{"id":"court_sdny_716_5","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":716,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2025-07-28","title":"SDNY ECF 716","summary_zh":"联邦调查局没收令状支持宣誓书 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #716（2025年7月28日）。FBI 特别探员 Anthony Alecci 陈述宣誓证言，支持对涉及 G Club、Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. 及其他关联实体所属的多个银行账户的没收，声称这些账户涉及电汇欺诈和洗钱违法所得。","summary_en":"FBI affidavit in support of seizure warrant — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #716 (filed July 28, 2025). FBI Special Agent Anthony Alecci submits affidavit supporting seizure of bank accounts held by entities including G Club and Himalaya International Clearing Ltd., alleging the accounts contain proceeds of wire fraud and money laundering.","body_en":"Exhibit E\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n22 MAG 8279\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\nTO BE FILED UNDER SEAL\n-v.-\nAffidavit in Support of Seizure\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile Warrant\nBank International account MBI10103-0000,\nheld by G Club International Ltd. (“Target Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 984\nAccount-1”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10133-0000,\nheld by Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.\n(“Target Account-2”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10137-0000,\nheld by Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd. (“Target\nAccount-3”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10138-0000,\nheld by Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.\n(“Target Account-4”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10139-0000,\nheld by Himalaya International Financial Group\nLtd. (“Target Account-5”), and all funds\ntraceable thereto, including accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10171-0000,\nheld by Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.\n(“Target Account-6”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest;\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10172-0000,\nheld by G Fashion International Limited\n\n(“Target Account-7”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest; and\nAll monies and funds contained in Mercantile\nBank International account MBI10183-0000,\nheld by Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd.\n(“Target Account-8”), and all funds traceable\nthereto, including accrued interest (collectively,\nthe “Target Property”).\nDefendants-in-rem.\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK) ss.:\nAnthony Alecci, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, being duly sworn,\ndeposes and says:\nI. Introduction\n1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI” or\n“Investigating Agency”). I have been a Special Agent with the FBI since in or about August 2020.\nSince in or about September 2021, I have been assigned to the FBI’s Complex Financial Crimes\nsquad. During my time with the FBI, I have participated in investigations of securities and wire\nfraud schemes, bank fraud, and money laundering, and have, among other things, conducted or\nparticipated in debriefings of witnesses, reviews of financial records, and the execution of search\nwarrants. In particular, I have participated in the execution of search warrants involving physical\npremises, electronic devices, and other electronic evidence.\n2. This affidavit is submitted in support of the United States of America’s Application\nfor the issuance of a seizure warrant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 and 984, for:\na. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10103-0000, held by G Club International Ltd. (“Target Account-1”), and all funds traceable\n2\n\nthereto, including accrued interest;\nb. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10133-0000, held by Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. (“Target Account-2”), and all\nfunds traceable thereto, including accrued interest;\nc. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10137-0000, held by Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd. (“Target Account-3”), and all funds\ntraceable thereto, including accrued interest;\nd. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10138-0000, held by Himalaya International Reserves Ltd. (“Target Account-4”), and all\nfunds traceable thereto, including accrued interest;\ne. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10139-0000, held by Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd. (“Target Account-5”),\nand all funds traceable thereto, including accrued interest;\nf. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10171-0000, held by Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. (“Target Account-6”), and all\nfunds traceable thereto, including accrued interest;\ng. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10172-0000, held by G Fashion International Limited (“Target Account-7”), and all funds\ntraceable thereto, including accrued interest; and\nh. All monies and funds contained in Mercantile Bank International account\nMBI10183-0000, held by Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd. (“Target Account-8,” together\nwith Target Account-1 through -7, the “Target Accounts”), and all funds traceable thereto,\nincluding accrued interest (collectively, the “Target Property”).\n3. The Target Property constitutes the proceeds of violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343\n3\n\n(wire fraud) and 1956 (money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering) (together,\nthe “Target Offenses”), as described below.\n4. This affidavit is based on, among other sources of information: (i) my personal\nknowledge; (ii) information provided by personnel at the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission\n(“SEC”) participating in a parallel investigation; (iii) my review of publicly available promotional\nmaterials relating to, among other ventures, “G Club” and the “Himalaya Exchange;” (iv) my\nreview of the publicly available websites for GTV Media Group, Inc. (“GTV”), the Himalaya\nExchange, and “G Club,” and materials available on those websites; (v) open-source research that\nI have conducted on the Internet; (vi) my review of digital videos posted on www.gnews.org\n(“GNews”) by GTV Media Group, Inc. and its employees and agents; (vii) my participation in\nvarious witness interviews; (viii) my review of electronic evidence obtained pursuant to\nsubpoenas, orders issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) for non-content information, and\njudicially authorized search warrants; (ix) the review and analysis of various bank account records,\nincluding financial records obtained from financial institutions pursuant to subpoenas and other\nrequests, conducted by myself and financial analysts at the FBI and SEC; (x) my review of\ndocuments provided by counsel for, among other entities, G Club, HCHK Technologies Inc.,\nHamilton Investment Management Ltd., and Major Lead International ROM (the parent entity of\nthe “Himalaya Exchange”); (xi) my conversations with other law enforcement officers; and\n(xi) my training and experience concerning the commission of financial crimes. Because this\naffidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause, it does not\ninclude all the facts that I have learned during the course of my investigation. Where dates, figures,\nand calculations are set forth herein, they are approximate. Where the contents of documents and\nthe actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported herein, they are reported in\nsubstance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.\n4\n\n5. As set forth herein, there is probable cause to believe that the Target Property is\nsubject to seizure and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A), (C) & (D) and 18 U.S.C.\n§981(b) as property involved in violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and/or the proceeds of\nviolations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, or property traceable thereto. In summary, the evidence reveals a\nseries of fraudulent investment schemes that pertain to several interrelated companies and their\naffiliated entities, including GTV Media Group Inc. (“GTV”), G Fashion (“G Fashion”), the\nHimalaya Farm Alliance (the “Farms”), the Himalaya Exchange (“Himalaya”), G Club Operations\nLLC (“G Club”), Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. (“Hamilton”), ACA Capital Group Ltd.\n(“ACA Capital”), and Crane Advisory Group LLC (“Crane”). As set forth in more detail below,\nthe leaders of the fraudulent investment schemes are Miles Guo, a/k/a “Guo Wengui,” a/k/a “Miles\nKwok” (“GUO”) and William Je, a/k/a Je Kin Ming (“JE”).\n6. Analysts at the FBI and SEC and I have traced the flow of certain fraud proceeds\nfrom victims of the investment schemes to the Target Property.\nII. Statutory Basis for Forfeiture\n7. The statutory provisions pursuant to which the Target Property is subject to civil\nseizure and forfeiture are as follows:\nMoney Laundering Offenses\n8. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(A), subjects to civil forfeiture:\nAny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in\nviolation of section 1956, 1957 or 1960 of this title, or any property traceable to such\nproperty.\n9. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) provides that any person who:\nknowing that the property involved in a financial transaction\ninvolves the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts\nor attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact\ninvolves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity –\n5\n\n(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in\npart—\n(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the\nsource, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds\nof specified unlawful activity [shall be guilty of a\ncrime.]\n10. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) provides that any person who:\ntransports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit,\nor transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the\nUnited States to or through a place outside the United States or to a\nplace in the United States from or through a place outside the\nUnited States—\n(B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds involved in\nthe transportation, transmission, or transfer represent\nthe proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that\nsuch transportation, transmission, or transfer is designed in whole or\nin part—\n(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source,\nthe ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified\nunlawful activity [shall be guilty of a crime.]\n11. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) further provides that “[a]ny person who conspires to commit\nany offense defined in [Section 1956] shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for\nthe offense the commission of which was the object of the conspiracy.”\nWire Fraud Offenses\n12. For purposes of Section 1956, “specified unlawful activity,” defined in 18 U.S.C.\n§ 1956(c)(7), includes, among other things, violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. See 18 U.S.C.\n§§ 1956(c)(7) and 1961(1).\n13. Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), subjects to civil forfeiture any\nproperty, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation\nof . . . any offense constituting ‘specified unlawful activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of\nthis title), or a conspiracy to commit such offense.”\n6\n\nSeizure Warrants\n14. The Court is empowered by 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) to issue a seizure warrant for any\nproperty subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) & (C). Section 981(b)(2)\nprovides that such a seizure may be made “pursuant to a warrant obtained in the same manner as\nprovided for a search warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” In addition, Section\n981(b)(3) provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure\n41(a), a seizure warrant may be issued pursuant to Section 981(b) by a judicial officer in any\ndistrict in which a forfeiture action against the property may be filed under Title 28, United States\nCode, Section 1355(b). Under Section 1355(b)(1)(A), a forfeiture action or proceeding may be\nbrought in the district in which any of the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred.\nAs set forth below, the offenses underlying the requested seizure warrant included acts or\nomissions occurring in the Southern District of New York.\n15. With respect to fungible property, including cash and funds deposited in a financial\ninstitution, 18 U.S.C. § 984 provides, in relevant part, that:\n(a)(1) In any forfeiture action in rem in which the subject property is cash, monetary\ninstruments in bearer form, funds deposited in an account in a financial institution . . . , or\nprecious metals:\n(A) it shall not be necessary for the Government to identify the specific property\ninvolved in the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture; and\n(B) it shall not be a defense that the property involved in such an offense has\nbeen removed and replaced by identical property.\n(2) Except as provided in subsection (b), any identical property found in the same place\nor account as the property involved in the offense that is the basis for the forfeiture shall\nbe subject to forfeiture under this section.\n(b) No action pursuant to this section to forfeit property not traceable directly to the\noffense that is the basis for the forfeiture may be commenced more than 1 year from the\ndate of the offense.\n7\n\nIII. Probable Cause\nA. Probable Cause Regarding Commission of the Subject Offenses\nThe Prior Seizure Warrants\n16. On or about September 17, 2022, I submitted (under seal) an affidavit in support of\nseizure warrants for funds held in 11 bank accounts, including all funds in one Metropolitan\nCommercial Bank (“MCB”) account, held For Benefit Of FV Bank, and all funds in nine Silvergate\nBank (“Silvergate”) accounts, held by William JE in the names of Hamilton Opportunity Fund\nSPC or Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. (the “September 17 Affidavit1”). The September\n17 Affidavit is incorporated herein as Exhibit A. On or about September 18, 2022, the Honorable\nStewart D. Aaron, United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of New York, issued\nseizure warrants for those 11 accounts, including a warrant to Silvergate for the nine Silvergate\naccounts (“Silvergate Warrant-1”) and a warrant to MCB for the one MCB account held For\nBenefit Of FV Bank (the “MCB Warrant”).\n17. Also on or about September 17, 2022, I submitted (under seal) an affidavit in\nsupport of a seizure warrant for approximately one U.S. Bank account, held in the name of G\nFashion (the “G Fashion Affidavit”). The G Fashion Affidavit is incorporated herein as Exhibit\nB. On or about September 18, 2022, Judge Aaron issued a seizure warrant for that U.S. Bank\naccount (the “U.S. Bank Warrant”).\n18. On or about September 20, 2022, I submitted (under seal) an affidavit in support of\nseizure warrants for four additional bank accounts, specifically, one Silvergate account, held in the\nname of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC, and three FV Bank accounts, held in the names of\nHimalaya International Financial Group, Ltd., Himalaya International Reserves, Ltd., and\n1 The September 17 Affidavit also supported the seizure of up to $16 million contained in a\nManufacturers & Traders Trust Co. held by GETTR USA, Inc.\n8\n\nHimalaya International Clearing, Ltd. (the “September 20 Affidavit.”) The September 20\nAffidavit is incorporated herein as Exhibit C. On or about September 20, 2022, Judge Aaron\nissued seizure warrants for (a) that Silvergate account (“Silvergate Warrant-2”), and (b) those three\nFV Bank accounts (the “FV Warrant,” together with Silvergate Warrant-1, Silvergate Warrant-2,\nand the U.S. Bank Warrant, the “Prior Seizure Warrants”).\nOverview of the Fraudulent Investment Schemes\n19. Since in or around May 2020, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern\nDistrict of New York (“SDNY”) and the FBI, among other law enforcement agencies, have been\ninvestigating a series of interrelated fraudulent investment schemes that pertain to several\ncompanies that are owned or operated by, or otherwise affiliated with, GUO, JE, and their\nassociates (collectively, the “Investment Schemes”). To date, the investigation (“Investigation”)\nhas revealed that the Investment Schemes involve the solicitation and subsequent investment\nand/or misappropriation of hundreds of millions of dollars. GUO and JE are leaders of the\nInvestment Schemes.