{"id":"court_sdny_785_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":785,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"FORFEITURE","filed_date":"2026-01-09","title":"U.S. Department of Justice [Type text]","summary_zh":"检方信函 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok 等人案（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo），SDNY 23-CR-118 (AT) ECF #785（2026年1月9日立案）。美国检方就没收财产免除申请（petitions for remission）与《美国法典》第21卷第853(n)条第三方财产主张的法律区别及设立特别主事的立场回应法院质询，指出普通债权人与诈骗受害者通常缺乏第853(n)条的法定诉讼资格，并提请法院依据《强制受害者赔偿法》（MVRA）裁定本案刑事赔偿不具可行性。","summary_en":"Government Letter — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok et al. (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 23-CR-118 (AT), ECF No. 785 (filed January 9, 2026). The Government responded to the Court's inquiry regarding the legal distinctions between administrative petitions for remission and third-party claims under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n), as well as the appointment of a special master, asserting that general creditors and fraud victims typically lack standing under § 853(n), and requested an order finding criminal restitution impracticable under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act.","body_en":"U.S. Department of Justice\n[Type text]\n                                                       United States Attorney\nw                                                      Southern District of New York\n\n                                                       The Jacob K. Javits Federal Building\n                                                       26 Federal Plaza, 37th Floor\n                                                       New York, New York 10278\n\n                                                       January 9, 2026\n\nBY ECF\nHonorable Analisa Torres\nUnited States District Judge\nSouthern District of New York\n500 Pearl Street\nNew York, NY\n\n       Re:     United States v. Miles Guo, S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nDear Judge Torres:\n\n        The Government respectfully writes in response to the Court’s Order, which requests the\nGovernment’s views on “(1) the differences between petitions for remission of forfeited assets and\nclaims submitted under § 853(n), and whether the Government proposes any method for resolving\nthe various claims; and (2) its position on the Court’s appointment of a special master to make\nrecommendations related to third-party claims.” Dkt. 782 (citations omitted). In addition, the\nGovernment respectfully requests that the Court enter an order finding that restitution would be\nimpracticable in this case under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3663A.\n\n       A. The Differences Between Petitions for Remission of Forfeited Assets and Claims\n          Submitted Under § 853(n)\n\n               1. Claims Submitted Under § 853(n)\n\n         Title 21, United States Code, Section 853 sets forth comprehensive procedural rules for the\nadministration of forfeiture, including when a third party, or petitioner, can claim an ownership\ninterest superior to the Government’s interest in forfeitable property through an “ancillary\nproceeding.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). Third parties have 30 days following notice (absent extension)\nto file a claim with the district court asserting an interest in specific property that the Government\nseeks to finally forfeit, which will then be adjudicated as part of an ancillary proceeding. See 21\nU.S.C. § 853(n)(6). Section 853(n) provides that any third-party petitioner has standing to assert\nits claim to specific property, where the petitioner demonstrates “an interest in a particular, specific\nasset, as opposed to a general interest in an entire forfeited estate or account.” United States v.