{"id":"court_sdny_822_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":822,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2026-03-21","title":"SDNY ECF 822","summary_zh":"被告量刑陈述书 — 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #822（2026年3月21日提交）。被告人及其代理律师通过长篇幅陈述书阐述其政治背景与中共针对，对检察机关的量刑指南损失额计算提出异议，并主张多项从轻酌情因素包括羁押条件和无支付能力。","summary_en":"Defendant's sentencing memorandum — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Guo Wengui / Miles Guo), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 ECF #822 (March 21, 2026). Defendant and counsel present extensive arguments addressing his political background and alleged targeting by the Chinese government, challenge the Government's loss amount calculations under the sentencing guidelines, and raise mitigating factors including conditions of pretrial confinement and lack of ability to pay.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n:\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n:\n:\nv.\n:\n23-CR-118 (AT)\n:\nMILES GUO,\n:\n:\nDefendant.\n:\n:\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\nSENTENCING MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED\nON BEHALF OF MILES GUO\nJohn F. Kaley, Esq.\nDoar Rieck Kaley & Mack\n217 Broadway, Suite 707\nNew York, NY 10007\nTel: 212-619-373\nJoshua L. Dratel\nLaw Offices of Dratel & Lewis\n29 Broadway, Suite 1412\nNew York, New York 10006\nTel: 212-732-0707\nMelinda Sarafa\nSARAFA ZELLAN PLLC\n43 West 43rd Street, Suite 370\nNew York, NY 10036\nTel: 212-785-7575\nAttorneys  for Defendant Miles Guo\n\n---\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nINTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 1\nI.\nMR. GUO’S PERSONAL BACKGROUND AND THE\nPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF THIS CASE ...................................................................................... 5\n\nA.\nMr. Guo’s Early Upbringing During the Cultural Revolution ........................................... 5\n\nB.\nThe Tiananmen Square Protests, Witnessing His Brother’s Death\nby Police Shooting, and Mr. Guo’s Political Imprisonment ............................................... 7\n\nC.\nMr. Guo Achieves Economic Prosperity, Forms Political Alliances,\nand Encounters Political Exposure .................................................................................... 8\n\nD.\nIncreasing Business Success and Friction with the Chinese Government ........................ 10\n\nE.\nMr. Guo Becomes a Prominent and Vocal Critic of the CCP from Abroad ..................... 13\n\nF.\nIntensification of CCP Targeting Following\nMr. Guo’s Relocation to the United States ....................................................................... 15\n\n1.\nINTERPOL Red Notice, Interference with VOA Interview,\nDirect Intimidation .............................................................................................. 16\n\n2.\nRecruitment of Influential U.S. Political and Business Figures\nto Lobby for Mr. Guo’s Repatriation to China .................................................... 17\n\n3.\nThe 912 Project – A Centrally Coordinated Operation\nto Discredit Mr. Guo Online ................................................................................ 20\n\n4.\nInterference with Mr. Guo’s Social Media Accounts ........................................... 23\n\n5.\nHacking Into Computer Systems of Mr. Guo’s Lawyers ...................................... 24\n\n6.\nWeaponizing the Civil Legal System with a False Rape Lawsuit ........................ 24\n\nG.\nThe CCP’s Targeting of Mr. Guo Converges with the Conduct in this Case ................... 25\n\nH.\nPolitical Conditions in the United States Set the Stage for a\nNew Administration to Turn Against Mr. Guo .................................................................. 32\n\nI.\nAffirmative Disavowal of Victim Status by Investors and Customers ............................... 34\n\nII.\nDETERMINING A SENTENCE THAT IS SUFFICIENT BUT NOT GREATER THAN\nNECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF SENTENCING .......................................... 38\n\nA.\nApplicable Sentencing Considerations ............................................................................. 38\n\nB.\nThe Sentencing Guidelines Calculations in the PSR are in Error .................................... 40\n\n---\n\nii\n\n1.\nNo “Loss Amount” Exists in this Case ................................................................ 41\n\na.\nThe Fundamental Legal Framework for Calculating “Loss Amount” ... 42\n\nb.\nThe Government’s Reliance Solely on Inflows to the\nG-Series Entities is Fundamentally Flawed ........................................... 43\n\nc.\nThe Government’s “Loss Amount” Improperly Includes Amounts\nAttributable to Conduct for Which Mr. Guo Was Acquitted ................... 45\n\nd.\nThe Government’s “Loss Amount” Fails to Account for the Volume of\nPurported “Victims” Who Affirmatively Deny They Are “Victims” ...... 45\n\ni.\nThe Himalaya Exchange ............................................................ 47\n\nii.\nThe Hamilton Petitioners ........................................................... 49\n\niii.\nThe Investors Who Have Either Filed Petitions Pursuant to 21\nU.S.C. § 853(n) or Written the Government Disclaiming Victim\nStatus ......................................................................................... 50\n\niv.\nThe Investors Who Have Contacted Defense Counsel ............... 51\n\nv.\nThe Unknown Number of Investors Who Deny They\nare Victims ................................................................................. 51\n\ne.\nThe Government Fails to Account for Other Offsets That Substantially\nReduce Any “Loss Amount” ................................................................... 52\n\nf.\nA Fatico Hearing is Consistent with the Court’s Rulings,\nand the Government’s Position, That in this Case “Speculation”\n and “Extrapolation” Based on Limited Investor Experience is\nInappropriate .......................................................................................... 54\n\n2.\nAdditional Legal Doctrine Supports a Finding of No Loss ................................. 55\n\na.\nAcquitted Conduct Cannot Be Used to Calculate\nMr. Guo’s Guidelines Level .................................................................... 56\n\ni.\nUsing Acquitted Conduct Here Would Violate Mr. Guo’s\nFifth and Sixth Amendment Rights ............................................. 57\n\nii.\nThe Impact of the 2024 Sentencing Guidelines Amendment ...... 58\n\niii.\nThe Reservations Expressed by Supreme Court Justices\nRegarding Use of Acquitted Conduct for Sentencing Purposes 60\n\nb.\nSpecific Legal Principles Significantly Reduce the\n“Loss Amount” in this Case ................................................................... 63\n\n---\n\niii\n\nc.\nMulti-Level Guidelines Enhancements Require\na Higher Burden of Proof ....................................................................... 66\n\nd.\nThe 30-Point Enhancement Pursuant to 2B1.1 Irrationally Influences\nMr. Guo’s Applicable Sentencing Guidelines Range ............................. 70\n\n3.\nObjections to Other Guidelines Enhancements ................................................... 79\n\nC.\nAdditional Objections to the PSR ..................................................................................... 82\n\nD.\nStatistical Analysis of Data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Other Sources\nDemonstrates that a Below-Guidelines Sentence for Mr. Guo Would be Consistent with\nCurrent Sentences for the Conduct of Conviction and Would Avoid Unwarranted\nSentence Disparities ......................................................................................................... 92\n\n1.\nSentencing Commission Publications and Data .................................................. 93\n\n2.\nJudiciary Sentencing Information Database (JSIN) ............................................ 96\n\n3.\nCourts Have Relied on Data in Fashioning Sentences ........................................ 96\n\n4.\nThe Data Establishes that in Practice the Guidelines are\nNot the Predominant Factor at Sentencing ......................................................... 97\n\nE.\nMr. Guo’s Medical History and Treatment at the MDC ................................................... 98\n\nF.\nMr. Guo Has Endured 37 Months’ Confinement at MDC\nDuring Its Most Violent and Chaotic Period .................................................................... 98\n\nG.\nThe BOP is in Crisis in Multiple Facets of its Operations Beyond MDC Brooklyn ......... 99\n\nH.\nIssues Following Conclusion of Mr. Guo’s Sentence ..................................................... 100\n\nIII.\nFINANCIAL PENALTIES .......................................................................................................... 100\n\nA.\nRestitution ....................................................................................................................... 100\n\nB.\nForfeiture ........................................................................................................................ 100\n\nC.\nFine ................................................................................................................................. 100\n\nCONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 101\n\n---\n\niv\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases\nBlakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) ................................................................................ 60\nConnecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) ..................................................................................... 61\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 598 (2007) .............................................. 43, 82\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 48 (2007) .................................................................................. 101\nGriffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1992). ................................................................................ 63\nIn re GTV Media Group, Inc. et al., Order, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-20537 (Sept. 13, 2021)..... 35\nIn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) .............................................................................................. 60\nIrizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008) ............................................................................. 81\nJones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) ................................................................................ 62\nJones v. United States, 574 U.S. 948 (2014) ................................................................................ 64\nKimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) ................................................................... 79, 80\nKoon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) ............................................................................. 43, 81\nLoper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) ............................................................. 80\nMcClinton v. United States, 600 U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 2400 (2023) ............................................. 64\nNelson v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 890  (2010)............................................................................. 42\nPeople v. Beck, 939 N.W.2d 213 (Mich. 2019) ............................................................................ 61\nRita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) ................................................................................... 46\nRui Ma v. Guo Wengui et al., Sup Ct, NY County, Sept. 11, 2017, Index No. 158140/2017) ..... 29\nSEC v. Ho Wan Kwok et al., No. 23-CV-2200-PGG (SDNY, Mar. 15, 2023) ............................. 35\nSpears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009) ............................................................................... 80\nUnited  States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ................................................... 75\nUnited States v. Adelson, 441 F.Supp.2d 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2006),\n aff’d 301 Fed. App’x. 93 (2d Cir. 2008) ............................................................................. 75, 77\nUnited States v. Algahaim, 842 F.3d 796 (2d Cir. 2016) .............................................................. 78\nUnited States v. Allen, 644 F. Supp.2d 422  (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ................................................ 72, 73\nUnited States v. Alptunaer, 23-CR-188 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2023) .............................. 5, 102\nUnited States v. Avenatti, 2024 WL 4553810 (9th Cir. October 23, 2024) ...................... 67, 68, 69\nUnited States v. Bai et al., No. 23-MJ-334-SJB (E.D.N.Y., April 6, 2023) ............... 17, 24, 26, 31\nUnited States v. Bell, 808 F. 3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .................................................................. 64\nUnited States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) ............................................................ 42, 61, 70, 79\nUnited States v. Buesing, 615 F.3d 971  (8th Cir. 2010 .............................................................. 100\nUnited States v. Byors, 586 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2009) .............................................................. 66, 67\nUnited States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2008) ........................................................ 62, 65\nUnited States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) ................................................. 43\nUnited States v. Chavez, 710 F.Supp. 3d 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2024 ................................................... 102\nUnited States v. Coleman, 138 F.4th 489, 511-512 (7th Cir.),\n cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 275 (2025) ........................................................................................... 65\nUnited States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992) .................................................... 71, 72\n\n---\n\nv\n\nUnited States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008), ............................................................. 67\nUnited States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2000) ........................................... 71, 72\nUnited States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013) ...................................................... 77, 78, 80\nUnited States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005) .................................................................. 42\nUnited States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 1997) ............................................................. 47\nUnited States v. Dorvee, 604 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2010),\n amended 616 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 76\nUnited States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ......................................... 75\nUnited States v. Faibish, No. 12-CR-265 (E.D.N.Y., March 10, 2016) ....................................... 76\nUnited States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978) ............................................................... 8, 46\nUnited States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp.2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008 .................................................. 76\nUnited States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 1994) ....................................................................... 66\nUnited States v. Gagarin, 950 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................................... 69\nUnited States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996) .................................................................... 71\nUnited States v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp.2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012),\n aff’d, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014) ................................................................................ 78, 79, 82\nUnited States v. Hundley, 02-CR- 441 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ................................................... 76\nUnited States v. Jackson, 364 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2003) .................................................................. 77\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2017) ............................................................... 100\nUnited States v. Johnson, 2018 WL 1997975 (E.D.N.Y. April 27, 2018).................................... 78\nUnited States v. Johnson, 754 F. Supp.3d 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) .................................................. 66\nUnited States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2008) ........................................................ 43, 73, 81\nUnited States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2007) ..................................................................... 72\nUnited States v. Kamper, 860 F. Supp.2d 596 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) ........................................ 66, 100\nUnited States v. Lauerson, 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003) .............................................................. 77\nUnited States v. Lauerson, 362 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2004) .............................................................. 77\nUnited States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.2008) ................................................................... 67\nUnited States v. Litvak, 3:13-CR-19 (D. Conn. July 23, 2014) .................................................... 76\nUnited States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993) ................................................................. 49\nUnited States v. Musgrave, 647 Fed. App’x 529 (6th Cir. 2016) ............................................... 100\nUnited States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024) ........................................................ 69, 70\nUnited States v. Russo, 643 F. Supp.3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2022).................................................... 100\nUnited States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F. 3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2014) ............................................. 64\nUnited States v. Salazar, 489 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2007) ................................................................. 73\nUnited States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555(7th Cir.1991) .............................................................. 68\nUnited States v. Segura-Genao, 18 Cr. 219 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. February 5, 2019) ........................ 102\nUnited States v. Settles, 530 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ............................................................... 62\nUnited States v. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1997) .............................................................. 73\nUnited States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.2004) ..................................................................... 68\nUnited States v. Singh, 877 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2017) .................................................................. 100\n\n---\n\nvi\n\nUnited States v. Stephen A. Wynn, No. 22-CV-1372 (D.D.C., May 17, 2022)................. 21, 22, 23\nUnited States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 631(6th Cir. 2012)................................................................... 100\nUnited States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2005) ................................................................. 72\nUnited States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam ............................................................ 60\nUnited States v. White, 551 F.3d 381(6th Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 61\nUnited States v. White, 96 Cr. 1123 (SHS), 2022 WL 18276933 (December 8, 2022) .............. 101\nUnited States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2008) .......................................................... 73, 74\nVan Loon v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024) .............................................. 80\n\nStatutes\n15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) ......................................................................................................................... 60\n18 U.S.C. § 2 ................................................................................................................................. 60\n18 U.S.C. § 1343 ........................................................................................................................... 60\n18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) ...................................................................................................................... 63\n18 U.S.C. § 1957 ........................................................................................................................... 60\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ............................................................................................................... passim\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) ........................................................................................................... passim\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) ............................................................................................................ 8, 101\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) ................................................................................................................. 42\n18 U.S.C. § 3582 ......................................................................................................................... 100\n18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3) ............................................................................................................. 103\n21 U.S.C. § 853 ............................................................................................................................. 53\n21 U.S.C. § 853(n) ................................................................................................................. passim\n\nOther Authorities\nU.S.S.G. §1B1.3 ............................................................................................................................ 62\nU.S.S.G. §1B1.3(c) ....................................................................................................................... 62\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 .................................................................................................................... passim\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) ................................................................................................................. 47\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) ............................................................................................................ 77\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10) ............................................................................................................... 84\nU.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) ............................................................................................................ 77\nU.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) .................................................................................................................. 84\nU.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) ................................................................................................................ 77, 84\nU.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 ........................................................................................................................... 84\nU.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. ......................................................................................................................... 99\nU.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 .......................................................................................................................... 73\n\n---\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nThis sentencing submission is respectfully submitted on behalf of defendant Miles Guo.\nFor the reasons set forth below, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should impose a sentence\ndramatically below the applicable Guidelines level, which would constitute a sentence “sufficient,\nbut not greater than necessary” to achieve the objectives of sentencing enumerated in 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3553(a)(2).\nAs this Court has recognized,\nIf there ever is a day in a person's life when [he] is entitled to be judged on the basis\nof the entirety of [his] background [and] contributions, it is at sentencing, and\nSection 3553(a), in directing the Court to consider the history and characteristics of\nthe offender, is consistent with that.\nTranscript of February 18, 2025, Proceedings, United States v. Alptunaer, 23-CR-188 (AT)\n(S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2023) (ECF No. 85 at 37).\nThat conception of sentencing, encompassing a defendant’s positive qualities balanced\nagainst the offense conduct, is particularly pertinent here, because, as detailed below, Mr. Guo’s\nnumerous admirable qualities and important, estimable accomplishments, clearly outweigh the\noffense conduct by an overwhelming margin.\nCertainly an examination of Mr. Guo’s multidimensional life experience and sacrifices,\nbeyond what was presented at trial, demonstrate that he is not defined by the offense conduct, or\nby a simple, single narrative. As detailed herein, his early personal history, from his family’s\npolitical ostracism during China’s Cultural Revolution, through his arrest in connection with the\nprotests culminating in the Tiananmen Square massacre, and his subsequent detention and torture,\nis as compelling and defining as his subsequent phenomenal success in business as private\nenterprise in China began to flourish.\n\n---\n\n2\n\nMr. Guo’s contributions to the aspirations of his Chinese compatriots is unrivaled, as is his\ncommitment to a better future for his country. Recognizing the importance of economic resources\nto building the infrastructure of a diaspora political movement, he has built and dedicated a\nfinancial fortune, and the public profile that has afforded him, toward that singular objective which\nhe has pursued with the utmost vigor for decades.\n\nIn return, Mr. Guo has endured persecution from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”)\nand its ruling Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) on a grand, pervasive, and life-threatening scale.\nAs discussed herein, those unrelenting, multifaceted attacks included recruitment of U.S. elites in\nbusiness, entertainment, and politics to conspire against Mr. Guo, and have contributed tangibly\nto the allegations in this case.1 In fact, as set forth below, the CCP engaged in a saturation social\nmedia campaign to discredit Mr. Guo, and compelled investors to file with U.S. law enforcement\nauthorities and media outlets false complaints against Mr. Guo.\nIn light of that indisputable evidence, a lengthy prison term herein would only validate the\nCCP’s campaign against Mr. Guo, seriously undermine his and his supporters’ objectives for China\n– which align entirely with U.S. interests – and embolden further efforts to eliminate Chinese\ndissidents from public life.\n\nAnother critical factor in this sentencing is the Guidelines calculation and, in particular,\ndetermination of the “loss amount.” Indeed, there is no “loss amount,” and the jury’s verdict does\nnot establish any. Additionally, as detailed below, and explained in prior submissions regarding\n\n1 Mr. Guo, as he must, acknowledges the jury’s verdict for purposes of sentencing. The\npositions set forth herein do not challenge that verdict, but instead are directed at specific issues\nrelevant to sentencing, and should not be regarded otherwise.\n\n---\n\n3\n\nforfeiture (see ECF Nos. 799, 804), the circumstances of this case are novel, if not entirely unique\nin that so many investors in and customers of the entities involved in this case affirmatively reject\nthe contention that they have been victimized by Mr. Guo.\n\nIndeed, a significant number of sophisticated investors, comprising two separate groups,\nand represented by counsel, insist the actions of the Government, and not Mr. Guo, have\njeopardized the value of their investments (and investment assets, such as the Himalaya Exchange\ncryptocurrency). In addition, hundreds of individuals have petitioned the Court, or contacted the\nGovernment and/or defense counsel directly, disclaiming victim status and instead seeking return\nof their seized investment property.\n\nThe Government’s alleged “loss amount” consists of pure speculation, is unsupported by\nany reliable evidence, and is directly contradicted by the unprecedented legion of investors and\ncustomers who deny that Mr. Guo defrauded them. There are also offsets – redemptions, refunds,\nsettlement payments, double counting, and assets of residual value still possessed by investors –\nthat the Government ignores as well, but which should be taken into account under the law\ngoverning “loss amount.”\n\nThere are additional facts and legal principles which undermine the Government’s\npurported “loss amount.” The Government and Probation, as set foth in the Presentence Report\n(“PSR”) would include acquitted conduct in calculating loss, which the Fifth and Sixth\nAmendments, as well as a 2024 amendment to the Guidelines (effective after preparation of the\nPSR), do not permit..\n\nAlso, pursuant to longstanding Second Circuit instruction, the extent of the “loss amount”\nenhancement – a staggering 30 points – requires that the Government prove any alleged “loss\n\n---\n\n4\n\namount” by a more demanding standard of proof than mere preponderance of the evidence. The\nGovernment cannot meet that burden.\n\nIn that context, Mr. Guo seeks an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to United States v. Fatico,\n579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978), to resolve any and all disputed issues of fact with respect to the\nalleged “loss amount,” other Guidelines enhancements to which Mr. Guo objects, and any other\ncontested factual issues relevant to sentencing.\n\nCourts have also repeatedly recognized that the “loss amount” in financial offense cases\ndrive the Guidelines range to an inordinate, unfair, and irrational extent. Consequently, those\ncourts have relied on other § 3553(a) considerations to correct the disproportionate impact of “loss\namount” enhancements that artificially increase a sentence by multipliers.\n\nThat recognition accounts for the mean and median sentences imposed in fraud cases,\nwhich, as the statistical analysis discussed herein establishes, are considerably below the\nGuidelines level in this case, and which more accurately, and fairly, represent an appropriate\nsentence here, while avoiding the unwarranted disparities proscribed by § 3553(a)(6).\n\nThree other factors relevant to Mr. Guo’s sentence have traditionally mitigated terms of\nimprisonment demonstrably in this District:  (1) the grueling 37 months Mr. Guo has been confined\nat the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”), including the two most violent and chaotic years\nin that facility’s history; (2) the substandard and continually deteriorating conditions within the\nU.S. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) system where he would be confined to serve any additional term\nof imprisonment; and (3) considerations relevant to conditions Mr. Guo is likely to encounter once\nhe completes his sentence. Discussion of these elements is augmented by separate, detailed\nexhibits  appended to this submission.\n\n---\n\n5\n\nAccordingly, it is respectfully submitted that examination and evaluation of all of the\nsentencing factors listed in § 3553(a) compels the conclusion that only a sentence dramatically\nbelow the applicable Guidelines range would satisfy § 3553(a)’s directive that the Court impose a\nsentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the purposes of sentencing set forth\nin § 3553(a)(2).\nI.\nMR. GUO’S PERSONAL BACKGROUND AND THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF\nTHIS CASE\n\nThis case cannot be understood, and Mr. Guo cannot be fairly sentenced, without a full\nappreciation of the personal, historical, and political context in which the events leading up to this\nday unfolded. By no means is this a routine case, and by no means is Mr. Guo a typical defendant.\nHis personal background, the political and economic conditions that motivated him and fueled\npublic interest in his Whistleblower Movement, the CCP’s relentless and overwhelmingly\npowerful targeting of him – which has reached fruition in the jury’s verdict in this case – and even\ndomestic political affairs in the United States all combined to create the conditions in which the\nunderlying conduct and this prosecution occurred, and the lens through which it must be viewed.\nA. Mr. Guo’s Early Upbringing During the Cultural Revolution\n\nGuo Wengui (郭文贵), also known by the Cantonese name Ho Wan Kwok (郭浩云) and\nthe English name Miles Guo,2 was born in 1968 in Jilin, a northeastern province of the People’s\nRepublic of China (“PRC”) bordering North Korea and Russia. He was the seventh of eight\nbrothers born to his father, a miner, and his mother, a homemaker. PSR ¶ 129.\n\n2 The Chinese surnames Guo and Kwok are represented by the same Chinese character (郭)\nbut have different pronunciations and Romanization. Mr. Guo’s birth name is Guo Wengui (郭文\n贵). He adopted the given name Ho Wan (浩云, literally, “noble cloud”) in 2000 when he obtained\na Hong Kong passport (see PSR ¶ 137). He began using the English name Miles, an homage to\nmusician Miles Davis, in 1991 during travels in the United States and Europe to facilitate\ninteractions with Westerners unfamiliar with Chinese names.\n\n---\n\n6\n\nMr. Guo’s early life was not one of privilege or abundance. He was born two years into the\nCultural Revolution launched in May 1966 by Mao Zedong, which lasted until Mao’s death in\n1976 and during which Mr. Guo’s parents were viewed as enemies of the state. As such, they were\ntreated essentially as exiles in the mountains of Jilin Province where they struggled to provide for\ntheir eight children. During Mr. Guo’s childhood, the family lived in a one-room shack with a dirt\nfloor, no electricity, and no indoor plumbing. PSR ¶ 131. He typically ate one meal per day. Id.\nThese conditions were not uncommon in China at that time, particularly for those ostracized as\nenemies of the ruling Communist Party.\n\nMr. Guo attended the local public primary school, Northeastern Nickel Mine School, from\nwhich he graduated in July 1979. PSR ¶ 150. The family thereafter moved to Shandong Province,\na coastal province on the Yellow Sea located between Beijing and Shanghai, where Mr. Guo\nattended the local public middle school, Gu Cheng #3. He quit school in July 1984, at age 15, in\norder to earn money and help support his family. Id.\n\nAs a child Mr. Guo witnessed his parents and brothers suffer at the hands of the CCP due\nto his father’s support for democracy. PSR ¶ 132. His father was at times physically beaten, his\nbrothers were beaten and stabbed by CCP supporters while trying to help their father, and his father\nwould often go into hiding from the CCP for days at a time. Id. Amidst this trauma, Mr. Guo’s\nmother suffered a breakdown, at times also disappearing for multiple days and leaving Mr. Guo\nand his brothers to fend for themselves. Id. These experiences, along with the CCP’s prohibition\non any public expression of the family’s Buddhist faith, left an early and indelible impression on\nMr. Guo of state-sponsored oppression and injustice. Id.\n\nStill in his teens, Mr. Guo married Hing Chi Ngok, the younger sister of a childhood friend,\nin Shandong Province in 1985. PSR ¶ 133. The union was officially registered in 1987, and the\n\n---\n\n7\n\ncouple remain married to this day. They have two children born during the late 1980s, a son named\nQiang and a daughter named Mei. PSR ¶ 134.\nB. The Tiananmen Square Protests, Witnessing His Brother’s Death by Police\nShooting, and Mr. Guo’s Political Imprisonment\n\nBy 1989, when Mr. Guo was approximately 20 years old, he and his wife were living with\ntheir son and newborn daughter in Puyang City, Henan Province, when the upheaval that spring in\nBeijing’s Tiananmen Square profoundly altered their lives. In April, following the death of former\nCCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang – revered by many and reviled by others for his economic\nand political reforms – tens of thousands of students began gathering in Beijing’s Tiananmen\nSquare to honor Hu’s legacy and demand pro-democracy reform.\nIn support of the demonstrators, Mr. Guo sold his motorcycle and donated the proceeds to\nthe student protestors. Two police officers subsequently visited him at his office in Puyang, where\nhis wife, infant daughter, and younger brother were at the time, for questioning. At one point an\nofficer pointed a gun at Mr. Guo, prompting his 17-year-old brother, Guo Wenbin, to jump in front\nof the officer. The officer shot Wenbin in the arm and leg, then arrested both brothers. Wenbin\nwas denied medical treatment and died of his wounds, while Mr. Guo was imprisoned and charged\nwith inciting counter-revolutionary activities.\nMr. Guo spent the next 22 months detained in a facility for political prisoners. He was\nbeaten and tortured both physically and psychologically, including witnessing the execution of\nmore than 50 prisoners. PSR ¶ 127. These experiences, combined with the death of his brother and\nthe abuses he witnessed as a child during the Cultural Revolution, solidified his resolve to fight\ngovernment oppression and corruption.\n\n---\n\n8\n\nC. Mr. Guo Achieves Economic Prosperity, Forms Political Alliances, and\nEncounters Political Exposure\nMr. Guo’s real estate development career began following his release from detention in\n1991. PSR ¶ 154. Mr. Guo understood that he needed a certain measure of personal success and\ninfluence in order to be an effective advocate for government reform. The 1990s were a period of\nrapid economic expansion in China as capital markets were established, private sector enterprises\nmultiplied and grew, and state-controlled sectors gradually reduced their share of national output.\nIn this environment, Mr. Guo and his family built a thriving commercial enterprise, beginning with\nthe development of a high-end commercial complex in Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan Province.\nThe crown jewel of the family’s real estate empire ultimately was Pangu Plaza, a mixed-\nuse complex planned in conjunction with Beijing’s preparation to host the 2008 Summer Olympics.\nConsisting of five separate towers incorporating a hotel, offices, residential and retail space, Pangu\nPlaza was situated next to the National Stadium (“Bird’s Nest”) and enjoyed high visibility during\nthe 2008 Olympic Games. Mr. Guo’s family company had purchased the property in 1999, and\nbenefited from its substantial increase in value in connection with Beijing’s hosting of the 2008\nSummer Olympic Games. Pangu Plaza became a hub for VIP guests, including a host of foreign\ndignitaries who circulated through the hotel over a period of several years, and Mr. Guo made\nconnections around the globe at the highest levels of government and business.\nTheir success in real estate development enabled Mr. Guo and his family to expand their\nbusiness activities into various investments, propelling them to extraordinary wealth. See PSR ¶\n154. His phenomenal business success also gave Mr. Guo greater and greater access to elite\npolitical circles and more insight into political corruption among some of the highest officials of\nthe Chinese government, as well as officials visiting from abroad.\n\n---\n\n9\n\nIn 2000, notwithstanding the business success he enjoyed, Mr. Guo continued to view the\nChinese government as fundamentally corrupt. That year, as an initial step toward distancing\nhimself from his home country and its central government regime, Mr. Guo obtained a Hong Kong\npassport in the name of Ho Wan Kwok. See PSR ¶ 137.\nIn 2003, Mr. Guo blew the whistle on the corrupt activities of a prominent Beijing city\nofficial. This resulted in officials from the Ministry of State Security (“MSS”), the preeminent\ncivilian intelligence agency in China, approaching Mr. Guo for additional information and\ncooperation, which he provided.\nThe fallout from Mr. Guo’s exposure of that official, however, was significant and\nenduring. In September 2004, then age 36 with two teenagers at home, Mr. Guo was arrested by\ndozens of police officers upon his arrival at the Beijing Airport. They took him to a hotel where\nhe was detained for 15 days. He was interrogated, beaten, and tortured in myriad ways. He was\ndeprived of sleep as officers took shifts watching him, using pepper spray to jolt him awake if he\nnodded off. He was forced to stand for long periods of time, causing his legs to swell up from the\npressure. He was hung upside down and beaten. Officers cut his hair, put it in a plastic bag, and\nplaced the bag over his head so he was forced to breathe in the tiny particles. He was stabbed in\nthe back with a corkscrew.3\nThe officers detaining Mr. Guo repeatedly ordered him to stop exposing the corruption of\nChinese government officials, which he refused to do. They asked him whether he had bribed the\n\n3 In describing Mr. Guo’s physical condition in the PSR, the Probation Officer wrote that “Guo\nexhibited various scars and disfigurements as a result of the physical torture he experienced while\nimprisoned in his native China, as well as subsequent surgeries and operations which he underwent\nbetween 1993 and 2022, that were required to repair residual injuries.” PSR ¶ 141. Mr. Guo’s\nmedical condition – both physical and mental – are addressed in more detail in Exhibit 1, submitted\nto the Court under seal.\n\n---\n\nmayor of Zhengzhou, where his first commercial development was located, and he trnthfully\nreplied that he had not. They demanded to know if he was spying for the United States, and he\ntrnthfully replied that he was not. After 15 days they took him to a hospital where he remained for\nthree days before being released to his home.\nNot\nsmprisingly, his relationship with certain U.S. officials in China invited scrntiny and suspicion by\nthe CCP that he was spying on behalf of the United States.\nfu approximately 2006, Mr. Guo developed a relationship with China's Deputy Minister of\nState Secmity, who was responsible for, among other things, domestic anti-conuption effo1ts and\nforeign intelligence collection. This Deputy Minister offered Mr. Guo a measure of protection\nagainst the local official seeking revenge for Mr. Guo's exposure of conuption, while also enabling\nMr. Guo to gain deeper insight into the workings of the highest levels of the CCP.\nD. Increasing Business Success and Friction with the Chinese Government\nMr. Guo and his fainily's business success and wealth continued to grow. Between 2012 and\n2014, the family became the largest shareholder of Haitong futemational Securities, which at the\ntime was China's largest publicly traded securities company. PSR ~ 154. The family also\nestablished- outside of China- the ACA Family Fund fuvestment Company (\"ACA\"). PSR ~ 154.