{"id":"court_sdny_822_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":822,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2026-03-21","title":"SDNY ECF 822","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\n:\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n:\n:\nv.\n:\n23-CR-118 (AT)\n:\nMILES GUO,\n:\n:\nDefendant.\n:\n:\n- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x\nSENTENCING MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED\nON BEHALF OF MILES GUO\nJohn F. Kaley, Esq.\nDoar Rieck Kaley & Mack\n217 Broadway, Suite 707\nNew York, NY 10007\nTel: 212-619-373\nJoshua L. Dratel\nLaw Offices of Dratel & Lewis\n29 Broadway, Suite 1412\nNew York, New York 10006\nTel: 212-732-0707\nMelinda Sarafa\nSARAFA ZELLAN PLLC\n43 West 43rd Street, Suite 370\nNew York, NY 10036\nTel: 212-785-7575\nAttorneys  for Defendant Miles Guo\n\n---\n\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\n\nINTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 1\nI.\nMR. GUO’S PERSONAL BACKGROUND AND THE\nPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF THIS CASE ...................................................................................... 5\n\nA.\nMr. Guo’s Early Upbringing During the Cultural Revolution ........................................... 5\n\nB.\nThe Tiananmen Square Protests, Witnessing His Brother’s Death\nby Police Shooting, and Mr. Guo’s Political Imprisonment ............................................... 7\n\nC.\nMr. Guo Achieves Economic Prosperity, Forms Political Alliances,\nand Encounters Political Exposure .................................................................................... 8\n\nD.\nIncreasing Business Success and Friction with the Chinese Government ........................ 10\n\nE.\nMr. Guo Becomes a Prominent and Vocal Critic of the CCP from Abroad ..................... 13\n\nF.\nIntensification of CCP Targeting Following\nMr. Guo’s Relocation to the United States ....................................................................... 15\n\n1.\nINTERPOL Red Notice, Interference with VOA Interview,\nDirect Intimidation .............................................................................................. 16\n\n2.\nRecruitment of Influential U.S. Political and Business Figures\nto Lobby for Mr. Guo’s Repatriation to China .................................................... 17\n\n3.\nThe 912 Project – A Centrally Coordinated Operation\nto Discredit Mr. Guo Online ................................................................................ 20\n\n4.\nInterference with Mr. Guo’s Social Media Accounts ........................................... 23\n\n5.\nHacking Into Computer Systems of Mr. Guo’s Lawyers ...................................... 24\n\n6.\nWeaponizing the Civil Legal System with a False Rape Lawsuit ........................ 24\n\nG.\nThe CCP’s Targeting of Mr. Guo Converges with the Conduct in this Case ................... 25\n\nH.\nPolitical Conditions in the United States Set the Stage for a\nNew Administration to Turn Against Mr. Guo .................................................................. 32\n\nI.\nAffirmative Disavowal of Victim Status by Investors and Customers ............................... 34\n\nII.\nDETERMINING A SENTENCE THAT IS SUFFICIENT BUT NOT GREATER THAN\nNECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF SENTENCING .......................................... 38\n\nA.\nApplicable Sentencing Considerations ............................................................................. 38\n\nB.\nThe Sentencing Guidelines Calculations in the PSR are in Error .................................... 40\n\n---\n\nii\n\n1.\nNo “Loss Amount” Exists in this Case ................................................................ 41\n\na.\nThe Fundamental Legal Framework for Calculating “Loss Amount” ... 42\n\nb.\nThe Government’s Reliance Solely on Inflows to the\nG-Series Entities is Fundamentally Flawed ........................................... 43\n\nc.\nThe Government’s “Loss Amount” Improperly Includes Amounts\nAttributable to Conduct for Which Mr. Guo Was Acquitted ................... 45\n\nd.\nThe Government’s “Loss Amount” Fails to Account for the Volume of\nPurported “Victims” Who Affirmatively Deny They Are “Victims” ...... 45\n\ni.\nThe Himalaya Exchange ............................................................ 47\n\nii.\nThe Hamilton Petitioners ........................................................... 49\n\niii.\nThe Investors Who Have Either Filed Petitions Pursuant to 21\nU.S.C. § 853(n) or Written the Government Disclaiming Victim\nStatus ......................................................................................... 50\n\niv.\nThe Investors Who Have Contacted Defense Counsel ............... 51\n\nv.\nThe Unknown Number of Investors Who Deny They\nare Victims ................................................................................. 51\n\ne.\nThe Government Fails to Account for Other Offsets That Substantially\nReduce Any “Loss Amount” ................................................................... 52\n\nf.\nA Fatico Hearing is Consistent with the Court’s Rulings,\nand the Government’s Position, That in this Case “Speculation”\n and “Extrapolation” Based on Limited Investor Experience is\nInappropriate .......................................................................................... 54\n\n2.