\nRibadeneira, 105 F.3d 833, 835-36 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added). Thus, in order to contest the\nforfeiture of a specific asset, a petitioner must establish that he has standing—i.e., a “legal interest\nin” that asset. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2). As a result, general creditors have no standing to file a\n§ 853(n) claim, because they have no interest in specific forfeited property. See Ribadeneira, 105\nF.3d at 835-36; see also DSI Assocs. LLC v. United States, 496 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 2007) (“As\n\na general creditor of Kings Holdings and Gordon, DSI does not possess a ‘legal right, title, or\ninterest in the property’ that was forfeited as required for standing under section 853(n)(6)(A).”);\nUnited States v. McCorkle, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (“A general creditor has\nno ‘vested’ or ‘superior’ interest in particular assets forfeited unless he not only has secured a\njudgment against the debtor, but also has perfected a lien against the particular item.”).\n\n        Courts have determined that fraud victims are typically general creditors and thus lack\nstanding to assert a § 853(n) claim. United States v. Lesak, No. 07 Cr. 0396 (GEL), 2009 WL\n1788411, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Crime victims are typically general creditors.” (citing United\nStates v. Eldick, 223 F. App’x 837 (11th Cir. 2007)); see also Eldick, 223 F. App’x at 839-40 (“A\nfraud victim who voluntarily transfers property to the defendant has a cause of action in tort against\nthe defendant but has no greater interest in the forfeited property than does any other general\ncreditor. Title to the funds in question no longer belongs to the victim; it belongs to the\ndefendant.”) 1.\n\n       Once a petitioner demonstrates standing, there are two avenues, set forth in § 853(n)(6), by\nwhich he or she may prevail in claiming forfeited property, namely, where:\n\n               (A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property,\n               and such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid\n               in whole or in part because . . . [it] was vested in the petitioner rather\n               than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of\n               the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave\n               rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section; or\n\n               (B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title,\n               or interest in the property and was at the time of purchase reasonably\n               without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture\n               under this section.\n\n21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6); see Pacheco v. Serendensky, 393 F.3d 348, 353 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Under the\nstatute, one of two conditions must adhere for an intervenor to receive relief.”). The burden is on\nthe petitioner to demonstrate his or her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See 21 U.S.C.\n§ 853(n)(6); Watts, 786 F.3d at 160.\n\n1\n  In limited circumstances, where a court has imposed the equitable remedy of creating a\nconstructive trust, a fraud victim may have standing to assert a § 853(n) claim. In general terms,\n“a constructive trust arises when, in the eyes of equity, a [person] is the true owner of the property\nat issue due to his right to the underlying assets from which it derives.” United States v. Watts, 786\nF.3d 152, 168 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The creation of a\nconstructive trust, however, requires both the absence of an adequate legal remedy and direct\ntracing of the petitioner’s property to the assets subject to forfeiture. See In re First Central\nFinancial Corp., 377 F.3d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2004). In other words, there would still have to be a\ngreater showing than mere victimhood.