\n\n---\n\n11\n\nAt the same time, tensions continued to mount with Chinese officials whom Mr. Guo\nexposed as corrupt. In December 2013, Mr. Guo left mainland China and relocated to Hong Kong\nwhere he resided with his wife and daughter.\n\nThe following October, Mr. Guo received a call that permanently altered his relationship\nwith mainland China. The caller, a highly placed central government official, notified Mr. Guo\nthat he was suspected of spying for the United States and had to return to mainland China for\nquestioning. Knowing that this portended certain imprisonment and potentially torture, which Mr.\nGuo was not willing to endure further, Mr. Guo left Hong Kong for London, where he joined his\nson who was living there.\n\nIn or around January 2015, Mr. Guo and his family established a family office named\nGolden Spring New York, Ltd., with an office in Manhattan. PSR ¶ 154. Also within this time\nframe, the family purchased an apartment in Manhattan’s Sherry-Netherland hotel, which became\nMr. Guo’s primary residence when he later relocated permanently to the United States in 2017.\nThe family also purchased, with approximately €28 million in family funds from ACA, the Lady\nMay yacht.\n\nMr. Guo’s sense that hostilities between his family and the Chinese government were on\nthe verge of erupting proved accurate. While in New York on business in January 2015, Mr. Guo\nreceived a number of calls from Zheng (“Bruno”) Wu. Purportedly acting on behalf of the Special\nInvestigative Team of the Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection of the CCP (“CCDI”),\nWu implored Mr. Guo to stop exposing corruption among Chinese officials and to not reveal any\ninformation that he may have received from the Deputy Minister of State Security.\nAccording to Wu, the Special Investigative Team wanted Mr. Guo to cooperate with China\nand return any evidence he had of corruption among senior leaders. In exchange, the CCP would\n\n---\n\n12\n\nrefrain from seizing Mr. Guo family’s assets, not arrest Mr. Guo’s family members, and not\nphysically harm or kill Mr. Guo. Mr. Guo refused.\n\nLater that month, on January 10, 2015, Chinese authorities conducted a raid on an event at\nthe Pangu Hotel in Beijing where many of Mr. Guo’s close family members and employees were\ngathered. Hundreds of armed police officers entered the hotel and arrested Mr. Guo’s family\nmembers, including his wife, daughter, his five brothers,5 two sisters-in-law, and one niece.\nPolice ordered all employees onto the ground and arrested approximately 270 of them. Mr.\nGuo’s family members were forcibly masked and taken to a detention center. Mr. Guo’s wife and\ndaughter, who endured abuse and torture while detained (see PSR ¶¶ 135, 140), were released after\n10 days but not permitted to return to their home for nearly two years. Instead, they were placed\nin temporary housing and required to report in person each day to a local intelligence office. PSR\n¶ 135.\nMr. Guo’s sisters-in-law were held for three months and his brothers were taken to Dalian\nCity, more than 800km from Beijing, where they were detained for two years. Among the\nemployees, approximately 30 were officially detained and underwent beatings, interrogation, and\ntorture. No formal charges were instituted except for unknown charges against two of Mr. Guo’s\nbrothers.\nBeginning in late January 2015, Chinese authorities began seizing China-based property\nand stock holdings owned by Mr. Guo’s family companies, and valued at approximately $10\nbillion. These included key buildings and other components of the Pangu Plaza development in\nBeijing, and numerous other office towers. Authorities released these assets in or around December\n2016 and January 2017, only to seize them again weeks later.\n\n5 Mr. Guo lost a second brother, who had been a police officer, to suicide in 1996. PSR ¶ 130.\n\n---\n\n13\n\nE. Mr. Guo Becomes a Prominent and Vocal Critic of the CCP from Abroad\nMr. Guo remained undeterred from his overriding goal of becoming a visible and forceful\nadvocate for democracy and the rule of law in China. Following his departure from China to the\nWest he was able to utilize Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube – all of which are blocked by the\n“Great Firewall of China”6 – to publicly expose systemic corruption in, and abuses of, the CCP.\nSee PSR ¶ 153.\nThrough thousands of hours of broadcasts, Mr. Guo has disclosed human rights abuses in\nChina, such as the crackdown on human rights lawyers and illegal organ harvesting from prisoners\nfor use by family members of high-ranking political figures. He has denounced Chinese state\nsuppression of democratic movements in China and Hong Kong. He has publicly revealed China’s\nstrategy of infiltration into Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, and worked to expose\nChina’s covert operations in the United States in political, economic, cultural, and intelligence\narenas, to cite but a handful of examples. Notwithstanding the Government’s theory that Mr. Guo\nis masquerading as a dissident for his own personal gain, indisputable facts – including those drawn\nfrom cases brought by DOJ – establish that Mr. Guo has undertaken his whistleblowing activities\nat tremendous personal cost and risk.\nConcurrent with that activity, Mr. Guo amassed a massive social media following, with\nhundreds of thousands if not more than one million followers at times. Millions of members of the\n\n6 The U.S. Department of Justice has described the “Great Firewall of China” (“GFW”) as\nfollows: “Operated an enforced primarily by the Cyberspace Administration of China and the\nPRC’s Ministry of Public Security (“MPS”), the GFW has the capability to block Internet access\nwithin the PRC to particular servers and applications and is used to monitor and prevent PRC\ncitizens from accessing Internet platforms and services that might allow for the dissemination and\ndiscussion of information that runs afoul of messaging approved by the PRC government and the\nCCP.” Ex. 2 ¶ 7 (Complaint and Affidavit in Support of Application for Arrest Warrants in United\nStates v. Bai et al., No. 23-MJ-0334 (SJB) (E.D.N.Y., April 6, 2023) (“Bai Complaint”).\n\n---\n\n14\n\nChinese diaspora, disaffected by the CCP’s oppressive tactics – most indelibly represented by the\nmassacre of student protestors in Tiananmen – found resonance in Mr. Guo’s messages. Within\nChina, those with access to a VPN could break through the “Great Firewall” and access Mr. Guo’s\nbroadcasts, which for many were their first concrete exposure to events such as Tiananmen and\nother evidence of CCP abuses. 7 It may be difficult to fathom from a U.S. perspective, where we\nenjoy broad First Amendment freedoms, but for many in China, Mr. Guo’s broadcasts were beyond\neye opening – they shattered fundamental beliefs about the world in which they lived. See, e.g.,\nEx. 3 (Declaration of Wansheng Cheng).8 At the same time, the Whistleblower Movement that\nMr. Guo started offered genuine hope for a more democratic future for the Chinese people. Id.\nThe scope and power of Mr. Guo’s influence represented and continues to represent a threat\nthat the CCP emphatically wants to eliminate. The CCP seeks not only to suppress Mr. Guo’s pro-\ndemocracy advocacy and critiques of publicly known abuses and corruption involving the CCP,\nbut also to prevent disclosure of any non-public information he may possess concerning high-level\ncorruption, intelligence operations, or other sensitive matters.\n\n7 By June 2017, the New York Times Beijing office was reporting that even though Mr. Guo’s\nbroadcasts were officially banned in China, unofficially “many people here in Beijing are riveted.”\nChris Buckley, “Tycoon’s Claims Reverberate in China Despite Censorship and Thin Evidence,”\nNew York Times, June 27, 2017, http\nchina-corruption-xi-jinping.html.\n8 During our time representing Mr. Guo, defense counsel have received more than 1,000\nunsolicited statements of support for Mr. Guo from followers, investors, and/or customers of the\nG-Series entities. The statements continue to pour in. Given the volume of statements as well as\nprivacy concerns, we intend to provide the Court and the Government with a sealed supplement\ncontaining a representative sample of these statements, as they provide significant perspective on\nthe meaning of Mr. Guo’s work to his supporters, the nature and circumstances of the offenses of\nconviction, as well as the issue of loss in this case. For illustrative purposes, we include and cite\nto a few letters in this Memorandum, from individuals who have either testified in this case or\nexpressed willingness to do so.\n\n---\n\n15\n\nThe tactics employed by the CCP to silence Mr. Guo have included coercion, threats to\nfamily, asset seizures, lawsuits, payments to influence U.S. government officials, deployment of a\nvast network of operatives to discredit Mr. Guo globally using social media, interrogating,\narresting, and prosecuting supporters of his in China, and forcing supporters to file false claims of\nfraud against him. The scale and ferocity of the CCP’s campaign against Mr. Guo is staggering.\nF. Intensification of CCP Targeting Following Mr. Guo’s Relocation to the United\nStates\nMr. Guo moved from London to the United States in April 2017, entering on a non-\nimmigrant tourist visa. PSR ¶ 137. Between January 2016 and May 2017, Chinese officials had\ncontacted Mr. Guo approximately 30 times to urge him to cooperate with them. They urged him\nto: (1) stop exposing and publicizing corruption among Chinese government officials; (2) not\ncooperate with the U.S. government or talk to the FBI; and (3) not oppose the CCP, advocate for\ndemocratic reform in China, or talk about justice and the rule of law.\nIn exchange, they offered to release Mr. Guo’s family members and employees from\ncustody and release billions of dollars’ worth of family assets that authorities had frozen in China.\nMr. Guo refused.9 The CCP pressure campaign against Mr. Guo became increasingly aggressive\nand far-reaching, eventually overlapping directly with the allegations in this case. These events\nprovide crucial context for understanding the nature and circumstances of the conduct that brings\nMr. Guo before this Court.\n\n9 In May 2017, however, Mr. Guo was able to negotiate for his wife and daughter to leave\nChina and join him in the United States, in exchange for his agreement not to testify against former\nChinese state security officials who had been arrested in New York and charged in federal court.\n\n---\n\n16\n\n1. INTERPOL Red Notice, Interference with VOA Interview, Direct\nIntimidation\n\nOn April 19, 2017, nine days after Mr. Guo arrived in the United States, the Chinese\ngovernment requested that INTERPOL issue a “red notice” identifying Mr. Guo as a fugitive\nwanted for extradition. This occurred just hours before Mr. Guo was to appear on a live televised\ninterview on the Mandarin-language service of Voice of America (“VOA”) – which reaches an\naudience of millions in China and elsewhere – in which Mr. Guo planned to disclose corruption\nallegations against family members of senior CCP officials. See Sasha Gong, “How China\nManaged to Muffle the Voice of America,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2017 (“Gong WSJ Op-\nEd”).10\nMr. Guo went forward with the VOA interview as planned, but shortly into the second hour\nof what had been billed as a three-hour session, VOA abruptly ended the broadcast. As later\nexplained by Sasha Gong, Chief of VOA’s Mandarin Service and the journalist who conducted\nthe interview, two days before the broadcast China’s Foreign Ministry summoned VOA’s Beijing-\nbased correspondent and told him that China would view the interview as interference with China’s\ninternal affairs and could have serious repercussions if it went forward.\nThat admonition sent a chill through VOA’s top management in Washington, but\nmanagement eventually permitted a truncated interview to take place. Id.; see also Michael\nForsythe, “China Seeks Arrest of Billionaire Who Accused Officials’ Relatives of Graft,” New\nYork Times, April 19, 2017;11 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017\nReport to Congress, November 2017, at 472 (“UCESRC Report”) (excerpt attached as Exhibit 4).\n\n10  Available at http\namerica-1495580183?st=EgyHCa&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink.\n11 Available at http\nvoice-of-america.html.\n\n---\n\n17\n\nMillions of viewers saw the broadcast as well as its abrupt end, which for many was their first\nintroduction to Mr. Guo.\nIn May 2017 the CCP again attempted to silence Mr. Guo and threaten him more directly,\nby sending the Secretary of the CCDI and three other agents to New York to speak with him in\nperson. Mr. Guo refused to yield to their demands. Instead, he disclosed a broad network of CCP\nspies operating in the United States.\nThe following month, the Chinese government began public criminal proceedings against\nsome of Mr. Guo’s associates in China. See Ex. 4 (UCESRC Report) at 472-73. Authorities posted\nvideos and transcripts of the proceedings, in which three employees of Beijing Pangu Investment,\none of the Guo family companies, were convicted of fraud. Id.\n2. Recruitment of Influential U.S. Political and Business Figures to Lobby for\nMr. Guo’s Repatriation to China\n\nAs confirmed by the U.S. Government through a series of federal prosecutions, the Chinese\ngovernment’s increasingly charged campaign against Mr. Guo proceeded to reach directly into the\nhighest levels of United States government. In approximately May 2017, Low Taek Jho, a\nMalaysian businessman, coordinated a meeting during which Sun Lijun, China’s former Vice\nMinister for Public Security, enlisted former finance chair of the Republican National Committee\n(“RNC”) Elliot Broidy, hip-hop artist Prakazrel Michel, and businessperson Nickie Lum Davis to\nlobby then-President Trump and the Trump Administration to cancel Mr. Guo’s visa or otherwise\nremove Mr. Guo from the United States. See Ex. 5 ¶ 16 (Complaint in Attorney General of the\nUnited States v. Stephen A. Wynn, No. 22-CV-1372 (D.D.C., May 17, 2022)). This request was\nmade expressly on behalf of the PRC. Id.\nThese efforts – which were extremely well-compensated – took off in multiple directions.\nBroidy turned to Steve Wynn, an American real estate developer and owner of multiple luxury\n\n---\n\n18\n\ncasinos and resorts, including the Wynn Macau – billed on Wynn’s website as “the largest\ngambling location in Asia”12 – and the Wynn Palace, a massive luxury hotel opened in Macau in\n2016.\nBroidy was acquainted with Wynn through the RNC, and believed that the combination of\nWynn’s RNC work, business interests in China, and friendship with then-President Trump would\nhelp facilitate access to administration officials. Ex. 5 ¶ 17; see also Niraj Chokshi, “U.S. Accuses\nSteve Wynn of Lobbying Trump on Behalf of China,” New York Times, May 17, 2022.13\nWynn spoke directly with Sun in June 2017 and agreed to raise the matter with the\nPresident, while also engaging in numerous communications with Broidy during that time about\nhaving Mr. Guo placed on the No Fly List and ensuring that when Mr. Guo’s visa expired at the\nend of June any renewal application would be denied. Ex. 5 ¶¶ 20-21.\nIn one message sent by Broidy to Wynn via Wynn’s wife, Broidy stated that Chinese\nPresident Xi Jinping had told President Trump personally at Mar-a-Lago that he wanted Mr. Guo\nreturned to China, and that in exchange President Xi was willing to return certain U.S. citizens\nheld hostage in China, accept a large number of Chinese illegal immigrants for deportation back\nto China, and assist the United States with North Korea. Id. ¶ 21(c).\nDuring a dinner in Washington, D.C., in late June 2017, Wynn personally communicated\nto the President the PRC’s desire to have Mr. Guo returned to China. Id. ¶ 22. During the next two\nmonths, Wynn had multiple telephone calls with Sun during which they discussed Mr. Guo’s visa\nrenewal, the importance of the matter to the PRC, and Wynn’s business interests in Macau. Id. ¶\n23. Wynn made several efforts during this time frame to organize meetings about Mr. Guo with\n\n12 See http\n13 Available at http\nchina.html.\n\n---\n\n19\n\nsenior officials of the National Security Council and the White House. Id. ¶ 25. Ultimately these\nefforts – motivated by Wynn’s desire to protect his business interests in Macau, over which the\nChinese government exerted tight control – were unsuccessful. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28, 29.14\nWynn’s efforts, however, were just one component of this scheme. In late June 2017\nPrakazrel Michel, having himself already participated in multiple meetings in the United States\nand Asia with the goal of persuading Trump Administration officials to repatriate Mr. Guo to\nChina,15 reached out to George Higginbotham, who at the time was serving as a lawyer for the\nUnited States Department of Justice, Tr. 5727, to solicit his assistance. Tr. 5733-34.\nMr. Higginbotham met that summer with the Chinese ambassador to the United States at\nthe Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C.. Tr. 5735-36. During the meeting he relayed the\nmessage that “there were successful efforts being made for the extradition of Mr. Guo Wengui and\nthat there would be additional information forthcoming from General MicMaster [sic].” Tr. 5738.16\nApproximately two months later, Mr. Higginbotham traveled to Macau to personally inform Mr.\nLow that steps were still being taken to persuade the administration to repatriate Mr. Guo, as well\nas to accomplish a separate, unrelated goal. Tr. 5740-41. Mr. Higginbotham received\napproximately $100 million for his efforts in connection with the scheme to repatriate Mr. Guo\nand achieve the other goal. Tr. 5745.17\n\n14 Elliott Broidy pleaded guilty in October 2020 to conspiring to violate foreign lobbying laws\nin connection with these events. He admitted that he had accepted $9 million from Jho Low to\nlobby the Trump Administration to repatriate Mr. Guo. See Kenneth P. Vogel, “Elliott Broidy\nPleads\nGuilty\nin\nForeign\nLobbying\nCase,”\nNew\nYork\nTimes,\nOct.\n20,\n2020,\nhttp\n15 See Ex. 6 ¶¶ 136-149 (Indictment in United States v. Prakazrel Michel et al., No. 19-CR-\n148-CKK (D.D.C., May 2, 2019)).\n16 That was obviously a reference to Gen. H.R. McMaster, who served as U.S. National\nSecurity Advisor from 2017 to 2018.\n17 Mr. Higginbotham pleaded guilty in November 2018 to a conspiracy charge in connection\nwith\nhis\nparticipation\nin\nthese\nunregistered\nlobbying\naffairs.\nSee\n\n---\n\n20\n\n3. The 912 Project – A Centrally Coordinated Operation to Discredit Mr. Guo\nOnline\nThe U.S. Government has also confirmed the contemporaneous social media and Internet\ncampaign the PRC launched against Mr. Guo during the same period. While the CCP was paying\nhundreds of millions of dollars to recruit Washington insiders for a covert lobbying campaign to\ninfluence the actions of the President of the United States, it also was deploying a sophisticated\nteam of operatives to launch what ultimately grew into a massive social media campaign with the\naim of discrediting Mr. Guo. This campaign was aggressive, extensive, effective, and ongoing for\nyears. Its significance, power, and relevance to this case cannot be overstated.\nA detailed description of the overarching PRC operation to use social media to disseminate\nand amplify messages to discredit and undermine its political adversaries – including targeting of\nspecific individuals critical of the CCP – is set forth in the 89-page Complaint and Affidavit in\nSupport of Application for Arrest Warrants in United States v. Bai et al., No. 23-MJ-334-SJB\n(E.D.N.Y., April 6, 2023) (“Bai Complaint”), attached hereto as Ex. 2; see also Ex. 7 (EDNY\nUSAO Press Release in Bai).\nIt is undisputed that a primary focus of this operation, referred to in the Bai Complaint as\n“Victim-1,” was  Mr. Guo. See Ex. 2 ¶¶ 89-108. As explained in the Bai Complaint, which brought\ninterstate harassment conspiracy charges against 34 officers of the Chinese Ministry of Public\n\nhttp\nconspiracy-deceive-us-banks-about-millions. Nickie Lum Davis, who was paid at least $3 million\nfor her role in the scheme, pleaded guilty in August 2020 to aiding and abetting violation of the\nForeign\nAgents\nRegistration\nAct.\nSee\nhttp\nbusinesswoman-pleads-guilty-facilitating-back-channel-lobbying-campaign-drop-1mdb.\nPrakazrel Michel proceeded to trial in 2023 and was convicted in connection with the scheme to\nrepatriate Mr. Guo. See Hannah Ziegler, “Pras of the Fugees Gets 14 Years for Illegal Foreign\nInfluence Scheme,” New York Times, http\nfugees-campaign-finance-prison.html.\n\n---\n\n21\n\nSecurity (“MPS”),18 this operation (the “912 Project”) was coordinated by a group known as the\n“912 Special Project Working Group” (hereinafter the “912 Group”) within the MPS in Beijing\nand directly targeted Mr. Guo from at least 2017 through the filing of the Bai Complaint on April\n6, 2023, three weeks after Mr. Guo’s arrest in this case. Ex. 2 ¶ 89.\nUtilizing thousands of fake online personas across social media sites such as Twitter,\nFacebook, and YouTube, the 912 Group’s campaign against Mr. Guo specifically sought to brand\nhim as a liar, swindler, a con, and more, and demanded government action against him. As\ndiscussed in more detail infra, this long-running apparatus effectively sowed widespread public\ndoubt about Mr. Guo’s credibility, including the validity of the entities involved in this case.\nTo appreciate the scale of the online operation against Mr. Guo, consider studies\nundertaken by independent third parties about just the Twitter component of this campaign:\n• The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (“ASPI”) found that from April 24, 2017\n(five days after the PRC requested an INTERPOL red notice for Mr. Guo), and July\n31, 2019, at least 38,732 tweets from 618 Twitter accounts linked to the Chinese\ngovernment directly targeted Mr. Guo.19 “These tweets consist largely of vitriolic\nattacks on [Guo’s] character, ranging from highly personal criticisms to accusations\nof criminality, treachery against China and criticisms of his relationship with\ncontroversial U.S. political figure Steve Bannon.” Tom Uren et al., “Tweeting\nthrough the Great Firewall: Preliminary analysis of PRC-linked information\noperations against the Hong Kong protests,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute,\nReport No. 25/2019, at 14.20\n\n18 As explained in the Bai Complaint, “[a]lthough the MPS is generally identified as the PRC’s\nprimary domestic law enforcement agency – responsible for public safety, general criminal\ninvestigation, national security and Internet security – its mission extends beyond law enforcement\nand into functions more associated with an intelligence service.” Ex. 2 ¶ 8.\n19 In August 2019 Twitter took down 936 accounts that it determined were part of a coordinated\nstate-backed effort by China to sow disinformation and discord related to pro-democracy protests\nin Hong Kong. Kate Cooper, “Facebook and Twitter Say China Is Spreading Disinformation in\nHong\nKong,”\nNew\nYork\nTimes,\nAug.\n19,\n2019,\nhttp\nfacebook-twitter.html.\n20 The full report is available at http\nfirewall/.\n\n---\n\n22\n\n• In a follow-up report, ASPI found that from January 2018 to April 17, 2020, there\nwere 70,584 tweets, 11,832 images, and 580 videos associated with Mr. Guo from\nPRC-linked accounts.21 They characterized the three central narratives emerging\nfrom this dataset as: (1) Mr. Guo and Steve Bannon are colluding against the PRC;\n(2) Mr. Guo is a discredited liar; and (3) Mr. Guo is immoral and a rapist. Dr. Jake\nWallis et al., “Retweeting Through the Great Firewall: A persistent and undeterred\nthreat actor,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Report No. 33/2020, at 38-41\n(hereinafter “Retweeting”).22\n\n• The Stanford Internet Observatory also analyzed the activity from January 2018 to\nApril 17, 2020, of the 23,750 Twitter accounts taken down by the platform in June\n2020 for spreading disinformation. Of the 348,608 tweets, the overwhelming\nmajority (78.8%) of which were in Chinese, tweets about Mr. Guo made up the\nsecond largest topic in the dataset, after the Hong Kong protests. The study found\nthat “[a]s with the prior 2019 takedown, the campaign targeting Guo was sustained\nacross the timeline of the operation.” Carly Miller et al., “Sockpuppets Spin COVID\nYarns: An Analysis of PRC-Attributed June 2020 Twitter takedown,” Stanford\nInternet Observatory (June 17, 2020), at 16.23\nIn addition to Twitter, the campaign made extensive use of Facebook and YouTube to\ntarget Mr. Guo as well as his supporters, often posting videos about Mr. Guo from YouTube on\nFacebook and then layering comments onto the posts. Bai Complaint ¶¶ 93-108. To take just one\nexample, a post in mid-September 2021 featured a video about Mr. Guo with the caption (in\nChinese) “brags and cheats every day.” Within the next thirty minutes, a series of comments\nappeared in both Chinese and English, describing Mr. Guo as “a real liar” and “a consummate\nswindler,” and asking “Why isn’t he in jail? What is the government doing?” Id. at 98.\n\n21 In June 2020, Twitter announced the takedown of 23,750 core accounts that it determined\nwere part of a coordinated effort by China to spread disinformation, along with 150,000 additional\naccounts dedicated to amplifying the disinformation campaign through retweets and likes. Kate\nCooper, “Twitter Removes Chinese Disinformation Campaign,” New York Times, June 11, 2020,\nhttp\n22 The full report is available at http\nfirewall/.\n23 The full report is available at http\n\n---\n\n23\n\n4. Interference with Mr. Guo’s Social Media Accounts\nNot content with posting content to harass and discredit Mr. Guo, the Chinese government\nalso actively sought to disrupt Mr. Guo’s own social media accounts. In April 2017, Mr. Guo’s\nFacebook and Twitter accounts were briefly suspended, raising concerns about Chinese\ngovernment pressure. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (“UCESRC”)\nheard testimony in September 2017 that Chinese government targeting of Mr. Guo’s Twitter\naccount was ongoing. Ex. 4 at 471. The U.S. Department of Justice likewise recognized in the Bai\nComplaint the PRC’s efforts to “pressur[e] U.S. social media companies to remove [Guo] and\nU.S.-based associates of [Guo] from social media platforms.” Ex. 2 ¶ 89.\nMr. Guo’s social media accounts were indeed suspended shortly before China’s 19th\nNational Congress commenced on October 18, 2017. On October 17, 2017, it was reported that\nYouTube, in response to an allegation of harassment by an unidentified complainant, removed one\nof Mr. Guo’s videos and suspended him from posting any new live-stream videos for 90 days. Bill\nGertz, “YouTube Suspends Account of Chinese Dissident,” The Washington Free Beacon,\nOctober 17, 2017, http\ndissident/.24\nThe YouTube suspension came on the heels of restrictions on Mr. Guo’s Facebook account.\nId. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and\nCounterterrorism, during a hearing on April 9, 2025, the former Director of Global Public Policy\nat Facebook testified that Facebook had indeed acted at the direct behest of the CCP when it took\ndown Mr. Guo’s Facebook profile in April 2017 and subsequently banned him permanently from\n\n24 Gertz also reported in the same article that according to “a U.S. official,” the Chinese case\nunderlying the INTERPOL red notice against Guo was “political and not legal.”\n\n---\n\nFacebook in September 2017. See Cristiano Lima-Strong, \"Transcript: Former Exec Sarah Wynn-\nWilliams Testifies on Facebook's Comiship of China,\" Tech Policy Press, April 9, 2025.25\n5. Hacking Into Computer Systems of Mr. Guo 's Lawyers\nOn September 5, 2017, Mr. Guo filed an application for asylum with the U.S. Depa1iment\nof Homeland Secmity based on his fear of reti·ibution from the CCP for his exposme of political\nco1n1ption. PSR ~ 136. One week later, on September 12, 2017, the computer system of the law\nfom that filed the application, Clark Hill PLC, was hacked. 26 The hacker stole, at a minimum, Mr.\nGuo's asylum application and supporting affidavit, which together contained substantial\nconfidential and sensitive infonnation about the reasons Mr. Guo feared reti·ibution by the CCP\nshould he retmn to China.\nA week after the hack, the law fnm abmptly te1minated its representation of Mr. Guo.\nThen, beginning around September 23, 2017, Mr. Guo' s personal info1mation and confidential\npo1iions of his asylum application and affidavit began to appear on Twitter, causing reputational\nhann and putting Mr. Guo, his family, and his employees at risk.\n6. Weaponizing the Civil Legal System With a False Rape Lawsuit\nOn September 11, 2017, a fonner employee of Mr. Guo filed a civil complaint against him\nin New York State comi falsely alleging that he had raped her on multiple occasions and effectively\nheld her captive for nearly three years, even though Mr. Guo himself had not even been in the\n25 Video of the full hearing is available at http\nactivity/heai·ings/a-time-for-trnth-oversight-of-metas-foreign-relations-and-representations-to-\nthe-united-states-con\n24\n\n---\n\n25\n\nUnited States for three years at that time.27 The initial complaint did not allege when the supposed\nsexual assaults occurred – not which year, month, day, or even season – but did make a point at\nthe outset of lodging unrelated allegations against Mr. Guo, namely, that his public persona as a\nChinese dissident was crafted for the purpose of obtaining political support for asylum, and that\nhe had a “checkered past rife with allegations of economic fraud.” Ex. 8 ¶¶ 17, 18 (Complaint in\nRui Ma v. Guo Wengui et al.).\nNot long after the civil complaint was filed, organized demonstrations against Mr. Guo\nbegan to take place outside his Manhattan apartment building. Demonstrators lined up in formation\nand held uniform preprinted signs calling Mr. Guo a rapist and a liar and urging him to leave the\nUnited States. Images of these protests subsequently appeared in tweets from CCP-linked Twitter\naccounts. See “Retweeting” at 39-40. Consistent with the Ma case complaint, these demonstrations\nand online dissemination of related photos had all the markings of being coordinated by the CCP.\nG. The CCP’s Targeting of Mr. Guo Converges with the Conduct in this Case\n\nIn this context, where Mr. Guo had become a prominent public critic of the CCP, millions\nof Chinese individuals in China and abroad found resonance and hope in his messages, and the\nCCP was waging a fierce campaign to discredit, silence, and repatriate Mr. Guo, the events giving\nrise to the charges in this case took shape. The CCP itself was an active participant in shaping these\nevents.\nOne key element underlying this prosecution was the relationship that Mr. Guo developed\nwith Steve Bannon beginning in late 2017. After Mr. Bannon, a staunch believer that China\n\n27 The case is Rui Ma v. Guo Wengui et al., Sup Ct, NY County, Sept. 11, 2017, Index No.\n158140/2017). An interlocutory appeal of a 2023 order entered in the matter remains pending in\nthe Appellate Division, where plaintiff – who returned to China shortly after filing the complaint\n– now appears to be unrepresented.\n\n---\n\nrepresented the greatest long-tenn threat to the United States, 28 was forced out of his White House\nrole as an advisor to then-President Tnnnp, a shared acquaintance introduced him to Mr. Guo.29\nThe mutual disdain Mr. Guo and Mr. Bannon had for the Chinese government led to a natural\nalliance. 30\nMr. Guo engaged Bannon as a paid consultant in Janmuy 2018. In November 2018,\nfollowing considerable planning throughout the year (Tr. 469-70), the two announced the launch\nof the Rule of Law Foundation (\"ROLF\"). The Rule of Law Foundation, and accompanying Rule\nof Law Society (\"ROLS\") were nonprofit organizations focused on promoting democracy and the\nrnle oflaw in China, in tandem with Mr. Guo's Whistleblower Movement. On June 4, 2020, Mr.\nBannon and Mr. Guo announced creation of the New Federal State of China (\"NFSC\").31\nMeanwhile, the PRC government seized additional Guo family assets in late October\n2018,32 and the 912 Project actively continued to publicly discredit Mr. Guo. In Januaiy 2018 the\n28 See http /09/08/us/politics/steve-bannon-china-trnmp.html.\n29 Mr. Guo had been scheduled to be interviewed by jomnalist Bill Ge11z at the Hudson\nInstitute in Washington, D.C., on October 4, 2017, but the event was abmptly postponed in the\nwake\nof\na\ncyberattack\nthat\nthe\nInstitute\ntraced\nto\nShanghai.\nSee\nhttp\ninto-washington-1 507260255; http /www.hudson.org/node/4 l 042. Ge11z thereafter connected\nBannon with Mr. Guo.\n30 See htt  •\n•\nThe Government has characterized the October 2018 asset seizme as the motive for Mr.\nGuo's creation of the Rule of Law entities and later other G-Series entities - namely, as vehicles\nthrough which he could defraud followers and emich himself after being stripped of assets (see Tr.\n5959) - but considerable trial testimony contradicted that theo1y, including testimony from\nGovernment witness Karen Maistrello, who stated that Mr. Bannon was actively involved\nthroughout 2018 in planning for the launch of the Rule of Law organizations. Tr. 469-70.\n26\n\n---\n\n27\n\n912 Group created a Twitter account specifically to “like” other derogatory Tweets about Mr. Guo.\nBai Complaint ¶ 105.\nFor  example, one Tweet in Chinese stated, “I would like to ask all netizens not to be\nexploited by the media controlled by rumors, gossip, and the rapist, plague ghost [Guo Wengui]!\nPlague ghost [Guo Wengui] is the biggest ‘national thief’ on the Internet. Spreading rhetoric on\nthe Internet every day, using netizens to satisfy his own desires, plague ghost [Guo Wengui]’s\ncrimes are too numerous to mention.” Id.\nAs the ASPI and Stanford studies confirmed, tens of thousands of Twitter accounts were\nengaged in coordinated anti-Guo messaging throughout 2018 and beyond, including targeting Mr.\nGuo’s work with Bannon. The 912 Group also used Facebook to attack Mr. Guo’s credibility, with\none account posting at least nine times in November and December 2018, often referring to Mr.\nGuo as a “big liar.” Id. ¶ 104. The Facebook activity was pointed in its criticism and ongoing for\nyears, see id ¶¶ 94-103, as was 912 Group activity on YouTube. Id. ¶¶ 106-108.\nGiven the disruption to Mr. Guo’s own social media accounts, as well as the popularity of\nhis broadcasts, creation of his own online media platform was a logical and feasible step for Mr.\nGuo. To that end, GTV Media was established in April 2020 by Saraca Media Group, Inc., a Guo\nfamily entity, and the GTV private placement was announced later that month. Tr. 4542. The\nprivate placement raised hundreds of millions of dollars from thousands of investors.\nThe Farm Loan program began shortly thereafter, in June 2020, to create additional\nopportunities for small-scale supporters of the Movement to contribute to its operations and\neventually obtain shares in GTV.33 For those who contributed to the Farm Loan program, the\n\n33 As addressed by defense counsel during trial, the time horizon for conversion had not\nelapsed by the time of Mr. Guo’s arrest. See, e.g. Tr. 6038.\n\n---\n\n28\n\ncontributions demonstrated a meaningful degree of commitment to the Movement and its\nvolunteering and broadcast activities. It was important to Mr. Guo that owners of shares in GTV\nhave a genuine commitment to the Movement given the powerful forces in play trying to\nundermine him.\nG Club, which officially launched in October 2020, similarly provided a way for\nindividuals to support the Movement, find fellowship with like-minded people, and enjoy the\nbenefits that G Club offered, such as discounts on G Fashion. Thousands of individuals purchased\nG Club memberships for fees ranging from $10,000 (for a Tier 1 membership) to $50,000 (for a\nTier 5 membership).\nFinally, the Himalaya Exchange (“HEX”), a cryptocurrency ecosystem, enabled customers\nto purchase two types of tokens, Himalaya dollar (“HDO”) and Himalaya Coin (“HCN”). HDO\nwas a stablecoin, pegged 1:1 to the U.S. dollar and backed by reserves, and HCN was a token with\na floating value. Potential customers had access to separate whitepapers about HDO and HCN on\nthe HEX website in both English and Chinese. Customers could purchase HDO with fiat currency\nand HCN with HDO. HEX proved to be extremely popular, issuing hundreds of millions of dollars\nin HDO, and with active trading of HCN leading to significant increases in value. HEX, and its\naccompanying app, Himalaya Pay (H Pay), were widely used up until HEX was shut down\nfollowing the jury verdict in this case.\nDuring the same period of time that these entities were active, the CCP was assiduously\ncontinuing its online campaign to discredit Mr. Guo through the 912 Project while also taking\nincreasingly aggressive measures within China to undermine support of Mr. Guo. These measures\nincluded interrogations, threats, criminal prosecutions, coerced statements of regret, coerced filing\n\n---\n\n29\n\nof false complaints with U.S. authorities and media outlets in connection with the entities, and\neven templates for a social media smear campaign.\nDuring trial, Government witness Ya Li testified that the CCP called her parents in China\nand asked them to tell her to cease her activities with the Whistleblower Movement because they\nthreatened national security. Tr. 1535. According to Li, the CCP called other relatives as well,\ntrying to locate her, and her parents warned her not to return to China because she would be\narrested. Id. Also during trial, defense witness Jianhu Yi testified that in October 2020, after he\nhad invested in GTV, two plainclothes MSS officers took him from his workplace in Shanghai to\na separate location where three officers interrogated him for 11 hours during which he was not free\nto leave. Tr. 5042-46. Officers confiscated his phone and told him he was facing three to five years’\nimprisonment for investing in an organization hostile to the Chinese government. Tr. 5048-53.\nThey asked him about family members in China, made sure he understood that he could not hide\nfrom them, and tried to persuade him to cooperate. Tr. 5050-51\nYi testified to five subsequent meetings with these officers between October 2020 and\nJanuary 2021. During the second meeting, officers took his GTV stock certificates and told him\nhe would lose all his money because the investments were bogus. Tr. 5052. During the third\nmeeting, they told him to file a lawsuit against Mr. Guo. Tr. 5053. During the fourth meeting, they\nforced him to write a letter seeking to withdraw his investments in GTV, G Dollar, and G Club,\nand to send photos of the letters to the police. Tr. 5054-55.\nDuring the fifth meeting, they told Yi they would provide him with a lawyer, forced him\nto document all of his investments, and provided him with email addresses for sending complaints.\nTr. 5055-56. During the sixth meeting, they required Yi to bring his computer with a VPN installed\nso he could show them the false complaints he had been forced to file. Tr. 5056. Defense Exhibit\n\n---\n\n30\n\n60704, admitted at trial and attached hereto as Exhibit 9, is a copy of the (false) complaint that Yi\nfiled with the FBI. Tr. 5057.\nYi also filed false complaints with the New York State Attorney General, the New York\nTimes, and the Wall Street Journal, all to protect his family. Tr. 5058-59. The lawyer the Chinese\ngovernment provided to Yi  did in fact file a lawsuit against Mr. Guo on behalf of Yi, without Yi’s\nauthorization. Tr. 5066.\n Yi’s testimony is recounted here in some detail not simply to illustrate the lengths to which\nthe CCP has gone to undermine Mr. Guo and lay the groundwork for precisely the type of charges\nin this case, but also because it is entirely consistent with the experiences recounted in unsolicited\nstatements defense counsel has received from multiple other sources, many of whom provided\ndocumentary evidence in support.\nOne such source, Wansheng Cheng, whom undersigned counsel interviewed and whose\nDeclaration is attached hereto as Exhibit 3, described a similar series of interrogations by MSS\nofficers who ultimately forced him to file false complaints about his G-Series investments. The\ninterrogations took place from January 2021 to May 2021, with officers continuing to contact him\nthrough November 2021. Ex. 3 ¶¶ 19-46. Terrified that he might be imprisoned or more seriously\nharmed, Sheng at one point privately swore out a “non-suicide declaration,” which he shared only\nwith close friends and family, as a precaution and testament. Id. ¶ 28 & Ex. A.\nSheng provided counsel with photographs of the original Chinese language instructions the\nofficers provided to him. See id. ¶ 37 & Ex. B (with English translations). These documents\nprovide instructions for filing complaints with the FBI – citing the same website officers had Yi\nuse to file his false complaint, http – as well as with the New York State Attorney\nGeneral’s Office, the SEC, and JPMorgan Chase Bank. Id. Further mirroring Yi’s testimony, the\n\n---\n\n31\n\nsite encouraged contacting mainstream media such as the New York Times and the Wall Street\nJournal, and provided a mobile phone number, email address, and Twitter handle for the Wall\nStreet Journal reporter covering Mr. Guo and his “suspicious” activities. Id.34\nNot surprisingly, the SEC began investigating the GTV securities offerings, including\nofferings through Voice of Guo Media and the marketing of opportunities to invest in what were\nthen referred to as G-Coins and G-Dollars, in or around July 2020. GTV Media Group, Inc., Saraca\nMedia Group, Inc., and Voice of Guo Media, Inc., cooperated with the investigation, which\nresulted in settlement of a civil administrative proceeding based on failures to register the offerings,\nwhich did not qualify for registration exemptions. See Ex. 10 (In re GTV Media Group, Inc. et al.,\nOrder, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-20537 (Sept. 13, 2021)).\nAs part of the settlement, the parties agreed to disgorgement of $486,745,063, along with\n$17,688,365 in prejudgment interest and $35,000,000 in civil penalties. As evidenced at trial, the\nSEC thereafter established a Fair Fund to return funds to investors, each of whom received\napproximately 92% of their initial investment after administrative fee deductions. See Tr. 708,\n1358, 2377.35\n\n34 In addition to coercing him to file false complaints, Cheng reported that one of the MSS\nofficers sent him a handwritten template of “smear campaign” content for him to post online in\norder to disparage and discredit Mr. Guo. A photo of the handwritten Chinese-language template,\nalong with a typed version and English translation, are attached to Cheng’s declaration. See Ex. 3\n¶ 43 & Ex. C.\n35 On March 15, 2023, the date of Mr. Guo’s arrest, the SEC filed a civil complaint against Mr.\nGuo and others alleging fraud in connection with the GTV private placement, farm loans, and G\nClub memberships. SEC v. Ho Wan Kwok et al., No. 23-CV-2200-PGG (SDNY, Mar. 15, 2023).\nThe case has been stayed and remains pending. As discussed below, the jury acquitted Mr. Guo of\nwire fraud and securities fraud in connection with the GTV private placement.\n\n---\n\n32\n\nH. Political Conditions in the United States Set the Stage for a New Administration\nto Turn Against Mr. Guo\nMr. Guo’s close association with Steven Bannon, as well as his creation of the GTV\nplatform, collided with domestic politics in the United States during the run-up to the 2020\npresidential election. The path to Mr. Guo’s prosecution proceeded from there.\nBannon served for a time on the board of the Rule of Law Society, and was also listed in\nthe GTV offering documents as a member of GTV’s Board. He had come under scrutiny by the\nSouthern District of New York for his unrelated “We Build the Wall” crowdfunding campaign not\nlong after he and Mr. Guo announced formation of the Rule of Law entities in November 2018.\nThat investigation came to fruition in August 2020, when Mr. Bannon was arrested in dramatic\nfashion while aboard the Lady May yacht with Mr. Guo. News coverage during that time, informed\nby government sources, touted investigations of their affiliated undertakings, 36  and SEC\nsubpoenas issued to GTV Media and Saraca in July 2020 sought information about ROLS and\nROLF as well as about the GTV private placement.\nOn October 24, 2020, a GTV user posted salacious videos of Hunter Biden on the platform,\nsparking a national media firestorm just days before the presidential election. Mr. Guo did not\ninsist that the posts be removed, and he found himself engulfed in the ensuing political maelstrom.