\nAdditional Legal Doctrine Supports a Finding of No Loss ................................. 55\n\na.\nAcquitted Conduct Cannot Be Used to Calculate\nMr. Guo’s Guidelines Level .................................................................... 56\n\ni.\nUsing Acquitted Conduct Here Would Violate Mr. Guo’s\nFifth and Sixth Amendment Rights ............................................. 57\n\nii.\nThe Impact of the 2024 Sentencing Guidelines Amendment ...... 58\n\niii.\nThe Reservations Expressed by Supreme Court Justices\nRegarding Use of Acquitted Conduct for Sentencing Purposes 60\n\nb.\nSpecific Legal Principles Significantly Reduce the\n“Loss Amount” in this Case ................................................................... 63\n\n---\n\niii\n\nc.\nMulti-Level Guidelines Enhancements Require\na Higher Burden of Proof ....................................................................... 66\n\nd.\nThe 30-Point Enhancement Pursuant to 2B1.1 Irrationally Influences\nMr. Guo’s Applicable Sentencing Guidelines Range ............................. 70\n\n3.\nObjections to Other Guidelines Enhancements ................................................... 79\n\nC.\nAdditional Objections to the PSR ..................................................................................... 82\n\nD.\nStatistical Analysis of Data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Other Sources\nDemonstrates that a Below-Guidelines Sentence for Mr. Guo Would be Consistent with\nCurrent Sentences for the Conduct of Conviction and Would Avoid Unwarranted\nSentence Disparities ......................................................................................................... 92\n\n1.\nSentencing Commission Publications and Data .................................................. 93\n\n2.\nJudiciary Sentencing Information Database (JSIN) ............................................ 96\n\n3.\nCourts Have Relied on Data in Fashioning Sentences ........................................ 96\n\n4.\nThe Data Establishes that in Practice the Guidelines are\nNot the Predominant Factor at Sentencing ......................................................... 97\n\nE.\nMr. Guo’s Medical History and Treatment at the MDC ................................................... 98\n\nF.\nMr. Guo Has Endured 37 Months’ Confinement at MDC\nDuring Its Most Violent and Chaotic Period .................................................................... 98\n\nG.\nThe BOP is in Crisis in Multiple Facets of its Operations Beyond MDC Brooklyn ......... 99\n\nH.\nIssues Following Conclusion of Mr. Guo’s Sentence ..................................................... 100\n\nIII.\nFINANCIAL PENALTIES .......................................................................................................... 100\n\nA.\nRestitution ....................................................................................................................... 100\n\nB.\nForfeiture ........................................................................................................................ 100\n\nC.\nFine ................................................................................................................................. 100\n\nCONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................... 101\n\n---\n\niv\n\nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES\nCases\nBlakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) ................................................................................ 60\nConnecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) ..................................................................................... 61\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 598 (2007) .............................................. 43, 82\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 48 (2007) .................................................................................. 101\nGriffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1992). ................................................................................ 63\nIn re GTV Media Group, Inc. et al., Order, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-20537 (Sept. 13, 2021)..... 35\nIn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) .............................................................................................. 60\nIrizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008) ............................................................................. 81\nJones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) ................................................................................ 62\nJones v. United States, 574 U.S. 948 (2014) ................................................................................ 64\nKimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) ................................................................... 79, 80\nKoon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) ............................................................................. 43, 81\nLoper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) ............................................................. 80\nMcClinton v. United States, 600 U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 2400 (2023) ............................................. 64\nNelson v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 890  (2010)............................................................................. 