{"id":"court_sdny_81_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":81,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-04-21","title":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,","summary_zh":"被告保释申请意见书 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #81（2023年6月5日提交）。被告Yanping Wang的律师提交法律意见书，主张其不构成逃跑风险，理由包括指控范围和严重程度有限、作为政治异议人士的背景、在美国有充分联系，以及长期监禁会妨害其参与自己的辩护。","summary_en":"Defendant's memorandum in support of bail motion —— United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (a/k/a Guo Wengui, a/k/a Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #81 (filed June 5, 2023). Counsel for Defendant Yanping Wang submitted a memorandum arguing that she does not pose a flight risk due to limited scope and severity of charges, her background as a political dissident, substantial ties to the United States, and asserting that continued detention interferes with her ability to meaningfully participate in her defense.","body_en":"## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\nv.\n\nCase No. 23-CR-118-AT\n\nYANPING WANG,\n\nDefendant.\n\n# **DEFENDANT YANPING WANG'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR AN ORDER REVOKING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S ORDER OF DETENTION DATED APRIL 21, 2023, AND AUTHORIZING PRETRIAL RELEASE**\n\nPriya Chaudhry CHAUDHRYLAW PLLC 147 W. 25th Street, 12th Floor New York, New York 10001 Tel: (212) 785-5550 Email: priya@chaudhrylaw.com\n\nAlex Lipman LIPMAN LAW PLLC 147 W. 25th Street, 12th Floor New York, New York 10001 Tel: (212) 401-0070 Email: alexlipman@lipmanpllc.com\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant Yanping Wang*\n\n# **TABLE OF CONTENTS**\n\n|     |               |                                                                                                                                     | TABLE OF AUTHORITIES<br>iii                                                                                                                                                                                    |  |  |  |\n|-----|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|\n| I.  |               |                                                                                                                                     | FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3                                                                                                                                                                             |  |  |  |\n| II. | ARGUMENT<br>7 |                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                |  |  |  |\n|     | A.            | The Government Failed to Show That Ms.<br>Wang Was a Flight Risk<br>10                                                              |                                                                                                                                                                                                                |  |  |  |\n|     | B.            | The Government Failed to Carry Its Burden to Show That Ms.<br>Wang Was a<br>Flight Risk Under the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) Factors<br>11 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                |  |  |  |\n|     |               | 1.                                                                                                                                  | The charges against Ms.<br>Wang do not support detention because the<br>allegations against her are limited in scope and severity11                                                                            |  |  |  |\n|     |               | 2.                                                                                                                                  | Ms.<br>Wang is a dissident –<br>nothing in her background suggests that she<br>would defraud the other members of her dissident movement12                                                                     |  |  |  |\n|     |               | 3.                                                                                                                                  | Ms.<br>Wang did not flee knowing that criminal charges may be coming<br>15                                                                                                                                     |  |  |  |\n|     |               | 4.                                                                                                                                  | Ms.<br>Wang is not a flight risk because she has nowhere to go and<br>because she is being watched by the Chinese government even in New<br>York<br>16                                                         |  |  |  |\n|     |               | 5.                                                                                                                                  | Ms.<br>Wang has sufficient ties to the United States19                                                                                                                                                         |  |  |  |\n|     | C.            |                                                                                                                                     | Magistrate Judge Lehrburger Wrongly Concluded That Ms.<br>Wang's<br>Financial Means and International Contacts Provide a Sufficient Basis to<br>Deny Bail<br>21                                                |  |  |  |\n|     |               | 1.                                                                                                                                  | Courts recognize that the mere fact that a defendant is financially<br>well-off and is a foreign national who can flee to a country that may<br>not grant extradition is not a sufficient basis to deny bail21 |  |  |  |\n|     |               | 2.                                                                                                                                  | Ms.<br>Wang would not have the financial means to flee<br>23                                                                                                                                                   |  |  |  |\n|     |               |                                                                                                                                     | a)<br>Contrary to the government's suggestion and Judge<br>Lehrburger's suspicions, Ms.<br>Wang does not hold any<br>cryptocurrency23                                                                          |  |  |  |\n|     |               |                                                                                                                                     | b)<br>Contrary to the government's suggestion and Judge<br>Lehrburger's suspicions, Ms.<br>Wang did not lie to PTS about<br>the cash found in the safe in her apartment28                                      |  |  |  |\n\n| D. | The Government Failed to Meet Its Burden of Proving That No Combination<br>of Conditions Will Assure Defendant's Appearance33 |                                                                                                                 |  |  |\n|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|\n|    | 1.                                                                                                                            | The court must consider all reasonable, less restrictive alternatives to<br>detention<br>34                     |  |  |\n|    | 2.                                                                                                                            | The condition of home detention is the limit of what is permissible to<br>assure Ms.<br>Wang's appearance<br>35 |  |  |\n| E. |                                                                                                                               | Detention Interferes with Ms.<br>Wang's Ability to Participate in Her Own<br>Defense38                          |  |  |\n|    |                                                                                                                               | CONCLUSION40                                                                                                    |  |  |\n\n# **TABLE OF AUTHORITIES**\n\n# **CASES**\n\n| Barker v. Wingo,<br>407 U.S. 514 (1972)<br>38                                                             |\n|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| Bell v. Wolfish,<br>441 U.S. 520 (1979)<br>36                                                             |\n| Campbell v. McGruder,<br>580 F.2d 521 (1978)<br>36, 37                                                    |\n| Duran v. Elrod,<br>542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976)36                                                         |\n| Hung v. United States,<br>439 U.S. 1326 (1978)<br>21                                                      |\n| Moreland v. United States,<br>968 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1992)35                                              |\n| Powell v. Alabama,<br>287 U.S. 45 (1932)<br>39                                                            |\n| United States v. Berrios-Berrios,<br>791 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1986)<br>9, 33, 34                             |\n| United States v. Bodmer,<br>No. 03 CR 947 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 959 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2004)10, 21 |\n| United States v. Boustani,<br>932 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2019)<br>7                                             |\n| United States v. Briggs,<br>697 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2012)<br>35                                              |\n| United States v. Bruno,<br>89 F. Supp. 3d 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)8                                            |\n| United States v. Choudhry,<br>941 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)8                                        |\n| United States v. Cole,<br>715 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa. 1988)9                                               |\n\n| United States v. Friedman,<br>837 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988)         |                                                            | 8, 10                                                                              |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| United States v. Gotti,<br>358 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)   |                                                            | 8                                                                                  |\n| United States v. Hanson,                                         |                                                            | 613 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2009)9, 16, 22                                          |\n| United States v. Himler,<br>797 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1986)          |                                                            | 9                                                                                  |\n| United States v. Infelise,                                       |                                                            | 934 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1991)35                                                     |\n| United States v. Jackson,<br>823 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1987)           |                                                            | 38                                                                                 |\n| United States v. Khashoggi,<br>717 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) |                                                            | 22                                                                                 |\n| United States v. Leon,<br>766 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1985)             |                                                            | 8                                                                                  |\n| United States v. Ling,                                           |                                                            | No. 4:21-mj-00336, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101132 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2021)<br>10, 16 |\n| United States v. Molina,<br>No.                                  | 11 Cr. 528 (JFK), 2012 WL 3564013 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012) | 7                                                                                  |\n| United States v. Motamedi,                                       |                                                            | 767 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1985)7                                                     |\n| United States v. Paulino,<br>335 F. Supp. 3d 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) |                                                            | 8                                                                                  |\n| United States v. Sabhnani,<br>493 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2007)         |                                                            | passim                                                                             |\n| United States v. Salerno,<br>481 U.S. 739 (1987)                 |                                                            | 7                                                                                  |\n| United States v. Shakur,<br>817 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1987)          |                                                            | 7                                                                                  |\n\n| United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A.,<br>204 F. Supp. 2d 412 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)35                             |  |\n|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| United States v. Stein,<br>No. S1 05 Cr. 0888 (LAK), 2005 WL 8157371 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2005)8             |  |\n| United States v. Torres,<br>929 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1991)7                                                  |  |\n| United States v. Townsend,<br>897 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1990)7                                                |  |\n| United States v. Vitta,<br>653 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)39                                              |  |\n| United States v. White,<br>No. 3:21-mj-04070, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100544 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2021)9, 10  |  |\n| United States v. Wright,<br>No. 2:18-cr-336-DN, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121974 (D. Utah July 20, 2018)<br>11 |  |\n| United States v. Zarzuela,<br>2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206270 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2019)9                       |  |\n|                                                                                                            |  |\n| STATUTES                                                                                                   |  |\n| 8 C.F.R. §<br>208.1820                                                                                     |  |\n| 15 U.S.C. § 78f3                                                                                           |  |\n| 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)3                                                                                        |  |\n| 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5<br>3                                                                                 |  |\n| 18 U.S.C. §<br>1343<br>3                                                                                   |  |\n| 18 U.S.C. § 1957<br>3                                                                                      |  |\n| 18 U.S.C. § 2<br>3                                                                                         |  |\n| 18 U.S.C. § 3141<br>6                                                                                      |  |\n| 18 U.S.C. §<br>3142<br>34, 36                                                                              |  |\n| 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)34                                                                                      |  |\n| 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)7                                                                                    |  |\n| 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)8                                                                                       |  |\n| 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j)35                                                                                      |  |\n| 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b)7                                                                                       |  |\n| 18 U.S.C. § 371<br>3                                                                                       |  |\n| 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 31827                                                                                    |  |\n| 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 31897                                                                                    |  |\n\n| In re GTV Media Grp., Inc., Saraca Media Grp., Inc. & Voice of Guo Media, Inc., Respondents,<br>Release No. 94107 (Jan. 31, 2022)12, 15                                              |  |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|\n| S. Rep. No. 98-225 (1983)7                                                                                                                                                           |  |\n| United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading<br>Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, Treaty Doc. No. 100–200,<br>1465<br>U.N.T.S. 8520 |  |\n\nMs. Yanping Wang is not a flight risk, at least no more than anyone who is charged with federal white-collar crimes by the government, because she has nowhere to go, no means to get there, and no intention to do so. Nevertheless—and despite also having no criminal record and not being accused of being a danger to anyone—Ms. Wang has now been detained in MDC Brooklyn since March 15, 2023, first because the government would not approve her proposed bond cosigners and now on the grounds that there is no combination of conditions that could reasonably assure her appearance at trial. This motion seeks reversal of the order of detention that was entered against Ms. Wang on April 21, 2023, after a hearing by Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lehrburger. Judge Lehrburger's decision was based on erroneous facts proffered by the government and a misapplication of the law. As well, he did not have the benefit of certain additional facts, discussed below, that undercut the most critical aspects of his decision.