearing Ltd. (“Himalaya Clearing”), Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd. (“Himalaya\nFinancial”), and Himalaya International Reserves Ltd. (“Himalaya Reserves”).\nOverview of the Scheme to Launder Fraud Proceeds\n24. As described in greater detail herein and in the September 17 Affidavit, since at\nleast in or about 2020, GUO, JE, and others have operated the Investment Schemes, i.e., various\ninterrelated fraudulent investment schemes. The Investment Schemes involve entities affiliated\nwith GUO and/or JE, including GTV, G Fashion, G Club, HCHK Technologies, the Himalaya\nFarms, the Himalaya Exchange, Hamilton, and ACA Capital, among others.\n25. As described above, between in or about April 2020 and June 2020, GUO, JE, and\nothers fraudulently obtained more than approximately $635 million in purported investments\nthrough the Unregistered Stock Offerings and Convertible Loan Offering. See supra ¶ 21.\n4 See http (last visited October 11, 2022).\n5 See http (last visited October 11, 2022).\n13\n\nMoreover, records that I or others have reviewed in the course of the Investigation show that,\nbetween in or about November 2020 and June 2022, the G Club Membership Offering has\ngenerated more than approximately $221 million in purported G Club membership fees. As\ndescribed herein, records that I or others have reviewed in the court of the Investigation further\nshow that, between in or about April 2021and October 2022, the Himalaya Exchange scheme has\ngenerated more than approximately $500 million in purported cryptocurrency investments.\n26. As detailed below and in the September 17 Affidavit, the evidence demonstrates\nthat between at least approximately April 2020 and the present, GUO, JE, and others have been\nengaged in a scheme to launder fraud proceeds from the Investment Schemes (which include the\nUnregistered Stock Offerings, the Convertible Loan Offering, the G Club Membership Offering,\nand the Himalaya Exchange) (collectively, the “Investment Scheme Funds”).\n27. As part of the money laundering scheme, JE and others have conducted financial\ntransactions totaling more than approximately $1.5 billion, as described in greater detail below and\nin the September 17 Affidavit.\n28. As a further part of the money laundering scheme, and as set forth below, see infra\n¶¶ 51-53, at least approximately $626 million of the Investment Scheme Funds were remitted,\neither directly or indirectly, to the Target Accounts between on or about July 2, 2021 and October\n6, 2022.\nMercantile Bank and the Target Accounts\n29. The Target Accounts are all held at Mercantile Bank.\na. Mercantile Bank is a payments and digital asset custody bank based in\nPuerto Rico.6 Mercantile Bank was incorporated on or about July 16, 2018.\n6 http\n14\n\nb. Counsel for Mercantile Global Holdings, Inc. (“MGH”)—the parent\nholding company of Mercantile Bank—has described Mercantile Bank as “a startup bank.”\nSpecifically, because Mercantile Bank does not have direct access to the Federal Reserve payment\nsystem via a Federal Reserve master account, it has sought to partner with other bank(s) that have\nsuch an account (i.e., correspondent banking partners).7\n30. Based on my review of materials provided by MGH in response to a grand jury\nsubpoena, I have learned that six of the eight Target Accounts are held in the name of companies\nthat are wholly owned by JE and are associated with the operations of the Himalaya Exchange or\nits managing entity, Hamilton. The other two Target Accounts are held in the name of G Fashion\nand G Club (i.e., two of the other ongoing Investment Schemes).\n31. As described in the September 17 Affidavit and herein, JE and others have layered\nInvestment Scheme Funds into and through the Target Accounts at Mercantile Bank, among other\nfinancial institutions, to conceal the nature and source of the funds. See Ex. A at ¶ 56(b).\n32. Between on or about October 7, 2022 and October 11, 2022, Mercantile Bank sent\nletters to representatives of the U.S. Attorney’s Office advising, in substance and in part, that if\nthe Government “publicly seizes the funds in” the Target Accounts, “there is a high probability\nthat [Mercantile Bank] will have no choice but to permanently cease operations in the near future.”\n8\n7 For example, in or about January 2021, Mercantile Bank announced that it had reached a\ndefinitive agreement for a reverse merger with a publicly traded company, in which Mercantile\nBank would itself become a publicly traded entity. See, e.g., http\nrelease/mercantile-bank-international-corp.-announces-reverse-merger-transaction-with-crucial\n(last visited October 13, 2022). However, that reverse merger fell through.\n8 As described in paragraph 38 below, Hamilton had sought to purchase Mercantile Bank just prior\nto the execution of the Prior Seizure Warrants. The funds apparently earmarked for the purchase\nwere seized pursuant to the Prior Seizure Warrants, and the acquisition fell through.\n15\n\nExecution of the Prior Seizure Warrants and the Target Subjects’ Liquidation Efforts\n33. On or about September 20, 2022, the FBI served Silvergate Warrant-1 and the U.S.\nBank Warrant, among others.9 On or about September 21, 2022, the FBI served Silvergate\nWarrant-2 and the FV Warrant.\n34. As described in greater detail herein, since the execution of the Prior Seizure\nWarrants and the Government’s seizure of more than approximately $320 million in Investment\nScheme Funds contained in Hamilton and/or Himalaya Exchange accounts at Silvergate Bank and\nFV Bank pursuant to those warrants, see supra at ¶¶ 16 and 18, JE and other Target Subjects have\nattempted to move more than approximately $58 million in Investment Scheme Funds held at\nMercantile Bank.\nJE’s Attempted Transfer of Funds on September 22, 2022 and September 23, 2022\n35. In response to a grand jury subpoena issued on or about September 23, 2022, MGH\nprovided certain documents and information to the Government, including account balances for\nall Mercantile Bank accounts held in the names of various entities affiliated with William JE,\nincluding G Club, G Fashion, Himalaya (in the name of Himalaya Clearing, Himalaya Financial,\nHimalaya Reserves, and Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd.) and Hamilton (in the name of\nHamilton Capital Holding and Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.), as well as certain\ncommunications among MGH, JE, and others.\n36. Based on my review of documents and information provided by MGH, and as\ndescribed in greater detail below, I have learned that between on or about September 22, 2022 and\nSeptember 23, 2022 (i.e., within days of the Government’s seizure), JE attempted to move funds\n9 As described in the September 20 Affidavit, see Ex. B at ¶ 19, in light of clarification regarding\nwhere certain funds were held, the FBI did not serve the MCB Warrant and instead obtained a new\nwarrant (i.e., the FV Warrant).\n16\n\nout of Target Account-2 at Mercantile Bank (i.e., the Himalaya International Clearing account),\npurportedly to liquidate approximately $46 million of what JE claimed to be his own Himalaya\nExchange digital assets.\n37. Based on my review of account balance summaries, account monthly statements,\nand additional documents provided by MGH, including notes of calls between employees of MGH,\nMercantile Bank, and Hamilton, my review of documents provided by Silvergate, open-source\nresearch, and my conversations with representatives of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern\nDistrict of New York, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. Before execution of the Prior Search Warrants, Hamilton had engaged in\nnegotiations to purchase Mercantile Bank. Specifically, between in or about December 2021 and\nin or about September 2022, Hamilton conducted due diligence on Mercantile Bank and prepared\nto acquire Mercantile Bank. On or about September 16, 2022, MGH and the Hamilton Opportunity\nFund entered into a stock purchase agreement, pursuant to which Hamilton agreed to pay\n$49,695,000 to acquire Mercantile Bank.\nb. That same day, on or about September 16, 2022, Hamilton initiated an\noutgoing wire of approximately $49.695 million in Investment Scheme Funds from one of its\nSilvergate accounts to MGH (“Wire-1”). The beneficiary was listed as “Mercantile Global\nHolding Inc.,” and the stated purpose of the wire transfer request was: “Bank Purchase Hamilton\nMA Fund SP.” Those funds—which appear to have been related to Hamilton’s attempted purchase\nof Mercantile Bank—were never transferred to Mercantile Bank, and instead were seized pursuant\nto Silvergate Warrant-1.