42\nPeople v. Beck, 939 N.W.2d 213 (Mich. 2019) ............................................................................ 61\nRita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) ................................................................................... 46\nRui Ma v. Guo Wengui et al., Sup Ct, NY County, Sept. 11, 2017, Index No. 158140/2017) ..... 29\nSEC v. Ho Wan Kwok et al., No. 23-CV-2200-PGG (SDNY, Mar. 15, 2023) ............................. 35\nSpears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261 (2009) ............................................................................... 80\nUnited  States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) ................................................... 75\nUnited States v. Adelson, 441 F.Supp.2d 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2006),\n aff’d 301 Fed. App’x. 93 (2d Cir. 2008) ............................................................................. 75, 77\nUnited States v. Algahaim, 842 F.3d 796 (2d Cir. 2016) .............................................................. 78\nUnited States v. Allen, 644 F. Supp.2d 422  (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ................................................ 72, 73\nUnited States v. Alptunaer, 23-CR-188 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2023) .............................. 5, 102\nUnited States v. Avenatti, 2024 WL 4553810 (9th Cir. October 23, 2024) ...................... 67, 68, 69\nUnited States v. Bai et al., No. 23-MJ-334-SJB (E.D.N.Y., April 6, 2023) ............... 17, 24, 26, 31\nUnited States v. Bell, 808 F. 3d 926 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .................................................................. 64\nUnited States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) ............................................................ 42, 61, 70, 79\nUnited States v. Buesing, 615 F.3d 971  (8th Cir. 2010 .............................................................. 100\nUnited States v. Byors, 586 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2009) .............................................................. 66, 67\nUnited States v. Canania, 532 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2008) ........................................................ 62, 65\nUnited States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) ................................................. 43\nUnited States v. Chavez, 710 F.Supp. 3d 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2024 ................................................... 102\nUnited States v. Coleman, 138 F.4th 489, 511-512 (7th Cir.),\n cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 275 (2025) ........................................................................................... 65\nUnited States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1992) .................................................... 71, 72\n\n---\n\nv\n\nUnited States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008), ............................................................. 67\nUnited States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2000) ........................................... 71, 72\nUnited States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013) ...................................................... 77, 78, 80\nUnited States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005) .................................................................. 42\nUnited States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 1997) ............................................................. 47\nUnited States v. Dorvee, 604 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2010),\n amended 616 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 76\nUnited States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ......................................... 75\nUnited States v. Faibish, No. 12-CR-265 (E.D.N.Y., March 10, 2016) ....................................... 76\nUnited States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978) ............................................................... 8, 46\nUnited States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp.2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008 .................................................. 76\nUnited States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391 (2d Cir. 1994) ....................................................................... 66\nUnited States v. Gagarin, 950 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2020) ............................................................... 69\nUnited States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996) .................................................................... 71\nUnited States v. Gupta, 904 F. Supp.2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012),\n aff’d, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014) ................................................................................ 78, 79, 82\nUnited States v. Hundley, 02-CR- 441 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ................................................... 76\nUnited States v. Jackson, 364 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2003) .................................................................. 