\n20. The Investment Schemes are conducted through various, interrelated investment\nofferings, all of which exhibit features that are consistent with fraud. For example, investors are\npromised unrealistic, outsized returns on their investments; investors are induced to invest on the\nbasis of numerous misrepresentations; a large portion of the investment money is misappropriated;\nand with respect to the sale of digital asset securities, those currencies have never been tradable on\na public exchange, despite representations that they would be.\n21. Certain of the interrelated Investment Schemes are historical, while others are\nongoing. Specifically:\na. The GTV stock offering and the G Coin offering (collectively, the\n“Unregistered Stock Offerings”) operated between in or about April 2020 and in or about July\n9\n\n2020. As a result of the Unregistered Stock Offerings, the proceeds of which were commingled,\ncompanies affiliated with GUO, JE, and others (the “Target Subjects”) collectively raised at least\napproximately $487 million from more than 5,000 investors, including individuals in the United\nStates. The Unregistered Stock Offerings are described in greater detail in the September 17\nAffidavit. See Ex. A at ¶¶ 20-29.\nb. Starting at least in or about July 2020, the leaders of the Investment\nSchemes began to pitch investors on a new set of investment opportunities, marketed as an\nopportunity to convert their existing investments in GTV into a “loan” to GTV (the “Convertible\nLoan Offering”). The Convertible Loan Offering was carried out by the Guo-backed Himalaya\nFarm Alliance, which consists of informal groups, or “Farms,” of Chinese expatriates located in\nvarious cities around the world. Between in or about August 2020 and March 2021, the U.S.-\nbased Farms raised approximately $148 million from the Convertible Loan Offering. The\nConvertible Loan Offering is described in greater detail in the September 17 Affidavit. See Ex. A\nat ¶¶ 30-34.\nc. Starting in or about October 2020, the leaders of the Investment Schemes\nbegan to pitch investors on a purported luxury, exclusive concierge service called G Club (the “G\nClub Membership Offering”). The G Club Website, viewable at http advertises\n“An Exclusive Membership to a First-Class Tomorrow.” G Club purportedly offers five\nmembership tiers, ranging from $10,000 to $50,000 annually. The annual fee for the desired\nmembership tier must be paid in full with the submission of the G Club membership application,\nand G Club reserves the right to reject any membership application within 30 days at its sole and\nabsolute discretion. According to the G Club Website, G Club memberships provide, among other\nthings, “access to a concierge customer service with Mandarin and English access and support”\nand “exclusive early access to [the] latest fashion collections, including special member pricing on\n10\n\npurchases, extended video blogging time and early access to select music.” The G Club\nMembership Offering is described in greater detail in the September 17 Affidavit. See Ex. A at\n¶¶ 35-41. G Club is an ongoing investment scheme.\nd. In or about 2021, JE founded and began to market a purported\ncryptocurrency exchange platform called the Himalaya Exchange, available at\nhttp Similar to the link between G-Coin / G-Dollar and the Unregistered\nStock Offerings, the purported cryptocurrencies Himalaya Coin (“HCO” or “HCN”) and Himalaya\nDollar (“HDO”) (together, the “Himalaya Assets”) were initially offered as purported companion\ndigital asset securities for investors in the Convertible Loan Program. When the Himalaya\nExchange Website was launched, prospective investors were told that they would be able to\nexchange and withdraw their Himalaya cryptocurrency as of June 2021. However, the initial coin\noffering (“ICO”) of the Himalaya Assets was delayed several times, with the ICO taking place on\nNovember 1, 2021. The Himalaya Exchange is described in greater detail in the September 17\nAffidavit, see Ex. A ¶¶ 42-47, and herein. See infra at ¶¶ 41-47. The Himalaya Exchange is an\nongoing investment scheme.\n22. As described in the September 17 Affidavit, JE and others have raised at least\napproximately $664 million between in or about September 2020 and the present through G Club\nand the Himalaya Exchange.\nBackground on GUO and JE\n23. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review of law\nenforcement reports, review of documents, records, videos that were posted on social media\nplatforms, and public source research that I have conducted on the Internet, as well as my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\n11\n\na. GUO is a purported billionaire and a Chinese national who allegedly fled\nChina for the United States in 2014, after learning that an associate had been arrested on corruption\ncharges.\nb. GUO is involved with various entities relevant to the Investment Schemes,\nincluding GTV, G News, G Music LLC (“G Music”), G Club, G Fashion (“G Fashion”), and\nGETTR USA, Inc. (“Gettr”). GUO does not hold formal titles or positions at these entities.\nHowever, Guo publicly promotes these entities, including in videos he posts for his “followers”\non GTV, G News, and GETTR.2\nc. In or about 2018, GUO founded organizations named the Rule of Law\nFoundation (“ROLF”) and the Rule of Law Society (“ROLS”). Based on my review of publicly\navailable information, I have learned that the Rule of Law projects were underway by in or about\nDecember 2018.3 ROLF and ROLS are purportedly organizations dedicated to exposing and\ncombatting corruption in China by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”). At times, the board\nmembers for ROLF and/or ROLS have included Stephen K. Bannon (“Bannon”) and Kyle Bass\n(“Bass”). GUO does not hold a formal position at ROLF or ROLS; however, on the ROLS website,\nGUO is described as “the founder, a promoter and a spokesperson,” and a sponsor.\nd. JE, a close associate of GUO, has been described as a financier and\nentrepreneur. JE is involved with various entities relevant to the Investment Schemes, as described\nin greater detail below. Specifically:\n2 See, e.g., gnews.org/articles/992 and http\n3 See http\n(describing Guo and Bannon’s involvement in the “Rule of Law Fund”).\n12\n\ni. JE is the CEO of Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.\n(“Hamilton”), a purported global fund management company.4 Hamilton is headquartered in the\nBritish Virgin Islands and was incorporated on or about February 5, 2018. JE was formally\nappointed Director of Hamilton on or about March 20, 2019.\nii. JE is the Director of ACA Capital Group Ltd. (“ACA Capital”), a\npurported Hong Kong-based investment firm5 that was incorporated in the United Kingdom on or\nabout July 10, 2020.\ne. JE is listed as the founder and Chairman of the Himalaya Exchange, a\npurported cryptocurrency “ecosystem.” JE is the 100% beneficial owner of various entities that\noperate the Himalaya Exchange, including Major Lead International Ltd., Himalaya International\nClearing Ltd. (“Himalaya Clearing”), Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd. (“Himalaya\nFinancial”), and Himalaya International Reserves Ltd. (“Himalaya Reserves”).\nOverview of the Scheme to Launder Fraud Proceeds\n24. As described in greater detail herein and in the September 17 Affidavit, since at\nleast in or about 2020, GUO, JE, and others have operated the Investment Schemes, i.e., various\ninterrelated fraudulent investment schemes. The Investment Schemes involve entities affiliated\nwith GUO and/or JE, including GTV, G Fashion, G Club, HCHK Technologies, the Himalaya\nFarms, the Himalaya Exchange, Hamilton, and ACA Capital, among others.\n25. As described above, between in or about April 2020 and June 2020, GUO, JE, and\nothers fraudulently obtained more than approximately $635 million in purported investments\nthrough the Unregistered Stock Offerings and Convertible Loan Offering. See supra ¶ 21.\n4 See http (last visited October 11, 2022).\n5 See http (last visited October 11, 2022).\n13\n\nMoreover, records that I or others have reviewed in the course of the Investigation show that,\nbetween in or about November 2020 and June 2022, the G Club Membership Offering has\ngenerated more than approximately $221 million in purported G Club membership fees. As\ndescribed herein, records that I or others have reviewed in the court of the Investigation further\nshow that, between in or about April 2021and October 2022, the Himalaya Exchange scheme has\ngenerated more than approximately $500 million in purported cryptocurrency investments.\n26. As detailed below and in the September 17 Affidavit, the evidence demonstrates\nthat between at least approximately April 2020 and the present, GUO, JE, and others have been\nengaged in a scheme to launder fraud proceeds from the Investment Schemes (which include the\nUnregistered Stock Offerings, the Convertible Loan Offering, the G Club Membership Offering,\nand the Himalaya Exchange) (collectively, the “Investment Scheme Funds”).\n27. As part of the money laundering scheme, JE and others have conducted financial\ntransactions totaling more than approximately $1.5 billion, as described in greater detail below and\nin the September 17 Affidavit.\n28. As a further part of the money laundering scheme, and as set forth below, see infra\n¶¶ 51-53, at least approximately $626 million of the Investment Scheme Funds were remitted,\neither directly or indirectly, to the Target Accounts between on or about July 2, 2021 and October\n6, 2022.\nMercantile Bank and the Target Accounts\n29. The Target Accounts are all held at Mercantile Bank.\na. Mercantile Bank is a payments and digital asset custody bank based in\nPuerto Rico.6 Mercantile Bank was incorporated on or about July 16, 2018.\n6 http\n14\n\nb. Counsel for Mercantile Global Holdings, Inc. (“MGH”)—the parent\nholding company of Mercantile Bank—has described Mercantile Bank as “a startup bank.”\nSpecifically, because Mercantile Bank does not have direct access to the Federal Reserve payment\nsystem via a Federal Reserve master account, it has sought to partner with other bank(s) that have\nsuch an account (i.e., correspondent banking partners).7\n30. Based on my review of materials provided by MGH in response to a grand jury\nsubpoena, I have learned that six of the eight Target Accounts are held in the name of companies\nthat are wholly owned by JE and are associated with the operations of the Himalaya Exchange or\nits managing entity, Hamilton. The other two Target Accounts are held in the name of G Fashion\nand G Club (i.e., two of the other ongoing Investment Schemes).\n31. As described in the September 17 Affidavit and herein, JE and others have layered\nInvestment Scheme Funds into and through the Target Accounts at Mercantile Bank, among other\nfinancial institutions, to conceal the nature and source of the funds. See Ex. A at ¶ 56(b).\n32. Between on or about October 7, 2022 and October 11, 2022, Mercantile Bank sent\nletters to representatives of the U.S. Attorney’s Office advising, in substance and in part, that if\nthe Government “publicly seizes the funds in” the Target Accounts, “there is a high probability\nthat [Mercantile Bank] will have no choice but to permanently cease operations in the near future.”\n8\n7 For example, in or about January 2021, Mercantile Bank announced that it had reached a\ndefinitive agreement for a reverse merger with a publicly traded company, in which Mercantile\nBank would itself become a publicly traded entity. See, e.g., http\nrelease/mercantile-bank-international-corp.-announces-reverse-merger-transaction-with-crucial\n(last visited October 13, 2022). However, that reverse merger fell through.\n8 As described in paragraph 38 below, Hamilton had sought to purchase Mercantile Bank just prior\nto the execution of the Prior Seizure Warrants. The funds apparently earmarked for the purchase\nwere seized pursuant to the Prior Seizure Warrants, and the acquisition fell through.\n15\n\nExecution of the Prior Seizure Warrants and the Target Subjects’ Liquidation Efforts\n33. On or about September 20, 2022, the FBI served Silvergate Warrant-1 and the U.S.\nBank Warrant, among others.9 On or about September 21, 2022, the FBI served Silvergate\nWarrant-2 and the FV Warrant.\n34. As described in greater detail herein, since the execution of the Prior Seizure\nWarrants and the Government’s seizure of more than approximately $320 million in Investment\nScheme Funds contained in Hamilton and/or Himalaya Exchange accounts at Silvergate Bank and\nFV Bank pursuant to those warrants, see supra at ¶¶ 16 and 18, JE and other Target Subjects have\nattempted to move more than approximately $58 million in Investment Scheme Funds held at\nMercantile Bank.\nJE’s Attempted Transfer of Funds on September 22, 2022 and September 23, 2022\n35. In response to a grand jury subpoena issued on or about September 23, 2022, MGH\nprovided certain documents and information to the Government, including account balances for\nall Mercantile Bank accounts held in the names of various entities affiliated with William JE,\nincluding G Club, G Fashion, Himalaya (in the name of Himalaya Clearing, Himalaya Financial,\nHimalaya Reserves, and Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd.) and Hamilton (in the name of\nHamilton Capital Holding and Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.), as well as certain\ncommunications among MGH, JE, and others.\n36. Based on my review of documents and information provided by MGH, and as\ndescribed in greater detail below, I have learned that between on or about September 22, 2022 and\nSeptember 23, 2022 (i.e., within days of the Government’s seizure), JE attempted to move funds\n9 As described in the September 20 Affidavit, see Ex. B at ¶ 19, in light of clarification regarding\nwhere certain funds were held, the FBI did not serve the MCB Warrant and instead obtained a new\nwarrant (i.e., the FV Warrant).\n16\n\nout of Target Account-2 at Mercantile Bank (i.e., the Himalaya International Clearing account),\npurportedly to liquidate approximately $46 million of what JE claimed to be his own Himalaya\nExchange digital assets.\n37. Based on my review of account balance summaries, account monthly statements,\nand additional documents provided by MGH, including notes of calls between employees of MGH,\nMercantile Bank, and Hamilton, my review of documents provided by Silvergate, open-source\nresearch, and my conversations with representatives of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern\nDistrict of New York, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. Before execution of the Prior Search Warrants, Hamilton had engaged in\nnegotiations to purchase Mercantile Bank. Specifically, between in or about December 2021 and\nin or about September 2022, Hamilton conducted due diligence on Mercantile Bank and prepared\nto acquire Mercantile Bank. On or about September 16, 2022, MGH and the Hamilton Opportunity\nFund entered into a stock purchase agreement, pursuant to which Hamilton agreed to pay\n$49,695,000 to acquire Mercantile Bank.\nb. That same day, on or about September 16, 2022, Hamilton initiated an\noutgoing wire of approximately $49.695 million in Investment Scheme Funds from one of its\nSilvergate accounts to MGH (“Wire-1”). The beneficiary was listed as “Mercantile Global\nHolding Inc.,” and the stated purpose of the wire transfer request was: “Bank Purchase Hamilton\nMA Fund SP.” Those funds—which appear to have been related to Hamilton’s attempted purchase\nof Mercantile Bank—were never transferred to Mercantile Bank, and instead were seized pursuant\nto Silvergate Warrant-1.\nc. According to MGH, MGH employees had multiple conversations with\nHamilton employees about the status of Wire-1. During a FaceTime audio call initiated at\napproximately 7:55 p.m. GMT / 2:55 p.m. ET on or about September 22, 2022 between Priya Patel\n17\n\n(“Patel”) (Internal Litigation and Regulatory Counsel for Hamilton Capital Holding) and MGH’s\nGlobal Head of Legal and Compliance (“MGH Employee-1”), Patel advised MGH Employee-1,\nin sum and substance, that Hamilton’s funds at Silvergate—including Wire-1—had been seized,\nand that Hamilton may need to transfer money out of its accounts at Mercantile Bank.\nd. Approximately 18 minutes later, at approximately 8:13 p.m. GMT / 3:13\np.m. ET on or about September 22, 2022, JE called the CEO of MGH (“MGH Employee-2”) via\nWhatsApp. During the call, JE stated, in substance and in part, that Hamilton needed to transfer\napproximately $30 million10 for an unnamed “VIP” client and for G Club to a bank in Abu Dhabi,\nUAE. In response, MGH Employee-2 advised JE, in substance and in part, that MGH would\nrequire all such transfer requests to be submitted in writing. Based on information provided by\nMGH, I have learned that JE did not disclose identifying information about the “VIP” client to\nMGH Employee-2 during that call.