\n\n        Section 853(n)(6)(A) applies to third parties who had an interest in property before the\nsubject crime was committed (i.e., before the Government’s interest vested). This “leads inevitably\nto the conclusion that § 853(n)(6)(A) is likely never to apply to proceeds of the crime.” United\nStates v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. King, No. 10 Cr.\n122 (JGK), 2012 WL 2261117, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2012) (“[W]here a petitioner claims an\ninterest in property purchased with crime proceeds, § 853(n)(6)(A) will likely never apply, because\ncrime proceeds, by definition, do not precede the commission of criminal activity but instead result\nfrom that criminal activity.”).\n\n        Section 853(n)(6)(B) applies to third parties who innocently acquired property after the\ncrime. United States v. Chowaiki, 369 F. Supp. 3d 565, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing Watts, 786\nF.3d at 166). In order to state a claim for relief under § 853(n)(6)(B), a claimant must allege facts\nsufficient to prove three elements: (1) a legal interest in the property; (2) that the interest was\nacquired by the petitioner as a bona fide purchaser for value; and (3) that the interest was acquired\nat a time when the claimant was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject\nto forfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. ' 853(n)(6)(B); United States v. Allmendinger, 10 Cr. 248-01, 2012\nWL 966615, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2012).\n\n               2. Petitions for Remission\n\n         Although victims, as general creditors, are foreclosed from § 853(n) claims, aside from\nrestitution, their remedy is to seek recovery through the remission process of the Money\nLaundering, Narcotics and Forfeiture Section (“MNF”) (formerly the Money Laundering and\nAsset Recovery Section of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division), as discussed below.\n\n        Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Part 9, victims who do not have standing to pursue § 853(n) claims\nmay be eligible for remission drawn from forfeited funds if they can demonstrate several factors,\nincluding (among others): (1) that they have suffered a “pecuniary loss of a specific amount [that]\nhas been directly caused by the criminal offense, or related offense” and “is supported by\ndocumentary evidence”; and (2) “[t]he victim did not knowingly contribute to, or participate in,\nbenefit from, or act in a willfully blind manner towards the commission of the offense, or related\noffense, that was the underlying basis of the forfeiture.” 28 C.F.R. § 9.8(b)(1), (3). Generally, MNF\nwill grant remission on a pro rata basis where the amount to be distributed is less than the value\nof the victims’ losses. 28 C.F.R. § 9.8(e). Additionally, the regulations permit the use of trustees\nor other non-government personnel to assist in the processing and determination of remission\nclaims, particularly in cases involving a large number of victims, as if the case here. 28 C.F.R.\n§ 9.8(d).\n\n       B. Resolving the § 853(n) Claims in this Case\n\n       Following the entry of a preliminary order of forfeiture as to Yanping Wang, as well as the\npreliminary order of forfeiture as to Guo, Dkt. 719, 2 approximately 134 purported § 853(n) claims\n\n2\n Prior to January 20, 2026, the Government intends to file a motion for an amended preliminary\norder of forfeiture to add approximately four additional assets obtained by the Government: two\n\nwere filed on the docket. 