77\nUnited States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181 (2d Cir. 2017) ............................................................... 100\nUnited States v. Johnson, 2018 WL 1997975 (E.D.N.Y. April 27, 2018).................................... 78\nUnited States v. Johnson, 754 F. Supp.3d 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) .................................................. 66\nUnited States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2008) ........................................................ 43, 73, 81\nUnited States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2007) ..................................................................... 72\nUnited States v. Kamper, 860 F. Supp.2d 596 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) ........................................ 66, 100\nUnited States v. Lauerson, 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003) .............................................................. 77\nUnited States v. Lauerson, 362 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2004) .............................................................. 77\nUnited States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83 (2d Cir.2008) ................................................................... 67\nUnited States v. Litvak, 3:13-CR-19 (D. Conn. July 23, 2014) .................................................... 76\nUnited States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993) ................................................................. 49\nUnited States v. Musgrave, 647 Fed. App’x 529 (6th Cir. 2016) ............................................... 100\nUnited States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024) ........................................................ 69, 70\nUnited States v. Russo, 643 F. Supp.3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2022).................................................... 100\nUnited States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F. 3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2014) ............................................. 64\nUnited States v. Salazar, 489 F.3d 555 (2d Cir. 2007) ................................................................. 73\nUnited States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555(7th Cir.1991) .............................................................. 68\nUnited States v. Segura-Genao, 18 Cr. 219 (AT) (S.D.N.Y. February 5, 2019) ........................ 102\nUnited States v. Settles, 530 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ............................................................... 62\nUnited States v. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1997) .............................................................. 73\nUnited States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.2004) ..................................................................... 68\nUnited States v. Singh, 877 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2017) .................................................................. 100\n\n---\n\nvi\n\nUnited States v. Stephen A. Wynn, No. 22-CV-1372 (D.D.C., May 17, 2022)................. 21, 22, 23\nUnited States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 631(6th Cir. 2012)................................................................... 100\nUnited States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518 (2d Cir. 2005) ................................................................. 72\nUnited States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam ............................................................ 60\nUnited States v. White, 551 F.3d 381(6th Cir. 2008) .................................................................... 61\nUnited States v. White, 96 Cr. 1123 (SHS), 2022 WL 18276933 (December 8, 2022) .............. 101\nUnited States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2008) .......................................................... 73, 74\nVan Loon v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024) .............................................. 80\n\nStatutes\n15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) ......................................................................................................................... 60\n18 U.S.C. § 2 ................................................................................................................................. 60\n18 U.S.C. § 1343 ........................................................................................................................... 60\n18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) ...................................................................................................................... 63\n18 U.S.C. § 1957 ........................................................................................................................... 60\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ............................................................................................................... passim\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) ........................................................................................................... passim\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) ............................................................................................................ 