\n\nMs. Wang is one of the leaders of a dissident movement whose aim is nothing short of the overthrow of Chinese Communist Party (\"CCP\") rule in China. The government does not dispute that. She is well known and easily recognized in the Chinese community. She moved from Hong Kong to New York in 2017 because she feared for her safety at the hands of Chinese authorities. Although she is a Chinese patriot who longs to liberate and return to her country, she filed an application for asylum in the U.S. because she is afraid for her life if she were to return to China. She has dedicated her life as well as sacrificed her personal safety and her relationship with her son and husband in China to fight against the tyranny of the Chinese government. The indictment is entirely devoid of any allegation that any purported victim money came to rest in her pockets. She wants her day in court. She wants the world to know she stole nothing and victimized no one.\n\nThe magistrate judge's decision to deny bail to Ms. Wang was based on many erroneous factual assertions and critical unsubstantiated suppositions by the government which now must be\n\nreconsidered in light of new or additional evidence. This combination of incorrect assertions and unsubstantiated suppositions effectively shifted the burden to Ms. Wang to prove a negative, *i.e.*, that the government was wrong in what it *thought* was factual. In short, the government improperly created a false impression that Ms. Wang was a flight risk, or, at a minimum, that she was much more of a flight risk than is the truth, as we demonstrate below.\n\nIn addition, there are certainly conditions that will reasonably assure Ms. Wang's appearance at trial. In fact, she is less likely to flee than many other defendants. She literally has nowhere to go. She will not flee to China or Hong Kong because she would be arrested and likely killed for her anti-CCP activities. Were she to flee somewhere else abroad, she could only go to a country that does not extradite to the U.S. or China and would have to find a way to hide despite her notoriety, her accent, and her Chinese ethnicity. There likely is no such country, and the government has identified none. She would also clearly lose any chance of gaining asylum if she left the U.S. in violation of bail conditions. Furthermore, before she was charged, Ms. Wang was fully aware that she could potentially face criminal charges in the U.S., but she did not attempt to flee. Even with the possibility of jail, the U.S. is the safest place in the world for Ms. Wang. She does not have the financial resources alleged originally by the government nor the international connections, which would facilitate her flight. Finally, the government predicts that trial in this case will not commence for more than one year, and to detain Ms. Wang for that length of time is not only cruel but will greatly interfere with her ability to assist in her own defense. There is simply no factual or legal basis that would justify such a period of pretrial detention for a person like Ms. Wang.\n\nMs. Wang proposes and is prepared to accept extremely strict conditions of release:\n\n• A \\$2 million personal recognizance bond, secured by \\$1 million in property, one of her bank accounts, and \\$138,000 in cash;\n\n- Restrictions on use of her other bank account, such that she can withdraw money only for necessities or with pre-approval by Pretrial Services (\"PTS\");\n- Travel restricted to the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, except upon application to PTS and the government;\n- Surrender of all travel documents with no new applications;\n- Strict supervision by PTS;\n- Location monitoring technology as directed by PTS;\n- Home confinement with GPS monitoring, except for court appearances, meetings with counsel, or as otherwise permitted by PTS;\n- No contact with co-defendants, witnesses, or purported victims without attorneys present; and\n- Home monitoring by a friend who will live with her and will be responsible for reporting any violations.\n\nUnder these conditions, it will be impossible for Ms. Wang to flee the U.S. Accordingly,\n\nwe submit that Ms. Wang should be released on the above-stated conditions.\n\n# **I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**\n\nOn March 29, 2023, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment, S1 1:23-cr-00118-AT, which added Ms. Wang as a defendant to the indictment charging her co-conspirators, Ho Wan Kwok and Min King Je. The superseding indictment charged Ms. Wang with (1) conspiracy to commit wire fraud, securities fraud, bank fraud, and money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2; (3) securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78f; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (4) unlawful monetary transaction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2. (ECF No. 19).\n\nPrior to that, on March 15, 2023, Ms. Wang was arrested on a complaint and on the same day, Magistrate Judge Katharine H. Parker set bail at \\$5 million and required Ms. Wang's bail secured by \\$1 million in cash or property and co-signed by two financially responsible people. (ECF No. 3). Additionally, the Court ordered Ms. Wang to surrender her travel documents and to make no new applications for same; to disclose all financial accounts over which she exercised control; pretrial supervision as directed by PTS; home detention; location monitoring technology\n\nas directed by PTS; and GPS tracking. (*Id.*). Finally, Judge Parker ordered Ms. Wang detained until the bail conditions were met. (*Id.*).\n\nThese conditions were imposed substantially because the government had made several representations to Ms. Wang's counsel and to the Court that turned out to be wrong. On the day of Ms. Wang's arrest, in conversation with counsel, the government represented that the search of her apartment generated several concerning findings. The government claimed, *inter alia*, that a dozen phones were found in her apartment and that many of them were unplugged and hidden in what looked like their original boxes to make them look new when they were not. The government claimed that a phone was found hidden in the bed between mattresses; that documents were hidden between couch cushions; and that there was \\$138,000 in *new* one-hundred-dollar bills in her safe.1 The government also claimed that a laptop was hidden in the closet between sweaters. Assuming the government to be telling the truth, especially given the specificity of its factual assertions and not having had an adequate opportunity to confer with Ms. Wang, who was very shaken up counsel agreed to a \\$5 million bond co-signed by two financially responsible persons and secured by the equity in Ms. Wang's apartment, ankle monitoring, surrender of travel documents, and travel restrictions. Counsel told the government, however, that home confinement was unnecessary and that Ms. Wang should be released and given a reasonable amount of time to meet her bail conditions. Counsel for the government advised that, given the search findings, \"it would be malpractice\" to agree to that and that the government would insist on home confinement and detention pending the satisfaction of all bail conditions.\n\n<sup>1</sup> The government focused on the purportedly \"new\" \\$100 bills as evidence of recent preparation to flee.\n\nIn the argument that followed, the government repeated the same factual assertions to the Court. It argued that the purportedly secreted phones and hidden documents were \"powerful evidence of concealment and hiding evidence that we would allege to be certainly evidence of the crimes.\" (ECF No. 10-3 at 12:13–15). In other words, the government used this purported evidence to demonstrate Ms. Wang's guilt and the need for bail conditions reflecting attempted concealment of incriminating evidence. As to the cash, the government called it \"an emergency flight fund\" and relied on it as evidence of intent to flee. (*Id.* at 19:12–21). Faced with these damning allegations, Judge Parker was persuaded by and sided with the government; the government got what it asked for, and Ms. Wang was remanded pending satisfaction of her bail conditions.\n\nAs it turned out, none of the representations listed above was either true or not misleading, given the other facts the government knew. To begin, there was only one phone in an iPhone box in Ms. Wang's apartment. The government did not take it; it *was* new. All other phones were either plugged in and in plain sight or were old phones kept together in one bag in a closet. There was no phone hidden in the bed between mattresses or in any other way. There were no documents hidden between couch cushions. The cash did not contain new bills; in fact, the most recent year on any of the bills is 2017. (Glenn Decl. ¶ 6). This was not a stash of recent bills prepared by someone ready to flee: 2017 *predates* the purported start of the charged conspiracy. (ECF No. 19 ¶ 1). Much of the cash was in red gift envelopes (\"Hongbao\") that were given to Ms. Wang over several years, as is customary for Chinese people to do at Lunar New Year.2\n\nMs. Wang attempted to meet her bail conditions. She posted her apartment as security; it is valued at over \\$1 million. She offered several potential co-signers whom she would not want to saddle with a \\$5 million debt. Despite an offer of at least eight people willing to co-sign her\n\n<sup>2</sup> http\n\n\\$5 million bond, however, the government refused to approve two co-signers. Essentially, the government disqualified all the proposed co-signers either because they were not close enough to Ms. Wang or were deemed not to be sufficiently financially responsible or both.\n\nMs. Wang then sought intervention from the magistrate court. On March 22, 2023, a brief hearing was held before Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn. The judge was not inclined to overrule her colleague as to the bail conditions and thought that the hearing was premature and that she did not have enough specific information to go on. On March 24, 2023, Ms. Wang filed a motion with the magistrate court for an order directing that Ms. Wang complied with the terms of her bail conditions and to rule that the government's refusal to approve her bond co-signers had been arbitrary. In the alternative, Ms. Wang asked the Court to amend her bail conditions to eliminate the requirement that she obtain two financially responsible persons to co-sign her bond. (ECF No. 8). The hearing on that motion was scheduled for March 31, 2023.\n\nOn March 31, 2023, less than an hour before the hearing, the government filed a letter contending that it had discovered certain additional information that \"could justify more restrictive bail conditions\" but ended the letter stating that Ms. Wang \"should be detained pending trial.\" (*Compare* ECF. No. 22 at 1 *with* ECF No. 8 at 2). Most significantly, this letter now claimed that Ms. Wang had undisclosed cryptocurrency assets and that she failed to disclose to PTS that she had \\$138,000 in cash in her apartment when it was searched. (ECF No. 22). Because these were new allegations, Judge Lehrburger postponed the bail hearing until April 4, 2023.\n\nOn April 4, 2023, Judge Lehrburger conducted the bail hearing and asked the parties to submit additional materials. (ECF No. 39). On April 21, 2023, the judge ordered Ms. Wang detained based on his assessment of flight risk. (ECF No. 56).\n\n### **II. ARGUMENT**\n\nThe Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 *et seq.*, requires pre-trial release of the defendant \"unless the judicial officer determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community*.*\" *United States v. Boustani,* 932 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)); *United States v. Sabhnani*, 493 F.3d 63, 78 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that even where a court determines that a defendant poses a flight risk, there remains a statutory presumption in favor of the defendant's release \"unless the government demonstrates that no conditions of release can be imposed to assure the defendant['s] appearance in court\"). \"Reasonably assure\" does not mean \"guarantee,\" *see generally United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), and pretrial detention is appropriate *only*  where there is \"no condition or combination of conditions [that] will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant],” *Sabhnani*, 493 at 75.<sup>3</sup>\n\n<sup>3</sup> Through the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, Congress intended and expected that only “a small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants” would be detained pending trial. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 6 (1983); *see also United States v. Leon*, 766 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that detention is warranted in \"rare cases\"); *United States v. Motamedi*, 767 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J.) (\"Only in rare circumstances should release be denied.\"). Most defendants, Congress anticipated, would continue to be released on their own recognizance or on an unsecured bond. S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 12. In part, to ensure that detention was rare, Congress authorized detention only after a detention hearing, permitted a detention hearing under only specific circumstances, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f)(1)–(2), imposed a high burden on the government, and afforded defendants expansive means for challenging the government's assertions, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). Consistent with Congress' intention, the Supreme Court has recognized, \"[I]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.\" *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). Following the Supreme Court's guidance, other courts have recognized that \"[p]retrial detention is still an exceptional step.\" *United States v. Torres*, 929 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1991), *citing Salerno*, 481 U.S. at 749; *accord United States v. Townsend*, 897 F.2d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 1990) (\"Only in rare cases should release be denied.\"). *See also United States v. Shakur*, 817 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (\"[I]t is only a 'limited group of offenders' who should be denied bail pending trial.\") (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189).\n\nUnder 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), \"[i]f a person is ordered detained by a magistrate judge, . . . the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation or amendment of the order.\" *United States v. Molina*, No. 11 Cr. 528 (JFK), 2012 WL 3564013, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012). A \"district court should fully reconsider a magistrate's denial of bail and in ruling on a motion for revocation or amendment of a detention order should not simply defer to the judgment of the magistrate[] but reach its own independent conclusion.\" *United States v. Leon*, 766 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1985). The Bail Reform Act has been construed to require that a district judge conduct a *de novo* review of a magistrate's bail determination. *United States v. Gotti*, 358 F. Supp. 2d 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).\n\nIn considering whether bail is appropriate, the court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person in the community that would be posed by the person's release.4 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). The \"power to incarcerate before trial must be exercised with circumspection [and] may be involved only when and to the extent justified by danger which the defendant's conduct presents.\" *United States v. Bruno*, 89 F. Supp. 3d 425, 428–29 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting *United States v. Choudhry*, 941 F. Supp. 2d 347, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)). Importantly, it is well-established that a greater showing than the \"commission of a serious crime and the fact of a potentially long sentence [is\n\n<sup>4</sup> The government does not contend that Ms. Wang is a danger to the community. Although Judge Lehrburger stated that while \"there is no indication that Wang poses a physical danger to any person or community if released, she potentially could harm people if she were to reengage in fraudulent activity.\" (ECF No. 39). This observation is not a sufficient finding to support detention based on danger to the community because \"[a]n order of detention based on the safety of other persons and the community must rest on a finding supported by clear and convincing evidence.\" *United States v. Stein*, No. S1 05 Cr. 0888 (LAK), 2005 WL 8157371, at \\*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2005). No such evidence was even offered.\n\nnecessary] to support a finding of risk of flight.