3 The Government is reviewing those purported claims, and is in the\nprocess of categorizing each to determine whether a purported claim is from (i) a general creditor,\nsuch as a victim demonstrating an interest in recovering their loss from crime proceeds; (ii) a party\nwith standing to assert an interest under § 853(n)(6)(A); or (iii) a party with standing to assert an\ninterest under § 853(n)(6)(B).\n\n        The Government believes the appointment of a special master to assist the Court in its\nevaluation of the purported § 853(n) claims is warranted. The special master can review the\napproximately 134 filed claims in parallel with the Government and recommend to the Court\nwhich, if any, of those claims should be dismissed because they are claims made by general\ncreditors. With respect to any remaining claims, the Government will evaluate on a case-by-case\nbasis the appropriate disposition for each and recommend to the Court further proceedings. (The\nGovernment would consider whether those dismissed claims should be treated as petitions for\nremission.) Indeed, the Government is presently reviewing all the purported claims and estimates\nits review will take additional weeks to complete. As to each claim that is not dismissed upon\nrecommendation of the special master, the Government would either (i) move the Court for its\ndismissal; or (ii) make a proposal to the Court for further proceedings, whether recognizing a\nstipulation of settlement between the parties, adjudicating a dismissal motion, or setting a\ndiscovery schedule and date for a forfeiture hearing to dispose of the claim. To the extent there is\nadditional litigation between a claimant and the Government, the special master can further assist\nthe Court, as appropriate, in adjudicating the claim.\n\n       C. Restitution Is Impracticable In This Case Under the Mandatory Victim\n          Restitution Act\n\n        Under the MVRA, restitution to persons “directly and proximately harmed” by the\ndefendant’s counts of conviction is ordinarily mandatory. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1),\n(c)(1)(A)(ii). The MVRA, however, recognizes that, in certain cases, restitution cannot be\nmandatory because its imposition would be impossible, including when “the number of\nidentifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impracticable,” or when imposing restitution\nwould require “determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victim’s\nlosses” which “would complicate or prolong the sentencing process.” Id. § 3663A(c)(3). In\nsituations where restitution is impracticable, the Government routinely seeks to return money to\nvictims through the remission process, governed by 28 C.F.R. Part 9. When a court makes a finding\nthat a restitution order is impracticable, the Department of Justice regularly uses a forfeiture\nremission process to compensate victims, and it would do so in this case. See, e.g., United States\nv. Madoff, 09 Cr. 213 (DC), Dkt. 106 & United States v. Bonventre, 10 Cr. 228, Dkt. 318 (Madoff\n\nchecks made payable to G Club entities, and certain funds held in deposit in foreign banks accounts\nheld in the name of co-defendant Kin Ming Je and/or his wife.\n3\n  In addition, the Government has received approximately 238 purported § 853 claims by mail,\nwhich will be treated as petitions for remission, given that § 853(n) claimants must “petition the\ncourt,” not the Government. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2). Should the Court wish to treat these as\nthird-party claims, however, the Government will provide them to the Court for the Court’s\nadjudication.