8, 101\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) ................................................................................................................. 42\n18 U.S.C. § 3582 ......................................................................................................................... 100\n18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3) ............................................................................................................. 103\n21 U.S.C. § 853 ............................................................................................................................. 53\n21 U.S.C. § 853(n) ................................................................................................................. passim\n\nOther Authorities\nU.S.S.G. §1B1.3 ............................................................................................................................ 62\nU.S.S.G. §1B1.3(c) ....................................................................................................................... 62\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 .................................................................................................................... passim\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1) ................................................................................................................. 47\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) ............................................................................................................ 77\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10) ............................................................................................................... 84\nU.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) ............................................................................................................ 77\nU.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) .................................................................................................................. 84\nU.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) ................................................................................................................ 77, 84\nU.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 ........................................................................................................................... 84\nU.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. ......................................................................................................................... 99\nU.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 .......................................................................................................................... 73\n\n---\n\nINTRODUCTION\n\nThis sentencing submission is respectfully submitted on behalf of defendant Miles Guo.\nFor the reasons set forth below, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should impose a sentence\ndramatically below the applicable Guidelines level, which would constitute a sentence “sufficient,\nbut not greater than necessary” to achieve the objectives of sentencing enumerated in 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3553(a)(2).\nAs this Court has recognized,\nIf there ever is a day in a person's life when [he] is entitled to be judged on the basis\nof the entirety of [his] background [and] contributions, it is at sentencing, and\nSection 3553(a), in directing the Court to consider the history and characteristics of\nthe offender, is consistent with that.\nTranscript of February 18, 2025, Proceedings, United States v. Alptunaer, 23-CR-188 (AT)\n(S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2023) (ECF No. 85 at 37).\nThat conception of sentencing, encompassing a defendant’s positive qualities balanced\nagainst the offense conduct, is particularly pertinent here, because, as detailed below, Mr. Guo’s\nnumerous admirable qualities and important, estimable accomplishments, clearly outweigh the\noffense conduct by an overwhelming margin.\nCertainly an examination of Mr. Guo’s multidimensional life experience and sacrifices,\nbeyond what was presented at trial, demonstrate that he is not defined by the offense conduct, or\nby a simple, single narrative. As detailed herein, his early personal history, from his family’s\npolitical ostracism during China’s Cultural Revolution, through his arrest in connection with the\nprotests culminating in the Tiananmen Square massacre, and his subsequent detention and torture,\nis as compelling and defining as his subsequent phenomenal success in business as private\nenterprise in China began to flourish.\n\n---\n\n2\n\nMr. Guo’s contributions to the aspirations of his Chinese compatriots is unrivaled, as is his\ncommitment to a better future for his country. Recognizing the importance of economic resources\nto building the infrastructure of a diaspora political movement, he has built and dedicated a\nfinancial fortune, and the public profile that has afforded him, toward that singular objective which\nhe has pursued with the utmost vigor for decades.\n\nIn return, Mr. Guo has endured persecution from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”)\nand its ruling Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) on a grand, pervasive, and life-threatening scale.