\" *United States v. Friedman*, 837 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1988); *accord United States v. Paulino*, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).\n\nThe government bears the burden of showing \"by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant . . . presents an *actual* risk of flight.\" *Sabhnani*, 493 F.3d at 75 (emphasis added). \"Mere opportunity for flight is not sufficient.\" *United States v. Zarzuela*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206270, at \\*3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2019) (quoting *United States v. Himler*, 797 F.2d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 1986)). Instead, evidence substantiating \"an actual risk of flight\" must be something akin to evidence that the defendant possesses an intent to flee, as several courts have observed. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Hanson*, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C. 2009) (\"In this case, . . . there is no strong circumstantial evidence indicating that Mrs. Hanson intends to flee the [U.S.]\"); *United States v. Cole*, 715 F. Supp. 677, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (defendants told undercover agents they would flee if arrested); *United States v. White*, No. 3:21-mj-04070, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100544, at \\*21 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2021) (\"A case involves a 'serious risk of flight,' as opposed to a mere risk of non-appearance, if it involves a serious risk that the defendant intentionally will avoid court proceedings.\").\n\nEven if an actual risk of flight is established, \"the presumption in favor of bail still applies.\" *Zarzuela*, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206270, at \\*3 (quoting *United States v. Berrios-Berrios*, 791 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1986)). Accordingly, the government bears a secondary burden to \"demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could be imposed on the defendant that would reasonably assure his presence in court.\" *Sabhnani*, 493 F.3d at 75 (noting it was \"[p]lainly . . . incorrect\" for the government to act as though \"this second burden fell on the defendant, or that [the government] had the benefit of a statutory presumption of detention that the defendant was obligated to rebut\").\n\n#### **A. The Government Failed to Show That Ms. Wang Was a Flight Risk**\n\nThe government failed to meet its burden with respect to intent to flee because it offered very little by way of evidence, relying, instead, on supposition and conjecture. As noted above, the purported \"evidence\" the government offered at Ms. Wang's presentment turned out to be false, aside from the assertion that a computer had been found between sweaters in one of the closets; and we dispose of that allegation below. The government then followed up with additional allegations that, as also discussed below, it cannot prove. Indeed, in one instance, the government *admits* that, despite its argument to the contrary, it does not know whether Ms. Wang actually owned any cryptocurrency. We dispose of that below also. But in each instance, what the government offers is not evidence. Instead, the government offers conjecture. And conjecture (as opposed to actual evidence corroborating a contention) cannot satisfy the government's burden under the Bail Reform Act, as numerous courts have observed. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Bodmer*, No. 03 CR 947 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 959, at \\*8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2004) (holding that the government had failed to meet its burden because its argument was \"based, in large part, on speculation[,] without any evidence to support [its] claim\"); *United States v. Ling*, No. 4:21-mj-00336, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101132, at \\*14 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2021) (\"[T]he Government adduced no evidence to support [its] contention\" that the amount of drugs indicated \"a large-scale operation with significant amounts of cash, which could provide a means for Defendants to flee.\").\n\nBy forcing Ms. Wang to dispose of these conjectures, the government effectively shifted the burden of proof to her not to rebut its evidence but to disprove a negative, *i.e.*, to disprove that what the government *alleges* is not true. In other words, Ms. Wang should be released on bail for the simple reason that the government failed to present (or even proffer) any actual evidence that she was a flight risk beyond the risk associated with being a criminal defendant. *See Friedman*, 837 F.2d at 50 (\"[M]ore than the seriousness of the allegations and a potentially long sentence\n\n[are] necessary for a finding of risk of flight.\"); *White*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100544, at \\*20 (\"[*E*]*vidence* (or at least concrete information proffered by the Government), and not mere conclusory assertions, of serious risk of flight are required to warrant the holding of a detention hearing\") (citing *United States v. Wright*, No. 2:18-cr-336-DN, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121974, at \\*2 (D. Utah July 20, 2018)).\n\n## **B. The Government Failed to Carry Its Burden to Show That Ms. Wang Was a Flight Risk Under the 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) Factors**\n\n## **1. The charges against Ms. Wang do not support detention because the allegations against her are limited in scope and severity.**\n\nDespite describing Ms. Wang as Mr. Kwok's \"chief of staff,\" (ECF No. 19 ¶ 8), the indictment does not charge her with profiting from the alleged fraud, and the allegations relating to her are relatively narrow considering the scope of the entire indictment. The indictment charges a conspiracy to engage in four separate alleged frauds: the GTV offering, the Farm Loan Program, G|CLUBS, and the Himalayan Exchange. However, aside from summary paragraphs in the conspiracy count, Ms. Wang's name is mentioned only in connection with the GTV offering allegations. (*Id.* ¶¶ 1–25). Indeed, as an indication of her relative alleged culpability in the acts charged in the indictment, Ms. Wang's name appears in only twenty-two paragraphs or subparagraphs out of the total of 154 paragraphs and subparagraphs in the indictment.\n\nSpecifically, Ms. Wang is charged in only four of the twelve indictment counts: conspiracy, wire fraud relating to the GTV offering, securities fraud relating to the GTV offering, and engaging in a monetary transaction by wiring \\$100 million of the proceeds of the GTV offering to a hedge fund controlled by Relative-1. (*Id.*). The only overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that mentions Ms. Wang is the same wire of the \\$100 million to Relative-1's hedge fund. (*Id.* ¶ 32.b). Even with respect to the GTV allegations, Ms. Wang's name comes up only in connection with the same \\$100 million wire, aside from an allegation that she was listed as an \"Executive Director\"\n\nof GTV in its Private Placement Memorandum (\"PPM\"). (*Id.* ¶ 13.c). There are no allegations that Ms. Wang personally made any false statements to anyone in connection with the GTV offering.\n\nMoreover, as the indictment alleges, the \\$100 million was misdirected, meaning it was invested in a manner inconsistent with the use-of-funds disclosure in the PPM. (*Id.* ¶ 13.h). And although \\$30 million of the \\$100 million was lost, according to the indictment, that \\$30 million represents investment losses, not siphoning funds for personal use. (*Id.*; *see also In re GTV Media Grp., Inc., Saraca Media Grp., Inc. & Voice of Guo Media, Inc., Respondents*, Release No. 94107 (Jan. 31, 2022)). In any event, all that money has now been recovered because GTV and other entities disgorged all the relevant amounts with prejudgment interest. (*See In re GTV*.). Ms. Wang's personal history and characteristics do not support detention.\n\n## **2. Ms. Wang is a dissident – nothing in her background suggests that she would defraud the other members of her dissident movement.**\n\nMs. Wang is a Chinese dissident who gave up a comfortable life and her family by joining and becoming one of the leaders of the pro-democracy movement opposing the CCP. Her personal characteristics militate in favor of release on bail because she is dedicated to her movement and its members, she is a responsible and prominent member of her community, and she wants her day in court so that her supporters can see that she did not defraud them and did not financially benefit from any of the alleged schemes described in the indictment.\n\nMs. Wang is forty-four years old. She was born into a well-to-do Chinese family. Her parents were financially successful. They were the first local couple to own a color TV, a refrigerator, a landline telephone, and, later, a Motorola cell phone. Nevertheless, certain events demonstrating the CCP's disregard for Chinese people and the resulting suffering that she and her family endured led to Ms. Wang's fierce opposition to the CCP. First, when her mom became pregnant with Ms. Wang's younger brother, her parents faced a difficult choice of violating the\n\none-child policy or ending the pregnancy. Ms. Wang's parents chose to keep their second child and suffered serious consequences. This was the moment, when she was still a child, that sparked Ms. Wang's opposition to the CCP. Second, in late 2004, Ms. Wang's mother was diagnosed with lung cancer. She died eight months later. She was forty-nine. She was never a smoker, but the family lived in a province that suffers from heavy pollution due to the CCP's reckless disregard for the environment. Ms. Wang's father was also diagnosed with lung cancer in the spring of 2017. He died a year later at sixty-one.<sup>5</sup> Ms. Wang’s environmental concerns resulting from her parents’ deaths also fuel her fundamental opposition to the CCP.\n\nMs. Wang was able to attend good schools as well as study abroad. She was a stellar student, and she eventually obtained two bachelor's degrees from her college in China and two master's degrees in France. Ms. Wang met her husband in college in China. He, too, was a good student who earned two bachelor's and two master's degrees. Ms. Wang and her husband were each other's first significant others. In 2013, Ms. Wang gave birth to her son, her only child. She and her husband led a comfortable life in China. They owned their home in Beijing, a vacation home, and three cars. They worked hard, and they were frugal. They were a happy family. She had no personal reasons to leave them and every reason to stay with them. But for her anti-CCP activities, she would be with them now.\n\nNonetheless, Ms. Wang left mainland China in 2015 never to return. By then, while working for one of Mr. Kwok's family's companies, she joined the dissident movement. This made her a target of Chinese authorities. She was based in Hong Kong in 2015 and 2016, afraid of going\n\n<sup>5</sup> Three months after her father's death, Ms. Wang was herself diagnosed with stomach cancer. She had the cancer removed, and she is in remission.\n\nback to the mainland for fear of being detained there.6 For example, Chinese authorities repeatedly visited her father, brother, and husband and had arrested her husband several times and detained him. Ms. Wang's husband was under constant surveillance; he was followed wherever he went. Her bank and credit card accounts in China were being closed. And although she was able to move some of her money to Hong Kong, her bank accounts there also started to be closed and flagged for no specific reason. Eventually, she had to move what was left of her savings to New York. In short, Ms. Wang began to live in fear of being detained in Hong Kong also. She travelled a lot then, and she obtained a Vanuatu passport in 2016 in case she could not travel on her Chinese passport in the event she needed to escape the Chinese police.7\n\nMs. Wang moved to New York in the spring of 2017. In late 2017, she lost all contact with her son and her husband. Ms. Wang last saw her son in person when he was only two years old. For some time, she was able to speak with her son by video call. That was very hard. Ms. Wang's mother-in-law would tell her that Ms. Wang's son kept asking his father whether they could go to the supermarket and buy a new mom. And although her son would be happy to see her on video when he was younger, as he got older and realized that she was not coming home, he became sullen, and his eyes would well up with tears. Ms. Wang could well understand that with their own hearts breaking, her in-laws could not continue to lie to him and tell him that she would be coming home soon. In addition, her in-laws did not approve of her politics and wanted to cut off all contact. Eventually, Ms. Wang did lose all contact with her son, her husband, and her in-laws. It is her understanding that her husband was forced to divorce her. Over time, her brother was harassed so\n\n<sup>6</sup> Even when her father got sick in 2017, Ms. Wang was unable to go back to China to help when he was dying or to attend his funeral.\n\n<sup>7</sup> This passport is now expired and is in the possession of the government.\n\nmuch that even her contact with him had to be severely curtailed. She has not spoken with her brother at all since some time last year.\n\nThis is too much for one woman to bear, and Ms. Wang is emotionally scarred. As mentioned, the government does not have and has not identified any evidence that Ms. Wang personally benefitted from any of the schemes alleged in the indictment. (*See generally* ECF No. 19). As discussed below, she did not even take advantage of the purported cryptocurrency allocation that the government claims was hers. Ms. Wang did not give up her son and the love of her life for thirty pieces of silver.8 This is very hard for the government to understand; she is doing what she does on principle. Her choices are not career moves.\n\n#### **3. Ms. Wang did not flee knowing that criminal charges may be coming.**\n\nOne other strong indication that Ms. Wang is not a serious flight risk is that she did not flee after learning in September and October of last year that the government seized hundreds of millions of dollars in assets from the various entities associated with Mr. Kwok. (*Id.* ¶ 55.a-ii). She also did not flee following the resolution of the SEC case against GTV. (*See In re GTV*.). She did not flee when she learned that the government was serving grand jury subpoenas on various companies associated with Mr. Kwok. She also did not flee when she learned that Mr. Kwok was the target of a grand jury investigation that eventually led to the charges in this case. These were not whispers that she could ignore, this was the thunderous sound of the cavalry coming for her. Yet, she did not flee. Not only that, but when she thought she needed to travel for business to London and the British Virgin Islands at the end of last year, she gave the government notice by applying for a furlough to preserve her asylum application. And when that trip did not pan out, she\n\n<sup>8</sup> This is also why she would never endanger her co-signers who are also members of the movement. She has dedicated her life to them and their common cause.\n\nnotified the government again when seeking permission to travel early this year. Put differently, consistent with her desire to maintain her U.S. asylum application and inconsistent with an intent to flee, she sought the U.S. government's permission to travel and, when her first travel plan fell through, she applied again.9 These are not actions of someone who intends to flee. *See, e.g.*, *Hanson*, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (\"In this case, . . . there is no strong circumstantial evidence indicating that Mrs. Hanson intends to flee the United States.\").\n\n# **4. Ms. Wang is not a flight risk because she has nowhere to go and because she is being watched by the Chinese government even in New York.**\n\nAs a prominent dissident, Ms. Wang is very recognizable in the Chinese expatriate community. She could not escape and hide among other Chinese immigrants in the U.S. She also could not hide from Chinese communities in the U.S. because she speaks with a distinct accent and would be very noticeable among any other group or groups. The government parries by suggesting that the other members of her pro-democracy movement could secret her and help her escape. This is pure conjecture, and it assumes that these members of the movement, many of whom are themselves seeking asylum in the U.S., would be willing to break U.S. law by harboring a fugitive. Again, standing on conjecture alone, the government cannot carry its burden to show flight risk. *See e.g.*, *Ling*, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101132, at \\*14.\n\nIn any event, while it is entirely speculative to suggest that other pro-democracy dissidents would assist Ms. Wang should she flee, there can be no doubt that Chinese spies living in the U.S. would relish an opportunity to find and report her. Specifically, on April 17, 2023, the National Security Division of the Department of Justice and the United States Attorney's Office for the\n\n<sup>9</sup> The risk of being extradited to China from Great Britain or from a British territory is about the same as being extradited from the U.S., which is why Ms. Wang felt it would be safe to go to those places. And, of course, she would be extradited to the U.S. from either place.\n\nEastern District of New York (\"EDNY\") announced the filing of two criminal complaints against a total of thirty-four Chinese nationals, officers of the national police of the People's Republic of China (\"PRC\") – the Ministry of Public Security (\"MPS\") – with persecuting Chinese nationals residing in the New York metropolitan area and elsewhere in the U.S.<sup>10</sup> According to the two complaints filed in that case, these Chinese government officials executed repression schemes targeting U.S. residents who engaged in anti-CCP activities in the U.S., such as advocating for democracy in the PRC. (*See United States v. Bai Yunpeng et al.*, No. 23-mj-334-sjb, ECF No. 2; *United States v. Lu Jianwang et al.