\nc. According to MGH, MGH employees had multiple conversations with\nHamilton employees about the status of Wire-1. During a FaceTime audio call initiated at\napproximately 7:55 p.m. GMT / 2:55 p.m. ET on or about September 22, 2022 between Priya Patel\n17\n\n(“Patel”) (Internal Litigation and Regulatory Counsel for Hamilton Capital Holding) and MGH’s\nGlobal Head of Legal and Compliance (“MGH Employee-1”), Patel advised MGH Employee-1,\nin sum and substance, that Hamilton’s funds at Silvergate—including Wire-1—had been seized,\nand that Hamilton may need to transfer money out of its accounts at Mercantile Bank.\nd. Approximately 18 minutes later, at approximately 8:13 p.m. GMT / 3:13\np.m. ET on or about September 22, 2022, JE called the CEO of MGH (“MGH Employee-2”) via\nWhatsApp. During the call, JE stated, in substance and in part, that Hamilton needed to transfer\napproximately $30 million10 for an unnamed “VIP” client and for G Club to a bank in Abu Dhabi,\nUAE. In response, MGH Employee-2 advised JE, in substance and in part, that MGH would\nrequire all such transfer requests to be submitted in writing. Based on information provided by\nMGH, I have learned that JE did not disclose identifying information about the “VIP” client to\nMGH Employee-2 during that call.\ne. Hours later, at approximately 11:30 p.m. GMT / 6:30 p.m. ET on or about\nSeptember 22, 2022, Ehsan Masud (Hamilton’s CFO) sent MGH Employee-2 a WhatsApp\nmessage that read, in substance and in part: “We are likely to have a large VIP corporate\nredemption tomorrow of approx. $50m USD[.] Happy to jump on a call tomorrow to discuss.\nMany thanks”. Minutes later, MGH Employee-2 responded and advised Masud, in sum and\nsubstance, that a transfer of that size would “require detailed documentation and [ ] take more than\na day to process.” In subsequent WhatsApp communications between Masud and MGH\nEmployee-2 over approximately the next hour, Masud expressed urgency regarding the timing of\n10 As reflected herein and in MGH records, the stated amount of the outgoing transfer(s) appears\nto have ranged from approximately $30 million to approximately $50 million over the course of\ncommunications among JE, Masud, and MGH Employee-2. Ultimately, the written outgoing\nwire requests reflect requested transfers totaling approximately $46 million between two\ntransactions. See ¶ 37(j)(v).\n18\n\nthe outgoing transfer; for example, when MGH Employee-2 advised Masud that MGH Employee-\n2 had scheduled a meeting among MGH compliance personnel and Hamilton employees for on or\nabout September 24, 2022, Masud wrote, in substance and in part: “But this would mean we will\nmiss USD cut off for tomorrow” and “we need to get the ball rolling tomorrow soonest”.\nf. At approximately 3:01 a.m. GMT on or about September 23, 2022 / 10:01\np.m. ET on or about September 22, 2022, JE sent MGH Employee-2 WhatsApp messages that\nread, in substance and in part: “Hi, as discussed, my company would like to redeem some money\nso that we could continue to support the operation of your bank and other entities.”\ng. MGH Employee-2 responded to JE at approximately 9:38 a.m. GMT / 4:38\na.m. ET on or about September 23, 2022, advising JE, in sum and substance, that MGH Employee-\n2 would be speaking to Masud at approximately 11:00 a.m. and asking JE whether Masud was\naware of “what is happening?” In response, JE wrote, in substance and in part: “[Masud] only\nknows FV bank is frozen. He did not know the fund nor the transaction issues”, and “[w]e are just\ndoing normal redemption of a client.”\nh. During a WhatsApp call between MGH Employee-2 and Masud at\napproximately 11:01 a.m. GMT / 6:01 a.m. ET on or about September 23, 2022, Masud again\nexpressed urgency regarding the timing of the outgoing $50 million wire request for the “VIP”\nclient (whose identity had not yet been disclosed to MGH). According to MGH, MGH Employee-\n2 insisted on learning the identity of the client requesting the transfer; in response, Masud advised,\nin sum and substance, that the client was ACA Capital (i.e., JE’s Hong Kong-based investment\nfirm, see ¶ 23(d)(ii)), and that the wire would be sent to a particular bank in Abu Dhabi, UAE.\nMasud also advised that Hamilton had a plan to move most of its assets out of the United States.\n19\n\ni. In WhatsApp messages between JE and MGH Employee-2 hours later on\nor about September 23, 2022, JE wrote, in substance and in part: “I could send you all documents\nto show that I own ACA”, and “[w]e need the execution today or it is meaningless.”\nj. In WhatsApp messages starting at approximately 5:03 p.m. GMT / 12:03\np.m. ET on or about September 23, 2022, JE wrote the following to MGH Employee-2, in\nsubstance and in part: “Sent you all the ACA stuff”, “We are just redeeming”, and “Masud does\nnot know about ACA.” Based on my review of documents provided by MGH, I have learned that\nJE sent several documents to MGH that day, including, among others, the following:\ni. A letter on Himalaya Exchange letterhead from Masud (who is\nidentified in the letter as CFO of the Himalaya Exchange) addressed to “ACA Capital Group\nLimited,” purportedly dated October 29, 2021, reflecting a purported “Reservation of Himalaya\nCoin” and containing the following, in sum and substance:\nThe Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd., through the Himalaya Exchange,\nhas reserved Forty Million Himalaya Coin (HCN) for you at the price of $0.10 U.S.\nDollars per coin. As agreed, you can call on this Reservation as and when required.\nWe will credit your HCN on request, provided you have sufficient HDO position\nto cover the above mentioned HCN purchase.\nii. A “Himalaya Exchange OTC Transaction Form” on Himalaya\nExchange letterhead, addressed to “Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.,” purportedly reflecting\ntransaction execution details regarding the sale by “william.k.je@acacap.com” of approximately\n1,308,044.47 HCN at the price of $24.464 per HCN, for a total of 32 million HDO. The form\nreflected an effective transaction date and time of 9:35 p.m. GMT on or about September 22, 2022,\nand was signed by JE on or about September 22, 2022.\niii. A second “Himalaya Exchange OTC Transaction Form” on\nHimalaya Exchange letterhead, addressed to “Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.,” purportedly\n20\n\nreflecting transaction execution details regarding the sale by “william.k.je@acacap.com” of\napproximately 572,269.46 HCN at the price of $24.464 per HCN, for a total of 14 million HDO.\nThe form reflected an effective transaction date and time of 9:35 p.m. GMT on or about September\n22, 2022 (i.e., the same minute as the transaction reflected above in ¶ 37(j)(ii)), and was signed by\nJE on or about September 22, 2022.\niv. A blurry screenshot on Himalaya Exchange letterhead reflecting\nwhat purports to be the Himalaya Exchange Website’s Order Book page, which screenshot was\npurportedly taken at approximately 9:35 p.m. on or about September 22, 2022, as shown below:\nv. A “Himalaya Exchange Redemption Request Form” on Himalaya\nExchange letterhead, reflecting the name “ACA Capital Group Limited” and the Himalaya\n21\n\nExchange Login Email Address “william.k.je@acacap.com,” authorizing the “redemption of my\nHimalaya Dollar to USD from my Himalaya Exchange account” in the amount of approximately\n46 million HDO, for a total outgoing transfer of approximately $46 million. The purported\nredemption request form, which was signed by JE on or about September 23, 2022, provided bank\naccount information for an account in the name of ACA Capital Group Limited at First Abu Dhabi\nBank in the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”).\nk. In a WhatsApp message from JE to MGH Employee-2 at approximately\n9:12 p.m. GMT / 4:12 p.m. ET on or about Friday, September 23, 2022, JE wrote the following to\nMGH Employee-2, in substance and in part: “pls let me know if you need further information.\nWe are redeeming and need to be done today. Otherwise, it is meaningless.” At approximately\n9:29 p.m. GMT / 4:29 p.m. ET, JE wrote to MGH Employee-2, in substance and in part: “We\ncould divide into 2 tranches,” and then, “On a call with the lawyer now.” Approximately 30\nminutes later, JE wrote to MGH Employee-2: “Hi, pls hold until Mon.” (i.e., September 26, 2022).\n38. