{"id":"court_sdny_783_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":783,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2026-01-05","title":"LAW OFFICES OF DRATEL & LEWIS","summary_zh":"法院裁定令 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF 783（2026年1月5日）。被告律师要求法院审查分类信息程序法（CIPA）第4条材料并在量刑阶段披露，主张 Brady v. Maryland 发现义务应适用于量刑；法院驳回请求。","summary_en":"Court Order — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo), Case No. 1:23-cr-00118 (SDNY), ECF No. 783 (filed January 5, 2026). Defense counsel request that the Court review classified materials under the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) Section 4 and disclose them at sentencing, arguing that Brady v. Maryland discovery obligations apply to sentencing proceedings; the Court denies the motion.","body_en":"LAW OFFICES OF\n**DRATEL & LEWIS**\n29 BROADWAY\nSuite 1412\nNEW YORK, NEW YORK 10006\n\nTELEPHONE (212) 732-0707\nFACSIMILE (212) 571-3792\nE-MAIL: jdratel@dratellewis.com\n\nJOSHUA L. DRATEL\nLINDSAY A. LEWIS\n\nAMY E. GREER\nJACOB C. EISENMANN\n\nSAMANTHA ENGST-MANSILLA\n*Paralegal*\n\nJanuary 5, 2026\n\n**BY ECF**\n\nThe Honorable Analisa Torres\nUnited States District Judge\nSouthern District of New York\nDaniel P. Moynihan United States Courthouse\n500 Pearl Street\nNew York, New York 10007\n\n> Re: *United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo),*\n> 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nDear Judge Torres:\n\nThis letter motion is submitted on behalf of Defendant Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo) – whom John Kaley, Esq., Melinda Sarafa, Esq., and I have been appointed to represent in the above-entitled matter – in connection with his motion for review of classified materials provided to the Court by the government in 2023 pursuant to Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (\"CIPA\"), 18 U.S.C. App. 3 (2000) (\"Section 4 material\"), and Rule 16(d), Fed.R.Crim.P. *See* ECF #s 210 & 252.\n\nWhile the Court issued a ruling (and disclosure of certain materials) in a May 29, 2024, Order (ECF # 363), that decision was rendered in the context of relevance to and admissibility at *trial*. Mr. Guo's instant motion seeks material and information in relation to *sentencing*, which has a far broader conception of relevance, and to which the Federal Rule of Evidence do not apply.\n\nIn addition, as discussed below, the due process principles of *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), apply fully at sentencing. *See also* Rule 5(f), Fed.R.Crim.P. (*see* ECF # 9). Also, as discussed below, classified information and material is discoverable under CIPA under an even more relaxed standard than under *Brady*.\n\nAs a result, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should review the CIPA Section 4 material and compel disclosure to cleared defense counsel those items material or helpful to Mr. Guo in the sentencing context. Also, as discussed below, consistent with traditional practice, counsel respectfully request an opportunity to present to the Court *ex parte* a roadmap of what materials and information counsel has a good-faith belief exists within the CIPA Section 4 material.\n\n### A. *The Applicability of* Brady v. Maryland, *373 U.S. 83 (1963) to Sentencing*\n\nThe due process principle that requires the government to provide exculpatory material to a defendant, manifested in *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), applies with equal force at sentencing. Indeed, *Brady* itself was a *sentencing* case, *id*. at 84, 88, and the rule stated by the Court was that \"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt *or to punishment*, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.