\n\nPonzi scheme); United States v. Sharma, 18 Cr. 340, Dkt. 407 (multi-million-dollar cryptocurrency\nscheme); United States v. Dos Santos, 20 Cr. 398, Dkt. 283 (multi-million-dollar cryptocurrency\nscheme); United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried, 22 Cr. 673, March 28, 2024 Minute Order;\nUnited States v. Do Kwon, 23 Cr. 151, Dkt. 64 (forty-billion dollar cryptocurrency scheme).\n\n        The forfeiture statutes authorize the Attorney General to “grant petitions for mitigation or\nremission of forfeiture, restore forfeited property to victims of a violation of this subchapter, or\ntake any other action to protect the rights of innocent persons which is in the interest of justice and\nwhich is not inconsistent with the provisions of this section.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(i)(1). It is the policy\nof the Department of Justice, consistent with the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, to ensure that crime\nvictims receive “full and timely restitution as provided in law.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1).\nAccordingly, when the Government seizes property in connection with a criminal case, the\nGovernment’s goal is to forfeit the property and then, in remission proceedings administered by\nthe Attorney General through his delegee, the MNF Chief, to distribute funds to victims.\nFrequently MNF will distribute those assets through a remission program by which victims may\npetition for portions of forfeited property. See, e.g. Sharma, 2022 WL 1910026, at *2. In order to\nqualify for remission, a crime victim must provide information to the Government to support\nspecific elements, including that they suffered a specific pecuniary loss directly caused by the\ncriminal offense, that the victim did not contribute to the offense, that the victim has not been in\ncompensated for the loss from another means, and that the victim has no other recourse available.\nSee generally 28 C.F.R. § 9.8(b).\n\n         Because of the complexity of this case and the number of victims involved, awarding\nrestitution to victims in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3663A would be extremely costly and\nadministratively impractical. The cost and time associated with calculating each victim’s loss,\ndetermining whether the victim has already been compensated through the Securities and\nExchange Commission (“SEC”) or otherwise, and then paying out a percentage of each of the\nvictims’ losses would delay payment and diminish the amount of money actually paid to victims.\nTherefore, consistent with the Government’s frequent approach in complex cases with numerous\nvictims, the Government does not seek restitution, and instead moves for entry of an order finding\nthat restitution would be impracticable in this case. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3).\n\n         Indeed, this Court has ordered compensation through a remission process in lieu of\nrestitution for Yanping Wang, Guo’s co-defendant. Dkt. 495. The facts underlying the Court’s\ndecision with respect to Wang are largely similar and equally applicable to Guo. Victims’ interests\nwill be best served in this case through remission of finally forfeited funds through MNF’s\nremission process. An alternative arrangement whereby restitution is calculated and distributed to\nvictims by the Government and the Court would be nearly impossible administratively, and would\ncome at great expense to victims’ recovery. In order to enter an order of restitution, the Court\nwould need to determine and corroborate each victim’s losses. That would require determining\nand corroborating, for each of the thousands of victims, both the amount of funds the victim\nprovided