\ne. Hours later, at approximately 11:30 p.m. GMT / 6:30 p.m. ET on or about\nSeptember 22, 2022, Ehsan Masud (Hamilton’s CFO) sent MGH Employee-2 a WhatsApp\nmessage that read, in substance and in part: “We are likely to have a large VIP corporate\nredemption tomorrow of approx. $50m USD[.] Happy to jump on a call tomorrow to discuss.\nMany thanks”. Minutes later, MGH Employee-2 responded and advised Masud, in sum and\nsubstance, that a transfer of that size would “require detailed documentation and [ ] take more than\na day to process.” In subsequent WhatsApp communications between Masud and MGH\nEmployee-2 over approximately the next hour, Masud expressed urgency regarding the timing of\n10 As reflected herein and in MGH records, the stated amount of the outgoing transfer(s) appears\nto have ranged from approximately $30 million to approximately $50 million over the course of\ncommunications among JE, Masud, and MGH Employee-2. Ultimately, the written outgoing\nwire requests reflect requested transfers totaling approximately $46 million between two\ntransactions. See ¶ 37(j)(v).\n18\n\nthe outgoing transfer; for example, when MGH Employee-2 advised Masud that MGH Employee-\n2 had scheduled a meeting among MGH compliance personnel and Hamilton employees for on or\nabout September 24, 2022, Masud wrote, in substance and in part: “But this would mean we will\nmiss USD cut off for tomorrow” and “we need to get the ball rolling tomorrow soonest”.\nf. At approximately 3:01 a.m. GMT on or about September 23, 2022 / 10:01\np.m. ET on or about September 22, 2022, JE sent MGH Employee-2 WhatsApp messages that\nread, in substance and in part: “Hi, as discussed, my company would like to redeem some money\nso that we could continue to support the operation of your bank and other entities.”\ng. MGH Employee-2 responded to JE at approximately 9:38 a.m. GMT / 4:38\na.m. ET on or about September 23, 2022, advising JE, in sum and substance, that MGH Employee-\n2 would be speaking to Masud at approximately 11:00 a.m. and asking JE whether Masud was\naware of “what is happening?” In response, JE wrote, in substance and in part: “[Masud] only\nknows FV bank is frozen. He did not know the fund nor the transaction issues”, and “[w]e are just\ndoing normal redemption of a client.”\nh. During a WhatsApp call between MGH Employee-2 and Masud at\napproximately 11:01 a.m. GMT / 6:01 a.m. ET on or about September 23, 2022, Masud again\nexpressed urgency regarding the timing of the outgoing $50 million wire request for the “VIP”\nclient (whose identity had not yet been disclosed to MGH). According to MGH, MGH Employee-\n2 insisted on learning the identity of the client requesting the transfer; in response, Masud advised,\nin sum and substance, that the client was ACA Capital (i.e., JE’s Hong Kong-based investment\nfirm, see ¶ 23(d)(ii)), and that the wire would be sent to a particular bank in Abu Dhabi, UAE.\nMasud also advised that Hamilton had a plan to move most of its assets out of the United States.\n19\n\ni. In WhatsApp messages between JE and MGH Employee-2 hours later on\nor about September 23, 2022, JE wrote, in substance and in part: “I could send you all documents\nto show that I own ACA”, and “[w]e need the execution today or it is meaningless.”\nj. In WhatsApp messages starting at approximately 5:03 p.m. GMT / 12:03\np.m. ET on or about September 23, 2022, JE wrote the following to MGH Employee-2, in\nsubstance and in part: “Sent you all the ACA stuff”, “We are just redeeming”, and “Masud does\nnot know about ACA.” Based on my review of documents provided by MGH, I have learned that\nJE sent several documents to MGH that day, including, among others, the following:\ni. A letter on Himalaya Exchange letterhead from Masud (who is\nidentified in the letter as CFO of the Himalaya Exchange) addressed to “ACA Capital Group\nLimited,” purportedly dated October 29, 2021, reflecting a purported “Reservation of Himalaya\nCoin” and containing the following, in sum and substance:\nThe Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd., through the Himalaya Exchange,\nhas reserved Forty Million Himalaya Coin (HCN) for you at the price of $0.10 U.S.\nDollars per coin. As agreed, you can call on this Reservation as and when required.\nWe will credit your HCN on request, provided you have sufficient HDO position\nto cover the above mentioned HCN purchase.\nii. A “Himalaya Exchange OTC Transaction Form” on Himalaya\nExchange letterhead, addressed to “Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.,” purportedly reflecting\ntransaction execution details regarding the sale by “william.k.je@acacap.com” of approximately\n1,308,044.47 HCN at the price of $24.464 per HCN, for a total of 32 million HDO. The form\nreflected an effective transaction date and time of 9:35 p.m. GMT on or about September 22, 2022,\nand was signed by JE on or about September 22, 2022.\niii. A second “Himalaya Exchange OTC Transaction Form” on\nHimalaya Exchange letterhead, addressed to “Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.,” purportedly\n20\n\nreflecting transaction execution details regarding the sale by “william.k.je@acacap.com” of\napproximately 572,269.46 HCN at the price of $24.464 per HCN, for a total of 14 million HDO.\nThe form reflected an effective transaction date and time of 9:35 p.m. GMT on or about September\n22, 2022 (i.e., the same minute as the transaction reflected above in ¶ 37(j)(ii)), and was signed by\nJE on or about September 22, 2022.\niv. A blurry screenshot on Himalaya Exchange letterhead reflecting\nwhat purports to be the Himalaya Exchange Website’s Order Book page, which screenshot was\npurportedly taken at approximately 9:35 p.m. on or about September 22, 2022, as shown below:\nv. A “Himalaya Exchange Redemption Request Form” on Himalaya\nExchange letterhead, reflecting the name “ACA Capital Group Limited” and the Himalaya\n21\n\nExchange Login Email Address “william.k.je@acacap.com,” authorizing the “redemption of my\nHimalaya Dollar to USD from my Himalaya Exchange account” in the amount of approximately\n46 million HDO, for a total outgoing transfer of approximately $46 million. The purported\nredemption request form, which was signed by JE on or about September 23, 2022, provided bank\naccount information for an account in the name of ACA Capital Group Limited at First Abu Dhabi\nBank in the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”).\nk. In a WhatsApp message from JE to MGH Employee-2 at approximately\n9:12 p.m. GMT / 4:12 p.m. ET on or about Friday, September 23, 2022, JE wrote the following to\nMGH Employee-2, in substance and in part: “pls let me know if you need further information.\nWe are redeeming and need to be done today. Otherwise, it is meaningless.” At approximately\n9:29 p.m. GMT / 4:29 p.m. ET, JE wrote to MGH Employee-2, in substance and in part: “We\ncould divide into 2 tranches,” and then, “On a call with the lawyer now.” Approximately 30\nminutes later, JE wrote to MGH Employee-2: “Hi, pls hold until Mon.” (i.e., September 26, 2022).\n38. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, and review of\ndocuments and records, and in light of the nature and circumstances of JE’s purported redemption\nrequests, for the following reasons, among others, I believe that JE was attempting to move\napproximately $46 million in Investment Scheme Funds to bank accounts beyond the reach of U.S.\nlaw enforcement:\na. Based on the timing of the attempted outgoing transfers—shortly after the\nGovernment’s seizure of approximately $320 million in other JE-controlled accounts held at other\nbanks—I believe that JE attempted to move the funds offshore in anticipation of potential future\nGovernment seizure of funds (such as the requested seizure of the Target Accounts).\nb. As described above, the transfers were requested from Target Accounts at\nMercantile Bank to JE-controlled accounts at a bank in Abu Dhabi, UAE. Based on my training\n22\n\nand experience, I am aware that UAE authorities are unlikely to provide timely responses to formal\nrequests for information from U.S. authorities, and that UAE authorities are unlikely to enforce\nU.S. seizure warrants or forfeiture orders for funds held in the UAE.\nc. Based on my review of the nature and circumstances of the attempted\ntransfers, including the repeated urgency regarding the timing of those transfers (e.g., JE’s repeated\nstatements that the transfers would be “meaningless” if not completed quickly) as contrasted with\nthe claim that the redemption was merely the “normal redemption of a client,” as well as the fact\nthat Hamilton did not initially disclose that JE was, in fact, the client (through his ownership of\nACA Capital), I believe that Hamilton provided false or misleading information to Mercantile\nBank for the purpose of convincing Mercantile Bank to release the approximately $46 million\nquickly.\nThe Attempted Account Closing on October 7, 2022\n39. Based on my review of written communications from G Club’s attorneys to\nMercantile Bank, I have learned that, following Hamilton’s unsuccessful attempt to move\napproximately $46 million in Investment Fund Schemes out of Mercantile Bank, on or about\nOctober 7, 2022, G Club (through its attorneys) attempted to close Target Account-1 (i.e., the G\nClub Mercantile Bank account). G Club did not provide instructions regarding where the account\nbalance of approximately $12 million should be transferred once Target Account-1 was closed.\nPending Litigation Regarding the Prior Seizure Warrants\n40. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, my review of\nrecords and documents, including court documents, and my conversations with representatives of\nthe U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, I have learned the following,\namong other things:\n23\n\na. On or about September 29, 2022, following the execution of the Prior\nSeizure Warrants, an external counsel for Major Lead International Ltd. (i.e., the parent entity of\nthe Himalaya Exchange), Hamilton Investment Management Ltd., and Hamilton Opportunity\nFund SPC (“Williams & Connolly”) filed a letter under seal in the U.S. District Court for the\nSouthern District of New York (“Letter-1”), requesting an “emergency pre-motion conference in\nadvance of a forthcoming motion under Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 41(g) that will seek the immediate\nrelease of certain accounts and the return of funds seized from” certain accounts that were subject\nto the Prior Seizure Warrants. Letter-1 included the following representations, among others:\ni. JE, the UBO of the Himalaya Exchange, “directly or indirectly holds\nHimalaya Dollars and Coins, but those holdings represent a minority of the issued currencies. . . .\nMost currency is owned by the other nearly 18,000 [Himalaya] Exchange customers.”\nii. The freezing of the Himalaya Exchange operating accounts at FV\nBank “placed the Himalaya Exchange and associated customer holdings in serious jeopardy” and,\n“[w]hen [Himalaya] Exchange participants learn that they can no longer readily redeem their\nstable-coin Himalaya Dollars for cash, that almost certainly will lead to a massive, artificial\ndevaluation of the market-traded Himalaya Coins.” (emphasis added).\nb. On or about October 3, 2022, Williams & Connolly filed a motion for return\nof property under seal (the “Motion”) on behalf of Major Lead International Ltd. (“the “Himalaya\nGroup”), Hamilton Investment Management Ltd., and Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC\n(collectively, the “Movants”). 22 Misc. 275 (VSB), Dkts. 8 through 8-18 (under seal).\nc. The Motion included the following representations, among others:\niii. The Himalaya Group, through various subsidiaries, “owns and\noperates an innovative cryptocurrency exchange known as the Himalaya Exchange.”\n24\n\niv. The Himalaya Exchange “has more than 18,000 customers and a\nmarket capitalization of $25 billion.”\nv. The Himalaya Exchange “facilitates the buying and selling of two\ntypes of digital assets”—the Himalaya Dollar (or “HDO”), which the Movants described as “a\n‘stable coin’ token that is fixed to the U.S. dollar and backed by reserves consisting of dollar-for-\ndollar cash or cash-equivalent assets”; and the Himalaya Coin (or “HCN”), which the Movants\ndescribed as “a trading cryptocurrency valued by supply and demand.” (emphasis added).\nvi. “Customers can participate in the [Himalaya] Exchange by buying\nHimalaya Dollars, using that currency to buy and sell Himalaya Coin, and ultimately redeeming\nHimalaya Dollars back into U.S. dollars.” (emphasis added).\nvii. The Himalaya Exchange’s “pioneering model” combines “pure\ncryptocurrency trading with ‘stable coin’ backed by traditional currency.”\nviii. JE, the UBO of the Himalaya Exchange, “is also a customer of the\n[Himalaya] Exchange and owns a substantial amount of Himalaya Dollars and Himalaya Coin\nthrough other entities” and “will be negatively impacted” by the seizures, like other Himalaya\nExchange customers.\nix. JE “is prepared to consider reasonable restrictions on his ability to\nredeem Himalaya Dollars,” to the extent the Government has concerns about the UBO’s (i.e., JE’s)\ntreatment of his substantial holdings.\nx. Two of the Himalaya Group’s primary operating accounts at FV\nBank are the “Clearing Account,” which is used to process Himalaya Exchange customer deposits\nand redemption, and the “Reserve Account,” which holds customer funds.\nxi. When a customer “purchases Himalaya Dollars,” the customer’s\ncash payment is deposited into the Clearing Account, and the customer receives “a credit” for an\n25\n\nequivalent number of Himalaya Dollars. Mot. at 3. Funds spent to “purchase[] Himalaya Dollars”\nare “often sent to the Reserve Account, where they back the Himalaya Dollars.”\nxii. The customer can use Himalaya Dollar “credits” to “buy and sell\nHimalaya Coins, the [Himalaya] Exchange’s market-traded cryptocurrency.”\nxiii. When customers “seek to redeem their Himalaya Dollars back to\nhard currency,” customer money in the “Reserve Account travels back to the Clearing Account to\nmeet the redemption request.”\nxiv. The freezing of the FV Bank accounts—including the Clearing and\nReserve Accounts—has resulted in the Himalaya Exchange’s inability to process 142 pending\ncustomer redemption requests (as of the date the Motion was filed), despite the Himalaya\nExchange having a “back-up processing bank, Mercantile Bank.”\nxv. The Himalaya Exchange’s alleged inability to process redemption\nrequests would “precipitate the loss of confidence” of customers, “resulting in billions of dollars\nin market losses.”\nThe Himalaya Exchange Scheme\n41. The Himalaya Exchange is marketed and described as a cryptocurrency11 exchange.\nAs detailed herein, however—and contrary to claims made in Letter-1 and the Motion, described\nabove—the evidence demonstrates that the Himalaya Exchange does not appear to be a functional\ncryptocurrency exchange; that HDO does not appear to reside on the blockchain (contrary to\nrepresentations by the Himalaya Exchange, see infra ¶ 46(f)); and that the “customers” or\n11 Based on my training and experience, I know that “cryptocurrency” describes digital currency\nin which transactions are verified, and records maintained, by a decentralized system using\ncryptography (generally referred to as the “blockchain”), rather than by a centralized authority\nsuch as a bank.\n26\n\n“members” of the Himalaya Exchange appear, in fact, to be investors in (and victims of) the\ninterrelated Investment Schemes—including the Himalaya Exchange, as described more fully in\nthe September 17 Affidavit. See, e.g., Ex. A at ¶¶ 50-52, 54-55.\n42. Statements by the Himalaya Exchange and the Movants—including the Himalaya\nDollar Whitepaper12 (“HDO Whitepaper”) and the Himalaya Coin Whitepaper13 (“HCN\nWhitepaper,” together, the “Whitepapers”), information posted on the Himalaya Exchange\nwebsite, JE’s publicly-reported statements, Letter-1, and the Motion—are inconsistent regarding,\namong other things: (a) what “Himalaya Dollars” and “Himalaya Coins” actually are; (b) the\nliquidity of Himalaya Dollars and Himalaya Coins; (c) how the purported “market price” of\nHimalaya Coin is determined; and (d) whether the purported Himalaya cryptocurrencies exist on\nthe blockchain.\nHimalaya Dollar and Himalaya Coin\n43. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, open-source\nresearch that I have conducted on the Internet, my review of documents and evidence obtained\npursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, my review of court filings, and\nmy conversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. The Himalaya Exchange markets itself as a cryptocurrency exchange, or\n“true crypto ecosystem.” In the Whitepapers, the “Himalaya Exchange” is defined as a “crypto\nasset exchange on which members can buy, sell and trade their crypto assets.” HDO Whitepaper\n12 Available for download at http\n2.amazonaws.com/hedocs/hdo_whitepaper_eng_v6e.pdf (last visited October 12, 2022).\n13 Available for download at http\n2.amazonaws.com/hedocs/hcn_whitepaper_eng_v7e.pdf (last visited October 12, 2022).