{"id":"court_sdny_799_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":799,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"LETTER","filed_date":null,"title":"Defense letter objecting to Preliminary Order of Forfeiture","summary_zh":"辩护方信函动议 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #799（信函日期：2026年2月3日）。郭文贵辩护律师（Sarafa、Dratel、Kaley）就政府在没收初步令中主张的13亿美元金钱判决提出异议，主张政府未证明诈骗范围及本人实际获得该款项、已获无罪的指控不应作为罚没依据，并要求以政府及受托人已追回的资产价值予以抵扣。","summary_en":"Defense letter motion — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118, ECF #799 (letter dated February 3, 2026). Guo's counsel (Sarafa, Dratel, Kaley) objects to the government's request for a $1.3 billion money judgment in the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, arguing the government has not established the scope of the fraud or that Guo personally obtained the funds, that acquitted counts cannot support forfeiture liability, and that any judgment should be offset by amounts already recovered by the government and the bankruptcy trustee.","body_en":"![](_page_0_Picture_1.jpeg)\n\n43 West 43rd Street, Suite 370 | New York, NY 10036 212.785.7577 | 646.868.8266 (fax) www.sarafazellan.com\n\nFebruary 3, 2026\n\n### **By ECF Filing**\n\nHonorable Analisa Torres United States District Judge Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007\n\n### **Re:** *United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, et al.* **23-CR-118 (AT)**\n\nDear Judge Torres:\n\nTogether with Joshua Dratel and John Kaley, I respectfully submit this letter on behalf of Miles Guo (a/k/a \"Ho Wan Kwok\"), pursuant to this Court's Order dated January 8, 2026 (ECF No. 784), and subsequent order extending the filing deadline (ECF No. 798), to set forth Mr. Guo's objections to the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (\"POF\") entered on August 11, 2025 (ECF No. 720).\n\nIn its July 28, 2025, letter motion to the Court requesting entry of the POF (ECF No. 716) (Gov. Mtn.), the Government makes two distinct requests: (1) for entry of a money judgment of \\$1.3 billion against Mr. Guo; and (2) for forfeiture of Mr. Guo's interest in the specific property listed in the preliminary order of forfeiture (the \"Specific Property\"). As to the second request, Mr. Guo consistently has taken no position with respect to any personal interest he may have in the Specific Property. Mr. Guo reconfirms here that he does not assert a personal interest in the Specific Property and supports return of the Specific Property to its rightful owners.\n\n### **I. Introduction and Summary of Argument**\n\nThere are multiple reasons why the Court should decline to enter a money judgment in the amount of \\$1.3 billion as to Mr. Guo. First, the Government has not adduced evidence sufficient to establish the scope of the fraud, nor has the Government identified who exactly was defrauded. Second, the Government has not established that Mr. Guo personally obtained the \\$1.3 billion in purported crime proceeds that forms the basis of the Government's forfeiture request. Third, acquitted conduct cannot be the basis for imposing forfeiture liability. Finally, Mr. Guo is entitled to have whatever forfeiture amount\n\nthis Court determines is applicable offset by the very substantial value of cash and other assets already seized and/or in the possession of the Government, the Bankruptcy Trustee, and possibly others. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a summary of the more than \\$1 billion in cash that the Government has already recovered in connection with the conduct at issue in this criminal prosecution. We address the relevant background and legal framework of this matter as well as each of these arguments in turn.\n\n# **II. Relevant Background and Legal Framework**\n\nOn July 16, 2024, following a lengthy trial, a jury found Mr. Guo guilty of ten of thirteen counts set forth in the Third Superseding Indictment (the \"Indictment\") in this case. Mr. Guo maintains that he is not guilty of any of the charged offenses. For purposes of this motion, however, and without waiving any of his rights, including all of his appellate rights, while Mr. Guo disagrees with the jury's verdict he accepts it as he must for present purposes.\n\nThe jury acquitted Mr. Guo of Count Five (wire fraud in connection with GTV Private Placement, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1343 and 2), Count Six (securities fraud in connection with GTV Private Placement, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§78j(b) & 78ff, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5, 18 U.S.C. §2), and Count Twelve (unlawful monetary transactions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1957 and 2). The POF recites the inclusion of these counts in the Indictment but does not acknowledge that the jury found Mr. Guo not guilty of them.\n\nThe jury did not make any factual determination as to whether the Specific Property or any other property is forfeitable; that is, there has been no factual finding with respect to any nexus between the Specific Property and the offenses of conviction, or any determination as to the amount of criminal proceeds, if any, that Mr. Guo personally obtained.\n\nThe Government contends that the \\$1.3 billion money judgment it seeks represents \"a conservative estimate of the amount of funds sent by individual victims to certain arms of the G Enterprise's frauds: GTV, the Farms, G Clubs, and Himalaya Exchange.\" Gov. Mtn. at 3. According to the exhibit cited by the Government in support of this number, the \\$1.3 billion figure consists of: \\$411 million to GTV/Voice of Guo; \\$110 million to the Farms; \\$240 million to G Clubs; and \\$517 million to Himalaya Exchange. GXZ 26. Even assuming that this \\$1.3 billion figure accurately represents the amount of money investors and customers directed to the named entities, whether or not the entirety of these funds constitutes proceeds of fraud and/or racketeering activity is a question distinct from the jury's verdict and has yet to be determined.\n\nIn that context, hundreds of petitions have been filed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(c) asserting third-party claims to hundreds of millions of dollars seized by the Government, which petitioners maintain are superior to any right, title or interest in the Specific Property claimed by Mr. Guo, who makes no such claim, or the Government.\n\nThe Government concedes that it has not made any determination as to individual victim losses or compensation in this case, and that calculation of such losses or compensation for purposes of restitution is impracticable (see ECF No. 785 at 5).\n\nFinally, thousands of Himalaya Exchange customers and dozens of others who have written to the Court, to the Government, and to undersigned counsel directly have expressly stated that they are not victims of fraud or any other wrongdoing by Mr. Guo, but rather seek return of property seized by the Government.\n\nAgainst this backdrop, it falls to the Court, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1)(a), to determine \"what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable statute.\" Since the Government seeks forfeiture of specific property, this includes determining \"whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense,\" and, since the Government also seeks a personal money judgement against Mr. Guo, it includes determining \"the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered to pay.\" *Id.*\n\nAs the Second Circuit has recognized, \"[c]omputing a forfeiture amount is not an 'exact science.'\" *United States v. Rainford,* 110 F.4th 455, 488 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting *United States v. Treacy*, 639 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2011)). \"The district court must make only a 'reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information.' It may 'use general points of reference as a starting point for calculating the losses or gains from [the criminal activity] and may make reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing proceeding.'\" *Id.* (internal citation omitted).\n\n# **III. The Scope of the Fraud for Purposes of Forfeiture is Unresolved – and Significantly Less than the Government Asserts – Because of the Volume of Purported \"Victims\" Who Affirmatively Deny That They are \"Victims\"**\n\nAn essential aspect of forfeiture that is unresolved in this case is the *scope* of the fraud, and therefore the scope of \"proceeds\" subject to forfeiture. This case is extremely unusual, if not unique, in that it does not present a categorical fraud in which every investor claims either reliance on the alleged misrepresentations or that such misrepresentations were material to the specific investor's decision to contribute.\n\nInstead, unlike nearly all fraud cases, many investors in the various vehicles affirmatively *deny* that they are, in fact, *victims* of any fraud by Mr. Guo. As discussed below, in some instances, the investors assert that they have suffered economically from *the Government's* conduct, and not Mr. Guo's.[1](#page-2-0)\n\n<span id=\"page-2-0\"></span><sup>1</sup> This is not a sufficiency argument, or an attempt to relitigate the jury's verdict, which Mr. Guo acknowledges for purposes of sentencing, and forfeiture within that context. Rather, it involves defining what precisely the jury found, *i.e.*, which investors were defrauded, and therefore what constitutes the proceeds of unlawful activity.\n\nAs a result – again dissimilar from the vast majority of fraud cases – delineating the *extent* of the fraud is a necessary prerequisite to determining an appropriate total for purposes of forfeiture because, as set forth below, a significant number of investors were *not* deprived of money or property by fraud. In turn, their investments do not represent the \"proceeds\" of illegal activity and are not subject to forfeiture. Among that diverse group are some individuals and entities that have filed petitions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n).\n\nCertainly the government has not proved, as it must in order to justify forfeiture, that all or even most of the investors were defrauded in this case. Indeed, the government's proof was limited to five or six witnesses who testified in that regard. While in an ordinary case, there might be a basis to presume that other investors were similarly deceived, in this case that is not a viable presumption in light of the number and variety of investors who have disclaimed victim status.\n\nThe divergence between investors who were defrauded, and those who insist they were not, is illustrated in *United States v. Miller*, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993), in which the defendants, two lawyers, were accused of deceiving investors they represented (for the purpose of purchasing apartments available during a co-op conversion) by securing for themselves certain opportunities to purchase other apartments in the building without informing the investors. The Second Circuit, however, reversed the convictions, pointing out that the principal of the investor group that hired the two lawyers testified that\n\n> he never asked to invest more money in the [apartment complex] than that expended for the 114 apartments purchased by the Group; there was nothing wrong with [the defendants and a co-conspirator] making a personal investment in the [building's] apartments; he had no expectation regarding the possibility of such a personal investment by [the defendant lawyers]; and \"it was very much within [the defendants'] cards to do a deal, and if it wouldn't be with my group, it would be with a European group out there.\"\n\n*Id.* at 1014. The principal of the investor group also testified \"that he was satisfied with [defendant's] representation; and that he would not have any problem retaining [defendant] to represent him again.\" *Id.* at 1015.