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, and review of\ndocuments and records, and in light of the nature and circumstances of JE’s purported redemption\nrequests, for the following reasons, among others, I believe that JE was attempting to move\napproximately $46 million in Investment Scheme Funds to bank accounts beyond the reach of U.S.\nlaw enforcement:\na. Based on the timing of the attempted outgoing transfers—shortly after the\nGovernment’s seizure of approximately $320 million in other JE-controlled accounts held at other\nbanks—I believe that JE attempted to move the funds offshore in anticipation of potential future\nGovernment seizure of funds (such as the requested seizure of the Target Accounts).\nb. As described above, the transfers were requested from Target Accounts at\nMercantile Bank to JE-controlled accounts at a bank in Abu Dhabi, UAE. Based on my training\n22\n\nand experience, I am aware that UAE authorities are unlikely to provide timely responses to formal\nrequests for information from U.S. authorities, and that UAE authorities are unlikely to enforce\nU.S. seizure warrants or forfeiture orders for funds held in the UAE.\nc. Based on my review of the nature and circumstances of the attempted\ntransfers, including the repeated urgency regarding the timing of those transfers (e.g., JE’s repeated\nstatements that the transfers would be “meaningless” if not completed quickly) as contrasted with\nthe claim that the redemption was merely the “normal redemption of a client,” as well as the fact\nthat Hamilton did not initially disclose that JE was, in fact, the client (through his ownership of\nACA Capital), I believe that Hamilton provided false or misleading information to Mercantile\nBank for the purpose of convincing Mercantile Bank to release the approximately $46 million\nquickly.\nThe Attempted Account Closing on October 7, 2022\n39. Based on my review of written communications from G Club’s attorneys to\nMercantile Bank, I have learned that, following Hamilton’s unsuccessful attempt to move\napproximately $46 million in Investment Fund Schemes out of Mercantile Bank, on or about\nOctober 7, 2022, G Club (through its attorneys) attempted to close Target Account-1 (i.e., the G\nClub Mercantile Bank account). G Club did not provide instructions regarding where the account\nbalance of approximately $12 million should be transferred once Target Account-1 was closed.\nPending Litigation Regarding the Prior Seizure Warrants\n40. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, my review of\nrecords and documents, including court documents, and my conversations with representatives of\nthe U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, I have learned the following,\namong other things:\n23\n\na. On or about September 29, 2022, following the execution of the Prior\nSeizure Warrants, an external counsel for Major Lead International Ltd. (i.e., the parent entity of\nthe Himalaya Exchange), Hamilton Investment Management Ltd., and Hamilton Opportunity\nFund SPC (“Williams & Connolly”) filed a letter under seal in the U.S. District Court for the\nSouthern District of New York (“Letter-1”), requesting an “emergency pre-motion conference in\nadvance of a forthcoming motion under Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 41(g) that will seek the immediate\nrelease of certain accounts and the return of funds seized from” certain accounts that were subject\nto the Prior Seizure Warrants. Letter-1 included the following representations, among others:\ni. JE, the UBO of the Himalaya Exchange, “directly or indirectly holds\nHimalaya Dollars and Coins, but those holdings represent a minority of the issued currencies. . . .\nMost currency is owned by the other nearly 18,000 [Himalaya] Exchange customers.”\nii. The freezing of the Himalaya Exchange operating accounts at FV\nBank “placed the Himalaya Exchange and associated customer holdings in serious jeopardy” and,\n“[w]hen [Himalaya] Exchange participants learn that they can no longer readily redeem their\nstable-coin Himalaya Dollars for cash, that almost certainly will lead to a massive, artificial\ndevaluation of the market-traded Himalaya Coins.” (emphasis added).\nb. On or about October 3, 2022, Williams & Connolly filed a motion for return\nof property under seal (the “Motion”) on behalf of Major Lead International Ltd. (“the “Himalaya\nGroup”), Hamilton Investment Management Ltd., and Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\n(collectively, the “Movants”). 22 Misc. 275 (VSB), Dkts. 8 through 8-18 (under seal).\nc. The Motion included the following representations, among others:\niii. The Himalaya Group, through various subsidiaries, “owns and\noperates an innovative cryptocurrency exchange known as the Himalaya Exchange.”\n24\n\niv. The Himalaya Exchange “has more than 18,000 customers and a\nmarket capitalization of $25 billion.”\nv. The Himalaya Exchange “facilitates the buying and selling of two\ntypes of digital assets”—the Himalaya Dollar (or “HDO”), which the Movants described as “a\n‘stable coin’ token that is fixed to the U.S. dollar and backed by reserves consisting of dollar-for-\ndollar cash or cash-equivalent assets”; and the Himalaya Coin (or “HCN”), which the Movants\ndescribed as “a trading cryptocurrency valued by supply and demand.” (emphasis added).\nvi. “Customers can participate in the [Himalaya] Exchange by buying\nHimalaya Dollars, using that currency to buy and sell Himalaya Coin, and ultimately redeeming\nHimalaya Dollars back into U.S. dollars.” (emphasis added).\nvii. The Himalaya Exchange’s “pioneering model” combines “pure\ncryptocurrency trading with ‘stable coin’ backed by traditional currency.”\nviii. JE, the UBO of the Himalaya Exchange, “is also a customer of the\n[Himalaya] Exchange and owns a substantial amount of Himalaya Dollars and Himalaya Coin\nthrough other entities” and “will be negatively impacted” by the seizures, like other Himalaya\nExchange customers.\nix. JE “is prepared to consider reasonable restrictions on his ability to\nredeem Himalaya Dollars,” to the extent the Government has concerns about the UBO’s (i.e., JE’s)\ntreatment of his substantial holdings.\nx. Two of the Himalaya Group’s primary operating accounts at FV\nBank are the “Clearing Account,” which is used to process Himalaya Exchange customer deposits\nand redemption, and the “Reserve Account,” which holds customer funds.\nxi. When a customer “purchases Himalaya Dollars,” the customer’s\ncash payment is deposited into the Clearing Account, and the customer receives “a credit” for an\n25\n\nequivalent number of Himalaya Dollars. Mot. at 3. Funds spent to “purchase[] Himalaya Dollars”\nare “often sent to the Reserve Account, where they back the Himalaya Dollars.”\nxii. The customer can use Himalaya Dollar “credits” to “buy and sell\nHimalaya Coins, the [Himalaya] Exchange’s market-traded cryptocurrency.”\nxiii. When customers “seek to redeem their Himalaya Dollars back to\nhard currency,” customer money in the “Reserve Account travels back to the Clearing Account to\nmeet the redemption request.”\nxiv. The freezing of the FV Bank accounts—including the Clearing and\nReserve Accounts—has resulted in the Himalaya Exchange’s inability to process 142 pending\ncustomer redemption requests (as of the date the Motion was filed), despite the Himalaya\nExchange having a “back-up processing bank, Mercantile Bank.”\nxv. The Himalaya Exchange’s alleged inability to process redemption\nrequests would “precipitate the loss of confidence” of customers, “resulting in billions of dollars\nin market losses.”\nThe Himalaya Exchange Scheme\n41. The Himalaya Exchange is marketed and described as a cryptocurrency11 exchange.\nAs detailed herein, however—and contrary to claims made in Letter-1 and the Motion, described\nabove—the evidence demonstrates that the Himalaya Exchange does not appear to be a functional\ncryptocurrency exchange; that HDO does not appear to reside on the blockchain (contrary to\nrepresentations by the Himalaya Exchange, see infra ¶ 46(f)); and that the “customers” or\n11 Based on my training and experience, I know that “cryptocurrency” describes digital currency\nin which transactions are verified, and records maintained, by a decentralized system using\ncryptography (generally referred to as the “blockchain”), rather than by a centralized authority\nsuch as a bank.\n26\n\n“members” of the Himalaya Exchange appear, in fact, to be investors in (and victims of) the\ninterrelated Investment Schemes—including the Himalaya Exchange, as described more fully in\nthe September 17 Affidavit. See, e.g., Ex. A at ¶¶ 50-52, 54-55.