the Guo Enterprise, any partial refunds from the Guo Enterprise, the amount a victim was\ncompensated through the SEC’s disgorgement process, and potentially any funds returned to the\nvictim through collateral means. That task is all the more challenging given the global nature of\nthe defendant’s fraud. Instead, a process whereby the Government distributes finally forfeited\n\nfunds through a contracted claims administrator will promote efficiency, and will not “complicate\nor prolong the sentencing process” at the expense of the victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3).\n\n       D. Conclusion\n\n         Accordingly, the Government respectfully requests that the Court: (1) appoint a special\nmaster to assist the Court in evaluating § 853(n) claims; and (2) enter an order finding that\nrestitution would be impracticable in this case.\n\n                                           Respectfully submitted,\n\n                                           SEAN S. BUCKLEY\n                                           Attorney for the United States\n                                           Acting Under Authority Conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515.\n\n                                     by:       /s/\n                                           Micah F. Fergenson\n                                           Ryan B. Finkel\n                                           Justin Horton\n                                           Juliana N. Murray\n                                           Assistant United States Attorneys\n                                           (212) 637-2190 / 6612 / 2276 / 2314\n\ncc:    Counsel of Record (by ECF)","body_zh":"U.S. Department of Justice（美国司法部）\n[Type text]\n                                                       United States Attorney（联邦检察官）\nw                                                      Southern District of New York（纽约南区）\n\n                                                       The Jacob K. Javits Federal Building\n                                                       26 Federal Plaza, 37th Floor\n                                                       New York, New York 10278\n\n                                                       2026年1月9日\n\nBY ECF（经由ECF系统）\nHonorable Analisa Torres（尊敬的阿纳丽莎·托雷斯法官）\nUnited States District Judge（联邦地区法官）\nSouthern District of New York（纽约南区）\n500 Pearl Street\nNew York, NY\n\n       案由：United States v. Miles Guo（美国 诉 郭文贵案），S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n尊敬的托雷斯法官：\n\n        针对法院的裁定，政府谨此致信作出回应。该裁定要求政府就以下事项发表意见：“(1) 申请免除没收财产（petitions for remission of forfeited assets）与根据 § 853(n) 提起的权利主张之间的区别，以及政府是否提出任何解决各类主张的方法；以及 (2) 政府对法院任命一名特别主事官（special master）就第三方主张提出建议这一事项的立场。”案卷编号 782（引文省略）。此外，政府谨请求法院根据 Mandatory Victim Restitution Act（《强制被害人赔偿法》，“MVRA”），18 U.S.C. § 3663A，作出一项认定在本案中实施赔偿并不切实际的命令。\n\n       A. 申请免除没收财产与根据 § 853(n) 提起的权利主张之间的区别\n\n               1. 根据 § 853(n) 提起的权利主张\n\n         Title 21, United States Code, Section 853（《美国法典》第21编第853条）为没收的管理设立了全面的程序规则，包括第三方或请愿人（petitioner）何时可以通过“附随程序”（ancillary proceeding）就可没收财产主张优于政府利益的所有者权益。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)。第三方在收到通知后有30天时间（在没有延期的情况下）向地区法院提出主张，就政府寻求最终没收的特定财产主张权益，随后该主张将作为附随程序的一部分进行审理。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)。Section 853(n) 规定，任何第三方请愿人若要具备就特定财产主张权利的原告资格（standing），必须证明“对某一特定、具体的资产享有权益，而非对被没收的全部财产或账户享有一般性权益”。United States v. Ribadeneira, 105 F.3d 833, 835-36 (2d Cir. 1997)（后加下划线强调）。因此，为了对特定资产的没收提出异议，请愿人必须确立其具备诉讼资格——即对该资产享有“法律上的权益”。21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2)。因此，普通债权人（general creditors）无权提出 § 853(n) 主张，因为他们对特定的被没收财产不享有权益。参见 Ribadeneira, 105 F.3d at 835-36；亦见 DSI Assocs. LLC v. United States, 496 F.3d 175, 184 (2d Cir. 2007)（“作为 Kings Holdings 和 Gordon 的普通债权人，DSI 并不拥有被没收财产的‘法定权利、所有权或权益’，而这是根据 section 853(n)(6)(A) 确立诉讼资格所必需的。”）