\n\nWhile the Court in *Miller* characterized its decision to reverse as based on the government's failure to allege a property interest that defendants obtained through fraud, the language of the opinion, in addition to the section quoted above, clearly reflected a lack of sufficient evidence that any of the investors' expectations upon which the investors relied were abrogated, or that any of the uses to which their money was spent by defendants were material to the investors who were allegedly defrauded.\n\nAs the Court summarized in *Miller*, while\n\nthe government contend[ed] that [defendants] diverted to their own benefit\n\nproperty intended for the Group; to wit, the Apartments and the profits resulting from their resale . . . the government does not surmount the obstacle posed by [the witness's] uncontradicted testimony, which undercuts any understanding as to this specific agency relationship that precluded parallel investments by [defendants] in [the apartment complex's] apartments in general, or the eight Apartments in particular.\n\n*Id*. at 1020.\n\nThus, while ordinarily reliance and materiality would be subject to a \"reasonable person\" standard, *Miller* establishes otherwise when – as here with many of the investors – the purported \"victim\" specifically and affirmatively disavows one or the other element, thereby vitiating the allegations of fraud with respect to that particular person's investment.\n\nMore recently, in *United States v. Rainford*, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024), the Second Circuit expressed the same reservations with respect to blanket assertions of forfeiture based on a universe of transactions that were not uniformly fraudulent. In *Rainford*, the government's position was based on a witness's statement that 40 percent of defendant's law firm's cases were of the \"slip and fall\" variety – but even that should have been reduced by another 20 percent (of that subtotal) because only 80 percent of those cases were fraudulent. *Id*. at 489.\n\nThus, the Court in *Rainford* vacated the forfeiture judgment in part because \"even if the government's allegations about [the witness's] statements had been corroborated, the government arrived at the forfeiture amount by crediting only part of [that] statement.\" *Id*.; *see also id*. ([n]either the government nor the district court has explained why the initial forfeiture request of \\$1.6 million should be cut by 60 percent but the resulting \\$644,000 should not be cut by another 20 percent to account for slip-and-fall claims that were not fraudulent\").\n\nThose same principles apply here as well. The individual investors' expectations and reliance are critical to distinguishing between victims of fraud and those who were not victimized, and whose investments cannot be included in any forfeiture judgment.\n\nThe scope of the fraud here is diminished in material respects by four categories of persons who expressly disavow any status as \"victims\" of any fraud:\n\n- (1) the 6,512 persons maintaining cryptocurrency accounts with the Himalaya Exchange. *See, e.g.*, Response of 6.512 Claimants as Members of the Himalaya Exchange and Their Counsel to Individual Motions, October 22, 2025 (ECF No. 761) (\"*HX Response*\");\n- (2) the 324 investors in the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (\"Hamilton\"). *See, e.g.*, Supplemental Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture Entered as to Defendant\n\nMiles Guo, October 22, 2025 (ECF No. 756) (\"*Hamilton Supplemental*\"); Thirdparty Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner's Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, April 7, 2025 (ECF No. 674) (\"*Hamilton Petition*\");\n\n- (3) the investors who wrote the government disclaiming victim status, provided as discovery at USAO\\_00112534-USAO\\_00112564;\n- (4) the investors who have contacted defense counsel disclaiming victim status.\n\nAdded to that significant number are those purported victims whom the Government has failed to identify, but who may be included in any of those four classes of *non*-victims. Consequently, beyond the witnesses at trial, the number of victims – and therefore the total \"proceeds\" subject to forfeiture – may potentially be far narrower than what the Government claims in its POF.\n\nGiven the abundant proof that a considerable number of supposed \"victims\" reject that classification, it is incumbent upon the Government to establish the parameters of the fraud with sufficient specificity to permit the Court to conclude with the requisite confidence that the forfeiture total is accurate.\n\n### **A.** *The Members of the Himalaya Exchange*\n\nThrough their counsel, the 6,512 members of the Himalaya Exchange – representing approximately two-thirds of Himalaya Exchange members, *see HX Response*, at 3 – have objected to forfeiture of their accounts (and the assets within them) as proceeds of any fraud. As the *HX Response* states, \"[m]any investors in the Himalaya Exchange (HEX) have expressed frustration at being labeled as victims.\" *Id*. at 2.\n\nElaborating, the Himalaya Exchange petitioners explicitly reject the Government's theory of forfeiture: \"[t]he criminal case against [Mr. Guo and his co-defendants] rests on the assertion that they defrauded investors, yet many of these investors insist they were not defrauded and reject the victim label.\" *Id*.; *see also id*. at 3 (petitioners \"align with individual investor motions rejecting victim status\").\n\nIn addition, the Himalaya Exchange petitioners effectively concur with Mr. Guo that \"[p]rosecutors have not identified specific victims or quantified their alleged losses, which is critical in this context to substantiate fraud claims.\" *Id*. at 3.[2](#page-5-0)\n\nMoreover, the Himalaya Exchange petitioners maintain that the only economic harm they suffered was due to the Government's inappropriate intervention: \"[t]here is no evidence in the record\n\n<span id=\"page-5-0\"></span><sup>2</sup> In asserting an additional position congruent with Mr. Guo's, the *HX Response* adds that petitioners' counsel \"shares the movants' concerns regarding the excessive expenses\" incurred in the banktruptcy litigation. *HX Response*, at 7.\n\nshowing that HEX investors suffered losses, except for reputational and financial harm to HEX caused by the government's actions . . .\" in seizing petitioners' accounts. *Id*. at 2.\n\nIndeed, \"[t]here is consensus among investors that they were not defrauded by Kwok, Je, or Wang, but rather harmed by the U.S. government's actions, which seized their investments.\" *Id*. at 3; *see also id*. (government \"ironically caused the very financial harm it aimed to prevent\"). Further, it need be emphasized that Mr. Guo never received these monies. These investors' money was held in their own accounts, in their own names, and should be refunded to them.\n\n## **B.** *The Hamilton Petitioners*\n\nThe Hamilton petitioners advance a similar position. As a threshold matter, the Hamilton petitioners agree that\n\n> in order to prove a right to forfeiture, it is not enough for the Government to claim (without proving) that the funds are part of criminal activity. Rather, the Government must demonstrate that the property it claims is forfeited was obtained by, belonged to, or was controlled by, the defendant.\n\n# *Hamilton Supplemental*, at 9 ¶ 18.[3](#page-6-0)\n\nThe Hamilton petitioners' property – totaling \\$89,992,861.75, *see Hamilton Petition*, at 8 ¶ 20 – \"is comprised solely of funds that were lawfully invested by the M&A Fund Investors, has no nexus to the conduct charged in either criminal case, and therefore lies wholly outside the scope of property subject to forfeiture in either proceeding.\" *Id*. at 4-5; *see also id*. at 2 (citations omitted); 10 n.6 (investment was \"legitimate\" and \"regulated\"); 13 ¶¶ 23-24; 14 ¶ 25 (petitioner invested their own funds in a vehicle \"wholly unrelated to the fraudulent schemes alleged in the [Indictment]\") (citation omitted).\n\nAlso, \"the Government has never alleged, let alone proved, that Defendant Guo possessed any ownership interest in, or exercised any control over, Account 2770 or the funds held therein.\" *Id*. at 10 n. 6. The *Hamilton Supplemental* further reviews the trial record to confirm \"Petitioner's position that Defendant Guo had no ownership interest in Account 2770 or the funds therein – there was no evidence in the written record or presented at Defendant Guo's trial that Defendant Guo was a signatory on Account 2770, owned Account 2770, or operated Account 2770.\" *Id*. at 8 ¶ 16.\n\nNor was the Hamilton petitioners' funds used to commit any of the crimes charged, *id*. at 14-26, and \"there is no evidence that any of the funds in Account 2770 belonged to Defendant Guo or were ever commingled with tainted funds, such that the Government can argue that seizing Petitioner's Property satisfies the requirements of 21 U.S.C. §853.\" *Id*. at 12 ¶ 22 (citation omitted); *see also id*. at 15 ¶ 27\n\n<span id=\"page-6-0\"></span><sup>3</sup> The Hamilton petitioners also agree that \"[t]his case presents a unique forfeiture posture . . .\" *Hamilton Supplemental*, at 1.\n\n(\"[t]here is no evidence that Defendant Guo ever used, directed, or exercised any control over these funds, nor that the funds were part of, or the proceeds of, any of Defendant Guo's criminal activities\").\n\nAs a result, \"Petitioner's interest in Petitioner's Property is both vested in Petitioner and superior to any right that Defendant Guo, Defendant Wang, or the Government could claim in Petitioner's Property, because Defendant Guo, Defendant Wang and/or the Government never possessed a legal or equitable interest in Petitioner's Property.\" *Id*. at 7 ¶ 12; *see also id*. at 11 ¶ 20 (citing *United States v. Elias*, 154 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2025)).\n\nMoreover, like the Himalaya Exchange petitioners, the Hamilton petitioners' position is that they have suffered financially not because of Mr. Guo, but because of the Government's interference in the transaction for which the Hamilton petitioners' funds were invested. As the *Hamilton Supplement* recounts, \"[w]hile the transaction did close (Guo Trial, 6/17/2024, 2794:25-2795:4), [the seller] never received the investment money because '[t]he money was seized in transit by the U.S. Marshals.' Guo Trial, 6/17/2024, 2796:14-23.\" *Id*. at 15 ¶ 26 (footnote omitted).[4](#page-7-0)\n\n# **C.** *The Investors Who Have Either Filed Petitions Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) or Written the Government Disclaiming Victim Status*\n\nThe public electronic docket in this case includes petitions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n) from 126 individuals (not including the Hamilton or Himalaya Exchange petitioners) involving claims totaling \\$28,579,803.58. Those petitions, and that total, cast further doubt on the forfeiture amount the Government seeks herein.\n\nIn addition, discovery produced by the Government included (at least) [5](#page-7-1) one folder containing 31 emails containing complaints by investors that Mr. Guo did not defraud them. That folder is denominated by Bates numbers USAO\\_00112534-USAO\\_00112564. Most of the emails do not enumerate the amount of the investment each individual made, so a total is impossible to derive from them. However, those communications should further diminish the potential forfeiture total even if the amount of investment cannot be quantified.\n\n## **D.** *The Investors Who Have Contacted Defense Counsel*\n\nCoverage of the January 20, 2026, pre-sentencing conference conducted by the Court generated a number of emails to defense counsel from persons who identified themselves as investors in some of the vehicles that were the subject of the trial herein, and who denied they were victimized.