\nThat only intensified after Joseph Biden prevailed in the 2020 election, Mr. Guo publicly supported\nefforts to overturn the election results, and Hunter Biden sought retribution for disclosure of the\nvideos.\n\n36 See, e.g., Aruna Viswanatha, et al., “FBI Probes Chinese Exile, Including Work With Former\nTrump Aide Steve Bannon,” Wall Street Journal, July 8, 20202 (htt); Brian\nSpegele, et al., “Fundraising at Company Tied to Steve Bannon and Guo wengui Faces Probe,”\nWall Street Jonrnal, Aug. 19, 2020 (http).\n\n---\n\n33\n\nIn February 2023, Mother Jones reported that Hunter Biden’s counsel had recently sent a\nseries of letters asking state and federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, to launch\ninvestigations into alleged crimes by people thought to have played a role in distributing material\nfrom Hunter Biden’s laptop.37 The article specifically mentioned Mr. Guo. Two days later, the\nsame magazine reported that Hunter Biden had threatened to sue Mr. Guo as well as Bannon in\nconnection with disclosure of material from the laptop.38\nMr. Guo was arrested the following month, on March 15, 2023. The central allegation\nagainst him in the initial indictment concerned the private placement for the GTV platform on the\nwhich the Hunter Biden videos were initially posted. The Government added a RICO conspiracy\ncount in its second superseding indictment filed on January 3, 2024 (ECF No. 215), and renamed\nthe alleged RICO enterprise as the “G Enterprise” in a third superseding indictment filed on April\n24, 2024 (ECF No. 307).\nMr. Guo proceeded to trial in late May 2024. Steve Bannon’s name and image were placed\nbefore the jury more than one hundred times during the seven-week proceedings. On July 16, 2024,\nthe jury found Mr. Guo not guilty of wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with the GTV\nprivate placement (Counts Five and Six), and not guilty of engaging in an unlawful money\ntransaction (Count Twelve). The jury found Mr. Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy (Count\nOne), conspiracy to commit wire fraud or bank fraud (Count Two), conspiracy to commit money\nlaundering (Count Three), conspiracy to commit securities fraud (Count Four), substantive wire\n\n37 Dan Friedman, “Why Twitter Was Right to Suppress (Some of) the Material From Hunter’s\nLaptop,” Mother Jones, Feb. 8, 2023 (htt).\n38 Dan Friedman, “Hunter Biden Threatens to Sue Steve Bannon and Exiled Mogul Guo\nWengui,” Mother Jones, Feb. 10, 2023 (http).\n\n---\n\n34\n\nfraud and securities fraud in connection with the Farm Loan program and G Club (Counts Seven\nthrough Ten), and wire fraud in connection with the Himalaya Exchange (Count Eleven).\nThere was no special verdict form and the jury made no determination as to any “loss\namount.”\nI. Affirmative Disavowal of Victim Status by Investors and Customers\nNotwithstanding the conviction, thousands of individuals who invested in G-Series entities\nhave expressly stated that they were not victimized by Mr. Guo. As defense counsel has previously\ndetailed (see ECF No. 799 at 5-9), these individuals include: (a) more than 6,500 HEX customers\nwho have filed petitions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) for return of seized funds (see, e.g.,ECF\nNos. 759, 761 at 3); (b) hundreds of investors in the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC who have\nalso filed § 853(n) petitions (see, e.g.,  ECF Nos. 674, 756); (c) investors who have filed individual\n§ 853(n) petitions or contacted the Government disclaiming victim status, such as those disclosed\nin discovery at USAO_00112534-USAO_00112564; and (d) several hundred individuals who\nhave written directly to defense counsel. As previously noted, we will provide the Court with a\nseparate submission under seal containing a representative sample of the more than 1,000\nstatements sent to defense counsel disclaiming victim status.\nTo be clear, we present these perspectives not to challenge the jury verdict, which we\naccept for purposes of sentencing, but to place that verdict in its proper context and frame its\nlimitations. While the Government presented testimony from a handful of witnesses who identified\nthemselves as victims and claimed that certain statements by Mr. Guo were material to their\ndecisions to send money for particular investments or undertakings, thousands of other individuals\nsent funds to the same entities for reasons unrelated to the alleged misrepresentations that formed\nthe core of the Government’s case. For these individuals the alleged misrepresentations simply\nwere not material.\n\n---\n\n35\n\nIn addition, while discussed to some extent supra, Part I.G, the CCP campaign of\nintimidation and coerced complaints against Mr. Guo was considerably more extensive than\npresented at trial or in this memo. As it calls into question the validity of any written victim\nstatements that may have been provided to the Government or other law enforcement authorities,\nit is important at this stage of the case for the Court to have a more complete picture of its scope.\nTo date, defense counsel has received approximately 60 statements that reference CCP\ninterrogation, threats, or detention of the writer based on alleged interactions with Mr. Guo or\nentities involved in this case. At least five of these individuals indicated that they were forced to\nfile false complaints against Mr. Guo, and many more note that they have left China and either\nseek or have been granted asylum elsewhere.\nTestimony offered during trial and accounts provided in statements to defense counsel\nprovide insight into the value that the G-Series entities provided to investors and customers. These\nnarratives are voluminous, credible, and directly at odds with the Government’s theory that certain\nalleged misrepresentations materially induced individuals to part with their money.\nDefense witness Jianhu Yi, for instance, testified that he purchased a G Club memberhip\nbecause of the camaraderie, friendship, and services G Club offered. Tr. 5072. Countless others\nwho purchased G Club memberships have written to defense counsel expressing similar\nsentiments. Wansheng Cheng, for instance, states that he purchased a G Club membership in April\n2022 for $20,000, funded from proceeds of trading activity on the Himalaya Exchange. He writes:\n“I see GǀClub as a recognition of identity – a group where people share the same values. Initially\nI understand that we would [be] provided discounts on certain purchases, then later benefits would\nbe added, which I expected would take some time. I have not tried to get my GǀClub membership\nmoney back and I am not interested in getting it back.” Ex. 3 ¶16.\n\n---\n\n36\n\nDefense witness Lai Dai, who invested $155,000 in GTV, bought a $50,000 G Club\nmembership, and invested $300,000 in HEX, testified that his decision to get a G Club membership\nhad nothing to do with any connection between G Club membership and receiving GTV shares\n(Tr. 5248). To the contrary, he described G Club as a “symbol of identity” (Tr. 5244) that enabled\nhim to join with people who share a common faith and enjoy other benefits (Tr. 5244-45). With\nrespect to HEX, Dai testified that it was immaterial to him whether HDO was backed by gold (Tr.\n5379) or whether it was currently on the Ethereum blockchain (Tr. 5252). He found value in HEX\nregardless of these features, as did thousands of other HEX customers who maintain that they were\nnot victims of any fraud perpetrated by Mr. Guo. The same is true for countless contributors to the\nFarm Loan program, G Club members, and GTV investors.\nMr. Dai submitted a sentencing letter to the Court that provides further perspective on this\naspect of the case:\nThe matter most directly related to me in this case concerns my own investment\nexperience involving companies commonly referred to as the “G-Series.” In this\ncontext, I participated as an ordinary investor with some relevant experience. My\ninvestment decision was not based on blind trust but on my own investment\nexperience and commercial judgment. After reviewing relevant materials and\nbusiness plans, I made my decision while fully understanding that any investment\ninherently involves risk. Based on the information available to me, the relevant\nbusinesses did exist and were operating.\nAmong the investors I personally know, I have not personally encountered anyone\nwho considers themselves to have been harmed. Of course, I understand that\ndifferent individuals may have had different experience, and there may be\ncircumstances of which I am not aware. However, based on my own observations,\nmy experience does not fully align with certain narratives presented during the trial.\nI do not intend to deny others’ experiences; I simply wish to explain that, as a real\nparticipant in these investments, my own experiences and judgment formed the\ncontext in which I made my decision.\nEx. 11.\n\n---\n\n37\n\nGiven the scale of support Mr. Guo has amassed, he clearly is not alone in his fervor to\nbring democratic reform to China. The power of the Chinese government to control the affairs of\nits people and target its enemies, whether they live in China or elsewhere, is overwhelming. This\nfact is central to the appeal of the Whistleblower Movement and the G-Series entities to an untold\nnumber of individuals.\\ To cite just one of the hundreds of letters counsel has received addressing\nthe considerations deemed significant by investors and customers:\nMr. Guo repeatedly and emphatically warned all of his followers that opposing the\nCCP is the most dangering undertaking in the world, and that anyone with the\nslightest hesitation, or anyone motivated by money or fame, should not participate.\n\nThis was the consensus among all committed participants: our investments were\nnot financial speculation – they were votes. Votes to dismantle the CCP, to end the\nhuman tragedies it has inflicted for generations, to secure the safety of our own\nlives and the lives of our children. I chose to invest, chose to follow Mr. Guo, and\nchose to join the New Federal State of China. I regard thse as the most important\nand most correct decisions of my life.\n\nEx. 12 (Statement of\n, March 10, 2026).\n\nIndeed, many HEX customers made a considerable profit from their HCN purchases.\nWansheng Cheng, for instance, states that he put approximately $22,000 in HEX, which he used\nin part to purchase 3,000 HCN. Ex. 3 ¶ 15. At its peak, his HCN holdings had a value of\napproximately $160,000, and it was the funds he maintained in HEX that he used to support\nhimself during his nearly two-year journey from China to the United States following multiple\ninterrogations. Id.\nAs discussed in more detail in the following section, in these unusual circumstances where\nthere has been an extensive disavowal of victim status, and where the jury made no finding as to\nthe scope of any fraud for which they returned a guilty verdict, the Government’s calculation of a\n$1.3 billion fraud in this case is entirely speculative, and no “loss amount” can be assessed absent\na Fatico hearing.\n\n---\n\n38\n\nII.\nDETERMINING A SENTENCE THAT IS SUFFICIENT BUT NOT GREATER\nTHAN NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF SENTENCING\n\nA. Applicable Sentencing Considerations\n\nPursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543\nU.S. 220 (2005), and the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Booker in United States v. Crosby, 397\nF.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005), this Court’s sentencing decision must be based upon the factors set forth\nin 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Section 3553(a) requires the Court to impose a sentence “sufficient, but\nnot greater than necessary” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,\nto provide just punishment, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public,\nand to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other\ncorrectional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).\n\nThe Court is no longer required to impose a sentence within the range specified by the\nGuidelines. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111. Indeed, “[a] district court may not presume that a Guidelines\nsentence is reasonable; it must instead conduct its own independent review of the sentencing\nfactors, aided by the arguments of the prosecution and defense.” Id. The Supreme Court has\nconfirmed that “[t]he Guidelines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts, they are also\nnot to be presumed reasonable.” Nelson v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 890, 892 (2010) (emphasis in\noriginal).\n\nAlso, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent from the “remedial” opinion in United States v.\nBooker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005):[t]he statute provides no order of priority among all those factors,\nbut since the three just mentioned [§§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (B) & (C)] are the fundamental criteria\ngoverning penology, the statute – absent the mandate of § 3553(b)(1) – authorizes the judge to\napply his own perceptions of just punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public even when\n\n---\n\n39\n\nthese differ from the perceptions of the Commission members who drew up the Guidelines. 543\nU.S. at 304-305 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).\n\nThe factors the Court must consider in determining how to satisfy the enumerated goals of\nsentencing are the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the\ndefendant, the kinds of sentences available, the sentencing range set forth in the U.S. Sentencing\nGuidelines, any policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid\nunwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to any victims of the\noffense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).39\n\nThe Second Circuit has reaffirmed these sentencing principles while emphasizing that “[a]\nsentencing judge has very wide latitude to decide the proper degree of punishment for an individual\noffender and a particular crime.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (en\nbanc). Sentencing must be undertaken with due consideration of the particular circumstances of\nany given case and the background and character of any particular defendant. As the Supreme\nCourt observed in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), and reaffirmed in Gall v. United\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 598 (2007):\nIt has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing\njudge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a\nunique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify,\nthe crime and the punishment to ensue.\n\n518 U.S. at 113; see also United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 182 (2d Cir. 2008) (“in every case,\nthe district court ‘must make an individualized assessment’ of the appropriate sentence ‘based on\n\n39 The Government, per its letter to the Court dated January 9, 2026, does not seek restitution\nin this case given its impracticability, and instead seeks to return funds to investors and customers\nthrough a remission process. See ECF No. 785 at 4-5. Mr. Guo concurs. ECF No. 789 at 3.\n\n---\n\nthe facts presented' and the factors detailed in § 3553(a)\") (quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct.\n586, 597 (2007)).\nB. The Sentencing Guidelines Calculations in the PSR are in Error\nThe Presentence Report (\"PSR\") at ,, 112-123 calculates an adviso1y Guidelines\nsentencing offense level of 43 for Mr. Guo. The PSR calculates the Guidelines as follows:\nPSR 1\nDescription\nUSSG Section\nLevels\n~ 114\nBase offense level\n2B 1.1( a)(l)\n7\n~ 114\nLoss in excess of $550,000,000\n2B1 .1 (b )(1 )(P)\n+30\n~ 114\n10 or more victims\n2B 1.1 (b )(2)(A)(i)\n+2\n,114\nActed on behalf of a charitable, educational,\n2B 1.1 (b )(9)(A)-\n+2\nreligious, or political organization, or a\n(C)\ngovernment agency etc.\n,114\nRelocated or pa1ticipated in relocating a\n2B1.l(b)(l0)(A) & +2\nfraudulent scheme to another jmisdiction to\n(C)\nevade law enforcement or regulato1y officials,\nand the offense otherwise involved\nsophisticated means and defendant\nintentionally engaged in or caused the conduct\nconstituting sophisticated means\n,114\nDerived more than $1,000,000 in gross\n2B1.l(b)(17)\n+2\nreceipts from one or more financial institutions\nas a result of the offense\n~ 114\nTotal Base Offense Level\n45\n~ 115\nConviction under 18 U.S.C. 1956(h)\n2S 1.1 (b )(2)(B)\n+2\n, 116\n2Sl .l(b)(2)(B) applies and the offense\n2S 1.1 (b )(3)\n+2\ninvolved sophisticated laundering\n,118\nOrganizer or leader of criminal activity that\n3B1.l(a)\n+4\ninvolved 5 or more participants\n~ 119\nObstruction of iustice\n3Cl.1\n+2\n~ 120\nAdjusted Offense Level (Subtotal)\n55\n~ 123\nTOTAL OFFENSE LEVEL\n43\nThe PSR recommends a sentence of 300 months' imprisonment (see PSR Sentencing\nRecommendation at 58), a te1m that, in our respectful view, exceeds what is sufficient in this case\nand far greater than necessaiy for this Criminal Histo1y Catego1y I defendant.\n40\n\n---\n\n41\n\n1. No “Loss Amount” Exists in this Case\n\nAs a threshold matter, Mr. Guo continues to maintain that he is not guilty of any of the\ncharges, and intends to appeal his conviction on numerous grounds. Thus, Mr. Guo does not\nconcede that there is any “loss amount.”\nNor did the trial establish any “loss amount.” The jury was not asked to determine the\namount of loss or the identity of any alleged “victims.” In fact, the Court’s jury charge was explicit\nin that regard. For example, regarding the wire fraud counts, the Court instructed the jury that it\ndid not “need to find that the defendant profited from the fraud.” Tr. 5793. Similarly, regarding\nsecurities fraud, the jury was instructed that it was not required to find “that anyone suffered any\nloss or that the Defendant realized any gain.” Tr. 5802.\nHowever, because the sentencing stage requires acceptance of the jury’s verdict solely for\nthe abstract calculation of a Guidelines level, this submission engages in that evaluation as an\nessential component of sentencing.\n\nAmong the important reasons why the recommendation is far too high is that the Guidelines\ncalculation is erroneous, principally because the $1.3 billion “loss amount” alleged is unsupported\nfor a number of reasons:  (1)  the Government based the $1.3 billion figure solely on inflows to\nthe G-Series entities and not on any rigorious tracing analysis or other evidence establishing loss;\n(2) the “loss amount” improperly includes acquitted conduct, which violates both the Sixth\nAmendment and a 2024 Guidelines amendment; (3)  the “loss amount” erroneously includes funds\nfrom individuals who explicitly deny they were defrauded; and (4)  the “loss amount” incorrectly\nincludes amounts that should be excluded based on other controlling legal principles, such as\noffsets for redemptions, refunds, residual value, or double counting.\n\n---\n\n42\n\nWhile forfeiture and “loss amount” are doctrinally distinct, many of the issues relevant to\nforfeiture, and discussed in Mr. Guo’s submissions with respect to forfeiture (ECF Nos. 799, 804),\napply equally to “loss amount.”\n\nThis case is extremely unusual, if not unique, in that it does not present a categorical fraud\nin which every investor claims that misrepresentations were material to the specific investor’s\ndecision to contribute or that every investor actually was defrauded. Instead, unlike nearly all fraud\ncases, many investors in and customers of the G-Series entities affirmatively deny that they are, in\nfact, victims of any fraud by Mr. Guo.\nAs discussed below, in some instances the investors assert that they have suffered\neconomically from the Government’s conduct, and not Mr. Guo’s. 40  This novel posture,\nconsidering the number and variety of investors who have disclaimed victim status, requires\nscrutiny and precision before any “loss amount” can be determined.\n\nIf the Government attempts to establish any “loss amount,” or disputes any of the grounds\nset forth herein for reducing the “loss amount,” Mr. Guo respectfully submits that a hearing\npursuant to United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978), is necessary to adjudicate this\nessential component of his Guidelines calculation. Due Process and the Sixth Amendment do not\npermit any less.\na. The Fundamental Legal Framework for Calculating “Loss Amount”\nThe Government argues that the “loss” for Guidelines purposes is $1.3 billion dollars, and\nthe PSR, adopts that number. PSR ¶¶ 109, 113-14. The PSR’s and the Government’s arithmetic,\n\n40 This is not a sufficiency argument, or an attempt to relitigate the jury’s verdict, which Mr.\nGuo acknowledges for purposes of sentencing, and for the Guidelines calculation within that\ncontext. Rather, it involves examining the elements of that calculation.\n\n---\n\n43\n\nhowever, based solely on the amount of money flowing into the various entities set forth in GX Z-\n26, is fundamentally and fatally flawed.\nAnalysis commences with the proposition stated in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,\n351 (2007), that the district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating\nthe applicable sentencing range. An incorrect calculation interferes with the court’s duty to impose\na sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to comply with the purposes of sentencing\nas outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and related case law provide guidance into the sometimes complex task\nof accurately determining loss amount in financial crimes such as fraud. Note A to the Loss Table\nin § 2B1.1(b)(1) provides that “loss” is “the greater of actual loss or intended loss.” Note C(i)\ndefines “actual loss” as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the\noffense,” and Note C(ii) defines “intended loss” as “the pecuniary harm that the defendant\npurposely sought to inflict[,]” including “intended pecuniary harm that would have been\nimpossible or unlikely to occur.” 41 The Government bears the burden of proving loss by a\npreponderance of the evidence. United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 228 (2d Cir. 1997).\nIn arriving at its loss determination, the Court does not need to be exact. However, its\nestimate of loss must still be a reasonable estimate, based upon the evidence. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1,\ncomment. n. B. Additional legal principles that apply to specific aspects of loss are detailed below.\nb. The Government’s Reliance Solely on Inflows to the G-Series Entities is\nFundamentally Flawed\nThe Government asks the Court to adopt a $1.3 billion loss figure based almost entirely on\nits trial exhibit GX Z-26,42 a summary chart derived from analysis performed by the Government’s\n\n41 Note C(iii) defines “pecuniary harm” as monetary harm or harm that is “readily measurable\nin money.”\n42 GX Z-26 was received in evidence at Tr. 4329. A copy is attached hereto as Ex. 13.\n\n---\n\n44\n\nretained expert, Paul Hinton of the Brattle Group. The problem with this reliance is that the Brattle\nGroup’s work consisted of little more than processing bank records and related documents\nprovided by the Government in order to chart the transactions of interest to the Government. The\nwork product, culminating in GX Z-26, was not an independent forensic analysis of investor harm,\nbut a presentation of prosecutorial selections.\nHinton testified that GX Z-26 essentially “was the result of summing up the value of all\nthe transactions in the database, so that’s all the transactions we processed and categorized\naccording to the categories that the government gave us for GTV, Farms, G Club, and Himalaya.”\nTr. 4330. The Brattle Group had no independent understanding of the sources of funds for these\nentities, nor did it have any discretion to deviate from instructions provided by the Government\nabout defining sources of funds. Tr. 4331. It just added up the inflows to each of the categories\ndefined by the Government, based on sources defined by the Government. Tr. 4331, 4355-56.\nHinton was not asked to do any tracing in connection with his analysis. Tr. 4356, 4430. He\ndid not do any detailed flow-of-fund analysis, and thus could not testify how much flowed through\nspecific accounts. Tr. 4458. He did not perform any transaction-level analysis of alleged fraud\nproceeds, or conduct an investor-level accounting of deposits, withdrawals, redemptions, or value\nreceived.\nThere was no evidence, moreover, of the source of “other inflows” of funds that went into\none key account belonging to ACA Capital, a Guo family entity, at First Abu Dhabi Bank. This in\nturn meant that there was no evidence at trial from which any finder of fact could reliably conclude\nthat any alleged fraud proceeds – much less $77 million or $110 million in supposed proceeds\nattributed to the Farm Loans – ever flowed out of that account. See Tr. 4428-30; Ex. 13 at 8. The\nsource of those outflows remains entirely unproven.\n\n---\n\n45\n\nThe Government’s attribution of $517 million in loss to the Himalaya Exchange is similarly\nimpaired. That $517 million figure aggregates gross account inflows without distinguishing\ninvestor deposits from secondary-market trading activity or transfers to other categories such as G\nClub. The Government’s calculation reflects transactional volume only, not any pecuniary loss.\nc. The Government’s “Loss Amount” Improperty Includes Amounts\nAttributable to Conduct for which Mr. Guo was Acquitted\nAs detailed infra, at Part II.B.2, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, as well as a 2024\nGuidelines amendment, preclude inclusion of funds attributable to conduct for which Mr. Guo was\nacquitted in any “loss amount” calculation. That alone excludes the $411 million that the\nGovernment attributes to GTV from inclusion in any “loss amount.”\nd. The Government’s “Loss Amount” Fails to Account for the Volume of\nPurported “Victims” Who Affirmatively Deny They Are “Victims”\n\nAs noted above, this case is markedly dissimilar from the vast majority of fraud cases\nbecause a significant number of investors and customers have come forward to attest that they\nwere not deprived of money or property by fraud. In turn, their investments do not qualify for\ninclusion in any “loss amount.” Among that diverse group are some individuals and entities that\nhave filed petitions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n).\n\nThe impact of those investors’ position is illustrated in United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d\n1010 (2d Cir. 1993), in which the defendants, two lawyers, were accused of deceiving investors\nthey represented for the purpose of purchasing apartments available during a co-op conversion.\nThe alleged fraud consisted of securing for themselves certain opportunities to purchase other\napartments in the building without informing the investors.43\n\nAs the Court summarized in Miller, while\n\n43 A more extended discussion of Miller is included in Mr. Guo’s letter regarding forfeiture,\nECF No. 799, at 4-5.\n\n---\n\n46\n\nthe government contend[ed] that [defendants] diverted to their own benefit property\nintended for the Group; to wit, the Apartments and the profits resulting from their\nresale . . . the government does not surmount the obstacle posed by [the witness’s]\nuncontradicted testimony, which undercuts any understanding as to this specific\nagency relationship that precluded parallel investments by [defendants] in [the\napartment complex’s] apartments in general, or the eight Apartments in particular.\n\nId. at 1020.\n\nThus, while materiality ordinarily would be subject to a “reasonable person” standard,\nMiller establishes otherwise when – as here with so many of the investors and customers – the\npurported “victim” specifically and affirmatively disavows that element, thereby vitiating the\nallegations of fraud with respect to that particular person’s investment. By definition, if an investor\nis not a victim of fraud, then that investor’s investment funds cannot be considered part of any\n“loss amount.”\nAs a result, any “loss amount” herein is diminished in material respects by several\ncategories of persons (or entities) who expressly disavow any status as “victims” of any fraud:\n(1)\nthe 6,512 persons maintaining cryptocurrency accounts with the Himalaya\nExchange. See, e.g., Response of 6.512 Claimants as Members of the Himalaya\nExchange and Their Counsel to Individual Motions, October 22, 2025 (ECF No.\n761) (“HEX Response”);\n(2)\nthe 324 investors in the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Hamilton”). See, e.g.,\nSupplemental Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner’s Interest in Forfeited\nProperty and to Amend the Prelminary Order of Forfeiture Entered as to Defendant\nMiles Guo, October 22, 2025 (ECF No. 756) (“Hamilton Supplemental”); Third-\nparty Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner’s Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend\nthe Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, April 7, 2025 (ECF No. 674) (“Hamilton\nPetition”);\n(3)\nthe investors who wrote the Government disclaiming victim status, provided in part\nas discovery at USAO_00112534-USAO_00112564;\n(4)\nthe investors who have contacted defense counsel disclaiming victim status.\nAdded to that significant number are those purported victims whom the Government has\nfailed to identify, but who may be included in any of those four classes of non-victims. Given the\nabundant proof that a considerable number of supposed “victims” reject that classification, it is\n\n---\n\n47\n\nincumbent upon the Government to establish any “loss amount” with sufficient specificity to\npermit the Court to conclude with the requisite confidence that there is any “loss amount” at all.\nThat evaluation requires a Fatico hearing because Mr. Guo disputes the contention that there is\nany loss.\ni.\nThe Himalaya Exchange\nThe Himalaya Exchange (“HEX”) was a viable and popular cryptocurrency exchange, used\nby its investors and users to exchange and make money, which they did. HEX was a commercially\nactive platform and trading HCN was a source of income and profit for many investors who traded\nin HCN.\nGovernment witness Wei Chen testified that she invested more than $500,000 in HCN even\nafter the SEC had seized the money she invested in GTV. Tr. 4499, 4634. In fact, she sold and\npurchased HCN in numerous transactions, sometimes on a seconardary market. Tr. 4671-72. YOU\nARE HERE – add cites from JK The sworn declaration of Wansheng Cheng also documents active\n– and highly profitable – use of HEX. See Ex. 3. Cheng invested approximately $22,000 in HEX,\npurchased 3,000 HCN when they became available, and saw his investment swell to a value of\n$160,000 at its peak. Id. ¶ 15. He relied on HDO and HCN while living in Turkey and Thailand\nafter fleeing China in the wake of persistent CCP interrogations, as well as during further travel en\nroute to the United States, selling 500 HCN at $19 each just prior to HEX being shut down on July\n16, 2024 after the jury verdict in this case. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17, 48. Cheng does not view himself as a\nvictim of any fraud perpetrated by Mr. Guo. Id. ¶ 55.\nAlso, through their counsel, 6,512 members of the Himalaya Exchange – representing\napproximately two-thirds of Himalaya Exchange members, see HEX Response, at 3 – have\nobjected to forfeiture of their accounts (and the assets within them) as proceeds of any fraud – a\nposition that vitiates any claim that it can be considered part of any “loss amount.”  As the HEX\n\n---\n\n48\n\nResponse states, “[m]any investors in the Himalaya Exchange (HEX) have expressed frustration\nat being labeled as victims.” Id. at 2.\nElaborating, the HEX petitioners explicitly reject the Government’s theory of prosecution:\n“[t]he criminal case against [Mr. Guo and his co-defendants] rests on the assertion that they\ndefrauded investors, yet many of these investors insist they were not defrauded and reject the\nvictim label.” Id.\nIn addition, these HEX petitioners effectively concur with Mr. Guo that “[p]rosecutors\nhave not identified specific victims or quantified their alleged losses, which is critical in this\ncontext to substantiate fraud claims.” Id. at 3.\nThese HEX petitioners, moreover, maintain that the only economic harm they suffered was\ndue to the Government’s inappropriate intervention:  “[t]here is no evidence in the record showing\nthat HEX investors suffered losses, except for reputational and financial harm to HEX caused by\nthe government’s actions . . .” in seizing petitioners’ accounts. Id. at 2.\nIndeed, “[t]here is consensus among investors that they were not defrauded by [Guo], Je,\nor Wang, but rather harmed by the U.S. government’s actions, which seized their investments.”\nId. at 3. As they put it, it was the Government that “ironically caused the very financial harm it\naimed to prevent.” Id.\nHCN, moreover, retained value, so investors who held (and continue to hold) HCN were\nprovided assets that retain value, which, as explained infra, at Part II.B.1.e, must be discounted\nfrom any “loss amount.” Upon information and belief, the total number of HCN issued was\n930,222,521, and the closing price the day the Government seized certain HEX accounts\n(September 18, 2022) was $25.30 USD. Subsequently, the closing price on March 15, 2023, the\n\n---\n\n49\n\nday of Mr. Guo’s arrest, was $17.81 USD, and $19.77 USD on July 16, 2024, the day Mr. Guo\nwas convicted.\nThe following day, July 17, 2024, trading in HCN was paused, and the closing price was\n$13.77. See October 22, 2025, Updated and Final Entry of Appearance for Counsel’s 6,512 Clients,\nat 2 (ECF No. 759). Bradford L. Geyer, Esq., the attorney for those 6,512 HCN account-holders,\nstates in that filing that his cllients hold 433,992,619.55 HCN, estimating that the Government’s\ninterference in the HEX, disrupting the HCN market, has cost his clients $5,976,051,078. Id.\nIt is respectfully submitted that the closing price on the day of seizure should be utilized to\ndetermine the value of HCN holdings – $23,534,604,000 – because that event clearly affected the\nprice (a decrease of 30%) more than Mr. Guo’s arrest (since the price had recovered somewhat –\nby 11% – by the time of conviction).\nThat $23.5 billion capitalization of HCN eclipses by nearly 20 times the Government’s\nalleged “loss amount.” Even at the capitalization figures for the date of arrest, or the date of\nconviction, or the next day when trading ceased, the remaining value surpasses the alleged “loss\namount” by orders of magnitude.\nii.\nThe Hamilton Petitioners\nThe Hamilton petitioners advance a similar position. The Hamilton petitioners’ property –\ntotaling $89,992,861.75, see Hamilton Petition at 8 ¶ 20 – “is comprised solely of funds that were\nlawfully invested by the M&A Fund Investors, has no nexus to the conduct charged in either\ncriminal case, and therefore lies wholly outside the scope of property subject to forfeiture in either\nproceeding.” Hamilton Supplemental at 4-5; see also id. ¶ 19 n.6 (investment was “legitimate” and\n“regulated”); id. ¶ 25 (petitioner invested their own funds in a vehicle “wholly unrelated to the\nfraudulent schemes alleged in the [Indictment]”).\n\n---\n\n50\n\nThus, the Hamilton investment cannot constitute a “loss.” The Hamilton petitioners’ funds\nwere not used to commit any of the crimes charged, id. ¶ 26, and “there is no evidence that any of\nthe funds in Account 2770 belonged to Defendant Guo or were ever commingled with tainted\nfunds, such that the Government can argue that seizing Petitioner’s Property satisfies the\nrequirements of 21 U.S.C. § 853.” Id. ¶ 22; see also id. ¶ 27 (“[t]here is no evidence that Defendant\nGuo ever used, directed, or exercised any control over these funds, nor that the funds were part of,\nor the proceeds of, any of Defendant Guo’s criminal activities”).\nMoreover, like the HEX petitioners, the Hamilton petitioners’ position is that they have\nsuffered financially not because of Mr. Guo, but because of the Government’s interference in the\ntransaction for which the Hamilton petitioners’ funds were invested. As the Hamilton Supplement\nrecounts, “[w]hile the transaction did close (Guo Trial, 6/17/2024, 2794:25-2795:4), [the seller]\nnever received the investment money because ‘[t]he money was seized in transit by the U.S.\nMarshals.’ Guo Trial, 6/17/2024, 2796:14-23.” Id. ¶ 26 (footnote omitted).44\niii.\nThe Investors Who Have Either Filed Petitions Pursuant to 21 U.S.C.\n§853(n) or Written the Government Disclaiming Victim Status\nThe public electronic docket in this case includes petitions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)\nfrom at least 126 individuals (not including the Hamilton or Himalaya Exchange petitioners)\ninvolving claims totaling more than $28 million. Those petitions, and that total, casts further doubt\non the “loss amount” alleged by the Government.\n\n44 A substantial part of the alleged losses testified to by the Government’s witnesses resulted\nnot from actual losses but from the Government’s seizure of funds in accounts related to GTV, G\nClub, G Bank and Himalaya Exchange. For example, as a result of the GTV seizure, GTV investors\nlost at least 8% of their GTV investments, as 8% was the amount retained by the SEC before\ndistribution pursuant to the SEC’s Fair Fund. Regarding the Farm Loans, payment on those loans\nwas not due until December 1, 2023, and had not been due and payable at the time of seizure by\nthe Government.\n\n---\n\n51\n\nIn addition, discovery produced by the Government included at least one folder containing\n31 emails setting forth complaints by investors that Mr. Guo did not defraud them. That folder is\ndenominated by Bates numbers USAO_00112534-USAO_00112564. Most of the emails do not\nspecify the amount of each individual investment, so a total is impossible to derive from them.\nHowever, those communications should further diminish the potential “loss amount” total even if\nthe amount of investment cannot be quantified.\niv.\nThe Investors Who Have Contacted Defense Counsel\nDefense counsel continues to receive communications from persons who identify\nthemselves as investors in or customers of G-Series entities, and who deny they were victimized.\nThe total number of such statements received currently exceeds 1,000.\nAlso, some have informed counsel that to the extent they lodged complaints to U.S. or\nother authorities regarding Mr. Guo, those complaints were coerced by – and in some instances\nwholly authored by – agents of the CCP. See, e.g., Ex. 3 ¶¶ 36-42 (Declaration of Wansheng\nCheng). Many of the correspondents suffered interrogations and detention by PRC authorities in\nthe process.45\nv.\nThe Unknown Number of Investors Who Deny They Are Victims\nThe discussion above raises the question of how many more persons do not consider\nthemselves victims of any fraud by Mr. Guo. Some may be unaware of the sentencing (and\nattendant forfeiture or remission) proceedings; some may be afraid to come forward because they\nfear retribution from the CCP if they contradict the CCP’s narrative that has endeavored to\n\n45 As noted supra, Part I n. 8, Mr. Guo plans to provide the Court with a supplemental\nsubmission containing represetantive samples of the hundreds of statements received by defense\ncounsel, including those recounting CCP interrogation and coercion.\n\n---\n\n52\n\ndiscredit Mr. Guo for political reasons; and some may not have the means or sophistication to\nunderstand their rights pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n).\nRegardless the reason, it is logical and reasonable to conclude that in this most unusual\ncase the categories listed above do not represent all of the persons in each category (except,\nperhaps, for the Hamilton investors). That “unknown” renders it even more imperative that the\nGovernment be held to its burden to prove the existence of any “loss amount.”\nAt the very least, the amounts attributable to those investors in the categories described\nabove must be eliminated from consideration of any “loss amount.” In turn, given the\nunprecedented nature of the circumstances in this case, the Government must establish with\nprecision any “loss amount” attributable to specific investors. Again, that requires a Fatico\nhearing.46\ne. The Government Fails to Account for Other Offsets That Substantially\nReduce Any “Loss Amount”\nThe $1.3 billion “loss amount” alleged by the Government also fails to account for specific\noffsets that further reduce any “loss amount.” Applicable deductions include redemptions, refunds,\nsettlement payments, the residual value of property that investors retain, and double-counting of\ncertain funds.\nFor example, upon information and belief, HEX made at least $200,000,000 in customer\nredemptions, possibly as much as $268,000,000.. Also, the approximately $487,000,000 obtained\n\n46  Unsurprisingly, for this same reason, the Government has chosen not to seek restitution in\nthe case under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act but rather proceed by way of remission and\n§ 853(n) petitions. The simple and undeniable fact is that the Government cannot identify alleged\n“victims,” or any corresponding “loss amount,” with the requisite precision needed to establish\n“loss.”\n\n---\n\n53\n\nby the SEC in connection with the GTV private placement settlement (also excluded because it is\nbased on acquitted conduct) must be deducted from any loss calculation.\nIn addition, the Government’s erroneous “inflow” theory caused it to double-count money\nthat was subject to account-to-account transfers, which the Government appears never to have\nattempted to parse. As discussed, Government witness Paul Hinton, who conducted certain\nfinancial analysis for the prosecution, testified that he was not asked to, and did not, perform a\ndetailed flow-of-fund analysis, rendering him unable to provide an accounting of funds moving\nfrom one entity or account to another entity or account. Tr. 4458.\nSo, for instance, if an investor used money in a HEX account to buy items through G Club,\nthe Government included in its loss calculations the same money when it was deposited in that\ninvestor’s HEX account, and then again when the same money was transferred to G Club to pay\nfor whatever merchandise the investor had purchased.\nG Club provides a specific example. While G Club may have issued $255 million worth of\nmemberships, not all memberships were paid with fiat currency. G Club accepted HDO and HCN\nas payment methods for G Club membership. Approximately $70 million worth of G Club\nmemberships were issued in exchange for HDO, and approximately $25 million of memberships\nwere issued in exchange for HCN.\nAccordingly, any amount that the Government lists for money sent by individuals to G\nClub is incorrect by approximately $70 million in HDO equivalent purchases as well as at least\n$25 million in HCN equivalent purchases which G Club accepted as payment for memberships.\nTherefore, at least $95 million in account-to-account transfers has been double-counted, and must\nbe removed from any “loss amount.”\n\n---\n\n54\n\nMoreover, other refunds to investors also must be deducted, including G Club refunds\ntotaling at least $1 million. These various payments and accounting errors also require a Fatico\nhearing to resolve.\nf. A Fatico Hearing is Consistent with the Court’s Rulings, and the\nGovernment’s Position, That in this Case “Speculation” and\n“Extrapolation” Based on Limited Investor Experience is Inappropriate\nMr. Guo’s position is wholly consistent with, and reinforced by, the position advanced by\nthe Government and endorsed by the Court during trial with respect to the inferences properly\ndrawn from the experience of a limited quantum of investors.\nWhen addressing the plausible inference to be drawn from the testimony of  defense\nwitness Jianhu Yi, who had testified regarding the pressure and threat campaign that the CCP\nexerted on him, the Government argued strenuously, repetitively, and at length, that the jury should\nnot be allowed to infer from Mr. Yi that what happened to him happened to others.