{"id":"court_sdny_805_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":805,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2026-02-20","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge:\n\nDefendant, Miles Guo, requests that the Court “review the [Classified Information\nProcedures Act (‘CIPA’)] Section 4 material and compel disclosure to cleared defense counsel\n[of] those items material or helpful to [Guo] in the sentencing context.”  Mot. at 2, ECF No. 783;\nsee also ECF Nos. 793, 795 (Government’s Responses); ECF No. 796 (Guo’s Reply).  For the\nreasons stated below, the motion is DENIED.\n\nI. Background\n\nCIPA Section 4 permits the Court to “authorize the United States to delete specified items\nof classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant through\ndiscovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to substitute a summary of the\ninformation for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts\nthat the classified information would tend to prove.”  18 U.S.C. app. § 4.\n\nCIPA “neither creates new discovery rights nor expands the rules of discovery governing\nthe admissibility of evidence.”  United States v. Alshahhi, 628 F. Supp. 3d 449, 453 (E.D.N.Y.\n2022).  In evaluating the Government’s motion under CIPA, the district court, therefore, first\ndetermines whether certain information is discoverable.  United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 80\n(2d Cir. 2008).  Then, it determines whether the “state-secrets privilege applies” to the\ninformation and has been properly invoked.  Id.  Finally, it determines “whether the information\nis helpful or material to the defense” and exercises its discretion in compelling disclosure.  Id.\n\nOn April 18, 2024, the Court issued a decision on the Government’s ex parte CIPA\nSection 4 motion in this case and in 18 Cr. 118-3.  See CIPA Section 4 Order, ECF No. 294.1  In\nthat decision, after extensive briefing and a careful in camera review of the materials, the Court\nfound that “[m]any of the materials [we]re . . . not discoverable under Brady v. Maryland, 373\nU.S. 83 (1963) . . . or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16” and were, therefore, properly\nwithheld from discovery.  Id. at 4.  For the remaining materials, the Court either: (1) approved\nthe Government’s redactions, “finding that the redactions omitted information that did not affect\n\n1 Guo’s motion references a separate order entered at ECF No. 363.  See Mot. at 4.  The order filed at ECF No. 363\nrelated to motions and proceedings under CIPA Sections 5 and 6(a) and concerned Guo’s ability to ask a trial\nwitness about certain classified information during cross-examination.  See generally ECF No. 363.  Because Guo’s\nmotion asks the Court to “review the CIPA Section 4 material,” the Court does not construe Guo as moving for\nreconsideration of the order at ECF No. 363, and to the extent that Guo is moving for reconsideration of that order,\nthe Court finds no reason to reopen and relitigate that prior order.\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\n-against-\n\n23 Cr. 118 (AT)\nORDER\nHO WAN KWOK A/K/A “MILES GUO,”\n                                  Defendant.\nUSDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT\nELECTRONICALLY FILED\nDOC #:  _________________\nDATE FILED: _2/20/2026___\n\n---\n\n2\n\nDefendants’ ability to present their defenses”; (2) approved substitutions, “holding that the\nsubstitutions would provide Defendants with substantially the same ability to present their\ndefenses”; (3) determined after an ex parte hearing that the requested deletions were proper as\nthe deleted material was “cumulative of unclassified discovery”; or (4) approved further\nsubstitutions provided after the ex parte hearing on the grounds that the substitutions “provided\nDefendants with substantially the same ability to assert their defenses.”  Id. at 4–5.\n\nII. Discussion\n\nGuo now asks the Court to revisit its CIPA Section 4 order, arguing, first, that Brady and\nother discovery obligations apply to sentencing proceedings and therefore require the Court’s\nreexamination of CIPA Section 4 material at sentencing, and second, that because more\ninformation may be “relevant” during a Court’s sentencing proceedings than is relevant at trial, a\nsecond review of the Section 4 materials is warranted.  See Mot. at 2–3.  The Court is not\npersuaded.\n\nFirst, even though a defendant’s right to receive disclosure from the Government under\nRule 16 and Brady does not vanish upon his conviction, the Court has already examined his right\nto disclosure in this case and found that much of the CIPA Section 4 material was, in fact, not\ndiscoverable under Rule 16 or Brady.  See CIPA Section 4 Order at 4.  Nothing in Guo’s motion\ngives the Court reason to reconsider its holding that the bulk of these materials is not\ndiscoverable.  