\n27\n\nat 3 (emphasis added). An image from the Himalaya Exchange Website, viewable at\nhttp is shown below:\nb. Himalaya Dollar is described in the Motion papers and the HDO\nWhitepaper as a “‘stable coin’ token” or “a new stablecoin pegged to the U.S. Dollar.” See, e.g.,\nHDO Whitepaper at 7. JE is reported to have described HDO as “the only stable coin in the world\nto maintain” a 1-to-1 stability with the U.S. dollar following the global stablecoin crash in or about\nMay 2022. See Ex. A at 34 n.9 (emphasis added).\nc. Himalaya Coin is described in the Motion papers and the HCN Whitepaper\nas a “trading cryptocurrency valued by supply and demand,” a “market-traded cryptocurrency,” or\nthe “official coin issued” by the Himalaya Exchange. See, e.g., HCN Whitepaper at 4.\n28\n\nd. Elsewhere, however, it is stated that the Himalaya Exchange operates not\nthrough the use of cryptocurrency, but rather through the use of “Credits,” as reflected in the\nStructural Considerations portion of the HDO Whitepaper shown below:\nSee HDO Whitepaper at 10 (emphasis added); HCN Whitepaper at 11; see also Ex. A at ¶ 44(d).\nThat is, as reflected in the language above, the Himalaya Exchange operates through the use of\n“credits” (not cryptocurrency), and those credits (a) can only be used within the Himalaya\nEcosystem, and (b) do not carry any right to require their exchange for fiat currency or crypto-\nassets. Moreover, while a Himalaya Exchange member may request to exchange that member’s\nHDO credits for an equivalent payment in U.S. dollars, the Himalaya Exchange has the\n“discretion” to deny any such request.\ne. The January 2022 version of the HDO Whitepaper contains approximately\n135 references to “credits.” See generally HDO Whitepaper. By contrast, the HDO Whitepaper\ncontains only six references to “stablecoin” or “stablecoins.” See id.\n29\n\nf. The January 2022 version of the HCN Whitepaper contains approximately\n131 references to “credits.” See generally HCN Whitepaper. By contrast, the HCN Whitepaper\ncontains only 15 references to “token” or “tokens.” See id.\ng. Images from the Himalaya Exchange Website, viewable at\nhttp are shown below:\nThe above descriptions of Himalaya Dollar and Himalaya Coin on the Himalaya Exchange\nWebsite make no mention of “credits.”\nh. I submit that the foregoing establishes that, contrary to claims that HDO and\nHCN are cryptocurrencies, HDO and HCN are not in fact cryptocurrencies. Rather, individuals\nwho purportedly “buy” HDO and use their HDO to “buy” HCN have simply sent money to bank\naccounts controlled by JE and others in exchange for what are described as “credits.”\n30\n\nValuation of Himalaya Coin\n44. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, open-source\nresearch that I have conducted on the Internet, my review of documents and evidence obtained\npursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, my review of court filings, and\nmy conversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. The Movants have represented that Himalaya Coin is “valued by supply and\ndemand.”\nb. In a declaration submitted by Ehsan Masud, the CFO of Hamilton, in\nsupport of the Motion, Masud represented that the market capitalization of HCN exceeded $25\nbillion as of October 2, 2022.\nc. The purported historical price of HCN is reflected in data on the Himalaya\nExchange Website. See, e.g., Ex. A at ¶¶ 44(c), 45(d).\nd. Contrary to representations that the price of HCN is determined by market\nsupply and demand, the HCN Whitepaper states the following regarding Subsequent Issuances\n(i.e., issuances of HCN after the initial coin offering, or ICO), in substance and in part:\n31\n\nHCN Whitepaper at 16. That is, as reflected in the language above, the Issuer has “sole and\nabsolute discretion” to decide that the Issue Price, as calculated by the methodology described\nabove, “does not constitute a fair market price,” in which case the Issuer is “entitled to make such\nadjustments in the calculation of the Issue Price as it deems necessary in order to achieve an Issue\nPrice which it deems to be a fair market price.” Id. (emphasis added).\ne. The HCN Whitepaper also states the following: “Members should note that\nthe value of HCN Credits is independent from the value of any other assets, including HCN\ntokens.” Id.\nf. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, I\nsubmit that the foregoing reflects that—contrary to representations that the price of “HCN” (and\ntherefore the value of HCN Credits)is determined by market supply and demand—the Himalaya\n32\n\nExchange has absolute discretion to set a “price” for the issuance of future HCN without any regard\nfor the purported market value of any purportedly issued HCN.\nLiquidity of Himalaya Assets\n45. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, open-source\nresearch that I have conducted on the Internet, my review of documents and evidence obtained\npursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, my review of court filings, and\nmy conversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. The Movants have made certain statements regarding the liquidity of the\nHimalaya Dollar. For example, Masud represented that Himalaya Dollar can be redeemed back\nto fiat US dollar “at any time.” See also supra at ¶ 40(a)(ii).\nb. By contrast, as described above, the HDO Whitepaper states that a\nHimalaya Exchange member’s request to exchange Himalaya Dollar Credits into U.S. Dollars is\n“at the discretion of the Himalaya Exchange.” See supra at ¶ 43(d).\nc. The HDO Whitepaper further states, in substance and in part: “While it is\nintended that the Himalaya Exchange should provide good levels of liquidity, the maintenance of\nthe Reserve is intended to provide an additional layer of potential liquidity as a barrier to\nunexpected market events. It provides the Issuer [i.e., Himalaya Financial] with the discretionary\nability to take action to support liquidity where it deems necessary.” HDO Whitepaper at 12. And:\n“The Issuer is not obliged to provide liquidity support and the Himalaya Exchange is not obliged\nto agree to any request from a Member to exchange HDO Credits for U.S. Dollars and such actions\nare at the sole discretion of the Issuer and the Himalaya Exchange respectively. Members do not\nhave any direct or indirect claim on the Issuer or the Reserve.” Id.\nd. In his declaration in support of the Motion, Masud has also made certain\nstatements regarding the liquidity of Himalaya Coin, including, among others, that “[a]ll HCN are\n33\n\nheld by customers of the Exchange,” and that “[c]ustomers use HDO to purchase HCN and\ncustomers sell HCN to obtain HDO, which can be redeemed back to fiat US dollar.”\ne. By contrast, the HCN Whitepaper states the following, in substance and in\npart:\nMembers are advised that neither crypto assets or fiat currency may be held by\nMembers within the Himalaya Ecosystem, and the Himalaya Ecosystem does not\nprovide . . . any type of custody or other arrangements to facilitate this. The\nHimalaya Exchange intends to hold in its own name and for its own account, crypto\nassets which it may elect to use at the request of a Member to complete an exchange\nof a Member’s Credits for corresponding crypto assets. . . . where such request\nfrom a Member is approved by the Himalaya Exchange.\nHCN Whitepaper at 11 (emphasis added).\nf. Despite representations by the Movants about the purported liquidity of\nHDO and HCN, evidence gathered during this Investigation (including the language from the\nWhitepapers cited above) demonstrates that Himalaya Exchange customers’ ability to convert\nHimalaya Assets into fiat currency is limited and lies within the sole discretion of the Himalaya\nExchange. Based on my review of bank records and subpoena returns, I have learned that some\nHimalaya Exchange customers have purportedly executed successful “redemptions” (i.e., received\nback fiat currency from bank accounts controlled by Hamilton and/or Himalaya entities).\nHowever, based on my participation in this Investigation, training, and experience, it appears that\nthe Himalaya Exchange granted certain purported “redemption” requests and returned Investments\nScheme Funds to certain members’ bank accounts in an effort to perpetuate the fraud; that is, to\ncreate the appearance that Himalaya Exchange cryptocurrencies are liquid.\nAnalysis of the Blockchain\n46. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\n34\n\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. The Movants have represented that “the Himalaya Dollar is backed by\nreserves consisting of dollar-for-dollar cash or cash-equivalent assets.”\nb. The Movants stated that an outside accountant “[p]eriodically . . . examines\nthe books and records of the Exchange and provides reports confirming this dollar for dollar\nbacking.” In connection with the Motion, the Movants submitted an Independent Accountant’s\nReport, dated August 10, 2022 (the “Accountant’s Report”), prepared by a particular accounting\nfirm headquartered in California (the “Accounting Firm”).14 The Accountant’s Report is attached\nhereto as Exhibit D.\nc. The Accountant’s Report indicates that Himalaya Dollars “are\ncryptographic digital tokens residing on the Ethereum blockchain at the smart contract address\n[0x7C197afcd8D36884309ed731424985E3ed17F018]” (the “Blockchain Address”), and further\nreferences “collateralized HDO Credits, which are HDO-denominated liabilities issued and\npurchased for dollars on Himalaya Ecosystem Platforms.” Ex. D. at 1.\nd. The Himalaya Dollar Bank & Funds Holding Report, which is a report that\nwas provided by the Himalaya International Reserve to the Accounting Firm, states, among other\nthings, that approximately 401,047,298.15 HDO Tokens “have been minted on the Ethereum\n14 As reflected in Exhibit D, the Accountant’s Report is approximately one page long, with an\nattachment of the Himalaya Dollar Bank & Funds Holding Report, which was signed by Himalaya\nInternational Reserve CEO Jesse Brown on or about August 10, 2022. See Ex. D. On or about\nOctober 10, 2022, the FBI received a voluminous subpoena response from the Accounting Firm\nconsisting of, among other things, what appears to be documentation supporting the Accountant’s\nReport. The FBI’s review of that subpoena response is ongoing.\n35\n\nblockchain at the smart contract address” (i.e., the Blockchain Address) as of on or about July 31,\n2022. See Ex. D at 2 n.1.\ne. Based on my conversations with others, including a member of the FBI’s\nvirtual currency response team, I have learned the following, in substance and in part:\ni. Neither the Whitepapers nor the Himalaya Exchange Website\nprovide the smart contract address15 for the Himalaya cryptocurrencies. Without a smart contract\naddress, it is difficult for potential or current investors to conduct due diligence regarding the\nHimalaya cryptocurrencies.\nii. Based on the FBI’s review of the Blockchain Address (i.e. that\nMovants provided to the Government in the Accountant’s Report (which does not appear to be\npublicly available) on an open-source block explorer (the “Explorer”), it appears that the\nBlockchain Address first appeared on the Ethereum blockchain on or about March 16, 2021. As\ndescribed in the September 17 Affidavit, the Himalaya Exchange has been operating (pre-ICO)\nsince in or about April 2021. See Ex. A at ¶ 18(c).\nf. Based on the FBI’s review of the Blockchain Address on the Explorer, it\nappears that the Blockchain Address is affiliated with HDO. It further appears that there are there\napproximately 24 holders of HDO; that approximately 70 transactions appear on the Blockchain\nAddress between on or about March 16, 2021 and on or about October 14, 2022; and that market\ncapitalization is not tracked within the Explorer for HDO.16\n15 Based on my training and experience and my conversations with others, I am aware that a\ncontract address hosts a smart contract, which is a set of code stored on a blockchain that runs\nwhen predetermined conditions are met. I am further aware that a contract address could be\nresponsible for deploying a particular cryptocurrency (e.g., a token or coin) on a blockchain.\n16 By comparison, and as an example, I and others searched the smart contract address of a\nstablecoin called “Gemini Dollar” (the “Gemini Blockchain Address”) on the Explorer. See\n36\n\ng. Based on the foregoing, I submit that (i) the purported Himalaya Exchange\n“cryptocurrency” HDO does not, in fact, appear to reside within the Blockchain Address, and\n(ii) “HDO Tokens” have not, in fact, been minted on the Blockchain Address, contrary to the\nHimalaya Dollar Bank & Funds Holding Report. See Ex. D at 2 n.1.\n47. As described above, the Himalaya Exchange is marketed to investors as a\ncryptocurrency exchange where individuals can hold and trade cryptocurrency assets, including\nstablecoin and trading coins. In fact, as detailed above, the evidence demonstrates that members\nof the Himalaya Exchange do not hold, own, or control cryptocurrency or digital assets. Rather,\nHimalaya Exchange members who send money to bank accounts controlled by JE and others\n(including the Target Accounts) receive “credits,” which purportedly give them an option to buy\ncryptocurrency (in the form of HDO stablecoins or HCN trading coins). While members may\nbelieve they have effectively exercised that option and are in possession of cryptocurrency or\ndigital assets, the Himalaya Exchange is a closed cryptocurrency platform, and members (like the\npublic) do not have transparency into the purported market for HDO or HCN, beyond the data that\nis reflected on the Himalaya Exchange Website. Moreover, it is the Himalaya Exchange (and not\nmembers) that holds the money that members have paid for the purpose of “buying” HDO (i.e.,\nInvestment Scheme Funds), and the Himalaya Exchange holds those funds “in its own name and\nfor its own account.” See supra at ¶ 45(e).\nhttp (last visited October 13, 2022). Based on that search, I am aware that\nthat that there are approximately 9,927 holders of Gemini Dollar; that approximately 520,188\ntransactions were recorded on the Gemini Blockchain Address between its ICO in or about\nFebruary 2022 and approximately 9:17 p.m. on or about October 13, 2022; and that Gemini Dollar\nhas a current market capitalization of approximately $329 million.\n37\n\nB. Tracing of Fraudulent Proceeds to the Target Accounts\n48. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. Investors participate in the Investment Schemes by either wiring money\ndirectly to a bank account controlled or used by entities affiliated with GUO, JE, and others\n(including the Farms, G Club, or the Himalaya Exchange), or by wiring or otherwise transferring\nmoney to other entities at the direction of the Target Subjects, which funds are then transmitted to\nbank accounts ultimately controlled by JE and other Target Subjects. See Ex. A at ¶ 57(a).\nb. To date, I and analysts at the FBI and SEC have identified and attempted to\ntrace more than approximately $1.6 billion in Investment Scheme Fund transactions, a substantial\npart of which has been laundered through financial institutions located in at least four different\ncountries, including the United States, the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, and the UAE.\n49. As described in the September 17 Affidavit, prospective Investment Scheme\ninvestors were instructed to send funds intended as an investment in GTV, G Club, or the Himalaya\nExchange (for example) to certain bank accounts. See, e.g., Ex. A at ¶¶ 40(g), 57, 61-62.\na. Those Investment Scheme Funds were transferred into and among more\nthan at least 80 bank accounts being used by JE and others in ways that, based on my training and\nexperience, are indicative of money laundering. See Ex. A at ¶ 55.\nb. Specifically, the tracing of the funds reflects, among other things:\n(a)transfers of Investment Scheme Funds from U.S. bank accounts to bank accounts located\noverseas (including the UAE and the Bahamas) in high risk jurisdictions that are frequent havens\n38\n\nfor money laundering; (b) layering of Investment Scheme Funds through a series of entities and\nbank accounts, in some cases pursuant to purported loan agreements or other financial\narrangements, in a manner consistent with concealment of the nature, source, or origin of the funds;\n(c)investments in real estate or other business interests that have no apparent connection with the\nstated purposes of the businesses controlling the bank accounts; and (d) the transfer of Investment\nScheme Funds between multiple banks, as well as among multiple accounts within the same bank,\nin a single day. See Ex. A at ¶¶ 56-57.\nFraud Proceeds are Layered Through Various Banking Institutions\n50. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, open-source research that I have conducted on the Internet, my review\nof evidence obtained pursuant to subpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my\nconversations with others, I have learned the following, among other things:\na. Approximately $60 million of Investment Scheme Funds (including, in\nparticular, funds raised through the GTV Stock Offering and the Convertible Loan Offering) were\ntransferred into the Crane MSSB Accounts between in or about May 2021 and June 2021, after\nbeing layered through a series of entities at various different banks in a manner that, based on my\ntraining and experience, is indicative of money laundering. See Ex. A at ¶¶ 58(a), 61-62.\nb. The approximately $60 million in Investment Scheme Funds from the Crane\nMSSB Accounts was combined with approximately $49 million in other Investment Scheme\nFunds that had been transferred into the Crane MSSB Accounts from two Crane accounts at a\ndifferent bank, Capital One (together, the “Crane Capital One Accounts”), raising the total\ncombined balance in the Crane MSSB Accounts to approximately $109 million. Ex. A at\n¶ 58(a)(iii).\n39\n\nc. Approximately $79 million of those approximately $109 million in\nInvestment Scheme Funds in the Crane MSSB Accounts were then transferred to accounts at the\nsame bank (i.e., MSSB), but in the name of G Club (i.e., the G Club MSSB Accounts). The\napproximately $79 million was combined with approximately $79.7 million in other Investment\nScheme Funds that had been transferred into the G Club MSSB Accounts from individual G Club\nInvestors and from G Club bank accounts at Signature Bank, First Bank of Puerto Rico, and City\nNational Bank, raising the total combined balance of Investment Scheme Funds in the G Club\nMSSB Accounts to more than approximately $158 million.\nFraud Proceeds are Transferred to the Target Accounts at Mercantile Bank\n51. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into and among the Target Accounts\nin ways that, based on my training and experience, are indicative of money laundering.\nSpecifically, the tracing of the funds reflects, among other things: (a) transfers of Investment\nScheme Funds from U.S. bank accounts to bank accounts located overseas in high-risk\njurisdictions that are frequent havens for money laundering (including the Bahamas, Hong Kong,\nthe Cayman Islands, and the British Virgin Islands); (b) layering of Investment Scheme Funds\nthrough a series of entities and bank accounts, in some cases pursuant to purported loan agreements\nor other financial arrangements, in a manner consistent with concealment of the nature, source, or\norigin of the funds; and (c) the transfer of Investment Scheme Funds among the Target Accounts\nin a single day.\n52. Based on my review of information provided by MGH, I have learned that the\nTarget Accounts held a combined total of approximately $305,196,589.12 as of on or about\nOctober 6, 2022, as reflected in the table below (the “Account Balances Table”):\nTarget Account Account Number Balance\nTarget Account-1 MBI10103-0000 $12,887,977.68\nTarget Account-2 MBI10133-0000 $10,312,965.97\n40\n\nTarget Account Account Number Balance\nTarget Account-3 MBI10137-0000 $3,196,001.32\nTarget Account-4 MBI10138-0000 $277,000,000.00\nTarget Account-5 MBI10139-0000 $356,460.30\nTarget Account-6 MBI10171-0000 $1,211,105.79\nTarget Account-7 MBI10172-0000 $52,078.06\nTarget Account-8 MBI10183-0000 $180,000.00\nTotal $305,196,589.12\n53. Based on my participation in this Investigation, training, experience, review and\nanalysis of various bank account records and financial analyses performed by me and financial\nanalysts at the FBI and SEC, my review of court filings and evidence obtained pursuant to\nsubpoenas and judicially authorized search warrants, and my conversations with others, I have\nlearned the following, among other things:\nTarget Account-1\na. On or about May 5, 2021, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of G Club Operations LLC (the “Target\nAccount-1 Application”). The Target Account-1 Application described G Club’s business as, in\nsubstance and in part, “holding the securities of (or other equity interests in) companies and\nenterprises.”\nb. Alex Hadjicharalambous (“Hadjicharalambous”), the Financial Controller\nfor G Club, is an authorized signer on Target Account-1. See Ex. A at ¶ 41(a).\nc. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-1 had an\naccount balance of $12,887,977.68 as of October 6, 2022.\nd. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-1; for\nexample:\n41\n\ni. The initial deposit of funds into Target Account-1 consisted of an\napproximately $4 million transfer of Investment Scheme Funds from a G Club account held at\nMedici Bank.\nii. Between on or about August 23, 2021 and November 19, 2021,\napproximately $74 million of the aforementioned Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from\nthe G Club MSSB Accounts to Target Account-1.\niii. On or about December 24, 2021, approximately $10 million of the\nInvestment Scheme Funds was transferred from a Silvergate bank account ending in -7739, held\nin the name of Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (identified as “Target Account-1” in the\nSeptember 17 Affidavit, see Ex. A) to Target Account-1.\nTarget Account-2\ne. On or about November 11, 2021, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.\n(the “Target Account-2 Application”). The Target Account-2 Application reflected that Himalaya\nClearing did not plan to engage in digital currency activity.\nf. JE is an authorized signer on Target Account-2 and is listed as the ultimate\nbeneficial owner and 100% shareholder of Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.\ng. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-2 had an\naccount balance of $10,312,965.97 as of October 6, 2022.\nh. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-2; for\nexample:\ni. Between on or about November 29, 2021 and December 6, 2021,\napproximately $100 million of the Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from bank accounts\n42\n\nat Metropolitan Commercial Bank and Reserve Trust into Target Account-2. See September 17\nAffidavit at ¶¶ 56(b)(i), 59(g)(iii)(3).\nii. On or about December 2, 2021, approximately $50 million of the\naforementioned Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-1 into Target\nAccount-2.\nTarget Account-3\ni. On or about December 6, 2021, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Hamilton Capital Holdings Ltd. (the\n“Target Account-3 Application”). The Target Account-3 Application described Hamilton Capital\nHoldings Ltd.’s business as, in substance and in part, “[c]onsultancy services company offering\nback office support.” The Target Account-3 Application described the source of assets used to\nfund Target Account-3 as “loan proceed(s).”\nj. JE is an authorized signer on Target Account-3 and is listed as the ultimate\nbeneficial owner and 100% shareholder of Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd.\nk. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-3 had an\naccount balance of $3,196,001.32 as of October 6, 2022.\nl. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-3 via\ninternal Mercantile Bank transfers from Target Account-2 and Target Account-6. Specifically:\ni. Between approximately on or about December 7, 2021 and August\n5, 2022, approximately $42 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target\nAccount-2 into Target Account-3.\nii. Between approximately on or about August 10, 2022 and September\n16, 2022, approximately $8 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target\nAccount-6 into Target Account-3.\n43\n\nTarget Account-4\nm. On or about December 2, 2021, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.\n(the “Target Account-4 Application”). The Target Account-4 Application described the nature of\nHimalaya International Reserves Ltd.’s business as “investment management.” While the\napplication information relates to “Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.,” in the Acknowledgment\nsection of the application, the legal entity name was (apparently inaccurately) entered as Himalaya\nInvestment Reserves Ltd.\nn. JE is an authorized signer on Target Account-4 and is listed as the CEO,\nultimate beneficial owner, and 100% shareholder of Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.\no. Based on my review of email communications, dated between on or about\nFebruary 17, 2022 and March 3, 2022, among Mercantile Bank’s Deputy Chief Compliance\nOfficer (“MB Employee-1”) and Hamilton’s General Counsel, Georgette Adonis-Roberts, relating\nto the opening of certain of the Target Accounts, I have learned that Hamilton made the following\nrepresentations to Mercantile Bank, among others:\ni. Himalaya Reserves is “the Himalaya Dollar Issuer.”\nii. Himalaya Reserves has “[n]o direct customers.”\niii. The stated purpose of Target Account-4 is “[t]o maintain the\nreserves of the proceeds of the Himalaya Dollar.”\niv. The anticipated Target Account-4 activity would consist of\n“hold[ing] the proceeds of Himalaya Dollar redemptions.”\nv. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-4\nhad an account balance of $277,000,000.00 as of October 6, 2022.\n44\n\np. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-4; for\nexample:\ni. Between on or about March 25, 2022 and on or about August 5,\n2022, approximately $115 million in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from an FV Bank\naccount held in the name of Himalaya Clearing (identified as “Target Account-4” in the September\n20 Affidavit, see Ex. C) into Target Account-4.\nii. On or about May 16, 2022, an additional approximately $150\nmillion in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-2 (i.e., Himalaya\nClearing) into Target Account-4.\niii. On or about June 27, 2022, an additional approximately $10 million\nin Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from an FV Bank account held in the name of\nHimalaya Reserves (identified as “Target Account-3” in the September 20 Affidavit, see Ex. C)\ninto Target Account-4. While the Mercantile Bank records reflect that the transfer originated at\nFV Bank, the originator bank account number is listed as “*6891,” which I understand to refer to\nthe pooled MCB account held FBO FV Bank. See Ex. A at ¶¶ 2(k), 62(e); see also Ex. C at ¶ 18(b).\nTarget Account-5\nq. On or about December 2, 2021, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Himalaya Financial Group Ltd. (the\n“Target Account-5 Application”). The Target Account-5 Application described the nature of\nHimalaya Financial’s business as “managing investments.”\nr. Based on my review of email communications, dated between on or about\nFebruary 17, 2022 and March 3, 2022, among MB Employee-1 and Hamilton employees\n(including CFO Ehsan Masud and General Counsel Georgette Adonis-Roberts) relating to the\n45\n\nopening of certain of the Target Accounts, I have learned that Hamilton employees made the\nfollowing representations to Mercantile Bank, among others:\ni. Himalaya Financial is the “Himalaya Coin Issuer.”\nii. Himalaya Financial “does not have direct customers as the coins are\nlisted on the Himalaya Exchange as a broker.”\niii. The anticipated Target Account-5 activity would consist of\n“transactions from HICL [i.e., Himalaya Clearing] to realize profits and payments for\ninvestments.”\ns. JE is an authorized signer on Target Account-5 and is listed as the CEO,\nultimate beneficial owner, and 100% shareholder of Himalaya Financial Group Ltd.\nt. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-5 had an\naccount balance of $356,460.30 as of October 6, 2022.\nu. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-5; for\nexample:\ni. On or about March 25, 2022, approximately $10 million in\nInvestment Scheme Funds was transferred from an FV Bank account held in the name of Himalaya\nClearing (identified as “Target Account-4” in the September 20 Affidavit, see Ex. C) into Target\nAccount-5.\nii. On or about March 30, 2022, an additional approximately $10\nmillion in Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from the same FV Bank account into Target\nAccount-5.\niii. On or about April 15, 2022, approximately $20 million in\nInvestment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-2 (i.e., the Mercantile Bank\nHimalaya Clearing account) into Target Account-5.\n46\n\nTarget Account-6\nv. On or about April 19, 2022, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Hamilton Investment Management\nLimited (the “Target Account-6 Application”). The Target Account-6 Application described the\nnature of Hamilton Investment Management Limited’s business as “consulting” and described the\nsource of assets used to fund Target Account-6 as “loan proceed(s).”\nw. JE is an authorized signer on Target Account-6 and is listed as the\nPresident, ultimate beneficial owner, and 100% shareholder of Hamilton Investment Management\nLimited.\nx. Based on my review of email communications, dated on or about April 22,\n2022, among MB Employee-1 and Gentjana Hysi, the CFO of Hamilton Investment Management\nLimited (the “Hamilton CFO”) relating to the opening of Target Account-6, I have learned the\nfollowing, in substance and in part:\ni. MB Employee-1 identified inconsistencies between the stated\nnature of Hamilton Investment Management Limited’s business as provided in the Target\nAccount-6 Application (“Professional Organization offering Consulting Services”), and the stated\nnature of Hamilton’s business as reflected in: (a) the UK Government’s registrar of companies\n(“Financial Intermediation”); and (b) the company’s website (“investment management platform\nspecializing in Private Equity and Digital Asset Management.”). In response, the Hamilton CFO\nwrote the following:\nTotally understand your confusion, the website that you see relates to Hamilton\nInvestment Management Limited (B.V.I.) not the UK entity. To answer your\nquestion, HIM Limited (UK) is not regulated and does not handle customer funds,\nonly provides consulting services to third parties and some of its affiliated\ncompanies. Our IT team is working to resolve the website issue and confusion.\nOnce completed we’ll share with you the link.\n47\n\nii. MB Employee-1 requested loan documentation relating to the “loan\nproceed” source of funds for Target Account-6. In response, the Hamilton CFO emailed MB\nEmployee-1 a loan agreement (the “HIML Loan Agreement”) and wrote, in substance and in part:\n“HIML has provided a loan facility to one of its affiliates . . . and is expected the borrower will\nmake regular payments to reduce the loan balance.”\ny. Based on my participation in this Investigation and my review of documents\nand records, including the HIML Loan Agreement, I am aware of the following, among other\nthings:\ni. The HIML Loan Agreement is dated July 7, 2020.\nii. Hamilton Investment Management Limited is listed as the “Lender,”\nand Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd. is listed as the “Borrower.”\niii. The registered office address listed for both Lender and Borrower is\nthe same address in London, England.\niv. Pursuant to the terms of the HIML Loan Agreement, the Lender\nagreed to lend the Borrower up to approximately $25 million to apply “towards the costs\nincurred . . . whilst identifying and advising on potential corporate investment opportunities\nglobally for the Lender” and to cover “operating, fixed and recurring costs.”\nv. JE signed the HIML Loan Agreement on behalf of Hamilton Capital\nHolding Ltd. (i.e., the Borrower).\nz. As described above, JE is the 100% owner of both Hamilton Capital\nHolding Ltd. (see supra at ¶ 52(h)) and Hamilton Investment Management Limited. See supra at\n¶ 52(s).\naa. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-6 had an\naccount balance of $1,211,105.79 as of October 6, 2022.\n48\n\nbb. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-6; for\nexample:\ni. On or about July 13, 2022, approximately $8 million of Investment\nScheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-3 (i.e., the Hamilton Capital Holding\naccount) into Target Account-6. The description of the transfer was “HCH Loan Repayment.”\nii. On or about August 10, 2022, approximately $4 million of\nInvestment Fraud Funds was transferred from Target Account-6 back into Target Account-3\n(i.e., the Hamilton Capital Holding account). The description of the transfer was: “HIM will\nloan/transfer $4M to HCH account.”\niii. On or about September 16, 2022, an additional approximately $4\nmillion of Investment Scheme Funds was transferred from Target Account-6 back into Target\nAccount-3 (i.e., the Hamilton Capital Holding account). The description of the transfer was:\n“Loan facility.”\ncc. Based on my participation in this Investigation and my training and\nexperience, and as described above, I believe the transfer of $8 million into Target Account-6\n(which is a JE-controlled account) from Target Account-3 (which is a JE-controlled account) as\na purported loan repayment, and the subsequent transfer of $8 million from Target Account-6\nback into Target Account-3 as a purported loan, reflects the laundering of funds through the use\nof layering of Investment Scheme Funds in a manner consistent with concealment of the nature,\nsource, or origin of the funds.