\n\n<span id=\"page-7-0\"></span><sup>4</sup> The footnote adds that the Hamilton petitioners were subjected to an arbitration proceeding instituted by the sellers due to the Hamilton petitioners' inability to close the transaction because of the government's seizure of the funds allocated to that purchase. *Hamilton Supplemental*, at 15 n.12.\n\n<span id=\"page-7-1\"></span><sup>5</sup> There may be more among the 64 terabytes of discovery, as counsel's review continues. The specific production described above is the folder counsel has found thus far.\n\nAlso, some have informed counsel that to the extent they lodged complaints to U.S. or other authorities regarding Mr. Guo, those complaints were compelled – and in some instances wholly authored by – agents of the People's Republic of China (\"PRC\"). Some of the correspondents suffered interrogations and detention by PRC authorities in the process.\n\nCounsel have recently been in contact with an attorney for 12 such persons, have received documents and other materials related to those persons, and are in the process of verifying those accounts, as well as others made separately to counsel from other persons. Counsel is also mindful that some of the persons involved have requested confidentiality because they fear retaliation by the PRC. That applies even to some of the individuals living in the U.S. (while others reside in China and elsewhere).\n\nAs a result, counsel do not presently have a specific number of persons counsel can reliably list as *non*-victims, or the amount of money they invested. However, counsel continue to receive such emails and will catalogue those instances that are verified once that process is complete.\n\n## **E.** *The Unknown Number of Investors Who Deny They Are Victims*\n\nThe discussion above, particularly with respect to sections A, C, and D, begs the question of how many more persons do not consider themselves victims of any fraud by Mr. Guo. Some may be unaware of the forfeiture proceedings; some may be afraid to come forward because they fear retribution from the PRC if they contradict the PRC's narrative that has endeavored to discredit Mr. Guo for political reasons; and some may not have the means or sophistication to understand their rights pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n).\n\nRegardless the reason, it is logical and reasonable to conclude that in this most unusual case the categories listed above do not represent *all* of the persons in each category (except for the Hamilton investors). That \"unknown\" renders it even more imperative that the Government be held to its burden to identify victims and the basis for claiming that their investments are subject to forfeiture.\n\nAt the very least, those investors in the categories described above must be eliminated from consideration for forfeiture. In turn, given the unprecedented nature of the circumstances in this case, the Government must establish with precision just who constitutes a \"victim\" in this case.\n\n# **IV. The Government Has Not Established that Mr. Guo Personally Obtained \\$1.3 Billion of Crime Proceeds**\n\nAnother factor limiting the extent of any money judgment imposed in this case is the fact that Mr. Guo can only be ordered to forfeit assets that he personally obtained. In *Honeycutt v. United States*, 581 U.S. 443 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the imposition of joint and several liability on a defendant \"for property that his co-conspirator derived from the crime but that the defendant himself did not acquire.\" *Id.* at 445. The Supreme Court decided *Honeycutt* in the context of a drug conspiracy where forfeiture was imposed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853, which mandates forfeiture of \"any property\n\nconstituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of\" certain drug crimes. In *United States v. Elias*, 154 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2025), the Second Circuit extended the holding of *Honeycutt* to forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), one of the statutes at issue here, reasoning that the statute in *Honeycutt* was \"functionally the same\" as §981(a)(1)(C). *Id.* at 59. Earlier, in *United States v. Tanner*, 942 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2019), the Second Circuit applied the holding of *Honeycutt* in the context of a money laundering conspiracy where forfeiture was imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), another forfeiture statute at issue in this case. *Id.* at 68. We submit that the reasoning of *Honeycutt* applies equally to forfeiture under the criminal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), the third forfeiture statute that applies in this case.\n\nAccordingly, Mr. Guo can only be held liable to forfeit the value of tainted proceeds to the extent that he at some point *personally* obtained them. The Second Circuit has made it clear that, post-*Honeycutt*, a district court may no longer routinely order forfeiture of proceeds obtained by coconspirators, even if reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. *United States v. Papas*, 715 Fed. Appx. 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2018). Rather, the district court \"must now determine a . . . forfeiture amount owed by defendant based only on his *personal* proceeds from the offense.\" *Id.* (remanding for a new forfeiture calculation in light of *Honeycutt*) (emphasis added).\n\nIn post-*Honeycutt* cases where the Second Circuit has upheld forfeiture orders, the evidence that the defendant at some point personally obtained tainted proceeds has been clear. For instance, in *United States v. Pastore*, 2022 WL 2068434, at \\*7 (2d Cir. June 8, 2022), the Government demonstrated during trial that the defendant personally received illegal gambling payments delivered by runners. In *United States v. Glenn*, 794 Fed.Appx. 19, 22 (2d Cir. 2019), the uncontested facts in the PSR described a robbery where both defendant and his co-conspirator filled their duffel bags with stolen goods and fled the store. In *Tanner*, while the Second Circuit vacated separate forfeiture orders requiring each defendant in a money laundering conspiracy to forfeit \\$9.7 million – precluding double recovery – it held that a defendant who actively participated in the money laundering conspiracy and personally wired \\$9.7 million in four separate transactions could be held jointly and severally liable for that amount. *Tanner*, 942 F.3d at 68.\n\nHere, the evidence falls far short of establishing that Mr. Guo personally obtained the \\$1.3 billion that the Government claims represents the total amount of money sent by individuals to GTV, the Farms, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange. To the contrary, with respect to the GTV Private Placement, VOG, G-Coin, and G-Dollar funds that were disgorged to the SEC, it is apparent that Mr. Guo did not possess or control those funds as they were disgorged by three distinct entities – GTV Media Group, Inc., Saraca Media Group, Inc., and Voice of Guo Media, Inc. – where Mr. Guo maintained no formal role. Similarly, the nearly \\$600 million in cash seized by the Government (see Ex. A) was held in accounts maintained and controlled by others. During trial, for instance, the Government called as a witness James Collins, the Chairman and CEO of Mercantile Global Exchange, which provided banking services for G Clubs, G Fashion, and Himalaya Exchange, among others, and from which the Government seized hundreds of millions of dollars that it now seeks to forfeit. See Ex. A. Mr. Collins testified that his financial institution – a regulated entity – determined through its due diligence process that Mr. Guo was not the ultimate beneficial owner of G Clubs, nor was he the source of funds for G Clubs or G Fashion. Trial Tr. at 2842.\n\nMr. Collins further testified that Mr. Guo exercised no operational control over G Clubs, G Fashion, or Himalaya Exchange. Trial Tr. at 2843.\n\nThe analyses set forth in numerous §853(n) petitions filed in this case are also instructive here, insofar as they explain the evidentiary deficiencies linking Mr. Guo to the seized accounts. For instance, in their Supplemental Third Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioners' Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture Entered as to Defendant Miles Guo, petitioners Hamilton Investment Management, Ltd. (BVI) and Hamilton Investment Management, Ltd. (UK) succinctly debunk the notion that any evidence in this case ties the accounts at issue in that petition to Mr. Guo. See ECF No. 760 at ¶¶13-23.\n\nSimilarly, the petitions filed on behalf of thousands of customers of the Himalaya Exchange documenting the transactions engaged in by those customers further undermine the notion that Mr. Guo ever personally obtained funds deposited with the Himalaya Exchange. *See, e.g.*, ECF No. 612 and supporting exhibits.\n\nThe Government's own sentencing memorandum as to Mr. Guo's co-defendant, Yvette Wang, undermines any argument that the Government may now attempt to make that Mr. Guo exercised operational control over the entities involved in this case. According to the Government, Ms. Wang \"was the day-to-day boss\" of these entities, \"[s]he was calling the shots,\" she \"was the conductor\" who exercised \"control over every aspect of the operations of the various entities.\" See ECF No. 476 at 28.\n\nIn short, the Government has yet to present evidence sufficient to establish that Mr. Guo personally obtained or directly controlled the funds it now seeks to order Mr. Guo personally to forfeit. Mr. Guo did not hold title to the Mahwah residence or to any of the vehicles listed in the POF. Title to the Bugatti, for instance, never even transferred to G Club, the purchaser of the vehicle, as G Club never accepted delivery of the Bugatti. See ECF No. 749 (Post Oak Motors, LLC's Verified Petition for Determination of Third-Party Interest in Property Subject to Preliminary Order of Forfeiture). In fact, as set out in the § 853(n) petition of Post Oak Motors, LLC, G Club paid Post Oak Motors for the Bugatti but Post Oak maintained possession, custody, and control of the vehicle at its dealership until it was seized by the U.S. Marshals. ECF No. 749 at 2. Clearly Mr. Guo did not personally obtain the Bugatti and thus is not in a position to forfeit it. Without competent evidence establishing that Mr. Guo personally obtained the Bugatti or any other Specific Property to be forfeited, or that Mr. Guo personally obtained \\$1.3 billion in criminal proceeds, the Government's request for a \\$1.3 billion money judgment against Mr. Guo fails as a matter of law.\n\n## **V. Acquitted Conduct Should Not Be Considered in the Forfeiture Determination**\n\nIn addition to the infirmities discussed above, the Government's effort to collect from Mr. Guo alleged proceeds of the GTV Private Placement (see Gov. Mtn. at 4) also is misguided in light of the jury's acquittal of Mr. Guo of both wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with the GTV Private Placement.\n\nWhile the Government relies on *United States v. Watts*, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (*per curiam*) for the proposition that \"the Court may consider at sentencing the GTV-related facts from the trial record[,]\" Gov Mtn. at 3, in the nearly 30 years since *Watts* was decided the landscape regarding the treatment of acquitted conduct at sentencing – which plainly includes forfeiture – has changed dramatically. This is true with respect to the Sentencing Guidelines and reflected in doubts expressed by Supreme Court Justices, both of which manifest appreciation of the constitutional dissonance in sentencing a defendant for conduct for which the jury acquitted.\n\n## **A.** *The 2024 Sentencing Guidelines Amendment*\n\nThe U.S. Sentencing Commission, as part of its 2024 amendments cycle, revised §1B1.3 to add subsection (c), which eliminated acquitted conduct from consideration in calculating a sentencing guidelines range. *See* Amendment 826, available at http\n\nAmendment 826, effective November 1, 2024, provides that \"[r]elevant conduct does not include conduct for which the defendant was criminally charged and acquitted in federal court, unless such conduct also establishes, in whole or in part, the instant offense of conviction.