；United States v. McCorkle, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2000)（“普通债权人对被没收的特定资产不享有‘既得’或‘优先’权益，除非其不仅获得了针对债务人的判决书，还针对该特定物品设定并完善了留置权。”）。\n\n        法院已裁定，欺诈受害者通常属于普通债权人，因此缺乏提出 § 853(n) 主张的诉讼资格。United States v. Lesak, No. 07 Cr. 0396 (GEL), 2009 WL 1788411, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)（“犯罪受害者通常是普通债权人。”（引用 United States v. Eldick, 223 F. App’x 837 (11th Cir. 2007)））；亦见 Eldick, 223 F. App’x at 839-40（“自愿将财产转移给被告的欺诈受害者对被告享有侵权诉由，但对被没收财产享有的权益并不大于任何其他普通债权人。涉案资金的所有权已不再属于受害者；而是属于被告。”）1。\n\n       一旦请愿人证明其具备诉讼资格，根据 § 853(n)(6) 的规定，其可以通过两种途径在主张被没收财产中胜诉，即当：\n\n               (A) 请愿人对该财产享有法定权利、所有权或权益，且该等权利、所有权或权益使得没收命令全部或部分无效，原因是在引发本条项下财产没收的行为发生之时，该等权利、所有权或权益……已归属于请愿人而非被告，或优于被告的任何权利、所有权或权益；或者\n\n               (B) 请愿人是该财产上的权利、所有权或权益的善意有偿取得人（bona fide purchaser for value），且在购买时合理地没有理由相信该财产属于本条项下应予没收的财产。\n\n21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)；参见 Pacheco v. Serendensky, 393 F.3d 348, 353 (2d Cir. 2004)（“根据该法定条文，参加人若要获得救济，必须符合这两个条件之一。”）。请愿人承担以优势证据证明其主张的举证责任。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)；Watts, 786 F.3d at 160。\n在有限的情况下，当法院适用了设立拟制信托（constructive trust）的衡平法救济时，欺诈受害者可能具备提出 § 853(n) 主张的诉讼资格。概括而言，“拟制信托产生于在衡平法看来，由于某人对作为该财产来源的基础资产享有权利，因而其属于涉案财产的真正所有人。”United States v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 168 (2d Cir. 2015)（内部引号及变动省略）。然而，拟制信托的设立既要求缺乏充分的普通法救济，又要求将请愿人的财产直接追踪对应至应予没收的资产。参见 In re First Central Financial Corp., 377 F.3d 209, 215 (2d Cir. 2004)。换句话说，仍必须作出超出单纯受害者身份的更多证明。\n\n        Section 853(n)(6)(A) 适用于在涉案犯罪发生之前即对财产享有权益的第三方（即在政府权益既得之前）。这“不可避免地得出一个结论，即 § 853(n)(6)(A) 可能永远不适用于犯罪所得。”United States v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2000)；亦见 United States v. King, No. 10 Cr. 122 (JGK), 2012 WL 2261117, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2012)（“当请愿人对用犯罪所得购买的财产主张权益时，§ 853(n)(6)(A) 可能永远不适用，因为根据定义，犯罪所得并非先于犯罪活动的发生，而是产生于该犯罪活动。”）。\n\n        Section 853(n)(6)(B) 适用于在犯罪发生后无辜取得财产的第三方。United States v. Chowaiki, 369 F. Supp. 3d 565, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)（引用 Watts, 786 F.3d at 166）。为了根据 § 853(n)(6)(B) 提出救济请求，主张人必须主张足以证明以下三项要件的事实：(1) 对该财产享有法律上的权益；(2) 该权益系由请愿人作为善意有偿取得人而取得；以及 (3) 取得该权益时，主张人合理地没有理由相信该财产属于应予没收的财产。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B)；United States v. Allmendinger, 10 Cr. 248-01, 2012 WL 966615, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2012)。\n\n               2. 申请免除没收财产\n\n         尽管受害者作为普通债权人被排除在 § 853(n) 主张之外，但除赔偿外，他们的救济途径是通过 Money Laundering, Narcotics and Forfeiture Section（洗钱、麻醉品与没收处，“MNF”，原为司法部刑事司洗钱与资产追回处）的免除程序寻求受偿，如下文所述。\n\n        根据 28 C.F.R. Part 9，没有诉讼资格提起 § 853(n) 主张的受害者，如果能够证明若干因素，则可能有资格从被没收资金中获得免除款项，这些因素包括（除其他外）：(1) 他们遭受了“由该刑事犯罪或相关犯罪直接造成的特定数额的金钱损失”，且“有书面证据支持”；以及 (2) “受害者未明知地促成、参与、受益于作为没收基础的犯罪或相关犯罪的实施，或对此采取蓄意视而不见（willfully blind）的态度。”28 C.F.R. § 9.8(b)(1), (3)。通常情况下，当拟分配金额低于受害者损失价值时，MNF 将按比例（pro rata）批准免除。28 C.F.R. § 9.8(e)。此外，法规允许使用受托人或其他非政府人员来协助处理和裁定免除申请，特别是在涉及大量受害者的案件中，如同本案的情形。28 C.F.R. § 9.8(d)。\n\n       B. 解决本案中的 § 853(n) 权利主张\n\n       在对 Yanping Wang（王雁平）作出初步没收令，以及对郭文贵作出初步没收令（案卷编号 719）之后，2 诉讼案卷中提交了大约 134 项声称的 § 853(n) 主张。3 政府正在审查这些声称的主张，并正在进行分类，以确定声称的主张是否来自：(i) 普通债权人，例如表明有意从犯罪所得中追回其损失的受害者；(ii) 有诉讼资格根据 § 853(n)(6)(A) 主张权益的当事方；或 (iii) 有诉讼资格根据 § 853(n)(6)(B) 主张权益的当事方。\n在2026年1月20日之前，政府打算提出一项修改初步没收令的动议，以增加政府取得的大约四项额外资产：两项\n\n        政府认为，任命一名特别主事官协助法院评估声称的 § 853(n) 主张是合理的。特别主事官可以与政府并行审查已提交的大约 134 项主张，并向法院建议其中哪些主张（如有）应予驳回，因为它们属于普通债权人提出的主张。对于任何剩余的主张，政府将逐案评估每项主张的适当处理方式，并向法院建议进一步的诉讼程序。（政府会考虑是否应将那些被驳回的主张作为免除申请处理。）事实上，政府目前正在审查所有声称的主张，并预计其审查还需要数周时间才能完成。对于特别主事官建议不予驳回的每一项主张，政府将要么 (i) 提请法院予以驳回；要么 (ii) 向法院提出进一步程序建议，无论是确认当事方之间的和解协议、就驳回动议进行裁决，还是设定证据开示日程和没收听证会日期以对该主张进行处理。在主张人与政府之间存在进一步诉讼的情况下，特别主事官可以在适当时进一步协助法院审理该主张。\n\n       C. 