\nAUSA Finkel argued that the Court should not allow argument (and inference) about CCP\nthreats to others because “[t]hat is using speculation to make an argument.” Tr. 5568. The Court\nsustained the Government’s objection, ruling that “[y]ou cannot generalize from Mr. Yi’s\nindividual experience. You cannot speculate that he represents the majority of the complainants,\nbecause we have no evidence about any complainants other than the ones who testified here.” Tr.\n5571. The Court continued, “[d]on’t invite them to speculate.” Tr. 5571.\nWhen the issue was raised again, AUSA Horton reiterated the argument that the defense\ncould not argue an inference beyond Mr. Yi’s own personal circumstances. AUSA Horton\ncontended that “what they’re [the defense] trying to do, and what your Honor ruled on, is to take\na single victim’s, a single investor’s testimony limited to his own experience – and I can go through\nspecific cites in the transcript to show how limited it was – and extrapolate from that to really\n\n---\n\n55\n\nunfortunate innuendo against the victim witnesses in the case, and your Honor said it was a very\nhard no, and that was absolutely correct.” Tr. 5852.\nAgain the Court agreed with the Government’s limiting principle, ruling that the defense\ncould not “generalize and speculate based on the testimony in this case, and so I adhere to my\ndecision.” Tr. 5855.  Yet, that is precisely what the Government seeks to do now at sentencing\nregarding the “loss amount”: “speculate” and “extrapolate” that thousands of investors were\ndefrauded, even though thousands have expressly disclaimed that status.\nThe Government cannot have it both ways. If speculation, extrapolation, and conjecture\nwere not allowed with respect to the inference sought by the defense, it cannot be allowed to\nsupport the unsubstantiated inference proffered by the Government with respect to the “loss\namount.” The same principles must apply here to any “loss amount,” particularly when it could\naccount for such an outsized portion of Mr. Guo’s ultimate Guidelines level.\nIndeed,  at this stage, the defense position  is far less speculative, and far more credible\nand reliable given the thousands of investors who have come forward and filed petitions pursuant\nto 18 U.S.C. § 853(n), and vigorously rejected the claim that they were lied to at all, or that they\nwere induced to make their investments by materially false statements.\n2. Additonal Legal Doctrine Supports a Finding of No Loss\n\nIn addition to the analysis above, there are four independent aspects of the legal doctrine\nthat combine to eliminate any loss in this case:\n(1)\nacquitted conduct – in this case, the conduct alleged in Counts 5, 6, and 12 – cannot\nbe considered for purposes of computing the “loss amount”;\n(2)\ncontrary to the Government’s incorrect position that the “loss amount” is indivisible,\nthe Court must evaluate what portions of the funds invested are properly categorized\nas part of the “loss amount”;\n(3)\nSecond Circuit jurisprudence establishes that a 30-point sentencing enhancement –\nthe amount both the PSR and the Government calculate – requires an enhanced\n\n---\n\n56\n\nburden of proof, borne by the Government, beyond mere preponderance of the\nevidence; and\n(4)\nmany courts have correctly, and for a variety of reasons, concluded that the\nGuidelines’ focus on “loss amount” is disproportionate, not based on empirical\nevidence or experience, and not a valid metric for sentencing purposes.\n\nIn the event the Government maintains that there is some “loss amount,” Mr. Guo\nrespectfully demands a Fatico hearing at which the Government bears the burden of proof to\nprovide evidence in an attempt to establish exactly what that loss is.\na. Acquitted Conduct Cannot Be Used to Calculate Mr. Guo’s Guidelines\nLevel\n\nMr. Guo was acquitted of Counts 5, which charged wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§1343 and § 2 and Count 6, which charged securities fraud in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and\n78ff, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, and 18 U.S.C. § 2, in relation to the GTV Private Placement investment,\nand Count 12, which charged engaging in and attempting to engage in an unlawful monetary\ntransaction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and § 2. Yet the Government, and the PSR, would\ninclude the conduct for which Mr. Guo was acquitted in arriving at the “loss amount” for purposes\nof determining the Guidelines offense level.\nWhile the Government relies on United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (per\ncuriam), for the proposition that “the Court may consider at sentencing the GTV-related facts from\nthe trial record[,]” (See ECF No. 716 at 3), in the nearly 30 years since Watts was decided the\nlandscape regarding the treatment of acquitted conduct at sentencing has changed considerably.\nThat is true specifically with respect to the Sentencing Guidelines, as reflected in\nGuidelines amendments as well as doubts expressed by Supreme Court Justices, both of which\nmanifest appreciation of the constitutional dissonance in sentencing a defendant for conduct for\nwhich the jury acquitted.\n\n---\n\n57\n\ni.\nUsing Acquitted Conduct Here Would Violate Mr. Guo’s Fifth and\nSixth Amendment Rights\nAs the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Sixth\nAmendment’s right to trial by jury is among the most “fundamental reservation[s] of power in our\nconstitutional structure.” Id. at 305-306. In addition, that Sixth Amendment right operates in\ncombination with the Fifth Amendment’s right to due process, which “protects the accused against\nconviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the\ncrime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).\nIn that context, Watts decided a narrow issue – “the interaction of the Guidelines with the\nDouble Jeopardy Clause,” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 240 n.4 (2005) – and did not\nendorse ““sentencing enhancement[s]” that exceed the punishment “authorized by the jury\nverdict.” Id. at 240. See also United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 392 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J.,\ndissenting) (“reliance on Watts as authority for enhancements based on acquitted conduct is\nobviously a mistake”); People v. Beck, 939 N.W.2d 213, 224 (Mich. 2019) (finding “Watts\nunhelpful in resolving whether the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing violates due process”\nbecause “Watts addressed only a double-jeopardy challenge”).\nAlso, the Court in Booker specifically cautioned against overreliance on Watts, which “did\nnot even have the benefit of full briefing or oral argument.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 240 n.4; see also,\ne.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12 n.4 (1991) (summary dispositions do “not enjoy the full\nprecedential value of a case argued on the merits”).\nNor are the Sixth Amendment and Due Process implications limited to sentences that\nexceed the statutory maximum because of facts determined by the sentencing court. As Justice\nScalia pointed out in his concurring opinion in Rita, neither Booker nor prior precedent foreclosed\n“as-applied Sixth Amendment challenges to sentences that would not have been upheld as\n\n---\n\n58\n\nreasonable on the facts encompassed by the jury verdict or guilty plea.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 375\n(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also\nWhite, 551 F.3d at 389 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (“it is clear that the post-Booker development of\nreasonableness review has opened the door for Sixth Amendment challenges” even “to sentences\nwithin the statutory range authorized by the jury’s verdict”).\nSystemic considerations also mandate exclusion of acquitted conduct at sentencing. In the\ncommon-law era, juries deliberately, albeit “indirectly checked” the “severity of sentences” by\nissuing “what today we would call verdicts of guilty to lesser included offenses.” Jones v. United\nStates, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999). For example, juries would “often * * * bring in larceny to be\nunder the value of twelvepence” to avoid a mandatory death sentence.” 4 William Blackstone,\nCommentaries 248.\nNo doubt juries continue to perform that function, even in a non-capital context in which\nthey are not aware of the specific sentences available (although often they are through cross-\nexamination of cooperating witnesses). Disregarding a jury’s conscious choice by re-introducing\nacquitted conduct at sentencing “undermines respect for the law and the jury system.” United\nStates v. Settles, 530 F.3d 920, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.). See also United States v.\nCanania, 532 F.3d 764, 778 n.4 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring) (quoting letter from juror\nto judge calling the use of acquitted conduct a “tragedy” that denigrates “our contribution as\njurors”).\nii.\nThe Impact of the 2024 Sentencing Guidelines Amendment\n\nThe U.S. Sentencing Commission, as part of its 2024 amendments cycle, revised §1B1.3\nto add subsection (c), eliminating acquitted conduct from consideration in calculating a U.S.\n\n---\n\n59\n\nSentencing\nGuidelines\nrange.\nSee\nAmendment\n826,\navailable\nat\nhttp\n\nAmendment 826, effective November 1, 2024, provides that “[r]elevant conduct does not\ninclude conduct for which the defendant was criminally charged and acquitted in federal court,\nunless such conduct also establishes, in whole or in part, the instant offense of conviction.”\nU.S.S.G. §1B1.3(c).\n\nAs Judge Carlton W. Reeves, Chair of the Sentencing Commission declared in announcing\nthe amendment, “Not guilty means not guilty[.]”Sentencing Commission News Release,\n“Commission Votes Unanimously to Pass Package of Reforms Including Limit on Use of\nAcquitted Conduct in Sentencing Guidelines,” April 17, 2024, available at http\nw.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/april-17-2024.\n\nWhen the Amendment was first circulated, Judge Reeves remarked that “‘[w]hat conduct\njudges can consider when using the guidelines’ is . . . ‘of foundational and of fundamental\nimportance to the operation of the entire federal justice system.’” Id. (quoting Prof. Douglas\nBerman), available at http\nhearings-andmeetings/20230405/20230405_transcript.pdf.\n\nNor can any other offense of conviction in this case serve as a “backdoor” for including\nacquitted conduct in any “loss amount” calculation. Not only would that completely defeat the\npurpose of the 2024 Guidelines amendment, and subvert Booker and the Sixth and Fifth\nAmendments, but it would be contrary to longstanding doctrine that when a jury convicts on a\nmulti-object conspiracy, the insufficiency of evidence with respect to one prong does not warrant\nreversal of a conviction because the jury is presumed to have returned its verdict on the objective\nfor which there was sufficient evidence. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1992).\n\n---\n\n60\n\nHere, Griffin counsels that the jury, finding the GTV prong insufficient, would not have\nconsidered it sufficient for the other counts in which (for purposes of sentencing analysis only) it\ndetermined that other objects were sufficient to justify a conviction. That applies not only to\nconspiracy, but also to the RICO charges, which require predicate acts of racketeering. The jury’s\nacquittal precludes any conclusion that the GTV private placement could have served as a RICO\npredicate.\n\nSimilarly, regarding money laundering, the jury could not have considered money raised\nthrough GTV to constitute the predicate “specified unlawful activity” required by 18 U.S.C.\n§1956(h), because the jury acquitted on the GTV-related counts.\n\nAccordingly, inclusion of the acquitted conduct in this case in any “loss amount”\ncalculation is precluded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.\niii.\nThe Reservations Expressed by Supreme Court Justices Regarding\nUse of Acquitted Conduct for Sentencing Purposes\n\nThe Sentencing Commission’s action also removed an obstacle to the Supreme Court’s\nconsideration of the issue. See McClinton v. United States, 600 U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 2400 (2023)\n(Sotomayor, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari); id. at 2403 (Kavanaugh, J., joined\nby Gorsuch, J., and Barrett, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari).\n\nIn McClinton, in denying the petition for certiorari, both Justice Sotomayor and Justice\nKavanaugh expressed interest in revisiting Watts. For example, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that\n“[a]s many jurists have noted, the use of acquitted conduct to increase a defendant’s Sentencing\nGuidelines range and sentence[] raises important questions that go to the fairness and perceived\nfairness of the criminal justice system.” 143 S. Ct. at 2401  (citing  Jones v. United States, 574\nU.S. 948, 949-950 (2014) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting from denial\nof certiorari)); United States v. Bell, 808 F. 3d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J.,\n\n---\n\n61\n\nconcurring in denial of reh’g en banc); United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F. 3d 1328, 1331\n(10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); Watts, 519 U. S. at 170 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (footnotes\nomitted).47\n\nJustice Sotomayor also explained that “[t]he Court’s denial of certiorari today should not\nbe misinterpreted[]” because “[t]he Sentencing Commission, which is responsible for the\nSentencing Guidelines, has announced that it will resolve questions around acquitted-conduct\nsentencing in the coming year.” 143 S. Ct. at 2403. Justice Sotomayor added that “[i]f the\nCommission does not act expeditiously or chooses not to act, however, this Court may need to take\nup the constitutional issues presented.” Id;  see also United States v. Coleman, 138 F.4th 489, 511-\n512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 275 (2025) (“In denying the petition for certiorari in\nMcClinton, four Supreme Court justices encouraged the United States Sentencing Commission to\nresolve questions around the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing . . . Ten months later, the\nSentencing Commission heeded the call”).48\n\nJustice Sotomayor elaborated that “[t]here are also concerns about procedural fairness and\naccuracy when the State gets a second bite at the apple with evidence that did not convince the\n\n47  In Bell, Justice Kavanaugh, while serving on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,\nrecognized that “[a]llowing judges to rely on acquitted or uncharged conduct to impose higher\nsentences than they otherwise would impose seems a dubious infringement of the rights to due\nprocess and to a jury trial.” 808 F. 3d at 928 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of reh’g en\nbanc). Likewise, in United States v. Sabillon-Umana, Justice Gorsuch, while serving on the U.S.\nCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, questioned the assumption “that a district judge may either\ndecrease or increase a defendant’s sentence (within the statutorily authorized range) based on facts\nthe judge finds without the aid of a jury or the defendant’s consent.” 772 F. 3d at 1331.\n48  Justice Kavanaugh echoed that “the Court’s denial of certiorari today should not be\nmisinterpreted[,]” 143 S. Ct. at 2403, adding that “[t]he use of acquitted conduct to alter a\ndefendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range raises important questions.” Id. Again, though, Justice\nKavanaugh noted that because “the Sentencing Commission is currently considering the issue[,]”\nit would be “appropriate for this Court to wait for the Sentencing Commission’s determination\nbefore the Court decides whether to grant certiorari in a case involving the use of acquitted\nconduct.” Id.\n\n---\n\n62\n\njury coupled with a lower standard of proof.” 143 S. Ct. at 2402. Justice Sotomayor also noted that\n“[m]any other state and federal judges have questioned the practice.” 143 S. Ct. at 2401 n.2\n(citations omitted).\n\nIn addition, in McClinton, Justice Sotomayor observed that\nacquitted-conduct sentencing also raises questions about the public’s perception\nthat justice is being done, a concern that is vital to the legitimacy of the criminal\njustice system. Various jurists have observed that the woman on the street would\nbe quite taken aback to learn about this practice. See, e.g., United States v. Canania,\n532 F. 3d 764, 778 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring).\nId., at 2402-03.\n\nWatts, of course, was decided without the benefit of these subsequent developments.49\nAmendment 826 reflects the resolution of the issue and clearly prohibits the use of acquitted\nconduct in determing the applicable Guidelines level. See United States v. Johnson, 754 F. Supp.3d\n305, 312-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (noting, in light of the promulgation of Amendment 826, and citing\nMcClinton, that “[t]he practice of sentencing defendants based on acquitted conduct is now firmly\ndisfavored”).\n\nHere, in seeking to include the GTV Private Placement funds in the “loss amount” for\npurposes of the Guidelines calculation, the Government attempts to circumvent not only both the\nletter and spirit of Amendment 826, and the constitutional protections it vindicates, but also the\nclear and consistent momentum undermining Watts.50 Consequently, the acquitted conduct cannot\ncontribute to the “loss amount” determined for Guidelines purposes.\n\n49  Even Watts did not mandate consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing; rather, it held\nonly that there existed “no prohibition against considering . . . acquitted conduct[.]” 519 U.S. at\n152-155.\n50  Even prior to Watts Judge Oakes noted in reluctant concurrence (bound by prevailing Circuit\nlaw) the incongruity of permitting acquitted conduct to contribute to a defendant’s punishment:\n\nwe hold that a person’s sentence for crimes of which he has been convicted may\nbe multiplied fourfold by taking into account conduct of which he has been\n\n---\n\n63\n\nb. Specific Legal Principles Significantly Reduce the “Loss Amount” in this\nCase\n\nSeveral principles developed by the courts in assessing “loss amount” also apply here,  and\nrequire a Fatico hearing. For example, in United States v. Byors, 586 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2009), the\nCourt applied Application Note 3(E), which “provides that the loss should be reduced, or offset,\nby ‘[t]he money returned, and the fair market value of the property returned and the services\nrendered, by the defendant . . . to the victim before the offense was detected.” 586 F.3d at 226\n(quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3(E)(I)).\n\nConsistent with that Application Note, the Court credited the amounts repaid to the victims.\nId.; see also United States v. Avenatti, 2024 WL 4553810 at *2 (9th Cir. October 23, 2024)\n(Guidelines require sentencing courts to credit against loss the money defined in § 2B1.1 cmt.\nn.3(E)(I)).\n\nHowever, the defendant in Byors also argued that other “amounts should not be counted\ntowards the loss because investors received something of value in exchange for their money –\naccording to Byors these investors received what they were promised.” Byors, 586 F.3d at 226.\nThe Court agreed in principle but noted that “[u]nlike the cases defendant relies upon, however,\ndefendant’s victims [in Byors] were left with nothing of value when the fraud was uncovered.” Id.\n\nThus, the Court in Byors distinguished the circumstances from those in United States v.\nLeonard, 529 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir.2008), in which, as the Court in Byors described, the Second\nCircuit ruled that “the District Court erred in calculating loss based on the total value investors\npaid for securities . . . noting that ‘investors did obtain an interest in a company engaged in\n\nacquitted. This is jurisprudence reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland. “Acquittal\nfirst, sentence afterwards.”\n\nUnited States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 392-394 (2d Cir. 1994) (Oakes, J., concurring).\n\n---\n\n64\n\nproducing and distributing a motion picture’ and that the securities likely had some ‘actual value.’”\n586 F.3d at 226.\n\nSimilarly, in United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008), the Court, analyzing\nan Application Note  relating to the determination of “loss amount” in cases involving loan fraud,\nconcluded that the “amended Note 7(b) [to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1] gives the defendant credit for\nobjective facts – payments prior to discovery of fraud and assets pledged to secure the loan – that\nmight alter a loss calculation if based solely on face amounts of loan applications.” Id. at 151; see\nalso United States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555, 558–59 (7th Cir.1991) (describing it as “simple”\nbut “irrational” to treat all frauds as equivalent to thefts, and opting instead to consider whether\nthe defendant intended in fact to retain the face value of the amount he had obtained through the\nmisrepresentation).51\n\nIn Confredo, the Court also discussed United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.2004),\nin which, according to the Court in Confredo,\na doctor caused his office to submit to medicare and medicaid insurers bills that\nwere higher than the fixed rates established by the Government for the services\nprovided. See id. at 176-77, 193. The district court determined intended loss based\non the combined total of the face value of the bills. See id. at 193. The defendant\nargued that he never intended to receive full reimbursement because he knew the\nrate schedules were carved in stone.\n528 F.3d at 152. The Court in Singh went on to rule that the defendant ““should have a further\nopportunity on remand to show, if he can, that the total amount he expected to receive from the\ninsurers was indeed less than the amounts he actually billed.” 390 F.3d at 194; see also Confredo,\n528 F.3d at 152.\n\n51 In Confredo, the Court noted that “[a]lthough the dispute concerns only one level of\nenhancement, the difference between the resulting maximums of the two arguably applicable\nranges is 27 months.” 528 F.3d at 149. Here, of course, the difference is significantly larger.\n\n---\n\n65\n\nIn Avenatti, which involved a 20-point “loss amount” enhancement, in addition to requiring\ncredit for monies returned to the clients defrauded by defendant, a lawyer who pilfered case\nsettlement funds, the Ninth Circuit also pointed out that “even if Avenatti acted lawfully, his clients\nwould not have received the full settlement amounts.” 2024 WL 4553810 at *1.\n\nConsequently, “[b]y finding that Avenatti’s victims ‘lost’ the full settlement value without\naccounting for Avenatti's fees and costs, the district court enhanced Avenatti’s sentence based on\npecuniary harm that did not occur, and did not ‘result[ ] from [Avenatti's] offense.’” Id. (quoting\nU.S.S.G. §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(I)). The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[s]uch services rendered to\nthe victim must be deducted from the restitution owed.”Id. at *2 (citing United States v. Gagarin,\n950 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2020)).\n\nThe Court in Avenatti added that the over-inclusion in the “loss amount” “was contrary to\nthe purpose of the loss enhancement, which is to ensure that a defendant's sentence is proportional\nto the harm he caused.” Id. at *1 (citing § 2B1.1 cmt. Background).52\n\nMore recently, in the forfeiture context, in United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d\nCir. 2024), the Second Circuit expressed the same reservations with respect to blanket assertions\nof forfeiture based on a universe of transactions that were not uniformly fraudulent. In Rainford,\nthe Government’s position was based on a witness’s statement that 40 percent of defendant’s law\nfirm’s cases were of the “slip and fall” variety, but the Court determined that even that 40 percent\nshould have been reduced by another 20 percent  because only 80 percent of those cases were\nfraudulent. Id. at 489.\n\n52  In Avenatti, the Court also distinguished between “loss amount” and forfeiture. 2024 WL\n4553810, at *2 (remanding and directing “the district court to account for the fair market value of\nAvenatti’s legal services and costs in its ‘actual loss’ calculation, without any reliance on\nforfeiture”).\n\n---\n\n66\n\nThus, the Court in Rainford vacated the forfeiture judgment in part because “even if the\ngovernment’s allegations about [the witness’s] statements had been corroborated, the government\narrived at the forfeiture amount by crediting only part of [that] statement.” Id. As the Court stated,\n“[n]either the government nor the district court has explained why the initial forfeiture request of\n$1.6 million should be cut by 60 percent but the resulting $644,000 should not be cut by another\n20 percent to account for slip-and-fall claims that were not fraudulent.” Id.\n\nIn addition, in calculating forfeiture, the Court in Rainford declared that the “Government’s\nword is not evidence.” Id. Thus, in this case, the Government’s assertions that “Guo then continued\nto defraud his followers with a series of interconnected schemes, including the GTV private\nplacement in 2020,” and that “the GTV placement was connected with and integral to the other\narms of the G Enterprise,” ECF No. 716 at 3, are neither evidentiary nor conclusive.\n\nNor are they substantiated. As a result, they are as unpersuasive for purposes of “loss\namount” as they are for forfeiture. See Rainford, 110 F.4th at 489 (while a “district court may take\n‘general points of reference as a starting point for calculating the losses or gains,’ [] an\nunsubstantiated government claim is not a ‘point[ ] of reference’”) (internal citation omitted).\n\nAll these factors – money returned to investors (including redemptions), the value of the\ninvestment an investor retained regardless of the fraud, the fair market value of fees, costs, and\nservices, and whether sufficient evidence established that Mr. Guo intended to retain all of an\ninvestor’s contribution – all serve to reduce the “loss amount” considerably in this case.\nc. Multi-Level Guidelines Enhancements Require a Higher Burden of Proof\n\nDuring the era prior to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Second Circuit,\nas a remedial measure designed to soften the impact of the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines,\nestablished a process through which sentencing courts could ensure that dramatic increases in a\n\n---\n\n67\n\ndefendant’s offense level, imposed by either adjustments or inclusion of relevant conduct, could\nbe alleviated by a secondary level of analysis that subjected the facts to a more demanding standard\nof proof. If those facts did not meet that standard, a downward departure (or, in the post-Booker\nera, a downward variance) from the Guidelines range would be appropriate.\n\nIn addressing the burden of proof issue in the pre-Booker environment, the Second Circuit\nseveral times grappled with the inexorable tension between a defendant’s Due Process and Sixth\nAmendment rights at sentencing, and the preponderance of the evidence standard. For example, in\nUnited States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit clarified its\nvarious opinions on the issue, explaining that\nthe enhancement of a sentence based upon a defendant’s “relevant conduct,” if done\nwithout regard to the weight of the evidence proving the relevant conduct, may\nresult in a total term of incarceration which is excessive, inappropriate, and\nunintended under Sentencing Guidelines.\n\nId. at 708.\n\nThe Court in Cordoba-Murgas cited and quoted from United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53\n(2d Cir. 1996), which included adjustments within that framework:\nthe preponderance standard is no more than a threshold basis for adjustments and\ndepartures, and the weight of the evidence, at some point along a continuum of\nsentence severity, should be considered with regard to both upward adjustments\nand upward departures. With regard to upward adjustments, a sentencing judge\nshould require that the weight of the factual record justify a sentence within the\nadjusted Guidelines range.\n94 F.3d at 56; see also United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 390 (2d Cir. 1992) and 983\nF.2d at 393-95 (Newman, J., concurring).\nUnder such circumstances, the Court in Gigante instructed that in making its\ndetermination,the Court may examine whether the conduct underlying multiple\nupward adjustments was proven by a standard greater than that of preponderance,\nsuch as clear and convincing or even beyond a reasonable doubt where appropriate.\n\n---\n\n68\n\n94 F.3d at 56.\n\nThe Court in Gigante added, “[w]here a higher standard, appropriate to a substantially\nenhanced sentence range, is not met, the court should depart downwardly.” Id. In Cordoba-\nMurgas, the Court similarly declared that “the factual finding by a preponderance of the evidence\nis a preliminary step susceptible to adjustment.” 233 F.3d at 709. The Court also authorized\ndownward departures when the appropriate standard of proof was not satisfied, id. at 708, and\nprovided the following direction to sentencing courts after finding such enhancements or relevant\nconduct by a preponderance of the evidence:\nunder the combination of circumstances that may be present here, including (i)  an\nenormous upward adjustment (ii)  for uncharged conduct (iii)  not proved at trial\nand (iv)  found by only a preponderance of the evidence, (v)  where the court has\nsubstantial doubts as to the accuracy of the finding, the Court would be authorized\nto depart downward from the scheduled adjustment by reason of the extraordinary\ncombination of circumstances.\nId. at 708 (citing United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 389); see also United States v. Allen,\n644 F. Supp.2d 422, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (footnote omitted).\n\nSince Booker, that doctrine has not been disturbed. See United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d\n518 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing both Cordoba-Murgos and Gigante in addressing whether acquitted\nconduct could be used in calculating a Guidelines range); United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694 (2d\nCir. 2007) (citing Cordoba-Murgas in holding that allegations in an indictment were by themselves\ninsufficient to justify an enhanced sentence).\n\nIndeed, the Cordoba-Murgas doctrine was applied in United States v. Allen, 644 F. Supp.2d\n422 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), in which the Court found certain relevant conduct by the preponderance\nstandard, yet noted that “the Guidelines are not mandatory[,]” id. at 434 (footnote omitted), and\nthat “were defendants to be sentenced in accordance with the Guidelines, a downward departure\nmight be appropriate.” Id. at 435.\n\n---\n\n69\n\nIn examining the conduct – which the Court concluded it had “no doubt that [it] in fact\noccurred,” although adding that it was equally “skeptical that any rational jury could make this\nfinding beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. (footnote omitted) – the Court in Allen remarked that “[t]he\nsituation in Cordoba-Murgas exactly parallels that of these defendants” because “[t]he related\nconduct increases their sentencing exposure at least five-fold for conduct proven only by a\npreponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 435 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).\n\nIn addition, the Court in Allen reasoned that “[w]ere the Guidelines mandatory, and no\ndownward departure available, this situation would present serious constitutional problems. Due\nprocess of law has little meaning if it does not protect citizens from such arbitrary exercises of\npower.” Id. at 434.\n\nThe discretion Cordoba-Murgas and its successors in the post-Booker environment afford\nsentencing courts for the purpose of ameliorating disproportionate enhancements and/or relevant\nconduct has been amplified since Booker by the Guidelines’ status as merely advisory, and the\nadded consideration of § 3553(a)’s sentencing factors that are balanced against the Guidelines’\nseverity. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that question\nof standard of proof is less compelling because Booker makes all Guidelines findings “in the end,\nonly advisory”) ; United States v. Salazar, 489 F.3d 555, 558 (2d Cir. 2007) (“the discretion\nafforded district judges by Booker applies only to their consideration of a Guidelines range as one\nof the § 3553(a) factors after that range has been calculated”).53\n\n53  The panel’s statement in Jones that “[i]n light of this Court’s continual application of the\npreponderance of the evidence standard, it is incorrect to construe the [] language [in United States\nv. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085, 1089 (2d Cir. 1997)] as authorizing the use of a higher standard of\nproof[,]” 531 F.3d at 176, which would appear to deprive the Court of discretion to follow\nCordoba-Murgas and Gigante, are at best confusing and inconsistent. Neither Cordoba-Murgas\nnor Gigante has ever been overruled; indeed, the cases that reassert the preponderance standard –\ni.e., Vaughn, and even Jones itself – all cite Cordoba-Murgas as authority while inexplicably\n\n---\n\n70\n\nConsequently, it is respectfully submitted that the formulation in Cordoba-Murgas should\nbe applied here to “loss amount.54  Such a potential drastic increase in Mr. Guo’s sentence – 30\npoints –  requires attendant safeguards regarding the burden of proof in order to protect Mr. Guo’s\nFifth and Sixth Amendment rights.\n\nIndeed, Due Process places constraints on the information a court can consider and/or rely\nupon, and what measure of reliability is required before it can do so. Here, the “loss amount”\nalleged by the Government fails to surpass any applicable burden of proof, and at the very least\nrequires a Fatico hearing, with an appropriately exacting burden of proof. Due Process and the\nSixth Amendment do not permit any less.\nd. The 30-Point Enhancement Pursuant to § 2B1.1 Irrationally Influences\nMr. Guo’s Applicable Sentencing Guidelines Range\n\nEven if all the foregoing arguments did not eliminate the “loss amount,” the extraordinary\nimpact of the 30-point enhancement for loss amount pursuant to § 2B1.1 on Mr. Guo's applicable\n\nignoring the remainder of Cordoba-Murgas’s instruction to the District Court – namely, that it is\nat least permissible, and even appropriate, to calibrate the burden of proof proportionately with the\neffect a particular adjustment or set of facts exerts on a defendant’s Guidelines level, and depart\ndownward accordingly. In addition, the comment in Jones that the language in Shonubi was merely\ndictum, 531 F.3d at 176, is perplexing because the relevant passage in Shonubi declares “though\nthe Sentencing Commission has favored the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for resolving\nall disputed fact issues at sentencing, U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3., p.s., comment., we have ruled that a more\nrigorous standard should be used in determining disputed aspects of relevant conduct where such\nconduct, if proven, will significantly enhance a sentence.” 103 F.3d at 1085.\n54  Nor does the opinion in United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2008), alter the\nanalysis. In Yannotti, the jury convicted the defendant of RICO conspiracy but deadlocked on the\nsubstantive RICO count. Id. at 118. The jury also deadlocked on an alleged kidnaping conspiracy,\nid. at 119, and the Court made the unremarkable determination that it “could be factored into\nYannotti’s sentence as relevant conduct pursuant to §1B1.3.” Id. at 128. The Court did not address\nCordoba-Murgas or Gigante, or whether the effect of the relevant conduct could be moderated by\nimposition of a higher burden of proof and a downward departure, as those cases authorize.\n\nInterestingly, too, in Yannotti, while the jury had marked on the verdict sheet “not proven”\nwith respect to murders and attempted murders, id. at 118-19, apparently that conduct was not\nincluded in the Guidelines calculation or sentence as relevant conduct (but only the kidnaping\nconspiracy was in dispute). Id. at 127-28.\n\n---\n\n71\n\nGuidelines range has, in similar cases, been rejected by courts because it is disproportionate,\ndistorts the sentencing process, and merits amelioration by greater reliance on other § 3553(a)\nfactors.\n\nThe Guidelines levels in financial fraud cases are driven principally by the “loss amount”\nadjustment. Yet Courts have criticized the rigid and arbitrary nature of the Guidelines in this\ncontext, recognizing the injustice “that sometimes results from the guidelines’ fetish with abstract\narithmetic, as well as the harm that guideline calculations can visit on human beings if not cabined\nby common sense.” United States v. Adelson, 441 F.Supp.2d 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d 301\nFed. App’x. 93 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United  States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 745, 754\n(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (describing “Sentencing Guidelines for white-collar crimes” as “a black stain on\ncommon sense” and sentencing defendant “to a term of incarceration of 60 months in the face of\nan advisory guidelines range of 360 to life”); United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416,\n427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Lynch, J.) (“[t]he Guidelines place undue weight on the amount of loss\ninvolved in the fraud”).\n\nScholars and commentators, too, have recognized the inordinate impact of “loss amount”\non sentencing in fraud cases. See, e.g., Derek R. Vollrath, Losing the Loss Calculation:  Toward a\nMore Just Sentence Regime in White-Collar Criminal Case, 59 Duke L.J. 1001, 1025 (2010)\n(“Guidelines fail to achieve justice in white-collar criminal cases. Their sentencing\nrecommendations are irrationally high and, due to the Guidelines’ overemphasis on the loss\ncalculation, fail to accurately reflect a defendant’s culpability”); Frank O. Bowman III, Sentencing\nHigh-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds after Booker, 20 Fed. Sent. R. 167, 169, 2008 WL 2201039\nat *4 (Feb. 2008) (“since Booker, virtually every judge faced with a top-level corporate fraud\ndefendant in a very large fraud has concluded that sentences called for by the Guidelines were too\n\n---\n\n72\n\nhigh. This near unanimity suggests that the judiciary sees a consistent disjunction between the\nsentences prescribed by the Guidelines [in corporate fraud cases] and the fundamental requirement\nof § 3553(a) that judges impose sentences ’sufficient but not greater than necessary’ to comply\nwith its objectives”).\n\nIndeed, other examples abound. In United States v. Faibish, Judge Vitaliano remarked that\n“the guidelines, even with its slight revisions, are just mindlessly accelerated once you have\nnumbers of any size added in the loss or gain table.” Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, United\nStates v. Faibish, No. 12-CR-265 (E.D.N.Y., March 10, 2016) (ECF No. 271 at 23-27). In Faibish\nJudge Vitaliano sentenced a defendant convicted of fraud, with a Guidelines level of life, and with\na “cap” of 80 years  to a prison term of 63 months. Id. at 54; see also Robert J. Anello and Richard\nF. Albert, “Rise of ABA Task Force's ‘Shadow Sentencing Guidelines,’” New York Law Journal,\nApril 5, 2016, available at http (“Shadow\nSentencing”) (noting that in United States v. Litvak, 3:13-CR-19 (D. Conn. July 23, 2014), Chief\nJudge Janet C. Hall sentenced a defendant to 24 months’ imprisonment for securities fraud even\nthough the Guidelines recommendation in the PSR was 108-135 months).55\n\n55  See Transcript of Sentencing Proceeding, United States v. Litvak, 3:13-CR-19 (D. Conn.\nJuly 23, 2014) (ECF No. 298 at 135-136, 141-47, 158).  In Litvak, Judge Hall expressed the\nconcern that the Guidelines ”loss” table ”overwhelms” all the other factors to be considered. As\nJudge Hall noted further, ”I think 60 percent of the total offense is attributable to just sheer dollars\nwithout any regard for any other characteristics of the offense. Therefore, I don't find the\nGuidelines helpful at all.” Id.  at 142.\n\nOn appeal, Litvak’s conviction was reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded. United\nStates v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015). On remand, Litvak was retried and again convicted\non the securities fraud count. On May 2, 2017, Judge Hall again sentenced Litvak, , to 24 months\nimprisonment. ECF No. 542.\n\n---\n\n73\n\nSimilarly, in United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp.2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008), the Court\nimposed sentences on five defendants ranging from one-year-and-one-day to four years for their\nroles in a $500 million fraud, notwithstanding an advisory Guidelines range of life in prison.\nIn United States v. Hundley, 02-CR- 441 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. 2005), four defendants were\nconvicted at trial of conspiracy, bank fraud (involving a loss of approximately $100 million) and\ntax fraud (for evading approximately $29 million in taxes).\nTwo of the defendants additionally were convicted of making false statements and one was\nconvicted of perjury. Yet Judge Preska sentenced the defendants well below their Guidelines\nranges. For example, the defendant convicted of making false statements, but not perjury, faced a\nGuidelines range of 78 to 97 months; he was sentenced to prison for one-year-and-one-day.\n\nIn Adelson, a case involving a conviction at trial for accounting fraud at a publicly traded\ncompany that resulted in a $260 million loss to shareholders, and in which the Court imposed a\n42-month prison sentence despite a Guidelines Total Offense Level of 46 (with a range of 360\nmonths to life imprisonment), Judge Rakoff elaborated on the absence of an underlying rationale\nfor the Guidelines’ fraud loss table:\n[a]s many have noted, the Sentencing Guidelines, because of their arithmetic\napproach and also in an effort to appear “objective”, tend to place great weight on\nputatively measurable quantities, such as weight of drugs in narcotics cases or the\namount of financial loss in fraud cases, without, however, explaining why it is\nappropriate to accord such huge weight to such factors. See generally Kate Stith\n& Jose Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 69\n(1998).\n441 F.Supp.2d at 509 (emphasis added).56\n\n56  In addition, when, as here, as in many fraud cases, the “loss” amount is alleged to exceed\n$1 billion and additional enhancements are added, those enhancements necessarily overlap\nbecause enhancements already are baked into a high loss figure. See United States v. Lauerson,\n362 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Lauerson, 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003); United States\nv. Jackson, 364 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2003). For instance, the PSR in this case includes a two-point\n\n---\n\n74\n\nThe absence of an empirical rationale for the dominance of the loss table, and/or the lack\nof an explanation “why it is appropriate to accord such huge weight to” the table, in sentencing in\nfraud cases has troubled courts. In United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013), Judge\nUnderhill, concurring, commented that “[t]he loss guideline . . . was not developed by the\nSentencing Commission using an empirical approach based on data about past sentencing\npractices.” Id. at 379 (Underhill, J., concurring); see also United States v. Algahaim, 842 F.3d 796,\n800 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[t]his approach, unknown to other sentencing systems, was one the\nCommission was entitled to take, but its unusualness is a circumstance that a sentencing court is\nentitled to consider”).