\" U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(c).\n\nAs Judge Carlton W. Reeves, Chair of the Sentencing Commission declared in announcing the amendment, \"Not guilty means not guilty[.]\" April 17 2024, Sentencing Commission News Release, \"Commission Votes Unanimously to Pass Package of Reforms Including Limit on Use of Acquitted Conduct in Sentencing Guidelines,\" available at http w.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/april-17-2024.\n\nA year earlier, when the Amendment was first circulated, Judge Reeves remarked that \"'[w]hat conduct judges can consider when using the guidelines' is . . . 'of foundational and of fundamental importance to the operation of the entire federal justice system.'\" *Id*. (Chair Reeves quoting Prof. Douglas Berman), available at http ent-process/public-hearings-andmeetings/20230405/20230405\\_transcript.pdf.\n\n## **B.** *The Reservations Expressed by Supreme Court Justices Regarding Using Acquitted Conduct for Purposes of Sentencing*\n\nThe Sentencing Commission's action also removed an obstacle to the Supreme Court's consideration of the issue. *See McClinton v. United States*, 600 U.S. \\_\\_\\_, 143 S. Ct. 2400 (2023) (Sotomayor, J., *statement respecting the denial of certiorari*) (citations omitted); *id*., at 2403 (Kavanaugh, J., joined by Gorsuch, J., and Barrett, J., *statement respecting the denial of certiorari*).\n\nIn *McClinton v. United States*, 600 U.S. \\_\\_\\_, 143 S. Ct. 2400 (2023), in denying the petition for *certiorari*, both Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kavanaugh expressed interest in revisiting *Watts*. For example, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that \"[a]s many jurists have noted, the use of acquitted conduct to increase a defendant's Sentencing Guidelines range and sentence[] raises important questions that go to the fairness and perceived fairness of the criminal justice system.\" 143 S. Ct. at 2401 (Sotomayor, J.,\n\n*statement respecting the denial of certiorari*), *citing Jones v. United States*, 574 U. S. 948, 949-950 (2014) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas and Ginsburg, JJ., *dissenting from denial of certiorari*); *United States v. Bell*, 808 F. 3d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., *concurring in denial of reh'g en banc*); *United States v. Sabillon-Umana*, 772 F. 3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); *Watts*, 519 U. S. at 170 (Kennedy, J., *dissenting*) (footnotes omitted).[6](#page-12-0)\n\nJustice Sotomayor also explained that \"[t]he Court's denial of certiorari today should not be misinterpreted[]\" because \"[t]he Sentencing Commission, which is responsible for the Sentencing Guidelines, has announced that it will resolve questions around acquitted-conduct sentencing in the coming year.\" 143 S. Ct. at 2403. Justice Sotomayor added that \"[i]f the Commission does not act expeditiously or chooses not to act, however, this Court may need to take up the constitutional issues presented.\" *Id*.*; see also United States v. Coleman*, 138 F.4th 489, 511-512 (7th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 146 S. Ct. 275 (2025) (\"In denying the petition for certiorari in *McClinton*, four Supreme Court justices encouraged the United States Sentencing Commission to resolve questions around the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing . . . Ten months later, the Sentencing Commission heeded the call\").[7](#page-12-1)\n\nJustice Sotomayor elaborated that \"[t]here are also concerns about procedural fairness and accuracy when the State gets a second bite at the apple with evidence that did not convince the jury coupled with a lower standard of proof.\" 143 S. Ct. at 2402. Justice Sotomayor also noted (with a string of citations) that \"[m]any other state and federal judges have questioned the practice.\" 143 S. Ct. at 2401 n.2 (Sotomayor, J., *statement respecting the denial of certiorari*) (citations omitted).\n\nIn addition, in *McClinton*, Justice Sotomayor observed that\n\nacquitted-conduct sentencing also raises questions about the public's perception that justice is being done, a concern that is vital to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Various jurists have observed\n\n<span id=\"page-12-1\"></span><span id=\"page-12-0\"></span><sup>6</sup> In *Bell*, cited by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kavanaugh, while serving on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, recognized that \"[a]llowing judges to rely on acquitted or uncharged conduct to impose higher sentences than they otherwise would impose seems a dubious infringement of the rights to due process and to a jury trial.\" 808 F. 3d at 928 (Kavanaugh, J., *concurring in denial of reh'g en banc*). Likewise, Justice Gorsuch, when he served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in *United States v. Sabillon-Umana* (also cited by Justice Sotomayor), questioned the assumption \"that a district judge may either decrease or increase a defendant's sentence (within the statutorily authorized range) based on facts the judge finds without the aid of a jury or the defendant's consent.\" 772 F. 3d at 1331. 7 Justice Kavanaugh echoed that \"the Court's denial of certiorari today should not be misinterpreted[,]\" 143 S. Ct. at 2403 (Kavanaugh, J., *statement respecting the denial of certiorari*), adding that \"[t]he use of acquitted conduct to alter a defendant's Sentencing Guidelines range raises important questions.\" *Id*. Again, though, Justice Kavanaugh noted that because \"the Sentencing Commission is currently considering the issue[,]\" *id*., it would be \"appropriate for this Court to wait for the Sentencing Commission's determination before the Court decides whether to grant *certiorari* in a case involving the use of acquitted conduct.\" *Id*.\n\nthat the woman on the street would be quite taken aback to learn about this practice. *See, e.g., United States v. Canania*, 532 F. 3d 764, 778 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., *concurring*).\n\n## *Id*., at 2402-03.\n\n*Watts*, of course, was decided without the benefit of these subsequent developments.<sup>8</sup> Amendment 826 reflects the resolution of the issue and clearly prohibits the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing. *See also United States v. Johnson*, 754 F. Supp.3d 305, 312-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (noting, in light of the promulgation of Amendment 826, and citing *McClinton*, that \"[t]he practice of sentencing defendants based on acquitted conduct is now firmly disfavored\").\n\nNor can it be disputed that forfeiture is criminal and punitive in character, and therefore a component of sentencing to which Amendment 826 and the reservations expressed by the Supreme Court Justices and other jurists apply. Just last year the Second Circuit, in *United States v. Elias*, 154 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2025), citing *United States v. Peters*, 732 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2013), added the parenthetical that \"Criminal forfeiture . . . is a *form of punishment*, separate and apart from any restitutive measures imposed during sentencing.\" *Elias*, 154 F.4th at 63 (other citation omitted) (emphasis added).[9](#page-13-1)\n\nHere, in seeking to include the GTV Private Placement funds in the forfeiture judgment, the Government attempts to circumvent not only the letter and spirit of Amendment 826, and the constitutional protections it vindicates, but also the clear and consistent momentum undermining *Watts*.<sup>10</sup>\n\n*United States v. Frias*, 39 F.3d 391, 392-394 (2d Cir. 1994) (Oakes, J., *concurring*).\n\n<span id=\"page-13-0\"></span><sup>8</sup> Even *Watts* did not *mandate* consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing; rather, it held only that there existed \"no prohibition against considering . . . acquitted conduct[.]\" 519 U.S. at 152-155.\n\n<span id=\"page-13-1\"></span><sup>9</sup> Reinforcing the criminal character of forfeiture, even restitution – long regarded as \"remedial,\" *see Elias*, 154 F.4th at 63 – has now been recognized by the Supreme Court as \"criminal punishment.\" *Ellingburg v. United States*, 2026 WL 135982, at \\*2, \\_\\_\\_ S. Ct. \\_\\_\\_, 607 U.S. \\_\\_\\_ (January 20, 2026). Indeed, even before *Ellingburg*, the Second Circuit ruled that \"restitution is not permitted for loss caused by 'relevant conduct,' even though such conduct may be 'properly included in offense level calculation' under the Sentencing Guidelines.\" *United States v. Vilar*, 729 F.3d 62, 97 (2d Cir. 2013), *quoting United States v. Lussier*, 104 F.3d 32, 33 (2d Cir.1997).\n\n<span id=\"page-13-2\"></span><sup>10</sup> Even prior to *Watts* Judge Oakes noted in reluctant concurrence (bound by prevailing Circuit law) the incongruity of permitting acquitted conduct to contribute to a defendant's punishment:\n\nwe hold that a person's sentence for crimes of which he has been convicted may be multiplied fourfold by taking into account conduct of which he has been acquitted. This is jurisprudence reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland. \"Acquittal first, sentence afterwards.\"\n\n# **C.** *There Was Not a Sufficient Nexus Between the GTV Private Placement and Any of the Offenses for Which Mr. Guo Was Convicted*\n\nEven in the absence of Amendment 826, a sufficient nexus does not exist to justify forfeiture of the funds related to the GTV Private Placement. Pursuant to Rule 32.2 \"if the government seeks forfeiture of specific property, the court must determine whether the government has established the requisite nexus between the property and the offense.\" Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added); *United States v. Capoccia*, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007) (\"[t]he violation on which the forfeiture is based must be the specific violations of which [the defendant] was convicted, not some other, separate . . . violations\").\n\nIndeed, in *Capoccia*, the Second Circuit pointed out that \"[r]equiring the government to link assets to specific crimes of conviction is not only consistent with the punitive purposes of criminal forfeiture but also implements Congress's intent in enacting [the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (\"CAFRA\")].\" *Id.* (internal citation omitted). In fact, \"[t]he legislative history of [CAFRA] suggests that §2641(c) was designed to prevent abuse of the civil forfeiture process in part by encouraging the government to seek forfeiture through criminal proceedings, where it would have to link targeted property to a specific criminal conviction.\" *Id*. (*citing* H.R. Rep. 106-192, at 8 (1999); 146 Cong. Rec. S1753–02.\n\nNor do *Capoccia* or *United States v. Fruchter*, 411 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 2005) permit forfeiture of *all* proceeds generated by a racketeering enterprise – including those unrelated to racketeering activity – simply because defendant was convicted of a RICO conspiracy. In *United States v. Morrison*, 656 F.Supp.2d 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), the Court explained that\n\n> *Fruchter* held that acquitted conduct could form the basis for a forfeiture of \"'proceeds' derived from racketeering activity,\" 411 F.3d at 384 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §1963(a)(3)), provided that the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that such activity was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. *See also Capoccia*, 503 F.3d at 117-18 (\"[W]e have held that a defendant may be required to forfeit all proceeds of the racketeering enterprise forming the basis of his conviction, including *proceeds of particular racketeering activities* of which the defendant was not convicted.