\nTarget Account-7\ndd. On or about April 27, 2022, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of G Fashion International Limited (the\n“Target Account-7 Application”). The Target Account-7 Application described the nature of G\n49\n\nFashion International Limited’s business as “Equity Holding Company.” The stated purpose of\nTarget Account-7 was “[c]urrent relationship with other affiliates.” The company email address\nprovided in the Target Account-7 Application for the General Counsel of G Fashion (the “G\nFashion GC”) was a particular “@hchktech.com” email address. See Ex. A at ¶¶ 41, 59(f).\nee. Based on my review of email communications, dated between on or about\nApril 7, 2022 and June 8, 2022, among MB Employee-1, MGH Employee-2, the G Fashion GC,\nand Hadjicharalambous, among others, relating to the opening of Target Account-7, I have\nlearned the following, in substance and in part:\ni. Hadjicharalambous (who is listed as the Financial Controller of G\nClub, see supra at ¶ 52(b)) introduced MGH Employee-2 to the G Fashion GC by email on or\nabout April 7, 2022, and asked for MGH Employee-2’s assistance in “fast track[ing]” the opening\nof an account for “G FASHION INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, a BVI entity.” In the email,\nHadjicharalambous stated, in substance and in part, that G Fashion “need[s] an account opened\nASAP.”\nii. In an email to MB Employee-1, the G Fashion GC described G\nFashion as “a high-end fashion company established in 2021 which solely operates through its e-\ncommerce website. The company is headquartered in NYC and has clients all over the world.\nFurther, the company’s products are exclusively manufactured in Italy due to the high-end and\npristine reputation of Italian manufacturers in the fashion industry. The company’s vision is to\nbecome a high-end fashion brand and compete head-to-head with the biggest in the industry.”\niii. On or about May 5, 2022, Hadjicharalambous emailed MGH\nEmployee-2 and MB Employee-1, among others, to advise that Hadjicharalambous would “be\nhandling the account moving forward from a financial perspective very similarly to how I manage\nthe GCLUB BVI account.”\n50\n\niv. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-7\nhad an account balance of $52,078.06 as of October 6, 2022.\nff. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account 7 via four\ninternal Mercantile Bank transfers from Target Account-2 (i.e., the Himalaya Clearing account),\ntotaling approximately $3.35 million between on or about May 5, 2022 and August 19, 2022. The\ndescriptions for two of the four incoming transfers reference, in substance and in part, “HDO\nRedemption.”\nTarget Account-8\ngg. On or about August 30, 2022, a business bank account application was\nsubmitted to Mercantile Bank for an account in the name of Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd\n(the “Target Account-8 Application”). The Target Account-8 Application described the nature of\nHimalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd’s business as “Outsourced Customer Service Center and\nCompliance Consulting.” The stated purpose of opening Target Account-8 was as follows: “We\nwould like to receive service fees from our clients in USD and then send them in AUD to our\nAustralian bank account. Unfortunately, our Australian bank does not provide FX conversion and\ncan only receive AUD.”\nhh. JE is listed as the ultimate beneficial owner and 100% shareholder (via his\nwholly-owned entity, Major Lead International Ltd.) of Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd.\nii. Based on my review of email communications, dated between on or about\nAugust 8, 2022 and August 31, 2022, among MB Employee-1, MGH Employee-2, and Masud\n(i.e., Hamilton’s CFO), among others, relating to the opening of Target Account-8, I have learned\nthe following, in substance and in part:\ni. On or about August 24, 2022, Masud sent an email to MB\nEmployee-1, MGH Employee-2, and others with information about an entity called Himalaya\n51\n\nCurrency Clearing, which Masud described, in substance and in part, as “an important entity within\nthe Group, as it is one of the few which holds regulatory licenses.” In the email, Masud requested\nthat Mercantile Bank set up a bank account for Himalaya Currency Clearing “ASAP please.”\nii. In subsequent email communications on or about August 29, 2022,\nHeeseup Shin, Hamilton’s Head of Legal and Compliance, Australia (“Shin”), advised MB\nEmployee-1 and others, in substance and in part, that “William Je is the ultimate beneficiary/\nindividual shareholder (100%) of Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd (Australia).”\niii. As shown in the Account Balances Table above, Target Account-8\nhad an account balance of $180,000.00 as of October 6, 2022.\njj. Investment Scheme Funds have been traced into Target Account-8 via an\ninternal Mercantile Bank transfer from Target Account-2 (i.e., the Himalaya Clearing account),\non or about September 13, 2022, totaling approximately $180,000.\nIII.Request for Non-Disclosure and Sealing\n54. The nature and scope of this ongoing criminal investigation—including the\nidentities of Target Subjects of the Investigation—is not publicly known. As described herein, the\naffidavits supporting the Prior Seizure Warrants were filed under seal and remain under seal.\nPremature public disclosure of this affidavit or the requested warrant could alert potential criminal\ntargets that they are under investigation, causing them to destroy evidence, flee from prosecution,\nor otherwise seriously jeopardize the investigation. Specifically, as set forth above, the targets of\nthis investigation appear to have the financial means that would facilitate their flight from\nprosecution, and have traveled internationally in the past to jurisdictions where extradition to the\nUnited States for purposes of prosecution is unlikely or impossible.\n52\n\n55. For these reasons, I respectfully request that this affidavit and all papers submitted\nherewith be maintained under seal until the Court orders otherwise, except that the Government\nbe permitted without further order of this Court to provide copies of the warrant and affidavit as\nneed be to personnel assisting it in the investigation and prosecution of this matter, and to disclose\nthose materials as necessary to comply with discovery and disclosure obligations in any\nprosecutions related to this matter.\nIV.Conclusion\n56. Based on the information set forth in the September 17 Affidavit, the G Fashion\nAffidavit, the September 20 Affidavit, and the foregoing, I submit that there is probable cause to\nbelieve that funds held in the Target Property are subject to forfeiture as proceeds of violations of\n18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud) and, and/or as property involved in violations of 18 U.S.C.\n§§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and 1956(h) (money laundering and conspiracy to commit\nmoney laundering).\n53\n\n57. Accordingly, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(b), I respectfully request that the Court\nissue a warrant authorizing the seizure of the Target Property.\n_____________________________________\nANTHONY ALECCI\nSpecial Agent\nFederal Bureau of Investigation\nSworn to me through the transmission of this\nAffidavit by reliable electronic means, pursuant to\nFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(d)(3) and 4.1, this\n__ day of October, 2022\n_____________________________________\nTHE HONORABLE STEWART D. AARON\nUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n54","body_zh":"证物 E\n\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\n案号：22 MAG 8279\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n密封归档\n-诉-\n支持扣押令的宣誓书\n根据 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 与 984\n\nG Club International Ltd. 所持有的 Mercantile Bank International 账户 MBI10103-0000（“目标账户-1”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\n\nHimalaya International Clearing Ltd. 所持有的 Mercantile Bank International 账户 MBI10133-0000（“目标账户-2”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\n\nHamilton Capital Holding Ltd. 所持有的 Mercantile Bank International 账户 MBI10137-0000（“目标账户-3”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\n\nHimalaya International Reserves Ltd. 所持有的 Mercantile Bank International 账户 MBI10138-0000（“目标账户-4”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\n\nHimalaya International Financial Group Ltd. 所持有的 Mercantile Bank International 账户 MBI10139-0000（“目标账户-5”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\n\nHamilton Investment Management Ltd. 所持有的 Mercantile Bank International 账户 MBI10171-0000（“目标账户-6”）内包含的所有款项与资金，以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\n\nG Fashion International Limited 所持有的 Mercantile Bank International 账户 MBI10172-0000 内包含的所有款项与资金\n\n（“目标账户-7”），以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；以及\nMercantile Bank International（美商国际银行）账号为 MBI10183-0000 的账户中所包含的所有款项及资金，该账户由 Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd.（喜马拉雅货币清算有限公司）持有（“目标账户-8”），以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息（统称为“目标财产”）。对物诉讼被告。\n纽约南区（SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK）) ss.:\n联邦调查局（Federal Bureau of Investigation）特工 Anthony Alecci 经依法宣誓，作证并陈述如下：\n\nI. 引言\n\n1. 本人系联邦调查局（“FBI”或“调查机构”）的一名特工。本人自 2020 年 8 月左右起担任 FBI 特工。自 2021 年 9 月左右起，本人被分配至 FBI 的复杂金融犯罪调查组。在 FBI 任职期间，本人曾参与证券与电汇诈骗计划、银行诈骗及洗钱等案件的调查，并开展或参与了（其中包括）对证人的讯问、对财务记录的审查以及搜查令的执行。特别是，本人曾参与执行涉及实体场所、电子设备及其他电子证据的搜查令。\n\n2. 本宣誓书旨在支持美利坚合众国依据 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 及 984 签发扣押令的申请，针对以下标的：\na. Mercantile Bank International 账号为 MBI10103-0000 的账户中所包含的所有款项及资金，该账户由 G Club International Ltd.（G Club国际有限公司）持有（“目标账户-1”），以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\nb. Mercantile Bank International 账号为 MBI10133-0000 的账户中所包含的所有款项及资金，该账户由 Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际清算有限公司）持有（“目标账户-2”），以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\nc. Mercantile Bank International 账号为 MBI10137-0000 的账户中所包含的所有款项及资金，该账户由 Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd.（汉密尔顿资本控股有限公司）持有（“目标账户-3”），以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\nd. Mercantile Bank International 账号为 MBI10138-0000 的账户中所包含的所有款项及资金，该账户由 Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际储备有限公司）持有（“目标账户-4”），以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\ne. Mercantile Bank International 账号为 MBI10139-0000 的账户中所包含的所有款项及资金，该账户由 Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际金融集团有限公司）持有（“目标账户-5”），以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\nf. Mercantile Bank International 账号为 MBI10171-0000 的账户中所包含的所有款项及资金，该账户由 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（汉密尔顿投资管理有限公司）持有（“目标账户-6”），以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；\ng. Mercantile Bank International 账号为 MBI10172-0000 的账户中所包含的所有款项及资金，该账户由 G Fashion International Limited（G Fashion国际有限公司）持有（“目标账户-7”），以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息；以及\nh. Mercantile Bank International 账号为 MBI10183-0000 的账户中所包含的所有款项及资金，该账户由 Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd. 持有（“目标账户-8”，连同目标账户-1 至目标账户-7 统称为“目标账户”），以及所有可追溯至该账户的资金，包括应计利息（统称为“目标财产”）。\n\n3. 如下所述，目标财产构成违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343（电汇诈骗）及 1956（洗钱及共谋洗钱）（合称为“涉案罪行”）所得之收益。\n\n4. 本宣誓书基于以下信息来源（其中包括）：(i) 本人的亲身知悉；(ii) 参与平行调查的美国证券交易委员会（U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission，“SEC”）工作人员提供的信息；(iii) 本人对涉及（其中包括）“G Club”和“Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）”等项目的公开宣传材料的审查；(iv) 本人对 GTV Media Group, Inc.（GTV传媒集团，“GTV”）、喜马拉雅交易所及“G Club”的公开网站以及这些网站上可用材料的审查；(v) 本人在互联网上进行的开源情报调查；(vi) 本人对 GTV Media Group, Inc. 及其雇员和代理人发布在 www.gnews.org（“GNews”）上的数字视频的审查；(vii) 本人参与的多次证人访谈；(viii) 本人对依据传票、依据 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) 针对非内容信息签发的命令以及司法授权的搜查令所获得的电子证据的审查；(ix) 本人以及 FBI 和 SEC 的金融分析师对各类银行账户记录进行的审查与分析，包括依据传票及其他请求从金融机构获取的财务记录；(x) 本人对（其中包括）G Club、HCHK Technologies Inc.、Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 以及 Major Lead International ROM（“喜马拉雅交易所”的母实体）的代理律师所提供文件的审查；(xi) 本人与其他执法人员的交谈；以及 (xii) 本人关于实施金融犯罪方面的培训与经验。由于提交本宣誓书的有限目的仅为确立合理根据（probable cause），因此其并未包含本调查过程中本人获悉的所有事实。本宣誓书中所列日期、数据和计算均为近似值。本宣誓书所报告的文件内容以及他人的行为、陈述和谈话，除另有说明外，均按其实质内容和部分内容进行陈述。\n\n5. 如本宣誓书所述，有合理根据表明，目标财产作为涉及违反 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) 的财产和/或违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 所得之收益，或可追溯至该等财产的财产，应依据 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A)、(C) 与 (D) 以及 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) 予以扣押和没收。总括而言，证据揭示了一系列欺诈性投资计划，这些计划涉及数家相互关联的公司及其关联实体，包括 GTV Media Group Inc.（“GTV”）、G Fashion（“G Fashion”）、Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟，“Farms”）、Himalaya Exchange（“Himalaya”）、G Club Operations LLC（“G Club”）、Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（“Hamilton”）、ACA Capital Group Ltd.（“ACA Capital”）以及 Crane Advisory Group LLC（“Crane”）。如下文更详尽所述，该欺诈性投资计划的头目为 Miles Guo，又名“郭文贵（Guo Wengui）”，又名“Miles Kwok”（“GUO”），以及 William Je，又名余建明（Je Kin Ming）（“JE”）。\n\n6. 本人以及 FBI 和 SEC 的分析师已追踪到部分诈骗收益从投资计划受害者流向目标财产的资金路径。\n\nII. 没收的法定依据\n\n7. 目标财产应予民事扣押和没收的法定条款如下：\n\n洗钱罪行\n\n8. 《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(A) 条规定，以下财产应予民事没收：\n涉及违反本编第 1956、1957 或 1960 条的交易或未遂交易的任何不动产或动产，或可追溯至该等财产的任何财产。\n\n9. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) 规定，任何人凡：\n明知金融交易所涉及的财产包含某种形式的非法活动的收益，仍进行或企图进行该等实际上涉及特定非法活动收益的金融交易——\n(B) 明知该交易的设计全部或部分旨在——\n(i) 隐匿或伪装特定非法活动收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权[即构成犯罪。]\n\n10. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) 规定，任何人凡：\n将货币工具或资金从美国境内某地运送、传送或转移至美国境外某地或途经该地，或者从美国境外某地运送、传送或转移至美国境内某地或途经该地，或企图进行上述运送、传送或转移——\n(B) 明知该运送、传送或转移所涉及的货币工具或资金代表某种形式的非法活动的收益，且明知该运送、传送或转移的设计全部或部分旨在——\n(i) 隐匿或伪装特定非法活动收益的性质、所在地、来源、所有权或控制权[即构成犯罪。]\n\n11. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) 进一步规定，“任何人凡共谋实施[第 1956 条]所界定的任何罪行，应受与作为该共谋目标的罪行所规定的相同处罚。”\n\n电汇诈骗罪行\n\n12. 就第 1956 条而言，18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) 所界定的“特定非法活动”包括（其中包括）违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 的行为。参见 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7) 及 1961(1)。\n\n13. 《美国法典》第 18 编第 981(a)(1)(C) 条规定，构成或源自可追溯至违反……构成‘特定非法活动’（定义见本编第 1956(c)(7) 条）的任何罪行或共谋实施该等罪行的收益的任何不动产或动产，均应予民事没收。\n\n扣押令\n\n14. 法院依 18 U.S.C. § 981(b) 获权就依据 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) 与 (C) 应予没收的任何财产签发扣押令。第 981(b)(2) 条规定，该等扣押可“依据按照《联邦刑事诉讼规则》所规定的获得搜查令的相同方式所取得的令状”进行。此外，第 981(b)(3) 条规定，尽管有《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 41(a) 条的规定，司法官员仍可在依据《美国法典》第 28 编第 1355(b) 条可对该财产提起没收之诉的任何司法区，依据第 981(b) 条签发扣押令。根据第 1355(b)(1)(A) 条，没收之诉或诉讼程序可在引起没收的任何作为或不作为发生地的司法区提起。如下所述，作为所申请扣押令之基础的罪行包括发生在纽约南区的作为或不作为。\n\n15. 关于种类物（包括现金及存入金融机构的资金），18 U.S.C. § 984 在相关部分规定：\n(a)(1) 在标的财产为现金、无记名形式的货币工具、存入金融机构账户的资金……或贵金属的任何对物没收之诉中：\n(A) 政府无需指明涉及作为没收基础之罪行的具体财产；且\n(B) 涉及该等罪行的财产已被转移并被同等财产替代，不得作为抗辩理由。\n(2) 除 (b) 款另有规定外，在涉及作为没收基础之罪行的财产所在的同一地点或账户中发现的任何同等财产，均应依据本条予以没收。\n(b) 依据本条对无法直接追溯至作为没收基础之罪行的财产提起没收之诉的，自罪行发生之日起超过 1 年不得提起。\n\nIII. 合理根据\n\nA. 关于实施涉案罪行的合理根据\n\n先前的扣押令\n\n16. 2022 年 9 月 17 日左右，本人提交了一份（保密的）宣誓书，以支持针对 11 个银行账户中所存资金签发扣押令，包括存放在 Metropolitan Commercial Bank（大都会商业银行，“MCB”）一个为 FV Bank 利益持有的账户中的所有资金，以及存放在 Silvergate Bank（银门银行，“Silvergate”）由 William JE 以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 或 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 名义持有的九个账户中的所有资金（即“9 月 17 日宣誓书”）。9 月 17 日宣誓书作为附件 A 纳入本文件。2022 年 9 月 18 日左右，Stewart D. 阁下\n\nAaron（美国纽约南区（Southern District of New York）联邦治安法官）就该 11 个账户签发了扣押令，其中包括向 Silvergate 签发的针对 9 个 Silvergate 账户的扣押令（“Silvergate 扣押令-1”），以及向 MCB 签发的针对为 FV Bank 利益持有的 1 个 MCB 账户的扣押令（“MCB 扣押令”）。17. 同样在 2022 年 9 月 17 日或前后，我提交了（附封存）一份宣誓书，以支持对以 G Fashion 名义持有的约 1 个 U.S. Bank 账户签发扣押令（“G Fashion 宣誓书”）。G Fashion 宣誓书作为附件 B 纳入本文件。在 2022 年 9 月 18 日或前后，Aaron 法官就该 U.S. Bank 账户签发了扣押令（“U.S. Bank 扣押令”）。18. 在 2022 年 9 月 20 日或前后，我提交了（附封存）一份宣誓书，以支持对另外 4 个银行账户签发扣押令，具体包括：以 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 名义持有的 1 个 Silvergate 账户，以及分别以 Himalaya International Financial Group, Ltd.、Himalaya International Reserves, Ltd. 和 Himalaya International Clearing, Ltd. 名义持有的 3 个 FV Bank 账户（“9 月 20 日宣誓书”）。1 9 月 20 日宣誓书作为附件 C 纳入本文件。在 2022 年 9 月 20 日或前后，Aaron 法官就以下账户签发了扣押令：(a) 该 Silvergate 账户（“Silvergate 扣押令-2”），以及 (b) 该 3 个 FV Bank 账户（“FV 扣押令”，与 Silvergate 扣押令-1、Silvergate 扣押令-2 及 U.S. Bank 扣押令合称为“先前扣押令”）。\n\n1 9 月 17 日宣誓书亦支持扣押 GETTR USA, Inc. 在 Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. 持有的高达 1600 万美元款项。\n\n欺诈性投资计划概述\n\n19. 自 2020 年 5 月或前后起，United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York（美国纽约南区联邦检察官办公室，简称“SDNY”）与 FBI（联邦调查局）以及其他执法机构一直在调查一系列相互关联的欺诈性投资计划，这些计划涉及由 GUO（郭文贵）、JE（余建明/Je Kin Ming）及其同伙拥有、运营或以其他方式关联的数家公司（统称为“投资计划”）。截至目前，调查（“调查”）显示，投资计划涉及数亿美元的招揽以及随后的投资和/或挪用。GUO 和 JE 是投资计划的领导者。\n\n20. 投资计划通过各种相互关联的投资招募项目进行，所有这些项目均表现出符合欺诈特征的情形。