\n42. Statements by the Himalaya Exchange and the Movants—including the Himalaya\nDollar Whitepaper12 (“HDO Whitepaper”) and the Himalaya Coin Whitepaper13 (“HCN\nWhitepaper,” together, the “Whitepapers”), information posted on the Himalaya Exchange\nwebsite, JE’s publicly-reported statements, Letter-1, and the Motion—are inconsistent regarding,\namong other things: (a) what “Himalaya Dollars” and “Himalaya Coins” actually are; (b) the\nliquidity of Himalaya Dollars and Himalaya Coins; (c) how the purported “market price” of\nHimalaya Coin is determined; and (d) whether the purported Himalaya cryptocurrencies exist on\nthe blockchain.\nHimalaya Dollar and Himalaya Coin\n43. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, open-source\nresearch that I have conducted on the Internet, my review of documents and evidence obtained\npursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, my review of court filings, and\nmy conversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. The Himalaya Exchange markets itself as a cryptocurrency exchange, or\n“true crypto ecosystem.” In the Whitepapers, the “Himalaya Exchange” is defined as a “crypto\nasset exchange on which members can buy, sell and trade their crypto assets.” HDO Whitepaper\n12 Available for download at http\n2.amazonaws.com/hedocs/hdo_whitepaper_eng_v6e.pdf (last visited October 12, 2022).\n13 Available for download at http\n2.amazonaws.com/hedocs/hcn_whitepaper_eng_v7e.pdf (last visited October 12, 2022).\n27\n\nat 3 (emphasis added). An image from the Himalaya Exchange Website, viewable at\nhttp is shown below:\nb. Himalaya Dollar is described in the Motion papers and the HDO\nWhitepaper as a “‘stable coin’ token” or “a new stablecoin pegged to the U.S. Dollar.” See, e.g.,\nHDO Whitepaper at 7. JE is reported to have described HDO as “the only stable coin in the world\nto maintain” a 1-to-1 stability with the U.S. dollar following the global stablecoin crash in or about\nMay 2022. See Ex. A at 34 n.9 (emphasis added).\nc. Himalaya Coin is described in the Motion papers and the HCN Whitepaper\nas a “trading cryptocurrency valued by supply and demand,” a “market-traded cryptocurrency,” or\nthe “official coin issued” by the Himalaya Exchange. See, e.g., HCN Whitepaper at 4.\n28\n\nd. Elsewhere, however, it is stated that the Himalaya Exchange operates not\nthrough the use of cryptocurrency, but rather through the use of “Credits,” as reflected in the\nStructural Considerations portion of the HDO Whitepaper shown below:\nSee HDO Whitepaper at 10 (emphasis added); HCN Whitepaper at 11; see also Ex. A at ¶ 44(d).\nThat is, as reflected in the language above, the Himalaya Exchange operates through the use of\n“credits” (not cryptocurrency), and those credits (a) can only be used within the Himalaya\nEcosystem, and (b) do not carry any right to require their exchange for fiat currency or crypto-\nassets. Moreover, while a Himalaya Exchange member may request to exchange that member’s\nHDO credits for an equivalent payment in U.S. dollars, the Himalaya Exchange has the\n“discretion” to deny any such request.\ne. The January 2022 version of the HDO Whitepaper contains approximately\n135 references to “credits.” See generally HDO Whitepaper. By contrast, the HDO Whitepaper\ncontains only six references to “stablecoin” or “stablecoins.” See id.\n29\n\nf. The January 2022 version of the HCN Whitepaper contains approximately\n131 references to “credits.” See generally HCN Whitepaper. By contrast, the HCN Whitepaper\ncontains only 15 references to “token” or “tokens.” See id.\ng. Images from the Himalaya Exchange Website, viewable at\nhttp are shown below:\nThe above descriptions of Himalaya Dollar and Himalaya Coin on the Himalaya Exchange\nWebsite make no mention of “credits.”\nh. I submit that the foregoing establishes that, contrary to claims that HDO and\nHCN are cryptocurrencies, HDO and HCN are not in fact cryptocurrencies. Rather, individuals\nwho purportedly “buy” HDO and use their HDO to “buy” HCN have simply sent money to bank\naccounts controlled by JE and others in exchange for what are described as “credits.”\n30\n\nValuation of Himalaya Coin\n44. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, open-source\nresearch that I have conducted on the Internet, my review of documents and evidence obtained\npursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, my review of court filings, and\nmy conversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. The Movants have represented that Himalaya Coin is “valued by supply and\ndemand.”\nb. In a declaration submitted by Ehsan Masud, the CFO of Hamilton, in\nsupport of the Motion, Masud represented that the market capitalization of HCN exceeded $25\nbillion as of October 2, 2022.\nc. The purported historical price of HCN is reflected in data on the Himalaya\nExchange Website. See, e.g., Ex. A at ¶¶ 44(c), 45(d).\nd. Contrary to representations that the price of HCN is determined by market\nsupply and demand, the HCN Whitepaper states the following regarding Subsequent Issuances\n(i.e., issuances of HCN after the initial coin offering, or ICO), in substance and in part:\n31\n\nHCN Whitepaper at 16. That is, as reflected in the language above, the Issuer has “sole and\nabsolute discretion” to decide that the Issue Price, as calculated by the methodology described\nabove, “does not constitute a fair market price,” in which case the Issuer is “entitled to make such\nadjustments in the calculation of the Issue Price as it deems necessary in order to achieve an Issue\nPrice which it deems to be a fair market price.” Id. (emphasis added).\ne. The HCN Whitepaper also states the following: “Members should note that\nthe value of HCN Credits is independent from the value of any other assets, including HCN\ntokens.” Id.\nf. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, I\nsubmit that the foregoing reflects that—contrary to representations that the price of “HCN” (and\ntherefore the value of HCN Credits)is determined by market supply and demand—the Himalaya\n32\n\nExchange has absolute discretion to set a “price” for the issuance of future HCN without any regard\nfor the purported market value of any purportedly issued HCN.\nLiquidity of Himalaya Assets\n45. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, open-source\nresearch that I have conducted on the Internet, my review of documents and evidence obtained\npursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, my review of court filings, and\nmy conversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. The Movants have made certain statements regarding the liquidity of the\nHimalaya Dollar. For example, Masud represented that Himalaya Dollar can be redeemed back\nto fiat US dollar “at any time.” See also supra at ¶ 40(a)(ii).\nb. By contrast, as described above, the HDO Whitepaper states that a\nHimalaya Exchange member’s request to exchange Himalaya Dollar Credits into U.S. Dollars is\n“at the discretion of the Himalaya Exchange.” See supra at ¶ 43(d).\nc. The HDO Whitepaper further states, in substance and in part: “While it is\nintended that the Himalaya Exchange should provide good levels of liquidity, the maintenance of\nthe Reserve is intended to provide an additional layer of potential liquidity as a barrier to\nunexpected market events. It provides the Issuer [i.e., Himalaya Financial] with the discretionary\nability to take action to support liquidity where it deems necessary.” HDO Whitepaper at 12. And:\n“The Issuer is not obliged to provide liquidity support and the Himalaya Exchange is not obliged\nto agree to any request from a Member to exchange HDO Credits for U.S. Dollars and such actions\nare at the sole discretion of the Issuer and the Himalaya Exchange respectively. Members do not\nhave any direct or indirect claim on the Issuer or the Reserve.” Id.\nd. In his declaration in support of the Motion, Masud has also made certain\nstatements regarding the liquidity of Himalaya Coin, including, among others, that “[a]ll HCN are\n33\n\nheld by customers of the Exchange,” and that “[c]ustomers use HDO to purchase HCN and\ncustomers sell HCN to obtain HDO, which can be redeemed back to fiat US dollar.”\ne. By contrast, the HCN Whitepaper states the following, in substance and in\npart:\nMembers are advised that neither crypto assets or fiat currency may be held by\nMembers within the Himalaya Ecosystem, and the Himalaya Ecosystem does not\nprovide . . . any type of custody or other arrangements to facilitate this. The\nHimalaya Exchange intends to hold in its own name and for its own account, crypto\nassets which it may elect to use at the request of a Member to complete an exchange\nof a Member’s Credits for corresponding crypto assets. . . . where such request\nfrom a Member is approved by the Himalaya Exchange.