\nAs discussed herein, those unrelenting, multifaceted attacks included recruitment of U.S. elites in\nbusiness, entertainment, and politics to conspire against Mr. Guo, and have contributed tangibly\nto the allegations in this case.1 In fact, as set forth below, the CCP engaged in a saturation social\nmedia campaign to discredit Mr. Guo, and compelled investors to file with U.S. law enforcement\nauthorities and media outlets false complaints against Mr. Guo.\nIn light of that indisputable evidence, a lengthy prison term herein would only validate the\nCCP’s campaign against Mr. Guo, seriously undermine his and his supporters’ objectives for China\n– which align entirely with U.S. interests – and embolden further efforts to eliminate Chinese\ndissidents from public life.\n\nAnother critical factor in this sentencing is the Guidelines calculation and, in particular,\ndetermination of the “loss amount.” Indeed, there is no “loss amount,” and the jury’s verdict does\nnot establish any. Additionally, as detailed below, and explained in prior submissions regarding\n\n1 Mr. Guo, as he must, acknowledges the jury’s verdict for purposes of sentencing. The\npositions set forth herein do not challenge that verdict, but instead are directed at specific issues\nrelevant to sentencing, and should not be regarded otherwise.\n\n---\n\n3\n\nforfeiture (see ECF Nos. 799, 804), the circumstances of this case are novel, if not entirely unique\nin that so many investors in and customers of the entities involved in this case affirmatively reject\nthe contention that they have been victimized by Mr. Guo.\n\nIndeed, a significant number of sophisticated investors, comprising two separate groups,\nand represented by counsel, insist the actions of the Government, and not Mr. Guo, have\njeopardized the value of their investments (and investment assets, such as the Himalaya Exchange\ncryptocurrency). In addition, hundreds of individuals have petitioned the Court, or contacted the\nGovernment and/or defense counsel directly, disclaiming victim status and instead seeking return\nof their seized investment property.\n\nThe Government’s alleged “loss amount” consists of pure speculation, is unsupported by\nany reliable evidence, and is directly contradicted by the unprecedented legion of investors and\ncustomers who deny that Mr. Guo defrauded them. There are also offsets – redemptions, refunds,\nsettlement payments, double counting, and assets of residual value still possessed by investors –\nthat the Government ignores as well, but which should be taken into account under the law\ngoverning “loss amount.”\n\nThere are additional facts and legal principles which undermine the Government’s\npurported “loss amount.” The Government and Probation, as set foth in the Presentence Report\n(“PSR”) would include acquitted conduct in calculating loss, which the Fifth and Sixth\nAmendments, as well as a 2024 amendment to the Guidelines (effective after preparation of the\nPSR), do not permit..\n\nAlso, pursuant to longstanding Second Circuit instruction, the extent of the “loss amount”\nenhancement – a staggering 30 points – requires that the Government prove any alleged “loss\n\n---\n\n4\n\namount” by a more demanding standard of proof than mere preponderance of the evidence. The\nGovernment cannot meet that burden.\n\nIn that context, Mr. Guo seeks an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to United States v. Fatico,\n579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978), to resolve any and all disputed issues of fact with respect to the\nalleged “loss amount,” other Guidelines enhancements to which Mr. Guo objects, and any other\ncontested factual issues relevant to sentencing.\n\nCourts have also repeatedly recognized that the “loss amount” in financial offense cases\ndrive the Guidelines range to an inordinate, unfair, and irrational extent. Consequently, those\ncourts have relied on other § 3553(a) considerations to correct the disproportionate impact of “loss\namount” enhancements that artificially increase a sentence by multipliers.\n\nThat recognition accounts for the mean and median sentences imposed in fraud cases,\nwhich, as the statistical analysis discussed herein establishes, are considerably below the\nGuidelines level in this case, and which more accurately, and fairly, represent an appropriate\nsentence here, while avoiding the unwarranted disparities proscribed by § 3553(a)(6).\n\nThree other factors relevant to Mr. Guo’s sentence have traditionally mitigated terms of\nimprisonment demonstrably in this District:  (1) the grueling 37 months Mr. Guo has been confined\nat the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”), including the two most violent and chaotic years\nin that facility’s history; (2) the substandard and continually deteriorating conditions within the\nU.S. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) system where he would be confined to serve any additional term\nof imprisonment; and (3) considerations relevant to conditions Mr. Guo is likely to encounter once\nhe completes his sentence. Discussion of these elements is augmented by separate, detailed\nexhibits  appended to this submission.