\n\nIn fact, the loss Guidelines suffer from an original, fundamental, and material flaw that\ncompromises its capacity to provide an empirical basis:  in calculating the “average” pre-\nGuidelines sentence for fraud cases, the Sentencing Commission included only sentences of\nimprisonment, and excluded all sentences of probation, thereby distorting the Guidelines not only\nin favor of imprisonment, but also in favor of longer terms of imprisonment. See U.S. Sent'g\nComm'n, Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements, Table\n1(a), p. 22, 34 (1987), at 22, 24 (referring to Table 1(a) at 27), available at http\n\nGuidelines enhancement for more than ten victims, pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) (PSR ¶ 114),\nwhich is essentially automatic in modern financial fraud cases. In United States v. Dorvee, 604\nF.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2010), amended 616 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2010), the Court cautioned that\nGuidelines enhancements “that are all but inherent to the crime of conviction” can inappropriately\nand disproportionately increase a Guidelines level beyond the point of reasonableness, and that in\nsuch instances, because “adherence to the Guidelines” can lead to a result “fundamentally\nincompatible with § 3553(a),” a sentencing court could correct that imbalance through analysis of\nother § 3553(a) factors. 604 F.3d at 96. That is true with respect to the two-point “sophisticated\nmoney laundering” enhancement under § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) (PSR ¶ 116) and the four-point\nenhancement for “organizer or leader of criminal activity that involved 5 or more participants”\nunder § 3B1.1(a) (PSR ¶ 118).\n\n---\n\n75\n\nThat was no small omission, since in 1984 nearly 40% of all defendants were sentenced to\nstraight probation. Due to that original bias in favor of imprisonment, “the Sentencing\nCommission’s loss enhancement numbers do not result from any reasoned determination of how\nthe punishment can best fit the crime, nor any approximation of the moral seriousness of the\ncrime.” United States v. Johnson, 2018 WL 1997975, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. April 27, 2018).\n\nInstead, “the numbers assigned by the Sentencing Commission to various sentencing\nfactors appear to be more the product of speculation, whim, or abstract number-crunching than of\nany rigorous methodology – thus maximizing the risk of injustice.” United States v. Gupta, 904 F.\nSupp.2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014). As the Court noted in\nGupta, in focusing largely on the amount of monetary gain or loss occasioned by an offense, the\nSentencing Commission “effectively ignored the statutory requirements that federal sentencing\ntake many factors into account, see 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), and, by contrast, effectively guaranteed\nthat many such sentences would be irrational on their face.” Id.; see also Johnson, 2018 WL\n1997975, at *4 (describing the loss enhancement as a “grievous wrong” and noting “the rigidity\nof the loss amount overriding the diverse reality of complex financial crimes [and] the lack of any\nconsideration of danger to society[]”).\n\nCommentators, too, have expressed reservations. See Mark H. Allenbaugh, “Drawn from\nNowhere:” A Review of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's White-Collar Sentencing Guidelines\nand Loss Data, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 19, 22 (2013); Jillian Hewitt, Fifty Shades of Gray: Sentencing\nTrends in Major White-Collar Cases, 125 Yale L. J. 1018, 1025 (2016) (concluding that review of\nthe post-[United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)] sentencing data “empirically\ncorroborate[d] scholarly criticism that the loss table often vastly overstates the seriousness of an\noffense”).\n\n---\n\n76\n\nIndeed, some have termed the Sentencing Guidelines “fundamentally broken” in high-loss\ncases. See Frank O. Bowman, III, “Comment on Proposed Amendments to Economic Crime\nGuideline, § 2B.1.1,” Feb. 19, 2015, at 2 (citing remarks of Judge Patti B. Saris, Jan. 9, 2015,\navailable at htt\nmeetings/20150109/Remarks.pdf); see also Shadow Sentencing.\n\nThus, the amount of loss is often “a kind of accident[,]” and thus a “relatively weak\nindicator of [] moral seriousness . . . or the need for deterrence.” Emmenegger, 329 F.Supp.2d at\n427. As the Supreme Court instructed in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), when\nthe Sentencing Commission has failed to base its formulation of a guideline upon empirical\nevidence of pre-Guidelines practice and/or review and revision based on judicial decisions and\nsentencing data, or when a guideline “do[es] not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its\ncharacteristic institutional role” because the Commission “did not take account of empirical data\nand national experience,” the sentencing court is free to conclude that the guideline “yields a\nsentence greater than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case” and\n“may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations.” Id. at 101, 109-110;\nsee also Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264-66 (2009).57\n\nThus, in Corsey, Judge Underhill counseled that “the low marginal utility of the guideline\nin this very high intended loss case should have prompted greater, not lesser, reliance on the section\n3553(a) factors other than the Guidelines.” 723 F.3d at 380. The Court in Corsey  additionally\n\n57  That judicial deference is not required in this instance has been reinforced by the Supreme\nCourt’s decision in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024); see also Van Loon v.\nDep’t of the Treasury, 122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024) (applying Loper-Bright to the Office of\nForeign Assets Control’s interpretation of statutory language in the International Emergency\nEconomic Powers Act).\n\n---\n\n77\n\nnoted that the loss Guidelines are “fundamentally flawed, especially as loss amounts climb. The\nhigher the loss amount, the more distorted is the guideline’s advice to sentencing judges.” Id.\n\nHere, the distortion generated by the alleged loss amount’s impact on Mr. Guo’s Guidelines\nlevel is aggravated by the uncertainty with respect to determining an accurate and reliable loss\namount. In turn, the questions regarding a verifiable loss amount reinforce the need for a Fatico.\n\nWritten in another time and for a different purpose, Albert Einstein’s observation that “Not\neverything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted,” has\nparticular application to this case. A man’s life and the measure of that life cannot simply be\nreduced to a box on a sentencing grid propelled by an equally mechanistic slot on a “loss” table.\n\nSentencing is not only not an exact science, but not a science at all, given its essentially\nhuman dimension. Rather it is a “fluid and dynamic process[,]” Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S.\n708 (2008), the aim of which is to impose a sentence that is reasonable, that is tailored to the facts\nof the particular case and particular individual being sentenced, and that achieves the statutory\nobjective of a punishment that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish the\ngoals enumerated in § 3553(a)(2).\n\nAs the Supreme Court reminded over 25 years ago, even in the Guidelines era, the “uniform\nand constant . . . tradition for the sentencing judge [is] to consider every convicted person as an\nindividual and every case as a unique study in human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes\nmagnify the crime and the punishment to ensure.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996);\nsee also United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 182 (2d Cir. 2008).\n\nIn Gupta, a stock fraud case involving insider trading, in which the defendant was a\nfinancial titan near the pinnacle of global economic wealth and power, Judge Rakoff repeated his\nconcerns expressed earlier in Adelson regarding the disproportionate and unrealistic effect that the\n\n---\n\n78\n\nGuidelines’ loss table has on the measure of an appropriate sentence in that case. Evaluating the\nfull range of factors pertinent to sentencing, Judge Rakoff philosophized on a court’s duty at\nsentencing:\n[i]mposing a sentence on a fellow human being is a formidable responsibility. It\nrequires a court to consider, with great care and sensitivity, a large complex of facts\nand factors. The notion that this complicated analysis, and moral responsibility, can\nbe reduced to the mechanical adding-up of a small set of numbers artificially\nassigned to a few arbitrarily-selected variables wars with common sense. Whereas\napples and oranges may have but a few salient qualities, human beings in their\ninteractions with society are too complicated to be treated like commodities, and\nthe attempt to do so can only lead to bizarre results.\n904 F. Supp.3d at 350.\n\nRather than impose the enormous sentence dictated by the Guidelines, Judge Rakoff\nsentenced the defendant in Gupta to two years’ incarceration. What Judge Rakoff characterized as\nthe “irrationality of this approach” that would have hewed to the Guidelines is present here as well,\nand threatens to create, as Judge Rakoff recognized in Gupta, “in the name of uniformity, a\nsentencing disparity of the most unreasonable kind.” Id. at 351.\n\nThus, courts in this District have on multiple occasions recognized that a “loss amount”\nthat increases a Guidelines level by several orders of magnitude distorts the sentencing process\nand requires amelioration through increased consideration of the other § 3553(a) sentencing\nfactors.\n\nHere, the 30-point enhancement for “loss amount” computed in the PSR comprises more\nthan half the total offense level. See PSR ¶ 114. As Judge Rakoff commented in Gupta, “this [loss\namount] is a very rough surrogate” for determining an appropriate sentence. 904 F. Supp.3d at\n351.\n\nAccordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should, consistent with other courts\nconsidering this issue, exercise its discretion to remedy the distorting effect of any “loss amount,”\n\n---\n\n79\n\nand concentrate instead on other § 3553(a) factors in order to, as the Supreme Court counseled in\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) “make an individualized assessment based on the facts\npresented.” Id. at 50.\n3. Objections to Other Guidelines Enhancements\n\nIn addition to his objection to the 30-level increase in the Guidelines level for loss, Mr.\nGuo also objects to the following enhancements.\nPSR ¶ 114:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for 10 or more victims. There was no\nevidence of any victims other than the five witnesses who claimed to have lost money on their G-\nSeries investments..\nPSR ¶ 114:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for allegedly acting on behalf of a\ncharitable, educational, religious, or political organization or a government agency. There was\nnothing fraudulent about either The Rule of Law Foundation or the Rule of Law Society.  Both\nROLF and ROLS were operating non-profits in compliance with non-profit tax requirements, with\ntheir own leadership and staff. Witnesses called by the Government testified that each entity had\na board of directors, held board meetings and voted on initiatives, and that Mr. Guo was not part\nof either of those boards. Accordingly, that Mr. Guo acted on behalf of a charitable organization,\nspecifically in the context of the alleged fraud scheme, is unfounded. Further, as reflected in\ntestimony at trial, ROLF and the ROLS promoted human rights and democracy in China and\nassisted Chinese nationals who wanted to flee China.\nPSR ¶ 114:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for relocating or participating in\nrelocating  fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory\nofficials, and the offense otherwise involved sophisticated means and defendant intentionally\nengaged in or caused the conduct constituting sophisticated means. The G-Series entities were\n\n---\n\n80\n\ninternational in scope, and Mr. Guo is a Chinese national whose family, like many wealthy\nfamilies. has financial holdings in a number of different jurisdictions. There is no evidence to\nsupport the notion that the location of any business entities or accounts was selected for the purpose\nof evading law enforcement or regulatory officials. This is purely speculative.\nPSR ¶ 114:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for deriving more than $1 million in\ngross receipts from one of more financial institutions as a result of the offense. Mr. Guo did not\npersonally receive more than $1 million in gross receipts from any financial institution as a result\nof the offense.\nPSR ¶ 114:  For the foregoing reasons, as well as our objection to the 30-point increase for\nloss amount, we object to the Total Base Offense Level calculated in this paragraph.\nPSR ¶ 116:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for “sophisticated laundering” pursuant\nto § 2S1.1(b)(3) for essentially the same reasons we object to the enhancement for relocating the\nfraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction. The multi-jurisidictional nature of the G-Series entities,\nand the attendant use of multiple bank accounts, does not render the conduct in this case\n“sophisticated laundering.” The entities involved were not fictitious, there were no shell\ncorporations, and there was no layering of transactions for the purpose of concealment.\nFurthermore, this enhancement cannot apply if the sophisticated means enhancement under\n§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(A) & (C) is applied, because any conduct that the Court may deem sufficient to\nsupport that enhancement is the same as any conduct that could be found to support this\nenhancement, an outcome expressly precluded by Application Note 5(B) to § 2S1.1.58found to\nsupport that enhancm\n\n58 Application Note 5(B) to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 provides: “If subection (b)(3) applies, and the\nconduct that forms the basis for an enhancement under the guideline applicable to the underlying\n\n---\n\n81\n\nPSR ¶ 118:  We object to the 4-level enhancement pursuant to § 3B1.1(a) for being an\norganizer or leader of criminal activity. While Mr. Guo was a leader of the Whistleblower\nMovement, he was not an organizer or leader of any criminal activity.  In this regard, we note that\nco-defendants Je and Wang had operational control of the relevant businesses and controlled the\nrelevant bank accounts.\nPSR ¶ 119:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to\n§ 3C1.1. There is no evidence to support the purported grounds for this enhancement as set forth\nin PSR ¶ 110. First, there was no evidence that Mr. Guo conspired with others to evade applicable\nlaws or retaliate against anyone who sought return of funds. Second, any signs supporters may\nhave affixed in the Mahwah mansion cannot be attributed to Mr. Guo and the notion that such\nsignage constitutes obstruction is wild speculation. Third, the suggestion that Mr. Guo “and a co-\nconspirator” may have started the fire that engulfed the Sherry-Netherland apartment on the day\nof Mr. Guo’s arrest is beyond preposterous, for reasons set forth in the following section. Fourth,\nthe notion that Mr. Guo “lied in forms related to his bankruptcy proceedings in a manner that was\nalso designed to thwart the investigation of this case” is also based on nothing more than pure\nspeculation. Fifth, there is no evidence to support Mr. Guo’s purported involvement in the\npurported solicitation of a false declaration from Government witness Ya Li for the purpose of\nthwarting the investigation. Sixth, any conduct undertaken by co-defendant Wang cannot be\nattributed to Mr. Guo, and the alleged conduct appears to constitute ordinary business activity.\nSeventh, there is no evidence of any direction by Mr. Guo to destroy evidence. Finally, to the\nextent that this enhancement is based on any protest activities of Movement supporters, there was\n\noffense is the only conduct that forms the basis for application of subsection (b)(3) of this\nguideline, do not apply subsection (b)(3) of this guideline.”\n\n---\n\n82\n\nno assaultive conduct, no arrests were made, and any protest activity constituted First Amendment-\nprotected free speech on the part of supporters.\nPSR ¶ 123:  For the foregoing reasons, we object to the Total Offense Level calculated in\nthis paragraph.\nC. Additional Objections to the PSR\nWhile accepting the jury’s verdict for purposes of sentencing, Mr. Guo disagrees with it\nand, in addition to the objections above to the Guidelines calculation, presents and preserves for\nappeal his objection to any paragraphs of the PSR that purport to allege or conclude that Mr. Guo\nis guilty of any offense, committed any wrongdoing or illegal acts, or attempted to, conspired to,\nor committed any wrongdoing, fraud, money laundering, or obstruction of justice, or is responsible\nfor alleged losses, much less in the amount of $1.3 billion dollars, and forfeiture of the same.\nThese general objections apply to each of the specific objections set forth both above and\nbelow, as well as to paragraphs 25, 26, 29, 33, 47, and 50 of the PSR.\n¶ 24  The business entities at issue were not fictitious entities “created” to perpetrate a\nfraud or to commit any offense.  Each entity had payrolls, operated publicly, offered services to\nclients and the public, and/or operated pursuant to its business mission(s). GETTR continues to\noperate as a social media platform. It is available to the public. Government witness Limarie Reyes\ntestified to the benefits provided to G-Club members and to the entity’s daily business operations,\nincluding the significant efforts and travel to secure additional member benefits. With respect to\nthe Rule of Law Society (“ROLS”) and Rule of Law Foundation (“ROLF”), neither organization\nsold or promoted the sale of securities, and neither misappropriated any funds.\n\n¶ 27  Mr. Guo did not interact with “approximately 500 accounts” or any accounts to\nconceal the illegal source of funds. Mr. Guo did not control the bank accounts of the entities; they\nwere controlled by co-defendants Je and Wang. None of the funds were illegal or illegally\nobtained.\n\n¶ 28  All expenditures were made to support the pro-democracy movement, and to project\nan image of its wealth and power. The $100 million sent to Hayman Capital should be removed\nbased on the jury’s acquittal for fraud in connection with the GTV private placement. Specific\nitems listed in ¶ 28 were purchased for use by customers or members of the entities that paid for\nthe items, and some of the items were purchased and paid for before the period of the alleged fraud.\nThe Lady May, for instance, was purchased in February 2015 with family funds from ACA. Also,\n\n---\n\n83\n\nthe investors and supporters were not “victims” (because they were not defrauded), and many of\nthem have stated as such.\n\n¶ 30  The purchase of an apartment in NYC in 2015 and the price for it is not relevant and\nshould be deleted. The Sherry-Netherland apartment was purchased years before the period of the\nalleged fraud. At a minimum, this fact should be added to this paragraph.\n\nMr. Guo also objects to ROLF and ROLS being characterized as “purported” non-profit\norganizations. ROLF and ROLS were operating non-profits in compliance with non-profit tax\nrequirements.\n\nMr. Guo objects to the remainder of the paragraph’s allegations that false and materially\nmisleading information was provided to investors.\n\n¶ 31  Mr. Guo objects to the reference in this paragraph to a “scheme.”\n\n¶ 32  Yanping Wang worked for the pro-democracy movement and never managed any\nfunds for Miles Guo.\n\n¶ 34  The word “purported” should be deleted as the jury’s acquittal on the GTV counts\nreflects its recognition of the fact that GTV was a genuine news-focused social media platform to\nfurther the aims of the pro-democracy movement.\n\n¶ 35  The word “purported” should be deleted. Further, Government witness Limarie Reyes\ntestified that G Club was owned and controlled by Haoran He, and that Haoran He approved\nfinancial decisions.\n\n¶ 36  There was nothing “purported” about the Himalaya Exchange and the other entities\nnoted, and it is inaccurate to describe them as “functionally” owned” and “controlled” by Miles\nGuo. The HEX accounts were owned by the individual account holders.\n\n¶¶37-38  Miles Guo did not say he would use his “own” money to finance any charities.\nHe said his family fund would, and bank records for ROLF and ROLS show at least $500,000\nfrom the Guo family funds being donated to the ROLF.\n\n¶ 38  This paragraph should be stricken in its entirety, as it reflects statements made by\nSteve Bannon and not Mr. Guo. Also, Mr. Bannon was paid to serve as a consultant for GTV and\nMr. Guo was acquitted of all GTV related conduct.\n\n¶ 39  There was nothing “purported” about either organization. ROLF was not used to\npromote Miles Guo. As reflected in testimony at trial, ROLF and the ROLS promoted human rights\nand democracy in China and assisted Chinese nationals who wanted to flee China.\n\nN-95 mask donations were not sent to Mr. Guo’s home for his personal use. Cross\nexamination of Karen Maistrello made clear that she did not work for ROLF and lacked any basis\nto assert that the masks were delivered to Mr. Guo’s home.\n\n---\n\n84\n\nFurther, N-95 masks were donated to several agencies in New York City (including hotels,\nthe NYPD, and hospitals) as well as individuals across the United States and in China. Even if\nmasks were delivered to Mr. Guo’s residence during the pandemic, that would be consistent with\nthe majority of organizations, which took steps to ensure that their people were  adequately\nprotected from the virus. For the pro-democracy movement, it was essential that Mr. Guo maintain\nhis health and be able to continue his public campaign.\n\n ¶¶ 40-46  Mr. Guo was acquitted of this conduct. These paragraphs should either be\nstricken or, at a minimum, reflect that fact.\n\n¶ 48  The sentence stating: “Those bank account closures frustrated the ability of GUO,\nJE, and their co-conspirators to collect proceeds from victims seeking to invest in GTV” should\nbe deleted because it states nothing more than the Government’s opinion. Further, the jury found\nall of Mr. Guo’s GTV-related conduct to be lawful. Additionally, these bank seizures occurred\nafter the GTV private placement was completed, meaning that, logically and for formal purposes,\nthe closures could not have frustrated investors’ ability to invest in the GTV private placement.\n\n¶ 49  The first two sentences in this paragraph should be deleted. Mr. Guo’s statement that\nGTV had a market value of $2 billion was correct and, in fact, was an undervaluation of GTV’s\nmarket value. The Government obtained an appraisal by Alvarez & Marsal Valuation Services,\nLLC, that determined GTV’s enterprise value to range from $1.4 billion to $2.6 billion. Thus, the\nreference that Guo “well knew” that “GTV’s market value was far less because among other things,\nGTV was a new business that generated no revenue” is incorrect. Mr. Guo believed GTV’s market\nvalue to be in excess of $2 billion, which is supported by Alvarez & Marsal’s expert valuation. It\nwas further supported by the GTV’s private placement memorandum’s calculation of GTV’s\nvalue, which Mr. Guo did not author and which was vetted by counsel, as well as the fact that at\nthat valuation, GTV raised nearly half a billion dollars in a month. Defense expert Raymond\nDragon testified to both facts at trial as items to consider in determining valuation, which was not\ncontradicted.\n\n¶ 51  The word “purported” should be deleted. G Club was a real business and people did\nmake purchases.\n\n¶¶ 52-53  Limarie Reyes testified to the benefits offered by G Club, and to the millions in\ndollars of prizes awarded to G Club members. Ms. Reyes also testified that G Club hired two\nindependent companies to properly manage G Club’s prize giveaways. Her trial testimony\ncontradicts statements in this paragraph including “G Club did not even make good on prizes it\noffered members for participating in contests.” Regarding the BMW, there was no evidence of\nfraud and no evidence or testimony supporting the narrative in the PSR.\n\nMr. Guo did not run or manage G Club; he was not its CEO. Further, on March 8, 2021,\nthe world was in the midst of the pandemic, and many companies were hampered by performance\ndeficits as a result. G Club was not a fictitious company, nor do these facts relate to Miles Guo.\n\n---\n\n85\n\n¶ 54  Statements by William Je should not be attributed to Mr. Guo. In addition, the video\nexcerpt referenced should include the entire broadcast of Mr. Guo on that date, not just excerpts\ntaken out of context.\n\n¶ 55  There was no evidence at trial that Miles Guo asked investors to purchase multiple\nmemberships in G Club.\n\nTrial witnesses testified that the items noted in sub-paragraphs (a) through (f) were\npurchased for the benefit of G Club members and were not purchased for Mr. Guo’s personal use.\n\nThe “yacht” referenced in paragraph (a) was utilized by G Club members prior to Mr.\nGuo’s arrest, and before it was sold off by G Club owner Haoran He. The proceeds from the sale\nof the “yacht” went to G Club.\n\nWith respect to the Lamborghini referenced in subparagraph (b), a Government exhibit\nshows Mr. Guo, in a promotional video, state that the Lamborghini was for G Club members. The\nGovernment had no evidence to refute Mr. Guo’s statements. There was no evidence of any\npersonal use of that car; in fact, Miles Guo did not have a valid driver’s license and did not drive.\nHis son, moreover, was banned from the United States and neither his daughter nor his wife drives\nan automobile.\n\nThe Bugatti referenced in subparagraph (c) never left the showroom and was never\nreceived by Mr. Guo.\n\nFBI agents at the direction of SDNY prosecutors placed “undercover” calls with Haoran\nHe, pretending to be buyers for the Bugatti. Mr. He, who was unaware he was speaking to\nundercover agents, repeatedly confirmed that the Bugatti and any proceeds from its sale would go\nto G Club. This evidence was not presented.\n\nThe Mahwah “mansion” was for use by G Club members to serve as a secret base for the\npro-democracy movement. While the Government tried to claim that each of the Guo family\nmembers had a wing at Mahwah, it had no explanation for  why there would be a wing at Mahwah\nfor “son” when Mr. Guo’s son was banned from travel to the United States per the U.S.\ngovernment’s denial of his visa renewal request. The Government, moreover, objected when the\ndefense tried to elicit such evidence.\n\nThe need for such a facility was confirmed by Paul Doran, an Operation Fox Hunt expert\ncalled by the defense. The stipulation  between the parties conceded that Mr. Guo was the target\nof a widespread campaign by the Chinese government to silence him, including through\nkidnapping, coercion, and physical harassment. The Government adduced no evidence that Mr.\nGuo or his family was to live at Mahwah. They presented no surveillance evidence (which they\nconducted on Mahwah) of Mr. Guo and his family residing at Mahwah. That there was a “wing”\nfor “son” makes clear that those were titles simply an easy way to note space. Mr. Guo’s son was\nbanned by ICE from entering the US and would have no ability to use a wing in any home in the\nUnited States. When the defense sought to elicit the testimony at trial, the Government objected.\n\n---\n\n86\n\nNor did the Government call ICE agents to testify that Mileson Guo’s (son) visa to enter the United\nStates had been revoked.\n\nFor these reasons ¶ 55 should be stricken in its entirety or these objections noted.\n\n¶ 56  The word “purported” should be deleted. Government witnesses Jesee Brown and\nMr. Roberts testified that the Himalaya Exchange issued a cryptocurrency on the blockchain.\nDefense witness Ms. Sklar, the only cryptocurrency expert to testify in the trial, and auditing firm\nArmino testified that the HCN was a cryptocurrency and that the HDOs in circulation were in fact\na digital asset with a 1-to-1 value backed by currency. Further records reflect that the\ncryptocurrency was traded, and people made money buying, selling, or holding the cryptocurrency.\n\n¶ 57  See response to ¶ 56. Further, the Government witness Jesee Brown testified that\nthere were plans by the Himalaya Exchange to buy gold. Witness Tom Bishop testified that in\nMarch 2022 the Himalaya Exchange paid $5 million to Sharps Pixley, a London-based gold\nbroker. Mr. Brown also testified that the Himalaya Exchange was owned and controlled by\nWilliam Je. Accordingly, this paragraph should reflect the above and the fact that while Mr. Guo\nknew of the Himalaya Exchange’s goal to purchase gold, Mr. Guo did not know the total amount\nof gold the Exchange had purchased at the time of the statements, and that the statements were not\nmade with fraudulent intent.\n\n¶ 60  Actions by William Je, the owner of the Himalaya Exchange, should not be attributed\nto Mr. Guo. No evidence was presented indicating Mr. Guo’s involvement. In addition, the\nGovernment possesses information that the auctioneer of the vehicle did in fact open and maintain\na wallet on the Himalaya Exchange, did received payment of the vehicle purchase in HDOs, and\nthat the HDOs were subsequently redeemed for fiat. This paragraph is misleading.\n\n¶ 61  The Himalaya Exchange White Paper, publicly available on its website, speaks for\nitself regarding the Exchange and how it operated. Bank statements admitted at trial demonstrated\nthat Himalaya Exchange customers were able to redeem at least $70 million HDOs into fiat (upon\ninformation and belief, the redemptions were at least roughly $268 million). Government witness\nYa Li, an HDO holder, testified that she had successfully redeemed HDOs into fiat.\n\n¶ 62  This paragraph should be stricken as it relates to actions taken by Mr. Je and not Mr.\nGuo. The Government witness and Himalaya Exchange CEO Jesee Brown testified that the Board\nof the Himalaya Exchange reviewed and approved by unanimous vote the issuance of the loan.\nMr. Brown did not testify that Mr. Guo was involved in this decision, and no evidence was\npresented showing Mr. Guo’s involvement.\n\n¶ 63  As noted in this paragraph, the A10 program was launched in February 2023, less\nthan two months before Mr. Guo’s arrest and before any aspect of the program could be completed.\nThere was no “scheme,” and there were no false statements. Accordingly, it is misleading to state\nthat Mr. Guo’s statements about the program were not true, as he was incapable of doing anything\nto conclude the program once he was detained.\n\n---\n\n87\n\n¶ 64 Mr. Guo did not “control” millions of dollars in fraud proceeds and he did not\n“regularly move funds.” That sentence should be stricken.\n\nFurther, the first sentence of paragraph 64 does not contain facts but instead reads as a\nGovernment advocacy piece and should be deleted. There is no evidence as to why Mr. Guo filed\nfor bankruptcy. It was filed on February 15, 2022, a fact properly noted in the PSR.\n\nFurther, Mr. Guo is entitled to a lifestyle of his choosing, and one supported by his family\nwealth which existed for many years prior to the conduct alleged in this case. To the pro-\ndemocracy movement, wealth meant power to face and to confront the CCP. The “despite”\nreference suggests that Mr. Guo filed for bankruptcy for nefarious reasons, which is argument and\nnot fact.\n\nSimilarly, the language despite “his control of hundreds of millions of dollars in fraud\nproceeds” is gratuitous and does not undermine Mr. Guo’s filing for bankruptcy. In fact, the\nGovernment’s argument in this regard undercuts its own theory that Mr. Guo committed fraud\nbecause he needed money.\n\n¶ 65  This section should only reference the case agent’s sworn testimony in court as\nsupported by the trial transcripts.\n\n¶¶ 66-79  The Government’s allegations regarding Mr. Guo and the GTV private\nplacement were rejected by the jury’s acquittal on counts 5, 6 and 12.\n\nAdditionally, what Ms. Wang did or did not know is not relevant to Mr. Guo. Therefore,\nthat language “WANG well knew that the funds raised from the GTV Private Placement could not\nbe invested in a high-risk hedge fund held for the benefit of Relative-1” is irrelevant and was\nrejected by the jury in acquitting on the GTV counts. Much of what is in these paragraphs\nrepresents suppositions by the Government rather than facts.\n\n¶ 80  The first sentence of paragraph 80 should stand, and the rest of the paragraph should\nbe deleted because it describes actions by William Je.\n\n¶ 81  The paragraph should be stricken because it describes actions by William Je.\n\n¶ 82  The monies referenced were not fraud proceeds.\n\n¶ 83  This paragraph should clarify that PAX “claimed” that Mr. Guo had personally\nguaranteed the loan. Further, all statements following the second sentence are entirely speculative\nand should be stricken.\n\n¶ 84  Mr. Guo denies that he hid assets and he disputes the findings of the Court in the\nPAX litigation and related findings in the Bankruptcy Court.\n\n¶ 85  Mr. Guo does not object to the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. However,\nhe does object to the remainder of the paragraph because it is argument and not fact. Further, in\n\n---\n\n88\n\nhis initial bankruptcy filing Mr. Guo stated that his lifestyle and all personal expenses were paid\nfor by his family through a long-established family fund based outside  the United States. This fact\nwas in Mr. Guo’s bankruptcy filing and should be included to provide a complete picture.\n\n¶ 86  We object to the use of the terms “formally” and “Guo enterprise.” Prior to its sale\nby the Trustee, Mei Guo was the legal owner of Lady May. Further, the term “Guo enterprise” was\ninvented by the Government and does not appear anywhere except in the  indictment.\n\n¶ 87  This paragraph should be stricken. First, the encrypted communications are\ncommunications on WhatsApp – an application available for download on every cell phone. It is\nused by individuals worldwide and uses encryption by default for its communications.\n\nSecond, at the time of communications between Mr. Guo’s daughter and Ms. Wang\nregarding the Lady May’s ownership, the Lady May was in fact registered under Mei Guo’s name\nand had been under her name for years. It was purchased before the period of the alleged fraud\ncharged. Third, whatever coaching Ms. Wang purportedly undertook, is more appropriately\nreflected in her PSR and not here. There is no evidence that Ms. Wang statements regarding the\nLady May’s ownership were made at Mr. Guo’s bidding, or that he acted upon them.\n\n¶ 88  The text after the first sentence should be stricken. Mr. Guo believed that the CCP\nhad the ability to influence the bankruptcy trustee, who earns approximately $2,000 dollars per\nhour, and that belief was reasonable given the CCP’s ability to enlist assets such as George\nHigginbotham, a DOJ employee, and other prominent professionals  in its efforts to target him.\nFurther, supporters of Mr. Guo enjoy First Amendment protection and are allowed to voice their\nopinions within the bounds of the law.\n\n¶ 89  Miles Guo believed, and as the Operation Fox Hunt expert noted during trial, the\nCCP has engaged in many similar practices to harass those who oppose its goals. Mr. Guo had no\nreason to believe that the SEC could be dissuaded because its decisions were influenced by the\nCCP’s coercion in forcing investors to file false claims against Mr. Guo.\n\n¶ 90  The PAX litigation came on the heels of Mr. Guo’s interview on Voice of America.\nWe object to the entirety of paragraph 90 except for the second sentence which acknowledges that\nPAX won a civil judgment. Further, supporters of Mr. Guo enjoy First Amendment protection,\nand are allowed to voice their opinions within the bounds of the law.\n\nAdditionally, any protest against the bankruptcy trustee, his family, or the SEC was deemed\na lawful exercise of the First Amendment. Despite law enforcement being called, no one was\narrested or charged with a crime. The Trustee and his family members were advised by law\nenforcement that no laws were broken. No individual was punched in the eye by anyone involved\nin the protests against PAX or the Trustee. Further, the “well done” statement attributed to Mr.\nGuo, if accurate, would be an excerpt that is being taken completely out of context. The full\nstatements of Mr. Guo should be included to give full context to any “well done” reference in the\nPSR.\n\n---\n\n89\n\n¶ 91  Mahwah was not purchased with fraud proceeds. It was purchased for use by G Club\nmembers. Footnote 6 merely repeats the text of ¶ 91 and should be stricken as incorrect and\nduplicative.\n\n¶ 92  Mr. Guo objects to “meticulously” to describe the search as unnecessary and\nconclusory without factual support and irrelevant to the PSR. Whether or not the search was\nmeticulous need not be decided here. Regarding the “custom-designed Brioni” suits, there is no\nevidence that these items were purchased with fraud proceeds.\n\n¶ 93  We object to any suggestion that the use of Mahwah by NFSC members was a\n“perpetuation” of “Guo’s criminal enterprise.” The use of Mahwah by members of the NFSC after\nMr. Guo’s arrest was neither new nor staged. Had the Government not seized Mahwah, NFSC\nmembers might be using it still  as it had in the past, and would have commemorated June 4, 2024,\nand 2025, to mark the Tiananmen Square massacre. Upon information and belief, the last such\ncommemoration was attended by several members of the United States Congress, G Club\nmembers, and community leaders.\n\n¶ 95  Acts by NFSC members on the Mahwah grounds (such as hanging of small paper\nplacards next to doors in Mahwah) after Mr. Guo’s arrest are not properly attributable to Mr. Guo.\nThere is no evidence that Mr. Guo directed such conduct. Conduct undertaken by unknown\nmembers of the community is not obstructive or properly attributed to Mr. Guo and should be\nstruck from the PSR.\n\n¶¶ 96-97  This conduct does not pertain to Mr. Guo and should be stricken.\n\n¶ 100  Upon information and belief, the prosecutors have spoken with counsel for William\nJe, who informed them that Mr. Je  has declined to return voluntarily to the United States.\n\n¶ 101  Mr. Guo objects to this paragraph in its entirety. The Government’s view should be\nreflected in its sentencing submission, and not in the PSR. The PSR should contain facts\ndetermined by the Probation Department and the record. It is also noted here that Mr. Guo was the\nfounder and promoter of ROLS and ROLF. Each entity carved its  own mission and had its own\nstaff and Board of Directors. Witnesses called by the Government testified that each entity\nconducted Board meetings and voted on initiatives, and that Mr. Guo was not part of either Board.\nAccordingly, the notion that Mr. Guo acted on behalf of a charitable organization to perpetrate a\nfraud is unfounded and should be stricken.\n\nSimilarly, Mr. Guo has not made a misrepresentation or undertaken fraudulent action or\nviolated orders during the course of his bankruptcy proceeding. He filed for bankruptcy on\nFebruary 15, 2022, is represented by counsel in that matter, and those proceedings continue.\nAccordingly, the paragraph’s reference to Mr. Guo’s bankruptcy should be stricken. Similarly, Mr.\nGuo denies the Government’s characterization of the alleged criminal activity, his alleged role, or\nthat the alleged scheme was moved to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory\nofficials, or that the alleged offense involved sophisticated means, more than 10 alleged victims\nand 5 or more participants, or that Mr. Guo illegally received gross receipts from a financial\ninstitution in an amount more than $1million.\n\n---\n\n90\n\n¶ 102  The Government should be required to detail the specific role it attributes to William\nJe. Its refusal to do so is clearly strategic, as an accurate characterization of Mr. Je’s role would\nmake clear that Mr. Je engaged in independent activity of which Mr. Guo was unaware, and in\nwhich Mr. Guo did not participate. For example, defense witness Leanne Li testified that Mr. Je\nand his staff at the Himalaya Exchange refused to grant her access to conduct an audit of the\nexchange as requested by Mr. Guo. Likewise, direct intervention by Mr. Guo with Mr. Je to allow\nthe audit to occur, in order to account for all of the community’s funds, also was rejected. This\ntestimony makes clear the independence with which Mr. Je operated over financial matters and the\nHimalaya Exchange.\n\n¶¶ 103-105  Mr. Guo objects to these paragraphs as irrelevant; HEX was an ongoing entity\nwith its own leadership and structure. Further, Mr. Guo objects to use of the terms “Guo’s\nenterprise businesses” and the “Guo Enterprise.” These terms are Government inventions and there\nwas no testimony that the various business entities were called “Guo’s enterprise businesses” or\nthe “Guo Enterprise” by anyone other than the Government.\n\nThe second sentence in paragraph 103  is factually incorrect. Since 2020, prior to Mr. Guo’s\narrest, Qidong Xia was the leader of the Himalaya Alliance, elected by the Global Alliance\nCommittee to serve as Secretary General of the Alliance. Mr. Guo could not “appoint or announce”\nQidong Xia as the “new” leader. This point is supported by the many on-line videos posted\n(predating Mr. Guo’s arrest) in which Qidong Xia speaks as the leader of the Himalaya Alliance.\n\nThere is some further context for the call referenced in ¶ 103. Mr. Guo had a meeting with\nsenior representatives from the United Arab Emirates’ sovereign fund scheduled for March 17,\n2023, two days after his arrest. Chats between William Je and Yanping Wang confirm the\nscheduling and coordination of this meeting with UAE representatives. The meeting was to finalize\nan investment by the UAE into the Himalaya Exchange and the issuance of government licenses\nto the Himalaya Exchange by the UAE. The UAE was to issue a banking license permitting\npayments and transactions in Euros for the Himalaya Exchange and members of the pro-\ndemocracy movement. Partnership and investment by the UAE sovereign fund would undoubtedly\nhave increased the value of the Himalaya Exchange and its cryptocurrency. That Mr. Guo\nencouraged continuation of efforts to partner and negotiate with the UAE as well as applications\nfor UAE banking licenses post-arrest is lawful and proper.\n\nThe suggestion in PSR ¶ 104 that Mr. Guo used “coded language” during any calls is\nentirely speculative and that reference should be stricken.\n\nMore generally, statements from Mr. Guo to Qidong Xia to continue supporting the leaders\nof the Himalaya Alliance and to keep ongoing overseas Movement operations running well are\nconsistent with the pro-democracy movement and are neither unlawful nor obstructive. Similarly,\nMr. Guo’s statements to fellow freedom fighters on the circumstances surrounding his arrest or\nbusiness negotiations are not improper, and do not bear on any of the charges in the indictment.\n\nFinally, none of these “jail calls” show control by Miles Guo. Rather, it shows the Alliance\nhad a structure similar to independent organizations and was led by community members who had\n\n---\n\nthe \"final say\" in operations for their respective organizations. Advising people to be ale1t that\ntheir conversations are being recorded is common sense and not nefarious.\n,r,r 106-108 These paragraphs as written must be stricken as they do not describe conduct\nby Mr. Guo, other than the Government's supposition and inuendo in these paragraphs that Mr.\nGuo sta1ted the fire. Any intimation or suggestion that the fire was caused by Mr. Guo while he\nwas afready in custody and incommunicado is not suppo1ted by any evidence. Moreover, both the\nA TF and the FBI concluded that the cause of the fire could not be determined and there is no\nevidence to the contra1y. Nor can it be ignored that at the time of the fire, Mr. Guo was in the\ncustody of federal agents and that the other person - Individual-I - in the apaitment at the time of\nthe FBI seai·ch also was not free to roain through the premises. He too was confined and under the\nwatchful eyes of the FBI.\nShould these pai·agraphs remain, the following infonnation should be added:\nGuo' s aiTest occuned on March 15, 2023. More than 12 agents from the FBI anned with a drone\nchose to enter Mr. Guo's Sheny -Netherland apa1tment at 6:00 a.m. through the service elevator.