\") (emphasis added). These cases do not hold that all proceeds are forfeitable. In fact, the quoted language supports the opposition conclusion, viz. only \"proceeds derived from racketeering activity\" are forfeitable. *Fruchter*, 411 F.3d at 384 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).\n\n*Id.* at 345 n.13.\n\nHere, the Government has failed to satisfy its burden of establishing the requisite nexus – even by a preponderance of the evidence **–** between the funds derived from the GTV Private Placement and\n\nnon-acquitted conduct.\n\nIndeed, all the evidence cited by the Government, Gov. Mtn. at 3-4, constitutes testimony regarding *acquitted conduct*. *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. 209 (Le Zhou); *id.* at 701 (Patrick Chin); *id.* at 2376-77 (Minran Wu); *id.* at 4465-67, 4471-72 (Wei Chen); *id.* at 1350-58, 1365-73 (Ya Li). Each witness testified regarding the GTV Private Placement, and in particular whether they were induced into investment by misrepresentation – conduct for which Mr. Guo was acquitted on Counts 5 and 6. Thus, consideration of this conduct with respect to forfeiture is proscribed because the requisite nexus is absent.\n\nIn addition, in calculating forfeiture, the \"Government's word is not evidence.\" *United States v. Rainford*, 110 F.4th 455, 489 (2d Cir. 2024). Thus, the Government's assertions that \"Guo then continued to defraud his followers with a series of interconnected schemes, including the the GTV private placement in 2020,\" and that \"the GTV placement was connected with and integral to the other arms of the G Enteprise,\" Gov. Mtn. at 3, are neither evidentiary nor conclusive. Nor are they substantiated; as a result, they are unpersuasive. *See Rainford*, 110 F.4th at 489 (while a \"district court may take 'general points of reference as a starting point for calculating the losses or gains,' [*United States v.*] *Treacy*, 639 F.3d 32, 48 [(2d Cir. 2011)], [] an unsubstantiated government claim is not a 'point[ ] of reference'\").\n\nFurther, the trial evidence the Government cites does not establish by a preponderance that the funds connected to the GTV Private Placement were \"obtained directly or indirectly, as a result of the commission of the offense giving rise to forfeiture.\" *See* 18 U.S.C. §981(a)(2)(A). Indeed, the Government argues that \"Guo fraudulently induced [investors] into investing in GTV.\" Gov. Mtn. at 3.\n\nThat, however, misstates the issue, which is not whether investments in the GTV Private Placement were fraudulently induced, which would constitute a \"separate violation,\" and acquitted conduct, but whether the funds related to the GTV Private Placement were obtained as a *result* of a convicted offense.\n\nThese issues are conflated further in the Government's citations to trial testimony. For example, Patrick Chin's testimony was that he would likely not have invested in GTV if he had known that GTV investor funds were to be re-invested by a hedge fund. Dkt 716 at 3 (*citing* Trial Tr. at 701). The same is true of the testimony of Minran Wu, who testified that if he had known that investments made in GTV were to be reinvested in a hedge fund he would not have invested in GTV. *Id.* (*citing* Trial Tr. 2376-77).\n\nYet that testimony fails to establish a nexus between the convicted offense(s) and the funds and instead relates solely to the elements of the counts for which Mr. Guo was acquitted. The Government also cites testimony from Ya Li that the \"[r]einvestment rule is once you received the refund from SEC [for the GTV private placement], within 45 days you should invest this money back to the investment project and then you can get five percent of H Coin.\" Trial Tr. 244; *see also* Gov. Mtn. at 3. That testimony, too, undercuts the Government's argument that a requisite nexus exists by which the GTV funds were \"obtained . . . as a result of the offense giving rise to forfeiture,\" as any statements made regarding reinvestment were made only *after* the GTV Private Placement funds were recovered by the SEC and set to be re-distributed, making it impossible that the GTV funds were gained as a \"result\" of\n\n### another offense.\n\nThe Government additionally asserts that because the Farm loan and G Clubs schemes were promoted in videos posted on the GTV platform, the Court should find the required nexus. Gov. Mtn. at 3. That contention improperly conflates the media platform itself, on which Mr. Guo posted videos discussing other investment opportunities, with the GTV Private Placement through which investments were made into the platform. The same analysis applies to the money laundering conspiracy conviction, on Count Three. The Government cannot sweep under the umbrella of money laundering the funds involved in the alleged GTV fraud on which Mr. Guo was acquitted. By its verdict on the GTV fraud counts, the jury determined that the GTV money was not derived from specified unlawful activity. Of course, that is not to say that other alleged fraud proceeds could not have established money laundering. The longstanding rule is clear that for a multi-object conspiracy, the insufficiency of evidence with respect to one prong does not warrant reversal of a conviction because the jury is presumed to have returned its verdict on the objective for which there was sufficient evidence. *See Griffin v. United States*, 502 U.S. 46 (1992). Conversely, here, the jury is presumed to have reached a guilty verdict on the objectives for which it found sufficient evidence – not the objective involving the GTV Private Placement, given the jury's acquittal on those specific counts.\n\nConsequently, the nexus required for forfeiture is absent with respect to the counts for which Mr. Guo was acquitted, namely those relating to the GTV Private Placement. The Government cannot rest its claim on the other counts – RICO and money laundering conspiracy – on the alleged GTV fraud as to which Mr. Guo was acquitted.\n\n### **VI. Other Funds Should Be Offset Against Any Money Judgment Against Mr. Guo**\n\n## **A.** *The SEC Has Already Obtained \\$486,745,063 in Disgorgement for the Same Conduct at Issue Here*\n\nEven if Amendment 826 did not prohibit inclusion of acquitted conduct within forfeiture, and/or there existed a sufficient nexus between the GTV Private Placement and any offense of conviction, the Government acknowledges that \"the actual funds derived from the GTV private placement were recovered by the SEC, which established a fair fund for distribution to victims.\" Dkt 716 at n. 2. Thus, the Government continues, \"[i]f the Court were to deduct the GTV private placement funds from the forfeiture amount, approximately \\$411 million should be deducted. *See* GXZ 26 at 2.\" *Id.* In fact, as discussed below, the recovery by the SEC is substantially higher than the \\$411 million cited by the Government.\n\nOn September 13, 2021, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the \"SEC\"), in Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-20537, entered an order (\"SEC Order\") simultaneously instituting cease-and-desist proceedings against GTV Media Group, Inc. (\"GTV\"), Saraca Media Group, Inc. (\"Saraca\"), and Voice of Guo Media, Inc. (\"VOG\") (collectively, \"Respondents\"), and settling those proceedings pursuant to offers of settlement submitted by the Respondents. See Ex. B (SEC Order). GTV and Saraca agreed to jointly and severally disgorge \\$434,134,141, and VOG agreed to disgorge\n\n\\$53,610,922, providing for a combined total of \\$486,745,063 in disgorgement to be paid within 14 days of the SEC Order's entry. *Id.*[11](#page-17-0) The SEC subsequently dispersed disgorged funds to investors via a Fair Fund it established for that purpose.\n\nThe SEC Order concerned conduct directly at issue in this case. Specifically, it addressed the sale of approximately \\$339 million worth of stock in GTV, to more than 1,000 investors, between April 2020 and June 2020 through publicly available videos posted on GTV's websites as well as multiple social media platforms. *Id.* at ¶¶11-13. The SEC Order also specifically addressed the transfer of \\$100 million of the stock offering proceeds to a hedge fund, a major focus of the Government's case here. *Id.* at ¶14. In addition, the SEC Order addressed the purchase of GTV stock by VOG on behalf of prospective investors who wished to invest less than \\$100,000, with VOG ultimately selling approximately \\$114 in GTV stock to more than 4,500 investors. *Id.* at ¶¶15-21. This conduct overlaps with the so-called Farm Loan Program charged in this case. Finally, the SEC Order also addressed the sale of approximately \\$34 million in G-Coins and G-Dollars from April 2020 through June 2020. *Id.* at ¶¶ 25-27. This conduct overlaps with the Himalaya Exchange allegations in this case. *See, e.g.,* Trial Tr. at 26.[12](#page-17-1)\n\nThere can be no dispute that the nearly \\$487 million collected by the SEC pursuant to the SEC Order represents proceeds of the same \"enterprise\" that the Government claims is responsible for the \\$1.3 billion in proceeds it now seeks to recover a second time in the form of a personal money judgment against Mr. Guo. Yet it cites no authority for the proposition that it should be permitted to recover the same alleged proceeds two times from two separate parties. To the contrary, relevant authority indicates that any funds already collected should offset any personal money judgment entered as to Mr. Guo.\n\nFor instance, in *United States v. Kalish*, 626 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit recognized \"that once some *payment* has been made by way of restitution, a defendant would be in a position to argue that such a payment should be a credit against any then remaining forfeiture amount. The forfeiture amount represents 'ill-gotten' gains, and it is at least arguable that any money returned to a victim has reduced the amount of 'ill-gotten' gains remaining in the defendant's possession.\" *Id.* at 169-70 (quoting *United States v. Emerson*, 128 F.3d 557, 566 (7th Cir. 1997). More recently, in *United States v. Carlyle*, 776 Fed. Appx. 565 (11th Cir. 2019), the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not err in ordering that the value of any assets or proceeds forfeited by a co-defendant must be offset against the defendant's forfeiture liability, ensuring that the government could in no event collect more than the total amount of proceeds from the fraud scheme. *Id.* at 572. \"The offset provision was particularly important to ensure that the government did not over-collect for this scheme because this Court has already affirmed [co-defendant's] forfeiture money judgment, holding him jointly and severally liable with [defendant] for \\$1.8 million, in 216, before *Honeycutt* was decided. Without this\n\n<span id=\"page-17-0\"></span><sup>11</sup> The parties also agreed to pay a combined total of \\$17,688,365 in prejudgment interest and \\$35,000,000 in civil penalties. See Ex. B at 8-9.\n\n<span id=\"page-17-1\"></span><sup>12</sup> In the Government's opening statement, AUSA Micah Ferguson stated \"At first he [Guo] called them G Coin and G Dollar, then they became H Coin and H Dollar – H Coin for Himalaya Coin, H Dollar for Himalaya Dollar.\" Trial Tr. at 26.\n\noffset provision, the government could have recovered \\$3.2 million, when the loss was only \\$1.8 million.\" *Id.* (internal citation omitted). Simply put, the Government cannot recover twice.[13](#page-18-0)\n\n# **B.