\nHCN Whitepaper at 11 (emphasis added).\nf. Despite representations by the Movants about the purported liquidity of\nHDO and HCN, evidence gathered during this Investigation (including the language from the\nWhitepapers cited above) demonstrates that Himalaya Exchange customers’ ability to convert\nHimalaya Assets into fiat currency is limited and lies within the sole discretion of the Himalaya\nExchange. Based on my review of bank records and subpoena returns, I have learned that some\nHimalaya Exchange customers have purportedly executed successful “redemptions” (i.e., received\nback fiat currency from bank accounts controlled by Hamilton and/or Himalaya entities).\nHowever, based on my participation in this Investigation, training, and experience, it appears that\nthe Himalaya Exchange granted certain purported “redemption” requests and returned Investments\nScheme Funds to certain members’ bank accounts in an effort to perpetuate the fraud; that is, to\ncreate the appearance that Himalaya Exchange cryptocurrencies are liquid.\nAnalysis of the Blockchain\n46. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\n34\n\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. The Movants have represented that “the Himalaya Dollar is backed by\nreserves consisting of dollar-for-dollar cash or cash-equivalent assets.”\nb. The Movants stated that an outside accountant “[p]eriodically . . . examines\nthe books and records of the Exchange and provides reports confirming this dollar for dollar\nbacking.” In connection with the Motion, the Movants submitted an Independent Accountant’s\nReport, dated August 10, 2022 (the “Accountant’s Report”), prepared by a particular accounting\nfirm headquartered in California (the “Accounting Firm”).14 The Accountant’s Report is attached\nhereto as Exhibit D.\nc. The Accountant’s Report indicates that Himalaya Dollars “are\ncryptographic digital tokens residing on the Ethereum blockchain at the smart contract address\n[0x7C197afcd8D36884309ed731424985E3ed17F018]” (the “Blockchain Address”), and further\nreferences “collateralized HDO Credits, which are HDO-denominated liabilities issued and\npurchased for dollars on Himalaya Ecosystem Platforms.” Ex. D. at 1.\nd. The Himalaya Dollar Bank & Funds Holding Report, which is a report that\nwas provided by the Himalaya International Reserve to the Accounting Firm, states, among other\nthings, that approximately 401,047,298.15 HDO Tokens “have been minted on the Ethereum\n14 As reflected in Exhibit D, the Accountant’s Report is approximately one page long, with an\nattachment of the Himalaya Dollar Bank & Funds Holding Report, which was signed by Himalaya\nInternational Reserve CEO Jesse Brown on or about August 10, 2022. See Ex. D. On or about\nOctober 10, 2022, the FBI received a voluminous subpoena response from the Accounting Firm\nconsisting of, among other things, what appears to be documentation supporting the Accountant’s\nReport. The FBI’s review of that subpoena response is ongoing.\n35\n\nblockchain at the smart contract address” (i.e., the Blockchain Address) as of on or about July 31,\n2022. See Ex. D at 2 n.1.\ne. Based on my conversations with others, including a member of the FBI’s\nvirtual currency response team, I have learned the following, in substance and in part:\ni. Neither the Whitepapers nor the Himalaya Exchange Website\nprovide the smart contract address15 for the Himalaya cryptocurrencies. Without a smart contract\naddress, it is difficult for potential or current investors to conduct due diligence regarding the\nHimalaya cryptocurrencies.\nii. Based on the FBI’s review of the Blockchain Address (i.e. that\nMovants provided to the Government in the Accountant’s Report (which does not appear to be\npublicly available) on an open-source block explorer (the “Explorer”), it appears that the\nBlockchain Address first appeared on the Ethereum blockchain on or about March 16, 2021. As\ndescribed in the September 17 Affidavit, the Himalaya Exchange has been operating (pre-ICO)\nsince in or about April 2021. See Ex. A at ¶ 18(c).\nf. Based on the FBI’s review of the Blockchain Address on the Explorer, it\nappears that the Blockchain Address is affiliated with HDO. It further appears that there are there\napproximately 24 holders of HDO; that approximately 70 transactions appear on the Blockchain\nAddress between on or about March 16, 2021 and on or about October 14, 2022; and that market\ncapitalization is not tracked within the Explorer for HDO.16\n15 Based on my training and experience and my conversations with others, I am aware that a\ncontract address hosts a smart contract, which is a set of code stored on a blockchain that runs\nwhen predetermined conditions are met. I am further aware that a contract address could be\nresponsible for deploying a particular cryptocurrency (e.g., a token or coin) on a blockchain.\n16 By comparison, and as an example, I and others searched the smart contract address of a\nstablecoin called “Gemini Dollar” (the “Gemini Blockchain Address”) on the Explorer. See\n36\n\ng. Based on the foregoing, I submit that (i) the purported Himalaya Exchange\n“cryptocurrency” HDO does not, in fact, appear to reside within the Blockchain Address, and\n(ii) “HDO Tokens” have not, in fact, been minted on the Blockchain Address, contrary to the\nHimalaya Dollar Bank & Funds Holding Report. See Ex. D at 2 n.1.\n47. As described above, the Himalaya Exchange is marketed to investors as a\ncryptocurrency exchange where individuals can hold and trade cryptocurrency assets, including\nstablecoin and trading coins. In fact, as detailed above, the evidence demonstrates that members\nof the Himalaya Exchange do not hold, own, or control cryptocurrency or digital assets. Rather,\nHimalaya Exchange members who send money to bank accounts controlled by JE and others\n(including the Target Accounts) receive “credits,” which purportedly give them an option to buy\ncryptocurrency (in the form of HDO stablecoins or HCN trading coins). While members may\nbelieve they have effectively exercised that option and are in possession of cryptocurrency or\ndigital assets, the Himalaya Exchange is a closed cryptocurrency platform, and members (like the\npublic) do not have transparency into the purported market for HDO or HCN, beyond the data that\nis reflected on the Himalaya Exchange Website. Moreover, it is the Himalaya Exchange (and not\nmembers) that holds the money that members have paid for the purpose of “buying” HDO (i.e.,\nInvestment Scheme Funds), and the Himalaya Exchange holds those funds “in its own name and\nfor its own account.” See supra at ¶ 45(e).\nhttp (last visited October 13, 2022). Based on that search, I am aware that\nthat that there are approximately 9,927 holders of Gemini Dollar; that approximately 520,188\ntransactions were recorded on the Gemini Blockchain Address between its ICO in or about\nFebruary 2022 and approximately 9:17 p.m. on or about October 13, 2022; and that Gemini Dollar\nhas a current market capitalization of approximately $329 million.\n37\n\nB. Tracing of Fraudulent Proceeds to the Target Accounts\n48. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. Investors participate in the Investment Schemes by either wiring money\ndirectly to a bank account controlled or used by entities affiliated with GUO, JE, and others\n(including the Farms, G Club, or the Himalaya Exchange), or by wiring or otherwise transferring\nmoney to other entities at the direction of the Target Subjects, which funds are then transmitted to\nbank accounts ultimately controlled by JE and other Target Subjects. See Ex. A at ¶ 57(a).\nb. To date, I and analysts at the FBI and SEC have identified and attempted to\ntrace more than approximately $1.6 billion in Investment Scheme Fund transactions, a substantial\npart of which has been laundered through financial institutions located in at least four different\ncountries, including the United States, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, and the UAE.\n49. As described in the September 17 Affidavit, prospective Investment Scheme\ninvestors were instructed to send funds intended as an investment in GTV, G Club, or the Himalaya\nExchange (for example) to certain bank accounts. See, e.g., Ex. A at ¶¶ 40(g), 57, 61-62.\na. Those Investment Scheme Funds were transferred into and among more\nthan at least 80 bank accounts being used by JE and others in ways that, based on my training and\nexperience, are indicative of money laundering. See Ex. A at ¶ 55.