\nMr. Guo' s bedroom is nowhere close to the service elevator, and eve1yone in the apaitment was\nasleep. Mr. Guo was handcuffed and not free to leave. Individual-I, a person who as fai· as we are\nawai·e was never inte1viewed or by the FBI on this issue, was almost simultaneously searched and\nhandcuffed. A search of his person and that of the apartment did not lead to the discove1y of any\nexplosives or remote device capable of igniting a fire. CCTV caineras in the apa1tment, in the sole\npossession and control of the Govermnent, reveal Individual-I doing nothing nefarious. Neither\nthe FBI nor the DOJ chose to have its agents weai· individual body caineras. It was the FBI who\nchose to unplug CCTV cameras in the apartment, which would have recorded actions unde1taken\nduring their time in the apaitment. The manner of the search was chosen by the FBI, not Miles\nGuo. The Government's evidence of the search shows wallboai·ds tom from the walls exposing\nstuds and electrical wiring; all the teai· down was done with the use of sharp metal objects and\nwithout consultation of the New York Fire Depaitment.\nFmther, the fire sta1ted at least several hours after both Mr. Guo and Individual-I had been\nremoved from the Sheny-Netherland. Only law enforcement remained and only law enforcement\nhad access to the apai·tment during the several hours before the fire staited and after the fire was\nextinguished.\nThis was a planned aiTest; the Government chose to enter through the se1vice elevator and\nnow expresses smprise no one heard their banging for entiy. Logic tells you that se1vice elevators\nai·e at the back of the apaitment and designed to be as far from the resident as possible.\nBecause the apaitment was ultimately seized by the bankmptcy Tmstee, the defense had\nonly limited access to the grounds well after it had been cleared. As a result, Mr. Guo could not\neffectively challenge the conclusions of the A TF and the Fire Depaitment; as noted, ATF\nconcluded that the cause of the fire could not be detennined\n91\n\n---\n\n92\n\n¶¶ 107-108  These paragraphs and subparagraphs have no relevance to the issues in the\ncase and only seek to foster the Government’s unsubstantiated inuendo that Mr. Guo was somehow\nresponsible for the fire. Accordingly, they should be stricken.\n\n¶¶ 109, 114  Mr. Guo objects to the adjustments and offense level set forth in these\nparagraphs. Further, the parties have agreed that restitution in this case is impracticable. See ECF\nNos. 785, 789.\n\n¶ 110  This paragraph is not supported by the trial evidence and should be stricken. Should\nthe Court be inclined to credit any of these arguments, Mr. Guo requests a Fatico hearing.\n\n¶¶ 114-123  The objections set forth above as to ¶¶ 88-97 and ¶¶101-114 are repeated\nherein. Mr. Guo objects to each of the adjustments and enhancements noted in these paragraphs\nand the adjusted and total offense levels set forth in ¶¶ 120, 123.\n\n¶ 129  Mr. Guo was born under the name “Guo Wengui” in Jilin Province, China.\n\n¶ 130  For clarification, Mr. Guo’s brother was shot by police during a visit to Mr. Guo’s\noffice to question Mr. Guo, not in the midst of the protests at Tiananmen Square.\n\n¶¶ 173-175  Because of the advisory nature of the Guidelines, Mr. Guo is eligible for a\nsentence of Probation.\n\n¶¶ 179-180  The parties have agreed that restitution in this case is not practical. See ECF\nNos. 785, 789.\n\n¶ 181  The issue of forfeiture has been the subject of briefing by the parties. See ECF Nos.\n799, 803, 804. The money and assets in the Government’s possession and control, the GTV money\n(acquitted conduct), the refunds and redemptions given to investors, the criminal proceeds in the\npossession of the Trustee, and other amounts all must be offsets against any forfeiture judgment\nto be entered against Mr. Guo. Mr. Guo requests a Fatico hearing on the amount of any order of\nforfeiture in this case.\n\nD. Statistical Analysis of Data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Other\nSources Demonstrates that a Below-Guidelines Sentence for Mr. Guo Would be\nConsistent with Current Sentences for the Conduct of Conviction and Would\nAvoid Unwarranted Sentence Disparities\nData from the United States Sentencing Commission and other sources establishes that a\nsentence dramatically below the applicable Guidelines range for Mr. Guo conforms generally with\nthe majority of sentences for Mr. Guo’s offense conduct in this District.\n\n---\n\n93\n\nThe analysis below, mirroring PSR ¶¶ 112-14, focuses on convictions for money\nlaundering (applying § 2S1.1) and fraud/theft (applying § 2B1.1). While there are differences in\nthe data set forth below for those respective offenses, they still point decidedly in one direction:  a\nsentence for Mr. Guo decisively below the advisory Guidelines level set forth in the PSR\n(corresponding to Level 43, which we challenge, and Criminal History Category I). See PSR ¶¶\n114, 126.\n1. Sentencing Commission Publications and Data\n\nThe Sentencing Commission publishes each quarter an abstract of federal sentencing\nstatistics entitled U.S. Sentencing Commission Preliminary Quarterly Data Report. The most\nrecent quarterly figures are contained in the United States Sentencing Commission Quarterly Data\nReport, 4th Quarter Release, Preliminary Fiscal Year 2025 Data, Through September 30, 2025\n(“Q4 Preliminary Data Report FY 2025”), which covers sentences imposed between October 1,\n2024 and September 30, 2025 (“Q4 2025”).59\n\nAnnually, the Sentencing Commission publishes a comprehensive Sourcebook of Federal\nSentencing Statistics, the most recent of which includes data for Fiscal Year 2024 (“2024\nSourcebook”).\nThe\n2024\nSourcebook\nis\navailable\nat\nhttp\nsourcebooks/2024/2024_Sourcebook.pdf.\n\nA third category of data that can be extracted from the Sentencing Commission’s publicly\navailable information is found in the Commission’s “Individual Datafiles” for Fiscal Years 2019-\n\n59\n The\nQ4\nPreliminary\nData\nReport\nFY\n2025\nis\navailable\nat\nhttp\nstatistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC_Quarter_Report_4th_FY25.pdf. Prior Quarterly\nData Reports are also available on the Sentencing Commission’s web site, at\nhttp\nstatistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/.\n\n---\n\n94\n\n2023, which can be downloaded from its website. See U.S. Sentencing Commission Datafiles,\navailable at http\n\nThe data regarding federal sentences generally demonstrates that the Guidelines no longer\nconstitute the predominant factor in approximately half of sentences nationally, and a decisive\nmajority of sentences in SDNY. For example, nationally, the Q4 Preliminary Data Report FY 2025\nreveals that 51.4% of sentences are within the Guidelines range, and only 0.4% of sentences are\nabove the Guidelines. Id. at 14.\n\nIn the Second Circuit more specifically, only 31.3% of sentences were within the calculated\nGuidelines range, and in SDNY only 23.8% of sentences were within the advisory Guidelines\nrange, and no court imposed a sentence based on an upward departure. Id.\n\nThe 2024 Sourcebook establishes that nationwide in 2024, defendants in federal court\nconvicted of money laundering were sentenced to an average of 54 months’ imprisonment and a\nmedian of 28 months, and of wire fraud, 21 months and 12 months, respectively. See 2024\nSourcebook at Table 15.\n\nFor Mr. Guo, in Criminal History Category I, the mean and median for money laundering\nwere lower than the overall average, at 41 and 21 months, respectively, as were the fraud/theft/\nembezzlement, at 18 and 7 months respectively. Id. at Table 27. The sentences for money\nlaundering were between 416 and 442 months lower than the 470 months the Sentencing\nCommission assigns to sentences of life imprisonment. See id. at Table 15 n.1.\n\nMoreover, even those defendants sentenced for money laundering within the applicable\nGuidelines range were sentenced to the lower half of the range 21.6% of the time, and sentenced\nto the minimum of the range 51.8% of the time. Id. at Table 34. Similarly, those sentenced for\nfraud were sentenced to the minimum range 53.4% of the time. Id.\n\n---\n\n95\n\nThe data from the Q4 Preliminary Data Report FY 2025 are similar. The mean sentence\nfor money laundering for  2025 nationally was 61 months, with the median at 30 months. See Table\n6 (“Sentence Length By Type of Crime”) at 9. Less than a majority – 28% – of money laundering\nsentences imposed were within the applicable Guidelines range. See Table 10 (“Sentence Imposed\nRelative to the Guideline Range by Type of Crime”) at 17.\n\nIn the SDNY, in 2024 the mean sentence for money laundering convictions was 34 months,\n20 months fewer than the national average. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Statistical Information\nPacket Fiscal Year 2024 Southern District of New York, at Table 7, available at\nhttp\nstatistics/state-district-circuit/2024/nys24.pdf. Similarly, the median SDNY sentence for money\nlaundering was 18 months, 10 months fewer than the national average. Id. at Table 7.\n\nThe Sentencing Commission’s “Interactive Data Files,”60 which provides the ability to\nreview “Individual Datafiles” offer additional support for the conclusion that sentencing Mr. Guo’s\nto life would create disparate result relative to current sentences. The Interactive Data Files reflect\nthe sentences imposed in SDNY on similarly situated defendants spanning a seven-year period.\nThe parameters chosen were: money laundering and fraud crime types with the Guidelines\n§ 2B1.1, a Criminal History Category of I, Sentencing Zone D, a defendant between the ages of\n51 and 60, and within SDNY. Career offenders were omitted from the pool.\n\nThat profile yielded 183 sentences imposed, with an average length of 27 months. In fact,\n56.3% of defendants received a sentence of less than 2 years, with only 2.2% receiving a sentence\nof 10 to less than 15 years.\n\n60  The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s “Interactive Data Analyzer” is available at:\nhttp\n\n---\n\n96\n\n2. Judiciary Sentencing Information Database (JSIN)\n\nAnother database, the Judiciary Sentencing Information (“JSIN,” available at\nhttp), provides data for a specific set of criteria: those defendants nationally who,\nbetween Fiscal Years 2020-2024, were assigned a primary Guidelines of § 2B1.1, had a Final\nOffense Level of 43 (which, as discussed supra, is grossly inflated by the unjustified 30-point “loss\namount” enhancement), and were in Criminal History Category I.\n\nOf the 31 defendants nationally in that particular data subset who were not the subject of a\n§ 5K1.1 motion, representing a fraction of the total of 1,345 federal money laundering cases during\nQ4 2025 (see Q4 Preliminary Data Report FY 2025, at 17 [Table 10]), JSIN reports that the\naverage sentence was 158 months, with the median at 138 months – 312 months shy of the length\nutilized for life imprisonment.\n3. Courts Have Relied on Data in Fashioning Sentences\n\nCourts have increasingly endorsed and relied upon the data in imposing sentence. In United\nStates v. Singh, 877 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2017) and United States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181 (2d Cir.\n2017), the Second Circuit employed statistical comparison as a key element in determining\nwhether a sentence would represent an unwarranted disparity. Indeed, in both cases, the Court held\nthat sentences significantly above the national norm for persons in the same CHC who committed\nthe same offense were substantively unreasonable.61\n\n61  Other courts have also relied upon statistics in reviewing and crafting sentences. See United\nStates v. Stock, 685 F.3d 631, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2012) (observing sentence was “by far the longest”\nimposed for an offense such as the one at bar, and that this might affect the reasonableness of the\nsentence on remand); United States v. Musgrave, 647 Fed. App’x 529, 538 (6th Cir. 2016)\n(sentence reasonable in part because district court “studied sentencing statistics nationally and in\nthe Southern District of Ohio”); United States v. Buesing, 615 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2010)\n(affirming sentence arrived at in part through analysis of Sentencing Commission statistics);\nUnited States v. Kamper, 860 F. Supp.2d 596, 608 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (“[t]he Commission’s\nstatistical work is invaluable to district court judges”);see also Alan Ellis & Mark Allenbaugh,\nUnwarranted Disparity:  Effectively Using Statistics in Federal Sentencing. 101 Crim. L. Rptr. 71\n\n---\n\n97\n\nStatistical comparison to mean and median sentences has also been a feature of courts\nreviewing prior sentences in the context of motions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, and particularly\nwhen the nature of the offense (often homicide) resulted in a life sentence. For example, in United\nStates v. Russo, 643 F. Supp.3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2022), the Court, noting how the sentences imposed\npursuant to guilty pleas coincided with national averages while those imposed after trial were\nlonger, listed a series of cases in which the average sentences were instructive, and illustrated the\ndisparity:\nSee, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 93 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring)\n(noting that a life-without-parole sentence was “far more severe than the average\nsentence imposed on those convicted of murder or manslaughter, who typically\nreceive under 25 years in prison”); United States v. Qadar, No. 00 Cr. 603 [(ARR),\n2021 WL 3087956, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2021)] (noting that the average\nfederal murder sentence in fiscal year 2020 was approximately 21 years); United\nStates v. Tellier, No. 92 Cr. 869 [(LGS), 2022 WL 1468381, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May\n10, 2022)] (noting that according to U.S. Sentencing Commission statistics, for\nfiscal years 2015-2021, the median sentence and length of imprisonment for murder\nwas 240 months, and the mean sentence and length of imprisonment for murder\nwas 262 and 263 months, respectively).\n\n643 F. Supp.3d at 335-36; see also United States v. White, 96 Cr. 1123 (SHS), 2022 WL 18276933,\nat *4 (December 8, 2022) (citing United States Sentencing Commission, Interactive Data\nAnalyzer, available at http (viewed December 8,\n2022)).\n4. The Data Establishes that in Practice the Guidelines are Not the Predominant\nFactor at Sentencing\n\nThe data set forth above demonstrate that the clear and prevalent practice within SDNY is\nsentencing below the Guidelines range, and that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range\n– notwithstanding that the Guidelines remain the benchmark for sentencing, see Gall v. United\n\n(Apr. 26, 2017), available at http\nstatistics-in-federal-sentencing.pdf.\n\n---\n\n98\n\nStates, 552 U.S. 48, 56 (2007) – is the rather limited exception, and not the rule. Thus, the norm\nnow is for Courts to consider § 3553(a) factors other than the Guidelines as more important when\nfashioning a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the statutory\nobjectives of sentencing enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).\n\nAlso, defendants convicted of similar conduct may vary in culpability, risk of recidivism,\ndangerousness and other variations that judges must now take into account. See Kimbrough, 552\nU.S. at 108 (“some departures from uniformity were a necessary cost of the remedy we adopted”).\n\nMr. Guo compares favorably for each of these touchstones.\nThe data firmly establish that a sentence for Mr. Guo well below the Guidelines would be\nconsistent with many other sentences for this class of offense conduct, and that a longer sentence\nwould create the type of disparity proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).\nE. Mr. Guo’s Medical History and Treatment at MDC\n\nMr. Guo’s medical history is set forth in Exhibit 1, which is respectfully submitted under\nseal to maintain confidentiality of health-related material as mandated by the Health Insurance\nPortability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Public Law 104-191.\nF. Mr. Guo Has Endured 37 Months’ Confinement at MDC During Its Most Violent\nand Chaotic Period\n\nMDC has been a dysfunctional institution for years. As detailed in Exhibit 14, attached\nhereto, MDC has suffered from staffing problems, violence, physical problems with maintenance\nand operations, safety vulnerabilities, leadership issues, and negligence with respect to medical\nand mental health care.\n\nThis Court is of course quite familiar with the serious, multiple, and systemic problems at\nthe institution. See Transcript, United States v. Segura-Genao, 18 Cr. 219 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.\nFebruary 5, 2019) (ECF # 211). Indeed, in 2019 this Court visited MDC, followed by an\n\n---\n\n99\n\nevidentiary hearing that identified many of the problems that currently remain, and remain resistant\nto remediation. Id.\n\nMore recently, during a sentencing proceeding in February 2025, this Court remarked that\n[t]he conditions of confinement at MDC are uniquely difficult. Courts in this district\nhave recognized that MDC is notoriously and, in some instances, egregiously slow\nin providing necessary medical and mental health treatment to inmates. And\nphysical conditions within the facility include mold and contaminated drinking\nwater.\nTranscript of February 25, 2025, Sentencing, United States v. Alptunaer, 23-CR-188 (AT)\n(S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2023) (ECF No. 86 at 36) (citing United States v. Chavez, 710 F.Supp. 3d 227,\n234- 35 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)).\n\nUnfortunately, since the Court’s inspection of MDC in 2019, the facility’s dysfunction has,\nin many respects, worsened even further. As the Court is aware, as a result of those conditions,\ncourts in SDNY and the Eastern District of New York have as a matter of course reduced the length\nof sentences they would otherwise impose. That standard should apply as well to Mr. Guo, whose\ntenure at MDC has corresponded to a particularly violent, volatile, and extraordinarily difficult\nperiod for the institution.\n\nExhibit 14 provides an updated, comprehensive review, prepared by counsel, describing\nthe conditions at MDC during Mr. Guo’s 37 months confined there.\nG. The BOP is in Crisis in Multiple Facets of its Operations Beyond MDC Brooklyn\n\nThe U.S. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has been in crisis for years, a situation documented\nrepeatedly by the Department of Justice Inspector General  in detailed reports issued for the past\ntwo decades. In addition, as discussed below, certain current developments will exacerbate the\nproblems confronted by BOP, and, inexorably, those imprisoned within its facilities.\n\n---\n\n100\n\nMr. Guo will be subject to the deteriorating conditions in BOP facilities. That decay\ninvolves both physical infrastructure as well as chronic insufficient staffing. Both imperil the\nhealth and safety of inmates like Mr. Guo, and staff as well. A detailed examination of the crises\nconfronting BOP, and the discouraging portents for the future, is presented in Exhibit 15 hereto.\nH. Issues Following Conclusion of Mr. Guo’s Sentence\nMr. Guo will confront other issues after expiration of his sentence in this case. Those issues\nare addressed in sealed Exhibit 16.\nIII.\nFINANCIAL PENALTIES\n\nA. Restitution\n\nThe Government has moved for entry of an order finding that restitution would be\nimpracticable in this case, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3). ECF No. 785 at 5. Mr. Guo\nconcurs. ECF No. 789 at 3. Accordingly, no order of restitution should be imposed.\nB. Forfeiture\n\nMr. Guo has submitted considerable briefing on the issue of forfeiture. See ECF Nos. 799,\n804. Should the Court be inclined to impose a forfeiture money judgment against Mr. Guo, we\nrequest a Fatico hearing prior to entry of any such order.\nC. Fine\n\nGiven that Mr. Guo has Court-appointed counsel and a bankruptcy proceeding pending, no\nfine should be imposed because he lacks the ability to pay.\n\n---\n\n101\nCONCLUSION\nMiles Guo is a complex individual and this is a complex and unique case. For all of the\nreasons discussed in this memorandum and accompanying exhibits, as well as the supplemental\nmaterials provided and to be provided by counsel, Miles Guo respectfully submits, on the unique\nand complex facts of his life and of this case, and considering all of the sentencing factors which\nthe Court must consider, that a sentence substantially below the applicable Guidelines range and\nthe sentencing recommendation in the PSR will be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to\nachieve the purposes of sentencing.\nDated: March 20, 2026\nNew York, New York\nRespectfully submitted,\n           /s/\nJohn F. Kaley\nDoar Rieck Kaley & Mack\n217 Broadway, Suite 707\nNew York, New York 10007\nTel: 212-619-3730\n           /s/\nJoshua L. Dratel\nLaw Offices of Dratel & Lewis\n29 Broadway, Suite 1412\nNew York, New York 10006\nTel: 212-732-0707\n           /s/\nMelinda Sarafa\nSARAFA ZELLAN PLLC\n43 West 43rd Street, Suite 370\nNew York, NY 10036\nTel: 212-785-7575\nTo:\nAll Counsel via ECF","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n:\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国）\n:\n:\n诉\n:\n23-CR-118 (AT)\n:\nMILES GUO（郭文贵），\n:\n:\n被告。\n:\n:\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n代表 MILES GUO（郭文贵）提交的\n量刑辩护备忘录\nJohn F. Kaley，律师\nDoar Rieck Kaley & Mack 律师事务所\n217 Broadway, Suite 707\nNew York, NY 10007\n电话：212-619-373\nJoshua L. Dratel\nLaw Offices of Dratel & Lewis 律师事务所\n29 Broadway, Suite 1412\nNew York, New York 10006\n电话：212-732-0707\nMelinda Sarafa\nSARAFA ZELLAN PLLC 律师事务所\n43 West 43rd Street, Suite 370\nNew York, NY 10036\n电话：212-785-7575\n被告 Miles Guo（郭文贵）之辩护律师\n\n---\n\n目录\n\n引言 ........................................................................................................................................ 1\nI.\n郭先生的个人背景及本案的\n政治背景 ...................................................................................... 5\n\nA.\n郭先生在文化大革命期间的早年成长经历 ........................................... 5\n\nB.\n天安门广场抗议、目睹其兄长被\n警察开枪打死，以及郭先生遭受的政治监禁 ............................................... 7\n\nC.\n郭先生取得经济上的成功、建立政治联盟，\n并面临政治风险 .................................................................................... 8\n\nD.\n日益增长的商业成功以及与中国政府的摩擦 ........................ 10\n\nE.\n郭先生在海外成为一名知名且直言不讳的 CCP（中国共产党）批评者 ..................... 13\n\nF.\n郭先生移居美国后，\nCCP 对其针对性打压的加剧 ....................................................................... 15\n\n1.\nINTERPOL（国际刑警组织）红色通缉令、干扰 VOA（美国之音）采访、\n直接恐吓 .............................................................................................. 16\n\n2.\n招募有影响力的美国政商界人士\n游说将郭先生遣返回中国 .................................................... 17\n\n3.\n912 专项工程——一项旨在在网络上\n抹黑郭先生的集中协调行动 ................................................................ 20\n\n4.\n干扰郭先生的社交媒体账户 ........................................... 23\n\n5.\n黑客入侵郭先生律师的计算机系统 ...................................... 24\n\n6.\n利用虚假强奸诉讼将民事法律制度武器化 ........................ 24\n\nG.\nCCP 对郭先生的针对性打压与本案指控行为发生交汇 ................... 25\n\nH.\n美国的政治局势为\n新一届政府转而针对郭先生奠定了基础 .................................................................. 32\n\nI.\n投资者和客户明确否认其受害者身份 ............................................... 34\n\nII.\n确定足以实现但不过度超出\n实现量刑目的所必需的刑罚 .......................................... 38\n\nA.\n适用的量刑考量因素 ............................................................................. 38\n\nB.\nPSR（判决前调查报告）中的《量刑指南》计算存在错误 .................................... 40\n\n---\n\nii\n\n1.\n本案不存在“损失金额” ................................................................ 41\n\na.\n计算“损失金额”的基本法律框架 ... 42\n\nb.\n政府仅依赖流入\nG 系列实体的资金存在根本性缺陷 ........................................... 43\n\nc.\n政府认定的“损失金额”不当地包含了\n郭先生已被判无罪的行为所对应的金额 ................... 45\n\nd.\n政府认定的“损失金额”未能考虑大量\n明确否认自己是“受害者”的所谓“受害者” ...... 45\n\ni.\nHimalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所） ............................................................ 47\n\nii.\nHamilton（汉密尔顿）请愿人 ........................................................... 49\n\niii.\n已依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 提交请愿书或已致信\n政府否认受害者身份的\n投资者 ......................................................................................... 50\n\niv.\n已与辩护律师联系的投资者 ............... 51\n\nv.\n否认自己是受害者的\n未明人数的投资者 ................................................................................. 51\n\ne.\n政府未能考虑能大幅减少\n任何“损失金额”的其他抵消项目 ................................................................... 52\n\nf.\n进行 Fatico 听证会符合法院的裁定\n以及政府的立场，即在本案中基于有限的投资者经历\n进行“推测”和“推断”是\n不适当的 .......................................................................................... 54\n\n2.\n其他法律学说支持认定无损失 ................................. 55\n\na.\n被判无罪的行为不能用于计算\n郭先生的《指南》级别 .................................................................... 56\n\ni.\n在此使用被判无罪的行为将侵犯郭先生依据\n《第五修正案》和《第六修正案》享有的权利 ............................. 57\n\nii.\n2024 年《量刑指南》修正案的影响 ...... 58\n\niii.\n最高法院大法官对\n出于量刑目的使用被判无罪行为所表达的保留意见 60\n\nb.\n具体法律原则显著降低了\n本案中的“损失金额” ................................................................... 63\n\n---\n\niii\n\nc.\n多级别的《指南》加重调整需要\n更高的证明标准 ....................................................................... 66\n\nd.\n依据 2B1.1 条款适用的 30 级加重调整不合理地影响了\n郭先生适用的《量刑指南》范围 ............................. 70\n\n3.\n对其他《指南》加重调整的异议 ................................................... 79\n\nC.\n对 PSR 的其他异议 ..................................................................................... 82\n\nD.\n对来自 U.S. Sentencing Commission（美国量刑委员会）及其他来源数据的统计分析\n表明，对郭先生判处低于《指南》建议的刑罚将与\n当前针对被定罪行为的量刑实践保持一致，并将避免不合理的\n量刑差异 ......................................................................................................... 92\n\n1.\n量刑委员会的出版物和数据 .................................................. 93\n\n2.\nJudiciary Sentencing Information Database（司法量刑信息数据库，JSIN） ............................................ 96\n\n3.\n法院在拟定量刑时曾依赖数据 ........................................ 96\n\n4.\n数据表明，在实践中《指南》\n并非量刑的主导因素 ......................................................... 97\n\nE.\n郭先生的病史及在 MDC（大都会拘留中心）接受的治疗 ................................................... 98\n\nF.\n郭先生在 MDC 最为暴力和混乱的时期\n承受了 37 个月的监禁 .................................................................... 98\n\nG.\nBOP（联邦监狱管理局）在 MDC Brooklyn（布鲁克林大都会拘留中心）以外的多个运营层面均处于危机之中 ......... 99\n\nH.\n郭先生服刑期满后的相关问题 ..................................................... 100\n\nIII.\n财产刑 .......................................................................................................... 100\n\nA.\n赔偿 ....................................................................................................................... 100\n\nB.\n没收 ........................................................................................................................ 100\n\nC.\n罚金 ................................................................................................................................. 100\n\n结论 ......................................................................................................................................... 101\n\n---\n\niv\n\n引用权威目录（TABLE OF AUTHORITIES）\n\n判例（Cases）\n\nBlakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) ................................................................................ 60\n\nConnecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) ..................................................................................... 61\n\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 598 (2007) .............................................. 43, 82\n\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 48 (2007) .................................................................................. 101\n\nGriffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1992). ................................................................................ 63\n\nIn re GTV Media Group, Inc.（GTV传媒集团公司）et al., Order, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-20537 (Sept. 13, 2021)..... 35\n\nIn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) .............................................................................................. 60\n\nIrizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008) ............................................................................. 81\n\nJones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) ................................................................................ 62\n\nJones v. United States, 574 U.S. 948 (2014) ................................................................................ 64\n\nKimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) ................................................................... 79, 80\n\nKoon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) ............................................................................. 43, 81\n\nLoper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) ............................................................. 80\n\nMcClinton v. United States, 600 U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 2400 (2023) ............................................. 64\n\nNelson v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 890 (2010)............................................................................. 42\n\nPeople v. Beck, 939 N.W.2d 213 (Mich. 2019) ............................................................................ 61\n\nRita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) ................................................................................... 46\n\nRui Ma（马蕊）v. Guo Wengui（郭文贵）et al., Sup Ct, NY County（纽约县最高法院）, Sept. 11, 2017, Index No. 158140/2017) ..... 29\n\nSEC（美国证券交易委员会）v. Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）et al., No. 23-CV-2200-PGG (SDNY（纽约南区）, Mar. 15, 2023) ............................. 35\n\nSpears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009) ............................................................................... 80\n\nUnited States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ................................................... 75\n\nUnited States v. Adelson, 441 F.Supp.2d 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2006),\naff’d 301 Fed. App’x. 93 (2d Cir. 2008) ............................................................................. 75, 77\n\nUnited States v. Algahaim, 842 F.3d 796 (2d Cir. 2016) .............................................................. 78\n\nUnited States v. Allen, 644 F. Supp.2d 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ................................................ 72, 73\n\nUnited States v. Alptunaer, 23-CR-188 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2023) .............................. 5, 102\n\nUnited States v. Avenatti, 2024 WL 4553810 (9th Cir. October 23, 2024) ...................... 67, 68, 69\n\nUnited States v. Bai et al., No. 23-MJ-334-SJB (E.D.N.Y., April 6, 2023) ............... 17, 24, 26, 31\n\nUnited States v. Bell, 808 F. 3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .................................................................. 64\n\nUnited States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) ............................................................ 42, 61, 70, 79\n\nUnited States v. Buesing, 615 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2010 .............................................................. 100\n\nUnited States v. Byors, 586 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2009) .............................................................. 66, 67\n\nUnited States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2008) ........................................................ 62, 65\n\nUnited States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) ................................................. 43\n\nUnited States v. Chavez, 710 F.Supp. 3d 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2024 ................................................... 102\n\nUnited States v. Coleman, 138 F.4th 489, 511-512 (7th Cir.),\ncert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 275 (2025) ........................................................................................... 65\n\nUnited States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992) .................................................... 71, 72\n\n---\n\nv\n\nUnited States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008), ............................................................. 67\n\nUnited States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2000) ........................................... 71, 72\n\nUnited States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013) ...................................................... 77, 78, 80\n\nUnited States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005) .................................................................. 42\n\nUnited States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 1997) ............................................................. 47\n\nUnited States v. Dorvee, 604 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2010),\namended 616 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 76\n\nUnited States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ......................................... 75\n\nUnited States v. Faibish, No. 12-CR-265 (E.D.N.Y., March 10, 2016) ....................................... 76\n\nUnited States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978) ............................................................... 8, 46\n\nUnited States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp.2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008 .................................................. 76\n\nUnited States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 1994) ....................................................................... 66\n\nUnited States v. Gagarin, 950 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................................... 69\n\nUnited States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996) .................................................................... 71\n\nUnited States v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp.2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012),\naff’d, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014) ................................................................................ 78, 79, 82\n\nUnited States v. Hundley, 02-CR- 441 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ................................................... 76\n\nUnited States v. Jackson, 364 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2003) .................................................................. 77\n\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2017) ............................................................... 100\n\nUnited States v. Johnson, 2018 WL 1997975 (E.D.N.Y. April 27, 2018).................................... 78\n\nUnited States v. Johnson, 754 F. Supp.3d 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) .................................................. 66\n\nUnited States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2008) ........................................................ 43, 73, 81\n\nUnited States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2007) ..................................................................... 72\n\nUnited States v. Kamper, 860 F. Supp.2d 596 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) ........................................ 66, 100\n\nUnited States v. Lauerson, 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003) .............................................................. 77\n\nUnited States v. Lauerson, 362 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2004) .............................................................. 77\n\nUnited States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.2008) ................................................................... 67\n\nUnited States v. Litvak, 3:13-CR-19 (D. Conn. July 23, 2014) .................................................... 76\n\nUnited States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993) ................................................................. 49\n\nUnited States v. Musgrave, 647 Fed. App’x 529 (6th Cir. 2016) ............................................... 100\n\nUnited States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024) ........................................................ 69, 70\n\nUnited States v. Russo, 643 F. Supp.3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2022).................................................... 100\n\nUnited States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F. 3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2014) ............................................. 64\n\nUnited States v. Salazar, 489 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2007) ................................................................. 73\n\nUnited States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555(7th Cir.1991) .............................................................. 68\n\nUnited States v. Segura-Genao, 18 Cr. 219 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. February 5, 2019) ........................ 102\n\nUnited States v. Settles, 530 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ............................................................... 62\n\nUnited States v. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1997) .............................................................. 73\n\nUnited States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.2004) ..................................................................... 68\n\nUnited States v. Singh, 877 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2017) .................................................................. 100\n\n---\n\nvi\n\nUnited States v. Stephen A. Wynn（斯蒂芬·A·韦恩）, No. 22-CV-1372 (D.D.C., May 17, 2022)................. 21, 22, 23\n\nUnited States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 631(6th Cir. 2012)................................................................... 100\n\nUnited States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2005) ................................................................. 72\n\nUnited States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam ............................................................ 60\n\nUnited States v. White, 551 F.3d 381(6th Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 61\n\nUnited States v. White, 96 Cr. 1123 (SHS), 2022 WL 18276933 (December 8, 2022) .............. 101\n\nUnited States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2008) .......................................................... 73, 74\n\nVan Loon v. Dep’t of the Treasury（美国财政部）, 122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024) .............................................. 80\n\n成文法（Statutes）\n\n15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) ......................................................................................................................... 60\n\n18 U.S.C. § 2 ................................................................................................................................. 60\n\n18 U.S.C. § 1343 ........................................................................................................................... 60\n\n18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) ...................................................................................................................... 63\n\n18 U.S.C. § 1957 ........................................................................................................................... 60\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ............................................................................................................... passim（见各处）\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) ........................................................................................................... passim（见各处）\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) ............................................................................................................ 8, 101\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) ................................................................................................................. 42\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3582 ......................................................................................................................... 100\n\n18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3) ............................................................................................................. 103\n\n21 U.S.C. § 853 ............................................................................................................................. 53\n\n21 U.S.C. § 853(n) ................................................................................................................. passim（见各处）\n\n其他权威资料\nU.S.S.G. §1B1.3 ............................................................................................................................ 62\nU.S.S.G. §1B1.3(c) ....................................................................................................................... 62\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 .................................................................................................................... 见各处\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) ................................................................................................................. 47\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) ............................................................................................................ 77\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10) ............................................................................................................... 84\nU.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) ............................................................................................................ 77\nU.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) .................................................................................................................. 84\nU.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) ................................................................................................................ 77, 84\nU.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 ........................................................................................................................... 84\nU.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. ......................................................................................................................... 99\nU.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 .......................................................................................................................... 73\n\n---\n\n引言\n\n本量刑意见书谨代表被告人 Miles Guo（郭文贵）呈递。基于下文阐述之理由，特此谨请法院作出显著低于适用《量刑指南》（Guidelines）级别的刑罚，该判决将构成一项“足够，但不过度”以实现 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) 所列之量刑目标的刑罚。正如本法院所确认的那样：\n“如果说在一个人的一生中，有哪一天他有权根据其全部个人背景及贡献来接受评判，那就是在量刑之时；而第 3553(a) 条在指示法院考量犯罪者的个人经历和特征时，正与此相符。”\n2025年2月18日庭审记录，United States v. Alptunaer 案，案号 23-CR-188 (AT)（Southern District of New York [纽约南区联邦地区法院]，2023年4月10日）（ECF No. 85 第 37 页）。这种包含被告人正面品质并与其犯罪行为相权衡的量刑理念，在此处尤为适用，因为如下文详述，郭先生诸多令人钦佩的品质以及重大、可贵的成就，显然以压倒性的优势超越了其犯罪行为。\n\n显而易见的是，对郭先生在庭审所呈现内容之外的多维人生经历和牺牲进行审视，表明他不能仅由其犯罪行为所定义，也不能由某种简单、单一的叙事所定义。正如文中所详述，他的早期个人经历，从其家庭在中国文化大革命期间遭受的政治排挤，到他因卷入最终导致天安门广场屠杀的抗议活动而被捕，以及他随后遭受的拘押和酷刑，与其后来随着中国私营企业的蓬勃发展在商业上取得的巨大成功一样，引人瞩目且具决定性意义。\n\n---\n\n郭先生对其中国同胞之夙愿所作出的贡献是无与伦比的，他对国家更美好未来的投入亦是如此。认识到经济资源对于建立海外政治运动基础设施的重要性，他积累并奉献了一笔巨额财富，以及该财富带给他的公众形象，全力投身于他数十年来以极大精力所追求的这一单一目标。\n\n作为回报，郭先生遭受了来自 People’s Republic of China（中华人民共和国，简称“PRC”）及其执政党 Chinese Communist Party（中国共产党，简称“CCP”）大规模、无孔不入且危及生命的迫害。正如文中所讨论的，这些持续不懈、多维度的攻击包括招募美国商业、娱乐和政治领域的精英来密谋反对郭先生，并对本案中的各项指控起到了实质性的推动作用。1 事实上，如下文所述，中共发起了铺天盖地的社交媒体运动以抹黑郭先生，并强迫投资者向美国执法机构和媒体机构提交针对郭先生的虚假控告。\n\n鉴于这一无可争议的证据，在本案中判处长期监禁只会坐实中共针对郭先生的打压行动，严重削弱他及其支持者对中国所抱有的目标——这些目标完全符合美国利益——并助长进一步将中国异见人士从公共生活中清除的图谋。\n\n本次量刑中的另一个关键因素是《量刑指南》的计算，尤其是“损失金额”的认定。事实上，并不存在“损失金额”，陪审团的裁决也未确立任何损失金额。此外，如下文详述，并在先前关于没收的呈递文件（参见 ECF Nos. 799、804）中所解释的那样，本案的情况是新颖的，甚至可以说完全是独一无二的，因为涉案实体的众多投资者和客户明确否认自己曾受到郭先生的侵害。\n\n1 郭先生出于量刑之目的，依规承认陪审团的裁决。此处阐述的立场并非挑战该裁决，而是针对与量刑相关的具体问题，不应作其他理解。