*, No. 23-mj-265-jrc, ECF No. 4). Among other things, as part of their harassment scheme, these Chinese agents attempted to gin up prosecutions of their victims by U.S. authorities, trashed their victims' reputations, and worked on ways to repatriate their victims to China for punishment. One of the victims discussed in the complaints, Victim-1, in fact, is Miles Kwok, Ms. Wang's co-defendant and the lead defendant in this case. (*Yunpeng*, No. 23 mj-334-sjb, ECF No. 2). And although Ms. Wang herself is not mentioned in the complaints, the list of victims is not exhaustive. She is a prominent dissident in her own right, she is close to Mr. Kwok, and she, too, has been subject to similar harassment and abuse by the Chinese authorities. In fact, she has an order of protection to prove it. (*See* Lipman Decl., Exhibit A,<sup>11</sup> *see also* Exhibits B–D).\n\nWhat these arrests and charges underscore and prove is that one reason Ms. Wang is not a flight risk from the point of view of the government—wholly separate and apart from having no\n\n<sup>10</sup> Press Release, United States Attorney's Office, Eastern District of New York, 34 Officers of People's Republic of China National Police Charged with Perpetrating Transnational Repression Scheme Targeting U.S. Residents (Apr. 17, 2023), http officers-peoples-republic-china-national-police-charged-perpetrating-transnational.\n\n<sup>11</sup> All exhibits referenced in this brief are annexed to the Declaration of Alex Lipman submitted in support of the instant motion.\n\nintention to flee—is that the CCP is on the hunt for her and would like nothing more than to see her continued detention and prosecution if they are unable, as is undoubtedly their first choice, to have her repatriated to China. Put differently, Chinese government agents, using sophisticated electronic means, track, follow, and report on their ideological enemies in the U.S., such as Ms. Wang. These agents are far better than electronic monitoring equipment and more reliable than private security; as Ms. Wang well understands, they would make sure that she is found in the U.S., and they would make sure that she would be found anywhere else.12\n\nSince her arrival in New York, Ms. Wang has had to put up with harassment by the Chinese authorities here. By then, Mr. Kwok had made his anti-CCP activities public. Her phone and laptop were repeatedly hacked. She received random, repeated calls from Chinese and Hong Kong numbers in the middle of the night that continued for the whole night. Her phone turned on and off by itself. She received trash messages with curses and threatening language. She repeatedly lost access to her email without any apparent reason. She even began to get emails in a new email account from an account to which she had previously lost access. There were posts on the Internet, on Twitter, and on YouTube trashing her and falsely claiming she had an affair with Mr. Kwok. She saw photos of her son posted on the Internet as well as a fake \"Looking for lost wife\" posting with her photo and ID, purportedly posted by her husband. She eventually learned that almost all\n\n<sup>12</sup> And if the irony of the Chinese government aiding the U.S. government in enforcing its bail conditions were not piquant enough, while all but two of the Chinese spy operatives (because this is what they are in plain English, *a la* a less glamorous 007) appear to have been outside the U.S. when the charges against them were announced. The two who were not outside the U.S. were arrested and released on bail. (*See United States v. Jianwang Lu*, No. 23-mj-265-jrc, ECF No. 9; *United States v. Jinping Chen*, No. 23-mj-265-jrc, ECF No. 12). In other words, Chinese spies operating in the U.S. who have every incentive to flee to their home country—and can be expected to be helped by their government to flee—were released on bail based on a finding that there were conditions of release that sufficiently secured their appearance. One of their victims, on the other hand, a woman whom they can be expected to track (even while awaiting their trial) to make sure she complied with *her* bail conditions is denied bail as too much of a flight risk.\n\nher family, friends, and acquaintances received fake audios and messages purportedly disclosing her alleged affair with Mr. Kwok.\n\nMost consequentially, in light of the charges by the EDNY discussed above, Ms. Wang had to obtain a restraining order against four individuals who followed her around, confronted and harassed her, made death threats and threats of bodily injury, and encouraged others to harm her by means of Internet posts.<sup>13</sup> As recited in the order of protection, (Exhibit A), one of these individuals needed to be further restrained because he continued to harass her despite the restraining order.\n\n#### **5. Ms. Wang has sufficient ties to the United States.**\n\nOne factor that seemed to have weighed heavily against Ms. Wang's release by the magistrate court is that she does not seem to have close friends other than Chinese people who are also members of the anti-CCP movement that she helps lead. She was criticized for not having put down sufficient roots. The government has certainly made that point. (*See* ECF No. 33 at 46:12– 18). Anyone inclined to criticize an immigrant who has been in the U.S. less than seven years for not having friends outside of her close group of other similarly situated immigrants is ignorant of what it means to be an immigrant and of what it means to speak with a heavy accent. Navigating social situations in a foreign country is daunting even for the most well-travelled. Immigrants who arrive in the U.S. as adults or teens know well the difficulty inherent in not knowing local customs, both afraid to offend and getting offended as well as being roundly ridiculed and abused. The best educated immigrants know what it feels like to be treated like an idiot because of how one sounds. It is not easy to make friends under those circumstances. It takes decades, and often one does not succeed at all, which is why Queens, New York may be the most international place on earth, but\n\n<sup>13</sup> It appears that the people involved in harassing Ms. Wang are not on the list of those who had been arrested by EDNY. *Supra* note 10.\n\nits residents group themselves geographically in the borough largely by their countries of origin. But there is more here as it relates to Ms. Wang: approximately two-and-a-half years of her time in the U.S. was during the COVID-19 pandemic (she arrived in the U.S. in 2017). Thus, for almost half of her time in this country she was isolated from most other people by the pandemic, and she is from China, the home of the \"China Virus.\"\n\nSeparately, Ms. Wang is a refugee and a dissident; she did not come here to seek asylum so she could have a better life in America. She is a Chinese patriot who dreams about liberating her country to be reunited with her son and husband. She came here to work hard to make that happen. This is why she lives in a 740-square-foot apartment without furniture that is within a short walk of her office. She did not come here to *seek* asylum; she came here because she *needed* asylum. Ms. Wang does not want to lose her asylum application.14 She cannot be sent to China or Hong Kong, where she would be arrested and likely killed for her anti-CCP activities. Were she to flee abroad, she could only go to a country that does not extradite to the U.S. or China and would have to find a way to hide there, despite her accent and her Chinese ethnicity. There is likely no such country and the government has identified none. Given all this, it is nothing short of extremely offensive for the government to claim that one indication that she is a flight risk is that her friends are mostly her fellow dissidents.\n\nFinally, Ms. Wang spent the entire pandemic in her tiny apartment in Manhattan. She continued to go to the office even when employees were told to work from home. Almost every day, she and a few others organized, packed, and delivered personal protective equipment to police\n\n<sup>14</sup> Even if she were convicted, she would likely not be deported after serving her sentence because of the U.S.'s participation in the Convention Against Torture. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, Treaty Doc. No. 100–200, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. The Convention Against Torture is implemented at 8 C.F.R. § 208.18.\n\nprecincts, hospitals, and the elderly in New York. New York is now Ms. Wang's only home. She really has nowhere else to go.\n\n# **C. Magistrate Judge Lehrburger Wrongly Concluded That Ms. Wang's Financial Means and International Contacts Provide a Sufficient Basis to Deny Bail**\n\nJudge Lehrburger concluded that Ms. Wang is a risk of flight because (1) she can flee to countries other than China given her global connections; and (2) she has considerable financial means at her disposal. (ECF No. 56 at 18–19). However, merely having global connections or means to flee are not sufficient reasons for denying bail; as discussed below, courts in this and other circuits recognize that the mere fact that a defendant is financially well-off and is a foreign national who can flee to a country that may not grant extradition is not a sufficient basis to deny bail. *See Bodmer*, 2004 WL 169790, at \\*2 (rejecting the government's argument that a Swiss defendant had a strong incentive to flee because the Swiss government would not extradite Swiss nationals because that \"alone cannot be a basis for denying bail because if taken to its logical conclusion, no Swiss national would ever be eligible for bail\"). In any event, Judge Lehrburger was mistaken as to both of those factual conclusions. Ms. Wang cannot go anywhere else, and she does not have the financial means to go anywhere or to support herself there.\n\n# **1. Courts recognize that the mere fact that a defendant is financially well-off and is a foreign national who can flee to a country that may not grant extradition is not a sufficient basis to deny bail.**\n\nThe mere fact that a defendant is a foreign national with means is insufficient to deny bail. *See generally Hung v. United States*, 439 U.S. 1326 (1978) (Brennan, J.). In *Hung*, the Supreme Court reversed a post-conviction detention order of a Vietnamese national and granted his release pending appeal. *Id.* at 1329. The Court explained that even though the defendant had \"not established a permanent residence in this country; and[,] should applicant flee to Vietnam, the\n\nUnited States would have no means to procure his return[,] . . . these considerations suggest opportunities for flight, they hardly establish any inclination on the part of applicant to flee.\" *Id*. Similarly, in *Hansen*, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court's pretrial release of a Danish defendant despite the government's inability to extradite from Denmark. The court explained that \"[t]he bail statute does not . . . require that foreign defendants be detained simply because their return cannot be guaranteed through extradition.\" 108 F. App'x at 332.\n\nIn *United States v. Flotron*, a judge in the District of Connecticut released a Swiss national, who was awaiting trial on charges of wire fraud, commodities fraud, and conspiracy to commit the same, pursuant to a bail package that included home confinement in his girlfriend's home in the District of New Jersey, GPS monitoring, and a personal recognizance bond secured by approximately \\$3 million in assets. *See* Order Setting Conditions of Release at 2, *United States v. Flotron*, No. 1 7-cr-220 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2017), ECF No. 10; Appearance Bond, *Flotron*, No. 1 7-cr-220, ECF No. 11. Likewise, in 2015, Judge Vernon Broderick of the Southern District of New York released on bail Chinese national and billionaire businessman, Ng Lap Seng, pursuant to conditions that included home confinement in a Manhattan apartment and round-the-clock private armed security responsible for ensuring Mr. Seng's appearance and preventing his flight from the U.S. *See* Order, *United States v. Seng*, No. l5-cr-706 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2015), ECF No. 53. Like Switzerland, China does not extradite its citizens to the U.S. and yet, Mr. Seng was deemed eligible for release. In *United States v. Khashoggi*, Judge Keenan of the Southern District of New York released on bail an \"enormously wealthy\" Saudi Arabian defendant who was facing trial on mail fraud charges despite that there was no extradition treaty in place. 717 F. Supp. 1048, 1050–52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).\n\n## **2. Ms. Wang would not have the financial means to flee.**\n\nSeparately, as a factual matter, Ms. Wang would not have the means to get anywhere or live there. Ms. Wang has agreed to either use her bank accounts to secure her bail or to have her accounts restrained such that she could not withdraw anything without PTS's advance permission. She has posted her apartment to secure her bond. Her cash has been seized. She has nothing else.15\n\n# **a) Contrary to the government's suggestion and Judge Lehrburger's suspicions, Ms. Wang does not hold any cryptocurrency.**\n\nThe government predicated its argument that Ms. Wang was a flight risk in part on an assertion that Ms. Wang failed to disclose approximately \\$13.5 million in cryptocurrency that she could have used to fund her escape.16 (ECF No. 42 at 3). This, the government claimed, was evidence of intent to flee and support for the proposition that Ms. Wang would not abide by her conditions of release because she could not be trusted. (*Id.*). This argument was perhaps the one that gave Judge Lehrburger the greatest concern as to the issue of flight risk because it raised the possibility that Ms. Wang had other undisclosed assets.\n\nThere are three problems with this argument: (i) it is based on hearsay documents that the government admits it does not understand, and the government's assertions about the import of these documents are pure conjecture (and evidentiarily inadequate); (ii) the government's\n\n<sup>15</sup> Again, the government's contention that other pro-democracy dissidents would support her as a fugitive is entirely speculative and assumes that these dissidents would be willing to break the law of countries other than China to help. In addition, flight would be tantamount to an admission of guilt. One would expect that other pro-democracy dissidents would refuse to help someone who admitted to fleecing them in the name of the movement. Finally, the Chinese government would do all it could to track her regardless of where she ended up, and it could be expected to use the very sophisticated electronic means at its disposal to track people.\n\n<sup>16</sup> The indictment alleges a fraudulent scheme by co-defendants Mr. Kwok and Mr. William Je related to the issuance of a digital currency: Himalaya Coin (\"HCN\"), which is convertible into Himalaya Dollars (\"HDO\") and traded on the Himalaya Exchange. (*See* ECF No. 19 ¶ 22).\n\nconjecture is wrong because, since Judge Lehrburger's decision, counsel for Ms. Wang have been able to confirm that she was unable to convert any allocation of Himalaya Coin (\"HCN\") into Himalaya Dollar (\"HDO\"); and (iii) in any event, even if she did own HDO, she could not use her HDO to fund her escape.\n\nIn support of its argument that Ms. Wang has failed to disclose significant crypto assets, the government relied on two documents it found in the search of her apartment. One is a schedule that the government calls, \"HCN Allocation at USD0.1.\" (Exhibit E). This document appears to show an allocation of 6,999,800 HCN to Ms. Wang. The document is hearsay, and the government has not offered any testimony by anyone with knowledge to explain its meaning or import. Similarly, the government claims—without any supporting evidence or testimony from a person with knowledge—that another document, Exhibit F, shows that a certain number of HCN were \"minted\" and that reflects a distribution of HCN to various people and entities, including to \"Yvette.\" (ECF No. 42 at 2). Relying on these two unexplained hearsay documents, the government makes the following evidentiary and logical leaps: that Ms. Wang received an allocation of 6,999,800 HCN, that she converted her 6,999,800 HCN into HDO at a price of 0.1 per HCN by paying a total of \\$699,980 for a total of 699,980 HDO, that her current holdings of HDO are now worth approximately \\$13.5 million, and that she failed to disclose these holdings so she could use them to fund her escape. (*Id.* at 2–3). These evidentiary leaps are flawed as a matter of fact and logic.\n\nThere is nothing on the face of Exhibit F that confirms either the date on which it was created or whether it reflects an *anticipated* distribution or one that has already taken place.17 There\n\n<sup>17</sup> Exhibit F also contains untranslated Chinese writing as well as hand-written cross-outs of certain numbers, including the number matching the name \"Yvette\" and no explanation as to why those numbers are crossed out.\n\nis also no indication that Exhibit F reflects HCN that had been converted into HDO; it is merely a schedule of allocated (or \"distributed\") HCN expressed in U.S. dollars (\"USD\"). In fact, Exhibit F seems to contemplate that a distribution of HCN would be in exchange for payments in USD to effectuate the acquisition of the \"distributed\" HCN; it appears to show a total sum of all such anticipated payments. In other words, as the government well knows and does not dispute the allocation of HCN was to be effectuated by a payment by the recipient of the allocation—much the same as a purchase of an option by an employee to whom the option is granted. The government has offered no proof—not even an allegation—that Ms. Wang personally paid \\$700,000 for the HCN purportedly allocated or \"distributed\" to her. The government will not find any such evidence. In fact, the government *admitted* that it could not prove that Ms. Wang held the assets they claim were hers. (ECF No. 33 at 55:8–56:3).18 All the government has are two hearsay\n\n(ECF No. 33 at 55:8–56:3 (emphasis added)).