\nb. Specifically, the tracing of the funds reflects, among other things:\n(a)transfers of Investment Scheme Funds from U.S. bank accounts to bank accounts located\noverseas (including the UAE and the Bahamas) in high risk jurisdictions that are frequent havens\n38\n\nfor money laundering; (b) layering of Investment Scheme Funds through a series of entities and\nbank accounts, in some cases pursuant to purported loan agreements or other financial\narrangements, in a manner consistent with concealment of the nature, source, or origin of the funds;\n(c)investments in real estate or other business interests that have no apparent connection with the\nstated purposes of the businesses controlling the bank accounts; and (d) the transfer of Investment\nScheme Funds between multiple banks, as well as among multiple accounts within the same bank,\nin a single day. See Ex. A at ¶¶ 56-57.\nFraud Proceeds are Layered Through Various Banking Institutions\n50. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. Approximately $60 million of Investment Scheme Funds (including, in\nparticular, funds raised through the GTV Stock Offering and the Convertible Loan Offering) were\ntransferred into the Crane MSSB Accounts between in or about May 2021 and June 2021, after\nbeing layered through a series of entities at various different banks in a manner that, based on my\ntraining and experience, is indicative of money laundering. See Ex. A at ¶¶ 58(a), 61-62.\nb. The approximately $60 million in Investment Scheme Funds from the Crane\nMSSB Accounts was combined with approximately $49 million in other Investment Scheme\nFunds that had been transferred into the Crane MSSB Accounts from two Crane accounts at a\ndifferent bank, Capital One (together, the “Crane Capital One Accounts”), raising the total\ncombined balance in the Crane MSSB Accounts to approximately $109 million. Ex. A at\n¶ 58(a)(iii).\n39\n\nc. Approximately $79 million of those approximately $109 million in\nInvestment Scheme Funds in the Crane MSSB Accounts were then transferred to accounts at the\nsame bank (i.e., MSSB), but in the name of G Club (i.e., the G Club MSSB Accounts). The\napproximately $79 million was combined with approximately $79.7 million in other Investment\nScheme Funds that had been transferred into the G Club MSSB Accounts from individual G Club\nInvestors and from G Club bank accounts at Signature Bank, First Bank of Puerto Rico, and City\nNational Bank, raising the total combined balance of Investment Scheme Funds in the G Club\nMSSB Accounts to more than approximately $158 million.\nFraud Proceeds are Transferred to the Target Accounts at Mercantile Bank\n51. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into and among the Target Accounts\nin ways that, based on my training and experience, are indicative of money laundering.\nSpecifically, the tracing of the funds reflects, among other things: (a) transfers of Investment\nScheme Funds from U.S. bank accounts to bank accounts located overseas in high-risk\njurisdictions that are frequent havens for money laundering (including the Bahamas, Hong Kong,\nthe Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands); (b) layering of Investment Scheme Funds\nthrough a series of entities and bank accounts, in some cases pursuant to purported loan agreements\nor other financial arrangements, in a manner consistent with concealment of the nature, source, or\norigin of the funds; and (c) the transfer of Investment Scheme Funds among the Target Accounts\nin a single day.\n52. Based on my review of information provided by MGH, I have learned that the\nTarget Accounts held a combined total of approximately $305,196,589.12 as of on or about\nOctober 6, 2022, as reflected in the table below (the “Account Balances Table”):\nTarget Account Account Number Balance\nTarget Account-1 MBI10103-0000 $12,887,977.68\nTarget Account-2 MBI10133-0000 $10,312,965.97\n40\n\nTarget Account Account Number Balance\nTarget Account-3 MBI10137-0000 $3,196,001.32\nTarget Account-4 MBI10138-0000 $277,000,000.00\nTarget Account-5 MBI10139-0000 $356,460.30\nTarget Account-6 MBI10171-0000 $1,211,105.79\nTarget Account-7 MBI10172-0000 $52,078.06\nTarget Account-8 MBI10183-0000 $180,000.00\nTotal $305,196,589.12\n53. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, my review of court filings and evidence obtained pursuant to\nsubpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my conversations with others, I have\nlearned the following, among other things:\nTarget Account-1\na. On or about May 5, 2021, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of G Club Operations LLC (the “Target\nAccount-1 Application”). The Target Account-1 Application described G Club’s business as, in\nsubstance and in part, “holding the securities of (or other equity interests in) companies and\nenterprises.”\nb. Alex Hadjicharalambous (“Hadjicharalambous”), the Financial Controller\nfor G Club, is an authorized signer on Target Account-1. See Ex. A at ¶ 41(a).\nc. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-1 had an\naccount balance of $12,887,977.68 as of October 6, 2022.\nd. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-1; for\nexample:\n41\n\ni. The initial deposit of funds into Target Account-1 consisted of an\napproximately $4 million transfer of Investment Scheme Funds from a G Club account held at\nMedici Bank.\nii. Between on or about August 23, 2021 and November 19, 2021,\napproximately $74 million of the aforementioned Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from\nthe G Club MSSB Accounts to Target Account-1.\niii. On or about December 24, 2021, approximately $10 million of the\nInvestment Scheme Funds was transferred from a Silvergate bank account ending in -7739, held\nin the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (identified as “Target Account-1” in the\nSeptember 17 Affidavit, see Ex. A) to Target Account-1.\nTarget Account-2\ne. On or about November 11, 2021, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.\n(the “Target Account-2 Application”). The Target Account-2 Application reflected that Himalaya\nClearing did not plan to engage in digital currency activity.\nf. JE is an authorized signer on Target Account-2 and is listed as the ultimate\nbeneficial owner and 100% shareholder of Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.\ng. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-2 had an\naccount balance of $10,312,965.97 as of October 6, 2022.\nh. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-2; for\nexample:\ni. Between on or about November 29, 2021 and December 6, 2021,\napproximately $100 million of the Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from bank accounts\n42\n\nat Metropolitan Commercial Bank and Reserve Trust into Target Account-2. See September 17\nAffidavit at ¶¶ 56(b)(i), 59(g)(iii)(3).\nii. On or about December 2, 2021, approximately $50 million of the\naforementioned Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-1 into Target\nAccount-2.\nTarget Account-3\ni. On or about December 6, 2021, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Hamilton Capital Holdings Ltd. (the\n“Target Account-3 Application”). The Target Account-3 Application described Hamilton Capital\nHoldings Ltd.’s business as, in substance and in part, “[c]onsultancy services company offering\nback office support.” The Target Account-3 Application described the source of assets used to\nfund Target Account-3 as “loan proceed(s).”\nj. JE is an authorized signer on Target Account-3 and is listed as the ultimate\nbeneficial owner and 100% shareholder of Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd.\nk. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-3 had an\naccount balance of $3,196,001.32 as of October 6, 2022.\nl. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-3 via\ninternal Mercantile Bank transfers from Target Account-2 and Target Account-6. Specifically:\ni. Between approximately on or about December 7, 2021 and August\n5, 2022, approximately $42 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target\nAccount-2 into Target Account-3.\nii. Between approximately on or about August 10, 2022 and September\n16, 2022, approximately $8 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target\nAccount-6 into Target Account-3.\n43\n\nTarget Account-4\nm. On or about December 2, 2021, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.