\n\n---\n\n事实上，由两个独立群体组成并由律师代理的大量资深投资者坚持认为，是政府的行为而非郭先生的行为危及了其投资（以及投资资产，例如 Himalaya Exchange [喜马拉雅交易所] 加密货币）的价值。此外，数百名个人已向法院请愿，或直接联系政府和/或辩护律师，声明放弃受害者身份，转而要求返还被查封的投资财产。\n\n政府所声称的“损失金额”纯属推测，没有任何可靠证据支持，并且与否认郭先生对其构成欺诈的前所未有的庞大投资者和客户群体直接相悖。此外还存在冲销项目——赎回、退款、和解款项、重复计算以及投资者仍持有的剩余价值资产——政府同样忽略了这些项目，但根据规范“损失金额”的法律，应当将这些项目考量在内。\n\n还有其他事实和法律原则削弱了政府所主张的“损失金额”。如《量刑前调查报告》（Presentence Report，简称“PSR”）中所陈述，政府和缓刑监督部门在计算损失时计入了已被判无罪的行为，而《宪法第五修正案》和《宪法第六修正案》以及 2024 年对《量刑指南》的修正案（在编制 PSR 之后生效）均不允许这样做。\n\n此外，根据第二巡回法院长期的指示，“损失金额”调整的幅度——惊人的增加 30 个级别——要求政府以比仅仅“证据优势”更为严格的举证标准来证明任何所主张的“损失金额”。政府无法满足该举证责任。\n\n---\n\n在此背景下，郭先生根据 United States v. Fatico 案（579 F.2d 707 [2d Cir. 1978]）申请举行证据听证会，以解决有关所主张的“损失金额”、郭先生提出异议的其他《量刑指南》加重调整项以及与量刑相关的任何其他争议事实问题的全部争议。\n\n法院亦屡次确认，金融犯罪案件中的“损失金额”对《量刑指南》量刑范围的影响达到了过分、不公和不合理的程度。因此，这些法院依赖第 3553(a) 条的其他考量因素，来纠正以倍数人为推高刑期的“损失金额”加重调整项所带来的不成比例的影响。\n\n这一认识体现在诈骗案件中判处刑期的均值和中位数上，正如文中所讨论的统计分析所确立的那样，这些数据显著低于本案中的《量刑指南》级别，并且更准确、更公正地体现了本案中应判处的适当刑期，同时避免了第 3553(a)(6) 条所禁止的不合理量刑差异。\n\n与郭先生量刑相关的另外三个因素在历来本司法区中均明显起到减轻监禁刑期的作用：(1) 郭先生在 Metropolitan Detention Center（大都会拘留中心，简称“MDC”）被羁押的艰难痛苦的 37 个月，包括该设施历史上最为暴力和混乱的两年；(2) 他将被关押以服完任何追加监禁刑期的 U.S. Bureau of Prisons（美国联邦监狱管理局，简称“BOP”）系统内不合标准且持续恶化的条件；以及 (3) 与郭先生服刑完毕后可能面临的处境相关的考量。本呈递文件附带的单独、详细的证据附件对这些要素的讨论作出了补充。\n\n---\n\n因此，谨此提请，对第 3553(a) 条所列全部量刑因素的审查和评估必然得出如下结论：唯有作出显著低于适用《量刑指南》范围的刑罚，方能符合第 3553(a) 条关于法院应判处“足够，但不过度”以实现第 3553(a)(2) 条所列量刑目的之刑罚的指示。\n\nI.\n郭先生的个人背景与本案的政治背景\n\n如果不充分理解导致今日局面的各项事件所展开的个人、历史和政治背景，就无法理解本案，也无法对郭先生进行公正的量刑。这绝非一起常规案件，郭先生也绝非典型被告人。他的个人背景、激励他并激发公众对其爆料革命（Whistleblower Movement）关注的政治和经济条件、中共对他进行的不懈且极度强力的针对打击——这在本案陪审团的裁决中达到了顶峰——乃至美国国内政治事务，所有这些因素共同造就了涉案行为发生及本次起诉展开的条件，也是审视本案必须采取的视角。\n\nA. 郭先生在文化大革命期间的早期成长经历\n\nGuo Wengui（郭文贵），亦使用粤语名 Ho Wan Kwok（郭浩云）及英文名 Miles Guo2，于 1968 年出生于 People’s Republic of China（中华人民共和国，简称“PRC”）东北部与朝鲜和俄罗斯接壤的吉林省。他在其身为矿工的父亲和身为家庭主妇的母亲所生的八兄弟中排行第七。PSR ¶ 129。\n\n2 中文姓氏“Guo”和“Kwok”对应相同的汉字（郭），但发音和罗马拼音不同。郭先生的原名为 Guo Wengui（郭文贵）。他在 2000 年取得香港护照时采用了名 Ho Wan（浩云，字面意为“高贵的云”）（参见 PSR ¶ 137）。他于 1991 年在美欧旅行期间开始使用英文名 Miles（向音乐家 Miles Davis 致敬），以便与不熟悉中国名字的西方人进行交流。\n\nGuo先生（郭先生）早年生活既不优渥，也不富足。他出生于Mao Zedong（毛泽东）在1966年5月发起的Cultural Revolution（文化大革命）爆发两年后；文革一直持续到1976年毛去世，在此期间Guo先生的父母被视作国家敌人。因此，他们基本上被当作流放人员对待，发配至Jilin Province（吉林省）的山区，艰难地抚养他们的八个子女。在Guo先生童年时期，全家挤在一间泥土地面、没有通电、也没有室内排水排污设施的单间窝棚里。PSR ¶ 131。他通常一天只吃一顿饭。Id.。这种状况在当时的中国并不少见，对于那些被排斥为执政党Communist Party（共产党）敌人的人来说尤为如此。\n\nGuo先生就读于当地的公立小学Northeastern Nickel Mine School（东北镍矿学校），并于1979年7月毕业。PSR ¶ 150。此后全家迁往Shandong Province（山东省），一个位于北京和上海之间、毗邻黄海的沿海省份，Guo先生在该地就读于当地公立中学Gu Cheng #3（古城三中）。为赚钱协助养家，他于1984年7月退学，时年15岁。Id.。\n\n孩提时代，Guo先生因其父亲支持民主而目睹父母和兄弟遭受CCP（中共）的迫害。PSR ¶ 132。他的父亲时常遭到人身殴打，他的兄弟们在试图协助父亲时被中共支持者殴打并刺伤，他的父亲还经常为了躲避中共而一次东躲西藏数日。Id.。在这段创伤经历中，Guo先生的母亲精神崩溃，有时也会失踪数天，留下Guo先生及其兄弟们自谋生路。Id.。这些经历，加之中共对其家庭佛教信仰公开表达的全面禁止，给Guo先生留下了关于国家体制性压迫与不公的深刻且不可磨灭的早期印记。Id.。\n\n1985年，Guo先生尚在青少年时期，便在山东省与儿时好友的妹妹Hing Chi Ngok（岳庆芝）结婚。PSR ¶ 133。两人于1987年正式登记结婚，至今仍维持婚姻关系。他们育有两个出生于1980年代后期的子女，儿子名为Qiang（郭强），女儿名为Mei（郭美）。PSR ¶ 134。\n\nB. 天安门广场抗议、目睹兄弟遭警察枪击身亡以及Guo先生的政治监禁\n\n到1989年Guo先生大约20岁时，他与妻子带着儿子和刚出生的女儿居住在Henan Province（河南省）Puyang City（濮阳市）；当年春天发生在北京Tiananmen Square（天安门广场）的动荡彻底改变了他们的生活。4月，前中共中央总书记Hu Yaobang（胡耀邦）逝世后——其因经济与政治改革而受到众多人敬仰，亦遭到另一些人诋毁——数以万计的学生开始聚集在天安门广场，以纪念胡的政治遗产并要求推行亲民主改革。\n\n为支持示威者，Guo先生卖掉了自己的摩托车，并将所得款项捐赠给抗议学生。随后，两名警察前往他位于濮阳的办公室进行讯问，当时他的妻子、尚在婴儿期的女儿和弟弟均在场。期间，一名警察拔枪指向Guo先生，促使其17岁的弟弟Guo Wenbin（郭文宾）扑向警察身前。该警察开枪击中Wenbin的手臂和腿部，随后将兄弟二人逮捕。Wenbin被剥夺了接受医疗救治的权利，终因伤势过重死亡；而Guo先生则被关押，并被指控犯有煽动反革命活动罪。\n\nGuo先生随后在关押政治犯的羁押场所度过了22个月。他在身体和心理上均遭受殴打与折磨，包括亲眼目睹了50多名犯人被处决。PSR ¶ 127。这些经历，加上他兄弟的死亡以及他童年时期在文革中所目睹的虐待，坚定了他抗击政府压迫与腐败的决心。\n\nC. Guo先生实现经济繁荣、结成政治联盟并遭遇政治风险\n\nGuo先生的房地产开发生涯始于其1991年获释出狱之后。PSR ¶ 154。Guo先生明白，要想成为推动政府改革的有效倡导者，他需要取得一定程度的个人成功和影响力。1990年代是中国经济快速扩张的时期，资本市场建立，民营企业成倍增长壮大，国家控制领域的产出占全国总产出的比重逐步下降。在此背景下，Guo先生及其家族建立起蓬勃发展的商业帝国，最初从河南省省会Zhengzhou（郑州）开发一处高端商业综合体起步。\n\n该家族房地产帝国的皇冠明珠最终是Pangu Plaza（盘古大观），这是一座结合北京筹办2008 Summer Olympics（2008年夏季奥运会）规划的综合体。盘古大观由五座独立的塔楼组成，集酒店、办公楼、住宅和商业零售空间于一体，紧邻National Stadium（国家体育场，即“Bird’s Nest（鸟巢）”），在2008年奥运会期间备受瞩目。Guo先生的家族企业于1999年购得该物业，并从北京主办2008年夏季奥运会所带来的巨大增值中获益。盘古大观成为贵宾客人的汇聚枢纽，其中包括在数年间进出该酒店的大批外国政要，Guo先生也由此在全球政界和商界最高层建立了人脉网络。\n\n他们在房地产开发领域的成功使Guo先生及其家族得以将商业活动拓展至多项投资领域，推动其积累了巨额财富。见 PSR ¶ 154。他在商业上的巨大成功，也让Guo先生得以越来越多地接触到政治精英阶层，并对中国政府部分最高级别官员以及来访外国官员的政治腐败有了更深入的了解。\n\n2000年，尽管享有巨大的商业成功，Guo先生仍然认为中国政府从根本上是腐败的。那一年，作为拉开与母国及其中央政权距离的初步步骤，Guo先生以Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）的名义取得了一本香港护照。见 PSR ¶ 137。\n\n2003年，Guo先生举报了一名北京重要市级官员的腐败行为。这导致中国最高级别的民事情报机构Ministry of State Security（国家安全部，简称“MSS”）的官员接触Guo先生，要求其提供更多信息并予以配合，他也确实提供了配合。\n\n然而，Guo先生揭发该官员所带来的余波影响深远且持久。2004年9月，当时36岁、家中有两个十几岁子女的Guo先生在抵达北京机场时被数十名警察逮捕。他们将其带至一家酒店羁押了15天。他遭到审讯、殴打以及各种方式的酷刑折磨。他被剥夺睡眠，警察轮班看守他，并在他打瞌睡时使用胡椒喷雾将其惊醒。他被迫长时间罚站，导致双腿因受压而肿胀。他被倒挂并遭殴打。警察剪下他的头发装入塑料袋，并将塑料袋套在他头上，强迫他吸入细小的碎发颗粒。他的背部被开瓶器刺伤。3\n\n羁押Guo先生的警察屡次命令其停止揭发中国政府官员的腐败，他均予以拒绝。他们讯问他是否向其首个商业开发项目所在地郑州市的市长行贿，他如实回答没有。他们要求交代他是否在为美国从事间谍活动，他亦如实回答没有。15天后，他们将其送往医院，他在那里停留了三天后获释回家。不足为奇的是，他与某些在华美国官员的关系引来了中共的审查和猜忌，怀疑其代表美国从事间谍活动。\n\n3 在PSR中描述Guo先生的身体状况时，Probation Officer（缓刑监督官）写道：“Guo身上带有多种疤痕和残疾，系其在祖国中国服刑期间遭受人身酷刑，以及为修复后遗创伤在1993年至2022年期间接受后续外科手术和处置所致。”PSR ¶ 141。Guo先生的医疗状况——包括生理和心理方面——在密封提交给法院的Exhibit 1（证据1）中有更为详细的阐述。\n\n约在2006年，Guo先生与中国国家安全部副部长建立了关系，该副部长除其他职责外还主管国内反腐工作及境外情报搜集。该副部长向Guo先生提供了一定程度的保护，以防范因Guo先生揭露腐败而寻求报复的地方官员，同时也使Guo先生得以更深入地洞察中共最高层的运作内幕。\n\nD. 商业成功的扩大以及与中国政府摩擦的加剧\n\nGuo先生及其家族的商业成功与财富持续增长。2012年至2014年期间，该家族成为Haitong International Securities（海通国际证券）的最大股东，海通国际当时是中国最大的上市证券公司。PSR ¶ 154。该家族还在中国境外设立了ACA Family Fund Investment Company（ACA家族基金投资公司，简称“ACA”）。PSR ¶ 154。\n\n与此同时，Guo先生与被其揭露腐败的中国官员之间的紧张关系不断升级。2013年12月，Guo先生离开中国大陆迁居香港，与妻子和女儿居住在一起。\n\n次年10月，Guo先生接到一通彻底改变其与中国大陆关系的电话。来电者是一名身居高位的中央政府官员，他通知Guo先生，其涉嫌为美国从事间谍活动，必须返回中国大陆接受讯问。Guo先生深知这预示着必然的牢狱之灾和潜在的酷刑折磨，而他已不愿再承受这些，于是Guo先生离开香港前往伦敦，与居住在该地的儿子会合。\n\n约在2015年1月，Guo先生及其家族设立了一家名为Golden Spring New York, Ltd.（纽约金泉有限公司）的家族办公室，并在Manhattan（曼哈顿）设有办公地点。PSR ¶ 154。同样在此期间，该家族在曼哈顿的Sherry-Netherland（雪梨荷兰酒店）购买了一套公寓，当Guo先生后来于2017年永久迁居美国时，该公寓成为其主要住所。该家族还利用来自ACA的约2800万欧元家族资金购买了Lady May（梅夫人号）游艇。\n\nGuo先生关于其家族与中国政府之间的敌对状态已处于爆发边缘的预感被证明是准确的。2015年1月在纽约出差期间，Guo先生接到了来自Zheng (“Bruno”) Wu（吴征（“Bruno”））的多通电话。吴自称代表中共Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection（中央纪律检查委员会，简称“CCDI”）特别调查组行事，恳求Guo先生停止揭露中国官员的腐败，且不要透露其可能从国家安全部副部长处获取的任何信息。\n\n据吴称，特别调查组希望Guo先生与中方配合，并交回其掌握的高级领导人涉腐的所有证据。作为交换，中共将不对Guo先生家族的资产进行查封，不抓捕Guo先生的家庭成员，且不对Guo先生进行人身伤害或杀害。Guo先生予以拒绝。\n\n当月晚些时候，即 2015 年 1 月 10 日，中国当局突击搜查了在北京 Pangu Hotel（盘古七星酒店）举行的一场活动，当时郭先生的许多近亲属和员工聚集在那里。数百名武装警察进入酒店并逮捕了郭先生的家属，包括他的妻子、女儿、他的五位兄弟、5 两位嫂子/弟媳以及一名侄女/外甥女。警察命令所有员工趴在地上，并逮捕了其中约 270 人。郭先生的家属被强行戴上面罩并带往拘留中心。郭先生的妻子和女儿在被拘留期间遭受了虐待和酷刑（参见 PSR ¶¶ 135, 140），在 10 天后获释，但近两年的时间里不被允许返回家中。相反，她们被安置在临时住所中，并被要求每天亲自向当地情报机构报到。PSR ¶ 135。\n\n郭先生的嫂子/弟媳被拘留了三个月，他的兄弟们被带到了距北京 800 多公里的 Dalian City（大连市），并在那里被拘留了两年。在员工中，约有 30 人被正式拘留，并遭受了殴打、审讯和酷刑。除对郭先生的两名兄弟提出了未指明的指控外，并未提起任何正式指控。\n\n自 2015 年 1 月下旬开始，中国当局开始扣押郭先生家族公司所有的位于中国的财产和股票资产，价值约 100 亿美元。其中包括北京 Pangu Plaza（盘古大观）开发项目中的核心建筑和其他组成部分，以及众多其他写字楼。当局在大约 2016 年 12 月和 2017 年 1 月解除了对这些资产的扣押，但在数周后又重新将其扣押。\n\n5 郭先生的二哥/弟曾是一名警察，于 1996 年自杀身亡。PSR ¶ 130。\n\nE. 郭先生从海外成为公开且高调抨击 CCP 的知名人士\n\n郭先生并未因其首要目标动摇，该目标是成为中国民主与法治的显眼且强有力的倡导者。在离开中国前往西方之后，他得以利用 Twitter、Facebook 和 YouTube——这些平台均被“Great Firewall of China（中国防火长城）”6 所屏蔽——来公开揭露 CCP 内部的体制性腐败及其滥权行为。参见 PSR ¶ 153。\n\n通过数千小时的直播，郭先生披露了中国的人权侵犯事件，例如对人权律师的打压以及从囚犯身上非法摘取器官供高级政治人物家属使用等情况。他谴责了中国国家政权对中国和香港民主运动的镇压。他公开揭露了中国对台湾、香港和美国的渗透战略，并致力于揭露中国在美国政治、经济、文化和情报领域的秘密行动，这仅是其中的少数事例。尽管政府声称郭先生是为了个人利益而伪装成持不同政见者，但无可争议的事实——包括从 DOJ（美国司法部）提起的案件中获取的事实——证实了郭先生是在承受巨大的个人代价和风险的情况下开展其爆料活动的。\n\n在进行该等活动的同时，郭先生积累了大量的社交媒体关注者，粉丝数量有时达到数十万甚至超过一百万。数以百万计的\n\n6 U.S. Department of Justice（美国司法部）对“Great Firewall of China（中国防火长城）”（“GFW”）作出了如下描述：“GFW 主要由 Cyberspace Administration of China（中国国家互联网信息办公室）和 PRC（中华人民共和国）的 Ministry of Public Security（公安部）（“MPS”）运营并强制实施，具有在 PRC 境内屏蔽对特定服务器和应用程序的网络访问的能力，并用于监控和防止 PRC 公民访问可能允许传播和讨论违反 PRC 政府及 CCP 批准的信息的互联网平台和服务。”Ex. 2 ¶ 7（United States v. Bai et al., No. 23-MJ-0334 (SJB) (E.D.N.Y., April 6, 2023) 案中支持逮捕令申请的起诉书及宣誓书（“Bai Complaint”/《白案起诉书》））。\n\n海外华人因对 CCP 的压迫手段感到不满——其中以天安门学生抗议者惨案最为不可磨灭——在郭先生传递的信息中找到了共鸣。在中国境内，能够使用 VPN 的人可以突破“防火长城”并观看郭先生的直播，对许多人而言，这是他们首次具体接触到天安门事件等事实以及 CCP 滥权的其他证据。7 从享有广泛第一修正案自由的美国视角来看，这或许难以理解，但对中国的许多人来说，郭先生的直播不仅令人大开眼界，更打破了他们对自己所生活世界的基本认知。参见，例如 Ex. 3（Wansheng Cheng（程万胜）的声明）。8 与此同时，郭先生发起的爆料革命为中国人民迈向更加民主的未来提供了真正的希望。出处同上。\n\n郭先生影响力的广度与威力，代表着且持续代表着 CCP 极力想要消除的威胁。CCP 不仅试图压制郭先生对民主的倡导以及对涉及 CCP 的众所周知之滥权与腐败的抨击，还试图阻止披露他可能掌握的有关高级别腐败、情报行动或其他敏感事务的任何非公开信息。\n\n7 到 2017 年 6 月，New York Times（纽约时报）北京分社报道称，尽管郭先生的直播在中国被正式封禁，但非正式地，“北京的很多人都被深深吸引了。”Chris Buckley，“Tycoon’s Claims Reverberate in China Despite Censorship and Thin Evidence，”New York Times，2017 年 6 月 27 日，http china-corruption-xi-jinping.html。\n\n8 在代表郭先生期间，辩护律师收到了来自 G-Series（G系列）实体的关注者、投资者和/或客户主动发来的 1,000 多份支持郭先生的声明。这些声明仍在源源不断地寄来。鉴于声明数量巨大以及隐私方面的考虑，我们拟向法院和政府提交一份包含这些声明代表性样本的封存补充文件，因为它们为郭先生的工作对其支持者的意义、定罪罪行的性质与情节，以及本案中的损失问题提供了重要视角。为说明起见，我们在本备忘录中纳入并引用了几封信件，这些信件来自曾在本案中作证或表示愿意作证的个人。\n\nCCP 用来使郭先生噤声的手段包括胁迫、对其家庭的威胁、资产扣押、诉讼、为影响美国政府官员而支付款项、部署庞大的特工网络在社交媒体上从全球范围抹黑郭先生、在华审讯、逮捕和起诉其支持者，以及强迫支持者对他提出虚假的欺诈指控。CCP 针对郭先生发起的行动规模之庞大、手段之凶狠，令人震惊。\n\nF. 郭先生移居美国后 CCP 针对行动的加剧\n\n郭先生于 2017 年 4 月从伦敦移居美国，持非移民旅游签证入境。PSR ¶ 137。在 2016 年 1 月至 2017 年 5 月期间，中国官员与郭先生联系了大约 30 次，敦促其与他们配合。他们敦促他：(1) 停止揭露和公开中国政府官员的腐败行为；(2) 不要与美国政府合作或与 FBI（联邦调查局）交谈；以及 (3) 不要反对 CCP、倡导中国民主改革或谈论正义与法治。\n\n作为交换，他们提出释放郭先生被羁押的家属和员工，并解冻当局在华冻结的价值数十亿美元的家族资产。郭先生予以拒绝。9 CCP 针对郭先生施加的施压行动变得愈发激进且影响广泛，最终直接与本案的指控产生了交集。这些事件为了解致使郭先生站在这家法院面前之行为的性质与情节提供了至关重要的背景。\n\n9 然而，在 2017 年 5 月，郭先生通过谈判达成协议，使其妻子和女儿能够离开中国并赴美与他团聚，条件是他同意不对在纽约被捕并在联邦法院被起诉的前中国国家安全官员出庭作证。\n\n1. 国际刑警组织红色通缉令、对 VOA 采访的干预、直接恐吓\n\n2017 年 4 月 19 日，即郭先生抵达美国九天后，中国政府要求 INTERPOL（国际刑警组织）发布“红色通缉令”，将郭先生指认为通缉引渡的逃犯。这发生在郭先生即将在 Voice of America（“VOA”，美国之音）普通话组进行电视直播采访的前几个小时——该节目在中国及其他地区拥有数百万受众——郭先生计划在采访中披露针对 CCP 高级官员家属的腐败指控。参见 Sasha Gong（龚小夏），“How China Managed to Muffle the Voice of America，”Wall Street Journal（华尔街日报），2017 年 5 月 23 日（“Gong WSJ Op-Ed”/《龚氏华尔街日报社论》）。10\n\n郭先生按计划进行了 VOA 采访，但在原定三小时的节目进行到第二小时刚开始不久，VOA 便突然终止了播出。正如 VOA 普通话组主管兼主持该采访的记者 Sasha Gong 事后所解释的，在播出前两天，中国外交部召见了 VOA 驻北京记者，并告诉他中国将把该采访视为对中国内政的干涉，如果继续进行可能会产生严重后果。\n\n这一警告令 VOA 华盛顿高层感到不寒而栗，但管理层最终还是允许进行了一场被缩短的采访。出处同上；另见 Michael Forsythe，“China Seeks Arrest of Billionaire Who Accused Officials’ Relatives of Graft，”New York Times，2017 年 4 月 19 日；11 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission（美中经济与安全审查委员会），2017 Report to Congress（2017 年向国会提交的报告），2017 年 11 月，第 472 页（“UCESRC Report”/《美中经安委报告》）（摘录附于证据 4）。可查阅于 http america-1495580183?st=EgyHCa&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink。\n\n11 可查阅于 http voice-of-america.html。\n\n数以百万计的观众观看了该场直播及其突如其来的中断，对许多人来说，这是他们第一次认识郭先生。\n\n2017 年 5 月，CCP 企图再次让郭先生噤声并更直接地威胁他，派出了 CCDI（中纪委）的纪委书记以及另外三名特工前往纽约与他当面交涉。郭先生拒绝屈从于他们的要求。相反，他揭露了在美国运作的庞大 CCP 间谍网络。\n\n接下来的一个月，中国政府对郭先生在华的部分关联人员启动了公开的刑事诉讼程序。参见 Ex. 4（UCESRC 报告），第 472-73 页。当局发布了诉讼过程的视频和文字记录，其中郭氏家族公司之一 Beijing Pangu Investment（北京盘古氏投资有限公司）的三名员工被判定犯有欺诈罪。出处同上。\n\n2. 招募有影响力的美国政商界人物游说将郭先生遣返回中国\n\n正如美国政府通过一系列联邦起诉所证实的那样，中国政府针对郭先生日益激烈的行动直接延伸到了美国政府的最高层。大约在2017年5月，马来西亚商人Low Taek Jho（刘特佐）协调了一次会面，其间中国公安部前副部长Sun Lijun（孙力军）招募了Republican National Committee（“RNC”，共和党全国委员会）前财务主席Elliot Broidy（埃利奥特·布罗伊迪）、嘻哈艺术家Prakazrel Michel（普拉卡兹雷尔·米歇尔）以及商人Nickie Lum Davis（妮基·拉姆·戴维斯），向时任总统特朗普和特朗普政府进行游说，以取消郭先生的签证或以其他方式将郭先生驱逐出美国。参见证据 5 第 16 段（Attorney General of the United States v. Stephen A. Wynn，案号 22-CV-1372（D.D.C.，2022年5月17日）起诉状）。该请求是明确代表PRC（中华人民共和国）提出的。出处同上。\n\n这些获得了极其丰厚报酬的努力向多个方向展开。布罗伊迪求助于美国房地产开发商Steve Wynn（史蒂夫·韦恩），后者是多家豪华赌场和度假村的所有人，其中包括Wynn Macau（永利澳门）——在韦恩的网站上被称为“亚洲最大的博彩场所”12——以及Wynn Palace（永利皇宫），即2016年在澳门开业的一家大型豪华酒店。\n\n布罗伊迪通过共和党全国委员会与韦恩相识，并认为韦恩在共和党全国委员会的工作、在中国的商业利益以及与时任总统特朗普的友谊相结合，将有助于促成与政府官员的接触。证据 5 第 17 段；另见 Niraj Chokshi 所著《U.S. Accuses Steve Wynn of Lobbying Trump on Behalf of China》（美国指控史蒂夫·韦恩代表中国游说特朗普），《New York Times》（纽约时报），2022年5月17日。13\n\n韦恩在2017年6月直接与孙进行了交谈，并同意向总统提出此事，同时在此期间还与布罗伊迪进行了多次沟通，内容涉及将郭先生列入禁飞名单（No Fly List），并确保郭先生的签证在6月底到期时任何续签申请都会被拒绝。证据 5 第 20-21 段。\n\n在布罗伊迪通过韦恩的妻子发送给韦恩的一条信息中，布罗伊迪称中国国家主席Xi Jinping（习近平）在Mar-a-Lago（海湖庄园）曾亲自向特朗普总统表示希望将郭先生遣返回中国，作为交换，习主席愿意遣返某些在中国被扣为人质的美国公民，接收大量被驱逐回中国的中国非法移民，并在朝鲜问题上向美国提供协助。出处同上，第 21(c) 段。\n\n在2017年6月下旬于华盛顿特区举行的一次晚宴上，韦恩亲自向总统传达了中华人民共和国希望将郭先生遣返回中国的意愿。出处同上，第 22 段。在接下来的两个月里，韦恩与孙通了多次电话，其间他们讨论了郭先生的签证续签、该事项对中华人民共和国的重要性以及韦恩在澳门的商业利益。出处同上，第 23 段。在此期间，韦恩多次努力组织与National Security Council（国家安全委员会）和白宫的高级官员就郭先生的事宜举行会议。出处同上，第 25 段。最终，这些努力——其动机是韦恩出于保护其在澳门商业利益的渴望，而中国政府对这些利益实施着严格的控制——均未获成功。出处同上，第 26、28、29 段。14\n\n然而，韦恩的努力只是该计划的一个组成部分。2017年6月下旬，普拉卡兹雷尔·米歇尔本人此前已在美国和亚洲参加了多次会议，旨在说服特朗普政府官员将郭先生遣返回中国15，他联系了当时担任United States Department of Justice（美国司法部）律师的George Higginbotham（乔治·希金博瑟姆），庭审笔录 5727，以寻求其协助。庭审笔录 5733-34。\n\n希金博瑟姆先生当年夏天在华盛顿特区的中国大使馆与中国驻美大使进行了会面。庭审笔录 5735-36。在会面期间，他转达了这样的信息：“为了引渡郭文贵先生，有关方面正在付出成功的努力，并且MicMaster [原文如此] 将军即将提供更多信息。”庭审笔录 5738。16 大约两个月后，希金博瑟姆先生前往澳门，亲自告知刘先生仍在采取措施说服政府遣返郭先生，并去完成另一项单独的、无关的目标。庭审笔录 5740-41。希金博瑟姆先生因参与遣返郭先生并实现另一目标的计划而获得了大约1亿美元的酬劳。庭审笔录 5745。17\n\n12 参见 http\n13 可查阅 http china.html。\n14 埃利奥特·布罗伊迪于2020年10月就与这些事件相关的串谋违反外国游说法罪名认罪。他承认自己接受了来自刘特佐的900万美元，用于游说特朗普政府遣返郭先生。参见 Kenneth P. Vogel 所著《Elliott Broidy Pleads Guilty in Foreign Lobbying Case》（埃利奥特·布罗伊迪在外国游说案中认罪），《纽约时报》，2020年10月20日，http\n15 参见证据 6 第 136-149 段（United States v. Prakazrel Michel et al.，案号 19-CR-148-CKK（D.D.C.，2019年5月2日）起诉书）。\n16 这显然是指曾在2017年至2018年担任美国国家安全顾问的H.R. McMaster（H·R·麦克马斯特）将军。\n17 希金博瑟姆先生于2018年11月就其参与这些未注册游说事务所涉及的一项共谋指控认罪。参见 http conspiracy-deceive-us-banks-about-millions。妮基·拉姆·戴维斯因在该计划中的角色获得了至少300万美元，于2020年8月就协助和教唆违反《Foreign Agents Registration Act》（外国代理人登记法）认罪。参见 http businesswoman-pleads-guilty-facilitating-back-channel-lobbying-campaign-drop-1mdb。普拉卡兹雷尔·米歇尔于2023年接受审判，并因与遣返郭先生的计划相关的罪名被定罪。参见 Hannah Ziegler 所著《Pras of the Fugees Gets 14 Years for Illegal Foreign Influence Scheme》（流亡者合唱团的普拉兹因非法外国影响计划被判14年监禁），《纽约时报》，http fugees-campaign-finance-prison.html。\n\n3. 912专项——在网络上诋毁郭先生的集中协调行动\n\n美国政府还证实了中华人民共和国在同一时期针对郭先生发起的同期社交媒体和互联网行动。在中共斥资数亿美元招募华盛顿内部人士开展秘密游说活动以影响美国总统的行动的同时，它还部署了一支由特工人员组成的精干团队，发起了一场最终发展成为旨在诋毁郭先生的大规模社交媒体行动。这场行动具有侵略性、广泛性、有效性，并持续了数年之久。其对本案的重要性、影响力和关联性无论怎样强调都不为过。\n\n在United States v. Bai et al.，案号 23-MJ-334-SJB（E.D.N.Y.，2023年4月6日）（“白案起诉状”，作为证据 2 附于本文件）长达89页的起诉状及支持逮捕令申请的宣誓书中，详细描述了中华人民共和国利用社交媒体传播和放大信息以诋毁并破坏其政治对手的全面行动——包括针对批评中共的特定个人；另见证据 7（纽约东区联邦检察官办公室在白案中的新闻发布稿）。\n\n无可争议的是，这项在白案起诉状中被称为“被害人-1”的行动的主要目标就是郭先生。参见证据 2 第 89-108 段。正如对中国Ministry of Public Security（“MPS”，公安部）18 的34名官员提出跨州骚扰共谋指控的白案起诉状所解释的那样，该行动（“912专项”）由北京公安部内一个名为“912专项工作组”（以下简称“912工作组”）的群体进行协调，并且至少从2017年起直至2023年4月6日白案起诉状提交（即郭先生在本案中被捕三周后）一直直接针对郭先生。证据 2 第 89 段。\n\n利用Twitter（推特）、Facebook（脸书）和YouTube（油管）等社交媒体网站上的数千个虚假网络身份，912工作组针对郭先生的行动特别试图将他打上骗子、行骗高手、诈欺犯等标签，并要求政府对其采取行动。如下文更详细讨论的那样，这一长期运行的机构有效地在公众中对郭先生的信誉播下了广泛的怀疑，包括对本案所涉实体的有效性。\n\n为了领会针对郭先生的网络行动的规模，请参考独立第三方仅就该行动中的推特部分所开展的研究：\n\n• Australian Strategic Policy Institute（“ASPI”，澳大利亚战略政策研究所）发现，从2017年4月24日（即中华人民共和国请求国际刑警组织对郭先生发布红色通缉令五天后）到2019年7月31日，来自与中国政府相关的618个推特账户的至少38,732条推文直接针对郭先生。19 “这些推文主要由对[郭]的人格进行的恶毒攻击组成，范围从高度针对个人的批评到指控犯罪、对中国的不忠，以及对他与备受争议的美国政治人物Steve Bannon（史蒂夫·班农）关系的批评。”Tom Uren 等人所著《Tweeting through the Great Firewall: Preliminary analysis of PRC-linked information operations against the Hong Kong protests》（推特穿透防火长城：与中华人民共和国相关针对香港抗议活动的信息行动初步分析），澳大利亚战略政策研究所，第 25/2019 号报告，第 14 页。20\n\n18 正如白案起诉状所解释的那样，“[尽]管公安部通常被认定为中华人民共和国主要的国内执法机构——负责公共安全、一般刑事调查、国家安全和互联网安全——但其职责范围超越了执法范畴，进入了更多与情报机构相关的职能。”证据 2 第 8 段。\n19 2019年8月，推特注销了936个账户，推特认定这些账户属于中国所主导的协同国家支持行动的一部分，旨在散布与香港亲民主抗议相关的虚假信息和不和。Kate Cooper 所著《Facebook and Twitter Say China Is Spreading Disinformation in Hong Kong》（脸书和推特称中国正在香港散布虚假信息），《纽约时报》，2019年8月19日，http facebook-twitter.html。\n20 完整报告可查阅 http firewall/。\n\n• 在一份后续报告中，澳大利亚战略政策研究所发现，从2018年1月到2020年4月17日，与中华人民共和国相关联的账户共发布了与郭先生有关的70,584条推文、11,832张图片和580个视频。21 他们将从该数据集中显现出的三大核心叙事描述为：(1) 郭先生与史蒂夫·班农勾结反对中华人民共和国；(2) 郭先生是一个名誉扫地的骗子；以及 (3) 郭先生是不道德的强奸犯。Jake Wallis 博士等人所著《Retweeting Through the Great Firewall: A persistent and undeterred threat actor》（穿透防火长城转推：一个持续且未受威慑的威胁行为体），澳大利亚战略政策研究所，第 33/2020 号报告，第 38-41 页（以下简称“《穿透防火长城转推》”）。22\n\n• Stanford Internet Observatory（斯坦福互联网观察台）还分析了该平台于2020年6月因散布虚假信息而注销的23,750个推特账户在2018年1月至2020年4月17日期间的活动。在348,608条推文中，绝大多数（78.8%）为中文，关于郭先生的推文构成了数据集中仅次于香港抗议活动的第二大主题。该研究发现，“[与]此前2019年的注销一样，针对郭的行动在整个行动的时间线上一直在持续。”Carly Miller 等人所著《Sockpuppets Spin COVID Yarns: An Analysis of PRC-Attributed June 2020 Twitter takedown》（网络水军编造新冠谎言：对2020年6月归咎于中华人民共和国的推特注销行动的分析），斯坦福互联网观察台（2020年6月17日），第 16 页。23\n\n除推特外，该行动还广泛利用脸书和油管针对郭先生及其支持者，通常是将油管上关于郭先生的视频发布在脸书上，然后在帖子下叠加评论。白案起诉状第 93-108 段。仅举一例，2021年9月中旬的一条帖子包含一段关于郭先生的视频，配文（中文）为“天天吹天天骗”。在接下来的三十分钟内，出现了一系列中英文评论，将郭先生描述为“真正的骗子”和“十足的诈骗犯”，并质问“他为什么没进监狱？政府在干什么？”出处同上，第 98 页。\n\n21 2020年6月，Twitter（推特）宣布查封 23,750 个核心账号，推特认定这些账号属于中国散布虚假信息协同行动的一部分；此外还查封了 150,000 个专门通过转推和点赞来放大该虚假信息宣传活动的附加账号。见 Kate Cooper（凯特·库珀）所著《推特清除中国虚假信息行动》，《New York Times》（纽约时报），2020年6月11日，http\n\n22 完整报告见 http firewall/。\n\n23 完整报告见 http\n\n---\n\n4. 干涉郭先生的社交媒体账号\n\n中国政府不仅满足于发布内容骚扰和抹黑郭先生，还积极企图破坏郭先生本人的社交媒体账号。2017年4月，郭先生的 Facebook（脸书）和推特账号被短暂封禁，引发了外界对中国政府施压的担忧。U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission（美中经济与安全审查委员会，简称“UCESRC”）在2017年9月听取证词，得知中国政府针对郭先生推特账号的行动仍在持续。证据 4 第 471 页。U.S. Department of Justice（美国司法部）同样在 Bai（白）起诉书中承认了 PRC（中华人民共和国）“向美国社交媒体公司施压，要求其将[郭]及[郭]在美关联人员从社交媒体平台上移除”的行径。证据 2 第 89 段。\n\n郭先生的社交媒体账号确实在2017年10月18日中国中共十九大召开前夕被封禁。2017年10月17日据报道，YouTube（优兔）针对一名未具名申诉人提出的骚扰指控，下架了郭先生的一条视频，并暂停其发布任何新直播视频，为期 90 天。见 Bill Gertz（比尔·格茨）所著《优兔封禁中国异见人士账号》，《The Washington Free Beacon》（华盛顿自由灯塔），2017年10月17日，http dissident/。24\n\n优兔的封禁紧随对郭先生脸书账号的限制之后发生。同上。在2025年4月9日 U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Counterterrorism（美国参议院司法委员会犯罪与反恐小组委员会）举行的听证会上，前脸书全球公共政策总监作证称，脸书在2017年4月下架郭先生的脸书个人资料并在随后于\n\n24 格茨在同篇文章中还报道称，据“一名美国官员”透露，针对郭的 INTERPOL（国际刑警组织）红色通缉令所依据的中国案件是“出于政治目的而非法律性质”。\n\n---\n\n2017年9月将其永久封禁时，确实是直接按照 CCP（中国共产党）的授意行事的。参见 Cristiano Lima-Strong（克里斯蒂亚诺·利马-斯特朗）所著《记录：前高管 Sarah Wynn-Williams 就脸书对华讨好行为作证》，《Tech Policy Press》（科技政策出版社），2025年4月9日。25\n\n5. 黑客入侵郭先生律师的计算机系统\n\n2017年9月5日，郭先生向 U.S. Department of Homeland Security（美国国土安全部）递交了庇护申请，理由是他担心因揭露政治腐败而遭到中共报复。PSR 第 136 段。一周后，即2017年9月12日，递交该申请的律师事务所 Clark Hill PLC（克拉克·希尔律师事务所）的计算机系统遭到黑客攻击。26 黑客至少窃取了郭先生的庇护申请书及支持宣誓书，两份文件中包含大量机密和敏感信息，详述了郭先生若返回中国惧怕遭受中共报复的原因。\n\n黑客攻击发生一周后，该律师事务所突然终止了对郭先生的代理。随后，大约从2017年9月23日开始，郭先生的个人信息及其庇护申请书和宣誓书的机密部分开始在推特上出现，造成名誉损害，并将郭先生、其家人及其员工置于危险之中。\n\n6. 利用虚假强奸诉讼将民事司法体系武器化\n\n2017年9月11日，郭先生的一名前员工在 New York State court（纽约州法院）对他提起民事诉状，虚假指控郭先生曾多次强奸她，并将其有效囚禁近三年，尽管当时郭先生本人甚至根本没有在\n\n25 完整听证会视频见 http activity/hearings/a-time-for-truth-oversight-of-metas-foreign-relations-and-representations-to-the-united-states-con\n\n---\n\n美国待满三年。27 初始诉状并未指控所谓的性侵发生于何时——没有具体年份、月份、日期，甚至没有季节——却在开头刻意对郭先生提出不相关的指控，即他作为中国异见人士的公众形象是为获取庇护的政治支持而伪造的，且他拥有“充斥着经济欺诈指控的不光彩过去”。证据 8 第 17、18 段（Rui Ma v. Guo Wengui et al. 案诉状）。\n\n民事诉状递交后不久，针对郭先生的有组织的示威活动开始在其曼哈顿公寓大楼外发生。示威者排成方阵，举着统一预印的标语，称郭先生为强奸犯和骗子，并敦促其离开美国。这些抗议活动的照片随后出现在与中共有关联的推特账号推文中。参见《Retweeting》（转推）第 39-40 页。与马案诉状如出一辙，这些示威活动以及在网络上散布相关照片的行为，均带有由中共协调策划的所有特征。\n\nG. 中共针对郭先生的行动与本案中的行为发生交汇\n\n在此背景下，郭先生已成为中共著名的公开批评者，中国境内外的数百万中国人从其传递的信息中找到了共鸣与希望，而中共正发起一场激烈的行动以抹黑、噤声并遣返郭先生，本案中引发各项指控的事件由此成型。中共本身就是促成这些事件的积极参与者。\n\n构成此项起诉的一个关键因素，是郭先生自2017年底开始与 Steve Bannon（史蒂夫·班农）建立的关系。在班农先生——一位坚信中国\n\n27 该案为 Rui Ma v. Guo Wengui et al.（马锐诉郭文贵等案），Sup Ct, NY County（纽约县最高法院），2017年9月11日，Index No. 158140/2017。就该案中作出的一项2023年命令提起的中间上诉目前仍在 Appellate Division（上诉法庭）审理中，原告在递交诉状后不久便返回中国，目前在该法庭似乎处于无代理律师状态。\n\n---\n\n对美国构成最大长期威胁的人士28——被迫离开其在白宫担任时任总统 Trump（特朗普）顾问的职位后，一位共同认识的人将其介绍给了郭先生。29 郭先生与班农先生对中国政府的共同鄙视促成了双方的自然结盟。30\n\n郭先生于2018年1月聘请班农担任有偿顾问。2018年11月，在经过全年的深入筹划后（庭审记录 469-70），两人宣布成立 Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金会，简称“ROLF”）。法治基金会及随附的 Rule of Law Society（法治社会，简称“ROLS”）是致力于在中国促进民主和法治的非营利组织，与郭先生的 Whistleblower Movement（爆料革命）协同运作。2020年6月4日，班农先生与郭先生宣布成立 New Federal State of China（新中国联邦，简称“NFSC”）。31\n\n与此同时，中华人民共和国政府于2018年10月下旬查封了郭氏家族的更多资产，32 且 912 专项组继续积极在公开场合抹黑郭先生。2018年1月，\n\n28 见 http /09/08/us/politics/steve-bannon-china-trump.html。\n\n29 郭先生原定于2017年10月4日在华盛顿特区的 Hudson Institute（哈德逊研究所）接受记者 Bill Gertz（比尔·格茨）的采访，但在该研究所追踪到源自上海的网络攻击后，该活动被突然推迟。见 http into-washington-1507260255；http /www.hudson.org/node/41042。格茨此后促成了班农与郭先生的联系。\n\n30 见 htt • •\n\n32 政府方将2018年10月的资产查封定性为郭先生创建法治实体及后来其他 G 系列实体的动机——即将其作为在资产被剥夺后用以诈骗追随者并自肥的工具（见庭审记录 5959）——但大量庭审证词反驳了该理论，包括来自政府方证人 Karen Maistrello（卡伦·梅斯特雷洛）的证词，她陈述称班农先生在2018年全年均积极参与了法治机构启动的筹划工作。庭审记录 469-70。\n\n---\n\n912 专项组专门创建了一个推特账号，用于“点赞”其他贬损郭先生的推文。白案起诉书第 105 段。\n\n例如，一条中文推文写道：“请广大网友不要被谣言八卦和强奸犯瘟鬼[郭文贵]控制的媒体所利用！瘟鬼[郭文贵]是网络上最大的‘国贼’。每天在网上大放厥词，利用网友满足自己的私欲，瘟鬼[郭文贵]罪行罄竹难书。”同上。\n\n正如 ASPI（澳大利亚战略政策研究所）和 Stanford（斯坦福大学）的研究报告所证实，在2018年及之后，成千上万个推特账号参与了协同反郭的信息传播，包括针对郭先生与班农的合作。912 专项组还利用脸书攻击郭先生的声誉，其中一个账号在2018年11月和12月至少发帖九次，频繁称郭先生为“大骗子”。同上，第 104 段。脸书上的活动批评针对性强且持续数年，参见同上第 94-103 段，912 专项组在优兔上的活动亦是如此。同上，第 106-108 段。\n\n鉴于郭先生本人的社交媒体账号屡遭破坏，加之其广播节目的受欢迎程度，建立自己的网络媒体平台对郭先生而言是合乎逻辑且切实可行的一步。为此，郭氏家族旗下实体 Saraca Media Group, Inc.（萨拉卡媒体集团公司）于2020年4月成立了 GTV Media（GTV 传媒），并在当月晚些时候宣布了 GTV 私募发行。庭审记录 4542。该私募发行从数千名投资者处筹集了数亿美元。\n\n农场贷款项目随后于2020年6月启动，旨在为爆料革命的小额支持者创造更多机会，使其能为运动的运作贡献力量，并最终获得 GTV 的股份。33 对于向农场贷款项目出资的人而言，\n\n33 正如辩护律师在庭审期间所阐明的那样，在郭先生被捕之时，债转股的期限尚未届满。参见，例如，庭审记录 6038。\n\n---\n\n这些出资表明了对该运动及其志愿服务与广播活动的切实投入。鉴于企图破坏郭先生的强大势力正在发挥作用，郭先生认为 GTV 的股份持有者对该运动拥有真正的投入至关重要。\n\n于2020年10月正式推出的 G Club（G会所），同样为个人支持该运动、与志同道合者建立联谊，并享受 G 会所提供的福利（例如 G Fashion 的折扣）提供了途径。数千人购买了 G 会所会员资格，费用从 10,000 美元（1 级会员）到 50,000 美元（5 级会员）不等。\n\n最后，加密货币生态系统 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所，简称“HEX”）使客户能够购买两种代币：Himalaya dollar（喜马拉雅美元，简称“HDO”）和 Himalaya Coin（喜马拉雅币，简称“HCN”）。HDO 是一种稳定币，与美元保持 1:1 锚定并由储备金支持，而 HCN 是一种具有浮动价值的代币。潜在客户可以在 HEX 网站上查阅关于 HDO 和 HCN 的独立中英文白皮书。客户可以使用法定货币购买 HDO，并使用 HDO 购买 HCN。事实证明 HEX 极受欢迎，发行了数亿美元的 HDO，且 HCN 的活跃交易导致其价值大幅上涨。HEX 及其配套应用程序 Himalaya Pay（喜马拉雅支付，简称 H Pay）被广泛使用，直至本案陪审团作出裁决后 HEX 被关停。\n\n在这些实体活跃运作的同一时期，中共通过 912 专项组坚持不懈地继续其在网络上抹黑郭先生的行动，同时在中国境内采取日益激进的措施以削弱对郭先生的支持。这些措施包括审讯、恐吓、刑事起诉、强迫书写悔过书、强迫递交\n\n……向美国当局和媒体机构针对相关实体提出虚假投诉，甚至包括社交媒体抹黑活动的模板。\n\n庭审期间，政府方证人 Ya Li 出庭作证称，CCP（中国共产党）曾致电其在中国境内的父母，要求其父母转告她停止参与 Whistleblower Movement（爆料革命）活动，理由是这些活动危害了国家安全。Tr. 1535。据 Li 所述，中共还致电其他亲属以试图查明她的下落，其父母警告她切勿返回中国，否则会被逮捕。同上。此外在庭审期间，辩方证人 Jianhu Yi 出庭作证称，2020年10月，在他投资 GTV 之后，两名便衣 MSS（国家安全部）官员将其从上海的工作地点带至另一处地点，三名官员在那里对他进行了长达11小时的讯问，期间他无法自由离开。Tr. 5042-46。官员们没收了他的手机，并告知他因向敌视中国政府的组织投资而面临三至五年的监禁。Tr. 5048-53。他们询问了其在中国境内家庭成员的情况，确保他明白自己无法逃避他们，并试图说服他进行配合。Tr. 5050-51。\n\nYi 就 2020年10月至 2021年1月期间与这些官员的五次后续会面作证。在第二次会面中，官员们拿走了他的 GTV 股票证书，并告诉他这些投资都是虚假的，他将损失全部资金。Tr. 5052。在第三次会面中，他们指示他向郭先生提起诉讼。Tr. 5053。在第四次会面中，他们强迫他写信要求撤回对 GTV、G Dollar 和 G Club 的投资，并将信件照片发送给警方。Tr. 5054-55。\n\n在第五次会面中，他们告诉 Yi 会为他提供一名律师，强迫他记录下其全部投资情况，并向他提供了用于发送投诉的电子邮箱地址。Tr. 5055-56。在第六次会面中，他们要求 Yi 携带安装了 VPN 的电脑，以便向他们展示其被迫提交的虚假投诉。Tr. 5056。辩方第 60704 号证据（已在庭审中获准采纳并作为附件 9 附于本文件之后）系 Yi 向 FBI（联邦调查局）提交的（虚假）投诉的副本。Tr. 5057。\n\nYi 还向 New York State Attorney General（纽约州总检察长）、New York Times（《纽约时报》）和 Wall Street Journal（《华尔街日报》）提交了虚假投诉，这一切均是为了保护其家人。Tr. 5058-59。中国政府为 Yi 提供的律师确实在未经 Yi 授权的情况下，代表 Yi 对郭先生提起了诉讼。Tr. 5066。\n\n此处较为详细地叙述 Yi 的证言，不仅是为了说明中共为打击郭先生并为本案此类指控奠定基础所采取的极端手段，而且还因为该证言与辩护律师从其他多方来源收到的主动陈述中所叙述的经历完全一致，其中许多来源均提供了书证以资佐证。\n\n其中一个来源 Wansheng Cheng，经下签字律师询问且其声明书作为附件 3 附于本文件之后，描述了国安部官员进行的一系列类似讯问，这些官员最终强迫他就其 G 系列投资提交虚假投诉。讯问发生在 2021年1月至 2021年5月期间，官员们在此后直至 2021年11月期间仍持续与其联系。附件 3 ¶¶ 19-46。因极度恐慌自己可能被监禁或遭受更严重的伤害，Cheng 曾私下立下一份“不自杀声明”，仅与密友和家人分享，作为防范措施和证明文件。同上 ¶ 28 及附件 A。\n\nCheng 向律师提供了官员向其提供的中文原始指令的照片。见同上 ¶ 37 及附件 B（附英文译本）。这些文件提供了向联邦调查局提交投诉的指南——其中引用的正是官员让 Yi 用于提交虚假投诉的同一网站，http——以及向纽约州总检察长办公室、SEC（美国证券交易委员会）和 JPMorgan Chase Bank（摩根大通银行）提交投诉的指南。同上。进一步与 Yi 的证言相吻合的是，该网站鼓励联系诸如《纽约时报》和《华尔街日报》等主流媒体，并提供了报道郭先生及其“可疑”活动的《华尔街日报》记者的手机号码、电子邮箱地址和 Twitter 账号。同上 34。\n\n不足为奇的是，SEC 大约在 2020年7月开始对 GTV 证券发行展开调查，包括通过 Voice of Guo Media 进行的发行以及推销投资当时被称为 G-Coins 和 G-Dollars 的机会。GTV Media Group, Inc.、Saraca Media Group, Inc. 和 Voice of Guo Media, Inc. 配合了调查，该调查最终以就未能注册发行事项达成民事行政程序和解而告终，该等发行不符合豁免注册的条件。见附件 10（In re GTV Media Group, Inc. et al., Order, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-20537 (Sept. 13, 2021)）。\n\n作为和解协议的一部分，各方同意没收（disgorgement）486,745,063 美元的不法所得，外加 17,688,365 美元的判决前利息以及 35,000,000 美元的民事罚款。正如庭审所证明的那样，SEC 随后设立了一个 Fair Fund（公平基金）以向投资者返还资金，扣除行政费用后，每位投资者收回了其初始投资的大约 92%。见 Tr. 708, 1358, 2377。35\n\n34 除了强迫其提交虚假投诉外，Cheng 还报告称一名国安部官员向其发送了一份“抹黑活动”内容的合同样本手写件，供其在网上发布以贬损和诋毁郭先生。手写中文样本的照片、打印版本及英文译本均附在 Cheng 的声明书后。见附件 3 ¶ 43 及附件 C。\n\n35 在郭先生被捕之日，即 2023年3月15日，SEC 对郭先生等人提起了民事起诉书，指控其在 GTV 私募、农场贷款和 G Club 会员资格方面存在欺诈行为。SEC v. Ho Wan Kwok et al., No. 23-CV-2200-PGG (SDNY, Mar. 15, 2023)。该案已被中止审理，目前仍处于待决状态。如下文所述，陪审团裁定郭先生在 GTV 私募方面的电汇欺诈和证券欺诈罪名不成立。\n\nH. 美国的政治环境为新一届政府转向针对郭先生奠定了基础\n\n郭先生与 Steven Bannon 的密切关联，以及他创立 GTV 平台之举，在 2020年总统大选前夕与美国国内政治发生了碰撞。对郭先生的检控之路由此展开。\n\nBannon 曾一度在 Rule of Law Society（法治公会）的董事会任职，并在 GTV 发行文件中被列为 GTV 董事会成员。在他与郭先生于 2018年11月宣布成立法治实体后不久，他就因其不相关的“We Build the Wall”众筹活动而受到 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）的审查。该项调查于 2020年8月结出成果，当时 Bannon 先生在 Lady May 号游艇上与郭先生在一起时，以极具戏剧性的方式被捕。在此期间，根据政府消息来源发布的新闻报道大肆宣扬对其关联事业的调查，36 且 SEC 于 2020年7月向 GTV Media 和 Saraca 发出的传票要求获取有关 ROLS 和 ROLF 以及有关 GTV 私募的信息。\n\n2020年10月24日，一名 GTV 用户在该平台上发布了 Hunter Biden 的不雅视频，在总统大选前数日引发了一场全美媒体风暴。郭先生并未坚持删除这些帖子，随后发现自己卷入了接踵而至的政治旋涡。在 Joseph Biden 赢得 2020年大选、郭先生公开支持推翻大选结果的努力、且 Hunter Biden 就视频的披露寻求报复之后，这种局面进一步加剧。\n\n36 参见，例如，Aruna Viswanatha 等，“FBI Probes Chinese Exile, Including Work With Former Trump Aide Steve Bannon，”《华尔街日报》，2020年7月8日（htt）；Brian Spegele 等，“Fundraising at Company Tied to Steve Bannon and Guo wengui Faces Probe，”《华尔街日报》，2020年8月19日（http）。\n\n2023年2月，《Mother Jones》（《琼斯母亲》）报道称，Hunter Biden 的律师最近发出了一系列信件，要求包括司法部在内的州及联邦机构对据信在分发来自 Hunter Biden 笔记本电脑的资料中发挥作用的人员涉嫌的犯罪行为展开调查。37 该文章特别提到了郭先生。两天后，同一家杂志报道称，Hunter Biden 威胁要就笔记本电脑资料的披露对郭先生以及 Bannon 提起诉讼。38\n\n郭先生于次月（即 2023年3月15日）被捕。最初起诉书中针对他的核心指控涉及最初发布 Hunter Biden 视频的 GTV 平台的私募。政府在 2024年1月3日提交的第二份替代起诉书（ECF No. 215）中增加了一项 RICO（《反勒索及受贿组织法》）共谋罪名项，并在 2024年4月24日提交的第三份替代起诉书（ECF No. 307）中将涉嫌的 RICO 企业重新命名为“G Enterprise”（G 企业）。\n\n郭先生于 2024年5月下旬出庭受审。在长达七周的审判过程中，Steve Bannon 的名字和形象在陪审团面前出现了上百次。2024年7月16日，陪审团裁定郭先生在 GTV 私募方面的电汇欺诈和证券欺诈罪名不成立（罪名项五和罪名项六），并裁定其参与非法资金交易罪名不成立（罪名项十二）。陪审团裁定郭先生犯有敲诈勒索共谋罪（罪名项一）、共谋实施电汇欺诈或银行欺诈罪（罪名项二）、共谋实施洗钱罪（罪名项三）、共谋实施证券欺诈罪（罪名项四）、实质性电汇……\n\n37 Dan Friedman，“Why Twitter Was Right to Suppress (Some of) the Material From Hunter’s Laptop，”《琼斯母亲》，2023年2月8日（htt）。\n\n38 Dan Friedman，“Hunter Biden Threatens to Sue Steve Bannon and Exiled Mogul Guo Wengui，”《琼斯母亲》，2023年2月10日（http）。\n\n与农场借贷项目及 G Club（G会所）相关的欺诈和证券欺诈（罪名项第七至第十项），以及与 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）相关的电汇欺诈（罪名项第十一项）。当时没有特别裁决书，陪审团也未对任何“损失金额”作出裁定。\n\nI. 投资者和客户对受害者身份的明确否认\n\n尽管已作出定罪判决，投资于 G 系列实体的数千名个人已明确表示他们并未被 Mr. Guo（郭先生）侵害。正如辩护律师此前详述的那样（参见 ECF No. 799 第 5-9 页），这些个人包括：(a) 超过 6,500 名根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 提交请愿书请求返还被查扣资金的 HEX 客户（参见，例如 ECF Nos. 759, 761 第 3 页）；(b) 数百名同样提交了 § 853(n) 请愿书的 Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC 投资者（参见，例如 ECF Nos. 674, 756）；(c) 提交了个别 § 853(n) 请愿书或与政府联系声明放弃受害者身份的投资者，例如在证据开示中披露的编号为 USAO_00112534-USAO_00112564 的记录；以及 (d) 数百名直接致信辩护律师的个人。如前所述，我们将向法院提交一份单独的密封呈文，其中包含发送给辩护律师的 1,000 多份声明放弃受害者身份的陈述中的代表性样本。\n\n需要明确的是，我们提出这些观点并不是为了质疑陪审团的裁决——就量刑而言我们接受该裁决——而是为了将该裁决置于适当的背景中并界定其局限性。虽然政府出示了少数自称受害者的证人的证词，声称为特定投资或事业汇款的决定在实质上受到了郭先生某些陈述的影响，但其他数千名个人向相同实体汇款的原因与构成政府案件核心的指控不实陈述无关。对于这些个人而言，所指控的不实陈述根本不具实质重要性。\n\n此外，尽管前文第一部分 G 节（Part I.G）已在一定程度上进行了讨论，但 CCP（中国共产党）对郭先生实施的恐吓和强迫控告活动，其广泛程度远超庭审中或本备忘录所呈现的范围。由于这使得可能已向政府或其他执法机关提供的任何书面受害者陈述的有效性受到质疑，因此在案件的这一阶段，让法院更全面地了解其影响范围至关重要。\n\n迄今为止，辩护律师已收到约 60 份提及陈述者因涉嫌与郭先生或涉案实体有交集而遭到 CCP 审讯、威胁或拘留的声明。这些个人中至少有五人表示他们被迫对郭先生提出虚假控告，还有更多人指出他们已经离开中国，正在其他地方寻求或已获得庇护。\n\n庭审中提供的证词以及向辩护律师提交的陈述中所作的叙述，让人们深入了解了 G 系列实体为投资者和客户提供的价值。这些叙述篇幅庞大、可信，并且与政府声称某些被指控的不实陈述在实质上诱使个人出资的指控理论直接相悖。\n\n例如，辩方证人 Jianhu Yi（易建湖）作证称，他购买 G Club 会员资格是因为 G Club 所提供的同袍情谊、友谊和服务。Tr. 5072。无数其他购买了 G Club 会员资格的人也致信辩护律师表达了类似的情感。例如，Wansheng Cheng（程万胜）陈述称，他在 2022 年 4 月花费 20,000 美元购买了 G Club 会员资格，资金来自在喜马拉雅交易所进行交易活动的收益。他写道：“我将 G Club 视为一种身份认同——一个人们拥有相同价值观的群体。最初我的理解是我们在某些消费上会获得折扣，随后会增加福利，我预计这需要一些时间。我没有尝试要回我的 G Club 会员费，我也无意要回。”Ex. 3 ¶16。\n\n辩方证人 Lai Dai（戴磊）曾向 GTV 投资 155,000 美元，购买了 50,000 美元的 G Club 会员资格，并向 HEX 投资了 300,000 美元。他作证称，他决定获得 G Club 会员资格与 G Club 会员资格和获得 GTV 股份之间的任何关联毫无关系（Tr. 5248）。相反，他将 G Club 描述为一种“身份象征”（Tr. 5244），使他能够与拥有共同信仰的人走到一起并享受其他福利（Tr. 5244-45）。关于 HEX，戴作证称，对他而言，HDO 是否有黄金支持（Tr. 5379）或者它目前是否在以太坊区块链上（Tr. 5252）是无关紧要的。无论这些特征如何，他都认为 HEX 具有价值，其他数千名坚称自己并非郭先生所实施的任何欺诈行为受害者的 HEX 客户也是如此。对于农场借贷项目的无数出资者、G Club 会员和 GTV 投资者而言，情况也是如此。\n\n戴先生向法院提交了一份量刑陈情信，为案件的这一方面提供了进一步的视角：\n\n本案中与我最直接相关的事项涉及我自己对通常被称为“G系列”公司的投资经历。在此背景下，我是作为一名具备一定相关经验的普通投资者参与的。我的投资决定并非基于盲目信任，而是基于我自己的投资经验和商业判断。在审阅了相关材料和商业计划后，我在完全理解任何投资都固有风险的情况下作出了决定。根据我所掌握的信息，相关业务确实存在且在运营中。\n\n在我个人认识的投资者中，我个人并未遇到过任何认为自己受害的人。当然，我理解不同的人可能有不同的经历，可能存在我不了解的情况。然而，根据我自己的观察，我的经历并不完全符合庭审期间呈现的某些叙述。我无意否认他人的经历；我只是希望解释，作为这些投资的真实参与者，我自己的经历和判断构成了我作出决定的背景依据。\n\nEx. 11。\n\n鉴于郭先生所积聚的支持规模，他在为中国带来民主改革的热情上显然并非孤身一人。中国政府控制其民众事务并打击其敌人的权力，无论他们生活在中国还是其他地方，都是压倒性的。这一事实是 Whistleblower Movement（爆料革命）和 G 系列实体对无数个人产生吸引力的核心所在。仅引用辩护律师收到的数百封阐述投资者和客户认为重要的考量因素的信件之一：\n\n郭先生一再且着重地警告他所有的追随者，反对 CCP 是世界上最危险的事业，任何有丝毫犹豫的人，或者任何出于名利动机的人，都不应该参与。\n\n这是所有坚定参与者之间的共识：我们的投资不是金融投机——而是选票。用以解体 CCP、终结其数代人以来造成的人类悲剧、保障我们自身及子女生命安全的选票。我选择投资，选择追随郭先生，选择加入 New Federal State of China（新中国联邦）。我认为这些是我一生中最重要、最正确的决定。\n\nEx. 12（陈述人\n，2026 年 3 月 10 日）。\n\n事实上，许多 HEX 客户从购买 HCN 中获得了可观的利润。例如，程万胜陈述称，他向 HEX 投入了约 22,000 美元，其中部分用于购买 3,000 枚 HCN。Ex. 3 ¶ 15。在最高峰时，他持有的 HCN 价值约为 160,000 美元，而且正是在经历了多次审讯后从中国前往美国的近两年旅程中，他使用存留在 HEX 的资金来维持生计。同上。\n\n正如在下一节中更详细讨论的那样，在这种存在广泛否认受害者身份的罕见情况下，且陪审团并未对他们作出有罪裁决的任何欺诈范围作出事实认定时，政府在本案中计算出的 13 亿美元欺诈金额完全是推测性的，在没有进行 Fatico 听证程序的情况下，不能认定任何“损失金额”。\n\nII.\n确定足以实现但不超过实现量刑目的所需之判决\n\nA. 适用的量刑考量因素\n\n根据 United States Supreme Court（美国最高法院）在 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) 中的裁决，以及 Second Circuit（第二巡回法院）在 United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005) 中对 Booker 案的解释，本法院的量刑裁决必须基于 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 中规定的各项因素。§ 3553(a) 要求法院作出的判决应当“足以达到、但不过度超出所需之程度”，以体现罪行的严重性、促进对法律的尊重、提供公正的惩处、对犯罪行为提供充分的威慑、保护公众，并为被告人提供所需的教育或职业培训、医疗护理或其他矫正治疗。18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)。\n\n法院不再被强制要求在《量刑指南》（Guidelines）规定的幅度范围内判处刑罚。Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111。实际上，“地区法院不得假定《指南》规定的刑期是合理的；相反，它必须在控辩双方辩论的协助下，对量刑因素进行独立的审查。”同上。最高法院已确认，“《指南》不仅对量刑法院不具有强制力，而且也不得被推定为合理。”Nelson v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 890, 892 (2010)（原文强调）。\n\n此外，正如 Justice Scalia（斯卡利亚大法官）在 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) 一案中对“补救性”意见的异议中所指出的：制定法在所有这些因素之间没有规定优先顺序，但是由于刚才提到的三项[§§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (B) & (C)]是支配刑罚学的基本准则，该制定法——在没有 § 3553(b)(1) 的强制性要求的情况下——授权法官运用其自身对公正惩罚、威慑和保护公众的理解，即使\n\n这些理解与制定《指南》的委员会成员的理解存在分歧。543 U.S. at 304-305 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part)。\n\n法院在决定如何实现所列量刑目标时必须考虑的因素包括：犯罪的性质和情节、被告人的历史和特征、可适用的刑罚种类、美国《量刑指南》规定的量刑幅度、量刑委员会发布的任何政策声明、避免无正当理由的量刑差异的必要性，以及向本罪任何受害者提供赔偿的必要性。18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)。39\n\n第二巡回法院重申了这些量刑原则，同时强调“量刑法官在决定针对特定罪犯和特定犯罪的适当惩罚程度方面拥有极大的自由裁量权。”United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)。量刑必须在充分考虑任何特定案件的具体情况以及任何特定被告人的背景和品格的前提下进行。正如最高法院在 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) 中所指出的，并在 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 598 (2007) 中再次确认的那样：\n\n在联邦司法传统中，量刑法官始终一贯地将每位被定罪者视为一个独立的个体，并将每个案件视为对人类弱点的独特性研究，这些弱点有时会减轻、有时会加重罪行以及随之而来的惩罚。\n\n518 U.S. at 113；另见 United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 182 (2d Cir. 2008)（“在每一案件中，地区法院‘必须根据所呈现的事实’以及 § 3553(a) 中详细列明的考量因素，对适当的量刑‘作出个别化评估’ ”）（援引 Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007)）。\n\n39 根据政府于 2026 年 1 月 9 日致法庭的信函，鉴于赔偿的可行性问题，政府在本案中不寻求赔偿（restitution），而是寻求通过赦免退还（remission）程序向投资者和客户退还资金。参见 ECF No. 785 at 4-5。Guo 先生（郭文贵）表示同意。ECF No. 789 at 3。\n\n---\n\nB. 判决前调查报告（PSR）中的《量刑指南》计算有误\n\n《判决前调查报告》（Presentence Report，简称“PSR”）第 112-123 段为 Guo 先生计算出的建议性《指南》量刑罪行等级为 43。PSR 对《指南》的具体计算如下：\n\nPSR 段落\n描述\n《美国量刑指南》（USSG）条款\n等级\n\n第 114 段\n基础罪行等级\n2B1.1(a)(1)\n\n第 114 段\n损失超过 $550,000,000\n2B1.1(b)(1)(P)\n+30\n\n第 114 段\n10 名或以上受害者\n2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i)\n+2\n\n第 114 段\n代表慈善、教育、宗教或政治组织、或政府机构等行事\n2B1.1(b)(9)(A)-(C)\n+2\n\n第 114 段\n将欺诈计划转移至或参与转移至另一管辖区以规避执法或监管官员，且该罪行在其他方面涉及精巧手段，且被告人故意从事或促成了构成精巧手段的行为\n2B1.1(b)(10)(A) & (C)\n+2\n\n第 114 段\n因该罪行从一家或多家金融机构获取超过 $1,000,000 的总收入\n2B1.1(b)(17)\n+2\n\n第 114 段\n总基础罪行等级\n\n第 115 段\n依据 18 U.S.C. 1956(h) 定罪\n2S1.1(b)(2)(B)\n+2\n\n第 116 段\n适用 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) 且该罪行涉及精巧洗钱\n2S1.1(b)(3)\n+2\n\n第 118 段\n涉及 5 名或以上参与者的犯罪活动的组织者或领导者\n3B1.1(a)\n+4\n\n第 119 段\n妨碍司法公正\n3C1.1\n+2\n\n第 120 段\n调整后罪行等级（小计）\n\n第 123 段\n总罪行等级\n\nPSR 建议判处 300 个月监禁（参见 PSR 量刑建议第 58 页），在我们看来，这一刑期超出了本案所充分的程度，并且对于本案处于刑事前科类别 I（Criminal History Category I）的被告人而言，远大于必要程度。\n\n---\n\n1. 本案不存在“损失金额”\n\n作为首要问题，Guo 先生继续坚持自己对任何指控均无罪，并打算基于多项理由对其定罪提出上诉。因此，Guo 先生不承认存在任何“损失金额”。\n\n审判也未确立任何“损失金额”。陪审团并未被要求确定损失金额或任何所谓的“受害者”身份。事实上，法庭对陪审团的指示在这方面是非常明确的。例如，关于电汇欺诈罪名项，法庭指示陪审团“无需认定被告人从欺诈中获利”。Tr. 5793。同样，关于证券欺诈，陪审团被指示无需认定“任何人遭受了任何损失或被告人获得了任何利益”。Tr. 5802。\n\n然而，由于量刑阶段仅为了《指南》等级的抽象计算而要求接受陪审团的裁决，因此本陈述意见将该评估作为量刑不可或缺的组成部分进行探讨。\n\n该建议过高的重要原因之一在于《指南》计算有误，主要原因在于所声称的 13 亿美元“损失金额”没有依据，具体原因有多点：(1) 政府完全基于流入 G 系列（G-Series）实体的资金得出 13 亿美元这一数字，而非基于任何严谨的资金追踪分析或其他确立损失的证据；(2) “损失金额”不当地包含了经裁决无罪的行为，这既违反了《第六修正案》，也违反了 2024 年《指南》修正案；(3) “损失金额”错误地包含了明确否认自己受骗的个人的资金；以及 (4) “损失金额”不正确地包含了根据其他具有约束力的法律原则应当排除的金额，例如赎回、退款、残余价值或重复计算的抵扣。\n\n---\n\n虽然没收（forfeiture）与“损失金额”在法理上截然不同，但与没收相关的许多问题——以及在 Guo 先生关于没收的陈述意见（ECF Nos. 799, 804）中所讨论的许多问题——同样适用于“损失金额”。\n\n本案即便不是独一无二的，也是极不寻常的，因为它并不属于那种每一位投资者都声称虚假陈述对其决定出资具有实质性影响、或者每一位投资者实际上都遭受欺诈的典型欺诈案。相反，与几乎所有的欺诈案件不同，G 系列实体的许多投资者和客户明确否认自己实际上是 Guo 先生任何欺诈行为的受害者。\n\n如下文所述，在某些情况下，投资者坚称他们是在经济上遭受了政府行为的损害，而不是 Guo 先生的损害。40 鉴于否认受害者身份的投资者人数众多且背景各异，这种新颖的情况要求在确定任何“损失金额”之前必须进行严格审查和精确计算。\n\n如果政府试图确立任何“损失金额”，或者对本文提出的减少“损失金额”的任何理由提出异议，Guo 先生谨提请注意，有必要根据 United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978) 举行听证会，以对《指南》计算中的这一核心组成部分作出裁决。正当程序（Due Process）和《第六修正案》绝不允许低于此标准的要求。\n\na. 计算“损失金额”的基本法律框架\n\n政府主张出于《指南》目的的“损失”为 13 亿美元，PSR 采纳了该数字。PSR ¶¶ 109, 113-14。然而，PSR 和政府的算术计算\n\n40 这并非关于证据充分性的抗辩，也不是企图重新审理陪审团的裁决——Guo 先生为了量刑目的以及在该语境下的《指南》计算而承认该裁决。相反，这涉及审查该计算的各项要素。\n\n---\n\n完全建立在 GX Z-26 中列出的流入各实体的资金金额之上，存在根本性且致命的缺陷。\n\n分析始于 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) 中阐述的命题，即地区法院在开始所有量刑程序时，应当首先正确计算适用的量刑幅度。不正确的计算会妨碍法院履行判处“充分但不大于必要”刑期的职责，以符合 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) 中列明的量刑目的。\n\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 及相关判例法为在欺诈等金融犯罪中准确确定损失金额这一有时较为复杂的任务提供了指引。§ 2B1.1(b)(1) 损失表附注 A 规定，“损失”为“实际损失或预期损失中较高者”。附注 C(i) 将“实际损失”定义为“由该罪行导致的合理可预见的金钱损害”，附注 C(ii) 将“预期损失”定义为“被告人故意企图造成的金钱损害”，包括“不可能发生或不太可能发生的预期金钱损害”。41 政府承担以优势证据证明损失的举证责任。United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 228 (2d Cir. 1997)。\n\n在作出损失认定时，法庭无需做到完全精确。然而，其对损失的估算仍必须是基于证据的合理估算。U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 评注附注 B。适用于损失具体方面的其他法律原则详述如下。\n\nb. 政府完全依赖流入 G 系列实体的资金存在根本性缺陷\n\n政府要求法庭采纳 13 亿美元的损失数字，几乎完全基于其庭审证据 GX Z-26，42 这是一份汇总图表，源自政府聘请的专家——Brattle Group（博然思维集团）的 Paul Hinton 所进行的分析。\n\n41 附注 C(iii) 将“金钱损害”定义为金钱上的损害或“容易用金钱衡量的损害”。\n42 GX Z-26 已在庭审笔录第 4329 页（Tr. 4329）被采纳为证据。其副本作为附件 13（Ex. 13）附于本文件之后。\n\n---\n\n这种依赖的问题在于，Brattle Group 的工作只不过是处理政府提供的银行记录和相关文件，以便绘制出政府感兴趣的交易图表。最终形成 GX Z-26 的工作成果并非针对投资者损害的独立司法会计分析，而是对检方所挑选内容的呈现。\n\nHinton 作证称，GX Z-26 本质上“是将数据库中所有交易的价值相加的结果，因此这就是我们处理并根据政府给我们的 GTV、Farms（农场）、G Club、和 Himalaya（喜马拉雅）分类进行归类的所有交易。”Tr. 4330。Brattle Group 对这些实体的资金来源没有独立的了解，也没有任何自由裁量权去偏离政府提供的关于界定资金来源的指示。Tr. 4331。它只是根据政府界定的来源，将流入政府界定的每个类别的资金相加。Tr. 4331, 4355-56。\n\n在与其分析相关的过程中，Hinton 未被要求进行任何资金追踪。Tr. 4356, 4430。他没有进行任何详细的资金流向分析，因此无法作证有多少资金流经了特定账户。Tr. 4458。他没有对所谓的欺诈收益进行任何交易层面的分析，也没有对存款、提款、赎回或收到的价值进行投资者层面的核算。\n\n此外，也没有任何证据表明进入 Guo 氏家族实体 ACA Capital 在 First Abu Dhabi Bank（第一阿布扎比银行）开设的一个关键账户的“其他流入资金”的来源。这反过来意味着，在审判中没有任何证据可供任何事实认定者可靠地得出结论，认为任何所谓的欺诈收益——更不用说归因于农场贷款（Farm Loans）的所谓 7700 万美元或 1.1 亿美元收益——曾流出过该账户。参见 Tr. 4428-30；Ex. 13 at 8。这些流出资金的来源完全未获证明。\n\n---\n\n政府将 5.17 亿美元的损失归咎于 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所），同样存在缺陷。该 5.17 亿美元的数字汇总了账户总流入资金，而没有将投资者的存款与二级市场交易活动或向 G Club 等其他类别的转账区分开来。政府的计算仅反映了交易量，并未反映任何金钱损失。\n\nc. 政府的“损失金额”不当地包含了归属于已裁决 Guo 先生无罪之行为的金额\n\n如下文第二部分第 B.2 节（Part II.B.2）详述，《第五修正案》和《第六修正案》以及 2024 年《指南》修正案均禁止在任何“损失金额”计算中计入归属于已裁决 Guo 先生无罪之行为的资金。单凭这一点，就应将政府归属于 GTV 的 4.11 亿美元排除在任何“损失金额”之外。\n\nd. 政府的“损失金额”未能考虑明确否认自己是“受害者”的大量所谓“受害者”\n\n如上所述，本案与绝大多数欺诈案件明显不同，因为有相当数量的投资者和客户站出来证明他们并未因欺诈而被剥夺金钱或财产。反过来，他们的投资也不符合计入任何“损失金额”的条件。在这个多元化的群体中，包括一些根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 提交了请愿书的个人和实体。\n\n这些投资者的立场的影响在 United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993) 中得到了阐明。在该案中，被告人是两名律师，被指控欺骗了他们所代表的投资者，目的是购买合作公寓转换（co-op conversion）期间可获得的公寓。指控的欺诈行为包括在未告知投资者的情况下，为自己谋取购买大楼内其他公寓的特定机会。43\n\n正如法庭在 Miller 案中所总结的，虽然\n\n43 关于 Miller 案更详尽的讨论包含在 Guo 先生（郭文贵先生）就没收事宜提交的信函中，ECF No. 799，第 4-5 页。\n\n政府主张［被告人］将原本拟归属于该集团的财产挪作己用；即这些公寓以及转售所得利润……政府未能克服［证人］未受反驳的证词所造成的障碍，该证词削弱了关于存在某种特定代理关系的任何理解，而该代理关系本应普遍阻止［被告人］在［该公寓大楼］的公寓中进行平行投资，或特别是在这八套公寓中进行平行投资。\n\n同上，第 1020 页。\n\n因此，虽然重要性通常受制于“理性人”标准，但 Miller 案确立了在另外情况下的规则——正如本案中诸多投资者和客户的情形一样——当所谓的“受害者”明确且肯定地否认该要素时，从而使针对该特定人员投资的欺诈指控失去效力。顾名思义，如果一名投资者并非欺诈的受害者，那么该投资者的投资资金就不能被视为任何“损失金额”的一部分。\n\n结果是，本案中的任何“损失金额”都在实质方面被明确否认自己具备任何欺诈“受害者”身份的几类人员（或实体）所扣减：\n\n(1)\n在 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）持有加密货币账户的 6,512 人。参见，例如，《6,512 名作为 Himalaya Exchange 成员的申诉人及其律师对个别动议的答复》，2025 年 10 月 22 日（ECF No. 761）（“HEX 答复”）；\n\n(2)\nHamilton Opportunity Fund SPC（“Hamilton”）的 324 名投资者。参见，例如，《关于裁决请愿人对被没收财产之权益并修改就被告 Miles Guo 作出的初步没收命令的补充第三方请愿书》，2025 年 10 月 22 日（ECF No. 756）（“Hamilton 补充请愿书”）；《关于裁决请愿人对被没收财产之权益并修改初步没收命令的第三方请愿书》，2025 年 4 月 7 日（ECF No. 674）（“Hamilton 请愿书”）；\n\n(3)\n向政府致信声明放弃受害者身份的投资者，部分作为证据开示材料提供于 USAO_00112534-USAO_00112564；\n\n(4)\n已联系辩方律师声明放弃受害者身份的投资者。\n\n除了这一庞大数量之外，还包括那些政府未能识别、但可能包含在这四类非受害者中的所谓受害者。鉴于有充分证据表明相当数量的所谓“受害者”拒绝接受该归类，\n\n政府有责任以足够的具体性来确立任何“损失金额”，以使法院能够以必要的确信度得出究竟是否存在任何“损失金额”的结论。该评估需要进行一次 Fatico 听证会，因为 Guo 先生对存在任何损失的主张持有异议。\n\ni.\nHimalaya Exchange\n\nHimalaya Exchange（“HEX”）是一个可行且受欢迎的加密货币交易所，供其投资者和用户用于交易和赚钱，他们也确实做到了这一点。HEX 是一个商业活跃的平台，交易 HCN 是许多从事 HCN 交易的投资者的收入和利润来源。\n\n政府证人 Wei Chen（陈薇）作证称，即使在 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）查封了她投资于 GTV 的资金之后，她仍在 HCN 中投资了超过 500,000 美元。庭审笔录 4499, 4634。事实上，她在多次交易中买卖了 HCN，有时是在二级市场上。庭审笔录 4671-72。此处待续 – 补充 JK 的引用 Wansheng Cheng（程万胜）的宣誓声明也记录了对 HEX 的活跃且高盈利的使用。参见证物 3。Cheng 在 HEX 投资了约 22,000 美元，在 3,000 枚 HCN 上线可用时进行了购买，并见证其投资在最高峰时膨胀至 160,000 美元的价值。同上，第 15 段。他在因 CCP（中共）持续审讯而逃离中国后生活在土耳其和泰国期间，以及在前往美国的后续途中，均依赖 HDO 和 HCN，并在本案陪审团于 2024 年 7 月 16 日作出裁决后 HEX 被关闭前夕，以每枚 19 美元的价格出售了 500 枚 HCN。同上，第 15、17、48 段。Cheng 并不认为自己是 Guo 先生实施的任何欺诈的受害者。同上，第 55 段。\n\n此外，通过其代理律师，Himalaya Exchange 的 6,512 名成员——代表了 Himalaya Exchange 大约三分之二的成员，参见 HEX 答复，第 3 页——反对将其账户（以及其中的资产）作为任何欺诈所得予以没收——这一立场驳斥了可以将其视为任何“损失金额”之一部分的任何主张。正如 HEX\n\n答复所述，“Himalaya Exchange（HEX）的许多投资者对被贴上受害者的标签表示沮丧。”同上，第 2 页。\n\nHEX 请愿人进一步阐述，明确拒绝政府的控诉理论：“针对［Guo 先生及其共同被告人］的刑事案件建立在他们欺诈投资者的断言之上，然而这些投资者中有许多人坚持认为自己没有受骗，并拒绝受害者标签。”同上。\n\n此外，这些 HEX 请愿人实际上赞同 Guo 先生的观点，即“检察官并未确定具体的受害者或量化其指称的损失，而这在此背景下对于证实欺诈指控至关重要。”同上，第 3 页。\n\n此外，这些 HEX 请愿人坚持认为，他们遭受的唯一经济损失是由政府的不当干预造成的：“记录中没有证据表明 HEX 投资者遭受了损失，除了因政府在查封请愿人账户时的行动给 HEX 造成的声誉和财务损害……”同上，第 2 页。\n\n确实，“投资者之间达成了共识，即他们没有被［Guo］、Je 或 Wang 欺诈，而是受到了查封其投资的美国政府行为的伤害。”同上，第 3 页。正如他们所言，具有讽刺意味的是，正是政府“造成了其旨在防止的财务损害。”同上。\n\n此外，HCN 保留了价值，因此持有（并继续持有）HCN 的投资者获得了保留价值的资产，如下文第 II.B.1.e 部分所述，这必须从任何“损失金额”中予以扣除。根据已知信息和合理相信，发行的 HCN 总数为 930,222,521 枚，政府查封某些 HEX 账户当天（2022 年 9 月 18 日）的收盘价为 25.30 美元。随后，Guo 先生被捕之日即 2023 年 3 月 15 日的收盘价为 17.81 美元，而在 Guo 先生被定罪之日即 2024 年 7 月 16 日的收盘价为 19.77 美元。\n\n次日，即 2024 年 7 月 17 日，HCN 的交易被暂停，收盘价为 13.77 美元。参见 2025 年 10 月 22 日《代理律师为 6,512 名客户提交的更新及最终出庭通知书》，第 2 页（ECF No. 759）。这 6,512 名 HCN 账户持有人的代理律师 Bradford L. Geyer 律师在该份文件中表示，其客户持有 433,992,619.55 枚 HCN，并估计政府对 HEX 的干预扰乱了 HCN 市场，已给其客户造成了 5,976,051,078 美元的损失。同上。\n\n谨此提请，应使用查封之日的收盘价来确定所持有 HCN 的价值——23,534,604,000 美元——因为该事件对价格的影响（下降 30%）显然大于 Guo 先生被捕的影响（因为到定罪时价格已有所回升——回升了 11%）。\n\nHCN 那 235 亿美元的总市值使政府所指称的“损失金额”相形见绌，接近后者的 20 倍。即使按被捕之日、定罪之日或次日停止交易时的市值数据计算，剩余价值也超出指称的“损失金额”数个数量级。\n\nii.\nHamilton 请愿人\n\nHamilton 请愿人提出了类似的立场。Hamilton 请愿人的财产——总计 89,992,861.75 美元，参见 Hamilton 请愿书第 8 页第 20 段——“完全由并购基金投资者合法投资的资金组成，与两起刑事案件中被指控的行为没有任何关联，因此完全处于任一诉讼程序中应予没收的财产范围之外。”Hamilton 补充请愿书第 4-5 页；亦参见同上第 19 段脚注 6（投资是“合法的”且“受监管的”）；同上第 25 段（请愿人将其自有资金投资于一个“与［起诉书］中指控的欺诈计划完全无关”的工具中）。\n\n因此，Hamilton 投资不能构成“损失”。Hamilton 请愿人的资金未被用于实施所指控的任何犯罪，同上第 26 段，并且“没有任何证据表明 2770 账户中的任何资金属于被告 Guo，或曾与受污染资金混同，以至于政府可以辩称查封请愿人的财产符合 21 U.S.C. § 853 的要求。”同上第 22 段；亦参见同上第 27 段（“［没］有证据表明被告 Guo 曾使用、指示或对这些资金行使任何控制权，也没有证据表明这些资金是被告 Guo 任何犯罪活动的一部分或犯罪所得”）。\n\n此外，与 HEX 请愿人一样，Hamilton 请愿人的立场是，他们在经济上遭受损失不是因为 Guo 先生，而是因为政府对投入 Hamilton 请愿人资金的交易进行了干预。正如 Hamilton 补充请愿书所述，“虽然该交易确实完成了（Guo 案庭审，2024 年 6 月 17 日，2794:25-2795:4），但［卖方］从未收到投资款项，因为‘该款项在途经转账过程中被 U.S. Marshals（美国法警局）查封。’Guo 案庭审，2024 年 6 月 17 日，2796:14-23。”同上第 26 段（省略脚注）。44\n\niii.\n根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 提出请愿或向政府致信声明放弃受害者身份的投资者\n\n本案的公开电子备查日程表包含了根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 由至少 126 名个人（不包括 Hamilton 或 Himalaya Exchange 请愿人）提出的请愿书，涉及总计超过 2800 万美元的主张。这些请愿书以及该总额使政府所指称的“损失金额”受到了进一步的质疑。\n\n44 政府证人作证指称的损失中，有很大一部分并非源于实际损失，而是源于政府对与 GTV、G Club、G Bank 以及 Himalaya Exchange 相关账户中资金的查封。例如，由于 GTV 被查封，GTV 投资者失去了其 GTV 投资的至少 8%，因为 8% 是 SEC 根据其公平基金进行分配前扣留的金额。关于农场贷款（Farm Loans），这些贷款的付款直至 2023 年 12 月 1 日才到期，在政府查封时尚未到期且无需支付。\n\n此外，政府方出示的证据开示材料中包括至少一个文件夹，内含 31 封投资者阐述 Guo 先生（郭文贵）未对其实施欺诈的申诉电子邮件。该文件夹由 Bates 编号 USAO_00112534 至 USAO_00112564 标定。其中大部分电子邮件并未指明每位投资者的具体投资金额，因此无法据此推导出一个总额。然而，即便投资金额无法量化，这些通信也应进一步削减潜在的「损失金额」总数。\n\niv. 已联系辩方律师的投资者\n\n辩护律师持续收到自称为 G-Series（G系列）实体投资者或客户的人士发来的信息，且他们均否认自己受害。目前收到的此类声明总数已超过 1,000 份。\n\n此外，部分人士已告知律师，就他们向美国或其他当局提交的针对郭先生的投诉而言，这些投诉受到了 CCP（中国共产党）特工的强迫——在某些情况下完全是由其撰写。参见例如证物 3 第 36–42 段（Wansheng Cheng [程万盛] 的声明）。在此过程中，许多通信者遭受了 PRC（中华人民共和国）当局的审讯和拘留。45\n\nv. 人数未知的否认自己是受害者的投资者\n\n上述讨论引出了一个问题：还有多少人并不认为自己是郭先生任何欺诈行为的受害者？有些人可能不知道量刑（以及随之而来的没收或免除没收款项发放）程序；有些人可能不敢站出来，因为他们害怕如果违背 CCP 企图出于政治原因诋毁郭先生的叙事，会遭到 CCP 的报复；还有些人可能没有途径或缺乏法律认知来理解自己依据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) 所享有的权利。\n\n45 如前所述（第一部分注 8），郭先生计划向法院提交一份补充意见书，其中包含辩护律师收到的数百份声明中的代表性样本，包括那些叙述受到 CCP 审讯和强迫的声明。\n\n无论出于何种原因，合乎逻辑且合理的结论是，在这起极不寻常的案件中，上述类别并未代表各类别中的所有人（或许 Hamilton [汉密尔顿] 投资者除外）。这种「未知」使得要求政府承担证明任何「损失金额」存在的举证责任变得更加势在必行。\n\n退一步讲，归属于上述类别投资者的金额必须从任何「损失金额」的考量中剔除。进而，鉴于本案情况的空前性质，政府必须精确确定归属于特定投资者的任何「损失金额」。这同样需要召开 Fatico 听证会。46\n\ne. 政府未能计入实质性削减任何「损失金额」的其他抵扣项\n\n政府指控的 13 亿美元「损失金额」也未能计入进一步削减任何「损失金额」的具体抵扣项。适用的扣除额包括赎回款、退款、和解款项、投资者保留财产的剩余价值，以及对某些资金的重复计算。\n\n例如，据信，HEX 进行了至少 200,000,000 美元的客户赎回，可能高达 268,000,000 美元。此外，SEC（美国证券交易委员会）就 GTV 私募和解所获得的约 487,000,000 美元（因基于获判无罪的行为亦应予以排除）必须从任何损失计算中予以扣除。\n\n出人意料的是，正因如此，政府选择不在本案中根据《强制受害者赔偿法》（Mandatory Victim Restitution Act）寻求赔偿，而是通过免除没收款项发放和 § 853(n) 请愿的方式进行。简单且不可否认的事实是，政府无法以确定「损失」所需的必要精度来确定所谓的「受害者」或任何相应的「损失金额」。\n\n此外，政府错误的「流入」理论导致其对涉及账户间转账的资金进行了重复计算，而政府似乎从未试图对其进行梳理。如前所述，为检方进行某些财务分析的政府证人 Paul Hinton 作证称，他未被要求且未进行详细的资金流向分析，导致他无法提供资金从一个实体或账户流向另一个实体或账户的账目核算。审判记录（Tr.）4458。\n\n因此，例如，如果某位投资者使用 HEX 账户中的资金通过 G Club 购买商品，政府在其损失计算中，先是在这笔资金存入该投资者的 HEX 账户时将其计入，随后在同一笔资金转移至 G Club 用以支付该投资者购买的任何商品时，又再次将其计入。\n\nG Club 提供了一个具体的例子。虽然 G Club 可能发放了价值 2.55 亿美元的会员资格，但并非所有会员资格都是用法定货币支付的。G Club 接受 HDO 和 HCN 作为 G Club 会员资格的支付方式。价值约 7000 万美元的 G Club 会员资格是通过兑换 HDO 发放的，价值约 2500 万美元的会员资格是通过兑换 HCN 发放的。\n\n相应地，政府列出的由个人向 G Club 汇出的任何金额，都因 G Club 接受作为会员支付方式的约 7000 万美元等值 HDO 购买以及至少 2500 万美元等值 HCN 购买而存在错误。因此，账户间转账中至少有 9500 万美元被重复计算，必须从任何「损失金额」中予以扣除。\n\n此外，向投资者支付的其他退款也必须扣除，包括总计至少 100 万美元的 G Club 退款。这些各项款项和核算错误同样需要通过 Fatico 听证会来解决。\n\nf. 举行 Fatico 听证会符合法院的裁定以及政府的立场，即在本案中基于有限的投资者经历进行「推测」和「推断」是不恰当的\n\n郭先生的立场与政府在审判期间提出并得到法院认可的、关于从有限数量投资者的经历中合理得出推论的立场完全一致，并得到了后者的强化。\n\n在讨论从辩方证人 Jianhu Yi（易剑虎）的证词中得出的合理解释时（该证人曾就 CCP 对其施加的压力和威胁行动作证），政府极力、反复且详尽地辩称，不应允许陪审团从 Yi 先生身上推断发生在他身上的事情也发生在了其他人身上。\n\n联邦助理检察官（AUSA）Finkel 辩称，法院不应允许就 CCP 对其他人的威胁进行辩论（和推论），因为「那是利用推测来进行辩论。」Tr. 5568。法院支持了政府的异议，裁定「你不能从 Yi 先生的个人经历进行概括。你不能推测他代表了大多数投诉人，因为除了在此作证的投诉人之外，我们没有任何关于任何其他投诉人的证据。」Tr. 5571。法院继续指出，「不要引导他们进行推测。」Tr. 5571。\n\n当该问题再次被提出时，联邦助理检察官 Horton 重申了辩方不能提出超出 Yi 先生自身个人情况的推论的论点。AUSA Horton 主张，「他们（辩方）试图做的、以及法官阁下所裁定的，是获取单个受害者、单个投资者的仅限于其自身经历的证词——我可以查看记录中的具体引用以说明它是多么有限——并据此进行推断，从而对本案中的受害者证人产生真正令人遗憾的影射，法官阁下明确表示坚决不行，这完全是正确的。」Tr. 5852。\n\n法院再次同意政府的这一限制性原则，裁定辩方不能「根据本案的证词进行概括和推测，因此我坚持我的决定。」Tr. 5855。然而，这恰恰是政府目前在量刑时关于「损失金额」试图做的事情：「推测」和「推断」数千名投资者遭到了欺诈，尽管数千人已明确否认了该身份。\n\n政府不能两头占便宜。如果辩方寻求的推论不被允许使用推测、推断和猜测，那么就不能允许它们来支持政府就「损失金额」提出的毫无根据的推论。同样的原则必须适用于此处的任何「损失金额」，尤其是当它在郭先生最终的《量刑指南》（Guidelines）级别中占据如此过大的比重时。\n\n事实上，在现阶段，鉴于已有数千名投资者挺身而出并根据 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) 提交了请愿书，并坚决否认自己受到过任何欺骗，或否认自己是因重大虚假陈述而被诱导进行投资，辩方的立场推测成分要少得多，而且要可信和可靠得多。\n\n2. 额外的法律原则支持无损失的认定\n\n除上述分析外，还有四个独立的法律原则层面共同消除了本案中的任何损失：\n\n(1) 获判无罪的行为——在本案中为罪名项 5、6 和 12 中指控的行为——在计算「损失金额」时不得予以考虑；\n\n(2) 与政府关于「损失金额」不可分割的错误立场相反，法院必须评估投资资金中的哪些部分属于适当地归类为「损失金额」；\n\n(3) 第二巡回法院（Second Circuit）的司法判例确立了增加 30 级的量刑调整——即判决前调查报告（PSR）和政府计算的数额——需要由政府承担更高的证明标准，超出仅凭优势证据的程度；以及\n\n(4) 许多法院已基于各种理由正确地得出结论，认为《量刑指南》对「损失金额」的侧重是不成比例的，并非基于经验证据或实践经验，且不是用于量刑目的的有效指标。\n\n如果政府坚持存在某种「损失金额」，郭先生谨请求举行 Fatico 听证会，由政府承担举证责任以提供证据，试图确切证明该损失到底是多少。\n\na. 获判无罪的行为不能用于计算郭先生的量刑指南级别\n\n郭先生在罪名项 5（指控涉及 GTV 私募投资、违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343 和 § 2 的电汇欺诈）和罪名项 6（指控涉及 GTV 私募投资、违反 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) 和 78ff、17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 以及 18 U.S.C. § 2 的证券欺诈），以及罪名项 12（指控从事和试图从事非法货币交易、违反 18 U.S.C. § 1957 和 § 2）中均获判无罪。然而，政府和 PSR 却在得出用以确定《量刑指南》罪行级别的「损失金额」时，将郭先生获判无罪的行为纳入其中。\n\n虽然政府依据 United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (per curiam) 提出「法院在量刑时可以考虑审判记录中与 GTV 相关的事实」（参见 ECF No. 716 第 3 页），但在 Watts 案判决后的近 30 年里，关于量刑中处理获判无罪行为的司法格局已发生了相当大的变化。\n\n具体就《量刑指南》而言确实如此，这体现在指南修正案以及 Supreme Court（最高法院）大法官表达的质疑中，两者均表明认识到了在对被告人就陪审团已判无罪的行为进行量刑时存在的宪法层面的不和谐。\n\ni. 在本案中使用被判无罪的行为将侵犯郭先生（Mr. Guo）的第五修正案和第六修正案权利\n\n正如最高法院（Supreme Court）在 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) 一案中所重申的，第六修正案规定的由陪审团审判的权利属于“我们宪法结构中最根本的权力保留”之一。同上，第 305-306 页。此外，该第六修正案权利与第五修正案的正当程序权利结合适用，后者“保护被告免于被定罪，除非有排除合理怀疑的证据证明构成其被指控罪行所必需的每一项事实。”In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)。