\" *Id*. at 87 (emphasis added).\n\nMoreover, in the context of CIPA, information need not be \"material\" to the defense for disclosure to be required. Rather, the question is whether the information is \"helpful or material\" to the defense; in order \"to be helpful or material to the defense, evidence need not rise to the level that would trigger the Government's obligation under *Brady v. Maryland*, to disclose exculpatory information.\" *United States v. Aref*, 533 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2008).\n\nRather, \"[i]nformation can be helpful without being 'favorable' in the *Brady* sense.\" *Id*. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That is also broader than the Rule 16, Fed.R.Crim.P., standards that govern pretrial discovery production. Thus, when information may be helpful or material to the defense, the classified material or information must be provided, although the Court may permit the government to make appropriate deletions or substitutions. 18 U.S.C. App. 3 §4.\n\n### B. *The Broader Relevance Applicable at Sentencing Rather Than Trial*\n\nThe concept of relevance for purposes of sentencing is exceedingly broad. In fact, the statutory standard, defined in 18 U.S.C. §3661, reflects the broad discretion afforded district courts to determine a sentence: \"[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.\" *See also United States v. Murillo*, 902 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1990); *United States v. Jones*, 531 F.3d 163, 172 n. 6 (2d Cir. 2008).\n\nIn fact, in *Pepper v. United States*, 562 U.S. 476 (2011), the Court cited §3661 as an important means of achieving just sentences: \"[p]ermitting sentencing courts to consider the widest possible breadth of information about a defendant 'ensures that the punishment will suit not merely the offense but the individual defendant.'\" *Id*. at 488, *quoting Wasman v. United States*, 468 U.S. 559, 564 (1984).\n\nNor do the Federal Rules of Evidence apply at sentencing. *United States v. Fatico*, 458 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979). Instead, due process protections apply to ensure that a defendant is not sentenced on the basis of inaccurate or unreliable information proffered by the government. *Id*.\n\nConsequently, a review of the Section 4 materials for purposes of determining relevance and admissibility at sentencing is a vastly different exercise than with respect to trial.\n\n### C. *Determining Whether the Section 4 Material Is Discoverable for Sentencing*\n\nCIPA was not intended to, and does not, change the government's discovery obligations under *Brady* or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. *See, e.g., United States v. Libby*, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2006) (\"[CIPA] creates no new rights or limits on discovery of a specific area of classified information . . . [,] it contemplates an application of the general law of discovery in criminal cases to the classified information based on the sensitive nature of the classified information\"), *quoting United States v. Yunis*, 867 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1989).\n\nRather, the purpose of CIPA is to protect sensitive national security information, not to impede a defendant's rights in a criminal proceeding. *See United States v. Stewart*, 590 F.3d 93, 130 (2d Cir. 2009); *Aref*, 533 F.3d at 80 (government's privilege under CIPA \"must give way\" when classified information is helpful or material to the defense). *See also United States v. Dumeisi*, 424 F.3d 566, 578 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).