\n\n---\n\n5\n\nAccordingly, it is respectfully submitted that examination and evaluation of all of the\nsentencing factors listed in § 3553(a) compels the conclusion that only a sentence dramatically\nbelow the applicable Guidelines range would satisfy § 3553(a)’s directive that the Court impose a\nsentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the purposes of sentencing set forth\nin § 3553(a)(2).\nI.\nMR. GUO’S PERSONAL BACKGROUND AND THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF\nTHIS CASE\n\nThis case cannot be understood, and Mr. Guo cannot be fairly sentenced, without a full\nappreciation of the personal, historical, and political context in which the events leading up to this\nday unfolded. By no means is this a routine case, and by no means is Mr. Guo a typical defendant.\nHis personal background, the political and economic conditions that motivated him and fueled\npublic interest in his Whistleblower Movement, the CCP’s relentless and overwhelmingly\npowerful targeting of him – which has reached fruition in the jury’s verdict in this case – and even\ndomestic political affairs in the United States all combined to create the conditions in which the\nunderlying conduct and this prosecution occurred, and the lens through which it must be viewed.\nA. Mr. Guo’s Early Upbringing During the Cultural Revolution\n\nGuo Wengui (郭文贵), also known by the Cantonese name Ho Wan Kwok (郭浩云) and\nthe English name Miles Guo,2 was born in 1968 in Jilin, a northeastern province of the People’s\nRepublic of China (“PRC”) bordering North Korea and Russia. He was the seventh of eight\nbrothers born to his father, a miner, and his mother, a homemaker. PSR ¶ 129.\n\n2 The Chinese surnames Guo and Kwok are represented by the same Chinese character (郭)\nbut have different pronunciations and Romanization. Mr. Guo’s birth name is Guo Wengui (郭文\n贵). He adopted the given name Ho Wan (浩云, literally, “noble cloud”) in 2000 when he obtained\na Hong Kong passport (see PSR ¶ 137). He began using the English name Miles, an homage to\nmusician Miles Davis, in 1991 during travels in the United States and Europe to facilitate\ninteractions with Westerners unfamiliar with Chinese names.\n\n---\n\n6\n\nMr. Guo’s early life was not one of privilege or abundance. He was born two years into the\nCultural Revolution launched in May 1966 by Mao Zedong, which lasted until Mao’s death in\n1976 and during which Mr. Guo’s parents were viewed as enemies of the state. As such, they were\ntreated essentially as exiles in the mountains of Jilin Province where they struggled to provide for\ntheir eight children. During Mr. Guo’s childhood, the family lived in a one-room shack with a dirt\nfloor, no electricity, and no indoor plumbing. PSR ¶ 131. He typically ate one meal per day. Id.\nThese conditions were not uncommon in China at that time, particularly for those ostracized as\nenemies of the ruling Communist Party.\n\nMr. Guo attended the local public primary school, Northeastern Nickel Mine School, from\nwhich he graduated in July 1979. PSR ¶ 150. The family thereafter moved to Shandong Province,\na coastal province on the Yellow Sea located between Beijing and Shanghai, where Mr. Guo\nattended the local public middle school, Gu Cheng #3. He quit school in July 1984, at age 15, in\norder to earn money and help support his family. Id.\n\nAs a child Mr. Guo witnessed his parents and brothers suffer at the hands of the CCP due\nto his father’s support for democracy. PSR ¶ 132. His father was at times physically beaten, his\nbrothers were beaten and stabbed by CCP supporters while trying to help their father, and his father\nwould often go into hiding from the CCP for days at a time. Id. Amidst this trauma, Mr. Guo’s\nmother suffered a breakdown, at times also disappearing for multiple days and leaving Mr. Guo\nand his brothers to fend for themselves. Id. These experiences, along with the CCP’s prohibition\non any public expression of the family’s Buddhist faith, left an early and indelible impression on\nMr. Guo of state-sponsored oppression and injustice. Id.\n\nStill in his teens, Mr. Guo married Hing Chi Ngok, the younger sister of a childhood friend,\nin Shandong Province in 1985. PSR ¶ 133. The union was officially registered in 1987, and the\n\n---\n\n7\n\ncouple remain married to this day. They have two children born during the late 1980s, a son named\nQiang and a daughter named Mei. PSR ¶ 134.\nB. The Tiananmen Square Protests, Witnessing His Brother’s Death by Police\nShooting, and Mr. Guo’s Political Imprisonment\n\nBy 1989, when Mr. Guo was approximately 20 years old, he and his wife were living with\ntheir son and newborn daughter in Puyang City, Henan Province, when the upheaval that spring in\nBeijing’s Tiananmen Square profoundly altered their lives. In April, following the death of former\nCCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang – revered by many and reviled by others for his economic\nand political reforms – tens of thousands of students began gathering in Beijing’s Tiananmen\nSquare to honor Hu’s legacy and demand pro-democracy reform.\nIn support of the demonstrators, Mr. Guo sold his motorcycle and donated the proceeds to\nthe student protestors. Two police officers subsequently visited him at his office in Puyang, where\nhis wife, infant daughter, and younger brother were at the time, for questioning. At one point an\nofficer pointed a gun at Mr. Guo, prompting his 17-year-old brother, Guo Wenbin, to jump in front\nof the officer. The officer shot Wenbin in the arm and leg, then arrested both brothers. Wenbin\nwas denied medical treatment and died of his wounds, while Mr. Guo was imprisoned and charged\nwith inciting counter-revolutionary activities.