\n\n在此背景下，Watts 案裁决的是一个狭窄的问题——“量刑指南与双重追诉条款的相互作用”，United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 240 n.4 (2005)——并且并未认可超出“陪审团裁决所授权”惩罚的“量刑加重情节”。同上，第 240 页。亦见 United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 392 (6th Cir. 2008)（Merritt 法官异议） （“将 Watts 作为依据被判无罪的行为予以加重处罚的先例，显然是一个错误”）；People v. Beck, 939 N.W.2d 213, 224 (Mich. 2019)（认定“Watts 对于解决在量刑中使用被判无罪的行为是否违反正当程序毫无帮助”，因为“Watts 仅处理了双重追诉异议”）。\n\n此外，Booker 案中的法院明确警告不要过度依赖 Watts 案，该案“甚至没有获得充分书面答辩或口头辩论的益处”。Booker, 543 U.S. at 240 n.4；亦见，例如 Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12 n.4 (1991)（简易处置“不享有经过实体审理辩论案件的全部先例价值”）。\n\n第六修正案和正当程序的法律含义也不仅限于因量刑法院认定的事实而超出法定最高限度的刑罚。正如 Scalia 大法官在 Rita 案的附同意见中指出的那样，无论 Booker 案还是先前的先例，都没有排除“对基于陪审团裁决或认罪答辩所包含的事实而本不能被维持为合理的刑罚提出具体适用的第六修正案异议”。Rita, 551 U.S. at 375（Scalia 大法官附同部分意见并附同判决，Thomas 大法官加入）；亦见 White, 551 F.3d at 389（Merritt 法官异议）（“很明显，Booker 案之后合理性审查的发展，已经为第六修正案异议敞开了大门”，即使“针对的是陪审团裁决授权的法定范围内的刑罚”）。\n\n体制层面的考量同样要求在量刑时排除被判无罪的行为。在普通法时代，陪审团通过作出“我们今天称之为对较轻包含罪名的有罪裁决”，故意且“间接地限制了”“刑罚的严厉程度”。Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999)。例如，陪审团“经常……裁定盗窃价值在十二便士以下”，以避免被强制判处死刑。4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 248。\n\n毫无疑问，陪审团仍在继续履行这一职能，即使在非死刑案件的背景下，他们并不了解具体可适用的刑罚（尽管他们通常通过对配合证人的交叉询问了解到这一点）。如果在量刑时重新引入被判无罪的行为而忽视陪审团的自觉选择，将“削弱对法律和陪审团制度的尊重”。United States v. Settles, 530 F.3d 920, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2008)（Kavanaugh 法官）。亦见 United States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764, 778 n.4 (8th Cir. 2008)（Bright 法官附同意见）（援引陪审员致法官的信，称使用被判无罪的行为是一场贬低“我们作为陪审员所作贡献”的“悲剧”）。\n\nii. 2024 年量刑指南修正案的影响\n\n美国量刑委员会（U.S. Sentencing Commission）作为其 2024 年修正周期的一部分，修订了 §1B1.3，增加了 (c) 款，在计算美国量刑指南（U.S. Sentencing Guidelines）范围时排除了对被判无罪行为的考量。见第 826 号修正案（Amendment 826），见网址 http\n\n第 826 号修正案自 2024 年 11 月 1 日起生效，规定“相关行为不包括被告在联邦法院被刑事起诉并被判无罪的行为，除非该行为亦构成或部分构成本案被定罪的罪行。”U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(c)。\n\n正如量刑委员会主席 Carlton W. Reeves 法官在宣布该修正案时所声明的那样：“无罪就意味着无罪。”量刑委员会新闻稿，“委员会全票通过一揽子改革方案，包括限制在量刑指南中使用被判无罪的行为”，2024 年 4 月 17 日，见网址 httpw.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/april-17-2024。\n\n在该修正案首次传阅时，Reeves 法官评论道：“‘法官在适用指南时可以考量何种行为’……‘对整个联邦司法系统的运作具有奠基性和根本性的重要意义。’”同上（引用 Douglas Berman 教授），见网址 httphearings-andmeetings/20230405/20230405_transcript.pdf。\n\n本案中被定罪的任何其他罪名也不能作为将已被判无罪的行为纳入任何“损失金额”计算的“后门”。这不仅会彻底挫败 2024 年量刑指南修正案的目的，破坏 Booker 案以及第六和第五修正案，而且会违背长期确立的法理——即当陪审团对多重目标阴谋罪做出定罪裁决时，其中某一项支线证据不足并不构成推翻定罪的理由，因为推定陪审团是基于具有充分证据的目标做出的裁决。Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1992)。\n\n在此，Griffin 案表明，陪审团既然认定 GTV 支线证据不足，就不会在认定其他目标足以判定有罪的其他罪名项中（仅出于量刑分析之目的）将其视为证据充分。这不仅适用于共谋罪，而且适用于要求有敲诈勒索前置行为的 RICO（《反敲诈勒索与腐败组织法》）指控。陪审团的无罪判决排除了将 GTV 私募行为作为 RICO 前置行为的任何结论。\n\n同样，关于洗钱罪，陪审团不可能将通过 GTV 募集的资金认定为 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) 所要求的作为前置条件的“特定非法活动”，因为陪审团对与 GTV 相关的罪名项做出了无罪裁决。\n\n因此，第五修正案和第六修正案禁止在本案的任何“损失金额”计算中纳入被判无罪的行为。\n\niii. 最高法院大法官对将无罪裁决行为用于量刑目的所表达的保留意见\n\n量刑委员会的行动也为最高法院审理该问题扫清了障碍。见 McClinton v. United States, 600 U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 2400 (2023)（Sotomayor 大法官关于拒绝调卷令的声明）；同上，第 2403 页（Kavanaugh 大法官关于拒绝调卷令的声明，Gorsuch 大法官和 Barrett 大法官加入）。\n\n在 McClinton 案中，在驳回调卷令申请时，Sotomayor 大法官和 Kavanaugh 大法官均表示有意重新审视 Watts 案。例如，Sotomayor 大法官指出，“正如许多法官所指出的，使用被判无罪的行为来提高被告的量刑指南范围和刑期，引发了关乎刑事司法系统公正性及公众对公正性认知的重大问题。”143 S. Ct. at 2401（援引 Jones v. United States, 574 U.S. 948, 949-950 (2014)（Scalia 大法官对拒绝调卷令的异议，Thomas 和 Ginsburg 大法官加入））；United States v. Bell, 808 F. 3d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2015)（Kavanaugh 法官附同驳回全院庭审复歇的意见）；United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F. 3d 1328, 1331 (10th Cir. 2014)（Gorsuch 法官）；Watts, 519 U. S. at 170（Kennedy 大法官异议）（脚注省略）。47\n\nSotomayor 大法官还解释称，“本院今日拒绝调卷令不应被误读”，因为“负责量刑指南的量刑委员会已宣布，将在未来一年内解决围绕基于被判无罪行为量刑的问题。”143 S. Ct. at 2403。Sotomayor 大法官补充道：“但是，如果委员会不迅速采取行动或选择不采取行动，本院可能需要审理所提出的宪法问题。”同上；亦见 United States v. Coleman, 138 F.4th 489, 511-512 (7th Cir.)，cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 275 (2025)（“在驳回 McClinton 案的调卷令申请时，四位最高法院大法官鼓励美国量刑委员会解决在量刑中使用被判无罪行为的相关问题……十个月后，量刑委员会响应了这一呼吁”）。48\n\nSotomayor 大法官进一步阐述道：“当控方凭借未能说服陪审团的证据，加上较低的证明标准，获得了‘第二次尝试机会’时，程序公正性和准确性也令人担忧。”143 S. Ct. at 2402。Sotomayor 大法官还指出，“许多其他州和联邦法官也对这种做法提出了质疑。”143 S. Ct. at 2401 n.2（引文省略）。在 Bell 案中，Kavanaugh 大法官在哥伦比亚特区巡回上诉法院任职期间认识到，“允许法官依据被判无罪或未被起诉的行为施加比原本应判处刑罚更高的刑期，似乎是对正当程序和由陪审团审判权利的可疑侵犯。”808 F. 3d at 928（Kavanaugh 法官附同驳回全院庭审复歇的意见）。同样，在 United States v. Sabillon-Umana 案中，Gorsuch 大法官在美国联邦第十巡回上诉法院任职期间，质疑了以下假定，即“地区法院法官可以在未经陪审团协助或未经被告同意的情况下，根据法官认定的事实，减轻或加重被告的刑罚（在法定授权范围内）。”772 F. 3d at 1331。Kavanaugh 大法官同样表示，“本院今日拒绝调卷令不应被误读”，143 S. Ct. at 2403，并补充道，“使用被判无罪的行为来改变被告的量刑指南范围引发了重大问题。”同上。然而，Kavanaugh 大法官再次指出，鉴于“量刑委员会目前正在考虑该问题”，因此“在本院决定是否对涉及使用被判无罪行为的案件批准调卷令之前，等待量刑委员会的决定是适当的”。同上。\n\n此外，在 McClinton 案中，Sotomayor 大法官指出，基于被判无罪行为的量刑还引发了公众对正义是否得到伸张的认知问题，这一关切对刑事司法系统的合法性至关重要。多位法官曾指出，街头的普通女性在得知这一做法时会感到相当错愕。见，例如 United States v. Canania, 532 F. 3d 764, 778 (8th Cir. 2008)（Bright 法官附同意见）。同上，第 2402-03 页。\n\n当然，Watts 案是在没有这些后续发展的情况下做出的判决。49 第 826 号修正案体现了对该问题的解决，并明确禁止在确定适用的指南级别时使用被判无罪的行为。见 United States v. Johnson, 754 F. Supp.3d 305, 312-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2024)（鉴于第 826 号修正案的颁布，并援引 McClinton 案指出，“根据被判无罪的行为对被告进行量刑的做法如今已受到坚决反对”）。\n\n在本案中，政府试图将 GTV Private Placement（GTV 私募）资金计入用于《量刑指南》（Guidelines）计算的“损失金额”（loss amount），此举不仅企图规避 Amendment 826（第 826 号修正案）的条文与精神及其所维护的宪法保护，而且企图规避削弱 Watts 案判例的明确且持续的发展势头。50 因此，被判无罪的行为不能计入为《量刑指南》之目的而确定的“损失金额”。\n\n即使是 Watts 案也并未强制要求在量刑时考虑被判无罪的行为；相反，该判例仅认定“并不禁止考虑……被判无罪的行为[。]” 519 U.S. at 152-155。\n\n甚至在 Watts 案之前，Oakes 法官在（受制于当时巡回法院有效先例的）勉强一致意见中就指出了允许将被判无罪的行为用于加重被告人刑罚的不合理之处：\n\n我们裁定，一个人因其被定罪之罪行所获的刑罚，可以通过考虑其已被判无罪的行为而增加四倍。这种法理令人联想到《爱丽丝梦游仙境》。“先判无罪，后行判刑。”\n\nUnited States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 392-394 (2d Cir. 1994) (Oakes, J., concurring)。\n\n---\n\nb. 具体法律原则大幅减少本案中的“损失金额”\n\n法院在评估“损失金额”时确立的若干原则同样适用于本案，并要求举行 Fatico hearing（法蒂科听证会）。例如，在 United States v. Byors, 586 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2009) 一案中，法院适用了 Application Note 3(E)（第 3(E) 条应用注释），该条规定损失应扣减或抵消“‘在犯罪行为被发现之前，被告人……退还给被害人的金钱、退还财产的公平市场价值以及所提供的服务的公平市场价值。’” 586 F.3d at 226（援引 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3(E)(I)）。\n\n与该应用注释一致，法院对偿还给被害人的金额予以了扣减记入。同上；另见 United States v. Avenatti, 2024 WL 4553810 at *2 (9th Cir. October 23, 2024)（《量刑指南》要求量刑法院从损失中扣减记入 § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(I) 所界定的款项）。\n\n然而，Byors 案中的被告人还主张，其他“金额不应计入损失，因为投资者以其资金换取了有价值的东西——根据 Byors 的说法，这些投资者得到了向他们承诺的东西。” Byors, 586 F.3d at 226。法院原则上同意这一观点，但指出“然而，与被告人所依赖的判例不同，[Byors 案中]被告人的被害人在欺诈行为被揭露时一无所获。”同上。\n\n因此，Byors 案法院将案情与 United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2008) 一案的情形区分开来；正如 Byors 案法院所描述的，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）在 Leonard 案中裁定“地区法院根据投资者为证券支付的总价值计算损失是错误的……并指出‘投资者确实获得了一家从事电影制作和发行的公司的权益’，且该证券很可能具有一定的‘实际价值’。” 586 F.3d at 226。\n\n---\n\n同样，在 United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008) 一案中，法院在分析涉及贷款欺诈案件中确定“损失金额”的应用注释时得出结论，即“[U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 的]经修正的 Note 7(b)（第 7(b) 条注释）给予被告人基于客观事实的扣减记入——即在发现欺诈之前支付的款项以及为担保贷款而质押的资产——如果仅仅依据贷款申请的票面金额，这些事实可能会改变损失的计算。”同上，at 151；另见 United States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555, 558–59 (7th Cir. 1991)（称将所有欺诈等同于盗窃是“简单”但“不理性”的，并选择转而考量被告人是否事实上意图保留其通过虚假陈述所获取金额的票面价值）。51\n\n在 Confredo 案中，法院还讨论了 United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2004) 一案，根据 Confredo 案法院的描述，在该案中：\n一名医生使其诊所向 medicare（联邦医疗保险）和 medicaid（联邦医疗补助）保险机构提交了高于政府为所提供服务设定的固定费率的账单。见同上，at 176-77, 193。地区法院根据账单票面价值的合计总额确定了意图损失。见同上，at 193。被告人主张他从未打算获得全额报销，因为他知道费率表是不可更改的。\n528 F.3d at 152。Singh 案法院进而裁定，被告人“在发回重审时‘应有进一步的机会表明（如果他能做到的话），他预期从保险机构收到的总金额确实少于他实际开具账单的金额。’” 390 F.3d at 194；另见 Confredo, 528 F.3d at 152。\n\n51 在 Confredo 案中，法院指出“尽管争议仅涉及一个级别的加重调整，但由此导致的两个可适用的量刑幅度上限之间的差距为 27 个月。” 528 F.3d at 149。当然，在本案中，这一差距要大得多。\n\n---\n\n在涉及 20 个等级的“损失金额”加重调整的 Avenatti 案中，除了要求对退还给被被告人（一名侵吞案件和解资金的律师）欺诈的客户的款项予以扣减记入外，Ninth Circuit（第九巡回上诉法院）还指出，“即使 Avenatti 的行为合法，他的客户也不会收到全额的和解金额。” 2024 WL 4553810 at *1。\n\n因此，“地区法院在未考虑 Avenatti 的费用和成本的情况下，认定 Avenatti 的被害人‘损失’了全部和解金额，这是基于并未发生且非‘因[Avenatti 的]犯罪行为导致’的金钱损害对 Avenatti 加重了刑罚。”同上（援引 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(I)）。第九巡回法院得出结论，“向被害人提供的此类服务必须从应付的赔偿中扣除。”同上，at *2（援引 United States v. Gagarin, 950 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2020)）。\n\nAvenatti 案法院补充指出，在“损失金额”中过度计入“违背了损失加重调整的目的，即确保被告人的刑罚与其造成的损害相适应。”同上，at *1（援引 § 2B1.1 cmt. Background）。52\n\n最近，在没收的情境下，在 United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024) 一案中，第二巡回法院针对基于并非一律属于欺诈的一系列交易所作出的统括性没收主张，表达了相同的保留意见。在 Rainford 案中，政府的立场是基于一名证人的证言，即被告人律师事务所 40% 的案件属于“滑倒跌伤”类案件，但法院判定即使是那 40% 也应该再减少 20%，因为这些案件中只有 80% 属于欺诈。同上，at 489。\n\n52 在 Avenatti 案中，法院还对“损失金额”与没收进行了区分。2024 WL 4553810, at *2（发回重审并指示“地区法院在其‘实际损失’计算中计入 Avenatti 法律服务和成本的公平市场价值，而不依赖于没收”）。\n\n---\n\n因此，Rainford 案法院撤销了部分没收判决，因为“即使政府关于[该证人]证言的指控得到了证实，政府在得出没收金额时也仅采信了[该]证言的一部分。”同上。正如法院所述，“政府和地区法院均未解释为什么最初 160 万美元的没收请求应核减 60%，而由此得出的 644,000 美元却不应为了计入非欺诈性的滑倒跌伤索赔而再核减 20%。”同上。\n\n此外，在计算没收时，Rainford 案法院宣布“政府的一面之词不是证据。”同上。因此，在本案中，政府关于“郭随后通过一系列相互关联的骗局继续欺诈其追随者，包括 2020 年的 GTV 私募”，以及“GTV 私募与 G Enterprise（G 集团）的其他分支相关联且是其不可分割的组成部分”的主张（ECF No. 716 at 3），既非证据性的，也非决定性的。\n\n这些主张也未得到证实。因此，就“损失金额”而言，它们与在没收方面一样毫无说服力。见 Rainford, 110 F.4th at 489（虽然“地区法院可以采用‘通用参考基准作为计算损失或收益的出发点’，[但]未经证实的政府主张并不是‘参考基准’”）（内部引用省略）。\n\n所有这些因素——退还给投资者的资金（包括赎回款）、投资者在欺诈之外所保留的投资价值、费用、成本及服务的公平市场价值，以及是否有充分证据证明郭先生意图保留投资者的全部出资——都切实使得本案中的“损失金额”大幅减少。\n\nc. 多级别《量刑指南》加重调整要求更高的举证责任\n\n在 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) 之前的时期，作为旨在减轻强制性《量刑指南》影响的补救措施，第二巡回法院建立了一套程序，通过该程序，量刑法院可以确保因调整或计入相关行为而导致的被告人罪行等级的大幅上升，能够通过将事实置于更严格证明标准的二级分析得以缓解。如果这些事实未能达到该标准，则从《量刑指南》幅度向下偏离（或在 Booker 案之后的时期，向下变动）将是适当的。\n\n---\n\n在处理 Booker 案前环境下的举证责任问题时，第二巡回法院数次努力解决量刑时被告人的正当程序及第六修正案权利与优势证据标准之间不可避免的紧张关系。例如，在 United States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2000) 一案中，第二巡回法院澄清了其在该问题上的各项意见，解释称：\n基于被告人的“相关行为”加重刑罚，如果在进行时不考虑证明该相关行为的证据证明力，可能会导致根据《量刑指南》而言过重、不当且非预期的总监禁刑期。\n\n同上，at 708。\n\nCordoba-Murgas 案法院援引并摘录了 United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996) 一案，该案将调整纳入了该框架之内：\n优势证据标准仅仅是进行调整和偏离的门槛基础，在刑罚严厉程度的连续谱系上的某个节点，应就向上调整和向上偏离同时考虑证据的证明力。关于向上调整，量刑法官应要求事实记录的证明力足以证明在调整后的《量刑指南》幅度内判处刑罚是正当的。\n\n94 F.3d at 56；另见 United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 390 (2d Cir. 1992) 以及 983 F.2d at 393-95 (Newman, J., concurring)。\n\n在此种情形下，Gigante 案法院指示，在作出决定时，法院可以审查作为多项向上调整基础的行为是否通过高于优势证据的标准予以了证明，例如在适当情况下达到清晰且有说服力的标准甚至排除合理怀疑的标准。\n\n---\n\n94 F.3d at 56。\n\nGigante 案中的法院补充指出，“在未达到与大幅提高的量刑幅度相适应的更高标准时，法院应当向下偏离。”同上。在 Cordoba-Murgas 案中，法院同样宣布，“依据优势证据作出的事实认定只是容易受到调整的初步步骤。”载于《联邦判例汇编第三辑》第 233 卷第 709 页（233 F.3d at 709）。法院还授权在未满足适宜证明标准时向下偏离，同上第 708 页，并在依据优势证据认定此类加重情节或相关行为后，向量刑法院提供了如下指导：\n在可能出现于本案的情形组合下，包括(i)针对(ii)未在审判中证明的(iii)未经起诉的行为作出的(iv)仅凭优势证据认定的(v)且法院对该认定的准确性存在实质性怀疑的巨大向上调整，由于这种非同寻常的情形组合，法院有权从预定的调整幅度向下偏离。\n同上第 708 页（引用 United States v. Concepcion 案，983 F.2d at 389）；另见 United States v. Allen 案，644 F. Supp.2d 422, 435 (S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）2009)（省略脚注）。\n\n自 Booker 案以来，该原则从未动摇。参见 United States v. Vaughn 案，430 F.3d 518 (2d Cir.（第二巡回上诉法院）2005)（在探讨能否使用判决无罪的行为计算《指南》幅度时，同时引用了 Cordoba-Murgos 案和 Gigante 案）；United States v. Juwa 案，508 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2007)（引用 Cordoba-Murgas 案，认定起诉书中的指控本身不足以支持加重刑罚）。\n\n事实上，Cordoba-Murgas 原则曾被适用于 United States v. Allen 案，644 F. Supp.2d 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)。在该案中，法院依据优势证据标准认定存在某些相关行为，但指出“《指南》并非强制性的”，同上第 434 页（省略脚注），并且“如果依照《指南》对被告人进行量刑，向下偏离可能是适当的。”同上第 435 页。\n\n在审查该行为时——法院认定其“毫无疑问确实发生过”，但补充称同样“怀疑任何理性的陪审团能否排除合理怀疑作出这一认定”，同上（省略脚注）——Allen 案法院指出，“Cordoba-Murgas 案的情形与这些被告人的情形完全对应”，因为“仅凭优势证据证明的相关行为使他们的量刑风险增加了至少五倍。”同上第 435 页（原文强调）（省略脚注）。\n\n此外，Allen 案法院阐述道：“如果《指南》具有强制性，且无法向下偏离，这种情况将引发严重的宪法问题。如果正当法律程序不能保护公民免受此类专断权力的行使，那么它就毫无意义。”同上第 434 页。\n\n在 Booker 案后的环境下，Cordoba-Murgas 案及其后续判例赋予量刑法院用于减轻不成比例的加重情节和/或相关行为影响的自由裁量权，自 Booker 案以来，因《指南》仅具建议性质的地位，以及在平衡《指南》严厉性时对 § 3553(a) 规定的量刑因素的附加考量而得到了进一步放大。参见例如 United States v. Jones 案，531 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 2008)（指出证明标准的问题不再那么紧迫，因为 Booker 案使所有《指南》认定“归根结底仅具建议性”）；United States v. Salazar 案，489 F.3d 555, 558 (2d Cir. 2007)（“Booker 案赋予地区法院法官的自由裁量权，仅适用于在计算出《指南》幅度后，将该幅度作为 § 3553(a) 因素之一予以考量”）。53\n\nJones 案合议庭所作的“鉴于本法院一贯适用优势证据标准，将[United States v. Shonubi 案，103 F.3d 1085, 1089 (2d Cir. 1997)中的]表述解释为授权使用更高的证明标准是不正确的”这一声明（531 F.3d at 176），看似剥夺了法院遵循 Cordoba-Murgas 案和 Gigante 案的自由裁量权，充其量是令人困惑且前后矛盾的。Cordoba-Murgas 案和 Gigante 案均未被推翻；事实上，重申优势证据标准的案例——即 Vaughn 案，甚至 Jones 案本身——都将 Cordoba-Murgas 案援引为判例权威，同时却令人费解地忽略了 Cordoba-Murgas 案对地区法院指示的其余部分——即至少允许甚至应当根据某项特定调整或某组事实对被告人《指南》等级产生的影响，相应地调整证明标准，并据此向下偏离。此外，Jones 案中关于 Shonubi 案中的表述仅为附带意见的评论（531 F.3d at 176）令人费解，因为 Shonubi 案中的相关段落明确宣布：“尽管量刑委员会倾向于采用优势证据标准来解决量刑时的所有争议事实问题（《美国量刑指南》（U.S.S.G.）§ 6A1.3，政策声明，评注），但我们裁定，如果相关行为一旦被证实将大幅加重刑罚，那么在确定该相关行为的争议方面时应当采用更为严格的标准。”103 F.3d at 1085。\n\nUnited States v. Yannotti 案，541 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2008)的判决意见亦未改变这一分析。在 Yannotti 案中，陪审团裁定被告人犯有《反勒索及腐败组织法》（RICO）共谋罪，但在实质性 RICO 罪名项上未达成一致。同上第 118 页。陪审团在被指控的绑架共谋上也未达成一致，同上第 119 页，法院作出了并无出奇之处的裁定，即该行为“可以依据 § 1B1.3 作为相关行为纳入 Yannotti 的量刑考量中。”同上第 128 页。法院并未涉及 Cordoba-Murgas 案或 Gigante 案，也未涉及是否可以通过施加更高的证明标准以及向下偏离来缓和相关行为的影响（正如这些案例所授权的那样）。\n\n同样引人注目的是，在 Yannotti 案中，虽然陪审团在裁决书上就谋杀和谋杀未遂标注了“未证实”，同上第 118-19 页，但显然该行为未作为相关行为被计入《指南》计算或刑期中（仅绑架共谋存在争议）。同上第 127-28 页。\n\n因此，谨提请本院，Cordoba-Murgas 案中的规则应当适用于本案中的“损失金额”。54 郭先生（Mr. Guo，郭文贵）的量刑可能面临如此剧烈的增加——30 个等级——需要附带有关证明标准的保障措施，以保护郭先生的第五和第六修正案权利。\n\n诚然，正当程序对法院可以考虑和/或依赖的信息，以及在采纳前所要求的可靠程度施加了约束。在此，政府指控的“损失金额”未能达到任何适用的证明标准，且至少需要举行一场适用相应严格证明标准的 Fatico 听证会（Fatico hearing）。正当程序和第六修正案不允许低于此要求。\n\nd. 依据 § 2B1.1 作出的 30 个等级加重不合理地影响了郭先生适用的《量刑指南》幅度\n\n即使前述所有主张未能消除“损失金额”，在类似案件中，依据 § 2B1.1 因损失金额而作出的 30 个等级加重对郭先生适用《指南》幅度的巨大影响，已被多家法院予以否定，因为该加重不成比例、扭曲了量刑程序，并且理应通过更多地依赖 § 3553(a) 项下的其他因素来予以纠正。\n\n金融欺诈案件中的《指南》等级主要由“损失金额”调整所驱动。然而，法院批评了在此背景下《指南》的僵化和专断本质，认识到“因量刑指南对抽象算术的盲目崇拜有时导致的不公，以及若不由常识加以限制，指南计算可能施加给人类的伤害。”United States v. Adelson 案，441 F.Supp.2d 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)，经 301 Fed. App’x. 93 (2d Cir. 2008)维持原判；另见 United States v. Parris 案，573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 745, 754 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院）2008)（将“针对白领犯罪的《量刑指南》”描述为“对常识的抹黑”，并在“建议指南幅度为 360 个月至终身监禁的情况下，判处被告人 60 个月监禁”）；United States v. Emmenegger 案，329 F. Supp. 2d 416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)（Lynch 法官）（“《指南》对欺诈涉及的损失金额赋予了过度的权重”）。\n\n学者和评论家们同样认识到了“损失金额”对欺诈案件量刑的过大影响。参见例如 Derek R. Vollrath，《摆脱损失计算：迈向白领刑事案件中更公正的量刑制度》，载于《杜克法律杂志》（59 Duke L.J. 1001, 1025 (2010)）（“《指南》未能在白领刑事案件中实现正义。其量刑建议过高得不合常理，且由于《指南》对损失计算的过度强调，未能准确反映被告人的可谴责性”）；Frank O. Bowman III，《Booker 案后高损失企业内部人欺诈的量刑》，载于《联邦量刑报告》（20 Fed. Sent. R. 167, 169, 2008 WL 2201039 at *4 (2008 年 2 月)）（“自 Booker 案以来，几乎每位在巨额欺诈中面对高层企业欺诈被告人的法官都得出结论，认为《指南》所要求的刑期过高。这种近乎一致的共识表明，司法界看到了《指南》所规定的刑期[在企业欺诈案件中]与 § 3553(a) 要求法官处以‘足够但不超过实现其目标所必需’的刑期这一根本要求之间存在持续的脱节”）。\n\n事实上，其他例证不胜枚举。在 United States v. Faibish 案中，Vitaliano 法官指出，“即使经过微调，一旦在损失或收益表中加入任何规模的数字，指南就会机械式地盲目飙升。”United States v. Faibish 案量刑程序庭审记录，案号 12-CR-265 (E.D.N.Y., 2016 年 3 月 10 日)（ECF 编号 271 第 23-27 页）。在 Faibish 案中，对于一名被判犯有欺诈罪、其《指南》等级为终身监禁且“上限”为 80 年的被告人，Vitaliano 法官判处其 63 个月监禁。同上第 54 页；另见 Robert J. Anello 与 Richard F. Albert，《美国律师协会工作组“影子量刑指南”的兴起》，载于《纽约法律杂志》（New York Law Journal），2016 年 4 月 5 日，网址见 http（“影子量刑”）（指出在 United States v. Litvak 案，3:13-CR-19 (D. Conn.（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）2014 年 7 月 23 日)中，首席法官 Janet C. Hall 判处一名证券欺诈被告人 24 个月监禁，尽管量刑前报告（PSR）中的《指南》建议刑期为 108 至 135 个月）。55\n\n参见 United States v. Litvak 案量刑程序庭审记录，3:13-CR-19 (D. Conn. 2014 年 7 月 23 日)（ECF 编号 298 第 135-136、141-47、158 页）。在 Litvak 案中，Hall 法官表达了对《指南》“损失”表“压倒”所有其他需考量因素的担忧。正如 Hall 法官进一步指出的那样，“我认为总罪行等级的 60% 仅归因于纯粹的金额，而完全不考虑罪行的任何其他特征。因此，我认为《指南》毫无帮助。”同上第 142 页。\n\n上诉后，Litvak 的定罪被部分推翻、部分撤销并被发回重审。United States v. Litvak 案，808 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015)。发回重审后，Litvak 接受了重新审理，并在证券欺诈罪名项上再次被定罪。2017 年 5 月 2 日，Hall 法官再次判处 Litvak 24 个月监禁。ECF 编号 542。\n\n同样，在 United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp.2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008)（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）案中，尽管咨询性的《联邦量刑指南》（Guidelines）建议判处终身监禁，法院因五名被告人参与一起涉案金额达 5 亿美元的欺诈案，分别对其判处一年零一天至四年不等的刑期。在 United States v. Hundley, 02-CR-441 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. 2005)（纽约南区联邦地区法院）案中，四名被告人在庭审中被裁定犯有共谋罪、银行欺诈罪（涉及约 1 亿美元损失）以及税务欺诈罪（逃税约 2900 万美元）。其中两名被告人还被裁定犯有作虚假陈述罪，一名被裁定犯有伪证罪。然而，Preska 法官对各被告人的量刑远低于其《量刑指南》建议幅度。例如，被裁定犯有作虚假陈述罪而非伪证罪的被告人，其面临的《量刑指南》幅度为 78 至 97 个月；他最终被判处一年零一天监禁。\n\n在 Adelson 案中——该案涉及一起上市公司财务造假案，经庭审定罪，造成股东损失达 2.6 亿美元；尽管《量刑指南》总罪行等级为 46 级（建议幅度为 360 个月至终身监禁），法院仍判处了 42 个月的监禁——Rakoff 法官详细阐述了《量刑指南》欺诈损失表缺乏底层合理依据的问题：\n正如许多人所指出的那样，《量刑指南》由于其算术化的方法，且为了表现出“客观”，往往对据称可量化的数额给予极大的权重，例如毒品案件中的毒品重量或欺诈案件中的经济损失金额，但却并未解释为何给予这些因素如此巨大的权重是合理的。参见 Kate Stith 与 Jose Cabranes 著，《Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts》（1998年），第 69 页。\n441 F.Supp.2d，第 509 页（强调为原文所加）。56\n此外，正如本案以及许多欺诈案件一样，当指控的“损失”金额超过 10 亿美元并附加了其他加重调整时，这些加重调整必然会发生重叠，因为高额的损失数据本身已经将这些加重情节涵盖在内。参见 United States v. Lauerson, 362 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2004)（第二巡回上诉法院）；United States v. Lauerson, 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003)；United States v. Jackson, 364 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2003)。例如，本案中的量刑前调查报告（PSR）依据 § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)（PSR ¶ 114）包含了因受害者超过十人而增加两级的加重调整，而这在现代金融欺诈案件中几乎是自动适用的。在 United States v. Dorvee, 604 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2010), 修正于 616 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2010) 案中，法院警告称，“几乎与所定罪行内在相伴”的《量刑指南》加重调整可能会不恰当地、不成比例地将《量刑指南》等级拉高至超出合理限度的程度，而在这种情况下，由于“机械恪守《量刑指南》”会导致“与 § 3553(a) 根本不相容”的结果，量刑法院可以通过分析 § 3553(a) 的其他法定考量因素来纠正这种失衡。604 F.3d，第 96 页。依据 § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B)（PSR ¶ 116）适用的“复杂洗钱”加重两级，以及依据 § 3B1.1(a)（PSR ¶ 118）适用的“涉及 5 名或以上参与者的犯罪活动的组织者或领导者”加重四级，同样属于此类情况。\n\n在欺诈案件量刑中，损失表占据主导地位缺乏实证依据，以及/或者缺乏关于“为何给予该表如此巨大权重是合理的”之解释，一直困扰着各级法院。在 United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013) 案中，Underhill 法官在其协同意见中指出：“损失指南……并非量刑委员会基于过去量刑实践数据采用实证方法制定的。”同上，第 379 页（Underhill 法官协同意见）；亦参见 United States v. Algahaim, 842 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 2016)（“这种在其他量刑体制中未曾谋面的做法，是委员会原本有权采取的，但其异乎寻常的特性构成了量刑法院有权考量的情形”）。\n\n事实上，损失指南存在着一个原生的、根本性的重大缺陷，削弱了其提供实证基础的能力：量刑委员会在计算欺诈案件在《量刑指南》实施前的“平均”刑期时，仅纳入了监禁刑，而排除了所有缓刑，从而导致《量刑指南》不仅严重偏向于监禁，而且偏向于更长的监禁刑期。参见 U.S. Sent'g Comm'n，《Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements》（1987年），表 1(a)，第 22、34 页，引至第 22、24 页（提及第 27 页的表 1(a)），见于 http\n\n这一疏漏绝非细枝末节，因为在 1984 年，近 40% 的被告人被判处纯缓刑。由于这种向监禁倾斜的原生偏差，“量刑委员会的损失加重数值并非源于关于如何使惩罚最契合罪行的任何理性判定，也绝非对罪行道德严重程度的任何近似评估。”United States v. Johnson, 2018 WL 1997975, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. April 27, 2018)（纽约东区联邦地区法院）。\n\n相反，“量刑委员会分配给各项量刑因素的数值，似乎更多是推测、心血来潮或抽象数字拼凑的产物，而非源自任何严谨的方法论——从而最大化了司法不公的风险。”United States v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp.2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 维持原判于 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014)。正如法院在 Gupta 案中所指出的，由于主要关注犯罪行为所造成的金钱收益或损失金额，量刑委员会“实际上无视了联邦量刑必须考虑诸多因素的法定要求，参见 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)，并且相反地，实际上确保了许多此类判决在表面上就是不合理的。”同上；亦参见 Johnson, 2018 WL 1997975, at *4（将损失加重定性为“严重的不公”，并指出“损失金额的僵硬性压倒了复杂金融犯罪的多样现实，[并且]缺乏对社会危险性的任何考量”）。\n\n评论界人士同样表达了保留意见。参见 Mark H. Allenbaugh 著，“Drawn from Nowhere: A Review of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's White-Collar Sentencing Guidelines and Loss Data,” 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 19, 22 (2013)；Jillian Hewitt 著，“Fifty Shades of Gray: Sentencing Trends in Major White-Collar Cases,” 125 Yale L. J. 1018, 1025 (2016)（得出结论认为，对 [United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)] 案后量刑数据的审查“从实证上印证了学界批评，即损失表往往极大地夸大了罪行的严重程度”）。\n\n事实上，一些人甚至称《量刑指南》在高损失案件中“彻底失灵”。参见 Frank O. Bowman, III 著，“Comment on Proposed Amendments to Economic Crime Guideline, § 2B.1.1,” 2015年2月19日，第 2 页（援引 Patti B. Saris 法官2015年1月9日的讲话，见于 htt meetings/20150109/Remarks.pdf）；亦参见《Shadow Sentencing》。\n\n因此，损失金额往往是“一种意外事故”，因而是一个“衡量道德严重程度……或威慑需求的相对微弱的指标。”Emmenegger, 329 F.Supp.2d，第 427 页。正如最高法院在 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) 案中所指示的，当量刑委员会在制定某项指南时未能依据《量刑指南》实施前的实证证据，以及/或者未能基于司法裁判和量刑数据进行审查与修订，或者当某项指南“未体现出委员会履行其特有机构职能”是由于委员会“未考量实证数据和全国经验”时，量刑法院完全可以认定该指南“即使在普通案件中也会导致超出实现 § 3553(a) 目的所必要限度的刑期”，并“可以纯粹基于政策考量偏离[《量刑指南》幅度]”。同上，第 101、109-110 页；亦参见 Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264-66 (2009)。57\n\n因此，在 Corsey 案中，Underhill 法官建议，“在这起拟图谋损失极高的案件中，该指南边际效用的低下，本应促使法院更多而非更少地依赖《量刑指南》之外的第 3553(a) 条法定考量因素。”723 F.3d，第 380 页。最高法院在 Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) 案中的判决进一步强化了本案无须给予司法尊重的结论；亦参见 Van Loon v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024)（第五巡回上诉法院）（将 Loper-Bright 案判例适用于外国资产控制办公室对《国际紧急经济权力法》法定语言的解释）。Corsey 案法院还指出，损失指南“存在根本性缺陷，特别是在损失金额攀升的情况下尤为明显。损失金额越高，该指南向量刑法官提供的建议就越扭曲。”同上。\n\n在本案中，指控的损失金额对 Guo 先生（郭文贵）的《量刑指南》等级所造成的扭曲影响，因确定准确可靠的损失金额方面存在的不确定性而进一步加剧。反过来，有关可核实损失金额的种种疑问，也强化了举行 Fatico 证据听证会的必要性。\n\n阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦（Albert Einstein）在另一个时代出于不同目的写下的一句观察——“并非所有能计算的都算数，也并非所有算数的都能被计算”——在本案中具有特殊的适用意义。一个人的生命以及衡量这一生命的尺度，绝不能被简单地归结为量刑表格上的一个方格，而这个方格仅仅是由“损失”表上同样机械化的定位所推动的。\n\n量刑不仅不是一门精确的科学，鉴于其本质上的人性维度，它根本就不是一门科学。相反，它是一个“流动且动态的过程”，Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008)，其目的在于作出合理的判决，既量体裁衣地契合具体案件的事实与被判刑的具体个人，又实现法律规定的惩罚目标，即施加“足够但不过度”的刑罚以实现 § 3553(a)(2) 所列明的各项宗旨。\n\n正如最高法院在 25 年前所提醒的那样，即使在《量刑指南》时代，“量刑法官的一贯传统[是]将每名被定罪者视为一个独立的个体，并将每起案件视为对人性弱点的独特个案审视，这些弱点有时会减轻、有时会加重罪行以及理应适用的惩罚。”Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)；亦参见 United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 182 (2d Cir. 2008)。\n\n在 Gupta 案——一起涉及内幕交易的股票欺诈案，被告人是一位位居全球经济财富与权力巅峰附近的金融巨头——中，Rakoff 法官重申了其此前在 Adelson 案中表达的担忧，即《量刑指南》的损失表在该案中对衡量恰当刑期产生了不成比例且脱离实际的影响。在评估与量刑相关的全盘因素时，Rakoff 法官就法院在量刑时的职责进行了哲学层面的审视：\n对一个同为人类的同胞施加刑罚是一项艰巨的责任。这要求法院以极大的审慎与敏感性，考量极其复杂的庞大事实与因素。认为这种复杂的分析以及道德责任，可以被简化为对人为分配给少数任意挑选的变量的小批数字进行机械相加，这种观念与常识背道而驰。苹果和橙子或许只有少数显著特征，但在人类与社会的互动中，人是极其复杂的，绝不能被当作商品对待，而试图这样做的企图只会导致离奇荒谬的结果。\n904 F. Supp.3d，第 350 页。\n\nRakoff 法官并未作出《量刑指南》（Guidelines）所规定的极重刑期判决，而是在 Gupta 案中判处被告两年监禁。Rakoff 法官所指出的若死板遵循《量刑指南》所导致的“该方法的不合理性”，在本案中同样存在，并且正如 Rakoff 法官在 Gupta 案中所认识到的那样，可能造成“以统一性之名，行最不合理的量刑差异之实”。同上引，第 351 页。\n\n因此，本法区（District）法院已多次确认，使《量刑指南》等级提高数个数量级的“损失金额”扭曲了量刑程序，需要通过加大对 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 其他量刑因素的考量来予以矫正。\n\n在本案中，审前调查报告（Presentence Investigation Report, 简称 PSR）中计算的针对“损失金额”的 30 级加重调整占了总罪行等级的一半以上。见 PSR ¶ 114。正如 Rakoff 法官在 Gupta 案中所评价的，“该［损失金额］是确定适当刑期的非常粗糙的替代指标”。904 F. Supp.3d at 351。\n\n因此，谨此恭敬提出，本法院应当与审理该问题的其他法院保持一致，行使其自由裁量权以纠正任何“损失金额”所带来的扭曲效应，并将重点转移至 § 3553(a) 的其他因素，以便如最高法院在 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) 一案中所建议的那样，“根据所呈现的事实作出个别化评估”。同上引，第 50 页。\n\n3. 对《量刑指南》其他加重情节的异议\n\n除对因损失而增加 30 个《量刑指南》等级提出异议外，Guo 先生（郭文贵）亦对以下加重情节提出异议。\n\nPSR ¶ 114：我们对针对 10 名或 10 名以上受害者增加 2 级的加重情节提出异议。除声称在 G 系列投资中亏损的 5 名证人外，没有任何证据表明存在任何其他受害者。\n\nPSR ¶ 114：我们对因涉嫌代表慈善、教育、宗教或政治组织或政府机构行事而增加 2 级的加重情节提出异议。法治基金（The Rule of Law Foundation, 简称 ROLF）与法治社会（Rule of Law Society, 简称 ROLS）均不存在任何欺诈行为。ROLF 与 ROLS 均为遵守非营利组织税收规定进行运营的非营利机构，拥有各自的领导层和员工。政府方传唤的证人作证称，每个实体都设有董事会，召开董事会会议并对各项计划进行表决，且 Guo 先生不是这两个董事会中任何一个的成员。因此，关于 Guo 先生代表慈善组织行事（特别是在涉嫌欺诈方案的背景下）的主张是毫无根据的。此外，正如庭审证词所反映的，ROLF 与 ROLS 在中国促进人权与民主，并援助希望逃离中国的中国公民。\n\nPSR ¶ 114：我们对因将欺诈方案转移或参与将其转移至另一管辖辖区以逃避执法或监管人员、且该罪行在其他方面涉及复杂手段以及被告故意参与或促成构成复杂手段之行为而增加 2 级的加重情节提出异议。G 系列实体具有跨国性质，而 Guo 先生是一名中国公民，其家庭与许多富裕家庭一样，在多个不同管辖辖区持有金融资产。没有任何证据支持关于选择任何商业实体或账户的地点是为了逃避执法或监管人员这一观点。这纯属推测。\n\nPSR ¶ 114：我们对因犯罪行为从一家或多家金融机构获取超过 100 万美元总收入而增加 2 级的加重情节提出异议。Guo 先生并未因该罪行而个人从任何金融机构获取超过 100 万美元的总收入。\n\nPSR ¶ 114：基于上述理由，以及我们对因损失金额增加 30 分提出的异议，我们对本段所计算的总基准罪行等级提出异议。\n\nPSR ¶ 116：我们依据 § 2S1.1(b)(3) 对“复杂洗钱”增加 2 级的加重情节提出异议，其理由与我们对将欺诈方案转移至另一管辖辖区之加重情节提出异议的理由基本相同。G 系列实体的多管辖区性质以及随之而来的对多个银行账户的使用，并未使本案中的行为构成“复杂洗钱”。所涉及的实体并非虚构，不存在空壳公司，亦不存在为了隐瞒目的而进行的交易分层。此外，如果适用了 § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A) 及 (C) 项下的复杂手段加重，则不得适用该加重情节，因为法院认为足以支持该加重情节的任何行为，均与可被认定支持本加重情节的行为相同，而 § 2S1.1 应用注释 5(B) 已明确排除此种结果。58\n\n58 《美国量刑指南》（U.S.S.G.）§ 2S1.1 应用注释 5(B) 规定：“如果适用第 (b)(3) 款，且构成适用于基础罪行的指南项下加重情节依据的行为，是适用本指南第 (b)(3) 款的唯一行为依据，则不适用本指南第 (b)(3) 款。”\n\nPSR ¶ 118：我们依据 § 3B1.1(a) 对作为犯罪活动的组织者或领导者增加 4 级的加重情节提出异议。尽管 Guo 先生是“爆料革命”（Whistleblower Movement）的领导者，但他并非任何犯罪活动的组织者或领导者。在这方面，我们指出，同案被告 Je（余建明）与 Wang（王雁平）对相关业务具有运营控制权并控制着相关银行账户。\n\nPSR ¶ 119：我们依据 § 3C1.1 对妨碍司法公正增加 2 级的加重情节提出异议。没有任何证据支持 PSR ¶ 110 中所列出的适用该加重情节的所谓理由。第一，没有证据表明 Guo 先生与他人合谋逃避适用法律，或对任何寻求退还资金的人进行报复。第二，支持者可能在 Mahwah 豪宅张贴的任何标语均不能归咎于 Guo 先生，认为此类标语构成妨碍司法的观点纯属胡乱推测。第三，关于 Guo 先生“及其共谋者”可能在 Guo 先生被捕当天点燃吞噬 Sherry-Netherland 公寓的火灾之暗示，基于后文所述理由，完全是荒谬绝伦的。第四，关于 Guo 先生“在其破产程序相关表格中说谎，其方式同样旨在阻挠本案调查”的说法，同样完全基于纯粹的推测。第五，没有证据支持 Guo 先生涉嫌参与所谓教唆政府证人 Ya Li 作出虚假声明以阻挠调查的行为。第六，同案被告 Wang 所采取的任何行为均不能归咎于 Guo 先生，且涉案行为似乎属于正常的商业活动。第七，没有任何证据表明 Guo 先生曾指示销毁证据。最后，就该加重情节基于“运动”支持者的任何抗议活动而言，该等活动不存在攻击性行为，未发生任何逮捕，且任何抗议活动均属于支持者受《第一修正案》（First Amendment）保护的言论自由。\n\nPSR ¶ 123：基于上述理由，我们对本段计算的总罪行等级提出异议。\n\nC. 对 PSR 的其他异议\n\n虽然为了量刑目的接受陪审团的裁决，但 Guo 先生不同意该裁决，并且除上述对《量刑指南》计算的异议外，提出并为上诉保留其对 PSR 中旨在指控或认定 Guo 先生犯有任何罪行、实施任何不当行为或违法行为、或企图、合谋或实施任何不当行为、欺诈、洗钱或妨碍司法，或对所谓的损失（更不用说 13 亿美元的金额）及同等金额的没收承担责任的任何段落的异议。\n\n这些总体异议适用于上文及下文所列的各项具体异议，以及 PSR 的第 25、26、29、33、47 和 50 段。\n\n¶ 24 涉案商业实体并非为了实施欺诈或犯下任何罪行而“设立”的虚构实体。每个实体都有员工工资册、公开运营、向客户及公众提供服务，且/或依照其商业使命运营。GETTR 持续作为社交媒体平台运营。它向公众开放。政府证人 Limarie Reyes 就向 G-Club 会员提供的福利以及该实体的日常业务运营进行了作证，包括为争取额外的会员福利而付出的巨大努力和差旅。关于法治社会（“ROLS”）和法治基金（“ROLF”），两个组织均未出售或推广销售证券，也均未挪用任何资金。\n\n¶ 27 Guo 先生并未与“约 500 个账户”或任何账户进行互动以隐瞒资金的非法来源。Guo 先生并未控制这些实体的银行账户；它们由同案被告 Je 和 Wang 控制。所有资金均非非法资金或非法所得。\n\n¶ 28 所有支出均是为了支持民主运动，并展示其财富与影响力的形象。基于陪审团对涉及 GTV 私募欺诈罪名的无罪裁决，向 Hayman Capital 汇出的 1 亿美元应予以剔除。¶ 28 中列出的具体物品系购买供支付这些物品费用的实体的客户或会员使用，且部分物品是在涉嫌欺诈期间之前购买和付款的。例如，Lady May 号游艇是在 2015 年 2 月使用来自 ACA 的家族资金购买的。此外，投资者和支持者并非“受害者”（因为他们并未被欺诈），且他们当中的许多人已作此声明。\n\n¶ 30 2015 年在纽约市购买公寓及其价格与本案无关，应予删除。Sherry-Netherland 公寓是在涉嫌欺诈期间之前数年购买的。至少应当在本段中增加该事实。\n\nGuo 先生亦对将 ROLF 和 ROLS 定性为“所谓”非营利组织提出异议。ROLF 和 ROLS 均为遵守非营利组织税收规定进行运营的非营利机构。\n\nGuo 先生对该段其余关于向投资者提供了虚假和重大误导性信息的指控提出异议。\n\n¶ 31 Guo 先生对本段中提及“方案”（scheme）提出异议。\n\n¶ 32 Yanping Wang 为民主运动工作，从未为 Miles Guo（郭文贵）管理任何资金。\n\n¶ 34 “所谓的”（purported）一词应予删除，因为陪审团对 GTV 罪名项的无罪裁决反映了其对 GTV 是一个以新闻为主、旨在推进民主运动目标的真实社交媒体平台这一事实的认可。\n\n¶ 35 “所谓的”一词应予删除。此外，政府证人 Limarie Reyes 作证称，G Club 由 Haoran He 拥有并控制，且财务决策由 Haoran He 批准。\n\n¶ 36 喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）及所提及的其他实体绝非“所谓”的实体，将其描述为由 Miles Guo“实质上拥有”和“控制”是不准确的。HEX 账户归各独立账户持有人所有。\n\n¶¶ 37-38 Miles Guo 并未表示他将使用自己的“个人”资金资助任何慈善机构。他表示他的家族基金会出资，且 ROLF 和 ROLS 的银行记录显示郭氏家族基金向 ROLF 捐赠了至少 500,000 美元。\n\n¶ 38 本段应予全段删除，因为其反映的是 Steve Bannon（斯蒂芬·班农）而非 Guo 先生所作的陈述。此外，Bannon 先生获酬担任 GTV 的顾问，而 Guo 先生在所有涉及 GTV 的行为上均已被判无罪。\n\n第 39 段 这两个组织均不存在所谓的“声称/据称”性质。ROLF（Rule of Law Foundation，法治基金）并未被用于宣传 Miles Guo（郭文贵）。正如庭审证言所反映的那样，ROLF 与 ROLS（Rule of Law Society，法治社会）旨在促进中国的人权与民主，并援助希望逃离中国的中国公民。\n\n捐赠的 N-95 口罩并未被寄往郭先生家中供其个人使用。对 Karen Maistrello（凯伦·迈斯特雷洛）的交叉询问明确表明，她并不在 ROLF 工作，完全缺乏依据来断言口罩被送到了郭先生家中。\n\n此外，N-95 口罩被捐赠给了 New York City（纽约市）的多家机构（包括酒店、NYPD（纽约市警察局）及医院），以及全美各地和中国的个人。即使在疫情期间有口罩被送至郭先生住所，这也与大多数组织的作法相符，这些组织均采取措施以确保其成员获得充分的病毒防护。对于民主运动而言，郭先生保持身体健康并能够继续开展公开活动是至关重要的。\n\n第 40-46 段 郭先生针对该行为已被判无罪。这些段落应当予以删除，或者至少应当反映该事实。\n\n第 48 段 载有“那些银行账户的关闭阻碍了郭、余及其共谋者向寻求投资 GTV 的受害者收取收益的能力”这一表述的句子应当予以删除，因为其所陈述的无非是政府的主观意见。此外，陪审团裁定郭先生所有与 GTV 相关的行为均为合法。另外，这些银行扣押发生于 GTV 这一私募完成之后，这意味着从逻辑上和形式要件上而言，账户关闭不可能阻碍投资者投资 GTV 私募的能力。\n\n第 49 段 本段的前两句应当予以删除。郭先生关于 GTV 市值为 20 亿美元的声明是正确的，事实上，这甚至低估了 GTV 的市场价值。政府获得了 Alvarez & Marsal Valuation Services, LLC（阿尔瓦雷斯与马萨尔估值服务有限责任公司）的一份评估报告，该报告确定 GTV 的企业价值范围在 14 亿美元至 26 亿美元之间。因此，指称郭“深知”“GTV 的市场价值远低于此，原因包括 GTV 是一家没有产生任何收入的新企业”的表述是不正确的。郭先生认为 GTV 的市场价值超过 20 亿美元，这得到了 Alvarez & Marsal 的专家估值的支持。这一点还进一步得到了 GTV 私募备忘录中对 GTV 价值计算的支持（该备忘录并非由郭先生撰写，且经由律师审核），以及 GTV 在一个月内以该估值筹集了近 5 亿美元这一事实的支持。辩方专家证人 Raymond Dragon（雷蒙德·德拉贡）在庭审中就这两项事实作证，指出这些是确定估值时应考量的项目，且该证言未受到反驳。\n\n第 51 段 “purported（所谓的/据称的）”一词应当予以删除。G Club（G俱乐部）是一项真实存在的业务，人们确实进行了购买。\n\n第 52-53 段 Limarie Reyes（利马丽·雷耶斯）就 G Club 提供的福利以及向 G Club 会员发放的数百万美元奖品出庭作证。雷耶斯女士还作证称，G Club 聘请了两家独立公司来规范管理 G Club 的抽奖派发活动。她的庭审证言与本段中包括“G Club 甚至未兑现其向参加比赛的会员提供的奖品”在内的陈述相矛盾。关于 BMW（宝马轿车），不存在任何欺诈证据，也没有任何支持 PSR（Presentence Investigation Report，量刑前调查报告）中此项叙述的证据或证言。\n\n郭先生并未经营或管理 G Club；他不是其首席执行官。此外，在 2021 年 3 月 8 日，全世界正处于疫情之中，许多公司因此面临业绩下滑的困扰。G Club 不是一家虚构的公司，这些事实也与郭文贵无关。\n\n第 54 段 William Je（余建明）发表的言论不应归咎于郭先生。此外，所提及的视频摘录应当包含郭先生在该日期的整场直播，而不仅仅是脱离语境的截取片段。\n\n第 55 段 庭审中没有任何证据表明郭文贵曾要求投资者购买多份 G Club 会员资格。\n\n庭审证人作证称，第 (a) 至 (f) 分项中指出的物品是为 G Club 会员的利益而购买的，并非为了郭先生的个人使用而购买。\n\n第 (a) 项所指的“游艇”在郭先生被捕前、以及在被 G Club 所有人 Haoran He（何浩然）出售前，均由 G Club 会员使用。出售该“游艇”所得的收益归于 G Club。\n\n关于第 (b) 分项所提及的 Lamborghini（兰博基尼跑车），一份政府证据显示郭先生在一则宣传视频中声明该兰博基尼是供 G Club 会员使用的。政府没有任何证据可以驳斥郭先生的声明。没有任何关于该车辆被个人使用的证据；事实上，郭文贵没有有效的驾驶执照，也不开车。此外，他的儿子被禁止进入美国，他的女儿和妻子也都不开车。\n\n第 (c) 分项所提及的 Bugatti（布加迪跑车）从未离开展厅，郭先生也从未收到过。\n\nFBI（Federal Bureau of Investigation，联邦调查局）特工在 SDNY（Southern District of New York，纽约南区联邦检察官办公室）检察官的指示下，假扮布加迪的买家与何浩然进行了“卧底”通话。何先生在不知情与卧底特工交谈的情况下，再三确认该布加迪及其出售所得的任何收益都将归 G Club 所有。这一证据未在庭上呈示。\n\nMahwah（马瓦）“豪宅”是供 G Club 会员使用、作为民主运动的秘密基地。虽然政府试图声称郭氏家族的每位成员在马瓦都有一处专属侧翼套房，但政府无法解释为什么在郭先生的儿子因美国政府拒绝其签证延期申请而被禁止前往美国的情况下，马瓦还会有一处留给“儿子”的套房。此外，当辩方试图引出此类证据时，政府提出了异议。\n\n辩方传唤的 Operation Fox Hunt（“猎狐行动”）专家 Paul Doran（保罗·多兰）证实了设立此类设施的必要性。双方当事人之间的约定书承认，郭先生是中国政府旨在使其噤声的广泛行动的目标，手段包括绑架、胁迫和人身骚扰。政府没有提出任何证据证明郭先生或其家属打算居住在马瓦。他们没有出示郭先生及其家属居住在马瓦的任何监控证据（他们曾对马瓦进行过监控）。存在一处给“儿子”的“套房”，明确表明这些名称仅仅是一种便于指代空间的称谓。郭先生的儿子被 ICE（Immigration and Customs Enforcement，美国移民与海关执法局）禁止进入美国，根本不可能使用美国任何住宅中的套房。当辩方试图在庭审中引出该证言时，政府提出了异议。\n\n政府也没有传唤 ICE 特工出庭作证以证明 Mileson Guo（郭强，儿子）进入美国的签证已被撤销。\n\n基于这些理由，第 55 段应当予以通篇删除，或对这些异议予以记录。\n\n第 56 段 “purported（所谓的/据称的）”一词应当予以删除。政府证人 Jesee Brown（杰西·布朗）和 Roberts（罗伯茨先生）作证称，Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）在区块链上发行了一种加密货币。辩方证人 Sklar（斯克拉女士，庭审中唯一出庭作证的加密货币专家）以及 Armino（阿米诺会计师事务所）作证称，HCN 是一种加密货币，且流通中的 HDO（喜马拉雅币）实际上是一种以货币为后盾、具有 1 比 1 价值的数字资产。进一步的记录反映，该加密货币进行了交易，人们通过买入、卖出或持有该加密货币赚到了钱。\n\n第 57 段 参见对第 56 段的答复。此外，政府证人杰西·布朗作证称，喜马拉雅交易所曾有购买黄金的计划。证人 Tom Bishop（汤姆·毕晓普）作证称，2022 年 3 月，喜马拉雅交易所向位于伦敦的黄金经纪商 Sharps Pixley（沙普斯·皮克斯利）支付了 500 万美元。布朗先生还作证称，喜马拉雅交易所由余建明所有并控制。因此，本段应当反映上述内容，并反映尽管郭先生知悉喜马拉雅交易所购买黄金的目标，但郭先生在发表相关声明时并不知晓该交易所已购买的黄金总量，且这些声明并非出于欺诈意图而作出。\n\n第 60 段 喜马拉雅交易所的所有人余建明的行为不应归咎于郭先生。没有呈示任何表明郭先生参与其中的证据。此外，政府掌握的信息表明，该车辆的拍卖方确实在喜马拉雅交易所开设并维持了一个钱包，确实收到了以 HDO 支付的购车款项，并且该 HDO 随后被兑换成了法定货币。本段具有误导性。\n\n第 61 段 喜马拉雅交易所白皮书公开刊载于其网站上，关于该交易所及其运作方式，该白皮书本身已说明一切。庭审中采纳的银行对账单表明，喜马拉雅交易所的客户能够将至少 7000 万美元的 HDO 兑换为法定货币（据信，兑换金额至少约为 2.68 亿美元）。政府证人、HDO 持有人 Ya Li（李雅）作证称，她成功将 HDO 兑换成了法定货币。\n\n第 62 段 本段应当予以删除，因为其涉及的是余先生所采取的行动而非郭先生。政府证人兼喜马拉雅交易所首席执行官杰西·布朗作证称，喜马拉雅交易所董事会审议并以全票赞成通过了发放该贷款的决定。布朗先生并未作证称郭先生参与了该项决定，且没有呈示任何证据显示郭先生参与其中。\n\n第 63 段 如本段所述，A10 项目于 2023 年 2 月启动，距郭先生被捕不到两个月，当时该项目的任何方面都尚未完成。不存在所谓的“计划/骗局”，也不存在虚假陈述。因此，陈述郭先生关于该项目的声明不真实是具有误导性的，因为一旦被拘留，他便无法采取任何行动来完成该项目。\n\n第 64 段 郭先生并未“控制”数百万美元的欺诈收益，也未“经常性转移资金”。该句应当予以删除。\n\n此外，第 64 段的第一句话并非事实陈述，而是读起来像是一篇政府的主张陈词，应当予以删除。没有任何关于郭先生为何申请破产的证据。该申请于 2022 年 2 月 15 日提交，这一事实在 PSR 中已作适当记录。\n\n此外，郭先生有权选择自己的生活方式，并享有其家族财富的支持，该财富在本案指控的行为发生前许多年便已存在。对于民主运动而言，财富意味着直面并对抗 CCP（中国共产党）的力量。“despite（尽管）”这一表述暗示郭先生出于不良目的申请破产，这属于辩论主张而非事实。\n\n同样，尽管“他控制着数亿美元的欺诈收益”这一措辞是毫无根据的，并不能推翻郭先生申请破产的事实。事实上，政府在这方面的论点削弱了其自身关于郭先生因需要资金而实施欺诈的理论。\n\n第 65 段 该部分应当仅引述经庭审笔录所支持的案件承办特工在法庭上的宣誓证言。\n\n第 66-79 段 政府关于郭先生及 GTV 私募的指控已被陪审团对罪名项 5、6 和 12 的无罪判决所否定。\n\n此外，Wang（王女士）知道或不知道什么与郭先生无关。因此，“王深知从 GTV 私募中筹集的资金不能投资于为亲属-1 的利益而设立的高风险对冲基金”这一表述是不相关的，且陪审团在对 GTV 相关罪名项作出无罪判决时已对此予以否定。这些段落中的大部分内容代表的是政府的推测而非事实。\n\n第 80 段 第 80 段的第一句应当予以保留，该段的其余部分应当予以删除，因为其描述的是余建明的行为。\n\n第 81 段 该段应当予以删除，因为其描述的是余建明的行为。\n\n第 82 段 所指的款项并非欺诈收益。\n\n¶ 83 本段应当澄清，PAX（太平洋商业联盟）是“声称”郭先生对该笔贷款提供了个人担保。此外，第二句之后的所有陈述均完全属于推测，应当予以删除。\n\n¶ 84 郭先生否认其隐匿资产，并对法院在 PAX 诉讼中的认定以及 Bankruptcy Court（破产法院）中的相关认定提出异议。\n\n¶ 85 郭先生对提交破产申请的日期没有异议。然而，他确实对本段的其余部分提出异议，因为那是论辩而非事实。此外，在郭先生最初的破产申报中，他声明其生活方式和所有个人开销均由其家族通过一家设在美国境外的历史悠久的家族基金支付。该事实包含在郭先生的破产申报中，应当予以载入以提供完整的全貌。\n\n¶ 86 我们反对使用“正式地”以及“郭氏企业”等用语。在 Trustee（破产受托人）将其出售之前，Mei Guo（郭美）是 Lady May（梅号游艇）的合法所有人。此外，“郭氏企业”一词是政府凭空捏造的，除 indictment（起诉书）外未见于任何地方。\n\n¶ 87 本段应当予以删除。首先，加密通信是在 WhatsApp 上的通信——这是一款在每部手机上均可下载的应用程序。它被全球各地的个人使用，并在通信中默认采用加密技术。\n\n其次，在郭先生的女儿与 Ms. Wang（王女士）就梅号游艇的所有权进行沟通期间，梅号游艇事实上登记在郭美名下，且已在她名下登记多年。它是在被指控的涉案欺诈期间之前购买的。第三，无论王女士据称进行了何种指使串通，更适宜反映在她的 PSR（判决前调查报告）中，而非此处。没有任何证据表明王女士关于梅号游艇所有权的陈述是受郭先生吩咐所作，或郭先生曾据此采取行动。\n\n¶ 88 第一句之后的内容应当予以删除。郭先生认为 CCP（中国共产党）有能力对每小时收费约 2,000 美元的破产受托人施加影响，鉴于中共在针对他的行动中能够招募诸如 DOJ（美国司法部）雇员 George Higginbotham（乔治·希金博瑟姆）以及其他知名专业人士等资源，这一看法是合理的。此外，郭先生的支持者享有第一宪法修正案的保护，并获准在法律范围内表达其观点。\n\n¶ 89 Miles Guo（郭文贵）认为，正如“Operation Fox Hunt（猎狐行动）”专家在庭审期间指出的那样，中共采取了许多类似做法来骚扰反对其目标的人士。郭先生没有理由相信 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）能够被劝阻，因为其决策受到了中共强迫投资者对郭先生提出虚假索赔的胁迫影响。\n\n¶ 90 PAX 诉讼紧随郭先生接受 Voice of America（美国之音）采访之后发生。我们对第 90 段的全部内容提出异议，但承认 PAX 赢得民事判决的第二句除外。此外，郭先生的支持者享有第一宪法修正案的保护，并获准在法律范围内表达其观点。\n\n另外，任何针对破产受托人、其家人或 SEC 的抗议均被视为合法行使第一宪法修正案权利。尽管报了警，但没有任何人被捕或被指控犯罪。受托人及其家人被执法人员告知并未违反任何法律。在针对 PAX 或受托人的抗议中，没有任何人被任何人打伤眼睛。此外，归咎于郭先生的“干得好”这一陈述，即便准确，也是一段完全脱离语境的节录。应当载入郭先生的完整陈述，以便为 PSR 中提及的任何“干得好”提供完整的背景语境。\n\n¶ 91 Mahwah（马瓦物业）并非使用欺诈收益购买。它是购买供 G Club（G会）会员使用的。脚注 6 仅仅是重复了第 91 段的正文，因不正确且重复应当予以删除。\n\n¶ 92 郭先生反对使用“一丝不苟地”来描述该搜查，认为该词缺乏事实支持，属于不必要且结论性的用语，且与 PSR 无关。搜查是否一丝不苟无需在此作出认定。关于“定制设计的 Brioni”西装，没有任何证据表明这些物品是使用欺诈收益购买的。\n\n¶ 93 我们反对任何关于 NFSC（新中国联邦）成员使用马瓦物业是“郭氏犯罪企业”之“延续”的暗示。在郭先生被捕后，新中国联邦成员对马瓦物业的使用既非首创，亦非刻意摆拍。若非政府扣押了马瓦物业，新中国联邦成员可能至今仍像过去一样在使用它，并本会纪念 2024 年和 2025 年的 June 4（六四），以纪念天安门广场大屠杀。据信，上一次此类纪念活动有多名美国国会议员、G会会员及社区领袖出席。\n\n¶ 95 郭先生被捕后，新中国联邦成员在马瓦场地内的行为（例如在马瓦的门旁悬挂小纸标语牌）不能正当地归咎于郭先生。没有任何证据表明郭先生指示了此类行为。由社区未知成员实施的行为不构成妨碍，亦不能正当地归咎于郭先生，应当从 PSR 中删除。\n\n¶¶ 96-97 这些行为与郭先生无关，应当予以删除。\n\n¶ 100 据信，检控官已与 William Je（余建明）的律师进行了交谈，后者告知他们余先生已拒绝自愿返回美国。\n\n¶ 101 郭先生对本段的全部内容提出异议。政府的观点应当反映在其量刑意见书中，而非反映在 PSR 中。PSR 应当包含 Probation Department（假释缓刑监督局）认定的事实以及记录在案的事实。在此还需指出，郭先生是 ROLS（法治社会）和 ROLF（法治基金）的发起人和推动者。每个实体均确立了自己的使命，并拥有自己的工作人员和董事会。政府传唤的证人作证称，每个实体均举行了董事会会议并对各项计划进行了表决，且郭先生不是任一董事会的成员。因此，关于郭先生代表慈善组织实施欺诈的主张是毫无根据的，应当予以删除。\n\n同样，郭先生在其破产程序过程中从未作出虚假陈述、采取欺诈行为或违反裁定。他于 2022 年 2 月 15 日申请破产，在该案中由律师代理，且该等程序仍在继续。因此，该段中对郭先生破产的提及应当予以删除。同样，郭先生否认政府对涉案犯罪活动、其涉案角色的定性，亦否认涉案计划被转移至另一司法管辖区以规避执法人员或监管官员，否认涉案罪行涉及复杂手段、超过 10 名涉案受害者以及 5 名或更多参与者，或者郭先生非法从金融机构收取了金额超过 100 万美元的总收入。\n\n¶ 102 应当要求政府详细说明其归咎于余建明的具体角色。其拒绝这样做显然是出于策略考虑，因为对余先生角色的准确描述将清楚表明，余先生从事了郭先生不知情且郭先生未参与的独立活动。例如，辩方证人 Leanne Li（李连）作证称，余先生及其在 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的工作人员拒绝按郭先生的要求准许其对交易所进行审计。同样，郭先生为查明该社区的所有资金而直接干预余先生以允许审计进行，也遭到了拒绝。这一证词清楚地表明了余先生在财务事宜及喜马拉雅交易所运作上的独立性。\n\n¶¶ 103-105 郭先生反对这些段落，认为其不具关联性；HEX（喜马拉雅交易所）是一个拥有自身领导层和架构的持续运营实体。此外，郭先生反对使用“郭氏企业业务”和“郭氏企业”等用语。这些术语是政府捏造的，除政府外，没有任何证词表明各商业实体被任何人称为“郭氏企业业务”或“郭氏企业”。\n\n第 103 段中的第二句在事实上是不正确的。自 2020 年起，在郭先生被捕之前，Qidong Xia（夏奇东）就是 Himalaya Alliance（喜马拉雅联盟）的领导人，由全球联盟委员会选举担任联盟秘书长。郭先生不可能“任命或宣布”夏奇东为“新”领导人。在郭先生被捕前发布的众多网络视频中，夏奇东均作为喜马拉雅联盟的领导人发言，这一事实支持了该论点。\n\n对于第 103 段所提及的通话，还有一些更进一步的背景。郭先生原定于 2023 年 3 月 17 日（即其被捕两天后）与来自 United Arab Emirates（阿拉伯联合酋长国）主权基金的高级代表举行会议。余建明与 Yanping Wang（王雁平）之间的聊天记录证实了与阿联酋代表举行本次会议的日程安排与协调。该会议旨在敲定阿联酋对喜马拉雅交易所的投资，以及阿联酋向喜马拉雅交易所发放政府牌照事宜。阿联酋原定发放一项银行牌照，允许喜马拉雅交易所和民主运动成员以欧元进行支付和交易。阿联酋主权基金的合作与投资无疑会提升喜马拉雅交易所及其加密货币的价值。郭先生在被捕后鼓励继续推进与阿联酋合作及谈判的努力，并继续申请阿联酋银行牌照，这是合法且正当的。\n\nPSR 第 104 段中暗示郭先生在任何通话中使用了“暗语”，这完全属于推测，该表述应当予以删除。\n\n更宽泛地说，郭先生向夏奇东作出的关于继续支持喜马拉雅联盟领导人以及保持海外运动各项持续运营良好运转的陈述，与民主运动是一致的，既非非法亦非妨碍。同样，郭先生就其被捕相关情况或商业谈判向自由战士同道作出的陈述并无不当，且与起诉书中的任何指控均无关联。\n\n最后，这些“狱中通话”没有一通表明受到郭文贵的控制。相反，它表明联盟拥有类似于独立组织的架构，并由具备相关能力的社区成员领导\n\n在其各自机构的运营中拥有“最终决定权”。提醒人们注意其对话正被录音属于常识，而非居心叵测。\n\n第 106-108 段：这些段落按目前的措辞必须予以删除，因为它们除包含政府在这些段落中关于郭先生引发火灾的推测与影射外，并未描述郭先生的任何行为。任何暗示或提出火灾是由郭先生在其已被羁押且处于隔绝状态期间引发的主张，均没有任何证据支持。此外，ATF（美国烟酒枪炮及爆炸物管理局）和 FBI（联邦调查局）均得出结论认为起火原因无法确定，且并无相反证据。同样不可忽视的是，起火时郭先生处于联邦执法人员的羁押之下，而在 FBI 搜查期间处于公寓内的另一名人士——某个人一（Individual-1）——也无法在现场随意走动。他也受到了限制，并处于 FBI 的严密监视之下。\n\n若保留这些段落，应补充以下信息：\n郭先生的被捕发生于 2023年3月15日。12名以上全副武装并配备无人机的 FBI 执法人员选择在清晨 6:00 通过服务电梯进入郭先生位于 Sherry-Netherland（雪梨荷属酒店）的公寓。郭先生的卧室与服务电梯相距甚远，且公寓内的所有当时人均在熟睡。郭先生被戴上手铐且不得离开。据我们所知从未就该问题接受过 FBI 询问的某个人一，也几乎同时被搜身并戴上手铐。对其人身及公寓的搜查未发现任何爆炸物或能够引发火灾的遥控装置。由政府独家持有和控制的公寓内闭路电视监控录像显示，某个人一未进行任何不法行为。FBI 与 DOJ（美国司法部）均未选择让其执法人员佩戴个人执法记录仪。正是 FBI 选择拔掉了公寓内的闭路电视监控摄像头，而这些摄像头本可以记录下他们在公寓期间所采取的行动。搜查的方式是由 FBI 选择的，而非 Miles Guo（郭文贵）。政府关于搜查的证据显示，墙板从墙上被扯下，露出了龙骨和电线；所有的拆除工作均是使用锋利金属工具进行的，且未咨询 New York Fire Department（纽约市消防局）。\n\n此外，火灾是在郭先生和某个人一被带离雪梨荷属酒店至少数小时后才发生的。在火灾发生前的数小时内以及火灾被扑灭后，现场仅留有执法人员，且仅有执法人员能够进入该公寓。\n\n这是一次有计划的逮捕；政府选择通过服务电梯进入，如今却对无人听到其要求进入的敲门声表示惊讶。逻辑表明，服务电梯位于公寓后部，设计上尽可能远离住户。\n\n由于该公寓最终被破产受托人（bankruptcy Trustee）扣押，辩方仅在现场被清理完毕很久之后才获得了有限的进入权限。因此，郭先生无法有效质疑 ATF 和消防局的结论；如前所述，ATF 得出的结论是起火原因无法确定。\n\n---\n\n第 107-108 段：这些段落及子段落与本案的争议焦点毫无关联，仅旨在助长政府关于郭先生以某种方式对火灾负有责任的毫无根据的影射。因此，应予删除。\n\n第 109、114 段：郭先生对这些段落中列出的调整及罪级提出异议。此外，双方已达成一致，认为在本案中进行赔偿（restitution）是不切实际的。参见 ECF 编号 785、789。\n\n第 110 段：本段缺乏审判证据支持，应予删除。若法院倾向于采信上述任何论点，郭先生请求举行 Fatico 听证会。\n\n第 114-123 段：在此重申前文针对第 88-97 段及第 101-114 段提出的异议。郭先生对这些段落中指出的各项调整与加重情节，以及第 120、123 段中列出的调整后罪级和总罪级提出异议。\n\n第 129 段：郭先生出生于中国吉林省，原名“Guo Wengui（郭文贵）”。\n\n第 130 段：为澄清事实，郭先生的兄弟是在警察前往郭先生办公室询问郭先生期间被警察开枪打中的，而非在天安门广场抗议活动期间。\n\n第 173-175 段：鉴于《量刑指南》的建议性质，郭先生符合判处缓刑（Probation）的条件。\n\n第 179-180 段：双方已达成一致，认为在本案中进行赔偿是不切实际的。参见 ECF 编号 785、789。\n\n第 181 段：没收（forfeiture）问题已成为双方提交书面意见的主题。参见 ECF 编号 799、803、804。政府持有和控制的资金与资产、GTV 资金（获无罪判决指控的行为）、给予投资者的退款和赎回款、受托人持有的犯罪所得以及其他款项，均必须从对郭先生作出的任何没收判决中予以抵扣。郭先生就本案任何没收裁定/命令的金额请求举行 Fatico 听证会。\n\nD. 来自美国量刑委员会及其他来源的数据统计分析表明，对郭先生判处低于《量刑指南》范围的刑罚符合当前对所定罪名行为的量刑判决，并将避免不合理的量刑差异\n\n来自 United States Sentencing Commission（美国量刑委员会）及其他来源的数据表明，对郭先生判处大幅低于适用《量刑指南》范围的刑罚，总体上符合本司法管辖区针对郭先生罪名行为的大多数判决。\n\n---\n\n下文的分析对照 PSR（量刑前报告）第 112-114 段，重点针对洗钱（适用 § 2S1.1）及欺诈/盗窃（适用 § 2B1.1）的定罪。尽管下文列出的上述各项罪名的数据存在差异，但它们仍明确指向一个方向：对郭先生的量刑应果断低于 PSR 中列出的建议《量刑指南》级别（对应于级别 43，对此我们提出异议，且犯罪前科类别为 I）。参见 PSR 第 114、126 段。\n\n1. 量刑委员会出版物及数据\n\n量刑委员会每季度发布一份题为《美国量刑委员会季度初步数据报告》的联邦量刑统计摘要。最新的季度数据载于《美国量刑委员会季度数据报告，第 4 季度发布，2025 财政年度初步数据，截至 2025年9月30日》（以下简称《2025 财年第 4 季度初步数据报告》），涵盖 2024年10月1日 至 2025年9月30日 期间作出的判决（以下简称“2025 年第 4 季度”）。59\n\n量刑委员会每年发布一份综合性的《联邦量刑统计资料源书》，最新一份包含 2024 财政年度的数据（以下简称《2024 年资料源书》）。该资料源书可查阅自 http sourcebooks/2024/2024_Sourcebook.pdf。\n\n可从量刑委员会公开信息中提取的第三类数据见于委员会 2019 至 2023 财政年度的“个人数据文件”。《2025 财年第 4 季度初步数据报告》可查阅自 http statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC_Quarter_Report_4th_FY25.pdf。以往的季度数据报告亦可在量刑委员会网站上查阅，网址为 http statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/。\n\n---\n\n2023 年的数据文件可从其网站下载。参见《美国量刑委员会数据文件》，网址为 http。\n\n有关联邦判决的数据总体表明，《量刑指南》在全国范围内约半数的判决中，以及在 SDNY（纽约南区）的绝大多数判决中，已不再构成主导因素。例如，在全国范围内，《2025 财年第 4 季度初步数据报告》显示，51.4% 的判决在《量刑指南》范围之内，仅有 0.4% 的判决高于《量刑指南》。见该报告第 14 页。\n\n更具体而言，在 Second Circuit（第二巡回区），仅有 31.3% 的判决在计算出的《量刑指南》范围之内；而在纽约南区，仅有 23.8% 的判决在建议的《量刑指南》范围之内，且没有任何法院基于向上偏离（upward departure）作出判决。同上。\n\n《2024 年资料源书》表明，2024 年在全国范围内，联邦法院中被判犯有洗钱罪的被告人平均被判处 54 个月监禁，中位数为 28 个月；被判犯有电汇欺诈罪的被告人平均被判处 21 个月监禁，中位数为 12 个月。参见《2024 年资料源书》表 15。\n\n对于犯罪前科类别为 I 的郭先生而言，洗钱罪的均值和中位数均低于总体平均水平，分别为 41 个月和 21 个月；欺诈/盗窃/侵占罪亦是如此，分别为 18 个月和 7 个月。同上，表 27。洗钱罪的刑期比量刑委员会赋予终身监禁刑期的 470 个月低 416 至 442 个月。参见同上，表 15 注 1。\n\n此外，即使是那些在适用的《量刑指南》范围内被判处洗钱罪刑罚的被告人，在 21.6% 的情况下被判处该范围的下半部分刑期，在 51.8% 的情况下被判处该范围的最低刑期。同上，表 34。同样，因欺诈罪被判刑的被告人在 53.4% 的情况下被判处最低范围刑期。同上。\n\n---\n\n《2025 财年第 4 季度初步数据报告》中的数据与此类似。2025 年全国洗钱罪的平均刑期为 61 个月，中位数为 30 个月。参见表 6（“按犯罪类型划分的刑期长度”），第 9 页。所作出的洗钱罪判决中，不到半数——即 28%——处于适用的《量刑指南》范围之内。参见表 10（“按犯罪类型划分的判处刑罚与量刑指南范围的关系”），第 17 页。\n\n在纽约南区，2024 年洗钱定罪的平均刑期为 34 个月，比全国平均水平少 20 个月。美国量刑委员会，《2024 财政年度统计信息包：纽约南区》，表 7，可查阅自 http statistics/state-district-circuit/2024/nys24.pdf。同样，纽约南区洗钱罪的中位刑期为 18 个月，比全国平均水平少 10 个月。同上，表 7。\n\n量刑委员会的“交互式数据文件”60 提供了审查“个人数据文件”的功能，为“对郭先生判处终身监禁将相对于当前判决产生不均衡结果”这一结论提供了进一步支持。交互式数据文件反映了跨越七年期间在纽约南区对处境相似的被告人所作出的判决。所选择的参数为：洗钱及欺诈犯罪类型，适用《量刑指南》§ 2B1.1，犯罪前科类别为 I，量刑区域 D，年龄在 51 至 60 岁之间的被告人，且在纽约南区管辖范围内。惯犯已被从该样本池中剔除。\n\n该画像共得出 183 份已作出的判决，平均刑期为 27 个月。事实上，56.3% 的被告人获得的刑期少于 2 年，仅有 2.2% 的被告人获得的刑期在 10 年至 15 年以下。\n美国量刑委员会的“交互式数据分析器”可查阅自：http\n\n---\n\n2. 司法量刑信息数据库（JSIN）\n\n另一个数据库——Judiciary Sentencing Information（司法量刑信息数据库，“JSIN”，可查阅自 http）——提供了针对一组特定标准的数据：即在 2020 至 2024 财政年度期间，在全国范围内被指定主要《量刑指南》条款为 § 2B1.1、最终罪级为 43（如前所述，该级别因不合理的 30 点“损失金额”加重而被严重夸大），且处于犯罪前科类别 I 的被告人。\n\n在全国属于该特定数据子集且未成为 § 5K1.1 动议对象的 31 名被告人中（占 2025 年第 4 季度期间全部 1,345 起联邦洗钱案件的极小一部分；参见《2025 财年第 4 季度初步数据报告》第 17 页 [表 10]），JSIN 报告称其平均刑期为 158 个月，中位数为 138 个月——比用于终身监禁的刑期长度少了 312 个月。\n\n3. 法院在拟定量刑时依赖数据\n\n法院在量刑时越来越认可并依赖这些数据。在 United States v. Singh, 877 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2017) 和 United States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2017) 案中，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）将统计比较作为确定刑罚是否构成不合理量刑差异的关键要素。事实上，在这两起案件中，法院均认定，对于处于同一 CHC（犯罪前科类别）且犯有相同罪行的人员，显著高于全国标准的判刑在实体上是不合理的。61\n其他法院在审查和拟定量刑时也依赖了统计数据。参见 United States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 631, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2012)（指出对于本案所涉及的此类罪行，该判刑是“迄今为止最长的”，这可能会影响发回重审时量刑的合理性）；United States v. Musgrave, 647 Fed. App’x 529, 538 (6th Cir. 2016)（量刑合理的部分原因在于地区法院“研究了全美以及 Southern District of Ohio（俄亥俄南区）的量刑统计数据”）；United States v. Buesing, 615 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2010)（维持部分通过分析量刑委员会统计数据得出的量刑）；United States v. Kamper, 860 F. Supp.2d 596, 608 (E.D. Tenn. 2012)（“委员会的统计工作对地区法院法官具有不可估量的价值”）；并参见 Alan Ellis 与 Mark Allenbaugh 所著《Unwarranted Disparity: Effectively Using Statistics in Federal Sentencing》，载于 101 Crim. L. Rptr. 71（2017年4月26日），网址见 http statistics-in-federal-sentencing.pdf。\n\n与平均刑期和中位数刑期的统计比较，也成为法院在根据 18 U.S.C. § 3582 提出的动议语境下审查先前判刑的一项特征，特别是当犯罪性质（通常为凶杀案）导致终身监禁时。例如，在 United States v. Russo, 643 F. Supp.3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) 案中，法院注意到依据认罪答辩作出的量刑与全国平均水平一致，而经过庭审后作出的量刑则更长，为此列举了一系列平均刑期具有指导意义并说明了这种差异的案件：\n例如参见 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 93 (2010) (Roberts, J. 协同意见)（指出不得假释的终身监禁判决“远比对被判犯有谋杀或过失杀人罪的人所作出的平均判决更为严厉，后者通常获得25年以下监禁”）；United States v. Qadar, No. 00 Cr. 603 [(ARR), 2021 WL 3087956, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2021)]（指出2020财年联邦谋杀罪的平均刑期约为21年）；United States v. Tellier, No. 92 Cr. 869 [(LGS), 2022 WL 1468381, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2022)]（指出根据美国量刑委员会的统计数据，在2015至2021财年，谋杀罪的监禁中位数刑期和长度为240个月，谋杀罪的平均刑期和监禁长度分别为262和263个月）。\n\n643 F. Supp.3d at 335-36；并参见 United States v. White, 96 Cr. 1123 (SHS), 2022 WL 18276933, at *4 (December 8, 2022)（引用 United States Sentencing Commission, Interactive Data Analyzer，网址见 http（查看于2022年12月8日））。\n\n4. 数据表明，在实践中《量刑指南》并非量刑时的首要决定因素\n\n上述数据表明，SDNY（纽约南区联邦地区法院）内部明确且普遍的做法是在《指南》范围之下量刑，而在适用的《指南》范围内量刑——尽管《指南》仍然是量刑的基准，参见 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 48, 56 (2007)——是相当有限的例外，而非普遍规则。因此，目前的规范是，法院在拟定“足以实现但不过度于实现”18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) 所列法定判决目的之刑罚时，认为《指南》以外的 § 3553(a) 因素更为重要。\n\n此外，被判犯有类似行为的被告在罪责程度、再犯风险、危险性以及法官现在必须考虑的其他差异方面可能各有不同。参见 Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 108（“偏离统一性是在某种程度上我们所采取的补救措施必然付出的代价”）。\n\nGuo 先生在上述每一个衡量基准上均表现良好。\n\n数据确凿地证明，对 Guo 先生处以远低于《指南》的量刑将与针对此类犯罪行为的多项其他判刑保持一致，而更长的刑期将造成 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) 所禁止的那种不合理差异。\n\nE. Guo 先生的病史及在 MDC 的治疗情况\n\nGuo 先生的病史载于附件 1 中，该附件系根据 1996 年《Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act（健康保险可携性与责任法案）》(HIPAA)（Public Law 104-191）的强制规定，为保持健康相关材料的保密性而谨此密封提交。\n\nF. Guo 先生在 MDC 最为暴力和混乱的时期承受了长达 37 个月的关押\n\nMDC 多年来一直是一个运转失灵的机构。如后附附件 14 所详述，MDC 一直饱受人员配置问题、暴力、维修与运营方面的设施物理问题、安全漏洞、领导层问题以及医疗和心理健康照护方面玩忽职守的困扰。\n\n本法院自然对该机构严重、多重且系统性的问题非常熟悉。参见 United States v. Segura-Genao, 18 Cr. 219 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. February 5, 2019) (ECF # 211) 庭审笔录。事实上，本法院在2019年视察了 MDC，随后举行了证据听证会，指出了目前依然存在且难以补救的诸多问题。同上。\n\n近期，在2025年2月的一次量刑程序中，本法院指出：\nMDC 的关押条件异常艰难。本辖区法院已经认识到，MDC 在向囚犯提供必要的医疗和心理健康治疗方面出了名地迟缓，在某些情况下甚至极其恶劣。该设施内的物理条件包括霉菌和受污染的饮用水。\n2025年2月25日量刑笔录，United States v. Alptunaer, 23-CR-188 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2023) (ECF No. 86 at 36)（引用 United States v. Chavez, 710 F.Supp. 3d 227, 234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)）。\n\n遗憾的是，自法院2019年对 MDC 进行检查以来，该设施的运转失灵在许多方面进一步恶化。正如法院所知，由于这些关押条件，SDNY 和 Eastern District of New York（纽约东区）的法院已常规性地缩短了它们原本会作出的刑期。该标准同样应当适用于 Guo 先生，他在 MDC 的关押期正值该机构一个尤为暴力、动荡且极度艰难的时期。\n\n附件 14 提供了由辩护律师准备的更新、全面的审查报告，描述了 Guo 先生在 MDC 被关押 37 个月期间的各项条件。\n\nG. BOP 在除 MDC Brooklyn 之外的多个运营层面均处于危机之中\n\nU.S. Bureau of Prisons（美国联邦监狱管理局，简称“BOP”）多年来一直处于危机之中，司法部监察长在过去二十年发布的详细报告中对此屡次记录。此外，如下文所述，当前的某些发展态势将加剧 BOP 所面临的问题，并不可避免地加剧其设施内被监禁人员所面临的问题。\n\nGuo 先生将面临 BOP 设施中不断恶化的条件。这种衰退既涉及物理基础设施，也涉及长期的人员配置不足。两者都危及像 Guo 先生这样的囚犯以及工作人员的健康与安全。关于 BOP 面临的危机及其令人沮丧的未来预兆的详细审查，见本文件所附附件 15。\n\nH. Guo 先生刑满后的相关问题\n\nGuo 先生在本案服刑期满后还将面临其他问题。这些问题在密封的附件 16 中予以说明。\n\nIII.\n财产刑罚\n\nA. 赔偿\n\n政府已根据 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3) 提出动议，请求作出认定在本案中实施赔偿不可行的命令。ECF No. 785 第 5 页。Guo 先生表示赞同。ECF No. 789 第 3 页。因此，不应下达赔偿命令。\n\nB. 没收\n\nGuo 先生已就没收问题提交了大量书面意见。参见 ECF Nos. 799, 804。若法院倾向于对 Guo 先生作出没收金钱判决，我们在作出任何此类命令前请求举行 Fatico 听证会。\n\nC. 罚金\n\n鉴于 Guo 先生拥有法院指定的辩护律师且有破产程序正在进行中，因其无支付能力，不应处以罚金。\n\n结论\n\nMiles Guo（郭文贵）是一个复杂的个体，这是一起复杂且独特的案件。基于本备忘录及所附附件中讨论的所有理由，以及辩护律师已经提供和即将提供的补充材料，郭文贵谨此基于其个人生活以及本案独特而复杂的事实，并在考量法院必须考量的所有量刑因素后主张，显著低于适用《指南》范围以及 PSR（判决前调查报告）中量刑建议的刑罚，将足以实现但不过度于实现量刑目的。\n\n日期：2026年3月20日\n纽约州纽约市\n\n谨此提交，\n\n/s/\nJohn F. Kaley\nDoar Rieck Kaley & Mack\n217 Broadway, Suite 707\nNew York, New York 10007\n电话：212-619-3730\n\n/s/\nJoshua L. Dratel\nLaw Offices of Dratel & Lewis\n29 Broadway, Suite 1412\nNew York, New York 10006\n电话：212-732-0707\n\n/s/\nMelinda Sarafa\nSARAFA ZELLAN PLLC\n43 West 43rd Street, Suite 370\nNew York, NY 10036\n电话：212-785-7575\n\n送达：\n全体辩护律师/诉讼代理人（通过 ECF）","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":36521,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-03-21 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-03-21","updated_at":"2026-08-23 08:42:39"}