\n\nIn fact, in enacting CIPA, Congress warned that \"the defendant should not stand in a worse position, because of the fact that classified information is involved, than he would without the Act.\" S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 9 (1980). *See also, e.g., United States v. Poindexter*, 698 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D.D.C. 1988).\n\nHere, counsel believe unequivocally that there exist within the heretofore undisclosed Section 4 materials information and materials that are helpful to Mr. Guo regarding sentencing.\n\n### D. *The Section 4 Materials at Issue and the Court's Prior Rulings*\n\nThe government's two CIPA Section 4 submissions are referenced in its December 22, 2023, and March 22, 2024, letters to the Court (ECF #s 210 & 252, respectively). In his November 17, 2023, motion for discovery (ECF #s 170 & 172), and referenced in the Court's February 21, 2024, Order (ECF # 243), Mr. Guo requested certain information and materials to which the Court denied access at that time, as well as the information that was the subject of the litigation culminating in the Court's May 29, 2024, Order (ECF # 363).\n\nThe specific items denied were Requests 5 and 19, and Request 6 in part. In addition, Mr. Guo renews his request, in the sentencing context, for an unredacted recording of the August 26, 2018, meeting, and for identification of other U.S. government agencies in possession of the aforementioned information.\n\nMr. Guo renews those denied requests in the broader context of sentencing. Mr. Guo also requests that his security-cleared counsel be afforded access to the classified information and materials the government submitted to the Court pursuant to CIPA Section 4 for purposes of preparing any application pursuant to CIPA Section 5 to use such information and materials with respect to sentencing.\n\n### E. *Defense Counsel Should Be Permitted to Make an* Ex Parte *Presentation to the Court Regarding How Classified Material May Be Helpful and Material at Sentencing*\n\nFurther, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should provide defense counsel an opportunity at an *in camera ex parte* conference consistent with the practice in other courts in the CIPA Section 4, context, to present to the Court *ex parte* information that will significantly assist the Court in evaluating the government's CIPA Section 4 submission, and whether it includes discoverable material or material that is helpful to the defense for sentencing.\n\nSuch a conference, which has been typical for CIPA Section 4 motions, permits defense counsel to explain why categories of potentially classified evidence may be relevant, material, and/or helpful to the defense for sentencing in this case, to answer questions from the Court in a contemporaneous fashion, and to permit dialogue to explore and clarify issues. It would also enable counsel to share with the Court potentially privileged information regarding the existence and/or relevance of certain material and information, for which counsel has a good-faith belief exists, without effecting a waiver.\n\nIn addition, this case is considerably more complicated than an ordinary case both factually and legally, and counsel's perspective on the favorable character of classified evidence, and what to look for, would make the Court's review more productive and comprehensive.