例如，向投资者承诺其投资可获得不切实际的巨额回报；在诸多虚假陈述的基础上诱导投资者进行投资；大笔投资资金被挪用；且就数字资产证券的销售而言，尽管曾陈述这些货币可以在公开交易所交易，但它们从未能够在公开交易所进行交易。\n\n21. 某些相互关联的投资计划已属既往，而另一些仍在进行中。具体而言：\n\na. GTV 股票招募和 G Coin 招募（统称为“未注册股票招募”）在 2020 年 4 月或前后至 2020 年 7 月或前后期间运作。由于收益发生混同的未注册股票招募，与 GUO、JE 及其他人（“目标主体”）关联的公司总计从 5,000 多名投资者（包括位于美国的个人）处筹集了至少约 4.87 亿美元。未注册股票招募在 9 月 17 日宣誓书中有更详细的描述。参见附件 A 第 20-29 段。\n\nb. 至少自 2020 年 7 月或前后起，投资计划的领导者开始向投资者推销一套新的投资机会，宣传为将其在 GTV 的现有投资转换为对 GTV 的“借款”的机会（“可转换借款招募”）。可转换借款招募由郭支持的 Himalaya Farm Alliance（喜马拉雅农场联盟）执行，该联盟由分布在世界各城市的中国海外侨民的非正式团体或“农场”组成。在 2020 年 8 月或前后至 2021 年 3 月期间，设在美国的农场通过可转换借款招募筹集了约 1.48 亿美元。可转换借款招募在 9 月 17 日宣誓书中有更详细的描述。参见附件 A 第 30-34 段。\n\nc. 自 2020 年 10 月或前后起，投资计划的领导者开始向投资者推销一项声称名为 G Club 的豪华专属礼宾服务（“G Club 会员招募”）。可在 http 查看的 G Club 网站宣传“尊享一流未来的专属会员资格”。G Club 据称提供五个会员等级，年费从 10,000 美元到 50,000 美元不等。所选会员等级的年费必须在提交 G Club 会员申请时全额支付，且 G Club 保留自行绝对酌情决定在 30 天内拒绝任何会员申请的权利。根据 G Club 网站，G Club 会员资格提供（除其他外）“使用提供普通话和英语支持的礼宾客户服务”以及“独家提前获取最新时装系列，包括专享会员购买价格、延长视频博文时长以及提前获取精选音乐”。G Club 会员招募在 9 月 17 日宣誓书中有更详细的描述。参见附件 A 第 35-41 段。G Club 是一项正在进行中的投资计划。\n\nd. 在 2021 年或前后，JE 创立并开始营销一个声称为 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的加密货币交易平台，网址为 http。类似于 G-Coin / G-Dollar 与未注册股票招募之间的关联，声称的加密货币 Himalaya Coin（“HCO”或“HCN”）和 Himalaya Dollar（“HDO”）（合称为“喜马拉雅资产”）最初作为可转换借款项目投资者的配套数字资产证券提供。当喜马拉雅交易所网站上线时，潜在投资者被告知他们将自 2021 年 6 月起能够兑换和提取其喜马拉雅加密货币。然而，喜马拉雅资产的首次代币发行（“ICO”）被多次推迟，ICO 最终于 2021 年 11 月 1 日进行。喜马拉雅交易所在 9 月 17 日宣誓书（参见附件 A 第 42-47 段）以及本文件中（参见下文第 41-47 段）有更详细的描述。喜马拉雅交易所是一项正在进行中的投资计划。\n\n22. 如 9 月 17 日宣誓书所述，自 2020 年 9 月或前后至今，JE 和其他人已通过 G Club 和喜马拉雅交易所筹集了至少约 6.64 亿美元。\n\nGUO 和 JE 的背景\n\n23. 基于我参与本次调查、所受培训、经验、对执法报告的审阅、对文件、记录、在社交媒体平台上发布的视频的审阅，以及我在互联网上进行的公开来源检索，并结合我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容等：\n\na. GUO 据称是一名亿万富翁及中国公民，据称在得知一名同伙因腐败指控被捕后，于 2014 年逃离中国前往美国。\n\nb. GUO 参与了与投资计划相关的各个实体，包括 GTV、G News、G Music LLC（“G Music”）、G Club、G Fashion（“G Fashion”）以及 GETTR USA, Inc.（“Gettr”）。GUO 在这些实体中并不担任正式头衔或职务。然而，郭公开宣传这些实体，包括在他为 GTV、G News 和 GETTR 上的“追随者”发布的视频中。2\n\nc. 在 2018 年或前后，GUO 创立了名为 Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金，简称“ROLF”）和 Rule of Law Society（法治社会，简称“ROLS”）的组织。根据我对公开信息的审阅，我获悉法治项目在 2018 年 12 月或前后就已在进行中。3 ROLF 和 ROLS 据称是致力于揭露和打击 CCP（中国共产党）在中国的腐败的组织。有时，ROLF 和/或 ROLS 的董事会成员包括 Stephen K. Bannon（“Bannon”）和 Kyle Bass（“Bass”）。GUO 在 ROLF 或 ROLS 中并不担任正式职务；然而，在 ROLS 网站上，GUO 被描述为“创始人、推广者和代言人”以及赞助人。\n\nd. JE 是 GUO 的密友，被描述为一名金融家和企业家。JE 参与了与投资计划相关的各个实体，详见下文。具体而言：\n\n2 参见，例如，gnews.org/articles/992 及 http\n3 参见 http（描述郭和班农参与“法治基金”）。\n\ni. JE 是 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（“Hamilton”）的首席执行官，该公司据称为一家全球基金管理公司。4 Hamilton 总部位于英属维尔京群岛，于 2018 年 2 月 5 日或前后注册成立。JE 于 2019 年 3 月 20 日或前后被正式任命为 Hamilton 的董事。\n\nii. JE 是 ACA Capital Group Ltd.（“ACA Capital”）的董事，该公司据称为一家总部位于香港的投资公司5，于 2020 年 7 月 10 日或前后在英国注册成立。\n\ne. JE 被列为喜马拉雅交易所的创始人兼主席，该交易所据称为一个加密货币“生态系统”。JE 是运营喜马拉雅交易所的各个实体的 100% 实益拥有人，这些实体包括 Major Lead International Ltd.、Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.（“Himalaya Clearing”）、Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd.（“Himalaya Financial”）以及 Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.（“Himalaya Reserves”）。\n\n洗钱欺诈收益计划概述\n\n24. 如本文件及 9 月 17 日宣誓书中更详细所述，至少自 2020 年或前后起，GUO、JE 和其他人一直在运作投资计划，即各种相互关联的欺诈性投资计划。投资计划涉及与 GUO 和/或 JE 关联的实体，包括 GTV、G Fashion、G Club、HCHK Technologies、喜马拉雅农场、喜马拉雅交易所、Hamilton 和 ACA Capital 等。\n\n25. 如上所述，在 2020 年 4 月或前后至 2020 年 6 月期间，GUO、JE 和其他人通过未注册股票招募和可转换借款招募，以声称的投资形式欺诈性地获取了超过约 6.35 亿美元。参见上文第 21 段。\n\n4 参见 http（最后访问日期为 2022 年 10 月 11 日）。\n5 参见 http（最后访问日期为 2022 年 10 月 11 日）。\n\n此外，我或他人在调查过程中审阅的记录显示，在 2020 年 11 月或前后至 2022 年 6 月期间，G Club 会员招募已产生超过约 2.21 亿美元的声称的 G Club 会员费。如本文件所述，我或他人在调查过程中审阅的记录进一步显示，在 2021 年 4 月或前后至 2022 年 10 月期间，喜马拉雅交易所计划已产生超过约 5 亿美元的声称的加密货币投资。\n\n26. 如下文及 9 月 17 日宣誓书所详述，证据表明，至少在约 2020 年 4 月至目前期间，GUO、JE 和其他人一直参与一项清洗来自投资计划（包括未注册股票招募、可转换借款招募、G Club 会员招募以及喜马拉雅交易所）的欺诈收益的计划（统称为“投资计划资金”）。\n\n27. 作为该洗钱计划的一部分，JE 和其他人进行了总额超过约 15 亿美元的金融交易，详见下文及 9 月 17 日宣誓书。\n\n28. 作为该洗钱计划的进一步组成部分，且如下文所述（参见下文第 51-53 段），在 2021 年 7 月 2 日或前后至 2022 年 10 月 6 日期间，至少约 6.26 亿美元的投资计划资金被直接或间接汇入目标账户。\n\nMercantile Bank 与目标账户\n\n29. 目标账户均开立于 Mercantile Bank。\n\na.\n\nMercantile Bank（商业银行）是一家总部位于 Puerto Rico（波多黎各）的支付和数字资产托管银行。6 Mercantile Bank 于 2018年7月16日左右注册成立。6 http\n\nb. Mercantile Global Holdings, Inc.（“MGH”，商业全球控股公司）——Mercantile Bank 的母控股公司——的律师曾将 Mercantile Bank 描述为“一家初创银行”。具体而言，由于 Mercantile Bank 没有通过美联储主账户直接接入 Federal Reserve（美联储）支付系统，它一直寻求与其他拥有此类账户的银行（即代理行业务合作伙伴）合作。7\n\n30. 根据我对 MGH 为响应大陪审团传票而提供的材料的审查，我得知八个目标账户中的六个是以完全由 JE 拥有、且与 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）或其管理实体 Hamilton（汉密尔顿）的运营相关的公司名义开设的。另外两个目标账户是以 G Fashion 和 G Club（即另外两个正在进行的投资计划）的名义开设的。\n\n31. 正如 9月17日宣誓书以及文中所述，JE 等人已将投资计划资金分层转入并通过 Mercantile Bank 以及其他金融机构的目标账户，以掩盖资金的性质和来源。参见附件 A 第 56(b) 段。\n\n32. 在 2022年10月7日左右至 2022年10月11日期间，Mercantile Bank 向 U.S. Attorney’s Office（美国联邦检察官办公室）的代表致信，主要并在一定程度上告知，如果政府“公开扣押”目标账户中的资金，“[Mercantile Bank] 极有可能别无选择，只能在不久的将来永久停止运营。”\n\n7 例如，在 2021 年 1 月前后，Mercantile Bank（商业银行）宣布已就与一家上市公司的反向并购达成确定性协议，在该交易中 Mercantile Bank 本身将成为一家上市实体。参见，例如，http release/mercantile-bank-international-corp.-announces-reverse-merger-transaction-with-crucial（最后访问日期为 2022 年 10 月 13 日）。然而，该反向并购告吹。\n\n8 如下文第 38 段所述，Hamilton（汉密尔顿）曾恰在 Prior Seizure Warrants（先前扣押令）执行前试图收购 Mercantile Bank。显然指定用于该项收购的资金根据先前扣押令被扣押，且该项收购告吹。\n\n执行先前扣押令及目标对象的清算企图\n\n33. 在 2022 年 9 月 20 日前后，FBI（联邦调查局）送达了 Silvergate Warrant-1（西尔弗盖特令状-1）以及 U.S. Bank Warrant（美国银行令状）等令状。9 在 2022 年 9 月 21 日前后，FBI 送达了 Silvergate Warrant-2（西尔弗盖特令状-2）以及 FV Warrant（FV 令状）。\n\n34. 如本文件更详细所述，自先前扣押令执行以及政府根据该等令状扣押了包含在 Silvergate Bank（西尔弗盖特银行）和 FV Bank（FV 银行）的 Hamilton 和/或 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）账户中约逾 3.2 亿美元的 Investment Scheme Funds（投资计划资金）以来，见上文第 16 段和第 18 段，JE 以及其他 Target Subjects（目标对象）曾企图转移存放在 Mercantile Bank 的约逾 5800 万美元投资计划资金。\n\nJE 于 2022 年 9 月 22 日及 2022 年 9 月 23 日企图进行的资金转账\n\n35. 针对 2022 年 9 月 23 日前后签发的大陪审团传票，MGH（Mercantile Global Holding，商业全球控股）向政府提供了某些文件和信息，包括以与 William JE（余建明）关联的各个实体名义开设的所有 Mercantile Bank 账户的账户余额，包括 G Club（G 俱乐部）、G Fashion（G 时尚）、Himalaya（喜马拉雅，以 Himalaya Clearing、Himalaya Financial、Himalaya Reserves 以及 Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd. 的名义开设）和 Hamilton（以 Hamilton Capital Holding 和 Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 的名义开设），以及 MGH、JE 与其他人之间的某些通信记录。\n\n36. 基于我对 MGH 所提供文件和信息的审查，且如下文更详细所述，我获悉在 2022 年 9 月 22 日前后至 2022 年 9 月 23 日前后之间（即政府实施扣押后的数日内），JE 企图将资金转出位于 Mercantile Bank 的 Target Account-2（目标账户-2，即 Himalaya International Clearing 账户），据称是为了清算约 4600 万美元 JE 声称属于其本人的 Himalaya Exchange 数字资产。\n9 如 9 月 20 日宣誓书所述，见证物 B 第 19 段，鉴于就某些资金存放地点的澄清说明，FBI 未送达 MCB 令状，而是取得了新的令状（即 FV 令状）。\n\n37. 基于我对账户余额汇总、账户月结单以及 MGH 提供的额外文件（包括 MGH、Mercantile Bank 和 Hamilton 员工之间的通话记录）的审查、我对 Silvergate 提供的文件的审查、开源调查以及我与 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York（纽约南区美国检察官办公室）代表的交谈，我获悉了以下内容等：\n\na. 在执行先前搜查令之前，Hamilton 曾参与收购 Mercantile Bank 的谈判。具体而言，在 2021 年 12 月前后至 2022 年 9 月前后之间，Hamilton 对 Mercantile Bank 开展了尽职调查，并准备收购 Mercantile Bank。在 2022 年 9 月 16 日前后，MGH 与 Hamilton Opportunity Fund（汉密尔顿机会基金）签订了一份股票购买协议，根据该协议，Hamilton 同意支付 49,695,000 美元收购 Mercantile Bank。\n\nb. 同一天，即 2022 年 9 月 16 日前后，Hamilton 从其 Silvergate 账户之一向 MGH 发起了一笔金额约为 4969.5 万美元投资计划资金的对外电汇（“Wire-1”）。收款人列为“Mercantile Global Holding Inc.”，电汇申请中注明的用途为：“Bank Purchase Hamilton MA Fund SP”。该等资金——看似与 Hamilton 企图收购 Mercantile Bank 相关——从未转入 Mercantile Bank，而是根据 Silvergate 令状-1 被扣押。\n\nc. 据 MGH 称，MGH 员工就 Wire-1 的状态与 Hamilton 员工进行了多次交谈。在 2022 年 9 月 22 日前后格林尼治标准时间约下午 7:55 / 东部时间下午 2:55 由 Priya Patel（“Patel”，Hamilton Capital Holding 的内部诉讼与监管法律顾问）与 MGH 的全球法务及合规主管（“MGH Employee-1”）发起的 FaceTime 音频通话中，Patel 告知 MGH Employee-1，要点是 Hamilton 在 Silvergate 的资金（包括 Wire-1）已被扣押，且 Hamilton 可能需要将其存放在 Mercantile Bank 账户中的资金转出。\n\nd. 约 18 分钟后，即 2022 年 9 月 22 日前后格林尼治标准时间约下午 8:13 / 东部时间下午 3:13，JE 通过 WhatsApp 致电 MGH 首席执行官（“MGH Employee-2”）。在通话期间，JE 陈述道，要点及部分内容是 Hamilton 需要为一名未具名的“VIP”客户以及 G Club 向位于 UAE（阿联酋）Abu Dhabi（阿布扎比）的一家银行转账约 3000 万美元10。作为回应，MGH Employee-2 告知 JE，要点及部分内容是 MGH 将要求以书面形式提交所有此类转账申请。基于 MGH 提供的信息，我获悉 JE 在该通话中并未向 MGH Employee-2 披露有关该“VIP”客户的身份识别信息。\n\ne. 数小时后，即 2022 年 9 月 22 日前后格林尼治标准时间约下午 11:30 / 东部时间下午 6:30，Ehsan Masud（Hamilton 的首席财务官）向 MGH Employee-2 发送了一条 WhatsApp 消息，要点及部分内容为：“我们明天可能会有一笔约 5000 万美元的大额 VIP 企业赎回。很乐意明天通话讨论。非常感谢”。数分钟后，MGH Employee-2 回复并告知 Masud，要点是如此规模的转账将“需要详细文件且需要超过一天时间来处理。”在随后的约一个小时内 Masud 与 MGH Employee-2 之间的 WhatsApp 通信中，Masud 对对外转账的时间安排表示了紧迫性；例如，当 MGH Employee-2 告知 Masud 其已安排 MGH 合规人员与 Hamilton 员工在 2022 年 9 月 24 日前后开会时，Masud 写道，要点及部分内容为：“但这将意味着我们将错过明天的美元截止时间”以及“我们需要明天尽早开始行动”。\n10 如本文件及 MGH 记录所反映，在 JE、Masud 与 MGH Employee-2 的沟通过程中，注明的对外转账金额看似在约 3000 万美元至约 5000 万美元之间变动。最终，书面对外电汇申请反映出分两笔交易申请转账的总金额约为 4600 万美元。见第 37(j)(v) 段。\n\nf. 在 2022 年 9 月 23 日前后格林尼治标准时间约凌晨 3:01 / 2022 年 9 月 22 日前后东部时间晚上 10:01，JE 向 MGH Employee-2 发送了 WhatsApp 消息，要点及部分内容为：“您好，如前所述，我公司希望赎回部分资金，以便我们能够继续支持贵银行及其他实体的运营。”\n\ng. MGH Employee-2 于 2022 年 9 月 23 日前后格林尼治标准时间约上午 9:38 / 东部时间凌晨 4:38 回复 JE，告知 JE 要点是 MGH Employee-2 将在上午 11:00 左右与 Masud 通话，并询问 JE，Masud 是否知悉“正在发生什么事情？”作为回应，JE 写道，要点及部分内容为：“[Masud] 只知道 FV 银行被冻结了。他不知道资金或交易的问题”，以及“[我们]只是在进行正常的客户赎回。”\n\nh. 在 2022 年 9 月 23 日前后格林尼治标准时间约上午 11:01 / 东部时间早上 6:01 MGH Employee-2 与 Masud 的 WhatsApp 通话中，Masud 再次就针对该“VIP”客户（其身份当时尚未向 MGH 披露）申请的对外 5000 万美元电汇的时间安排表示了紧迫性。据 MGH 称，MGH Employee-2 坚持要求获知申请转账的客户身份；对此，Masud 告知要点是客户为 ACA Capital（即 JE 位于香港的投资公司，见第 23(d)(ii) 段），且电汇将汇往位于阿联酋阿布扎比的一家特定银行。Masud 还告知 Hamilton 有一项将绝大部分资产转移出美国的计划。\n\ni. 在数小时后即 2022 年 9 月 23 日前后 JE 与 MGH Employee-2 之间的 WhatsApp 消息中，JE 写道，要点及部分内容为：“我可以向您发送所有文件以证明我拥有 ACA”，以及“[我们]需要今天执行，否则就毫无意义了。”\n\nj. 在 2022 年 9 月 23 日前后自格林尼治标准时间约下午 5:03 / 东部时间中午 12:03 开始的 WhatsApp 消息中，JE 向 MGH Employee-2 发送了如下内容，要点及部分内容为：“已把所有 ACA 的资料发给你了”，“我们只是在赎回”，以及“Masud 不知道 ACA 的事。”基于我对 MGH 所提供文件的审查，我获悉 JE 在当天向 MGH 发送了数份文件，其中包括以下内容等：\n\ni. 一封印有 Himalaya Exchange 信头的信件，由 Masud（在信中被确认为 Himalaya Exchange 的首席财务官）致“ACA Capital Group Limited”，据称日期为 2021 年 10 月 29 日，反映了一份据称的“Himalaya Coin（喜马拉雅币）预留”，要点包含如下内容：\nThe Himalaya International Financial Group Ltd.（喜马拉雅国际金融集团有限公司）通过 Himalaya Exchange，已按每枚 0.10 美元的价格为您预留了四千万枚 Himalaya Coin（HCN）。如已商定，您可根据需要随时提取该预留份额。只要您拥有足额的 HDO 仓位以支付上述购买 HCN 的款项，我们将在收到请求时向您计入 HCN。\n\nii. 一份印有 Himalaya Exchange 信头的“Himalaya Exchange OTC 交易表格”，致“Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.”，据称反映了关于“william.k.je@acacap.com”以每枚 HCN 24.464 美元的价格出售约 1,308,044.47 枚 HCN、总计 3200 万 HDO 的交易执行详情。该表格反映生效交易日期和时间为 2022 年 9 月 22 日前后格林尼治标准时间晚上 9:35，并由 JE 在 2022 年 9 月 22 日前后签署。\n\niii. 第二份印有 Himalaya Exchange 信头的“Himalaya Exchange OTC 交易表格”，致“Himalaya International Clearing Ltd.”，据称反映了关于“william.k.je@acacap.com”以每枚 HCN 24.464 美元的价格出售约 572,269.46 枚 HCN、总计 1400 万 HDO 的交易执行详情。该表格反映生效交易日期和时间为 2022 年 9 月 22 日前后格林尼治标准时间晚上 9:35（即与上文第 37(j)(ii) 段所反映交易同一分钟），并由 JE 在 2022 年 9 月 22 日前后签署。\n\niv. 一张印有 Himalaya Exchange 信头的模糊屏幕截图，反映了据称是 Himalaya Exchange 网站的订单簿页面，该截图据称截取于 2022 年 9 月 22 日前后晚上约 9:35，如下所示：\n\nv. 一份印有 Himalaya Exchange 信头的“Himalaya Exchange 赎回申请表”，反映名称“ACA Capital Group Limited”以及 Himalaya Exchange 登录电子邮件地址“william.k.je@acacap.com”，授权“从我的 Himalaya Exchange 账户将我的 Himalaya Dollar 赎回为美元”，金额约为 4600 万 HDO，对外转账总金额约为 4600 万美元。该份据称由 JE 于 2022 年 9 月 23 日前后签署的赎回申请表提供了以 ACA Capital Group Limited 名义在 United Arab Emirates（“UAE”，阿拉伯联合酋长国）的第一阿布扎比银行开设的银行账户信息。\n\nk. 在 2022 年 9 月 23 日前后格林尼治标准时间约晚上 9:12 / 东部时间下午 4:12 由 JE 发送给 MGH Employee-2 的一条 WhatsApp 消息中，\n\n在 2022 年 9 月 23 日（星期五）或前后，JE 实质上且部分地向 MGH 员工-2（MGH Employee-2）写道：“请告诉我你是否需要更多信息。我们正在进行赎回，且必须在今天完成。否则，这就毫无意义了。”在约格林威治标准时间晚上 9:29 / 美国东部时间下午 4:29，JE 实质上且部分地向 MGH 员工-2 写道：“我们可以分两笔进行”，随后又写道：“现在正在和律师通话。”大约 30 分钟后，JE 向 MGH 员工-2 写道：“嗨，请暂缓至周一。”（即 2022 年 9 月 26 日）。\n\n38. 基于我参与本调查、我的培训、经验以及对文件和记录的审查，并结合 JE 所称赎回请求的性质和情况，基于以下各项理由等，我认为 JE 企图将约 4600 万美元的投资骗局资金转移到美国执法部门触及范围之外的银行账户：\n\na. 基于企图向外转账的时间点——即在政府扣押了 JE 控制的存放在其他银行的其他账户中的约 3.2 亿美元之后不久——我认为 JE 企图将资金转移至离岸，以防备未来政府可能对资金进行的扣押（例如所请求扣押的目标账户）。\n\nb. 如上所述，转账请求是从 Mercantile Bank（商业银行）的目标账户转至阿联酋阿布扎比一家银行中由 JE 控制的账户。基于我的培训和经验，我知道阿联酋当局不太可能对美国当局的正式信息请求作出及时回应，且阿联酋当局不太可能对存放在阿联酋境内的资金执行美国的扣押令或没收命令。\n\nc. 基于我对企图转账之性质和情况的审查，包括针对这些转账时间一再表现出的紧迫性（例如，JE 多次声称如果不尽快完成转账将“毫无意义”），与赎回仅为“客户的正常赎回”这一说法形成对比，以及 Hamilton（汉密尔顿投资管理有限公司）最初并未披露 JE 实际上就是该客户（通过其对 ACA Capital 的所有权）这一事实，我认为 Hamilton 向 Mercantile Bank 提供了虚假或误导性信息，目的是说服 Mercantile Bank 尽快发放这笔约 4600 万美元的款项。\n\n2022 年 10 月 7 日企图销户\n\n39. 基于我对 G Club（G会所）律师致 Mercantile Bank 的书面沟通记录的审查，我得知在 Hamilton 企图将约 4600 万美元投资骗局资金转出 Mercantile Bank 未果后，在 2022 年 10 月 7 日或前后，G Club（通过其律师）企图关闭目标账户-1（即 G Club 的 Mercantile Bank 账户）。G Club 并未就目标账户-1 关闭后约 1200 万美元的账户余额应转移至何处提供指示。\n\n关于先前扣押令的未决诉讼\n\n40. 基于我参与本调查、我的培训、经验、对包括法院文件在内的记录和文件的审查，以及我与美国纽约南区联邦检察官办公室（U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York）代表的交谈，我得知了以下各项情况等：\n\na. 在 2022 年 9 月 29 日或前后，在执行了先前扣押令之后，Major Lead International Ltd.（即喜马拉雅交易所的母体公司）、Hamilton Investment Management Ltd.（汉密尔顿投资管理有限公司）以及 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 的外聘律师（“Williams & Connolly（威廉姆斯与康诺利律师事务所）”）向美国纽约南区联邦地区法院（U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York）提交了一封保密信函（“信函-1”），请求“在即将依据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 41(g) 条提出动议之前召开紧急动议前会议，该动议将寻求立即解冻某些账户并归还从受先前扣押令约束的某些账户中扣押的资金”。信函-1 包括以下陈述等：\n\ni. 喜马拉雅交易所的最终受益所有人（UBO）JE“直接或间接持有喜马拉雅美元和喜马拉雅币，但这些持仓仅占已发行货币的少数。……大部分货币由其他近 18,000 名[喜马拉雅]交易所客户拥有。”\n\nii. 冻结喜马拉雅交易所在 FV Bank（富途银行）的运营账户“使喜马拉雅交易所及相关客户资产陷入严重危险”，并且“当[喜马拉雅]交易所参与者得知他们无法再轻易将其实物稳定币喜马拉雅美元兑换为现金时，几乎必然会导致市场上交易的喜马拉雅币发生大规模的人为贬值。”（强调为原文所加）。\n\nb. 在 2022 年 10 月 3 日或前后，Williams & Connolly 代表 Major Lead International Ltd.（“喜马拉雅集团”）、Hamilton Investment Management Ltd. 和 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（统称“动议方”）提交了一份保密的财产返还动议（“动议”）。案号 22 Misc. 275 (VSB)，诉讼记录索引（Dkt.）第 8 至 8-18 号（保密）。\n\nc. 该动议包括以下陈述等：\n\niii. 喜马拉雅集团通过各子公司“拥有并运营着一个名为喜马拉雅交易所的创新加密货币交易所。”\n\niv. 喜马拉雅交易所“拥有超过 18,000 名客户，市值为 250 亿美元。”\n\nv. 喜马拉雅交易所“便利两种数字资产的买卖”——喜马拉雅美元（或“HDO”），动议方将其描述为“一种与美元锚定并由一比一现金或现金等价物资产储备支持的‘稳定币’代币”；以及喜马拉雅币（或“HCN”），动议方将其描述为“一种由供求关系定价的交易型加密货币”。（强调为原文所加）。\n\nvi. “客户可以通过购买喜马拉雅美元、使用该货币买卖喜马拉雅币，并最终将喜马拉雅美元赎回为美元来参与[喜马拉雅]交易所。”（强调为原文所加）。\n\nvii. 喜马拉雅交易所的“开创性模式”将“纯加密货币交易与由传统货币支持的‘稳定币’相结合。”\n\nviii. 喜马拉雅交易所的最终受益所有人 JE“也是[喜马拉雅]交易所的客户，并通过其他实体拥有大量的喜马拉雅美元和喜马拉雅币”，并且与其他喜马拉雅交易所客户一样，“将受到扣押的负面影响”。\n\nix. 在政府对最终受益所有人（即 JE）处理其巨额持仓存有顾虑的情况下，JE“准备考虑对其赎回喜马拉雅美元的能力施加合理限制”。\n\nx. 喜马拉雅集团在 FV Bank 的两个主要运营账户是用于处理喜马拉雅交易所客户存取款和赎回的“清算账户”，以及存放客户资金的“储备账户”。\n\nxi. 当客户“购买喜马拉雅美元”时，客户的现金付款存入清算账户，客户收到等额喜马拉雅美元的“信用额度”。动议第 3 页。用于“购买喜马拉雅美元”的资金“通常被送往储备账户，并在该账户中为喜马拉雅美元提供支持。”\n\nxii. 客户可以使用喜马拉雅美元“信用额度”来“买卖喜马拉雅币，即[喜马拉雅]交易所的市场交易加密货币。”\n\nxiii. 当客户“寻求将其喜马拉雅美元赎回为硬通货”时，“储备账户”中的客户资金“会流回清算账户以满足赎回请求。”\n\nxiv. 冻结 FV Bank 账户（包括清算账户和储备账户）已导致喜马拉雅交易所无法处理 142 笔待处理的客户赎回请求（截至提交动议之日），尽管喜马拉雅交易所拥有“备用处理银行 Mercantile Bank”。\n\nxv. 喜马拉雅交易所据称无法处理赎回请求将“引发客户丧失信心”，“导致数十亿美元的市场损失”。\n\n喜马拉雅交易所骗局\n\n41. 喜马拉雅交易所被宣传和描述为加密货币[第11条脚注]交易所。然而，正如本文所详述的——且与上述信函-1 和动议中的主张相反——证据表明，喜马拉雅交易所似乎并非一个具有实际功能的加密货币交易所；HDO 似乎并不存在于区块链上（与喜马拉雅交易所的陈述相反，见下文第 46(f) 段）；并且喜马拉雅交易所的“客户”或“会员”实际上似乎是相互关联的投资骗局的投资者（及受害者）——包括喜马拉雅交易所，正如 9 月 17 日宣誓书中所更详细描述的那样。例如，参见附件 A 第 50-52、54-55 段。\n\n[第11条脚注：基于我的培训和经验，我知道“加密货币”是指由使用密码学的去中心化系统（通常称为“区块链”）而非由银行等中心化机构验证交易和维护记录的数字货币。]\n\n42. 喜马拉雅交易所和动议方的陈述——包括《喜马拉雅美元白皮书》[第12条脚注]（“HDO 白皮书”）和《喜马拉雅币白皮书》[第13条脚注]（“HCN 白皮书”，合称“白皮书”）、喜马拉雅交易所网站上发布的信息、JE 公开报道的言论、信函-1 以及动议——在以下各项方面等存在不一致：(a) “喜马拉雅美元”和“喜马拉雅币”究竟是什么；(b) 喜马拉雅美元和喜马拉雅币的流动性；(c) 喜马拉雅币所谓“市场价格”是如何确定的；以及 (d) 所谓喜马拉雅加密货币是否存在于区块链上。\n\n喜马拉雅美元与喜马拉雅币\n\n43. 基于我参与本调查、我的培训、经验、我在互联网上进行的开源研究、我对根据传票和司法授权搜查令获取的文件和证据的审查、我对法院案卷材料的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我得知了以下各项情况等：\n\na. 喜马拉雅交易所自称是加密货币交易所，或“真正的加密生态系统”。在白皮书中，“喜马拉雅交易所”被定义为“会员可以在其上买卖和交易其加密资产的加密资产交易所”。HDO 白皮书第 3 页（强调为原文所加）。喜马拉雅交易所网站上的图片（可访问 http 网址查看）如下所示：\n\n[第12条脚注：可从 http 2.amazonaws.com/hedocs/hdo_whitepaper_eng_v6e.pdf 下载（最后访问日期为 2022 年 10 月 12 日）。]\n\n[第13条脚注：可从 http 2.amazonaws.com/hedocs/hcn_whitepaper_eng_v7e.pdf 下载（最后访问日期为 2022 年 10 月 12 日）。]\n\nb. 在动议文件和 HDO 白皮书中，喜马拉雅美元被描述为“‘稳定币’代币”或“与美元挂钩的新型稳定币”。例如，参见 HDO 白皮书第 7 页。据报道，在 2022 年 5 月或前后全球稳定币崩盘后，JE 曾将 HDO 描述为“世界上唯一维持”与美元 1 比 1 稳定性的“稳定币”。参见附件 A 第 34 页脚注 9（强调为原文所加）。\n\nc. 在动议文件和 HCN 白皮书中，喜马拉雅币被描述为“由供求关系定价的交易型加密货币”、“市场交易的加密货币”或喜马拉雅交易所“发行的官方货币”。例如，参见 HCN 白皮书第 4 页。\n\nd. 然而在其他地方，陈述表明喜马拉雅交易所的运作并非通过使用加密货币，而是通过使用“信用额度”（Credits），如下文所示的 HDO 白皮书“架构考量”部分所反映：\n\n参见 HDO 白皮书第 10 页（强调为原文所加）；HCN 白皮书第 11 页；另见附件 A 第 44(d) 段。也就是说，正如上述文字所反映的，喜马拉雅交易所是通过使用“信用额度”（而非加密货币）来运作的，并且这些信用额度 (a) 只能在喜马拉雅生态系统内部使用，且 (b) 不附带任何要求将其兑换为法定货币或加密资产的权利。\n\n此外，尽管喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）会员可以申请将其HDO积分兑换为等额的美元付款，但喜马拉雅交易所有权“酌情决定”拒绝任何此类申请。e. 2022年1月的HDO白皮书版本中约有135处提及“积分”（credits）。总体参见HDO白皮书。相比之下，HDO白皮书中仅有6处提及“稳定币”（stablecoin或stablecoins）。参见同上。f. 2022年1月的HCN白皮书版本中约有131处提及“积分”。总体参见HCN白皮书。相比之下，HCN白皮书中仅有15处提及“代币”（token或tokens）。参见同上。g. 喜马拉雅交易所网站（可访问http查看）的图片如下所示：喜马拉雅交易所网站上上述对喜马拉雅美元（Himalaya Dollar）和喜马拉雅币（Himalaya Coin）的描述均未提及“积分”。\n\nh. 我认为，前述事实表明，与HDO和HCN是加密货币的主张相反，HDO和HCN实际上并非加密货币。相反，那些据称“购买”HDO并使用其HDO“购买”HCN的个人，仅仅是将资金汇入了由JE等人控制的银行账户，以换取被称为“积分”的东西。\n\n喜马拉雅币的估值\n\n44. 基于我参与本案调查（Investigation）、培训、经验、在互联网上进行的开源研究、对我根据传票和经司法授权的搜查令所获取文件及证据的审查、对法院案卷材料的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容等：\n\na. 动议人声称喜马拉雅币“由供求关系决定价值”。\n\nb. 汉密尔顿（Hamilton）首席财务官Ehsan Masud在支持动议（Motion）而提交的声明中称，截至2022年10月2日，HCN的市值已超过250亿美元。c. 喜马拉雅交易所网站上的数据反映了HCN据称的历史价格。参见例如附件A第44(c)、45(d)段。d. 与关于HCN价格由市场供求关系决定的陈述相反，HCN白皮书关于后续发行（即首次代币发行或ICO之后的HCN发行）主要且部分陈述如下：HCN白皮书第16页。也就是说，如上述行文所反映的，发行人拥有“唯一且绝对的酌情决定权”去判定按上述方法计算的发行价“不构成公平市场价格”，在此情况下，发行人“有权在计算发行价时作出其认为必要的调整，以达到其认为合理的公平市场价格”。