\n(the “Target Account-4 Application”). The Target Account-4 Application described the nature of\nHimalaya International Reserves Ltd.’s business as “investment management.” While the\napplication information relates to “Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.,” in the Acknowledgment\nsection of the application, the legal entity name was (apparently inaccurately) entered as Himalaya\nInvestment Reserves Ltd.\nn. JE is an authorized signer on Target Account-4 and is listed as the CEO,\nultimate beneficial owner, and 100% shareholder of Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.\no. Based on my review of email communications, dated between on or about\nFebruary 17, 2022 and March 3, 2022, among Mercantile Bank’s Deputy Chief Compliance\nOfficer (“MB Employee-1”) and Hamilton’s General Counsel, Georgette Adonis-Roberts, relating\nto the opening of certain of the Target Accounts, I have learned that Hamilton made the following\nrepresentations to Mercantile Bank, among others:\ni. Himalaya Reserves is “the Himalaya Dollar Issuer.”\nii. Himalaya Reserves has “[n]o direct customers.”\niii. The stated purpose of Target Account-4 is “[t]o maintain the\nreserves of the proceeds of the Himalaya Dollar.”\niv. The anticipated Target Account-4 activity would consist of\n“hold[ing] the proceeds of Himalaya Dollar redemptions.”\nv. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-4\nhad an account balance of $277,000,000.00 as of October 6, 2022.\n44\n\np. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-4; for\nexample:\ni. Between on or about March 25, 2022 and on or about August 5,\n2022, approximately $115 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from an FV Bank\naccount held in the name of Himalaya Clearing (identified as “Target Account-4” in the September\n20 Affidavit, see Ex. C) into Target Account-4.\nii. On or about May 16, 2022, an additional approximately $150\nmillion in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-2 (i.e., Himalaya\nClearing) into Target Account-4.\niii. On or about June 27, 2022, an additional approximately $10 million\nin Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from an FV Bank account held in the name of\nHimalaya Reserves (identified as “Target Account-3” in the September 20 Affidavit, see Ex. C)\ninto Target Account-4. While the Mercantile Bank records reflect that the transfer originated at\nFV Bank, the originator bank account number is listed as “*6891,” which I understand to refer to\nthe pooled MCB account held FBO FV Bank. See Ex. A at ¶¶ 2(k), 62(e); see also Ex. C at ¶ 18(b).\nTarget Account-5\nq. On or about December 2, 2021, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Himalaya Financial Group Ltd. (the\n“Target Account-5 Application”). The Target Account-5 Application described the nature of\nHimalaya Financial’s business as “managing investments.”\nr. Based on my review of email communications, dated between on or about\nFebruary 17, 2022 and March 3, 2022, among MB Employee-1 and Hamilton employees\n(including CFO Ehsan Masud and General Counsel Georgette Adonis-Roberts) relating to the\n45\n\nopening of certain of the Target Accounts, I have learned that Hamilton employees made the\nfollowing representations to Mercantile Bank, among others:\ni. Himalaya Financial is the “Himalaya Coin Issuer.”\nii. Himalaya Financial “does not have direct customers as the coins are\nlisted on the Himalaya Exchange as a broker.”\niii. The anticipated Target Account-5 activity would consist of\n“transactions from HICL [i.e., Himalaya Clearing] to realize profits and payments for\ninvestments.”\ns. JE is an authorized signer on Target Account-5 and is listed as the CEO,\nultimate beneficial owner, and 100% shareholder of Himalaya Financial Group Ltd.\nt. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-5 had an\naccount balance of $356,460.30 as of October 6, 2022.\nu. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-5; for\nexample:\ni. On or about March 25, 2022, approximately $10 million in\nInvestment Scheme Funds was transferred from an FV Bank account held in the name of Himalaya\nClearing (identified as “Target Account-4” in the September 20 Affidavit, see Ex. C) into Target\nAccount-5.\nii. On or about March 30, 2022, an additional approximately $10\nmillion in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the same FV Bank account into Target\nAccount-5.\niii. On or about April 15, 2022, approximately $20 million in\nInvestment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-2 (i.e., the Mercantile Bank\nHimalaya Clearing account) into Target Account-5.\n46\n\nTarget Account-6\nv. On or about April 19, 2022, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Hamilton Investment Management\nLimited (the “Target Account-6 Application”). The Target Account-6 Application described the\nnature of Hamilton Investment Management Limited’s business as “consulting” and described the\nsource of assets used to fund Target Account-6 as “loan proceed(s).”\nw. JE is an authorized signer on Target Account-6 and is listed as the\nPresident, ultimate beneficial owner, and 100% shareholder of Hamilton Investment Management\nLimited.\nx. Based on my review of email communications, dated on or about April 22,\n2022, among MB Employee-1 and Gentjana Hysi, the CFO of Hamilton Investment Management\nLimited (the “Hamilton CFO”) relating to the opening of Target Account-6, I have learned the\nfollowing, in substance and in part:\ni. MB Employee-1 identified inconsistencies between the stated\nnature of Hamilton Investment Management Limited’s business as provided in the Target\nAccount-6 Application (“Professional Organization offering Consulting Services”), and the stated\nnature of Hamilton’s business as reflected in: (a) the UK Government’s registrar of companies\n(“Financial Intermediation”); and (b) the company’s website (“investment management platform\nspecializing in Private Equity and Digital Asset Management.”). In response, the Hamilton CFO\nwrote the following:\nTotally understand your confusion, the website that you see relates to Hamilton\nInvestment Management Limited (B.V.I.) not the UK entity. To answer your\nquestion, HIM Limited (UK) is not regulated and does not handle customer funds,\nonly provides consulting services to third parties and some of its affiliated\ncompanies. Our IT team is working to resolve the website issue and confusion.\nOnce completed we’ll share with you the link.\n47\n\nii. MB Employee-1 requested loan documentation relating to the “loan\nproceed” source of funds for Target Account-6. In response, the Hamilton CFO emailed MB\nEmployee-1 a loan agreement (the “HIML Loan Agreement”) and wrote, in substance and in part:\n“HIML has provided a loan facility to one of its affiliates . . . and is expected the borrower will\nmake regular payments to reduce the loan balance.”\ny. Based on my participation in this Investigation and my review of documents\nand records, including the HIML Loan Agreement, I am aware of the following, among other\nthings:\ni. The HIML Loan Agreement is dated July 7, 2020.\nii. Hamilton Investment Management Limited is listed as the “Lender,”\nand Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd. is listed as the “Borrower.”\niii. The registered office address listed for both Lender and Borrower is\nthe same address in London, England.\niv. Pursuant to the terms of the HIML Loan Agreement, the Lender\nagreed to lend the Borrower up to approximately $25 million to apply “towards the costs\nincurred . . . whilst identifying and advising on potential corporate investment opportunities\nglobally for the Lender” and to cover “operating, fixed and recurring costs.”\nv. JE signed the HIML Loan Agreement on behalf of Hamilton Capital\nHolding Ltd. (i.e., the Borrower).\nz. As described above, JE is the 100% owner of both Hamilton Capital\nHolding Ltd. (see supra at ¶ 52(h)) and Hamilton Investment Management Limited. See supra at\n¶ 52(s).\naa. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-6 had an\naccount balance of $1,211,105.79 as of October 6, 2022.\n48\n\nbb. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-6; for\nexample:\ni. On or about July 13, 2022, approximately $8 million of Investment\nScheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-3 (i.e., the Hamilton Capital Holding\naccount) into Target Account-6. The description of the transfer was “HCH Loan Repayment.”\nii. On or about August 10, 2022, approximately $4 million of\nInvestment Fraud Funds was transferred from Target Account-6 back into Target Account-3\n(i.e., the Hamilton Capital Holding account). The description of the transfer was: “HIM will\nloan/transfer $4M to HCH account.”