\n\nSuch *ex parte* presentations by defense counsel have been conducted in numerous other cases involving CIPA Section 4 review (of which counsel is specifically aware; there are likely more). *See, e.g., United States v. Hossain*, 19 Cr. 606 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. September 15, 2021) (ECF # 138), at 2; *United States v. Schulte*, 17 Cr, 548 (JFM) (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2019) (ECF # 124), at 2; *United States v. Hausa*, 12 Cr. 134 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y. March 26, 2016) (ECF # 90) at 2; *United States v. Mostafa*, 04 Cr. 356 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. January 17, 2014) (ECF #233), at 6-7; *United States v. Sulaiman Abu Ghayth*, 98 Cr. 1023 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. August 19, 2013) (ECF # 1285) (ordering, in the context of a CIPA Section 4 submission by the government, that \"to permit the Court to be better informed to make the judgments called for by the government's CIPA motion . . . the Court will meet . . . *ex parte* with the defense to be better informed of the defenses they plan to present\" in addition to meeting with the government as to the same); *United States v. Khaled Al Fawwaz & Adel Abdel Bary*, 98 Cr. 1023 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. August 19, 2013) (ECF # 1284 (same); *United States v. Babar Ahmad*, 04 Cr. 301 (JCH) (D. Conn. April 15, 2013) (ECF # 72 (calendering an *ex parte* hearing regarding the government's CIPA Section 4 filing, at which the Court would also \"hear an *ex parte* presentation from the defense, as per their request, to assist the court in making its Section 4 determination\"). *See also Libby*, 429 F.Supp.2d at 26 (allowing the defendant to submit an *ex parte* affidavit detailing the defense); *United States v. Moalin*, 10 Cr. 4246 (JTM) (S.D.Cal. February 23, 2012) (ECF # 127) at 1 (same).<sup>1</sup>\n\n### Conclusion\n\nAccordingly, for all the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully requested that the Court (1) conduct a review of the information and materials previously provided by the government pursuant to CIPA Section 4 and determine which of that information and materials are relevant to sentencing, and order their disclosure to the defense (either in classified form to security-cleared counsel, or, if declassified, to all counsel); and (2) permit defense counsel the opportunity, an *in camera ex parte* conference, to brief the Court on what materials and information counsel anticipates would be favorable to Mr. Guo with respect to sentencing, and which counsel has a good-faith reason to believe is (or should be) included in the Section 4 material.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nJoshua L. Dratel\nJohn F. Kaley\nMelinda Sarafa\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant\nHo Wan Kwok (Miles Guo)*\n\nJLD/\n\n---\n\n<sup>1</sup> In addition to serving as defense counsel in *Hausa*, *Mostafa*, *Babar*, and *Moalin*, I also participated in this process in the Northern District of Texas, in *United States v. Mohammad El-Mezain*, 04 Cr. 240-G (AJF), in which (sometime in 2005) the Court, without issuing a written Order on the docket, conducted an *ex parte* conference in chambers with defense counsel to ascertain what the Court ought to be looking for when conducting its review of the CIPA §4 materials provided by the government.","body_zh":"DRATEL & LEWIS 律师事务所（Law Offices of Dratel & Lewis）\n百老汇 29 号 1412 室\n纽约州纽约市 10006\n\n电话：(212) 732-0707\n传真：(212) 571-3792\n电子邮箱：jdratel@dratellewis.com\n\nJoshua L. Dratel（约书亚·L·德拉特尔）\nLindsay A. Lewis（林赛·A·刘易斯）\n\nAmy E. Greer（艾米·E·格里尔）\nJacob C. Eisenmann（雅各布·C·艾森曼）\n\nSamantha Engst-Mansilla（萨曼莎·恩斯特-曼西利亚）\n律师助理（Paralegal）\n\n2026年1月5日\n\n通过 ECF（电子案件档案系统）提交\n\n尊敬的 Analisa Torres（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯）\n美国联邦地区法官\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区联邦地区法院）\nDaniel P. Moynihan United States Courthouse（丹尼尔·P·莫伊尼汉美国法院大楼）\n珍珠街 500 号\n纽约州纽约市 10007\n\n事由：United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo)（美国 诉 郭文贵），\n案号 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n尊敬的托雷斯法官：\n\n本信函动议代表被告 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵/Miles Guo）提交——John Kaley（约翰·凯利）律师、Melinda Sarafa（梅琳达·萨拉法）律师与本人已被指定在上述案件中担任其辩护人。