** *Cash Assets Seized and Otherwise in Possession of the Government*\n\nTo the extent this Court finds that a money judgment is appropriate as to Mr. Guo, it also should be offset by the more than \\$1 billion already in the Government's possession in connection with this case. Exhibit A, attached hereto, provides a chart of the cash accounts designated by the Government as Specific Property to be forfeited, along with money disgorged pursuant to the SEC Order and funds forfeited by Haithem Khaled as a condition of his non-prosecution agreement. See Trial Tr. 2036-37. The cash in the seized accounts totals \\$646,551,016.93, the amount disgorged to the SEC totals \\$486,745,063.00, and the amount forfeited by Mr. Khaled is \\$2,700,000. Ex. A. The combined value of these assets is \\$1,135,996,079.93. This amount does not include any of the many other items of Specific Property listed in the POF that are not cash accounts.\n\nAs noted, there are numerous pending petitions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) in which petitioners claim interests in some of the seized assets. Should any petitions be adjudicated in the petitioners' favor, that adjudication itself would remove the property from the universe of criminal proceeds and reduce the \\$1.3 billion sum proffered by the Government. Should any petitions be deemed invalid and the money deemed forfeitable, that money should in turn be offset against any money judgment imposed as to Mr. Guo.\n\n# **C.** *The Funds and/or Assets in the Bankruptcy Trustee's Possession Should Be Used to Satisfy Mr. Guo's Forfeiture Obligations, as the U.S. Government Has Primary Title to Any Forfeitable Funds or Assets*\n\nFinally, the funds and assets in the Bankruptcy Trustee's possession that are among the items the Government deems forfeitable in this case (including the Mahwah mansion) should be used to reduce any forfeiture obligation imposed upon Mr. Guo rather than be distributed to debtors in inferior position to the U.S. Government. Among the statutes the Government cites as basis for forfeiture is 18 U.S.C. §1963, which states that \"All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) *vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section*.\" (Emphasis added). The same is true for 18 U.S.C. §981 (also cited by the Government), which includes the same\n\n<span id=\"page-18-0\"></span><sup>13</sup> Double recovery of fraud proceeds via criminal forfeiture also arguably would run afoul of the Excessive Fines Clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. As the court in *Carlyle*  recognized, \"[a] forfeiture order imposed at the end of a criminal proceeding due to a conviction constitutes a fine that is subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.\" 776 Fed. Appx. 572. Recovery of the same alleged proceeds from two different parties as part of a criminal forfeiture imposed at sentencing would clearly be excessive. It should not be permitted here with respect to disgorged funds already collected by the SEC, nor with respect to other alleged proceeds already in the Government's possession or that are otherwise returned to purported victims.\n\nlanguage at §981(f).[14](#page-19-0)\n\nAs the Second Circuit explained more recently in *United States v. Daugerdas*, 892 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 2018), \"[u]nder the 'relation-back' doctrine of §853(c), the Government's interest in the proceeds of a fraud vests as soon as those proceeds come into existence, and is therefore superior to that of any subsequent third-party recipient of those funds (unless the third party is a bona fide purchaser for value).\" *Id*. at 548; *see also Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States*, 491 U.S. 617, 627 (1989).[15](#page-19-1)\n\nThus, under the applicable forfeiture authorities, the Government in this criminal case possesses an interest in any forfeitable assets currently in the Trustee's custody (or which the Trustee might obtain) that is superior to that of any creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding. *See Luis v. United States*, 578 U.S. 5, 16 (2016) (\"[i]f we analogize to bankruptcy law, the Government, by application of §853(c)'s relationback provision, became something like a secured creditor with a lien on the defendant's tainted assets superior to that of most any other party\"). *See also* 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A) (requiring that any third party's interest in any forfeited property must have been superior to the defendant's \"at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture\").\n\nAs set forth in Mr. Guo's prior September 4, 2025, letter motion seeking to preserve the value of forfeitable assets (ECF No. 724) – a request for relief he restates herein – requiring the USAO SDNY to obtain custody of the assets in the Trustee's possession will make them available to investors in and customers of the various entities involved in this case. In its application for the POF, the Government professed, as it has throughout this case, that recompensing investors is its principal objective. Transfer of those funds and assets for disposition and distribution in this case certainly promotes that goal. *See, e.g.*, Transcript, April 8, 2025, at 7-8 (ECF No. 684).\n\nIndeed, also as set forth in Mr. Guo's motion to preserve the value of forfeitable assets, the Trustee's continued custody and control of those funds and assets would frustrate the goal of returning property to investors and customers of the entities involved in this case, given the rapid rate at which assets are being swallowed up by professional fees incurred in the bankruptcy proceedings.\n\nTo the extent the Government declines to assert its superior right to forfeitable assets in the custody and control of the Bankruptcy Trustee, the value of such assets should also be offset against any money judgment entered in this case. Similarly, to the extent the Government has declined to pursue\n\n<span id=\"page-19-0\"></span><sup>14</sup> These provisions codify the \"relation back\" theory that has been in effect for centuries. *See United States v. 1,960 Bags of Coffee*, 12 U.S. 398, 399 (1814) (\"[t]he forfeiture occurs at the moment of committing the offence. The statute says whenever the act is done, the thing shall be forfeited\"). *See also United States v. Stowell*, 133 U.S. 1 (1890) (denominating it the \"taint theory\").\n\n<span id=\"page-19-1\"></span><sup>15</sup> Courts have recognized that \"[t]he RICO forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. §1963, and [21 U.S.C.] §853 are 'are so similar in legislative history and in plain language as to warrant similar interpretation.'\" *United States v. Egan*, No. 10 Cr. 191 (JFK), 2015 WL 4772688, at \\*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2015), *aff'd*, 654 Fed. Appx. 520 (2d Cir. 2016) *quoting DSI Assocs. LLC v. United States*, 496 F.3d 175, 183 n. 11 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).\n\nother potentially forfeitable assets in this case – such as any proceeds of alleged unlawful activity retained by witnesses and others including Ya Li, Sara Wei, Haithem Khaled, Qidong Xia, and Kyle Bass, the value of those funds should also be offset against any money judgment entered here.\n\n## **VII. Conclusion**\n\nFor all of the reasons discussed herein, we respectfully submit that the Government has not met its evidentiary burden to support entry of the money judgment it requests here. Even if the Court does conclude that a money judgment is appropriate, the value of any such judgment should not exceed \\$164,003,920.07, which represents the difference between the \\$1.3 billion figure requested by the Government and the \\$1,135,996,079.93 already obtained by the Government in connection with this case. Further, any order imposing such money judgment should provide for it to be offset by the value of the sale of other Specific Property in the POF, and any other assets that the Government obtains in connection with this case.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nMelinda Sarafa Joshua Dratel John Kaley\n\ncc: All counsel via ECF","body_zh":"43 West 43rd Street, Suite 370 | New York, NY 10036 212.785.7577 | 646.868.8266（传真） www.sarafazellan.com\n\n2026年2月3日\n通过 ECF 提交\n\n尊敬的 Analisa Torres（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯）\n美国地区法官\nDaniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse（丹尼尔·帕特里克·莫伊尼汉美国联邦法院）\n500 Pearl Street\nNew York, NY 10007\n关于：United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, et al.（美国诉郭文贵等案） 23-CR-118 (AT)\n\n尊敬的托雷斯法官：\n\n我与 Joshua Dratel（约书亚·德拉特尔）以及 John Kaley（约翰·凯利）共同代表 Miles Guo（郭文贵，又名“Ho Wan Kwok”），依据本法院2026年1月8日的裁定（ECF No. 784）及随后延长提交期限的裁定（ECF No. 798），谨呈递本信函，以阐明郭先生对2025年8月11日作出的初步没收令（“POF”）（ECF No. 720）提出的异议。\n\n在2025年7月28日请求法院作出初步没收令的信函动议（ECF No. 716）（政府动议）中，政府提出了两项截然不同的请求：(1) 对郭先生作出13亿美元的金钱判决；以及 (2) 没收郭先生在初步没收令所列特定财产（“特定财产”）中的权益。关于第二项请求，郭先生对于其在特定财产中可能拥有的任何个人权益一贯不持立场。郭先生在此再次确认，他并不主张对特定财产享有个人权益，并支持将特定财产归还给其合法所有人。\n\nI. 引言与论点摘要\n\n法院应当拒绝针对郭先生作出金额为13亿美元的金钱判决，其理由有多方面。第一，政府尚未提出足以确定欺诈范围的证据，也未明确究竟是谁被欺诈。第二，政府尚未证实郭先生个人获得了构成政府没收请求基础的13亿美元所谓的犯罪收益。第三，被判无罪的行为不能作为承担没收责任的依据。最后，郭先生有权要求，本法院确定的任何适用没收金额，\n\n均应由政府、破产受托人以及可能由其他人已经扣押和/或占有的现金及其他资产的极其可观的价值予以抵销。随本信附上的附件 A 是关于政府在与本刑事起诉所涉行为相关的过程中已经追回的超过10亿美元现金的摘要。我们将依次阐述本案的相关背景和法律框架以及上述各项论点。\n\nII. 相关背景与法律框架\n\n2024年7月16日，经过漫长的审理，陪审团裁定郭先生在本案第三次替代起诉书（“起诉书”）所列十三项罪名项中的十项罪名成立。郭先生坚称自己未犯有任何被指控的罪行。然而，就本动议而言，在不放弃其任何权利（包括其全部上诉权利）的前提下，郭先生虽不同意陪审团的裁决，但就目前的程序而言，他必须接受该裁决。\n\n陪审团裁定郭先生在第五项罪名（与 GTV 私募相关的电汇欺诈，违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 和 2）、第六项罪名（与 GTV 私募相关的证券欺诈，违反 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) 及 78ff、17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5、18 U.S.C. § 2）以及第十二项罪名（非法货币交易，违反 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 和 2）上无罪。初步没收令虽然列举了起诉书中包含的这些罪名项，但并未承认陪审团已裁定郭先生在这些罪名项上不成立。\n\n陪审团未就特定财产或任何其他财产是否应当被没收作出任何事实认定；也就是说，关于特定财产与定罪罪行之间是否存在任何关联，或者关于郭先生个人获取的犯罪收益金额（若有），均未作出任何事实认定。\n\n政府主张其所寻求的13亿美元金钱判决代表了“对个别受害者向 G 集团欺诈行为的某些分支机构——GTV、Farms（农场）、G Clubs 以及 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）汇入资金数额的保守估计”。政府动议第3页。根据政府为支持该数字所引用的证据，13亿美元的数额由以下部分组成：向 GTV/Voice of Guo（文贵之声）汇入4.11亿美元；向农场汇入1.10亿美元；向 G Clubs 汇入2.40亿美元；以及向喜马拉雅交易所汇入5.17亿美元。GXZ 26。即使假定这13亿美元的数字准确反映了投资者和客户流向上述实体的资金数额，这些资金整体是否构成欺诈和/或敲诈勒索活动的收益，也是一个独立于陪审团裁决且尚待确定的问题。\n\n在此背景下，已有人依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 和《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(c) 条提交了数百份请愿书，对政府扣押的数亿美元主张第三方权利，请愿人坚称其权利优于郭先生（其并未提出此类主张）或政府对特定财产所主张的任何权利、所有权或权益。\n\n政府承认，其在本案中尚未就个别受害者的损失或赔偿作出任何确定，且出于赔偿目的计算此类损失或赔偿是不可行的（参见 ECF No. 785 第5页）。\n\n最后，数千名喜马拉雅交易所客户以及直接致信法院、政府和署名律师的数十名其他人士均明确表示，他们并非郭先生欺诈或任何其他不当行为的受害者，而是寻求归还被政府扣押的财产。\n\n在此背景下，依据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2(b)(1)(a) 条，应由法院确定“根据适用法律哪些财产应当被没收”。由于政府寻求没收特定财产，这包括确定“政府是否已证明该财产与该罪行之间存在必要的关联”，并且由于政府还寻求对郭先生作出个人金钱判决，这还包括确定“应命令被告支付的金额”。同上。\n\n正如第二巡回上诉法院所承认的，“计算没收金额并非一门‘精确的科学’”。United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455, 488 (2d Cir. 2024)（引用 United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2011)）。“地区法院只需‘根据现有信息，对损失作出合理估计’。法院可以‘使用一般参考点作为计算[犯罪活动]损失或收益的出发点，并可以根据量刑程序中优势证据所确立的事实作出合理推断’”。同上（内部引用省略）。\n\nIII. 出于没收目的的欺诈范围尚未解决——且远低于政府所主张的数额——因为大量所谓的“受害者”明确否认自己是“受害者”\n\n本案中出于没收目的尚未解决的一个关键方面是欺诈的范围，从而也是应当被没收的“收益”的范围。本案极其不寻常，甚至是绝无仅有的，因为它并不属于全盘欺诈的情形——即并非每一位投资者都声称依赖了指控中的虚假陈述，或者声称此类虚假陈述对该特定投资者作出出资决定具有重要性。\n\n相反，与几乎所有的欺诈案件不同，各个投资工具中的许多投资者明确否认他们事实上是郭先生任何欺诈行为的受害者。如下文所述，在某些情况下，投资者坚称他们是在经济上遭受了政府行为的损害，而非郭先生的行为。1\n\n1 这不是证据充分性的论点，也不是试图对陪审团裁决重新进行争辩（郭先生为了量刑以及在此背景下的没收目的而承认该裁决）。相反，这涉及界定陪审团究竟认定了什么，即哪些投资者受到了欺诈，并从而界定什么构成非法活动的收益。\n\n因此——这再次与绝大多数欺诈案件不同——勾勒出欺诈的范围是确定适当没收总额的必要前提，因为如下文所述，大量投资者并未因欺诈而被剥夺金钱或财产。进而，他们的投资并不代表非法活动的“收益”，也不应予以没收。在该多样化的群体中，包括了一些依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 提交请愿书的个人和实体。\n\n政府显然尚未证明（而为了证明没收的正当性政府必须证明）本案中所有或哪怕大多数投资者都受到了欺诈。事实上，政府的举证仅限于就此作证的五六名证人。虽然在普通案件中，可能有依据推定其他投资者同样受到了欺骗，但在本案中，鉴于否认受害者身份的投资者数量众多且形式多样，这并不是一个可行的推定。\n\n受欺诈的投资者与坚称自己未受欺诈的投资者之间的分歧，在 United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993) 一案中得到了说明。在该案中，两名律师被告被指控欺骗了他们所代表的投资者（目的是购买合作公寓改建期间可用的公寓），因为他们为自己争取到了在未告知投资者的情况下购买该建筑中其他公寓的某些机会。然而，第二巡回上诉法院推翻了定罪判决，指出聘请这两名律师的投资者团体的负责人作证称：\n\n他从未要求在[公寓大楼]中投入超过该团体购买114套公寓所花费的资金；[被告和一名共谋者]对[该建筑的]公寓进行个人投资并无不当；他对于[被告律师]可能进行此类个人投资没有任何预期；并且“对[被告]而言进行交易完全是预料之中的事，如果不与我的团体做，也会与欧洲的某个团体做。”\n\n同上，第1014页。该投资者团体的负责人还作证称，“他对[被告的]代理表示满意；并且如果再次聘请[被告]代表他，他不会有任何问题。”同上，第1015页。