For the substitutions that the Court did order, and the materials that the Court\nfound not relevant and helpful to the defense, Guo merely argues that the Court’s analysis of\nwhat is “relevant and helpful” under CIPA naturally becomes a “vastly different exercise” once a\ndefendant faces sentencing.  See Mot. at 3.  But that does not establish a right to have the Court\nreexamine discovery at sentencing.  The Court reiterates its prior holding that the material\nredacted from the substitutions did not deprive Guo of substantially the same ability to present\nhis defense.  Indeed, the Government’s briefing addressed—and the Court already considered—\nmaterials potentially relevant for sentencing mitigation.  See Initial CIPA Section 4 Mot., ECF\nNo. 210.  Guo identifies no authority establishing a right to have the Court reexamine each of its\nprior holdings concerning redacted information at sentencing.  See Mot. at 3 (citing cases\ndescribing CIPA procedures generally).2\n\nSecond, to the extent that Guo argues that the Court’s discovery orders, including its\nCIPA Section 4 order, failed to consider whether discoverable material would have been\n“relevant or helpful” for sentencing purposes, the Court construes those arguments as a motion\nfor reconsideration of those orders.  See, e.g., Mot. at 4 (“renew[ing]” requests that this Court\ndenied in a February 21, 2024 Order, ECF No. 243, “in the broader context of sentencing”).\n“Reconsideration of a court’s previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed\nsparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.”  United States\nv. Baldeo, No. 13 Cr. 125, 2015 WL 252414, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2015) (internal quotation\n\n2 United States v. Stewart held that a district court correctly refused to compel materials during discovery under\nCIPA and otherwise upheld the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentences at issue.  590 F.3d 93,\n130–32, 134 (2d Cir. 2009).  United States v. Aref concerned an appeal of a conviction and a defendant’s rights\nduring pretrial discovery.  See 533 F.3d at 76, 78.  United States v. Dumeisi likewise concerned a challenge to a\nconviction.  424 F.3d 566, 574 (7th Cir. 2005).  CIPA was not raised in the context of sentencing in these cases.\n\n---\n\n3\n\nmarks and citation omitted), aff’d, 615 F. App’x 26 (2d Cir. 2015).  “[A] motion for\nreconsideration ‘is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues . . .  or otherwise taking a second bite\nat the apple.’”  United States v. Lisi, No. 15 Cr. 457, 2020 WL 1331955, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.\nMar. 23, 2020) (quoting Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d\nCir. 2012)).  Indeed, “[t]he standard for granting such a motion is strict.”  United States v.\nGoldberg, No. 12 Cr. 864, 2021 WL 2444548, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2021) (citation omitted).\n\nGuo’s motion fails to meet that strict standard.  His sole argument is that sentencing\nproceedings are a “broader context” than trial.  Although a Court may consider more information\nin determining sentence than a jury would in determining guilt, without more, this fact is not a\nsufficient basis to relitigate the scope of discovery and reopen CIPA proceedings, for the reasons\ndiscussed above.\n\nMoreover, such a motion for reconsideration has not been brought within a reasonable\ntime and would further delay resolution of this case.  Guo fails to explain why he did not seek\nreconsideration of the Court’s CIPA orders earlier.  Local Criminal Rule 49.1(b) provides that a\nparty may file “[a] motion for reconsideration . . . within fourteen (14) days after the Court’s\ndetermination of the original motion.”  Although Guo’s motion does hinge on the fact that the\ncase is now in sentencing proceedings, the Court notes that Guo failed to make his motion within\n14 days of entry of the jury’s verdict—or, in fact, within any reasonable time at all.  See Jury\nVerdict, ECF Nos. 394–95 (July 18, 2024).  Guo instead brings this motion almost eighteen\nmonths after trial concluded and after sentencing proceedings have been adjourned numerous\ntimes at his request, see, e.g., ECF Nos. 512, 719, 782.\n\nAccordingly, Guo’s motion is DENIED.  The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to\nterminate the motion at ECF No. 783.\n\nSO ORDERED.\n\nDated:  February 20, 2026\n\n New York, New York","body_zh":null,"key_entities":["Guo","CIPA","Brady","Classified Information","Miles Guo","Torres","Analisa Torres","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":210,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":243,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":294,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":363,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":783,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":796,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":1431,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-02-20 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-02-20","updated_at":"2026-07-06 20:57:02"}