本动议事关被告申请审查政府于 2023 年依据《机密信息程序法》（Classified Information Procedures Act，简称“CIPA”）第 4 条、18 U.S.C. App. 3 (2000)（“第 4 条材料”）以及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Fed.R.Crim.P.）第 16(d) 条向法院提供的机密材料。参见 ECF 编号 210 与 252。\n\n尽管法院曾在 2024年5月29日 的命令（ECF 编号 363）中作出裁定（并披露了某些材料），但该裁决是在审判（trial）阶段的相关性与可采性背景下作出的。郭先生本次提出的动议，所寻求的材料和信息与量刑（sentencing）相关；量刑阶段对相关性的认定范围远宽于审判阶段，且《联邦证据规则》（Federal Rules of Evidence）在此并不适用。\n\n此外，如下文所述，Brady v. Maryland（布雷迪 诉 马里兰州案），373 U.S. 83 (1963) 确立的正当程序原则完全适用于量刑阶段。亦见《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 5(f) 条（参见 ECF 编号 9）。同时，如下文所述，在 CIPA 框架下，机密信息与材料的证据开示标准比 Brady 规则更为宽松。\n\n因此，辩方谨此提请法院审查 CIPA 第 4 条材料，并强制向已获得安全审查许可的辩护律师披露在量刑背景下对郭先生具有实质重要性或有助益的条目。此外，如下文所述，按照司法惯例，辩护律师谨请求获得向法院进行单方（ex parte）陈述的机会，以向法院梳理一份路线图，阐明辩护律师有充分理由确信存在于 CIPA 第 4 条材料之中的具体材料与信息。\n\nA. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 适用于量刑阶段\n\nBrady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 所体现的、要求政府向被告提供开脱罪责材料的正当程序原则，在量刑阶段具有同等效力。事实上，Brady 案本身就是一起涉及量刑（sentencing）的案件，见该判决第 84、88 页；法院确立的规则是：“控方在收到请求后隐匿有利于被告的证据，若该证据对定罪或量刑（or to punishment）具有实质重要性，无论控方出于善意还是恶意，均违反正当程序。”见该案第 87 页（重点为后加）。\n\n而且，在 CIPA 的语境下，相关信息无需达到对辩方具有“实质重要性”（material）的程度即可被要求披露。相反，核心问题在于该信息对辩方是否“有助益或具有实质重要性”；“为了对辩护有助益或具有实质重要性，证据无需达到触发政府在 Brady v. Maryland 案项下披露开脱罪责信息之义务的程度。”United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2008)。\n\n相反，“信息即便不构成 Brady 意义上的‘有利证据’，也可以是‘有助益的’。”同上引注（引文及内部引号省略）。该标准同样宽于管辖审前证据开示移交的《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 16 条标准。因此，当信息可能对辩护有助益或具有实质重要性时，必须提供该机密材料或信息，不过法院可允许政府进行适当的删节或替换。18 U.S.C. App. 3 §4。\n\nB. 量刑阶段适用的相关性标准远宽于审判阶段\n\n用于量刑目的的相关性概念极为广泛。事实上，18 U.S.C. §3661 中界定的法定标准体现了赋予地区法院在确定量刑方面的广泛自由裁量权：“合众国法院为处以适当刑罚之目的而接收并考虑的、关于被判定犯罪之人背景、品格及行为之信息，不受任何限制。”亦见 United States v. Murillo, 902 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1990)；United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 172 n. 6 (2d Cir. 2008)。\n\n事实上，在 Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) 案中，最高法院援引了 §3661 作为实现公正判刑的重要手段：“允许量刑法院考量关于被告的最广泛信息，‘确保了刑罚不仅与罪行相适应，而且与被告个人相适应。’”见该案第 488 页，转引自 Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 564 (1984)。\n\n《联邦证据规则》在量刑阶段亦不适用。United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979)。取而代之的是正当程序保护机制的适用，以确保被告不会基于政府提供的不准确或不可靠的信息而被判刑。同上。\n\n因此，为了确定在量刑阶段的相关性与可采性而对第 4 条材料进行的审查，与针对审判阶段的审查是一项截然不同的工作。\n\nC. 确定第 4 条材料在量刑阶段是否属于可开示范围\n\nCIPA 的初衷并非改变、且确实未改变政府在 Brady 或《联邦刑事诉讼规则》项下的证据开示义务。参见例如 United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2006)（“[CIPA] 未针对特定领域的机密信息创设新的权利或开示限制……它考虑的是基于机密信息的敏感性质，将刑事案件证据开示的一般法律适用于机密信息”），转引自 United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1989)。\n\n相反，CIPA 的宗旨是保护敏感的国家安全信息，而非阻碍被告在刑事诉讼中的权利。参见 United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 130 (2d Cir. 2009)；Aref, 533 F.3d at 80（当机密信息对辩护有助益或具有实质重要性时，政府在 CIPA 项下的特权“必须让步”）。亦见 United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 578 (7th Cir. 2005)（引文省略）。\n\n事实上，国会在制定 CIPA 时曾告诫称：“被告不应仅仅因为案件涉及机密信息，就处于比没有该法案时更不利的境地。”S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 9 (1980)。亦见例如 United States v. Poindexter, 698 F. Supp. 316, 320 (D.D.C. 1988)。\n\n在本案中，辩护律师坚信，在迄今尚未披露的第 4 条材料中，明确存在关于量刑方面对郭先生有助益的信息和材料。\n\nD. 涉案的第 4 条材料与法院先前的裁定\n\n政府提交的两份 CIPA 第 4 条呈递材料，见于其分别于 2023年12月22日 和 2024年3月22日 致法院的信函（分别为 ECF 编号 210 与 252）。在郭先生 2023年11月17日 的证据开示动议（ECF 编号 170 与 172）中，以及法院 2024年2月21日 的命令（ECF 编号 243）所提及的内容中，郭先生曾请求获取某些信息和材料，法院当时拒绝了这些请求，同时被拒绝的还包括最终促成法院 2024年5月29日 命令（ECF 编号 363）诉讼标的之信息。