\n\n虽然法院在 Miller 案中将其改判推翻定罪的决定描述为基于政府未能指控被告通过欺诈获得了财产权益，但该判决书的措辞（除上述引用的部分外）清楚地反映出，缺乏充分证据证明投资者所依赖的任何预期遭到了破坏，或缺乏证据证明被告使用其资金的任何用途对据称受到欺诈的投资者而言是重大的。\n\n正如法院在 Miller 案中所总结的，虽然\n\n政府主张[被告]为自身利益侵吞了\n\n原本归属于该团体的财产；即相关公寓以及转售所得利润……但政府无法克服[证人]无可反驳的证词所构成的障碍，该证词削弱了关于此特定代理关系排除了[被告]对[公寓大楼的]公寓进行普遍平行投资、或特别是对这八套公寓进行投资的任何理解。\n\n同上，第1020页。\n\n因此，虽然通常情况下信赖和重大性受“理性人”标准的约束，但正如本案中许多投资者的情况一样，当所谓的“受害者”明确且肯定地否认其中任一要素时，Miller 案确立了相反的规则，从而使针对该特定人员投资的欺诈指控失去效力。\n\n近期，在 United States v. Rainford（美国诉雷恩福德案），110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024) 中，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）针对基于并非全部具有欺诈性的交易整体而做出的笼统没收主张，表达了同样的保留意见。在 Rainford 案中，政府的立场基于一名证人的证词，即被告律所的案件中有40%属于“滑倒跌伤”类——但即便如此，该数额仍应（在该小计基础上）再扣减20%，因为这些案件中只有80%属于欺诈案件。Id. at 489。\n\n因此，Rainford 案中的法院部分撤销了没收判决，因为“即使政府关于[该证人]陈述的指控得到了印证，政府也是通过仅采信[该]陈述的一部分来得出没收金额的。”Id.；另见 id.（“政府和地区法院均未解释，为何最初提出的160万美元没收请求应当核减60%，而由此得出的64.4万美元却不应为了计入非欺诈性的滑倒跌伤索赔而再核减20%”）。\n\n这些相同的原则同样适用于本案。个体投资者的预期和信赖对于区分欺诈受害者与未受害者至关重要，后者的投资不得计入任何没收判决中。\n\n本案中的欺诈范围在实质方面因明确否认自己具有任何欺诈“受害者”身份的四类人员而缩减：\n\n(1) 在 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）持有加密货币账户的6,512人。例如，参见《6,512名作为喜马拉雅交易所成员的申索人及其律师对个别动议的答复》，2025年10月22日（ECF No. 761）（“HX Response”）；\n\n(2) Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（汉密尔顿机会基金，简称“Hamilton”）的324名投资者。例如，参见《关于裁定请愿人对被没收财产的权益并修改针对被告 Miles Guo（郭文贵）作出的初步没收令的补充第三方请愿书》，2025年10月22日（ECF No. 756）（“Hamilton Supplemental”）；《关于裁定请愿人对被没收财产的权益并修改初步没收令的第三方请愿书》，2025年4月7日（ECF No. 674）（“Hamilton Petition”）；\n\n(3) 致信政府声明不具受害者身份的投资者，作为证据开示材料提供于 USAO_00112534-USAO_00112564；\n\n(4) 已联系辩护律师声明不具受害者身份的投资者。\n\n除了这一庞大数量之外，还有那些政府未能确定身份、但可能属于上述四类非受害者的所谓受害者。因此，除庭审证人之外，受害者的数量——从而受制于没收的总“收益”——可能远少于政府在其初步没收令动议中所主张的数额。\n\n鉴于已有充分证据表明相当数量的所谓“受害者”拒绝接受该归类，政府有责任以足够的明确性确定欺诈的范围，以便法院能够以必要的确信度断定没收总额是准确的。\n\nA. 喜马拉雅交易所的成员\n\n通过其律师，喜马拉雅交易所的6,512名成员——约占喜马拉雅交易所成员的三分之二，参见 HX Response，第3页——已提出异议，反对将其账户（及其中的资产）作为任何欺诈的收益予以没收。正如 HX Response 所述，“喜马拉雅交易所（HEX）的许多投资者对于被贴上受害者的标签表示沮丧。”Id. at 2。\n\n喜马拉雅交易所请愿人进一步阐述，明确拒绝政府的没收理论：“针对[郭先生及其共同被告]的刑事案件建立在他们欺诈投资者的断言之上，然而这些投资者中的许多人坚称自己并未受骗，并拒绝受害者标签。”Id.；另见 id. at 3（请愿人“与拒绝受害者身份的个别投资者动议保持一致”）。\n\n此外，喜马拉雅交易所请愿人实际上赞同郭先生的观点，即“检察官尚未确定具体受害者，也未量化其指控的损失，而这在当前背景下对于证实欺诈主张至关重要。”Id. at 3。2\n\n不仅如此，喜马拉雅交易所请愿人坚称，他们遭受的唯一经济损失是由于政府的不当干预所致：“记录中没有任何证据表明 HEX 投资者遭受了损失，除了政府在查封请愿人账户的行动中……对 HEX 造成的声誉和财务损害。”Id. at 2。\n\n2 在提出与郭先生一致的另一立场时，HX Response 补充道，请愿人的律师“对动议人就破产诉讼中产生过度开支的关切表示认同”。HX Response，第7页。\n\n事实上，“投资者之间存在共识，即他们没有被 Kwok（郭文贵）、Je（余建明）或 Wang（王雁平）欺诈，而是受到了美国政府查封其投资的行为的损害。”Id. at 3；另见 id.（政府“具有讽刺意味地造成了其原本旨在防止的财务损害”）。此外，需要强调的是，郭先生从未收到过这些款项。这些投资者的资金存放在他们自己名下的账户中，应当退还给他们。\n\nB. Hamilton 请愿人\n\nHamilton 请愿人提出了类似的立场。作为首要问题，Hamilton 请愿人赞同：\n\n为了证明没收权，政府仅声称（而未证明）资金属于犯罪活动的一部分是不够的。相反，政府必须证明其主张没收的财产是由被告获取、属于被告或受被告控制的。\nHamilton Supplemental，第9页 ¶ 18。3\n\nHamilton 请愿人的财产——总计89,992,861.75美元，参见 Hamilton Petition，第8页 ¶ 20——“完全由并购基金投资者合法投资的资金组成，与两起刑事案件中被指控的行为均无任何关联，因此完全处于任一诉讼程序中应受没收财产的范围之外。”Id. at 4-5；另见 id. at 2（引用省略）；10 n.6（投资属于“合法”且“受监管”）；13 ¶¶ 23-24；14 ¶ 25（请愿人将其自有资金投资于“与[起诉书]中所指控的欺诈计划完全无关”的工具中）（引用省略）。\n\n此外，“政府从未指控、更未证明被告郭对2770号账户或其中持有的资金拥有任何所有权权益，或对其行使过任何控制权。”Id. at 10 n. 6。Hamilton Supplemental 进一步审查了庭审记录，以确认“请愿人的立场，即被告郭对2770号账户或其中的资金不享有所有权权益——在书面记录中或在被告郭的庭审中均未提出任何证据证明被告郭是2770号账户的签署人、拥有2770号账户或运营2770号账户。”Id. at 8 ¶ 16。\n\nHamilton 请愿人的资金也未被用于实施所指控的任何犯罪，id. at 14-26，并且“没有任何证据表明2770号账户中的任何资金属于被告郭，或曾与受污染资金混同，以至于政府可以主张扣押请愿人的财产符合 21 U.S.C. § 853 的要求。”Id. at 12 ¶ 22（引用省略）；另见 id. at 15 ¶ 27\n\n3 Hamilton 请愿人亦赞同“[本]案呈现出一种独特的没收态势……”Hamilton Supplemental，第1页。\n\n（“[没]有证据表明被告郭曾使用、指示或对这些资金行使任何控制权，也没有证据表明这些资金是被告郭任何犯罪活动的一部分或收益”）。\n\n因此，“请愿人对请愿人财产享有的权益既归属于请愿人，又优于被告郭、被告王或政府对请愿人财产可能主张的任何权利，因为被告郭、被告王和/或政府从未对请愿人财产拥有法定权益或衡平法权益。”Id. at 7 ¶ 12；另见 id. at 11 ¶ 20（引用 United States v. Elias，154 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2025)）。\n\n此外，与喜马拉雅交易所请愿人一样，Hamilton 请愿人的立场是，他们遭受经济损失并非由于郭先生，而是由于政府干预了投入 Hamilton 请愿人资金的那笔交易。正如 Hamilton Supplement 所叙述，“虽然交易确实完成了（郭案庭审，2024年6月17日，2794:25-2795:4），但[卖方]从未收到投资款项，因为‘该款项在途中被 U.S. Marshals（美国法警署）查扣。’郭案庭审，2024年6月17日，2796:14-23。”Id. at 15 ¶ 26（脚注省略）。4\n\nC. 依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 提交请愿书或致信政府声明不具受害者身份的投资者\n\n本案的公开电子卷宗包含依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 由126名个人（不包括 Hamilton 或喜马拉雅交易所请愿人）提交的请愿书，涉及总计28,579,803.58美元的主张。这些请愿书以及该总额，使政府在此处寻求的没收金额受到进一步质疑。\n\n此外，政府提供的证据开示材料中包含（至少）5一个文件夹，内含31封电子邮件，载有投资者关于郭先生未对其实施欺诈的申诉。该文件夹标有贝茨编号 USAO_00112534-USAO_00112564。大多数电子邮件未列出每个人所做投资的具体金额，因此无法从中得出总数。然而，即便投资金额无法量化，这些通信也应进一步减少潜在的没收总额。\n\nD. 已联系辩护律师的投资者\n\n法庭于2026年1月20日进行的判决前会议的相关报道引发了多封发送给辩护律师的电子邮件，发件人自称为本案庭审所涉部分投资工具的投资者，并否认自己遭受了侵害。\n\n4 脚注补充道，由于政府查封了分配给该项收购的资金，导致 Hamilton 请愿人无法完成交易，卖方因此对 Hamilton 请愿人提起了仲裁程序。Hamilton Supplemental，第15页 n.12。\n\n5 随着律师继续审查，在64太字节（TB）的证据开示材料中可能还会发现更多。上述具体提供的材料是律师迄今发现的文件夹。\n\n此外，一些人告知律师，就他们向美国或其他主管机关针对郭先生提出的申诉而言，这些申诉是在 People's Republic of China（中华人民共和国，简称“PRC”）人员的强迫下提出的——在某些情况下完全是由其撰写的。部分通信人在该过程中遭受了中华人民共和国当局的审讯和拘留。\n\n律师近期已与代表12名此类人士的律师取得联系，收到了与这些人相关的文件和其他材料，目前正在核实这些陈述，以及其他人单独向律师作出的其他陈述。律师还注意到，涉案的部分人士因担心受到中华人民共和国的报复而要求保密。这甚至适用于居住在美国的部分个人（而其他人则居住在中国及其他地方）。\n\n因此，辩护律师目前并没有一个确切的人数可以可靠地列为「非受害者」，也没有他们投资的具体金额。然而，辩护律师仍在持续收到此类电子邮件，并将在核实程序完成后，将那些已核实的情况编目归档。\n\nE. 否认自己是受害者的投资者人数不明\n\n上述讨论，特别是关于 A、C 和 D 节的讨论，引出了一个问题：究竟还有多少人并不认为自己是 Mr. Guo（郭先生）任何欺诈行为的受害者？有些人可能不知道没收程序；有些人可能因为害怕受到 PRC（中华人民共和国）的报复而不敢站出来，因为如果他们站出来，就会与 PRC 出于政治原因竭力诋毁郭先生的说辞相矛盾；还有些人可能没有途径或能力依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 理解自身的权利。\n\n不论原因如何，合乎逻辑且合理的结论是，在这起极其罕见的案件中，上述类别并未代表各个类别中的所有人（Hamilton 投资者除外）。这种「未知」使得政府更有必要承担其举证责任，以查明受害者身份以及主张其投资款项应予没收的依据。\n\n至少，上述类别中的那些投资者必须在没收考量中予以排除。反之，鉴于本案情况的空前性质，政府必须精确确定本案中究竟谁构成「受害者」。\n\nIV. 政府未能证明郭先生个人获得了 13 亿美元的犯罪所得\n\n限制本案中所处任何金钱判决范围的另一个因素是：法院只能命令郭先生没收其个人获得的资产。在 Honeycutt v. United States，581 U.S. 443 (2017) 一案中，U.S. Supreme Court（美国最高法院）驳回了对被告就「其共谋者从犯罪中获得但被告本人并未取得的财产」强加连带责任的做法。同上，第 445 页。最高法院是在毒品共谋犯罪的背景下对 Honeycutt 案作出判决的，该案中的没收是依据 21 U.S.C. § 853 实施的，该条款强制要求没收「该人因某些毒品犯罪直接或间接获得的任何收益所构成或衍生的任何财产」。在 United States v. Elias，154 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2025) 一案中，Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）将 Honeycutt 案的裁决扩展适用于依据 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) 进行的没收（本案争议的法规之一），其理由是 Honeycutt 案中的法规与 § 981(a)(1)(C) 在「功能上相同」。同上，第 59 页。此前，在 United States v. Tanner，942 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2019) 一案中，第二巡回法院在洗钱共谋犯罪的背景下适用了 Honeycutt 案的裁决，该案中的没收是依据 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) 实施的（本案争议的另一没收法规）。同上，第 68 页。我们认为，Honeycutt 案的推理同样适用于刑事 RICO 法规 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) 项下的没收，这是适用于本案的第三部没收法规。\n\n因此，郭先生只有在其某时某刻个人获得了不法所得的范围内，才承担没收该不法所得价值的责任。第二巡回法院已明确表示，在 Honeycutt 案之后，地区法院不得再按惯例命令没收共谋者获得的收益，即便该收益对被告而言属于合理可预见的范围。United States v. Papas，715 Fed. Appx. 88, 91 (2d Cir. 2018)。相反，地区法院「现在必须仅根据被告因该罪行获得的个人收益，来确定被告所欠的……没收数额。」同上（根据 Honeycutt 案发回重审以重新计算没收数额）（强调为后加）。\n\n在 Honeycutt 案之后第二巡回法院维持没收命令的案件中，证明被告曾在某时某刻个人获得不法所得的证据一直是非常明确的。例如，在 United States v. Pastore，2022 WL 2068434，第 *7 页（2d Cir. 2022 年 6 月 8 日）一案中，政府在庭审期间证明了被告个人收取了由跑腿人员送达的非法赌博款项。在 United States v. Glenn，794 Fed.Appx. 19, 22 (2d Cir. 2019) 一案中，PSR 中无可争议的事实描述了一起抢劫案，被告与其共谋者均用赃物装满各自的旅行包并逃离商店。在 Tanner 案中，尽管第二巡回法院撤销了要求洗钱共谋案中每名被告各自没收 970 万美元的单独没收命令（以防止双重受偿），但法院裁定，积极参与洗钱共谋并在四笔独立交易中个人电汇了 970 万美元的被告，可就该金额承担连带责任。Tanner，942 F.3d 第 68 页。\n\n在本案中，现有证据远未证明郭先生个人获得了政府所主张的 13 亿美元——政府称该金额代表个人汇给 GTV、各农场、G Clubs 和 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的款项总额。相反，关于已被追缴至 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）的 GTV Private Placement（GTV 私募）、VOG、G-Coin 和 G-Dollar 资金，显而易见郭先生并不占有或控制这些资金，因为它们是由三个独立实体追缴的——即 GTV Media Group, Inc.、Saraca Media Group, Inc. 和 Voice of Guo Media, Inc.——郭先生在这些实体中均未担任任何正式职务。同样，政府查扣的近 6 亿美元现金（见附件 A）也是存放在由他人维护和控制的账户中。例如，在庭审期间，政府传唤了 Mercantile Global Exchange 的董事长兼首席执行官 James Collins 作证，该机构曾为 G Clubs、G Fashion 和 Himalaya Exchange 等实体提供银行服务，政府正是从中查扣了其目前寻求没收的数亿美元款项。见附件 A。Collins 先生作证称，他的金融机构作为一家受监管的实体，通过其尽职调查程序确定郭先生既不是 G Clubs 的最终实益所有人，也不是 G Clubs 或 G Fashion 的资金来源。庭审记录第 2842 页。\n\nCollins 先生进一步作证称，郭先生未对 G Clubs、G Fashion 或 Himalaya Exchange 行使任何运营控制权。庭审记录第 2843 页。\n\n在本案中提交的众多 § 853(n) 申请书中所阐述的分析在此也具有启发意义，因为它们说明了将郭先生与被查扣账户联系起来的证据不足。例如，在请愿人 Hamilton Investment Management, Ltd. (BVI) 和 Hamilton Investment Management, Ltd. (UK) 提交的《关于判定请愿人对被没收财产之权益并修改针对被告 Miles Guo 作出的初步没收命令的补充第三方请愿书》中，简明扼要地驳斥了本案中存在将该申请所涉及账户与郭先生联系起来之证据的说法。见 ECF No. 760 第 13-23 段。\n\n同样，代表 Himalaya Exchange 数千名客户提交的、记录了这些客户所进行交易的申请书，进一步削弱了郭先生曾个人获得存入 Himalaya Exchange 资金的说法。见，例如，ECF No. 612 及证明附件。\n\n政府自身就郭先生的同案被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平）提交的量刑备忘录，削弱了政府目前可能企图提出的郭先生对本案涉案实体行使了运营控制权的任何论点。根据政府的说法，王女士是这些实体的「日常老板」，「由她发号施令」，她是「对各个实体运营的方方面面行使控制权」的「指挥者」。见 ECF No. 476 第 28 页。\n\n简而言之，政府尚未提出充分证据来证明郭先生个人获得或直接控制了其目前寻求命令郭先生个人予以没收的资金。郭先生并未拥有 Mahwah（马鞍山）住宅或 POF（初步没收命令）中所列任何车辆的所有权。例如，布加迪（Bugatti）跑车的所有权甚至从未转移给该车辆的购买方 G Club，因为 G Club 从未接受布加迪跑车的交付。见 ECF No. 749（Post Oak Motors, LLC 就确定对受初步没收命令规制财产的第三方权益所作的经核实请愿书）。事实上，正如 Post Oak Motors, LLC 的 § 853(n) 申请书中所述，G Club 向 Post Oak Motors 支付了布加迪跑车的款项，但 Post Oak 一直在其经销店保持着对该车辆的占有、保管和控制，直至该车辆被 U.S. Marshals（美国法警局）查扣。ECF No. 749 第 2 页。显而易见，郭先生并未个人获得该布加迪跑车，因此无法对其进行没收。在缺乏合格证据证明郭先生个人获得了该布加迪跑车或任何其他待没收的特定财产，或者证明郭先生个人获得了 13 亿美元犯罪所得的情况下，政府要求对郭先生处以 13 亿美元金钱判决的请求在法律上不能成立。\n\nV. 判定没收时不应考虑已被宣告无罪的行为\n\n除了上述缺陷之外，鉴于陪审团已就与 GTV 私募有关的电汇欺诈和证券欺诈均裁定郭先生无罪，政府企图向郭先生追缴所谓 GTV 私募收益的做法（见政府动议第 4 页）也是被误导的。\n\n尽管政府依赖 United States v. Watts，519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997)（全庭审决）所主张的「法院在量刑时可考虑庭审记录中与 GTV 相关的案件事实」，政府动议第 3 页，但在 Watts 案作出判决后的近 30 年里，关于量刑时处理被判无罪行为（显然包括没收）的司法格局已发生巨大变化。这一点在《量刑指南》方面是真实的，并反映在最高法院大法官们所表达的疑虑中，这两者都体现出对因陪审团已宣告无罪的行为而对被告进行量刑所产生的宪法性冲突的认识。\n\nA. 2024 年量刑指南修正案\n\nU.S. Sentencing Commission（美国量刑委员会）作为其 2024 年修正周期的一部分，修订了 § 1B1.3 以增加 (c) 款，该款在计算量刑指南范围时排除了对被判无罪行为的考量。见修正案 826，可查阅 http\n\n2024 年 11 月 1 日生效的修正案 826 规定：「相关行为不包括被告在联邦法院被提起刑事指控并被宣告无罪的行为，除非该行为亦构成（无论是全部还是部分构成）当期被定罪的罪行。」U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)。\n\n正如量刑委员会主席 Carlton W. Reeves 法官在宣布该修正案时所声明的：「无罪就是无罪。」2024 年 4 月 17 日量刑委员会新闻稿，《委员会全票通过包括限制在量刑指南中使用被判无罪行为在内的改革方案》，可查阅 http w.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/april-17-2024。\n\n一年前，在该修正案首次传阅时，Reeves 法官评论道：「『法官在使用指南时可以考虑哪些行为』……『对整个联邦司法系统的运作具有基石性和根本性的重要意义』。」同上（Reeves 主席引用 Douglas Berman 教授的话），可查阅 http ent-process/public-hearings-andmeetings/20230405/20230405_transcript.pdf。\n\nB. 最高法院大法官对于为量刑目的使用被宣告无罪行为所表达的保留意见\n\n量刑委员会（Sentencing Commission）的举措也消除了最高法院（Supreme Court）审理该问题的一大障碍。参见 McClinton v. United States，600 U.S. ___，143 S. Ct. 2400 (2023)（Sotomayor［索托马约尔］大法官关于拒绝调卷令的声明）（引文略）；同上，第 2403 页（Kavanaugh［卡瓦诺］大法官，Gorsuch［戈萨奇］大法官和 Barrett［巴雷特］大法官附议，关于拒绝调卷令的声明）。\n\n在 McClinton v. United States，600 U.S. ___，143 S. Ct. 2400 (2023) 一案中，在驳回调卷令（certiorari）申请时，索托马约尔大法官与卡瓦诺大法官均表示有兴趣重新审视 Watts 案。例如，索托马约尔大法官指出，“正如诸多法官所指出的那样，使用被宣告无罪的行为来提高被告人的《量刑指南》（Sentencing Guidelines）适用幅度及刑期，引发了涉及刑事司法系统公正性与公众感知到的公正性的重要问题。”143 S. Ct. 第 2401 页（索托马约尔大法官关于拒绝调卷令的声明），引自 Jones v. United States，574 U.S. 948, 949-950 (2014)（Scalia［斯卡利亚］大法官，Thomas［托马斯］大法官和 Ginsburg［金斯伯格］大法官附议，对拒绝调卷令的异议）；United States v. Bell，808 F.3d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2015)（卡瓦诺大法官关于拒绝全体法官重审的赞同意见）；United States v. Sabillon-Umana，772 F.3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 2014)（戈萨奇法官）；Watts，519 U.S. 第 170 页（Kennedy［肯尼迪］大法官异议意见）（脚注略）。[6]\n\n索托马约尔大法官还解释称，“法院今天拒绝调卷令的做法不应被误读”，因为“负责《量刑指南》的量刑委员会已宣布，将在未来一年内解决围绕基于被宣告无罪行为量刑的问题。”143 S. Ct. 第 2403 页。索托马约尔大法官补充道，“但是，如果委员会不迅速采取行动或选择不采取行动，本院可能需要审理所提出的宪法问题。”同上；亦见 United States v. Coleman，138 F.4th 489, 511-512 (7th Cir.)，调卷令被驳回，146 S. Ct. 275 (2025)（“在驳回 McClinton 案的调卷令申请时，四位最高法院大法官鼓励美国量刑委员会解决量刑中使用被宣告无罪行为的相关问题……十个月后，量刑委员会响应了这一呼吁”）。[7]\n\n索托马约尔大法官进一步阐述道，“当政府借助未能说服陪审团的证据以及更低的证明标准而获得‘二次出击’（a second bite at the apple）的机会时，程序公正性与准确性也同样令人担忧。”143 S. Ct. 第 2402 页。索托马约尔大法官还指出（附有一连串引证），“许多其他州法官和联邦法官也对这种做法提出了质疑。”143 S. Ct. 第 2401 页脚注 2（索托马约尔大法官关于拒绝调卷令的声明）（引文略）。\n\n此外，在 McClinton 案中，索托马约尔大法官观察到，基于被宣告无罪行为的量刑也引发了公众对正义是否得到伸张的感知的质疑，而这种关切对于刑事司法系统的正当性至关重要。多位法官指出，普通民众在得知这一做法时会感到相当震惊。参见例如 United States v. Canania，532 F.3d 764, 778 (8th Cir. 2008)（Bright［布莱特］法官赞同意见）。同上，第 2402-03 页。\n\n当然，Watts 案在判决时并无法受益于这些后来的发展。[8] 第 826 号修正案（Amendment 826）反映了该问题的解决，并明确禁止在量刑中使用被宣告无罪的行为。亦见 United States v. Johnson，754 F. Supp.3d 305, 312-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2024)（鉴于第 826 号修正案的颁布，并援引 McClinton 案指出，“基于被宣告无罪的行为对被告人进行量刑的做法如今已被明确否定”）。