同上（强调为后加）。e. HCN白皮书还陈述如下：“会员应注意，HCN积分的价值独立于任何其他资产的价值，包括HCN代币。”同上。f. 基于我参与本案调查、培训及经验，我认为前述事实反映出——与关于“HCN”价格（从而HCN积分价值）由市场供求决定的陈述相反——喜马拉雅交易所拥有绝对酌情决定权来设定未来发行HCN的“价格”，而完全不考虑任何据称已发行的HCN的据称市场价值。喜马拉雅资产的流动性\n\n45. 基于我参与本案调查、培训、经验、在互联网上进行的开源研究、对我根据传票和经司法授权的搜查令所获取文件及证据的审查、对法院案卷材料的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容等：\n\na. 动议人就喜马拉雅美元的流动性作出了某些陈述。例如，Masud声称喜马拉雅美元可以“随时”兑回法定美元。亦参见前文第40(a)(ii)段。b. 相比之下，如上所述，HDO白皮书规定，喜马拉雅交易所会员将喜马拉雅美元积分兑换为美元的申请“由喜马拉雅交易所酌情决定”。参见前文第43(d)段。c. HDO白皮书进一步主要且部分陈述如下：“尽管喜马拉雅交易所旨在提供良好的流动性水平，但维持储备金旨在提供一层额外的潜在流动性，以抵御不可预见之市场事件。它为发行人[即喜马拉雅金融（Himalaya Financial）]提供了酌情采取行动以在其认为必要时支持流动性的能力。”HDO白皮书第12页。并且：“发行人没有义务提供流动性支持，喜马拉雅交易所亦没有义务同意会员将HDO积分兑换为美元的任何申请，此类行动分别由发行人和喜马拉雅交易所全权酌情决定。会员对发行人或储备金不享有任何直接或间接索赔权。”同上。d. 在支持动议的声明中，Masud还就喜马拉雅币的流动性作出了某些陈述，其中包括：“所有HCN均由交易所客户持有”，以及“客户使用HDO购买HCN，客户出售HCN以获得HDO，而HDO可以兑回法定美元”。\n\ne. 相比之下，HCN白皮书主要且部分陈述如下：\n特此告知会员，会员不得在喜马拉雅生态系统内持有加密资产或法定货币，喜马拉雅生态系统亦不提供……任何类型的托管或其他安排以便利此项操作。喜马拉雅交易所打算以自己的名义并为自己的账户持有加密资产，在喜马拉雅交易所批准该会员申请的情况下，其可以选择应会员的要求使用这些资产来完成会员积分与相应加密资产的兑换。……HCN白皮书第11页（强调为后加）。f. 尽管动议人就HDO和HCN据称的流动性作出了陈述，但在本案调查期间收集的证据（包括上述引用的白皮书行文）表明，喜马拉雅交易所客户将喜马拉雅资产兑换为法定货币的能力是受限的，并且完全由喜马拉雅交易所自行酌情决定。基于我对银行记录和传票回函的审查，我获知一些喜马拉雅交易所客户据称成功执行了“赎回”（即从Hamilton和/或喜马拉雅实体控制的银行账户中收回了法定货币）。然而，基于我参与本案调查、培训和经验，喜马拉雅交易所批准某些据称的“赎回”申请并将投资计划资金退还至某些会员的银行账户，似乎是为了使欺诈行为得以延续；即制造出喜马拉雅交易所加密货币具有流动性的假象。\n\n区块链分析\n\n46. 基于我参与本案调查、培训、经验、对各种银行账户记录的审查与分析，以及由我以及美国联邦调查局（FBI）和美国证券交易委员会（SEC）金融分析师进行的财务分析、我在互联网上进行的开源研究，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容等：\n\na. 动议人声称“喜马拉雅美元由按一美元对一美元等额的现金或现金等价物资产组成的储备金提供支持”。\n\nb. 动议人陈述称，一家外部会计师事务所“[定期]……审查交易所的账簿和记录，并提供确认这种一美元对一美元支持的报告”。关于该动议，动议人提交了一份日期为2022年8月10日的《独立会计师报告》（“《会计师报告》”），该报告由一家总部位于加利福尼亚州的特定会计师事务所（“会计师事务所”）编制。14 《会计师报告》作为附件D附于本件之后。c. 《会计师报告》指出，喜马拉雅美元“是存在于以太坊区块链上智能合约地址[0x7C197afcd8D36884309ed731424985E3ed17F018]（“区块链地址”）的加密数字代币”，并进一步提及“有担保的HDO积分，即在喜马拉雅生态系统平台上以美元发行和购买的以HDO计价的负债”。附件D第1页。d. 《喜马拉雅美元银行与资金持有报告》是喜马拉雅国际储备（Himalaya International Reserve）向会计师事务所提供的一份报告，该报告指出，截至2022年7月31日左右，约有401,047,298.15枚HDO代币“已在智能合约地址（即区块链地址）的以太坊区块链上铸造”。参见附件D第2页注1。\n\n14 如附件D所反映，《会计师报告》长约一页，附有《喜马拉雅美元银行与资金持有报告》，该报告由喜马拉雅国际储备首席执行官Jesse Brown于2022年8月10日左右签署。参见附件D。2022年10月10日左右，FBI收到了该会计师事务所提供的大量传票答复材料，其中包括看似支持《会计师报告》的文件等。FBI对该传票答复材料的审查仍在进行中。\n\ne. 基于我与他人（包括FBI虚拟货币应对小组的一名成员）的交谈，我主要且部分获悉了以下内容：\n\ni. 白皮书和喜马拉雅交易所网站均未提供喜马拉雅加密货币的智能合约地址15。没有智能合约地址，潜在或现有投资者很难对喜马拉雅加密货币进行尽职调查。ii. 基于FBI在开源区块浏览器（“浏览器”）上对动议人在《会计师报告》中向政府提供的区块链地址（该地址似乎并未公开）的审查，该区块链地址似乎于2021年3月16日左右首次出现在以太坊区块链上。如9月17日宣誓书中所述，喜马拉雅交易所自2021年4月左右起一直在运营（ICO之前）。参见附件A第18(c)段。f. 基于FBI在浏览器上对该区块链地址的审查，该区块链地址似乎与HDO关联。进一步看来，HDO的持有者大约有24个；在2021年3月16日左右至2022年10月14日左右期间，该区块链地址上大约出现了70笔交易；且浏览器内未追踪HDO的市值。16\n\n15 基于我的培训、经验以及与他人的交谈，我知道合约地址托管着智能合约，智能合约是存储在区块链上并在满足预设条件时运行的一组代码。我进一步知道，合约地址可以负责在区块链上部署特定的加密货币（例如代币或币）。\n\n16 作为对比和示例，我和其他人曾在浏览器上搜索了一种名为“双子星美元（Gemini Dollar）”的稳定币的智能合约地址（“Gemini区块链地址”）。参见\n\ng. 基于前述事实，我认为 (i) 喜马拉雅交易所据称的“加密货币”HDO实际上似乎并未驻留在该区块链地址内，以及 (ii) 与《喜马拉雅美元银行与资金持有报告》相反，“HDO代币”实际上并未在该区块链地址上铸造。参见附件D第2页注1。\n\n47. 如上所述，喜马拉雅交易所向投资者推销为一家加密货币交易所，个人可以在该交易所持有和交易加密货币资产，包括稳定币和交易币。事实上，如上文详述，证据表明喜马拉雅交易所的会员并不持有、拥有或控制加密货币或数字资产。\n\n相反，向由 JE 等人控制的银行账户（包括目标账户）汇款的喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）会员会收到“积分（credits）”，据称这些积分赋予了他们购买加密货币（以 HDO 稳定币或 HCN 交易币的形式）的期权。虽然会员可能认为自己已经有效行使了该期权并持有加密货币或数字资产，但喜马拉雅交易所是一个封闭式加密货币平台，除喜马拉雅交易所网站上反映的数据外，会员（与公众一样）对所谓的 HDO 或 HCN 市场缺乏透明度。此外，由喜马拉雅交易所（而非会员）持有会员为“购买”HDO 而支付的款项（即投资计划资金），且喜马拉雅交易所是“以其自身名义并为其自身利益”持有这些资金。参见前文第 45(e) 段。http（最后访问日期为 2022 年 10 月 13 日）。根据该项检索，我得知双子座美元（Gemini Dollar）大约有 9,927 名持有者；在约 2022 年 2 月其首次代币发行（ICO）至约 2022 年 10 月 13 日晚上约 9:17 之间，Gemini 区块链地址上记录了大约 520,188 笔交易；且 Gemini Dollar 目前的市值约为 3.29 亿美元。B. 欺诈收益向目标账户的追踪\n\n48. 根据我参与本项调查（Investigation）的情况、专业培训、经验、对各类银行账户记录的审查与分析、我本人以及联邦调查局（FBI）和证券交易委员会（SEC）财务分析师所进行的财务分析、我在互联网上开展的开源网络情报研究、我对依据传票及司法授权搜查令获得的证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容等：\n\na. 投资者参与投资计划的方式为：要么直接将款项电汇至由 GUO（郭文贵）、JE 及其他人关联实体（包括农场、G Club 或喜马拉雅交易所）控制或使用的银行账户；要么根据目标对象的指示将款项电汇或以其他方式转移至其他实体，随后这些资金再被转入最终由 JE 及其他目标对象控制的银行账户。参见附件 A 第 57(a) 段。\n\nb. 迄今为止，我以及 FBI 和 SEC 的分析师已查明并试图追踪超过约 16 亿美元的投资计划资金交易，其中相当大一部分已通过位于至少四个不同国家（包括美国、巴哈马、英属维尔京群岛和阿联酋）的金融机构进行了洗钱。\n\n49. 正如 9 月 17 日宣誓书（September 17 Affidavit）中所述，预期的投资计划投资者被指示将拟用于投资 GTV、G Club 或喜马拉雅交易所（例如）的资金汇入特定银行账户。参见，例如，附件 A 第 40(g)、57、61-62 段。\n\na. 这些投资计划资金被转入 JE 等人使用的 80 多个银行账户并在这些账户之间转移，根据我的专业培训和经验，这种运作方式具有洗钱特征。参见附件 A 第 55 段。\n\nb. 具体而言，资金追踪情况反映出以下内容等：(a) 投资计划资金从美国银行账户转移至位于海外（包括阿联酋和巴哈马）高风险司法管辖区的银行账户，这些地区往往是洗钱的避风港；(b) 投资计划资金通过一系列实体和银行账户进行分层转移（layering），在某些情况下是依据所谓的贷款协议或其他财务安排进行的，其方式与隐瞒资金的性质、来源或出处相一致；(c) 投资于房地产或其他商业利益，而这些投资与控制银行账户的企业的既定业务目的无明显关联；以及 (d) 在同一天内，投资计划资金在多家银行之间以及同一家银行内的多个账户之间进行转移。参见附件 A 第 56-57 段。欺诈收益通过各类银行机构进行分层转移\n\n50. 根据我参与本项调查的情况、专业培训、经验、对各类银行账户记录的审查与分析、我本人以及 FBI 和 SEC 财务分析师所进行的财务分析、我在互联网上开展的开源网络情报研究、我对依据传票及司法授权搜查令获得的证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容等：\n\na. 投资计划资金中的大约 6,000 万美元（尤其是包括通过 GTV 股票发行和可转换贷款发行筹集的资金）在约 2021 年 5 月至 2021 年 6 月期间被转移至 Crane MSSB 账户，在此之前，该资金通过位于各不同银行的一系列实体进行了分层转移，根据我的专业培训和经验，这种方式具有洗钱特征。参见附件 A 第 58(a)、61-62 段。\n\nb. 来自 Crane MSSB 账户的约 6,000 万美元投资计划资金，与从 Crane 在另一家银行第一资本（Capital One）开设的两个账户（统称“Crane Capital One 账户”）转入 Crane MSSB 账户的约 4,900 万美元其他投资计划资金合并，使 Crane MSSB 账户的总余额增加至约 1.09 亿美元。附件 A 第 58(a)(iii) 段。\n\nc. Crane MSSB 账户中这笔约 1.09 亿美元投资计划资金中的约 7,900 万美元随后被转移至同一家银行（即 MSSB）但户名为 G Club 的账户（即 G Club MSSB 账户）。这笔约 7,900 万美元资金与来自 G Club 个人投资者以及来自 G Club 在签名银行（Signature Bank）、波多黎各第一银行（First Bank of Puerto Rico）和城市国家银行（City National Bank）的银行账户转入 G Club MSSB 账户的约 7,970 万美元其他投资计划资金合并，使 G Club MSSB 账户中的投资计划资金总余额增加至超过约 1.58 亿美元。欺诈收益被转移至商贸银行的目标账户\n\n51. 投资计划资金已被追踪至目标账户并在目标账户之间转移，根据我的专业培训和经验，其方式具有洗钱特征。具体而言，资金追踪情况反映出以下内容等：(a) 投资计划资金从美国银行账户转移至位于海外高风险司法管辖区的银行账户，这些地区往往是洗钱的避风港（包括巴哈马、香港、开曼群岛和英属维尔京群岛）；(b) 投资计划资金通过一系列实体和银行账户进行分层转移，在某些情况下是依据所谓的贷款协议或其他财务安排进行的，其方式与隐瞒资金的性质、来源或出处相一致；以及 (c) 投资计划资金在同一天内在各目标账户之间进行转移。\n\n52. 根据我对 MGH 提供的信息的审查，我得知截至约 2022 年 10 月 6 日，目标账户持有的资金总额约为 305,196,589.12 美元，如下表（“账户余额表”）所示：\n\n目标账户 账号 余额\n目标账户-1 MBI10103-0000 $12,887,977.68\n目标账户-2 MBI10133-0000 $10,312,965.97\n目标账户 账号 余额\n目标账户-3 MBI10137-0000 $3,196,001.32\n目标账户-4 MBI10138-0000 $277,000,000.00\n目标账户-5 MBI10139-0000 $356,460.30\n目标账户-6 MBI10171-0000 $1,211,105.79\n目标账户-7 MBI10172-0000 $52,078.06\n目标账户-8 MBI10183-0000 $180,000.00\n总计 $305,196,589.12\n\n53. 根据我参与本项调查的情况、专业培训、经验、对各类银行账户记录的审查与分析、我本人以及 FBI 和 SEC 财务分析师所进行的财务分析、我对法庭归档文件及依据传票和司法授权搜查令获得的证据的审查，以及我与他人的交谈，我获悉了以下内容等：\n\n目标账户-1\n\na. 在约 2021 年 5 月 5 日，有人向商贸银行（Mercantile Bank）提交了一份以 G Club Operations LLC 名义开立商业银行账户的申请（即“目标账户-1 申请”）。目标账户-1 申请将 G Club 的业务实质上及部分描述为“持有公司及企业的证券（或其他股权权益）”。\n\nb. G Club 的财务总监 Alex Hadjicharalambous（“Hadjicharalambous”）是目标账户-1 的授权签字人。参见附件 A 第 41(a) 段。\n\nc. 如上文账户余额表所示，截至 2022 年 10 月 6 日，目标账户-1 的账户余额为 12,887,977.68 美元。\n\nd. 投资计划资金已被追踪至目标账户-1；例如：\n\ni. 存入目标账户-1 的初始资金包括从 G Club 在 Medici Bank 持有的账户转入的约 400 万美元投资计划资金。\n\nii. 在约 2021 年 8 月 23 日至 2021 年 11 月 19 日之间，前述投资计划资金中的约 7,400 万美元从 G Club MSSB 账户转入目标账户-1。\n\niii. 在约 2021 年 12 月 24 日，投资计划资金中的约 1,000 万美元从尾号为 -7739、户名为 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（在 9 月 17 日宣誓书中被标识为“目标账户-1”，参见附件 A）的 Silvergate 银行账户转入目标账户-1。\n\n目标账户-2\n\ne. 在约 2021 年 11 月 11 日，有人向商贸银行提交了一份以 Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. 名义开立商业银行账户的申请（即“目标账户-2 申请”）。目标账户-2 申请反映出喜马拉雅清算（Himalaya Clearing）未计划从事数字货币活动。\n\nf. JE 是目标账户-2 的授权签字人，并被列为 Himalaya International Clearing Ltd. 的最终受益所有人及 100% 股东。\n\ng. 如上文账户余额表所示，截至 2022 年 10 月 6 日，目标账户-2 的账户余额为 10,312,965.97 美元。\n\nh. 投资计划资金已被追踪至目标账户-2；例如：\n\ni. 在约 2021 年 11 月 29 日至 2021 年 12 月 6 日之间，投资计划资金中的约 1 亿美元从大都会商业银行（Metropolitan Commercial Bank）和 Reserve Trust 的银行账户转入目标账户-2。参见 9 月 17 日宣誓书第 56(b)(i)、59(g)(iii)(3) 段。\n\nii. 在约 2021 年 12 月 2 日，前述投资计划资金中的约 5,000 万美元从目标账户-1 转入目标账户-2。\n\n目标账户-3\n\ni. 在约 2021 年 12 月 6 日，有人向商贸银行提交了一份以 Hamilton Capital Holdings Ltd. 名义开立商业银行账户的申请（即“目标账户-3 申请”）。目标账户-3 申请将 Hamilton Capital Holdings Ltd. 的业务实质上及部分描述为“提供后勤支持的咨询服务公司”。目标账户-3 申请将用于向目标账户-3 注资的资产来源描述为“贷款收益”。\n\nj. JE 是目标账户-3 的授权签字人，并被列为 Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd. 的最终受益所有人及 100% 股东。\n\nk. 如上文账户余额表所示，截至 2022 年 10 月 6 日，目标账户-3 的账户余额为 3,196,001.32 美元。\n\nl. 投资计划资金已通过商贸银行内部转账方式从目标账户-2 和目标账户-6 追踪至目标账户-3。具体而言：\n\ni. 在约 2021 年 12 月 7 日至 2022 年 8 月 5 日之间，投资计划资金中的约 4,200 万美元从目标账户-2 转入目标账户-3。\n\nii.\n\n在约2022年8月10日至2022年9月16日期间，约800万美元的投资计划资金（Investment Scheme Funds）从目标账户-6（Target Account-6）转入目标账户-3（Target Account-3）。\n\n目标账户-4（Target Account-4）\n\nm. 约在2021年12月2日，一份商业银行开户申请被提交至Mercantile Bank（商业银行），申请以Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.的名义开设账户（即“目标账户-4申请”）。该目标账户-4申请将Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.的业务性质描述为“投资管理”。虽然申请信息涉及“Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.”，但在该申请的确认（Acknowledgment）部分中，法人实体名称被（显然不准确地）填写为Himalaya Investment Reserves Ltd.。\n\nn. JE是目标账户-4的授权签署人，并被列为Himalaya International Reserves Ltd.的首席执行官（CEO）、最终受益所有人及100%控股股东。\n\no. 根据我对日期介于约2022年2月17日至2022年3月3日之间、涉及开设部分目标账户的Mercantile Bank副首席合规官（“MB Employee-1”）与Hamilton（汉密尔顿公司）总法律顾问Georgette Adonis-Roberts之间的电子邮件通信的审查，我获悉Hamilton向Mercantile Bank作出了如下陈述等：\n\ni. Himalaya Reserves（喜马拉雅储备）是“喜马拉雅美元发行方（the Himalaya Dollar Issuer）”。\n\nii. Himalaya Reserves“[无]直接客户”。\n\niii. 目标账户-4的声明用途是“[为]保留喜马拉雅美元收益的储备金”。\n\niv. 目标账户-4的预期活动将包括“持[有]喜马拉雅美元赎回所得款项”。\n\nv. 如上文账户余额表所示，截至2022年10月6日，目标账户-4的账户余额为$277,000,000.00。\n\np. 投资计划资金已被追查流向目标账户-4；例如：\n\ni. 约在2022年3月25日至约2022年8月5日期间，约1.15亿美元的投资计划资金从一个以Himalaya Clearing（喜马拉雅清算）名义持有的FV Bank（FV银行）账户（在9月20日宣誓书[September 20 Affidavit]中被标识为“目标账户-4”，参见附件C[Ex. C]）转入目标账户-4。\n\nii. 约在2022年5月16日，另有约1.5亿美元的投资计划资金从目标账户-2（即Himalaya Clearing）转入目标账户-4。\n\niii. 约在2022年6月27日，另有约1000万美元的投资计划资金从一个以Himalaya Reserves名义持有的FV Bank账户（在9月20日宣誓书[September 20 Affidavit]中被标识为“目标账户-3”，参见附件C[Ex. C]）转入目标账户-4。虽然Mercantile Bank的记录显示该笔转账发起于FV Bank，但发起银行账号被列为“*6891”，据我理解，该账号系指代表FV Bank持有的MCB汇总账户（pooled MCB account held FBO FV Bank）。参见附件A（Ex. A）第2(k)、62(e)段；另见附件C（Ex. C）第18(b)段。\n\n目标账户-5（Target Account-5）\n\nq. 约在2021年12月2日，一份商业银行开户申请被提交至Mercantile Bank，申请以Himalaya Financial Group Ltd.的名义开设账户（即“目标账户-5申请”）。该目标账户-5申请将Himalaya Financial（喜马拉雅金融）的业务性质描述为“管理投资”。\n\nr. 根据我对日期介于约2022年2月17日至2022年3月3日之间、涉及开设部分目标账户的MB Employee-1与Hamilton员工（包括首席财务官[CFO] Ehsan Masud以及总法律顾问Georgette Adonis-Roberts）之间的电子邮件通信的审查，我获悉Hamilton员工向Mercantile Bank作出了如下陈述等：\n\ni. Himalaya Financial是“喜马拉雅币发行方（Himalaya Coin Issuer）”。\n\nii. Himalaya Financial“没有直接客户，因为这些代币作为经纪商在喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）挂牌上市”。\n\niii. 目标账户-5的预期活动将包括“来自HICL [即Himalaya Clearing]的交易，以实现投资利润与付款”。\n\ns. JE是目标账户-5的授权签署人，并被列为Himalaya Financial Group Ltd.的首席执行官（CEO）、最终受益所有人及100%控股股东。\n\nt. 如上文账户余额表所示，截至2022年10月6日，目标账户-5的账户余额为$356,460.30。\n\nu. 投资计划资金已被追查流向目标账户-5；例如：\n\ni. 约在2022年3月25日，约1000万美元的投资计划资金从一个以Himalaya Clearing名义持有的FV Bank账户（在9月20日宣誓书[September 20 Affidavit]中被标识为“目标账户-4”，参见附件C[Ex. C]）转入目标账户-5。\n\nii. 约在2022年3月30日，另有约1000万美元的投资计划资金从同一FV Bank账户转入目标账户-5。\n\niii. 约在2022年4月15日，约2000万美元的投资计划资金从目标账户-2（即Mercantile Bank的Himalaya Clearing账户）转入目标账户-5。\n\n目标账户-6（Target Account-6）\n\nv. 约在2022年4月19日，一份商业银行开户申请被提交至Mercantile Bank，申请以Hamilton Investment Management Limited（汉密尔顿投资管理有限公司）的名义开设账户（即“目标账户-6申请”）。该目标账户-6申请将Hamilton Investment Management Limited的业务性质描述为“咨询”，并将用于为目标账户-6注资的资产来源描述为“贷款收益（loan proceed(s)）”。\n\nw. JE是目标账户-6的授权签署人，并被列为Hamilton Investment Management Limited的总裁（President）、最终受益所有人及100%控股股东。\n\nx. 根据我对日期约为2022年4月22日、涉及开设目标账户-6的MB Employee-1与Hamilton Investment Management Limited的首席财务官Gentjana Hysi（即“Hamilton CFO”）之间的电子邮件通信的审查，我实质上且部分地获悉了以下内容：\n\ni. MB Employee-1指出了在目标账户-6申请中所述的Hamilton Investment Management Limited的业务性质（“提供咨询服务的专业机构”）与如下渠道所反映的Hamilton业务性质之间的不一致之处：(a) 英国政府的公司注册处（UK Government’s registrar of companies，“金融中介”）；以及 (b) 该公司网站（“专门从事私募股权和数字资产管理的投资管理平台”）。针对此，Hamilton CFO作出了如下回复：\n\n完全理解您的困惑，您看到的网站属于Hamilton Investment Management Limited (B.V.I.)（英属维尔京群岛公司），而非英国实体。针对您的问题，HIM Limited (UK)（英国公司）不受监管且不处理客户资金，仅向第三方及其部分关联公司提供咨询服务。我们的IT团队正在努力解决网站问题和困惑。完成后，我们将向您分享链接。\n\nii. MB Employee-1索取了与目标账户-6的“贷款收益”资金来源相关的贷款文件。作为回复，Hamilton CFO通过电子邮件向MB Employee-1发送了一份贷款协议（即“HIML贷款协议”），并实质上且部分地写道：“HIML已向其一家关联公司提供了贷款授信……并且预计借款人将定期还款以减少贷款余额。”\n\ny. 根据我参与本调查以及我对包括HIML贷款协议在内的文件和记录的审查，我知悉如下事项等：\n\ni. HIML贷款协议的日期为2020年7月7日。\n\nii. Hamilton Investment Management Limited被列为“贷款人（Lender）”，而Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd.被列为“借款人（Borrower）”。\n\niii. 贷款人和借款人所列的注册办公地址均为位于英国伦敦的同一地址。\n\niv. 根据HIML贷款协议的条款，贷款人同意向借款人出借最高约2500万美元，用于“支付……在为贷款人寻找并在全球范围内提供潜在企业投资机会咨询建议期间所产生的费用”以及支付“运营、固定和经常性成本”。\n\nv. JE代表Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd.（即借款人）签署了HIML贷款协议。\n\nz. 如上所述，JE是Hamilton Capital Holding Ltd.（见上文第52(h)段）和Hamilton Investment Management Limited（见上文第52(s)段）两者的100%所有人。\n\naa. 如上文账户余额表所示，截至2022年10月6日，目标账户-6的账户余额为$1,211,105.79。\n\nbb. 投资计划资金已被追查流向目标账户-6；例如：\n\ni. 约在2022年7月13日，约800万美元的投资计划资金从目标账户-3（即Hamilton Capital Holding账户）转入目标账户-6。该笔转账的附言描述为“HCH贷款还款（HCH Loan Repayment）”。\n\nii. 约在2022年8月10日，约400万美元的投资欺诈资金（Investment Fraud Funds）从目标账户-6转回目标账户-3（即Hamilton Capital Holding账户）。该笔转账的附言描述为：“HIM将向HCH账户出借/转账400万美元（HIM will loan/transfer $4M to HCH account）”。\n\niii. 约在2022年9月16日，另有约400万美元的投资计划资金从目标账户-6转回目标账户-3（即Hamilton Capital Holding账户）。该笔转账的附言描述为：“贷款授信（Loan facility）”。\n\ncc. 根据我参与本调查以及我的专业训练和经验，且如上所述，我认为以所谓贷款还款的形式从目标账户-3（该账户为JE控制的账户）向目标账户-6（该账户为JE控制的账户）转账800万美元，以及随后以所谓贷款的形式从目标账户-6向目标账户-3转回800万美元，反映了通过对投资计划资金进行分层（layering）来洗钱的行为，其方式与隐瞒资金性质、来源或出处相一致。\n\n目标账户-7（Target Account-7）\n\ndd. 约在2022年4月27日，一份商业银行开户申请被提交至Mercantile Bank，申请以G Fashion International Limited的名义开设账户（即“目标账户-7申请”）。该目标账户-7申请将G Fashion International Limited的业务性质描述为“股权控股公司（Equity Holding Company）”。目标账户-7的声明用途为“[与]其他关联公司的现有关系”。目标账户-7申请中为G Fashion总法律顾问（“G Fashion GC”）提供的公司电子邮件地址为一个特定的“@hchktech.com”电子邮件地址。参见附件A（Ex. A）第41、59(f)段。\n\nee. 根据我对日期介于约2022年4月7日至2022年6月8日之间、涉及开设目标账户-7的MB Employee-1、MGH Employee-2、G Fashion GC以及Hadjicharalambous等人之间的电子邮件通信的审查，我实质上且部分地获悉了以下内容：\n\ni. Hadjicharalambous（其被列为G Club的财务主管[Financial Controller]，见上文第52(b)段）约于2022年4月7日通过电子邮件向G Fashion GC介绍了MGH Employee-2，并请求MGH Employee-2协助“快速推进（fast track）”为“G FASHION INTERNATIONAL LIMITED，一家BVI实体”开设账户。在该电子邮件中，Hadjicharalambous实质上且部分地表示，G Fashion“需要尽快（ASAP）开设一个账户”。\n\nii. 在给MB Employee-1的一封电子邮件中，G Fashion GC将G Fashion描述为“一家成立于2021年的高端时尚公司，完全通过其电子商务网站运营。该公司总部位于纽约市（NYC），客户遍布全球。此外，由于意大利制造商在时尚界享有高端且纯正的声誉，该公司的产品完全在意大利制造。该公司的愿景是成为高端时尚品牌，并与业内顶尖品牌正面竞争。”\n\niii.\n\n2022年5月5日或前后，Hadjicharalambous 向 MGH Employee-2 和 MB Employee-1 等人发送电子邮件，告知 Hadjicharalambous 今后“将从财务角度以与我管理 GCLUB BVI 账户非常类似的方式来处理该账户”。\n\niv. 如上述账户余额表所示，截至2022年10月6日，目标账户-7（Target Account-7）的账户余额为 $52,078.06。\n\nff. 投资计划资金（Investment Scheme Funds）已被追查通过四笔来自目标账户-2（即 Himalaya Clearing 账户）的 Mercantile Bank 内部转账进入目标账户-7，在2022年5月5日或前后至2022年8月19日期间总计约335万美元。在这四笔转入款项中，有两笔的交易摘要实质上且部分提及“HDO Redemption”（HDO 赎回）。\n\n目标账户-8（Target Account-8）\n\ngg. 2022年8月30日或前后，一份以 Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd 名义开立账户的企业银行账户申请表被提交给 Mercantile Bank（以下简称“目标账户-8申请表”）。该目标账户-8申请表将 Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd 的业务性质描述为“外包客户服务中心和合规咨询”。开立目标账户-8的声明目的如下：“我们希望以美元向客户收取服务费，然后以澳元转入我们的澳大利亚银行账户。遗憾的是，我们的澳大利亚银行不提供外汇兑换，只能接收澳元。”\n\nhh. JE（余建明）被列为 Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd 的最终实益拥有人及100%股东（通过其全资拥有的实体 Major Lead International Ltd.）。\n\nii. 根据我对2022年8月8日或前后至2022年8月31日期间 MB Employee-1、MGH Employee-2 与 Masud（即 Hamilton 的首席财务官）等人之间关于开立目标账户-8的电子邮件往来的审查，我实质上且部分了解到以下情况：\n\ni. 2022年8月24日或前后，Masud 向 MB Employee-1、MGH Employee-2 等人发送了一封电子邮件，其中包含关于名为 Himalaya Currency Clearing 的实体的信息，Masud 在实质上且部分将该实体描述为“集团内部的重要实体，因为它是少数持有监管牌照的实体之一”。在电子邮件中，Masud 要求 Mercantile Bank 为 Himalaya Currency Clearing 开立银行账户，“请尽快处理”。\n\nii. 在2022年8月29日或前后的后续电子邮件往来中，Hamilton 澳大利亚法律与合规主管 Heeseup Shin（以下简称“Shin”）向 MB Employee-1 等人实质上且部分告知，“William Je 是 Himalaya Currency Clearing Pty Ltd (Australia) 的最终受益人/个人股东（100%）”。\n\niii. 如上述账户余额表所示，截至2022年10月6日，目标账户-8的账户余额为 $180,000.00。\n\njj. 投资计划资金已被追查通过一笔来自目标账户-2（即 Himalaya Clearing 账户）的 Mercantile Bank 内部转账进入目标账户-8，发生于2022年9月13日或前后，总计约18万美元。\n\nIII. 不予披露及封存请求（Request for Non-Disclosure and Sealing）\n\n54. 这项正在进行的刑事调查的性质和范围——包括调查目标对象（Target Subjects of the Investigation）的身份——尚未为公众所知。如本文所述，支持先前扣押令（Prior Seizure Warrants）的宣誓书已作封存提交，目前仍处于封存状态。过早向公众披露本宣誓书或所请求的令状可能会向潜在的犯罪目标通风报信，使他们得知自己正受到调查，从而导致其销毁证据、逃避起诉，或以其他方式严重破坏调查。具体而言，如上所述，本案调查的目标对象似乎拥有有助于其逃避起诉的财务手段，且过去曾前往不太可能或不可能引渡回美国接受起诉的司法管辖区。\n\n55. 基於上述理由，我谨请求将本宣誓书及随附提交的所有文件予以封存，直至法院另有命令为止；但允许政府在无需本法院进一步命令的情况下，根据需要向协助调查和起诉本案的人员提供搜查令及宣誓书的副本，并在与本案相关的任何起诉中，根据需要披露上述材料以履行证据开示和披露义务。\n\nIV. 结论（Conclusion）\n\n56. 基于9月17日宣誓书、G Fashion 宣誓书、9月20日宣誓书以及前述内容中陈述的信息，我认为有相当理由（probable cause）相信，目标财产（Target Property）中持有的资金属于违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343（电信欺诈）所得的收益，和/或属于涉及违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)、1956(a)(2)(B)(i) 以及 1956(h)（洗钱及共谋洗钱）的财产，因此应予以没收。\n\n57. 据此，依据 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)，我谨请求法院签发令状，授权扣押目标财产。\n\nANTHONY ALECCI（安东尼·阿莱奇）\n特别探员\nFederal Bureau of Investigation（联邦调查局）\n根据《Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure》（联邦刑事诉讼规则）第 41(d)(3) 条和第 4.1 条，通过可靠的电子方式传送本宣誓书向我宣誓，于 2022 年 10 月 __ 日\n\nTHE HONORABLE STEWART D. AARON（斯图尔特·D·亚伦阁下）\nUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE（美国治安法官）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":14363,"status":"published","published_at":"2025-07-28 00:00:00","created_at":"2025-07-28","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:20:04"}