\n\n<sup>18</sup> Consider the following admission by the government:\n\n*Your Honor is correct, defense is correct, there's no way for the Government to prove that Ms. Wang holds that money*, and, in fact, the Government's allegation is that it's not cryptocurrency, but we're not alleging it's valueless. We're alleging that certain people have it and the people who are quickest to redeem can basically have an exit scam and get out with their money. I would note while, again, we don't have access to an account that Ms. Wang has where the money is held, Your Honor correctly identified approximately \\$7 million worth of a cryptocurrency asset would be something you would want to keep track of. The allocation indicates Yanping Wang, and then it has the allocation, it's in her name.\n\nIn other words, the government claims that Ms. Wang lied, but it also admits that it does not know what the truth is. Note also, that it is too late for the \"exit scam\" supposition offered by the government. As discussed below, the Himalaya Exchange has been deprived of its reserves by the government's seizure of its bank accounts and has set limitations on redemptions. Additionally, in the same paragraph, the government first claims that these assets are *not* cryptocurrency and then takes Ms. Wang to task for not reporting it as cryptocurrency.\n\ndocuments that are not at all clear on their face, that are undated, that contain untranslated Chinese writing, and for which there is no context or explanation. (*See* Exs. E–F).\n\nIt appears that Judge Lehrburger found that it was not credible that Ms. Wang did not remember what had happened with the allocation of HCN to her. Counsel for Ms. Wang did not deny that there appeared to have been an *intended* allocation of HCN to Ms. Wang. But counsel advised that she could not remember what happened, and that she did not possess the HDO now. (ECF No. 33 at 24:2–5). Judge Lehrburger appears to have thought that, given the sums involved, one would be expected to remember what had happened. That would be true only if Ms. Wang had successfully exercised her HCN and converted them into HDO, meaning she could be expected to remember paying almost \\$700,000 for approximately 700,000 HDO now purportedly worth \\$13.5 million. But she knew she did not do that; she knew she would not have had the sum of \\$700,000 to put into cryptocurrency. Put differently, she knew she did not do what she needed to have done to secure these assets for herself, but she could not recall what happened when she did not. Here, again, she was tasked with proving a negative.\n\nBecause Ms. Wang had to have paid to convert any allocation of HCN into HDO, counsel have, since Judge Lehrburger's decision, found and reviewed Ms. Wang's relevant bank statements to ascertain whether she had made any payments (in any amount) that looked like payments associated with the Himalaya Exchange. Counsel has found evidence of a wire to \"Himalaya Internati\" in the amount of \\$42,300 on September 27, 2021. (*See* Exhibit G). The same amount of \\$42,300 was returned to Ms. Wang's account at the same bank on October 7, 2021. (*Id.*). There are no other transfers or wires that are relevant here. It is counsel's understanding, based on refreshed recollections, that these wires represent the one and only attempt to convert certain HCN allocated to Ms. Wang, but that the conversion was not successful, and she never\n\nattempted to do so again. This is why she could not remember exactly what happened; she thought something may have happened and she was not sure what it was. She also did not want to say something that was false.\n\nBut the government's claims about HCN are also highly misleading: contrary to the government's claims, one cannot convert HCN holdings into cash except in limited amounts wholly insufficient to fund an escape. And the government knows this. In its submissions to Judge Lehrburger, the government assigned a wholly theoretical value to 700,000 HCN purportedly allocated to Ms. Wang. The government correctly asserted that \"on April 12, 2023, HCN was purportedly trading at 19.34 HDO. . . .\" (ECF No. 42 at 2). This means that the value of HCN listed on the Himalaya Exchange represented what bidders were willing to pay in HDO not in USD or any other fiat currency. The government followed this true assertion with a sleight of hand by claiming next that \"[s]tated otherwise, 1 HCN equals approximately \\$19.34.\" (*Id.*). That *would be true* if 1 HDO were actually convertible into 1 USD, but, as the government well knows, *it is not*. Indeed, according to the government and the SEC, investors who have attempted to convert their HDO into dollars were unable to do so, and the fraud allegations relating to the Himalaya Exchange (both in the indictment and in the SEC complaint) include allegations that, contrary to the government's representations, HDO were *not* convertible into USD and could *not* be used to purchase goods and services. (*See* ECF No. 19; SEC Complaint, No. 23-CV-02200, March 15, 2023, ECF No. 1 ¶ 128).\n\nIn any event, one reason HDO cannot be convertible into USD now is that the government seized from the Himalaya Exchange much, if not all, of the cash that would be the reserve the Himalaya Exchange could use to allow HDO holders to redeem HDO for USD. (*See* ECF No. 19 at ¶ 25(b) (\"Following the seizures, the Himalaya[] Exchange website continued to represent that\n\nHDO was backed by a 'Reserve consisting of USD and cash-equivalent assert' when, in truth, it was not.\")). And, as the government also knows, the Himalaya Exchange has notified its customers that it is unable to redeem HDO for USD except in \\$5,000 increments and only once a month. (*See* Exhibit H). In sum, even if Ms. Wang held 700,000 HCN now, contrary to the government's representations, she could not fund her escape, and it is not worth, in the real world, anything like \\$13,537,613.20 that the government falsely claims it is worth. (*See* ECF No. 42 at 2–3).\n\n# **b) Contrary to the government's suggestion and Judge Lehrburger's suspicions, Ms. Wang did not lie to PTS about the cash found in the safe in her apartment.**\n\nIn a further attempt to paint Ms. Wang as a serious flight risk because she allegedly lied about her assets, the government presented Judge Lehrburger with what looked like a transcript of a pretrial interview conducted on the day of Ms. Wang's arrest. But this was not an actual transcript—because no such transcript exists. The government was not there, and there is no official recording (video, audio, or stenographic). Indeed, as counsel learned only *after* Judge Lehrburger's decision, there were no notes of any kind kept by PTS. (*See* Exhibits J–K). Worse still, there are no scripts or lists of questions that the relevant PTS officer used and none for the PTS trainee who was also present. (Ex. J). According to this purported transcript, Ms. Wang said \"no\" in answer to the following questions: (1) \"At the time of your arrest, or within your residence, or on your person, did you have any cash to your name?\"; and (2) \"Are there any business accounts under your name or that you oversee, or any additional cash anywhere else?\" (Exhibit I). According to the government, this purported transcript showed that Ms. Wang hid from PTS that she had \\$138,000 in cash in her apartment.\n\nThe interactions between the government and counsel for Ms. Wang provide other reasons to doubt the accuracy of that purported transcript, including that the alleged script was not put in writing until almost a month later. According to the government's email to counsel, dated April\n\n25, 2023 (and unbeknownst to counsel or Judge Lehrburger), the government interviewed the PTS officer on April 10 and again on April 11, almost *thirty* days after Ms. Wang's PTS interview on March 15. (Exhibit L). And while the government's purported transcript was described to counsel as \"notes . . . created contemporaneously with . . . calls [made to the pretrial officer to ascertain what was said] (so on 4/10 and 4/11, respectively),\" it is contained in one email, dated *April 11* at 5:42 p.m., from AUSA Juliana Murray to herself. (Ex. I). That strongly suggests that, contrary to the government's assertion, the relevant portion of the \"contemporaneous notes\"—the part purporting to reflect a transcribed conversation between Ms. Wang and the PTS officer—was not taken contemporaneously (on April 10) but was written down a day later (April 11), after the government had a follow-up call with the PTS officer. (Note that the while the government provided handwritten notes of its various interviews with FBI agents, the only purportedly contemporaneous notes not taken by hand are contained in the April 11 email from AUSA Murray to herself).\n\nMoreover, the purported transcript has these two curious exchanges:\n\nQ: \"Do you happen to have any savings or checking accounts under your name or under your businesses?\" A: Disclosed two accounts. Initially stated it was a JPMC account, attorney said it was a MSSB account. Attorney gave the estimated balances and Pretrial Services confirmed with YW that was correct.\n\nQ: Specific bank / institution. A: Provided.\n\n(*Id.*). These purported exchanges are curious because the quoted answers cannot possibly be actual quotes; they are descriptions of what purportedly transpired. In other words, what the government made to look like a transcript to make it appear that some thirty days after the relevant conversation, the PTS officer had a clear word-for-word recollection – without the benefit of any notes – of what she said and what Ms. Wang said, was, at best, merely a summary of what the PTS\n\nofficer *thought* transpired. At worst, this is AUSA Murray's recollection of the substance of what the PTS officer said to her the day before.\n\nSeparately, counsel for Ms. Wang *were* present for the interview and took contemporaneous notes. (*See* Exhibits M–N). Neither counsel remembers the exact relevant questions that the government claims were asked: (1) \"At the time of your arrest, or within your residence, or on your person, did you have any cash to your name?\"; or (2) \"Are there any business accounts under your name or that you oversee, or any additional cash anywhere else?\" In fact, counsel do not recall any questions whatsoever about cash in Ms. Wang's residence nor questions about additional cash anywhere else. Instead, counsels' notes—both sets taken contemporaneously, simultaneously, and out of sight of each other—are consistent with a different relevant question, *i.e.,* in substance, \"Did you have any cash on you when you were arrested?\" One counsel's notes contain the following: \"No cash on her when arrested.\" (Ex. N). The second has a note stating: \"No cash on person.\" (Ex. M). This is what counsel remember and their recollection is consistent with their notes. And, even if the government were correct about the questions that were asked, it is clear from counsel's notes—again, the only existing *contemporaneous* notes that Ms. Wang's answer was limited to stating that she had no cash on her person when she was arrested. In short, what the government has created is more like a dramatic re-imagining of the interview, and it should be weighed as such.19\n\n<sup>19</sup> The presentation of this purported transcript also fails to mention that Ms. Wang's interview was conducted with the aid of an interpreter, meaning what the government presents as the precise questions posed to Ms. Wang is not necessarily what she was asked. As anyone who has had to face this issue knows, language translation is often imprecise, and this is especially true with Mandarin. Counsel contacted the interpreter after Judge Lehrburger's decision, and the interpreter represented he did not have any notes or remember what was said.\n\nRegardless, there is no doubt that there is a serious dispute—based, at a minimum, on the contemporaneous attorney notes and the thirty-day lapse of time between the PTS interview and the creation of the purported \"transcript\"—about what was said in that interview and that recollections are inconsistent. This is yet another instance of the government being unable to prove the existence of a fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Ms. Wang cannot be determined to be a flight risk based on this purported interview transcript, let alone be determined to be a *serious* flight risk.\n\nFinally, the cash found in Ms. Wang's apartment was not hidden in the floorboards or in the refrigerator. It was in the safe—together with passports and other things that are normally found in safes—and government agents had no difficulty locating the safe and accessing its contents. Ms. Wang saw the agents begin the search of her apartment. The idea that she would lie about cash stored in her safe at home in the hope that a search by nine FBI agents would not result in the discovery of her safe makes no sense whatsoever, especially considering her clear understanding, as described immediately below, of how thorough the FBI is in conducting searches. As well, the safe was in a closet together with all the other things she kept there (as described below, all of Ms. Wang's possessions were crammed into her closets). It is simply implausible that she could hope that the FBI would miss her safe while tearing apart the only places worth searching, her closets.\n\nIn support of its claim that Ms. Wang is a flight risk, the government has emphasized that the FBI agents who conducted the search of her apartment found documents and electronics in bags or suitcases in her closet. But any suggestion that these items were secreted in closets is entirely belied by the description and condition of Ms. Wang's apartment. Ms. Wang lives in a spartan, 740-square-foot, one-bedroom apartment. She does not own a desk, a wardrobe, or any\n\nbookshelves or other furniture where documents or electronics could be stored. Exhibit O, a government-drawn floorplan of Ms. Wang's apartment, shows that her living room furniture consists of a couch, a bean bag chair, an ottoman, a stool, a stand-up mirror, a side table without drawers, and a bench. There is no furniture that could hold electronics, documents, or anything else. Similarly, her bedroom furniture consists of a bed without any drawers, a side table without any drawers, inside of which sits a printer (on the floor between its legs), and a set of five narrow drawers that hold some personal items and intimate clothing. Because she cannot store her possessions anywhere else, all of Ms. Wang's possessions, old and new, are crammed into her closets. (*See* Exhibit P). This is why old phones were kept in a bag in the closet, documents were found in suitcases, and an old laptop was on the same shelf as her clothing. They were not being secreted; they were being stored as tightly and carefully as they could be, given the space constraints.\n\nIn addition, Ms. Wang is familiar with what happens when one's premises are searched. For example, in 2019, Ms. Wang witnessed the FBI search Mr. Kwok's office and residence. On that occasion, two dozen or more agents participated in the search. She knew how thorough the FBI agents were; the search lasted approximately twelve hours, and she understood that they searched through every room, every drawer, every closet, and every safe that was on the premises. The suggestion that Ms. Wang hid old phones and documents in her closet to avoid their discovery during a search simply cannot be credited. For the same reasons, the notion that she could have thought that the agents searching her apartment were not going to find her safe or not look inside (and find her cash) also cannot be credited. She well understood how thorough and exhaustive an FBI search is. All this knowledge is in addition to her familiarity with law enforcement searches generally because of her experiences with searches in China.\n\n## **D. The Government Failed to Meet Its Burden of Proving That No Combination of Conditions Will Assure Defendant's Appearance**\n\nMagistrate Judge Lehrburger erroneously failed to consider reasonable, less restrictive alternatives to detention. Essentially, the judge offered two reasons for his conclusion that there were no conditions that would assure Ms. Wang's appearance: \"First, the fact that [Ms.] Wang has not been able to identify financially responsible persons with moral suasion is itself a substantial change in circumstances since conditions were set by Judge Parker.\" (ECF No. 56 at 20). \"Second, [Ms.] Wang has not been forthcoming in fully disclosing her assets.\" (*Id.*). Even assuming these conclusions to be correct (and they are not, as discussed above), the detention order did not speak to, or even consider, what bail conditions could address these specific circumstances; the order simply states, in conclusory terms, that no bail conditions exist that would be sufficient here.\n\nBut the Bail Reform Act requires more: it requires proof by the government and a finding by the court—by a preponderance of the evidence—that no such conditions exist. *See Sabhnani*, 493 F.3d at 75. To get there, the court must consider alternatives and explain why those alternatives are insufficient. Authoritative in that regard is *Berrios-Berrios*, where the Second Circuit remanded for further proceedings to determine whether there were \"any viable alternatives to [the defendant's] continued detention pending trial\" because the district court had \"fail[ed] to explain on the record the extent to which it considered any alternatives to incarceration and, if so, on what basis they were rejected.\" 791 F.2d at 251. In other words, the court cannot find that no combination of conditions would exist to assure a defendant's appearance—as the government bears the burden to show under the Bail Reform Act to permit pretrial detainment—unless the court specifically considers all alternatives to pretrial detention and assesses why each of those alternatives cannot prevent, as alleged here, a risk of flight.