根据《强制被害人赔偿法》，在本案中实施赔偿并不切实际\n\n根据 MVRA（《强制受害者赔偿法》，Mandatory Victims Restitution Act），通常必须对受到被告被定罪的罪名项“直接且近因损害”的人员进行赔偿。参见 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii)。然而，MVRA 承认，在某些案件中，赔偿不能强制适用，因为实施赔偿将是不可能的，包括“可识别的受害者人数众多以致赔偿不可行”，或实施赔偿将需要“确定与受害者损失的原因或金额相关的复杂事实问题”，从而“使量刑程序复杂化或延长量刑程序”。同上 § 3663A(c)(3)。在赔偿不可行的情况下，政府通常通过由 28 C.F.R. 第 9 部分管辖的减免程序寻求向受害者返还款项。当法院作出赔偿命令不可行的认定时，Department of Justice（司法部）经常使用没收减免程序来补偿受害者，并且在本案中亦将如此处理。参见，例如，United States v. Madoff，案号 09 Cr. 213 (DC)，Dkt. 106 以及 United States v. Bonventre，案号 10 Cr. 228，Dkt. 318（Madoff\n\n以 G Club（G会所）实体为收款人的支票，以及以共同被告 Kin Ming Je（余建明）和/或其妻子的名义存放在外国银行账户中的某些资金。\n\n此外，政府已通过邮寄方式收到大约 238 份声称依据第 853 条提出的主张，鉴于 § 853(n) 的权利主张人必须“向法院提出请求”而非向政府提出，这些主张将被视为减免申请。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2)。然而，如果法院希望将这些视作第三方主张，政府将向法院提交以便法院进行裁判。\n\n庞氏骗局）；United States v. Sharma，案号 18 Cr. 340，Dkt. 407（数百万美元加密货币骗局）；United States v. Dos Santos，案号 20 Cr. 398，Dkt. 283（数百万美元加密货币骗局）；United States v. Samuel Bankman-Fried，案号 22 Cr. 673，2024年3月28日简要命令（Minute Order）；United States v. Do Kwon，案号 23 Cr. 151，Dkt. 64（四百亿美元加密货币骗局）。\n\n没收法规授权 Attorney General（司法部长）“准予减轻或减免没收的请求、将没收财产返还给违反本分部行为的受害者，或采取符合司法利益且不与本条规定相悖的任何其他行动以保护无辜人员的权利。”21 U.S.C. § 853(i)(1)。司法部的政策是，在符合 Crime Victims’ Rights Act（《犯罪受害者权利法》）的前提下，确保犯罪受害者获得“法律规定的充分且及时的赔偿”。参见 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1)。因此，当政府扣押与刑事案件相关的财产时，政府的目标是没收该财产，随后在由司法部长通过其被授权人 MNF 主管管理的减免程序中，将资金分配给受害者。MNF 经常会通过减免项目分配这些资产，受害者可以通过该项目申请分配部分没收财产。参见，例如 Sharma, 2022 WL 1910026, at *2。为了符合减免资格，犯罪受害者必须向政府提供支持特定要件的信息，包括他们遭受了由该犯罪行为直接造成的特定金钱损失、受害者未助长该犯罪行为、受害者未通过其他途径获得该损失的补偿，以及受害者没有其他可用的求偿途径。参见通说 28 C.F.R. § 9.8(b)。\n\n由于本案的复杂性以及涉及的受害者人数，根据 18 U.S.C. § 3663A 向受害者判处赔偿将极其昂贵且在行政上不切实际。计算每位受害者的损失、确定受害者是否已通过 Securities and Exchange Commission（“SEC”，证券交易委员会）或其他途径获得补偿，然后按各受害者损失的比例进行支付，由此产生的时间和成本将拖延支付并减少实际支付给受害者的金额。因此，与政府在涉及众多受害者的复杂案件中通常采取的做法一致，政府不寻求判处赔偿，而是提请动议要求作出认定本案中赔偿不可行的命令。18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)。\n\n确实，本法院已命令通过减免程序代替向郭的共同被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）判处赔偿。Dkt. 495。法院就王作出的裁决所依据的事实与 Guo（郭文贵）大体相似，并同等适用于郭。本案中，通过 MNF 的减免程序对最终没收的资金进行减免分配，将最大程度维护受害者的利益。由政府和法院计算并向受害者分配赔偿的替代方案在行政管理上几乎是不可能的，并且将对受害者的求偿挽损造成巨大代价。为了作出赔偿命令，法院需要确定并证实每位受害者的损失。这将需要针对数千名受害者中的每一位，查明并证实该受害者向 Guo Enterprise（郭氏企业）提供的资金数额、来自郭氏企业的任何部分退款、受害者通过 SEC 追缴违法所得程序获得的补偿金额，以及可能通过附属途径向受害者返还的任何资金。鉴于被告欺诈行为的全球性特征，这项任务更具挑战性。相反，由政府通过合同聘请的理赔管理人分配最终没收\n\n资金的程序将提高效率，且不会以牺牲受害者利益为代价而“使量刑程序复杂化或延长量刑程序”。18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3)。\n\nD. 结论\n\n据此，政府谨请求法院：(1) 指定一名特别主事官（special master）协助法院评估 § 853(n) 项下的主张；以及 (2) 作出命令认定本案中赔偿不可行。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nSEAN S. BUCKLEY\n美国联邦检察官（Attorney for the United States）\n根据 28 U.S.C. § 515 授予的职权行事\n\n签署人：/s/\nMicah F. Fergenson\nRyan B. Finkel\nJustin Horton\nJuliana N. Murray\n助理联邦检察官（Assistant United States Attorneys）\n(212) 637-2190 / 6612 / 2276 / 2314\n\n抄送：记录在案律师（通过 ECF）","key_entities":["853(n)","forfeiture","Guo","Crime Victim","MVRA","Yanping Wang","Torres","Miles Guo","Je","Kin Ming Je","Analisa Torres","Horton","Fergenson","Murray","Finkel","853(i)","CIPA"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":64,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":106,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":283,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":318,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":407,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":495,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":719,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":782,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":2760,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-01-09 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-01-09","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:32:21"}