\n\n同样无可争议的是，没收具有刑事和惩罚性质，因此属于量刑的一个组成部分，适用第 826 号修正案以及最高法院大法官和其他法官所表达的保留意见。就在去年，第二巡回法院在 United States v. Elias，154 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2025) 一案中援引 United States v. Peters，732 F.3d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 2013) 补充了括号说明：“刑事没收……是惩罚的一种形式，完全独立于量刑期间施加的任何赔偿措施。”Elias，154 F.4th 第 63 页（其他引文略）（强调为后加）。[9]\n\n在此，政府试图将 GTV 私募（GTV Private Placement）资金纳入没收判决书，这不仅企图规避第 826 号修正案的字面与精神及其所维护的宪法保护，而且企图规避削弱 Watts 案的明确且持续的发展势头。[10]\n\nUnited States v. Frias，39 F.3d 391, 392-394 (2d Cir. 1994)（Oakes［奥克斯］法官赞同意见）。\n\n6 在索托马约尔大法官引用的 Bell 案中，卡瓦诺大法官在哥伦比亚特区上诉法院任职时认识到，“允许法官依据被宣告无罪或未被起诉的行为施加高于其原本会施加的刑期，似乎是对正当程序权利和陪审团审判权利的可疑侵犯。”808 F.3d 第 928 页（卡瓦诺大法官关于拒绝全体法官重审的赞同意见）。同样，戈萨奇法官在第十巡回上诉法院任职时，在 United States v. Sabillon-Umana（亦由索托马约尔大法官引用）一案中质疑了一种假设，即“地区法院法官可以在未经陪审团协助或未经被告人同意的情况下，根据法官认定的事实，（在法定授权范围内）减少或增加被告人的刑期。”772 F.3d 第 1331 页。 7 卡瓦诺大法官附议称，“法院今天拒绝调卷令的做法不应被误读”，143 S. Ct. 第 2403 页（卡瓦诺大法官关于拒绝调卷令的声明），并补充说，“使用被宣告无罪的行为改变被告人的《量刑指南》适用幅度引发了重要问题。”同上。不过，卡瓦诺大法官再次指出，鉴于“量刑委员会目前正在审议该问题”，同上，在法院决定是否对涉及使用被宣告无罪行为的案件批准调卷令之前，“本院等待量刑委员会的裁决是适当的。”同上。\n\n8 即便 Watts 案也并未强制要求在量刑中考虑被宣告无罪的行为；相反，它仅认定“不存在禁止考虑……被宣告无罪行为的规定”。519 U.S. 第 152-155 页。\n\n9 进一步强化没收刑事性质的是，即便是长期被视为“补救性”的赔偿（参见 Elias，154 F.4th 第 63 页），如今也已被最高法院认定为“刑事惩罚”。Ellingburg v. United States，2026 WL 135982，第 *2 页，___ S. Ct. ___，607 U.S. ___ (2026年1月20日)。事实上，甚至在 Ellingburg 案之前，第二巡回法院就已裁定，“不得就‘相关行为’造成的损失判处赔偿，即便根据《量刑指南》，该等行为可能‘适当地计入犯罪等级计算’”。United States v. Vilar，729 F.3d 62, 97 (2d Cir. 2013)，引自 United States v. Lussier，104 F.3d 32, 33 (2d Cir. 1997)。\n\n10 甚至在 Watts 案之前，奥克斯法官在受制于巡回法院既有判例而勉强表示赞同时，就指出了允许被宣告无罪的行为增加被告人惩罚的不合常理之处：\n\n我们认定，通过考虑一个人已被宣告无罪的行为，其被定罪罪名的刑期可以翻上四倍。这种法理学让人联想起《爱丽丝梦游仙境》。“先宣告无罪，后进行量刑。”\n\nC. GTV 私募与郭先生被定罪的任何罪行之间均不存在充分的关联\n\n即使没有第 826 号修正案，也不存在充分的关联来证明没收与 GTV 私募相关的资金具有正当性。根据第 32.2 条，“如果政府请求没收特定财产，法院必须确定政府是否已在财产与犯罪之间确立了必要的关联。”联邦刑事诉讼规则（Fed. R. Crim. P.）32.2(b)(1)(A)（强调为后加）；United States v. Capoccia，503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007)（“没收所依据的违法行为必须是被告人被定罪的具体违法行为，而非某些其他、独立的……违法行为”）。\n\n事实上，在 Capoccia 案中，第二巡回法院指出，“要求政府将资产与具体定罪的罪行联系起来，不仅符合刑事没收的惩罚目的，而且落实了国会颁布《民事资产没收改革法》（Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act，即‘CAFRA’）的意图。”同上（内部引文略）。事实上，“《民事资产没收改革法》的立法历史表明，第 2641(c) 条的部分目的在于通过鼓励政府通过刑事程序寻求没收来防止对民事没收程序的滥用，而在刑事程序中，政府必须将目标财产与具体的刑事定罪联系起来。”同上（引自众议院报告第 106-192 号，第 8 页 (1999)；国会记录第 146 卷 S1753–02）。\n\nCapoccia 案或 United States v. Fruchter，411 F.3d 377 (2d Cir. 2005) 亦不允许仅凭被告人被判定犯有 RICO（《敲诈勒索与腐败组织法》）共谋罪，就没收敲诈勒索企业产生的所有收益——包括与敲诈勒索活动无关的收益。在 United States v. Morrison，656 F. Supp. 2d 338 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 一案中，法院解释道：\n\nFruchter 案认定，被宣告无罪的行为可以构成没收“源自敲诈勒索活动的‘收益’”的依据，411 F.3d 第 384 页（援引 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3)），前提是法院根据优势证据标准认定该等活动对被告人而言是合理可预见的。亦见 Capoccia，503 F.3d 第 117-18 页（“[我]们曾认定，可要求被告人没收作为其定罪基础的敲诈勒索企业的所有收益，包括被告人未被定罪的特定敲诈勒索活动的收益。”）（强调为后加）。这些先例并未认定所有收益均可没收。事实上，上述引用的措辞支持了相反的结论，即只有“源自敲诈勒索活动的收益”方可没收。Fruchter，411 F.3d 第 384 页（内部引号和引文略）。\n\n同上，第 345 页脚注 13。\n\n在此，政府未能承担其证明责任，即未能证明——哪怕依据优势证据标准——源自 GTV 私募的资金与非被宣告无罪的行为之间存在必要的关联。\n\n事实上，政府引用的所有证据（政府动议第 3-4 页）均构成关于被宣告无罪的行为的证词。参见例如庭审笔录（Trial Tr.）209（Le Zhou［周乐］）；同上，第 701 页（Patrick Chin［秦伯特］）；同上，第 2376-77 页（Minran Wu［吴敏然］）；同上，第 4465-67、4471-72 页（Wei Chen［陈巍］）；同上，第 1350-58、1365-73 页（Ya Li［李娅］）。每位证人均就 GTV 私募作证，特别是关于他们是否被虚假陈述诱导进行投资——郭先生在第 5 项和第 6 项罪名项中已被宣告无罪的行为。因此，在没收事宜中考虑该行为是被禁止的，因为不存在必要的关联。\n\n此外，在计算没收时，“政府的说法并不是证据”。United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455, 489 (2d Cir. 2024)。因此，政府声称“随后郭继续通过一系列相互关联的骗局诈骗其追随者，包括2020年的GTV私募”，以及“GTV私募与G系列企业（G Enteprise）的其他分支相关联且是其不可或缺的组成部分”，Gov. Mtn. 第3页，这些既非证据，亦非定论。这些主张也未得到证实；因此，它们不具说服力。参见 Rainford, 110 F.4th 第489页（虽然“地区法院可将‘一般参考点作为计算损失或收益的起点’，[United States v.] Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48 [(2d Cir. 2011)]，[] 但未经证实的政府主张并非‘参考点’”）。\n\n此外，政府引用的庭审证据并未以优势证据证明与GTV私募相关的资金是“作为引起没收的犯罪行为之结果而直接或间接收益获得的”。参见 18 U.S.C. §981(a)(2)(A)。事实上，政府主张“郭欺诈性地诱使[投资者]投资GTV”。Gov. Mtn. 第3页。\n\n然而，这歪曲了问题所在，问题不在于对GTV私募的投资是否系受欺诈性诱导——这将构成“单独的违法行为”及已获无罪判决的行为，而在于与GTV私募相关的资金是否是作为被定罪罪名的*结果*而获得的。\n\n在政府对庭审证词的引用中，这些问题被进一步混为一谈。例如，Patrick Chin（帕特里克·钦）的证词称，如果他知道GTV投资者的资金将被一家对冲基金用于再投资，他可能就不会投资GTV。Dkt 716 第3页（引用 Trial Tr. 第701页）。Minran Wu（吴敏然）的证词也是如此，他作证称，如果他知道对GTV的投资将被再投资于对冲基金，他就不会投资GTV。同上（引用 Trial Tr. 2376-77）。\n\n然而，该证词未能确立被定罪的罪名与相关资金之间的关联性，反而仅仅涉及郭先生获判无罪的罪名项的构成要件。政府还引用了Ya Li（李雅）的证词，称“[再]投资规则是一旦你收到SEC对GTV私募的退款，在45天内你应该把这笔钱重新投回投资项目，然后你可以获得百分之五的喜币（H Coin）”。Trial Tr. 244；另见 Gov. Mtn. 第3页。该证词同样削弱了政府关于存在使GTV资金“作为引起没收的犯罪行为的结果而获得……”的必要关联的主张，因为关于再投资的任何陈述都是在GTV私募资金被SEC追回并准备重新分配*之后*才作出的，这使得GTV资金绝不可能是作为另一项犯罪的“结果”而获取的。\n\n政府还坚称，由于农场贷款（Farm loan）和G俱乐部（G Clubs）计划是在发布于GTV平台的视频中推广的，法院应认定存在所要求的关联。Gov. Mtn. 第3页。该主张不当地将媒体平台本身（郭先生在其中发布讨论其他投资机会的视频）与通过其向该平台进行投资的GTV私募混为一谈。同样的分析也适用于罪名项三的共谋洗钱定罪。政府不能将郭先生获判无罪的涉嫌GTV欺诈所涉及的资金纳入洗钱罪的范畴之下。通过对GTV欺诈罪名项的裁决，陪审团认定GTV资金并非来源于指定的非法活动。当然，这并不是说其他涉嫌的欺诈收益不能构成洗钱。长期以来的明确规则是，对于多目标共谋，关于其中一项支柱的证据不足并不导致定罪被推翻，因为推定陪审团是根据有充分证据的目标作出了裁决。参见 Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1992)。相反，在本案中，鉴于陪审团对特定罪名项的无罪判决，推定陪审团是就其认定有充分证据的目标作出了有罪裁决——而非涉及GTV私募的目标。\n\n因此，对于郭先生获判无罪的罪名项（即涉及GTV私募的罪名项），没收所需的关联性并不存在。政府不能将其对其他罪名项（RICO和共谋洗钱）的权利主张建立在郭先生已获无罪判决的涉嫌GTV欺诈的基础之上。\n\nVI. 其他资金应从针对郭先生的任何金钱判决中予以抵扣\n\nA. SEC 已就本案涉及的同一行为通过追缴非法所得获得了 $486,745,063\n\n即便第826号修正案并未禁止将已获无罪判决的行为纳入没收范围，且/或GTV私募与任何被定罪的罪名之间存在充分的关联，政府亦承认“源自GTV私募的实际资金已被SEC追回，SEC设立了公平基金用于向受害者分配”。Dkt 716 第2页脚注。因此，政府继续表示，“[如果]法院从没收金额中扣除GTV私募资金，应扣除约4.11亿美元。参见 GXZ 26 第2页。”同上。事实上，如下文所讨论，SEC追回的金额大幅高于政府所引用的4.11亿美元。\n\n2021年9月13日，United States Securities and Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会，即“SEC”）在第 3-20537 号行政诉讼程序中作出一项命令（“SEC命令”），同时对 GTV Media Group, Inc.（GTV传媒集团公司，简称“GTV”）、Saraca Media Group, Inc.（萨拉卡传媒集团公司，简称“Saraca”）以及 Voice of Guo Media, Inc.（郭之声传媒公司，简称“VOG”）（合称“被申请人”）提起停止令程序，并根据被申请人提交的和解提议对这些程序达成和解。参见 附件B（SEC命令）。GTV与Saraca同意连带追缴非法所得 $434,134,141，VOG同意追缴非法所得\n\n$53,610,922，规定在SEC命令作出后14天内支付合计 $486,745,063 的追缴款项。同上。11 SEC随后通过其为此目的设立的公平基金（Fair Fund）向投资者分发了追缴的资金。\n\nSEC命令涉及直接与本案相关联的行为。具体而言，它涉及2020年4月至2020年6月期间，通过在GTV网站及多个社交媒体平台上发布的公开视频，向1000多名投资者出售了价值约3.39亿美元的GTV股票。同上，第11-13段。SEC命令还具体指出了将1亿美元股票发售收益转入一家对冲基金的情况，而这也是本案中政府案件的一大重点。同上，第14段。此外，SEC命令涉及VOG代表希望投资少于10万美元的潜在投资者购买GTV股票，VOG最终向4500多名投资者出售了约1.14亿美元的GTV股票。同上，第15-21段。该行为与本案中被指控的所谓农场贷款项目相重合。最后，SEC命令还涉及2020年4月至2020年6月期间出售价值约3400万美元的G-Coins（G币）和G-Dollars（G美元）。同上，第25-27段。该行为与本案中喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）的指控相重合。参见，例如，Trial Tr. 第26页。12\n\n毫无争议的是，SEC根据SEC命令收取的近4.87亿美元代表着同一个“企业”的收益，而政府声称该企业应对其现在寻求以针对郭先生的个人金钱判决形式进行第二次追缴的13亿美元收益负责。然而，政府并未引用任何法律依据支持其应被允许就同一涉嫌收益向两个单独的主体追缴两次的主张。相反，相关权威判例表明，已收取的任何资金都应抵扣针对郭先生所作出的任何个人金钱判决。\n\n例如，在 United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2010) 案中，第二巡回法院确认“一旦以赔偿方式作出了部分支付，被告就有理由主张该项支付应作为对当时剩余没收金额的抵减。没收金额代表‘非法所得’，且至少可以主张的是，退还给受害者的任何金钱都已经减少了仍在被告占有下的‘非法所得’金额。”同上，第169-70页（引自 United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d 557, 566 (7th Cir. 1997)）。最近，在 United States v. Carlyle, 776 Fed. Appx. 565 (11th Cir. 2019) 案中，第十一巡回法院认定，地区法院裁定共同被告被没收的任何资产或收益的价值必须从被告的没收责任中予以抵扣并无不当，从而确保政府在任何情况下收取的金额都不会超过欺诈计划的总收益金额。同上，第572页。“抵扣条款对于确保政府不会就该计划过度收取尤为重要，因为在本法院于2016年在 Honeycutt 判决作出之前维持[共同被告的]没收金钱判决并判定其与[被告]对180万美元承担连带责任。若无此\n\n11 双方还同意支付合计 $17,688,365 的判决前利息和 $35,000,000 的民事罚款。参见 附件B 第8-9页。\n\n12 在政府的开庭陈述中，助理联邦检察官 Micah Ferguson（米卡·弗格森）陈述道：“起初他[郭]将它们称为G币和G美元，后来它们变成了喜币和喜美元——喜币代表喜马拉雅币，喜美元代表喜马拉雅美元。”Trial Tr. 第26页。\n\n抵扣条款，政府本可以在损失仅为180万美元的情况下追缴320万美元。”同上（内部引用省略）。简而言之，政府不能重复追缴。13\n\nB. 已扣押及在政府占有下的其他现金资产\n\n在法院认为对郭先生作出金钱判决是适当的限度内，该判决也应由政府已就本案占有的10多亿美元予以抵扣。随本动议附上的附件A提供了一份表格，列出了被政府指定为待没收之特定财产（Specific Property）的现金账户，以及根据SEC命令追缴的款项和 Haithem Khaled（海瑟姆·哈立德）作为其暂缓起诉协议条件而没收的资金。参见 Trial Tr. 2036-37。扣押账户中的现金总计 $646,551,016.93，向SEC追缴的金额总计 $486,745,063.00，Mr. Khaled 被没收的金额为 $2,700,000。附件A。这些资产的合计价值为 $1,135,996,079.93。该金额不包含POF中所列出的许多其他非现金账户的特定财产项目。\n\n如前所述，有多起依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 提起的未决申请，其中申请人主张对部分被扣押资产享有权益。如果有任何申请获得有利于申请人的裁决，该裁决本身就会将相应财产从犯罪收益的总量中移除，并减少政府提出的13亿美元总额。如果有任何申请被认定无效且款项被认定应予没收，该款项相应地也应从对郭先生施加的任何金钱判决中予以抵扣。\n\nC. 破产受托人占有的资金和/或资产应被用于履行郭先生的没收义务，因为美国政府对任何应予没收的资金或资产享有优先所有权\n\n最后，在 Bankruptcy Trustee（破产受托人）占有的、属于政府在本案中认定可予没收的财产之列的资金和资产（包括 Mahwah（马瓦）庄园），应当用于冲减对 Mr. Guo（郭文贵）施加的任何没收义务，而不是分配给地位次于 U.S. Government（美国政府）的债务人。在政府引为没收依据的法条中包括 18 U.S.C. §1963，该条款规定：“(a) 款所述财产的一切权利、所有权和权益，自导致本条项下没收的行为实施之时起归属于美国（vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section）。”（强调为引者所加）。18 U.S.C. §981（同样由政府援引）亦是如此，其包含相同的\n\n13 通过刑事没收对欺诈收益进行双重追缴，在法理上也可能触犯 U.S. Constitution（美国宪法）的 Excessive Fines Clause（过高罚款条款）。U.S. Const. amend. VIII。正如 Carlyle（卡莱尔案）法院所认定，“在刑事诉讼终结时因定罪而施加的没收命令构成须受过高罚款条款约束的罚款。”776 Fed. Appx. 572。在量刑时作为施加的刑事没收的一部分从两个不同主体处追缴相同的涉案收益，显然属于过高。在本案中，无论针对 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）已经收取的退缴资金，还是针对政府已经占有的或以其他方式返还给所谓受害人的其他涉案收益，均不应予以允许。\n\n§981(f) 中的表述。[14](#page-19-0)\n\n正如 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）最近在 United States v. Daugerdas（美国诉道格达斯案），892 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 2018) 中所阐释的那样，“根据 §853(c) 的‘回溯’原则（relation-back doctrine），政府对欺诈收益的权益自该等收益产生之时起即告归属确立，因此优先于任何后续取得该等资金的第三方（除非该第三方是支付了对价的善意购买人）。”Id. at 548；亦见 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States，491 U.S. 617, 627 (1989)。[15](#page-19-1)\n\n因此，根据适用的没收裁判依据，政府在本刑事案件中对受托人目前保管（或受托人可能取得）的任何可予没收资产所拥有的权益，优先于破产程序中任何债权人的权益。参见 Luis v. United States，578 U.S. 5, 16 (2016)（“如果类比于破产法，政府通过适用 §853(c) 的回溯条款，在某种程度上成为了对被告被污染资产享有留置权的担保债权人，其地位优先于绝大多数其他主体”）。亦见 21 U.S.C. §853(n)(6)(A)（要求任何第三方对任何被没收财产的权益必须在“导致该没收的行为实施之时”即已优先于被告的权益）。\n\n正如郭先生此前于 2025年9月4日 提交的旨在保全可予没收资产价值的书面动议（ECF No. 724）中所述——他在本文件中重申了该项救济请求——要求 USAO SDNY（纽约南区联邦检察官办公室）获取对受托人占有资产的保管权，将使这些资产可用于向本案涉及的各个实体的投资者和客户进行分配。在其申请 POF（初步没收令）时，政府一如其贯穿本案始终所声明的那样，声称补偿投资者是其首要目标。移交该等资金和资产以供在本案中进行处置和分配，无疑契合该目标的实现。参见，例如，庭审笔录，2025年4月8日，第 7-8 页（ECF No. 684）。\n\n事实上，正如郭先生关于保全可予没收资产价值的动议中所述，鉴于破产程序中产生的专业服务费用正在迅速吞噬资产，受托人继续保管和控制该等资金和资产将挫败向本案涉及实体的投资者和客户返还财产的目标。\n\n在政府放弃对破产受托人保管和控制下的可予没收资产主张其优先权利的范围内，该等资产的价值亦应从本案作出的任何金钱判决中予以抵销。同样，在政府放弃追缴\n\n14 这些条款将已经施行了几个世纪的“回溯”（relation back）理论成文化。参见 United States v. 1,960 Bags of Coffee，12 U.S. 398, 399 (1814)（“没收发生在实施犯罪的时刻。法律规定，一旦行为实施，该物即应予以没收”）。亦见 United States v. Stowell，133 U.S. 1 (1890)（将其称为“污染理论”）。\n\n15 法院已认定，“RICO（反勒索与受贿组织法）没收法规 18 U.S.C. §1963 与 [21 U.S.C.] §853‘在立法历史和明文字句上极为相似，因而应当作出相似的解释。’”United States v. Egan，No. 10 Cr. 191 (JFK), 2015 WL 4772688, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2015), aff'd, 654 Fed. Appx. 520 (2d Cir. 2016) 引述 DSI Assocs. LLC v. United States，496 F.3d 175, 183 n. 11 (2d Cir.2007)（省略内部引号）。\n\n本案中其他潜在可予没收资产——例如证人及其他人（包括 Ya Li、Sara Wei、Haithem Khaled、Qidong Xia 以及 Kyle Bass）所保留的任何涉嫌非法活动的收益——的范围内，这些资金的价值也应当从在此作出的任何金钱判决中予以抵销。\n\nVII. 结论\n\n基于本文论述的所有理由，我们谨认为，政府未能达到其举证责任以支持在此作出其所要求的金钱判决。即使法院认定作出金钱判决是适当的，任何此类判决的数额也不应超过 $164,003,920.07，该数额代表政府要求的 13 亿美元数额与政府已就本案获得的 $1,135,996,079.93 之间的差额。此外，任何施加此类金钱判决的命令均应规定，该判决金额应由初步没收令中出售其他特定财产的价值以及政府就本案获得的任何其他资产予以冲减抵销。\n\n谨此呈递，\n\nMelinda Sarafa Joshua Dratel John Kaley\n\n抄送：全体代理律师（通过 ECF（电子案件档案系统））","key_entities":["Guo","forfeiture","GTV","Je","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","853(n)","G Clubs","Saraca","RICO","CIPA","Kwok","Miles Guo","Ho Wan Kwok","Torres","Sarafa","Dratel","Kaley","Farm Loan","Analisa Torres","Rule 32.2"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":476,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":612,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":674,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":684,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":716,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":720,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":724,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":749,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":756,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":760,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":761,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":784,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":785,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":798,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":10200,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-01-08 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-01-08","updated_at":"2026-09-04 11:47:24"}