\n\n被明确驳回的具体项为请求项 5 和 19，以及请求项 6 的部分内容。此外，郭先生在量刑背景下，重新申请获取 2018年8月26日 会议未经删节的录音，并要求指明持有前述信息的其他美国政府机构。\n\n郭先生在更为宽泛的量刑背景下重新提出上述曾被驳回的请求。郭先生亦请求允许其已获得安全审查许可的辩护律师查阅政府依据 CIPA 第 4 条向法院提交的机密信息和材料，以便依据 CIPA 第 5 条准备任何在量刑中使用此类信息与材料的申请。\n\nE. 应允许辩护律师就机密材料在量刑时如何具有助益和实质重要性向法院作单方陈述\n\n此外，辩方谨此提请法院，应参照其他法院在 CIPA 第 4 条背景下的惯例，在秘密审理单方（in camera ex parte）会议中向辩护律师提供机会，向法院作单方（ex parte）陈述，提供将显著协助法院评估政府 CIPA 第 4 条呈递材料的信息，并评估其中是否包含可开示的材料或在量刑上对辩方有助益的材料。\n\n此类会议在 CIPA 第 4 条动议中属于典型做法，它允许辩护律师解释为何某些类别的潜在机密证据可能在本案量刑中对辩护具有相关性、实质重要性和/或助益，并能实时回答法院的提问，通过对话探讨并澄清问题。这还将使辩护律师能够在不构成放弃特权的前提下，就律师有充分理由确信存在的某些材料和信息的存续性及/或相关性，向法院提供潜在的享有特权的信息。\n\n此外，本案在事实上和法律上都比普通案件要复杂得多，辩护律师就机密证据的有利性质以及查找方向所提供的视角，将使法院的审查工作更具成效和全面性。\n\n辩护律师作出的此类单方陈述已在涉及 CIPA 第 4 条审查的众多其他案件中实行（辩护律师明确知晓的已有诸多案件；实际可能更多）。参见例如 United States v. Hossain, 19 Cr. 606 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. 2021年9月15日) (ECF 编号 138)，第 2 页；United States v. Schulte, 17 Cr. 548 (JFM) (S.D.N.Y. 2019年7月22日) (ECF 编号 124)，第 2 页；United States v. Hausa, 12 Cr. 134 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y. 2016年3月26日) (ECF 编号 90)，第 2 页；United States v. Mostafa, 04 Cr. 356 (KBF) (S.D.N.Y. 2014年1月17日) (ECF 编号 233)，第 6-7 页；United States v. Sulaiman Abu Ghayth, 98 Cr. 1023 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2013年8月19日) (ECF 编号 1285)（在政府提交 CIPA 第 4 条材料的背景下裁定，“为使法院能更充分地了解情况以作出政府 CIPA 动议所要求的判断……除就相同事项与政府会面外，法院还将……与辩方进行单方（ex parte）会面，以更充分了解其计划提出的辩护理由”）；United States v. Khaled Al Fawwaz & Adel Abdel Bary, 98 Cr. 1023 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. 2013年8月19日) (ECF 编号 1284)（同上）；United States v. Babar Ahmad, 04 Cr. 301 (JCH) (D. Conn. 2013年4月15日) (ECF 编号 72)（就政府的 CIPA 第 4 条归档排定单方听证会，届时法院亦将“依辩方请求听取其单方陈述，以协助法院作出第 4 条裁定”）。亦见 Libby, 429 F.Supp.2d at 26（允许被告提交详细说明辩护意见的单方宣誓书）；United States v. Moalin, 10 Cr. 4246 (JTM) (S.D.Cal. 2012年2月23日) (ECF 编号 127) 第 1 页（同上）。1\n\n结论\n\n因此，基于上述所有理由，谨请求法院：(1) 对政府此前依据 CIPA（《机密情报保护法》）Section 4 提供的材料与信息进行审查，判定其中哪些材料与信息与量刑相关，并下令将其披露给辩方（以机密形式披露给具备安全许可的律师，或者如已解密，则披露给全体律师）；以及 (2) 允许辩护律师获得机会，在不公开且单方的会议中（in camera ex parte conference），向法院简要汇报律师预计在量刑方面对郭先生有利的材料与信息，且律师有充分善意的理由相信该等内容包含在（或应当包含在）Section 4 材料之中。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nJoshua L. Dratel（约书亚·L·德拉特尔）\nJohn F. Kaley（约翰·F·凯利）\nMelinda Sarafa（梅琳达·萨拉法）\n\n被告辩护律师\nHo Wan Kwok（Miles Guo）（郭文贵［郭文贵］）\n\nJLD/\n\n---\n\n1 除了在 Hausa 案、Mostafa 案、Babar 案和 Moalin 案中担任辩护律师外，我还曾在 Northern District of Texas（德克萨斯北区联邦地区法院）的 United States v. Mohammad El-Mezain 案（案号 04 Cr. 240-G (AJF)）中参与过这一程序。在该案中（2005年的某个时候），法院在未于案件卷宗中发布书面裁定/命令的情况下，在法官办公室与辩护律师举行了一次单方会议（ex parte conference），以确定法院在对政府提供的 CIPA § 4 材料进行审查时应当寻找什么内容。","key_entities":["CIPA","Guo","Brady","Classified Information","Dratel","Kwok","Miles Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Torres","Sarafa","Kaley","Je","Analisa Torres"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":9,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":72,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":90,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":124,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":127,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":138,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":233,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":243,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":363,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":1284,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":1285,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":2087,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-01-05 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-01-05","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:28:44"}