\n\nAs in *Berrios-Berrios*, the record here is devoid of any consideration by Judge Lehrburger of any reasonable, less restrictive alternatives to detention. Further, the record is also barren of any proffer by the government of alternatives—far from it. In effect, as was the case with the risk-offlight aspect of the government's presentation here, the government shifted the burden to Ms. Wang by identifying risks and then making a conclusory statement that there were no conditions that would adequately assure her appearance given those risks, leaving it to Ms. Wang to show that sufficient conditions *do* exist.<sup>20</sup>\n\n# **1. The court must consider all reasonable, less restrictive alternatives to detention.**\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) emphasizes that a judicial officer must explore all available options before resorting to pretrial detention. The section provides that detention should only be ordered\n\n<sup>20</sup> In addition, in violation of Supreme Court guidance, neither the government, nor Judge Lehrburger followed proper procedure. That is error. *See Salerno*, 481 U.S. at 752 (upholding the procedural protections of the Bail Reform Act and emphasizing that an order of detention may be issued under the Act only after the provision of robust procedural safeguards, including a \"fullblown adversary hearing,\" \"findings of fact,\" and a \"statement of reasons for a decision to detain\"). Contrary to these procedural protections, in its letter submitted in advance of the scheduled March 31, 2023, hearing before Judge Lehrburger, the government sought detention in a wholly contradictory way. Despite this being the letter in which the government accused Ms. Wang of not being forthcoming about her purported crypto assets and lying to PTS, the government first stated that it was asking for more restrictive conditions—in effect admitting that some set of conditions existed that were adequate even given its new allegations—but ended the letter with an outright demand for remand. (ECF No. 22). Thereafter, as Judge Lehrbruger noted in his decision, at the follow-up hearing on April 4, 2023, the government now argued for detention solely. (ECF No. 56). Several things follow: (1) the government never made a proper motion for a remand hearing, and neither did Judge Lehrburger as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (\"The judicial officer shall hold a hearing to determine whether any condition or combination of conditions . . . will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.\"); (2) for that reason, the government did not meet its burden of proving that the risk of flight was serious enough to justify even having a detention hearing; (3) the government was not put to its proper burden to prove that detention is appropriate; (4) because the motion was not properly teed up, Ms. Wang and her counsel were deprived of adequate opportunity to prepare for a detention hearing; they expected a hearing about the specific bail conditions that were already in place and whether they had been satisfied or, alternatively, whether they could be altered to meet Ms. Wang's specific circumstances; and (5) substantively, one cannot both claim that there are sufficient conditions to support release on bail and that also there are no such conditions.\n\nif no other measures can reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant and the safety of others in the community. Therefore, a judicial officer must exhaust all reasonable, less restrictive alternatives before resorting to pretrial detention. *See Berrios-Berrios*, 791 F.2d at 251. In other words, pretrial detention should be used sparingly and only when it is truly necessary to protect the community and ensure the defendant's appearance in court. *See United States v. Infelise*, 934 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1991) (remanding because trial court failed to consider whether the defendant's proposed electronic surveillance anklets were a reasonable alternative to detention).\n\n## **2. The condition of home detention is the limit of what is permissible to assure Ms. Wang's appearance.**\n\nBecause the \"interest in liberty\" is \"fundamental,\" it is a \"general rule of substantive due process that the government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a criminal trial.\" *Salerno*, 481 U.S. at 750. The reason is that the pretrial detention of a defendant conflicts with both the Eighth Amendment and the presumption of innocence. *See United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A.*, 204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (\"The Constitution, in its guarantee that excessive bail should not be required, established the default rule that defendants should not be detained prior to trial unless necessary. This is because the right to freedom before conviction is basic. Similarly, the right to release on bail is inextricably related to the presumption of innocence of an accused.\"); *Moreland v. United States*, 968 F.2d 655, 660 n.9 (8th Cir. 1992) (\"It is important to note that, when determining the conditions of release, the judicial officer must maintain the presumption of innocence of the presentencing defendant.\") (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j)). In fact, pretrial detention solely based on risk of flight, in the absence of danger to the community or clear intent to flee, may not be constitutionally sound. *See United States v. Briggs*, 697 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (\"Pretrial detention satisfies due process only if its purpose is regulatory rather than\n\npunitive. . . . Permissible regulatory purposes include 'preventing danger to the community,' . . . and 'ensur[ing] [a defendant's] presence at trial[.]'\") (citations omitted)).\n\nAs the Supreme Court said in *Bell v. Wolfish* in the context of a challenge to prison conditions by pretrial detainees:\n\n> The petitioners assert, and respondents concede, that the \"essential objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detainees' presence at trial.\" . . . While this interest undoubtedly justifies the original decision to confine an individual **in some manner**, we do not accept respondents' argument that the Government's interest in ensuring a detainee's presence at trial is the *only* objective that may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is lawfully made to confine a person. \"**If the government could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of detention.**\"\n\n441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979) (bold emphasis added) (quoting *Campbell v. McGruder*, 580 F.2d 521,\n\n529 (1978)). In other words, once a defendant is lawfully remanded, the government's interest in maintaining a prison may subject a detainee to the same conditions as other inmates. Otherwise, if the government's only interest is the run-of-the-mill risk of flight, the constitutional limits of pretrial detention may be home confinement. Put differently, in the absence of something extreme, like proven intent to flee, a defendant must be released or, at most, if the risk of flight justifies it, confined at home. This reading of the constitutional limits of pretrial detention is, as discussed above, consistent with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3142 and its legislative history. Significantly, the Supreme Court was quoting the District of Columbia Circuit opinion in *Campbell*. There, in the same context of a challenge to prison conditions, the D.C. Circuit, relying on the Seventh Circuit opinion in *Duran v. Elrod*, 542 F.2d 998, 999–1000 (7th Cir. 1976), having established that as a matter of due process, pretrial detainees may suffer no more restrictions than are reasonably necessary to ensure their presence at trial, said the following:\n\n## **If the government could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty**\n\n**of detainees only to the extent necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest would in the end be the only constitutionally justified form of detention.** Since this would render pretrial detention a virtual impossibility and **thus frustrate the government's interest in protecting the safety of the community**, we must acknowledge as an aspect of that interest the government's ability to manage the institution of pretrial detention in an administratively feasible manner. . . . The myriad of prosaic details involved in that enterprise—the choice of menus, the assignment of cells, the scheduling of recreation and other events take on a life independent of the primary justifications of the confinement.\n\n580 F.2d at 529 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). In other words, the Supreme Court was quoting and relying for this reasoning on a case that took an even narrower view of the limits of pretrial detention, linking it to the safety of the community.\n\nIn the instant case, the physical restrictions proposed by Ms. Wang are \"extraordinary,\" to borrow a phrase used by the Second Circuit in *Sabhnani* to describe conditions of home confinement that are substantively identical to those proposed by Ms. Wang here. 493 F.3d at 77. Indeed, *Sabhnani* is instructive here, as its facts bear a striking resemblance to those of this case. There, husband and wife defendants, who were citizens of India and Indonesia, respectively, faced charges for harboring illegal aliens in their Long Island home and for the forced labor of those illegal aliens, who were effectively treated as domestic slaves. *Id*. at 65. The defendants also possessed millions of dollars in assets. *Id*. The government sought pretrial detention on the basis that the defendants were a flight risk. According to the government, detention was necessary because (a) \"the evidence of [the defendants'] guilt was compelling\"; (b) they \"faced a significant term of incarceration\" of forty years' imprisonment; (c) their \"vast financial resources\" provided \"means and opportunity to flee\"; (d) they had \"personal and professional contacts with numerous foreign countries\" with which the \"United States had no extradition treaty\"; and finally (e) during their initial interview with PTS, they had misrepresented their assets. *Id*. at 67, 72.\n\nTo mitigate the government's concerns about potential flight, the defendants agreed to sign a personal recognizance bond secured by some of their assets and agreed to severe restraints on their physical liberty. They agreed to surrender their passports and be subject to home confinement with electronic monitoring and unannounced visits by PTS. *Id*. at 77. Despite the defendants' agreement to these conditions, the district court ordered the defendants detained. *Id*. at 72.\n\nThe defendants immediately appealed the detention order to the Second Circuit, requesting expeditious review. *Id*. at 73. The Second Circuit, in a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Reena Raggi, reversed, noting the \"extraordinary\" physical restrictions agreed to by the defendants. *Id*. at 77. The Second Circuit reiterated the \"statutory presumption in favor of release,\" and explained that \"there is no reason in this case to think that the proposed conditions of home confinement cannot reasonably mitigate any concerns about defendants' risk of flight.\" *Id*. at 78. Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded the case back to the district court and articulated its \"expectation that . . . the district court *will* enter appropriate bail release orders.\" *Id*. (emphasis added).\n\n# **E. Detention Interferes with Ms. Wang's Ability to Participate in Her Own Defense**\n\nThe government has indicated that the trial in this case should be expected to take place a year from now because of the volume of discovery and the complexity of the issues. Two things follow: first, this means that Ms. Wang would be in pretrial detention for over a year even before the trial starts. Requiring Ms. Wang to remain incarcerated for the entire time it takes to bring this case to trial simply cannot be reconciled with the Bail Reform Act or any standard of fairness. *United States v. Jackson*, 823 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1987) (\"grave due process concerns\" are implicated by a seven-month period of pretrial detention). Forcing her to remain incarcerated for an indeterminate amount of time is the equivalent of forcing Ms. Wang to serve a prison sentence before she has been convicted. In addition, detention at the MDC will deny her the ability to\n\nmeaningfully participate in the preparation of her own defense and will cripple her counsel's ability to understand the relevant documents, conduct the necessary factual investigations, and to prepare for trial. *See Barker v. Wingo*, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (\"[I]f a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense. Imposing those consequences on anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious.\"); *United States v. Vitta*, 653 F. Supp. 320, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (\"The quality of the detainee's legal defense is likely to diminish dramatically as long as he or she is incarcerated. The interlude between arraignment and trial is 'perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings . . . when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation . . . [are] vitally important . . . .'\") (quoting *Powell v. Alabama*, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).\n\nThis is especially so given that much of the material will be in Mandarin, will involve cultural nuances, and require the ordering and prioritizing of a very large volume of evidence. Counsel can already attest to the fact that Ms. Wang's detention has seriously complicated, delayed, and impeded this bail litigation.\n\n## **CONCLUSION**\n\nFor the forgoing reasons, Ms. Wang should be released forthwith and given ten business days to fulfill all the bail conditions set forth on pages 2–3 above.\n\nDated: June 5, 2023\n\nDated: June 5, 2023 Respectfully submitted,\n\n*/s/ Alex Lipman*\n\nPriya Chaudhry CHAUDHRYLAW PLLC 147 W. 25th Street, 12th Floor New York, New York 10001 Tel: (212) 785-5550 Email: priya@chaudhrylaw.com\n\nAlex Lipman LIPMAN LAW PLLC 147 W. 25th Street, 12th Floor New York, New York 10001 Tel: (212) 401-0070 Email: alexlipman@lipmanlawpllc.com\n\n*Attorneys for Defendant Yanping Wang*","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（美国联邦纽约南区地方法院）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国），\n\n诉\n\n案号：23-CR-118-AT\n\nYANPING WANG（王雁平），\n\n被告。\n\n被告 YANPING WANG（王雁平）支持其撤销治安法官于 2023 年 4 月 21 日作出的羁押裁定并准予审前释放动议的法律备忘录\n\nPriya Chaudhry，CHAUDHRYLAW PLLC，147 W. 25th Street, 12th Floor New York, New York 10001，电话：(212) 785-5550，电子邮箱：priya@chaudhrylaw.com\n\nAlex Lipman，LIPMAN LAW PLLC，147 W. 25th Street, 12th Floor New York, New York 10001，电话：(212) 401-0070，电子邮箱：alexlipman@lipmanpllc.com\n\n被告 Yanping Wang 的代理律师\n\n目录\n权威判例及法条汇编 iii\nI. 事实及程序背景 3\nII. 论证 7\nA. 政府未能证明王女士存在潜逃风险\nB. 政府未能履行其举证责任，以证明根据 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) 考量因素王女士存在潜逃风险 11\n1. 针对王女士的指控不支持对其予以羁押，因为针对她的指控在范围和严重性上均属有限 11\n2. 王女士是一名异见人士——其背景中没有任何迹象表明她会诈骗其异见运动的其他成员 12\n3. 王女士在知晓可能面临刑事指控的情况下并未潜逃\n4. 王女士不存在潜逃风险，因为她无处可去，而且即便在纽约她也受到中国政府的监视\n5. 王女士与美国有着充分的联系 19\nC. 治安法官 Lehrburger 错误地认定王女士的经济能力和国际人脉构成了拒绝保释的充分依据\n1. 法院认可，被告经济富裕以及身为外国国民可潜逃至可能不予引渡的国家这一单纯事实，不足以构成拒绝保释的充分依据 21\n2. 王女士不具备潜逃的经济能力\na) 与政府的主张及 Lehrburger 法官的怀疑相反，王女士不持有任何加密货币 23\nb) 与政府的主张及 Lehrburger 法官的怀疑相反，王女士并未就其公寓保险箱内发现的现金对审前服务处（PTS）说谎 28\nD. 政府未能履行其举证责任以证明没有任何条件组合能够确保被告出庭 33\n1. 法院必须考量羁押之外的所有合理且限制较小的替代措施\n2. 居家监禁条件是确保王女士出庭所允许采用的限度 35\nE. 羁押妨碍了王女士参与自身辩护的能力 38\n结论 40\n\n权威判例及法条汇编\n判例\nBarker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)\nBell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)\nCampbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (1978) 36, 37\nDuran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976) 36\nHung v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326 (1978)\nMoreland v. United States, 968 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1992) 35\nPowell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)\nUnited States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1986) 9, 33, 34\nUnited States v. Bodmer, No. 03 CR 947 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 959 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2004) 10, 21\nUnited States v. Boustani, 932 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2019)\nUnited States v. Briggs, 697 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2012)\nUnited States v. Bruno, 89 F. Supp. 3d 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) 8\nUnited States v. Choudhry, 941 F. Supp. 2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 8\nUnited States v. Cole, 715 F. Supp. 677 (E.D. Pa. 1988) 9\nUnited States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988) 8, 10\nUnited States v. Gotti, 358 F. Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 8\nUnited States v. Hanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2009) 9, 16, 22\nUnited States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1986) 9\nUnited States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1991) 35\nUnited States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1987) 38\nUnited States v. Khashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 22\nUnited States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1985) 8\nUnited States v. Ling, No. 4:21-mj-00336, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101132 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2021) 10, 16\nUnited States v. Molina, No. 11 Cr. 528 (JFK), 2012 WL 3564013 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012) 7\nUnited States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) 7\nUnited States v. Paulino, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 8\nUnited States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2007) 见各处引用\nUnited States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 7\nUnited States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1987) 7\nUnited States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., 204 F. Supp. 2d 412 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) 35\nUnited States v. Stein, No. S1 05 Cr. 0888 (LAK), 2005 WL 8157371 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2005) 8\nUnited States v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1991) 7\nUnited States v. Townsend, 897 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1990) 7\nUnited States v. Vitta, 653 F. Supp. 320 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) 39\nUnited States v. White, No. 3:21-mj-04070, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100544 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2021) 9, 10\nUnited States v. Wright, No. 2:18-cr-336-DN, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121974 (D. Utah July 20, 2018) 11\nUnited States v. Zarzuela, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206270 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2019) 9\n\n成文法及法规\n8 C.F.R. § 208.18 20\n15 U.S.C. § 78f 3\n15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) 3\n17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5\n18 U.S.C. §\n18 U.S.C. § 1957\n18 U.S.C. § 2\n18 U.S.C. § 3141\n18 U.S.C. § 34, 36\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) 34\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2) 7\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) 8\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(j) 35\n18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) 7\n18 U.S.C. § 371\n1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 7\n1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3189 7\nIn re GTV Media Grp., Inc., Saraca Media Grp., Inc. & Voice of Guo Media, Inc., Respondents, Release No. 94107 (Jan. 31, 2022) 12, 15\nS. Rep. No. 98-225 (1983) 7\nUnited Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment（《禁止酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚公约》）, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, Treaty Doc. No. 100–200, U.N.T.S. 85 20\n\nYanping Wang（王雁平）女士不存在潜逃风险，至少绝不高于任何被政府指控犯有联邦白领犯罪的人，因为她无处可去，没有前往任何地方的手段，也没有这样做的意图。然而——尽管她既无犯罪记录，也未被指控对任何人构成危险——王女士自 2023 年 3 月 15 日起就一直被羁押在 MDC Brooklyn（布鲁克林大都会拘留中心），起初是因为政府不批准她提出的保释保证人，而现在则是以没有任何条件组合能够合理确保其出庭受审为由。本动议旨在推翻治安法官 Robert W. Lehrburger 在听证后于 2023 年 4 月 21 日对王女士作出的羁押裁定。Lehrburger 法官的裁决是基于政府提供的不实事实以及对法律的错误适用。此外，他当时未能获悉下文将予论述的某些额外事实，而这些事实削弱了其裁决中最关键的方面。\n\n王女士是一场异见运动的领导人之一，该运动的目标正是推翻 Chinese Communist Party（“CCP”，中国共产党）在中国的统治。政府对此并无异议。她在华人社区广为人知且极易被认出。2017 年，因担心遭到中国当局的迫害危及人身安全，她从香港搬到了纽约。尽管她是一位渴望解放并重返祖国的中国爱国者，但由于担心一旦返回中国会有生命危险，她在美提交了庇护申请。她为对抗中国政府的暴政倾注了一生，并牺牲了个人的安全以及与留在中国境内的儿子和丈夫的关系。起诉书中完全没有任何指控表明任何所谓的受害者钱款最终落入了她的腰包。她希望获得在法庭上为自己辩护的机会。她希望让全世界知道她没有盗窃任何财物，也没有伤害任何人。\n\n治安法官对王女士作出拒绝保释的裁决，是基于政府提出的诸多错误的事实陈述以及关键的无根据推测，这些如今必须予以\n\n根据新的或补充证据予以重新考虑。这些不正确的断言与毫无根据的推测相结合，实际上将证明否定事实（即证明政府在自以为属于事实的问题上犯了错误）的举证责任转嫁给了王女士（Ms. Wang）。简而言之，政府不当地制造了王女士存在潜逃风险的虚假印象，或者至少如我们在下文所证明的那样，制造了其潜逃风险远高于实际情况的虚假印象。\n\n此外，完全存在能够合理保证王女士出庭受审的释放条件。事实上，她潜逃的可能性比许多其他被告人都要低。她在字面意义上无处可去。她不会潜逃至中国大陆或中国香港，因为她会因从事反中共活动而被捕并可能被处死。如果她潜逃至国外其他地方，她只能去一个既不向美国也不向中国引渡的国家，而且鉴于她的知名度、口音和华裔种族特征，她必须想办法隐藏身份。很可能根本不存在这样的国家，而且政府也没有指明任何一个国家。如果她违反保释条件离开美国，她显然也将失去任何获得庇护的机会。再者，在被起诉之前，王女士就完全知晓自己在美国可能面临刑事指控，但她并未企图潜逃。即使面临坐牢的可能性，美国对王女士而言仍是世界上最安全的地方。她既没有政府最初声称的经济资源，也没有便利其潜逃的国际关系网络。最后，政府预计本案在一年多之内都不会开庭审理，将王女士拘押这么长时间不仅极其残酷，而且会严重妨碍其协助自身辩护的能力。根本没有任何事实或法律依据能够证明对王女士这样的人实施如此长时间的审前拘押是正当的。\n\n王女士提议并准备接受极其严格的释放条件：\n\n• 200万美元的个人担保保释金，以价值100万美元的房产、她的一个银行账户以及138,000美元现金作为担保；\n\n- 限制使用她的另一银行账户，使其仅能提取用于必要生活开支的资金，或须经审前服务处（Pretrial Services，简称“PTS”）预先批准；\n- 旅行范围限制在纽约东区和南区（Eastern and Southern Districts of New York），除非向审前服务处及政府提出申请；\n- 上缴所有旅行证件且不得提出新的申请；\n- 接受审前服务处的严格监督；\n- 按照审前服务处的指示接受位置监控技术监管；\n- 实行带有GPS监控的居家监禁，但出庭、与律师会面或经审前服务处另行允许的情况除外；\n- 在没有律师在场的情况下，不得与共同被告人、证人或所谓的受害人接触；以及\n- 由一名与其同住的朋友进行居家监督，该朋友将负责报告任何违规行为。\n\n在这些条件下，王女士绝不可能逃离美国。因此，我们提请法庭按照上述条件释放王女士。\n\nI. 事实与程序背景\n\n2023年3月29日，大陪审团作出了一份附随起诉书（S1 1:23-cr-00118-AT），将王女士列为共同被告人，并入对其共谋者Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）和Min King Je的起诉书中。附随起诉书指控王女士犯有：(1) 共谋进行电信欺诈、证券欺诈、银行欺诈及洗钱，违反18 U.S.C. § 371；(2) 电信欺诈，违反18 U.S.C. §§ 1343和2；(3) 证券欺诈，违反15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b)和78f、17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5以及18 U.S.C. § 2；以及 (4) 非法货币交易，违反18 U.S.C. §§ 1957和2。（ECF No. 19）。\n\n此前，于2023年3月15日，王女士根据刑事起诉书（complaint）被捕；同日，联邦治安法官Katharine H. Parker（凯瑟琳·H·帕克）将保释金定为500万美元，并要求王女士的保释金以100万美元现金或房产担保，且须由两名具备经济担保能力的人士联签。（ECF No. 3）。此外，法院命令王女士上缴其旅行证件且不得申请新证件；披露其控制的所有财务账户；按审前服务处的指示接受审前监督；实行居家拘禁；按审前服务处的指示接受位置监控技术监管；以及进行GPS追踪。（同上）。最后，帕克法官命令将王女士予以拘押，直至满足保释条件。（同上）。\n\n之所以施加这些条件，主要是因为政府向王女士的辩护律师及法院作出了若干后来被证实是错误的陈述。在王女士被捕当日与辩护律师的交谈中，政府陈述称对其公寓的搜查产生了几项令人担忧的发现。政府声称（其中包括）在其公寓内发现了十几部手机，其中许多部未通电并藏在看似原装的盒子里，以使其在非全新状态下显得全新。政府声称在床上的床垫之间发现藏有一部手机；在沙发垫之间藏有文件；以及其保险柜内有138,000美元的全新百元面额美钞。1 政府还声称在壁橱内的毛衣之间藏有一台笔记本电脑。鉴于政府事实主张的具体性，辩护律师在当时假定政府说的是实话，且未有充分机会与当时情绪受到极大惊吓的王女士进行沟通，因而辩护律师同意了一项500万美元的保释金方案，该方案由两名具备经济担保能力的人士联签，并以王女士公寓的净值作为担保，附带脚踝监控、上缴旅行证件以及旅行限制。然而，辩护律师当时告知政府，居家监禁是不必要的，应当释放王女士并给予其合理的时间来满足保释条件。政府律师则表示，鉴于搜查发现，“同意这样做将构成失职”，政府将坚持要求实施居家监禁，并在所有保释条件得到满足之前继续拘押。\n\n1 政府重点强调据称“全新”的100美元钞票，以此作为近期准备潜逃的证据。\n\n在随后的法庭辩论中，政府向法院重复了相同的事实主张。政府辩称，据称藏匿的手机和隐匿的文件是“强有力的隐瞒证据和藏匿证据，我们指控这些无疑属于犯罪证据”。（ECF No. 10-3 第12:13–15行）。换言之，政府利用这些所谓的证据来证明王女士有罪，并证明需要施加体现其企图隐瞒罪证的保释条件。关于现金，政府称其为“紧急潜逃资金”，并将其作为具有潜逃意图的证据。（同上，第19:12–21行）。面对这些极具杀伤力的指控，帕克法官被政府说服并支持了政府；政府得到了其所要求的结果，王女士被羁押候审，直至满足保释条件。\n\n事实证明，鉴于政府所知晓的其他事实，上述陈述无一属实，也绝非没有误导性。首先，王女士公寓内只有一个装在iPhone包装盒里的手机。政府并未将其扣押；它确实是全新的。所有其他手机要么插着充电线且处于显眼位置，要么是存放在壁橱同一个袋子里的旧手机。床上床垫之间或任何其他地方都没有藏匿手机。沙发垫之间也没有藏匿任何文件。现金中并不包含新钞；事实上，所有钞票上最近的年份是2017年。（Glenn Decl. ¶ 6）。这根本不是一个准备潜逃的人所储备的近期钞票：2017年早于所指控的共谋行为的起始时间。（ECF No. 19 ¶ 1）。大部分现金装在多年来赠予王女士的红色礼品信封（“红包”）中，这符合中国人在农历新年的习俗。2\n\n2 http\n\n王女士曾试图满足其保释条件。她将其价值超过100万美元的公寓作为担保提供。她提供了若干潜在的联签人，她绝不希望让这些人背负500万美元的债务。然而，尽管有至少八人表示愿意为其500万美元保释金联签，政府却拒绝批准其中的两名联签人。基本上，政府取消了所有提议联签人的资格，理由是他们与王女士关系不够密切，或者被认为不具备足够的经济担保能力，或者两者兼而有之。\n\n王女士随后向治安法官法庭寻求干预。2023年3月22日，治安法官Sarah Netburn（萨拉·内特本）主持进行了一场简短的听证会。法官不倾向于推翻其同事关于保释条件的决定，并认为听证会为时尚早，且其手头缺乏足够的具体信息以供裁决。2023年3月24日，王女士向治安法官法庭提出动议，请求作出命令，裁定王女士已遵守其保释条件，并裁决政府拒绝批准其保释金联签人的行为系属专断。作为替代方案，王女士请求法院修改其保释条件，取消要求两名具备经济担保能力的人士联签其保释金的规定。（ECF No. 8）。关于该动议的听证会定于2023年3月31日举行。\n\n2023年3月31日，在听证会开始前不到一小时，政府提交了一封信件，主张其发现了某些“可以证明施加更具限制性的保释条件是正当的”补充信息，但在信末声称王女士“在审判前应予拘押”。（对照 ECF No. 22 第1页 与 ECF No. 8 第2页）。最重要的是，这封信现在声称王女士拥有未披露的加密货币资产，并且她在公寓被搜查时未能向审前服务处披露其拥有138,000美元现金。（ECF No. 22）。由于这些属于新指控，Lehrburger（勒伯格）法官将保释听证会推迟至2023年4月4日。\n\n2023年4月4日，勒伯格法官举行了保释听证会，并要求各方提交补充材料。（ECF No. 39）。2023年4月21日，该法官基于其对潜逃风险的评估，下令将王女士予以拘押。（ECF No. 56）。\n\nII. 论证\n\n《保释改革法》（Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq.）要求对被告人予以审前释放，“除非司法官员认定此类释放无法合理保证该人按要求出庭，或将危及任何其他人或社区的安全”。United States v. Boustani, 932 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2019)（援引 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)）；United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 78 (2d Cir. 2007)（指出即使法院认定被告人存在潜逃风险，法律仍推定支持释放被告人，“除非政府证明无法施加任何释放条件以保证被告人出庭”）。“合理保证”并不意味着“绝对保证”，参见 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 通篇；且仅在“没有任何条件或条件组合能够合理保证被告人出庭”的情况下，审前拘押才是适当的，Sabhnani, 493 at 75。3\n\n通过通过《1984年保释改革法案》（Bail Reform Act of 1984），国会旨在并预期仅有“少数但可识别的特别危险的被告人”会在审前被羁押。S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 6 (1983)；亦见 United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1985)（指出在“罕见案件”中羁押才是正当合理的）；United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985)（Kennedy，法官）（“只有在罕见情况下才应拒绝释放。”）。国会预期，大多数被告人将继续通过自保或无担保保释金获得释放。S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 12。在一定程度上，为确保羁押实属罕见，国会授权仅在举行羁押听证会后方可羁押，仅允许在特定情况下举行羁押听证会，18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f)(1)–(2)，对政府施加了高度举证责任，并赋予被告人广泛的手段以质证政府的主张，18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)。与国会的意图一致，最高法院已确认，“在我们的社会中，自由是常态，而在审前或未经审判的羁押则是受到严格限制的例外。” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)。遵循最高法院的指导，其他法院也已确认“[审]前羁押仍是一种例外的措施。” United States v. Torres, 929 F.2d 291, 292 (7th Cir. 1991)，引自 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749；一致意见见 United States v. Townsend, 897 F.2d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 1990)（“只有在罕见案件中才应拒绝释放。”）。亦见 United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1987)（“[仅]有‘有限的犯罪人群体’才应在审前被拒绝保释。”）（引自 S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 7 (1984)，重印于 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189）。\n\n根据 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b)，“[如果]治安法官（magistrate judge）命令羁押某人，……该人可向对该罪行具有原始管辖权的法院提出撤销或修改该命令的动议。” United States v. Molina, No. 11 Cr. 528 (JFK), 2012 WL 3564013, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2012)。“地区法院应当全面重新审查治安法官对保释的拒绝，并且在对撤销或修改羁押命令的动议作出裁定时，不应仅仅服从治安法官的判断，而应得出自己独立的结论。” United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1985)。《保释改革法案》已被解释为要求地区法官对治安法官的保释裁定进行全新审理（de novo）。United States v. Gotti, 358 F. Supp. 2d 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)。\n\n在考虑保释是否适当时，法院必须考虑 (1) 指控罪行的性质和情况；(2) 针对该人的证据权重；(3) 该人的历史和特征；以及 (4) 释放该人对社区中任何人构成的危险的性质和严重性。4 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)。“审前关押的权力必须审慎行使，[并且]只有在被告人的行为所带来的危险证明其合理时并在该范围内才可启用。” United States v. Bruno, 89 F. Supp. 3d 425, 428–29 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)（引自 United States v. Choudhry, 941 F. Supp. 2d 347, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)）。重要的是，众所周知，仅凭“犯下严重罪行以及潜在长期刑罚的事实”，不足以支持关于逃跑风险的认定，需要作出更高的证明。\n\n4 政府并不主张 Ms. Wang（王女士）对社区构成危险。尽管 Lehrburger 法官指出，虽然“没有迹象表明王女士若获释会对任何人或社区构成人身危险，但如果她重新从事欺诈活动，她可能会对人造成伤害。”（ECF No. 39）。这一观察不足以作为基于对社区构成危险而支持羁押的裁定，因为“[基]于他人和社区安全的羁押命令必须建立在由清晰且具有说服力的证据所支持的认定之上。” United States v. Stein, No. S1 05 Cr. 0888 (LAK), 2005 WL 8157371, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2005)。政府甚至根本没有提供此类证据。\n\nUnited States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1988)；一致意见见 United States v. Paulino, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)。\n\n政府承担证明责任，以“优势证据证明被告人……构成实际的逃跑风险。” Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 75（强调为原文所加）。“仅有逃跑的机会是不够的。” United States v. Zarzuela, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206270, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2019)（引自 United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 1986)）。相反，正如若干法院所指出的，证实“实际逃跑风险”的证据必须类似于表明被告人具有逃跑意图的证据。例如，见 United States v. Hanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C. 2009)（“在本案中，……没有强有力的间接证据表明 Hanson 女士企图逃离[美国]”）；United States v. Cole, 715 F. Supp. 677, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1988)（被告人告知卧底探员若被捕他们将逃跑）；United States v. White, No. 3:21-mj-04070, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100544, at *21 (M.D. Tenn. May 27, 2021)（“如果案件涉及被告人故意逃避法庭程序的严重风险，那么该案就涉及‘严重的逃跑风险’，而非仅仅是不出庭的风险。”）。\n\n即使确立了实际的逃跑风险，“有利于保释的推定仍然适用。” Zarzuela, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206270, at *3（引自 United States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1986)）。因此，政府承担次要证明责任，“以优势证据证明，无法对被告人施加任何条件或条件组合以合理保证其出庭。” Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 75（指出政府表现得好像“这第二项证明责任落在了被告人身上，或者[政府]享有依法应由被告人负责反驳的羁押推定”，这“[显]然……是不正确的”）。\n\nA. 政府未能证明王女士具有逃跑风险\n\n政府在证明逃跑意图方面未能完成其举证责任，因为其提供的证据极少，反而依赖于推测和臆断。如上所述，除声称在其中一个壁橱的毛衣之间发现了一台电脑外，政府在王女士首次过堂（presentment）时提供的所谓“证据”已被证明是不实的；我们将在下文驳斥该指控。随后，政府又提出了其他指控，同样如下文所述，这些指控政府无法证实。事实上，在一处细节中，政府承认，尽管其提出了相反的主张，但它并不知晓王女士是否实际拥有任何加密货币。我们同样在下文对此予以驳斥。但在每一种情况下，政府提供的都不是证据。相反，政府提供的是臆断。正如诸多法院所指出的，臆断（相对于证实某一主张的实际证据）无法满足《保释改革法案》下政府的举证责任。例如，见 United States v. Bodmer, No. 03 CR 947 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 959, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2004)（裁定政府未能完成其举证责任，因为其主张“在很大程度上基于推测，[而]没有任何证据支持[其]主张”）；United States v. Ling, No. 4:21-mj-00336, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101132, at *14 (N.D. Tex. May 24, 2021)（“[政]府没有提出任何证据来支持[其]主张”，即毒品数量表明“这是一起涉及大量现金的大规模运作，这可能为被告人提供逃跑的手段。”）。\n\n通过强迫王女士驳斥这些臆断，政府实际上将证明责任转移给了她，不是让她去反驳政府的证据，而是让她去证明一个否定事实，即去证明政府所指控的事实不属实。换言之，基于政府未能出示（甚至未能提请审查）除作为刑事被告人所附带的风险之外、证明她具有逃跑风险的任何实际证据这一简单理由，王女士即应获得保释。见 Friedman, 837 F.2d at 50（“要认定存在逃跑风险，需要[超]过指控的严重性和潜在长期刑罚的事实。”）；White, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100544, at *20（“需要存在关于严重逃跑风险的证据（或至少是由政府提请审查的具体信息），而非仅仅是结论性的断言，方可证明举行羁押听证会具有正当性”）（引自 United States v. Wright, No. 2:18-cr-336-DN, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121974, at *2 (D. Utah July 20, 2018)）。\n\nB. 政府未能完成其根据 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) 考量因素证明王女士具有逃跑风险的举证责任\n\n1. 对王女士的指控不支持予以羁押，因为针对她的指控在范围和严重程度上都是有限的。\n\n尽管起诉书将王女士描述为 Kwok 先生（郭文贵先生）的“幕僚长”（ECF No. 19 ¶ 8），但并未指控她从涉嫌的欺诈中牟利，且考虑到整份起诉书的范围，与她相关的指控相对有限。起诉书指控了一起从事四项独立涉嫌欺诈的共谋：GTV 发行、农场贷款项目（Farm Loan Program）、G|CLUBS 以及喜马拉雅交易所（Himalayan Exchange）。然而，除了共谋罪名项中的总结性段落外，王女士的名字仅在与 GTV 发行指控相关之处被提及。（同上，¶¶ 1–25）。事实上，作为她在起诉书所指控行为中相对涉嫌有罪程度的一项体现，在起诉书总共 154 个段落和小项中，王女士的名字仅出现在二十二个段落或小项中。\n\n具体而言，在起诉书的十二项罪名中，王女士仅被指控涉嫌四项：共谋、涉及 GTV 发行的电汇欺诈、涉及 GTV 发行的证券欺诈，以及通过将 GTV 发行的 1 亿美元收益电汇至由亲属-1（Relative-1）控制的对冲基金而从事货币交易。（同上）。在推进共谋的公开行为中，提及王女士的唯一行为就是向亲属-1的对冲基金电汇该 1 亿美元的同一笔汇款。（同上，¶ 32.b）。即便关于 GTV 的指控，除了指控她在 GTV 的私募备忘录（Private Placement Memorandum，“PPM”）中被列为“执行董事”之外，王女士的名字也仅与同一笔 1 亿美元电汇相关联。\n\n（同上，¶ 13.c）。没有任何指控称王女士就 GTV 发行亲自向任何人作出过任何虚假陈述。\n\n此外，如起诉书所指控，该 1 亿美元被挪用，意味着其投资方式与 PPM 中的资金用途披露不一致。（同上，¶ 13.h）。而且根据起诉书，尽管该 1 亿美元中有 3000 万美元发生亏损，但该 3000 万美元属于投资亏损，而非为个人用途抽逃资金。（同上；亦见 In re GTV Media Grp., Inc., Saraca Media Grp., Inc. & Voice of Guo Media, Inc., Respondents, Release No. 94107 (Jan. 31, 2022)）。无论如何，所有这些资金现均已被追回，因为 GTV 及其他实体已交出（disgorged）所有相关款项连同判决前利息。（见 In re GTV.）。王女士的个人历史和特征不支持予以羁押。\n\n2. 王女士是一名异见人士——其背景中没有任何迹象表明她会欺诈其异见运动的其他成员。\n\nWang 女士（王女士）是一名中国异见人士，她通过加入并成为反对 CCP（中国共产党）的亲民主运动的领导者之一，放弃了舒适的生活和家庭。她的个人特质支持对其准予保释，因为她全身心投入于其运动及其成员，她是其社区中负责任且杰出的成员，并且她希望在法庭上获得公平审判的机会，以便她的支持者能够看到她没有欺诈他们，也没有从起诉书中所述的任何指控计划中获取经济利益。\n\nWang 女士现年四十四岁。她出生于一个富裕的中国家庭。她的父母在经济上很成功。他们是当地第一对拥有彩色电视机、冰箱、固定电话以及后来拥有 Motorola（摩托罗拉）手机的夫妇。然而，某些显示出中共漠视中国人民的事件，以及她和她的家人所遭受的相应痛苦，导致了 Wang 女士对中共的强烈反对。首先，当她母亲怀上 Wang 女士的弟弟时，她的父母面临着违反独生子女政策或终止妊娠的艰难选择。Wang 女士的父母选择了保留他们的第二个孩子，并遭受了严重的后果。正是在这一刻，当她还是个孩子的时候，激发了 Wang 女士对中共的反对。其次，在 2004 年底，Wang 女士的母亲被诊断出患有肺癌。八个月后她去世了。她当时四十九岁。她从不吸烟，但全家生活在一个因中共对环境肆无忌惮的漠视而遭受严重污染的省份。Wang 女士的父亲也在 2017 年春季被诊断出患有肺癌。一年后去世，享年六十一岁。5 由于父母去世而引发的对环境问题的关切，也加剧了 Wang 女士对中共的根本性反对。\n\nWang 女士得以就读于优良的学校并出国留学。她是一名优秀的学生，最终在中国的高校获得了两个学士学位，并在法国获得了两个硕士学位。Wang 女士在中国上大学时认识了她的丈夫。他也是一名优秀的学生，获得了两个学士学位和两个硕士学位。Wang 女士和她的丈夫是彼此的初恋。2013 年，Wang 女士生下了她的儿子，也是她唯一的孩子。她和她的丈夫在中国过着舒适的生活。他们在北京拥有自己的住房、一处度假房产以及三辆汽车。他们工作努力，生活节俭。他们曾是一个幸福的家庭。她没有任何个人理由离开他们，完全有理由留在他们身边。若非因为她的反中共活动，她现在本该和他们在一起。\n\n尽管如此，Wang 女士于 2015 年离开中国大陆，未再返回。届时，在为 Kwok 先生（郭先生）家族的一家公司工作期间，她加入了异见人士运动。这使她成为了中国当局的目标。她在 2015 年和 2016 年期间常驻香港，因担心在大陆被拘留而不敢返回。6 例如，中国当局多次找上她的父亲、弟弟和丈夫，并曾数次逮捕并拘留她的丈夫。Wang 女士的丈夫处于持续监视之下；无论他走到哪里都有人跟踪。她在中国的银行和信用卡账户陆续被关闭。尽管她得以将部分资金转移至香港，但她在香港的银行账户也开始在没有明确原因的情况下被关闭和标记。最终，她不得不将剩余的积蓄转移至纽约。简而言之，Wang 女士也开始生活在香港被拘留的恐惧之中。她当时经常旅行，并在 2016 年获得了 Vanuatu（瓦努阿图）护照，以防在需要逃避中国警方的情况下无法使用其中国护照旅行。7\n\nWang 女士于 2017 年春季移居纽约。2017 年底，她失去了与儿子和丈夫的所有联系。Wang 女士最后一次亲眼见到儿子时，他只有两岁。有一段时间，她能够通过视频通话与儿子交谈。那非常艰难。Wang 女士的岳母/婆婆会告诉她，Wang 女士的儿子一直问他父亲他们是否可以去超市买一个新妈妈。虽然她的儿子在年龄较小的时候在视频中看到她会很高兴，但随着他渐渐长大并意识到她不会回家，他变得闷闷不乐，眼里常常泛起泪水。Wang 女士完全能够理解，在自身心碎的情况下，她的姻亲无法继续对他撒谎说她很快就会回家。此外，她的姻亲不赞成她的政治立场并希望切断所有联系。最终，Wang 女士确实失去了与儿子、丈夫和姻亲的所有联系。据她了解，她的丈夫被迫与她离婚。随着时间的推移，她的弟弟受到了如此多的骚扰，以至于连她与他的联系也不得不大幅削减。自去年某个时候以来，她根本没有与她的弟弟说过话。\n\n这对于一个女人来说是难以承受之重，Wang 女士在情感上留下了创伤。如前所述，政府没有且尚未指出任何证据证明 Wang 女士从起诉书中所指控的任何计划中个人获利。（参见 ECF No. 19 整体）。如下文所讨论的，她甚至没有利用政府声称属于她的所谓的加密货币分配。Wang 女士没有为了三十块银币放弃她的儿子和生平挚爱。8 这对政府来说是很难理解的；她是出于原则而做她所做的事情。她的选择并非职业晋升手段。\n\n3. Wang 女士在知晓刑事指控可能到来的情况下并未潜逃。\n\n表明 Wang 女士不存在严重潜逃风险的另一个有力迹象是，她在去年 9 月和 10 月获悉政府从与 Kwok 先生相关的各个实体扣押了数亿美元资产后并未潜逃。（同上，¶ 55.a-ii）。在 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）针对 GTV 的案件解决后，她也并未潜逃。（参见 In re GTV）。当她获悉政府正在向与 Kwok 先生相关的各家公司送达大陪审团传票时，她并未潜逃。当她获悉 Kwok 先生是大陪审团调查的目标且该调查最终导致了本案的指控时，她同样没有潜逃。这些不是她可以忽视的耳语，这是针对她而来的铁骑奔腾般的雷霆之声。然而，她并未潜逃。不仅如此，当她认为自己在去年年底需要前往伦敦和英属维尔京群岛出差时，她通过申请休假准许以保留其庇护申请的方式通知了政府。而当那次旅行未能成行时，她在今年年初寻求旅行许可时再次通知了政府。换言之，这与她维持其美国庇护申请的意愿相符，而与潜逃意图不符，她寻求了美国政府的旅行许可，并且当她的第一个旅行计划落空时，她再次提出了申请。9 这些绝非有意潜逃之人的行为。参见例如 Hanson 案，613 F. Supp. 2d at 90（“在本案中……没有强有力的间接证据表明 Hanson 夫人有意逃离美国。”）。\n\n4. Wang 女士不存在潜逃风险，因为她无处可去，且即使在纽约她也受到中国政府的监视。\n\n作为一名杰出的异见人士，Wang 女士在中国海外华人社区中非常容易被认出。她无法逃跑并藏匿在美国的其他中国移民之中。她也无法在美国的华人社区中藏身，因为她操着一口独特的口音，在任何其他群体中都会非常显眼。政府通过暗示其亲民主运动的其他成员可以隐匿她并帮助她逃跑来予以反驳。这纯属推测，并且该推测假定了该运动的这些成员——其中许多人自己也在美国寻求庇护——会愿意通过窝藏逃犯来违反美国法律。再次强调，仅凭推测，政府无法承担证明存在潜逃风险的举证责任。参见例如 Ling 案，2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101132, at *14。\n\n无论如何，虽然暗示其他亲民主异见人士会在 Wang 女士潜逃时提供协助完全是猜测，但毫无疑问的是，居住在美国的中国间谍会非常乐意获得寻找并举报她的机会。具体而言，2023 年 4 月 17 日，Department of Justice（美国司法部）国家安全司和 United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York（纽约东区联邦检察官办公室，简称“EDNY”）宣布对总计三十四名中国公民提起两起刑事控告，这些人是 PRC（中华人民共和国）国家警察——Ministry of Public Security（公安部，简称“MPS”）的官员——罪名是迫害居住在纽约大都市区及美国其他地方的中国公民。10 根据在该案中提交的两份控告书，这些中国政府官员执行了针对在美国从事反中共活动（如在中华人民共和国倡导民主）的美国居民的镇压计划。（参见 United States v. Bai Yunpeng et al.，案号 23-mj-334-sjb，ECF No. 2；United States v. Lu Jianwang et al.，案号 23-mj-265-jrc，ECF No. 4）。除其他事项外，作为其骚扰计划的一部分，这些中国特工企图煽动美国当局起诉其受害者，诋毁其受害者的声誉，并设法将其受害者遣返回中国接受惩罚。控告书中讨论的受害者之一 Victim-1（受害者-1），事实上就是 Miles Kwok（郭文贵），即 Wang 女士的同案被告及本案的主要被告。（Yunpeng 案，案号 23 mj-334-sjb，ECF No. 2）。尽管 Wang 女士本人未在控告书中被提及，但受害者名单并非穷尽性的。她本身就是一名杰出的异见人士，她与 Kwok 先生关系密切，并且她也同样遭受了中国当局类似的骚扰和虐待。事实上，她有一份保护令可以证明这一点。（参见 Lipman Decl.，证物 A，11 另见证物 B–D）。\n\n这些逮捕和指控所强调和证明的是，从政府的角度来看，Wang 女士不存在潜逃风险的原因之一——完全独立于且有别于无处可去……\n\n5 在其父亲去世三个月后，Wang 女士本人被诊断出患有胃癌。她切除了癌变组织，目前处于缓解期。\n\n6 即使在她的父亲于 2017 年生病时，Wang 女士也无法返回中国在他临终时提供照顾或参加他的葬礼。\n\n7 该护照现已过期，并由政府扣押。\n\n8 这也是为什么她绝不会危及同为该运动成员的共同签署人。她已将自己的生命奉献给他们以及他们共同的事业。\n\n9 从英国或英国领地被引渡到中国的风险与从美国被引渡的风险大致相同，这就是为什么 Wang 女士觉得前往那些地方是安全的。当然，从上述任何一个地方她都将被引渡到美国。\n\n10 新闻通稿，纽约东区联邦检察官办公室，《34 名中华人民共和国国家警察官员被控针对美国居民实施跨国镇压计划》（2023 年 4 月 17 日），http officers-peoples-republic-china-national-police-charged-perpetrating-transnational。\n\n11 本诉状中提及的所有证物均附于为支持本动议而提交的 Alex Lipman 声明之后。\n\n潜逃意图——在于CCP（中国共产党）正在追捕她，如果无法将她遣返回中国（这无疑是他们的首选），他们最希望看到的就是她继续被拘留和起诉。换句话说，中国政府特工利用尖端的电子手段，追踪、尾随并报告其在美的意识形态敌人，例如Ms. Wang（王女士）。这些特工远胜于电子监控设备，也比私人安保更可靠；正如王女士深知的那样，他们会确保在全美范围内找到她，并确保在世界上任何其他地方都能找到她。12\n\n自抵达纽约以来，王女士不得不忍受中国当局在当地的骚扰。彼时，Mr. Kwok（郭文贵先生）已将其反共活动公开化。她的手机和笔记本电脑屡次遭到黑客攻击。她在深夜反复接到来自中国大陆和香港号码的骚扰电话，整夜持续不断。她的手机会自行开机和关机。她收到了带有咒骂和威胁性语言的垃圾短信。她多次在没有任何明显原因的情况下失去对其电子邮件的访问权限。她甚至开始在一个新的邮箱账户中收到来自她此前已无法访问的账户发来的邮件。在互联网、Twitter以及YouTube上出现了诋毁她并诬称她与郭先生有染的帖子。她看到自己儿子的照片被发布在网上，还有一张附有她的照片和身份证件的虚假「寻走失妻子」启事，声称是由其丈夫发布的。她最终得知，几乎她所有的\n\n12 如果说中国政府协助美国政府执行其保释条件这一讽刺意味还不够辛辣的话，那么在针对他们的指控被公布时，除两名中国间谍特工外，其余所有人似乎都在美国境外（因为用大白话讲，他们就是不那么光彩的007式的特工）。而不在美国境外的两人均被逮捕并获得保释。（参见United States v. Jianwang Lu，案号 23-mj-265-jrc，ECF No. 9；United States v. Jinping Chen，案号 23-mj-265-jrc，ECF No. 12）。换言之，在美国境内活动的中国间谍拥有潜逃回母国的一切动机——且可以预见会得到其政府的协助潜逃——却基于认定存在足以确保其出庭的释放条件而获准保释。另一方面，作为他们的受害者之一，一名完全可以预见会被他们追踪（甚至在等待审判期间）以确保其遵守自身保释条件的女性，却以潜逃风险过高为由被拒绝保释。\n\n家人、朋友和熟人都收到了虚假的音频和信息，据称披露了她涉嫌与郭先生有不正当关系的传闻。\n\n最为关键的是，鉴于上文讨论的EDNY（纽约东区联邦检察官办公室）的指控，王女士不得不针对四名人员申请限制令，这些人对她进行尾随跟踪、对质和骚扰，发出死亡威胁和人身伤害威胁，并通过网络发帖煽动他人对她实施伤害。13 正如保护令（证物A）中所述，其中一人因不顾限制令继续对她进行骚扰而需要受到进一步约束。