\niii. On or about September 16, 2022, an additional approximately $4\nmillion of Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-6 back into Target\nAccount-3 (i.e., the Hamilton Capital Holding account). The description of the transfer was:\n“Loan facility.”\ncc. Based on my participation in this Investigation and my training and\nexperience, and as described above, I believe the transfer of $8 million into Target Account-6\n(which is a JE-controlled account) from Target Account-3 (which is a JE-controlled account) as\na purported loan repayment, and the subsequent transfer of $8 million from Target Account-6\nback into Target Account-3 as a purported loan, reflects the laundering of funds through the use\nof layering of Investment Scheme Funds in a manner consistent with concealment of the nature,\nsource, or origin of the funds.\nTarget Account-7\ndd. On or about April 27, 2022, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of G Fashion International Limited (the\n“Target Account-7 Application”). The Target Account-7 Application described the nature of G\n49\n\nFashion International Limited’s business as “Equity Holding Company.” The stated purpose of\nTarget Account-7 was “[c]urrent relationship with other affiliates.” The company email address\nprovided in the Target Account-7 Application for the General Counsel of G Fashion (the “G\nFashion GC”) was a particular “@hchktech.com” email address. See Ex. A at ¶¶ 41, 59(f).\nee. Based on my review of email communications, dated between on or about\nApril 7, 2022 and June 8, 2022, among MB Employee-1, MGH Employee-2, the G Fashion GC,\nand Hadjicharalambous, among others, relating to the opening of Target Account-7, I have\nlearned the following, in substance and in part:\ni. Hadjicharalambous (who is listed as the Financial Controller of G\nClub, see supra at ¶ 52(b)) introduced MGH Employee-2 to the G Fashion GC by email on or\nabout April 7, 2022, and asked for MGH Employee-2’s assistance in “fast track[ing]” the opening\nof an account for “G FASHION INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, a BVI entity.” In the email,\nHadjicharalambous stated, in substance and in part, that G Fashion “need[s] an account opened\nASAP.”\nii. In an email to MB Employee-1, the G Fashion GC described G\nFashion as “a high-end fashion company established in 2021 which solely operates through its e-\ncommerce website. The company is headquartered in NYC and has clients all over the world.\nFurther, the company’s products are exclusively manufactured in Italy due to the high-end and\npristine reputation of Italian manufacturers in the fashion industry. The company’s vision is to\nbecome a high-end fashion brand and compete head-to-head with the biggest in the industry.”\niii. On or about May 5, 2022, Hadjicharalambous emailed MGH\nEmployee-2 and MB Employee-1, among others, to advise that Hadjicharalambous would “be\nhandling the account moving forward from a financial perspective very similarly to how I manage\nthe GCLUB BVI account.”\n50\n\niv. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-7\nhad an account balance of $52,078.06 as of October 6, 2022.\nff. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account 7 via four\ninternal Mercantile Bank transfers from Target Account-2 (i.e., the Himalaya Clearing account),\ntotaling approximately $3.35 million between on or about May 5, 2022 and August 19, 2022. The\ndescriptions for two of the four incoming transfers reference, in substance and in part, “HDO\nRedemption.”\nTarget Account-8\ngg. On or about August 30, 2022, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd\n(the “Target Account-8 Application”). The Target Account-8 Application described the nature of\nHimalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd’s business as “Outsourced Customer Service Center and\nCompliance Consulting.” The stated purpose of opening Target Account-8 was as follows: “We\nwould like to receive service fees from our clients in USD and then send them in AUD to our\nAustralian bank account. Unfortunately, our Australian bank does not provide FX conversion and\ncan only receive AUD.”\nhh. JE is listed as the ultimate beneficial owner and 100% shareholder (via his\nwholly-owned entity, Major Lead International Ltd.) of Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd.\nii. Based on my review of email communications, dated between on or about\nAugust 8, 2022 and August 31, 2022, among MB Employee-1, MGH Employee-2, and Masud\n(i.e., Hamilton’s CFO), among others, relating to the opening of Target Account-8, I have learned\nthe following, in substance and in part:\ni. On or about August 24, 2022, Masud sent an email to MB\nEmployee-1, MGH Employee-2, and others with information about an entity called Himalaya\n51\n\nCurrency Clearing, which Masud described, in substance and in part, as “an important entity within\nthe Group, as it is one of the few which holds regulatory licenses.” In the email, Masud requested\nthat Mercantile Bank set up a bank account for Himalaya Currency Clearing “ASAP please.”\nii. In subsequent email communications on or about August 29, 2022,\nHeeseup Shin, Hamilton’s Head of Legal and Compliance, Australia (“Shin”), advised MB\nEmployee-1 and others, in substance and in part, that “William Je is the ultimate beneficiary/\nindividual shareholder (100%) of Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd (Australia).”\niii. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-8\nhad an account balance of $180,000.00 as of October 6, 2022.\njj. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-8 via an\ninternal Mercantile Bank transfer from Target Account-2 (i.e., the Himalaya Clearing account),\non or about September 13, 2022, totaling approximately $180,000.\nIII.Request for Non-Disclosure and Sealing\n54. The nature and scope of this ongoing criminal investigation—including the\nidentities of Target Subjects of the Investigation—is not publicly known. As described herein, the\naffidavits supporting the Prior Seizure Warrants were filed under seal and remain under seal.\nPremature public disclosure of this affidavit or the requested warrant could alert potential criminal\ntargets that they are under investigation, causing them to destroy evidence, flee from prosecution,\nor otherwise seriously jeopardize the investigation. Specifically, as set forth above, the targets of\nthis investigation appear to have the financial means that would facilitate their flight from\nprosecution, and have traveled internationally in the past to jurisdictions where extradition to the\nUnited States for purposes of prosecution is unlikely or impossible.\n52\n\n55. For these reasons, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted\nherewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise, except that the Government\nbe permitted without further order of this Court to provide copies of the warrant and affidavit as\nneed be to personnel assisting it in the investigation and prosecution of this matter, and to disclose\nthose materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any\nprosecutions related to this matter.\nIV.Conclusion\n56. Based on the information set forth in the September 17 Affidavit, the G Fashion\nAffidavit, the September 20 Affidavit, and the foregoing, I submit that there is probable cause to\nbelieve that funds held in the Target Property are subject to forfeiture as proceeds of violations of\n18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud) and, and/or as property involved in violations of 18 U.S.C.\n§§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and 1956(h) (money laundering and conspiracy to commit\nmoney laundering).\n53\n\n57. Accordingly, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(b), I respectfully request that the Court\nissue a warrant authorizing the seizure of the Target Property.\n_____________________________________\nANTHONY ALECCI\nSpecial Agent\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nSworn to me through the transmission of this\nAffidavit by reliable electronic means, pursuant to\nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(d)(3) and 4.1, this\n__ day of October, 2022\n_____________________________________\nTHE HONORABLE STEWART D. AARON\nUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n54","body_zh":null,"key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":14363,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-07-28 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-07-28","updated_at":"2026-07-06 20:56:39"}