\n\n5. 王女士与美国具有充分的联系。\n\n治安法官法院在裁定不利于王女士获得保释时似乎极为看重的一个因素是，除同样身为由其协助领导的反共运动成员的华人之外，她似乎没有亲密的朋友。她因未扎下足够的根基而受到批评。政府无疑提出了这一论点。（参见 ECF No. 33 第46:12–18行）。任何倾向于批评一个来美不足七年的移民除了与其处境相似的其他移民小圈子之外没有其他朋友的人，都是对何为移民以及带有浓重口音说话意味着什么一无所知。即使对于旅行经验最丰富的人来说，在异国他乡处理社交场合也是令人生畏的。成年或青少年时期来到美国的移民深知不懂当地习俗所固有的困难，既害怕冒犯他人又容易受到冒犯，还会遭到严厉的嘲笑和辱骂。受过最高教育的移民也深知因自己的口音而被当作白痴对待是什么感受。在这些情况下结交朋友绝非易事。这需要耗费数十年的时间，而且往往根本无法成功，这就是为什么纽约皇后区可能是地球上最具国际化色彩的地方，但是\n\n13 参与骚扰王女士的人员似乎不在被EDNY逮捕的人员名单之列。见上文注释10。\n\n其居民在该区内部在很大程度上按其原籍国聚居。但就王女士而言情况还不止于此：她在美时间大约有两年半是在COVID-19（新冠疫情）期间度过的（她于2017年来美）。因此，在她身处该国近一半的时间里，她因疫情而与大多数人隔绝，并且她来自中国——「中国病毒」的策源地。\n\n此外，王女士是一名难民和异见人士；她来这里并非为了寻求庇护以在美过上更好的生活。她是一位梦想解放自己的国家并与儿子和丈夫团聚的中国爱国者。她来到这里是为了努力工作以实现这一目标。这就是为什么她住在距离办公室步行几步之遥、面积仅740平方英尺且没有家具的公寓里。她来到这里并非为了「寻求」庇护；她来到这里是因为她「需要」庇护。王女士不想失去她的庇护申请。14 她不能被遣送回中国或香港，否则她将因其反共活动而被逮捕并很可能被杀害。如果她潜逃到国外，她只能去一个不向美国或中国引渡的国家，并且必须设法在那里藏匿，尽管她有口音且具有华裔血统。很可能根本不存在这样的国家，而且政府也没有指出任何一个这样的国家。综上所述，政府声称其朋友大多是其异见人士同伴是表明她具有潜逃风险的迹象之一，这简直是极具冒犯性的。\n\n最后，王女士在曼哈顿狭小的公寓里度过了整个疫情期。即使在员工被要求居家工作时，她仍继续前往办公室。几乎每天，她和其他几个人都会组织、包装并向纽约的警察\n\n14 即使她被定罪，由于美国加入了《反酷刑公约》，她在服刑完毕后也很可能不会被驱逐出境。《联合国禁止酷刑和其他残忍、不人道或有辱人格的待遇或处罚公约》，1984年12月10日通过，条约文件编号 No. 100–200，1465 U.N.T.S. 85。《反酷刑公约》依据 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 实施。\n\n分局、医院和老年人运送个人防护装备。纽约现在是王女士唯一的家。她确实无处可去。\n\nC. 治安法官Lehrburger（勒伯格）错误地认定王女士的财务资力和国际社会关系构成了拒绝保释的充分依据\n\nLehrburger法官认定王女士存在潜逃风险，原因在于：(1) 鉴于其全球关系网络，她可以潜逃至中国以外的国家；以及 (2) 她拥有可供其支配的巨额财务资力。（ECF No. 56 第18–19页）。然而，仅仅拥有全球关系或潜逃资力并不是拒绝保释的充分理由；如下文所述，本巡回区及其他巡回区的法院均承认，仅仅因为被告经济富裕且是一名可以潜逃至可能不予引渡的国家的外国公民这一事实，并不构成拒绝保释的充分依据。参见 Bodmer，2004 WL 169790，第*2页（驳回了政府关于瑞士籍被告具有强烈潜逃动机的主张，政府称瑞士政府不会引渡瑞士公民，法院认为该理由「单凭自身不能成为拒绝保释的依据，因为如果推向其逻辑结论，将没有任何瑞士公民有资格获得保释」）。无论如何，Lehrburger法官对这两项事实结论均存在误判。王女士无法前往任何其他地方，而且她也没有财务资力前往任何地方或在当地维持生计。\n\n1. 法院承认，仅仅因为被告经济富裕且是一名可以潜逃至可能不予引渡的国家的外国公民这一事实，并不构成拒绝保释的充分依据。\n\n被告仅为有资力的外国公民这一事实不足以拒绝保释。普遍参见 Hung v. United States，439 U.S. 1326 (1978)（Brennan法官）。在 Hung 案中，最高法院撤销了对一名越南公民的定罪后拘留命令，并准许其在上诉期间获得释放。同上，第1329页。法院解释称，尽管被告「在该国尚未建立永久居所；并且，若申请人潜逃至越南，\n\n美国将没有任何途径促使其返回，……这些考量因素虽表明存在潜逃的机会，但几乎无法证实申请人有任何潜逃的倾向。」同上。同样，在 Hansen 案中，第六巡回上诉法院维持了地区法院对一名丹麦籍被告的审前释放决定，尽管政府无法从丹麦引渡。法院解释称，「保释法并不……要求仅仅因为无法通过引渡保证外国被告的返回就必须予以羁押。」108 F. App'x 第332页。\n\n在 United States v. Flotron 案中，District of Connecticut（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）的一名法官依据一套保释方案释放了一名瑞士公民，该被告当时正因被控电汇诈骗、商品诈骗及共谋实施上述罪行而等待审判，保释条件包括在其女友位于District of New Jersey（新泽西区）的家中接受居家监禁、GPS监控以及由约300万美元资产担保的个人无担保保释金。参见 Order Setting Conditions of Release 第2页，United States v. Flotron，案号 1 7-cr-220 (D. Conn. Sept. 22, 2017)，ECF No. 10；Appearance Bond，Flotron，案号 1 7-cr-220，ECF No. 11。同样，在2015年，Southern District of New York（纽约南区联邦地区法院）的Vernon Broderick法官依据保释条件释放了中国籍亿万富翁商人Ng Lap Seng（吴立胜），条件包括在曼哈顿的一套公寓内接受居家监禁，以及由负责确保吴先生出庭并防止其逃离美国的24小时全天候私人武装安保看守。参见 Order，United States v. Seng，案号 l5-cr-706 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2015)，ECF No. 53。与瑞士一样，中国不向美国引渡其公民，然而吴先生仍被认定符合释放条件。在 United States v. Khashoggi 案中，纽约南区联邦地区法院的Keenan法官准许了一名面临邮件诈骗指控且「极其富有」的沙特阿拉伯籍被告保释，尽管当时并没有引渡条约存在。717 F. Supp. 1048, 1050–52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)。\n\n2. 王女士不具备潜逃的财务资力。\n\n另外，从事实层面来看，王女士不具备前往任何地方或在当地生活的资力。王女士已同意要么使用其银行账户担保其保释，要么对其账户进行限制，使其在未经审前服务处（PTS）事先许可的情况下无法提取任何款项。她已抵押其公寓以担保其保释金。她的现金已被扣押。她已别无所有。15\n\na) 与政府的说法和Lehrburger法官的怀疑相反，王女士不持有任何加密货币。\n\n政府主张 Wang（王）女士存在潜逃风险，其部分依据是声称王女士未能披露约 1350 万美元的加密货币，而她本可利用这些资金资助其潜逃。16（ECF No. 42 第 3 页）。政府声称，这就是企图潜逃的证据，并支持了王女士因不可信赖而不会遵守保释释放条件的论点。（同上）。这一论点或许正是让 Judge Lehrburger（莱尔伯格法官）在潜逃风险问题上最为担忧的论点，因为该论点提出了王女士拥有其他未披露资产的可能性。\n\n该论点存在三个问题：(i) 该论点基于传闻文件，而政府承认自己并不理解这些文件，且政府关于这些文件含义的断言纯属臆测（且在证据上并不充分）；(ii) 政府的\n\n15 再次声明，政府关于其他亲民主异见人士会作为逃犯支持她的主张完全属于推测，并假设这些异见人士愿意违反中国以外其他国家的法律来提供帮助。此外，潜逃等同于承认有罪。人们理应预料到，其他亲民主异见人士会拒绝帮助一个承认以该运动名义诈骗他们的人。最后，无论她最终逃往何处，中国政府都会竭尽全力追踪她，并且可以预见其会利用所掌握的极其复杂的电子手段来追踪人员。\n\n16 起诉书指控共同被告 Mr. Kwok（郭文贵先生）与 Mr. William Je（余建明先生）实施了与发行一种数字货币相关的欺诈计划：喜马拉雅币（Himalaya Coin，简称“HCN”），该货币可兑换为喜马拉雅美元（Himalaya Dollars，简称“HDO”），并在喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）进行交易。（参见 ECF No. 19 第 22 段）。\n\n臆测是错误的，因为自莱尔伯格法官作出裁决以来，王女士的辩护律师已能够确认，她无法将任何分配的喜马拉雅币（“HCN”）兑换为喜马拉雅美元（“HDO”）；以及 (iii) 无论如何，即使她确实拥有 HDO，她也无法使用其 HDO 来资助其潜逃。\n\n为支持其关于王女士未能披露大额加密资产的论点，政府依赖了在其公寓搜查中发现的两份文件。其中一份是政府称之为“以 0.1 美元分配 HCN”的明细表。（证物 E）。该文件似乎显示向王女士分配了 6,999,800 枚 HCN。该文件属于传闻证据，且政府未提供任何知情人士的证词来解释其含义或实质要义。同样，政府在没有任何支持性证据或知情人士证词的情况下声称，另一份文件即证物 F 显示“铸造”了一定数量的 HCN，且反映了 HCN 向各个人员和实体的分配，包括向“Yvette”的分配。（ECF No. 42 第 2 页）。依赖于这两份未经解释的传闻文件，政府做出了以下证据和逻辑上的跳跃：即王女士收到了 6,999,800 枚 HCN 的分配，她通过支付总计 699,980 美元以每枚 HCN 0.1 的价格将其 6,999,800 枚 HCN 兑换为 HDO（共计 699,980 枚 HDO），她目前持有的 HDO 现价值约 1350 万美元，并且她未能披露这些持有资产以便用于资助其潜逃。（同上，第 2–3 页）。这些证据上的跳跃在事实和逻辑上均存在缺陷。\n\n证物 F 表面上没有任何内容能证实其创建日期，也无法证实其反映的是预期的分配还是已经发生的分配。17 同样\n\n17 证物 F 还包含未经翻译的中文文字，以及对某些数字的手写划除，包括与名字“Yvette”对应的数字，且没有任何关于为何划除这些数字的解释。\n\n也没有任何迹象表明证物 F 反映的是已兑换为 HDO 的 HCN；它仅仅是一份以美元（“USD”）表示的已分配（或“已分发”）HCN 的明细表。事实上，证物 F 似乎设想以支付美元的形式来换取 HCN 的分配，以实现对“已分发”HCN 的获取；它似乎显示了所有此类预期付款的总金额。换句话说，正如政府心知肚明且不持异议的那样，HCN 的分配本应通过分配接收方付款来实现——这与被授予期权的员工购买期权基本相同。政府未提供任何证据——甚至连一项指控都没有——证明王女士曾亲自为据称分配或“分发”给她的 HCN 支付过 700,000 美元。政府将找不到任何此类证据。事实上，政府已经承认其无法证明王女士持有他们声称属于她的资产。（ECF No. 33 第 55:8–56:3 行）。18 政府所拥有的不过是两份传闻\n\n（ECF No. 33 第 55:8–56:3 行（后加强调））。\n\n18 审视政府的以下承认：\n\n法官阁下是正确的，辩方是正确的，政府无法证明王女士持有那笔钱，而且事实上，政府的指控是该资产并非加密货币，但我们并不是指控它毫无价值。我们指控的是某些人拥有它，而兑现最快的人基本上可以完成卷款跑路（exit scam）并带着钱脱身。我想指出，虽然我们同样无法访问王女士持有该笔款项的账户，但法官阁下正确地指出，价值约 700 万美元的加密货币资产是应当予以追踪的事项。该分配指明了 Yanping Wang（王雁平），然后上面有分配额，就在她的名下。\n\n换言之，政府声称王女士撒了谎，但它同时也承认自己不知道事实真相为何。另请注意，对于政府提出的“卷款跑路”设想而言，现在为时已晚。如下文所述，喜马拉雅交易所因政府扣押其银行账户而被剥夺了储备金，并对兑回设定了限制。此外，在同一段落中，政府先是声称这些资产不是加密货币，随后又因王女士未将其作为加密货币申报而对她进行责难。\n\n文件，这些文件表面上根本不明确，未注明日期，包含未经翻译的中文文字，且没有任何背景或解释。（参见证物 E–F）。\n\n看来莱尔伯格法官认为王女士不记得分配给她的 HCN 的后续情况是不合情理的。王女士的辩护律师并未否认似乎曾存在向王女士分配 HCN 的意图。但辩护律师说明，她无法记起发生了什么，并且她现在并不拥有 HDO。（ECF No. 33 第 24:2–5 行）。莱尔伯格法官似乎认为，鉴于涉及的金额，人们理应记得发生了什么。但这只有在王女士成功行使其 HCN 并将其兑换为 HDO 的情况下才成立，这意味着人们可以预期她会记得支付近 700,000 美元以获取目前据称价值 1350 万美元的约 700,000 枚 HDO。但她清楚自己并没有那样做；她知道自己不会有 700,000 美元的资金投入到加密货币中。换句话说，她知道自己没有做为了为自己锁定这些资产而需要做的事情，但她无法回忆起当她没有这样做时发生了什么。在这里，她再次被要求去证明一件不存在的事情。\n\n由于王女士必须付款才能将任何分配的 HCN 兑换为 HDO，自莱尔伯格法官作出裁决以来，辩护律师已找到并审查了王女士的相关银行对账单，以核实她是否曾进行过任何看起来与喜马拉雅交易所有关的付款（无论金额大小）。辩护律师已找到证据，证明在 2021 年 9 月 27 日有一笔金额为 42,300 美元电汇至“Himalaya Internati”。（参见证物 G）。同等金额的 42,300 美元于 2021 年 10 月 7 日被退回到王女士在同一家银行的账户。（同上）。此处不存在其他相关的转账或电汇。根据唤起的记忆，辩护律师理解，这些电汇代表了将分配给王女士的某些 HCN 进行兑换的唯一一次尝试，但该兑换并未成功，且她从未\n\n再次尝试这样做。这就是为什么她无法确切记起发生了什么；她以为可能发生过某些事情，但她不能确定具体是什么。她也不想做出虚假的陈述。\n\n然而，政府关于 HCN 的主张也极具误导性：与政府的主张相反，人们无法将持有的 HCN 兑换为现金，除非是完全不足以资助潜逃的极小额度。政府对此心知肚明。在向莱尔伯格法官提交的文件中，政府给据称分配给王女士的 700,000 枚 HCN 赋予了一个纯理论性的价值。政府正确地断言“在 2023 年 4 月 12 日，HCN 的交易价格据称为 19.34 HDO……”。（ECF No. 42 第 2 页）。这意味着喜马拉雅交易所列出的 HCN 价值代表了竞买人愿意以 HDO 支付的价格，而不是以美元或任何其他法定货币支付的价格。政府在这一真实的断言之后玩弄了花招，紧接着声称“换言之，1 枚 HCN 约等于 19.34 美元”。（同上）。如果 1 HDO 确实能兑换为 1 美元，那将是事实，但正如政府心知肚明的那样，它不能兑换。事实上，根据政府和 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）的说法，试图将其 HDO 兑换为美元的投资者均未能成功，且涉及喜马拉雅交易所的欺诈指控（无论在起诉书中还是在 SEC 起诉状中）均包含以下指控：与政府的陈述相反，HDO 无法兑换为美元，且不能用于购买商品和服务。（参见 ECF No. 19；SEC 起诉状，案号 No. 23-CV-02200，2023 年 3 月 15 日，ECF No. 1 第 128 段）。\n\n无论如何，HDO 目前无法兑换为美元的一个原因在于，政府从喜马拉雅交易所扣押了大部分（若非全部）现金，而这些现金本应是喜马拉雅交易所可用于允许 HDO 持有人将 HDO 兑回为美元的储备金。（参见 ECF No. 19 第 25(b) 段（“在扣押之后，喜马拉雅交易所网站继续声明\n\nHDO 由‘由美元及现金等价物资产组成的储备金’支持，而事实上并非如此。”））。而且，正如政府同样知晓的那样，喜马拉雅交易所已通知其客户，除以 5,000 美元为增量且每月仅限一次外，无法将 HDO 兑回为美元。（参见证物 H）。总而言之，即使王女士目前持有 700,000 枚 HCN，与政府的陈述相反，她也无法以此资助其潜逃，且在现实世界中，该资产的价值根本不像政府虚假声称的价值 13,537,613.20 美元。（参见 ECF No. 42 第 2–3 页）。\n\nb) 与政府的暗示和莱尔伯格法官的怀疑相反，王女士并未就其公寓保险箱中发现的现金对 PTS（审前服务处）说谎。\n\n为了进一步将Wang女士（王女士）描绘成一个因涉嫌对其资产撒谎而具有严重潜逃风险的人，政府向Lehrburger法官（勒伯格法官）提交了一份看似是在王女士被捕当天进行的审前访谈记录。但这不是一份真正的记录——因为根本不存在这样的记录。政府当时不在场，也没有官方记录（无论是视频、音频还是速记记录）。事实上，正如辩护律师在勒伯格法官作出决定后才知晓的那样，PTS（Pretrial Services，审前服务处）没有保存任何形式的笔记。（见附件 J–K）。更糟糕的是，相关PTS官员没有使用任何问话脚本或问题清单，当时同样在场的PTS实习生也没有。（附件 J）。根据这份所谓的记录，王女士对以下问题回答了“否”：(1) “在您被捕时、在您的住所内或您本人身上，您名下是否有任何现金？”；以及 (2) “是否有任何在您名下或由您监管的公司账户，或者在其他任何地方有任何额外现金？”（附件 I）。据政府称，这份所谓的记录表明，王女士向PTS隐瞒了其公寓内藏有 138,000 美元现金的事实。\n\n政府与王女士辩护律师之间的互动提供了其他理由来怀疑该所谓记录的准确性，包括所谓的问话脚本直到将近一个月后才被记录成书面形式。根据政府于 2023年4月25日 发给辩护律师的电子邮件（且辩护律师和勒伯格法官此前均不知情），政府在 4月10日 以及 4月11日 再次询问了PTS官员，这距离王女士于 3月15日 接受PTS访谈已过去了近三十天。（附件 L）。虽然政府向辩护律师描述其所谓的记录是“……在……致电[审前官员以核实当时说了什么]时同步制作的笔记（即分别在 4/10 和 4/11 制作）”，但它实际上包含在一封日期为 4月11日 下午 5:42 由AUSA（Assistant United States Attorney，助理联邦检察官）Juliana Murray 发给其本人的电子邮件中。（附件 I）。这有力地表明，与政府的断言相反，“同步笔记”中的相关部分——即声称反映王女士与PTS官员之间对话记录的部分——并不是同步（在 4月10日）记录的，而是在一天之后（4月11日）政府与PTS官员进行后续通话后才写下的。（请注意，虽然政府提供了其与FBI（Federal Bureau of Investigation，联邦调查局）探员进行各项询问的手写笔记，但唯一一份声称是同步制作却非手写的笔记，仅包含在Murray助理检察官发给她自己的 4月11日 电子邮件中）。\n\n此外，该所谓记录包含以下两段耐人寻味的对话：\n\n问：“您的名下或您的公司名下是否有任何储蓄或支票账户？” 答：披露了两个账户。最初声称是JPMC账户，律师称是MSSB账户。律师提供了预估余额，审前服务处向YW确认属实。\n\n问：具体银行/机构。 答：已提供。\n\n（同前引）。这些所谓的对话耐人寻味，因为引述的回答根本不可能是当事人的原话；它们只是对据称发生的事情的描述。换句话说，政府将其伪装成一份笔录，以使其看起来像是在相关谈话大约三十天后，PTS官员在没有任何笔记帮助的情况下，对她说了什么以及王女士说了什么有着清晰且逐字逐句的记忆——但充其量这不过是PTS官员认为当时发生情况的摘要。在最坏的情况下，这只是Murray助理检察官对PTS官员前一天向她陈述的实质内容的回忆。\n\n另一方面，王女士的辩护律师当时确实在场参加了访谈，并做了同步笔记。（见附件 M–N）。两位辩护律师都不记得政府声称被问及的那些确切的相关问题：(1) “在您被捕时、在您的住所内或您本人身上，您名下是否有任何现金？”；或 (2) “是否有任何在您名下或由您监管的公司账户，或者在其他任何地方有任何额外现金？” 事实上，辩护律师根本不记得有任何关于王女士住所内现金的问题，也不记得有关于其他任何地方额外现金的问题。相反，辩护律师的笔记——两份笔记均是同步、同时且在互不知情的情况下记录的——与另一个相关的实质性问题相吻合，即：“在您被捕时，您身上有现金吗？” 一位律师的笔记中包含以下内容：“被捕时身上无现金。”（附件 N）。第二位律师的笔记注明：“本人身上无现金。”（附件 M）。这就是辩护律师所记得的内容，且他们的回忆与他们的笔记是一致的。而且，即便政府对所提问题的说法是正确的，从辩护律师的笔记——再次强调，这是现存唯一的同步笔记——中也可以清楚看出，王女士的回答仅限于说明她在被捕时身上没有现金。简而言之，政府所制作的材料更像是对该访谈的一次戏剧性重新构想，应当据此对其进行衡量。19\n\n19 提交这份所谓的记录时，还忽略了王女士的访谈是在翻译人员的协助下进行的这一事实，这意味着政府所呈现的向王女士提出的确切问题，并不一定就是她实际被问到的问题。正如任何面对过这一问题的人所知，语言翻译往往是不精确的，在普通话翻译中尤其如此。辩护律师在勒伯格法官作出裁决后联系了翻译人员，翻译人员表示他没有任何笔记，也不记得当时说了什么。\n\n无论如何，毫无疑问，基于（至少）律师的同步笔记以及PTS访谈与制作所谓“记录”之间相隔三十天的事实，对于该访谈中所述内容存在严重争议，且各方的回忆并不一致。这是政府无法以优势证据证明事实存在的又一例证。不能基于这份所谓的访谈记录判定王女士具有潜逃风险，更不用说判定其具有严重潜逃风险了。\n\n最后，在王女士公寓中发现的现金并没有藏在地板下或冰箱里。它在保险箱里——与护照以及通常存放在保险箱中的其他物品放在一起——政府探员毫无困难地找到了保险箱并获取了其中的物品。王女士看到了探员开始搜查她的公寓。认为她会谎报存放在家中保险箱里的现金，寄希望于九名FBI探员的搜查不会发现她的保险箱，这种想法完全没有道理，特别是考虑到如下文所述，她清楚地了解FBI搜查的彻底程度。同样，保险箱在壁橱里，与她存放在那里的所有其他物品放在一起（如下文所述，王女士的所有物品都塞进了她的壁橱里）。认为她会寄希望于FBI在翻遍唯一值得搜查的地方（即她的壁橱）时漏掉她的保险箱，这根本是难以置信的。\n\n为了支持其关于王女士具有潜逃风险的主张，政府强调对她公寓进行搜查的FBI探员在她壁橱里的包或手提箱中发现了文件和电子设备。但是，任何认为这些物品被隐匿在壁橱中的说法，都完全被王女士公寓的描述和现状所推翻。王女士住在一套面积为 740 平方英尺、简朴的一居室公寓中。她没有书桌、衣柜、任何书架或任何可以存放文件或电子设备的其他家具。附件 O 是政府绘制的王女士公寓平面图，显示其客厅家具包括一张沙发、一个豆袋椅、一个脚凳、一个凳子、一面穿衣镜、一个没有抽屉的边桌和一张长凳。没有任何可以存放电子设备、文件或任何其他物品的家具。同样，她的卧室家具包括一张没有任何抽屉的床、一个没有任何抽屉的边桌（桌腿之间的地板上放着一台打印机），以及一组用于放置部分个人物品和贴身衣物的五个窄抽屉。因为她无法将物品存放在其他任何地方，王女士所有的物品，无论新旧，都塞进了她的壁橱里。（见附件 P）。这就是为什么旧手机被放在壁橱的包里，文件在手提箱中被发现，而一台旧笔记本电脑与她的衣物放在同一个架子上。它们并没有被隐匿；鉴于空间的限制，它们只是尽可能紧凑和小心地被存放着。\n\n此外，王女士熟悉当一个人的住所遭到搜查时会发生什么。例如，在 2019年，王女士目睹了FBI搜查Kwok先生（郭文贵先生）的办公室和住所。在那次搜查中，有二十多名或更多的探员参与了搜查。她知道FBI探员有多彻底；搜查持续了大约十二个小时，而且她明白他们搜查了现场的每一个房间、每一个抽屉、每一个壁橱以及每一个保险箱。关于王女士将旧手机和文件藏在壁橱中以避免在搜查过程中被发现的说法，根本不可信。出于同样的原因，认为她可能以为搜查她公寓的探员不会找到她的保险箱或不会查看内部（从而发现她的现金）的想法同样不可信。她非常清楚FBI的搜查有多彻底和详尽。除了所有这些认知之外，由于她在中国经历过搜查，她对执法搜查通常也是熟悉的。\n\nD. 政府未能承担证明没有任何保释条件组合能够确保被告出庭的举证责任\n\nLehrburger治安法官错误地未能考虑羁押之外合理的、限制较少的替代方案。从本质上讲，法官为其得出不存在能够确保王女士出庭的保释条件的结论提供了两个理由：“第一，Wang（王）未能确定具有道德感召力且在经济上负责任的人士，这一事实本身即构成了自Parker法官（帕克法官）设定保释条件以来的重大情势变更。”（ECF No. 56 第 20 页）。“第二，Wang在充分披露其资产方面不够坦诚。”（同前引）。即便假定这些结论是正确的（如上所述，它们并不正确），羁押命令也没有说明甚至没有考虑什么样的保释条件可以应对这些具体情况；该命令只是以结论性的措辞表明，在本案中不存在充分的保释条件。\n\n但《Bail Reform Act（保释改革法）》要求得更多：它要求政府提供证据，并由法院以优势证据认定不存在此类保释条件。见 Sabhnani 案，493 F.3d at 75。为了达到这一要求，法院必须考虑替代方案并解释为何这些替代方案不足以解决问题。在这方面具有权威性的是 Berrios-Berrios 案，在该案中，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）将案件发回重审以进行进一步程序，从而确定是否存在“在审前继续羁押[被告]的任何可行替代方案”，因为地区法院“未能记录在案地解释其在多大程度上考虑了监禁的任何替代方案，以及如果考虑了，是基于何种理由予以驳回的”。791 F.2d at 251。换句话说，除非法院具体考虑审前羁押的所有替代方案并评估为何这些替代方案中的每一项都无法防止（如本案中所指控的）潜逃风险，否则法院不能认定不存在可确保被告出庭的保释条件组合——正如政府根据《保释改革法》为获准进行审前羁押而承担举证责任证明的那样。\n\n正如在 Berrios-Berrios 案中所见，本案记录完全没有显示 Lehrburger（莱尔伯格）法官对羁押之外任何合理的、限制性较小的替代措施进行过任何考虑。此外，记录中也同样全无政府方提出任何替代措施的提议——恰恰相反。实际上，正如政府方在本案中就潜逃风险方面陈述的情况一样，政府方通过指出风险，随后作出结论性陈述称鉴于这些风险，没有任何条件能够充分确保其出庭，从而将举证责任转嫁给了 Wang（王）女士，由王女士去证明确实存在充分的条件。20\n\n1. 法院必须考虑羁押之外所有合理的、限制性较小的替代措施。\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) 强调，司法官员在采取审前羁押手段之前，必须穷尽所有可行的选择。该条款规定，只有在没有任何其他措施能够合理确保被告人出庭以及社区中其他人的安全时，方可下令予以羁押。\n\n20 此外，违反联邦最高法院指导意见的是，政府方和 Lehrburger 法官均未遵循正当程序。这是错误的。参见 Salerno 案，481 U.S. at 752（维持《保释改革法》（Bail Reform Act）的程序性保护，并强调根据该法，只有在提供强有力的程序保障——包括“全面的对抗性听证会”、“事实认定”以及“羁押决定的理由陈述”——之后，方可发布羁押命令）。与这些程序保护相反，在就定于 2023 年 3 月 31 日在 Lehrburger 法官面前举行的听证会提前提交的信函中，政府方以完全自相矛盾的方式寻求羁押。尽管正是在这封信中，政府方指控王女士对其声称拥有的加密资产不坦白并向审前服务处（Pretrial Services, PTS）撒谎，但政府方首先表示其要求的是更具限制性的条件——实际上承认了即使存在其指控的新情况，也存在一套充分的条件——却在信末直接要求还押还监。（ECF No. 22）。此后，正如 Lehrburger 法官在其裁决中所指出的，在 2023 年 4 月 4 日的后续听证会上，政府方转而唯一主张羁押。（ECF No. 56）。随之产生若干问题：(1) 政府方从未正式提出过举行还押听证会的动议，Lehrburger 法官也未按 18 U.S.C. § 3142 的要求行事（“司法官员应举行听证会，以确定是否有任何条件或条件组合……能够合理确保该人按要求出庭以及任何其他人及社区的安全。”）；(2) 正因如此，政府方未能履行证明潜逃风险已严重到甚至有理由举行羁押听证会的举证责任；(3) 政府方未被要求承担证明羁押系适当的应有举证责任；(4) 由于该动议未被正当提出，王女士及其辩护律师被剥夺了为羁押听证会作充分准备的机会；他们原预期的是就现已实施的具体保释条件以及该等条件是否已获满足，或者备选地，该等条件是否可作调整以适应王女士的具体情况而举行听证会；以及 (5) 从实体上看，一个人不能既声称存在足以支持保释释放的充分条件，又同时声称不存在该等条件。\n\n因此，司法官员在采取审前羁押手段之前，必须穷尽所有合理的、限制性较小的替代措施。参见 Berrios-Berrios 案，791 F.2d at 251。换言之，审前羁押应谨慎使用，且仅在为保护社区和确保被告人出庭而确有必要时方可使用。参见 United States v. Infelise 案，934 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1991)（因初审法院未能考虑被告人提议的电子监控脚镯是否为羁押的合理替代措施而发回重审）。\n\n2. 居家羁押条件是为确保王女士出庭所允许的限度。\n\n因为“自由利益”是“根本性的”，所以“实质性正当程序的一般规则是，政府不得在刑事审判作出有罪判决之前拘留任何人。”Salerno 案，481 U.S. at 750。原因在于，对被告人的审前羁押与第八修正案（Eighth Amendment）及无罪推定均存在冲突。参见 United States v. Speed Joyeros, S.A. 案，204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)（“宪法在保障不应要求过重保释金的同时，确立了除非必要否则不应在审前羁押被告人的默认规则。这是因为定罪前享有自由的权利是基本权利。同样，获得保释释放的权利与被指控人的无罪推定密不可分。”）；Moreland v. United States 案，968 F.2d 655, 660 n.9 (8th Cir. 1992)（“必须指出的是，在确定释放条件时，司法官员必须保持对判决前被告人的无罪推定。”）（引用 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j)）。事实上，在不存在对社区的危险或明确潜逃意图的情况下，仅仅基于潜逃风险而实施审前羁押，在宪法上可能是站不住脚的。参见 United States v. Briggs 案，697 F.3d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2012)（“审前羁押仅在其目的为监管性而非惩罚性时，方符合正当程序。……允许的监管目的包括‘防止对社区造成危险’……以及‘确保[被告人]在审判时出庭’。”）（引用省略）。\n\n正如联邦最高法院在 Bell v. Wolfish 案中在审前被羁押人对监狱条件提出质疑的语境下所述：\n\n请愿人主张、且相对人承认，“审前拘禁的基本目标是确保被羁押人在审判时出庭。”……虽然这一利益无疑证明了最初决定以某种方式拘禁个人的正当性，但我们不接受相对人的论点，即政府确保被羁押人在审判时出庭的利益是在合法作出拘禁个人的决定后唯一可以证明施加限制和条件具有正当性的目标。“如果政府只能在确保被羁押人审判时出庭所必需的限度内拘禁被羁押人或以其他方式侵犯其自由，那么软禁最终将成为宪法上唯一具有正当性的羁押形式。”\n\n441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)（黑体强调为后加）（引用 Campbell v. McGruder 案，580 F.2d 521, 529 (1978)）。换言之，一旦被告人被合法还押，政府维持监狱的利益即可使被羁押人受到与其他囚犯相同的条件待遇。否则，如果政府唯一的利益只是普通的潜逃风险，那么审前羁押的宪法限度可能就是居家监禁。换个方式说，在不存在诸如被证实的潜逃意图等极端情况的前提下，被告人必须予以释放，或者在潜逃风险确有理由要求的情况下，最多予以居家监禁。如上所述，对审前羁押宪法限度的这种理解符合 18 U.S.C. § 3142 的要求及其立法历史。值得注意的是，最高法院引述的是哥伦比亚特区联邦巡回上诉法院在 Campbell 案中的意见。在那里，同样是在对监狱条件提出质疑的语境下，哥伦比亚特区巡回法院依托第七巡回上诉法院在 Duran v. Elrod 案，542 F.2d 998, 999–1000 (7th Cir. 1976) 中的意见，在确立了作为正当程序的要求、审前被羁押人所受限制不得超过为确保其在审判时出庭所合理必需的程度之后，作出了如下阐述：\n\n如果政府只能在确保被羁押人审判时出庭所必需的限度内拘禁被羁押人或以其他方式侵犯其自由，那么软禁最终将成为宪法上唯一具有正当性的羁押形式。由于这将使审前羁押几乎成为不可能，并从而挫败政府保护社区安全的利益，我们必须承认政府以行政上可行的方式管理审前羁押机构的能力是该利益的一个方面。……该项事务中涉及的无数繁琐细节——菜单的选择、牢房的分配、文体活动及其他事项的时间安排——获得了独立于拘禁主要正当理由的自身意义。\n\n580 F.2d at 529（强调为后加）（内部引用省略）。换言之，最高法院为了这一论理所引述和依赖的判例，对审前羁押限度采取了更为严格狭义的观点，将其与社区安全联系在一起。\n\n在本案中，王女士提议的身体限制是“非同寻常的”，借用 Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）在 Sabhnani 案中用来描述与王女士在此提议的条件实质上相同的居家监禁条件的用语。493 F.3d at 77。事实上，Sabhnani 案在此具有指导意义，因为其案件事实与本案高度相似。在该案中，作为被告人的夫妇分别系印度和印度尼西亚公民，面临在其 Long Island（长岛）住所窝藏非法移民以及对这些实际上被视为家奴的非法移民强迫劳动的指控。同上，第 65 页。被告人还拥有数百万美元的资产。同上。政府方以被告人存在潜逃风险为由寻求审前羁押。据政府方称，羁押是必要的，因为 (a) “证明[被告人]有罪的证据确凿有力”；(b) 他们“面临严重的监禁刑期”，长达四十年监禁；(c) 他们的“巨额财政资源”提供了“潜逃的手段和机会”；(d) 他们与“美国未与之签订引渡条约”的“众多外国有个人和专业联系”；最后 (e) 在接受审前服务处的初步访谈期间，他们虚报了其资产。同上，第 67、72 页。\n\n为了缓解政府方对潜在潜逃的担忧，被告人同意签署由其部分资产担保的个人无担保保释金，并同意对其人身自由施加严格限制。他们同意交出护照，并接受带有电子监控以及审前服务处不预先通知的走访的居家监禁。同上，第 77 页。尽管被告人同意了这些条件，地区法院仍下令将该等被告人羁押。同上，第 72 页。\n\n被告人随即向第二巡回上诉法院就羁押命令提出上诉，请求快速审理。同上，第 73 页。第二巡回上诉法院在由 Reena Raggi（丽娜·拉吉）法官执笔的一致意见中撤销了原裁定，指出了被告人所同意的“非同寻常的”身体限制。同上，第 77 页。第二巡回上诉法院重申了“有利于释放的法定推定”，并解释称“在本案中没有理由认为所提议的居家监禁条件不能合理缓解关于被告人潜逃风险的任何担忧”。同上，第 78 页。据此，第二巡回上诉法院将本案发回地区法院，并明确表达了其“预期……地区法院将作出适当的保释释放命令”。同上。（强调为后加）。\n\nE. 羁押妨碍了王女士参与自身辩护的能力\n\n政府已表明，鉴于证据开示（discovery）的数量庞大以及案情的复杂性，本案审理预计将在一年后进行。由此产生两个问题：首先，这意味着 Ms. Wang（王女士）甚至在开庭审理开始前就将被审前羁押超过一年。要求王女士在将本案推进至开庭审理所需的全部时间内始终处于监禁状态，根本无法与 Bail Reform Act（《保释改革法》）或任何公平标准相调和。United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1987)（为期七个月的审前羁押涉及“严重的正当程序关切”）。强迫其处于不定期限的监禁状态，等同于强迫王女士在被定罪前服刑。此外，在 MDC（大都会拘留中心）的羁押将剥夺其实质性参与自身辩护准备的能力，并将严重削弱其律师理解相关文件、进行必要事实调查以及准备开庭审理的能力。参见 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972)（“如果被告被关押，其收集证据、联系证人或以其他方式准备辩护的能力将受到阻碍。将这些后果强加给任何尚未被定罪的人都是严重的”）；United States v. Vitta, 653 F. Supp. 320, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1986)（“只要被羁押人处于监禁状态，其法律辩护的质量就可能大幅下降。提审与审判之间的间隙‘也许是诉讼程序中最关键的时期……此时磋商、深入调查和准备……至关重要……’”，引自 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)）。\n\n鉴于大量材料为 Mandarin（普通话）、将涉及文化细微差异，并需要对极大量的证据进行排序和确立优先次序，情况尤其如此。辩护律师已可证明，对王女士的羁押已严重使本次保释诉讼复杂化、拖延并阻碍了本次保释诉讼。\n\n结论\n\n基于前述理由，王女士应立即获释，并给予十个工作日以履行上述第 2–3 页所列的全部保释条件。\n\n日期：2023年6月5日\n\n日期：2023年6月5日 谨此提交，\n\n/s/ Alex Lipman\n\nPriya Chaudhry（普里亚·乔杜里）\nCHAUDHRYLAW PLLC（乔杜里律师事务所）\n147 W. 25th Street, 12th Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\n电话：(212) 785-5550\n电子邮箱：priya@chaudhrylaw.com\n\nAlex Lipman（亚历克斯·利普曼）\nLIPMAN LAW PLLC（利普曼律师事务所）\n147 W. 25th Street, 12th Floor\nNew York, New York 10001\n电话：(212) 401-0070\n电子邮箱：alexlipman@lipmanlawpllc.com\n\n被告 Yanping Wang（王雁平）的代理律师","key_entities":["Je","Himalaya","GTV","CCP","Kwok","Himalaya Exchange","CIPA","Yanping Wang","Murray","Guo","Torres","Saraca","Ho Wan Kwok","William Je","Farm Loan","Chinese Communist Party","MSS"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":2,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":3,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":4,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":8,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":9,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":10,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":11,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":12,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":19,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":22,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":33,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":39,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":42,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":53,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":56,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":15475,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-04-21 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-04-21","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:22:36"}