\nMr. Guo spent the next 22 months detained in a facility for political prisoners. He was\nbeaten and tortured both physically and psychologically, including witnessing the execution of\nmore than 50 prisoners. PSR ¶ 127. These experiences, combined with the death of his brother and\nthe abuses he witnessed as a child during the Cultural Revolution, solidified his resolve to fight\ngovernment oppression and corruption.\n\n---\n\n8\n\nC. Mr. Guo Achieves Economic Prosperity, Forms Political Alliances, and\nEncounters Political Exposure\nMr. Guo’s real estate development career began following his release from detention in\n1991. PSR ¶ 154. Mr. Guo understood that he needed a certain measure of personal success and\ninfluence in order to be an effective advocate for government reform. The 1990s were a period of\nrapid economic expansion in China as capital markets were established, private sector enterprises\nmultiplied and grew, and state-controlled sectors gradually reduced their share of national output.\nIn this environment, Mr. Guo and his family built a thriving commercial enterprise, beginning with\nthe development of a high-end commercial complex in Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan Province.\nThe crown jewel of the family’s real estate empire ultimately was Pangu Plaza, a mixed-\nuse complex planned in conjunction with Beijing’s preparation to host the 2008 Summer Olympics.\nConsisting of five separate towers incorporating a hotel, offices, residential and retail space, Pangu\nPlaza was situated next to the National Stadium (“Bird’s Nest”) and enjoyed high visibility during\nthe 2008 Olympic Games. Mr. Guo’s family company had purchased the property in 1999, and\nbenefited from its substantial increase in value in connection with Beijing’s hosting of the 2008\nSummer Olympic Games. Pangu Plaza became a hub for VIP guests, including a host of foreign\ndignitaries who circulated through the hotel over a period of several years, and Mr. Guo made\nconnections around the globe at the highest levels of government and business.\nTheir success in real estate development enabled Mr. Guo and his family to expand their\nbusiness activities into various investments, propelling them to extraordinary wealth. See PSR ¶\n154. His phenomenal business success also gave Mr. Guo greater and greater access to elite\npolitical circles and more insight into political corruption among some of the highest officials of\nthe Chinese government, as well as officials visiting from abroad.\n\n---\n\n9\n\nIn 2000, notwithstanding the business success he enjoyed, Mr. Guo continued to view the\nChinese government as fundamentally corrupt. That year, as an initial step toward distancing\nhimself from his home country and its central government regime, Mr. Guo obtained a Hong Kong\npassport in the name of Ho Wan Kwok. See PSR ¶ 137.\nIn 2003, Mr. Guo blew the whistle on the corrupt activities of a prominent Beijing city\nofficial. This resulted in officials from the Ministry of State Security (“MSS”), the preeminent\ncivilian intelligence agency in China, approaching Mr. Guo for additional information and\ncooperation, which he provided.\nThe fallout from Mr. Guo’s exposure of that official, however, was significant and\nenduring. In September 2004, then age 36 with two teenagers at home, Mr. Guo was arrested by\ndozens of police officers upon his arrival at the Beijing Airport. They took him to a hotel where\nhe was detained for 15 days. He was interrogated, beaten, and tortured in myriad ways. He was\ndeprived of sleep as officers took shifts watching him, using pepper spray to jolt him awake if he\nnodded off. He was forced to stand for long periods of time, causing his legs to swell up from the\npressure. He was hung upside down and beaten. Officers cut his hair, put it in a plastic bag, and\nplaced the bag over his head so he was forced to breathe in the tiny particles. He was stabbed in\nthe back with a corkscrew.3\nThe officers detaining Mr. Guo repeatedly ordered him to stop exposing the corruption of\nChinese government officials, which he refused to do. They asked him whether he had bribed the\n\n3 In describing Mr. Guo’s physical condition in the PSR, the Probation Officer wrote that “Guo\nexhibited various scars and disfigurements as a result of the physical torture he experienced while\nimprisoned in his native China, as well as subsequent surgeries and operations which he underwent\nbetween 1993 and 2022, that were required to repair residual injuries.” PSR ¶ 141. Mr. Guo’s\nmedical condition – both physical and mental – are addressed in more detail in Exhibit 1, submitted\nto the Court under seal.\n\n---\n\nmayor of Zhengzhou, where his first commercial development was located, and he trnthfully\nreplied that he had not. They demanded to know if he was spying for the United States, and he\ntrnthfully replied that he was not. After 15 days they took him to a hospital where he remained for\nthree days before being released to his home.\nNot\nsmprisingly, his relationship with certain U.S. officials in China invited scrntiny and suspicion by\nthe CCP that he was spying on behalf of the United States.\nfu approximately 2006, Mr. Guo developed a relationship with China's Deputy Minister of\nState Secmity, who was responsible for, among other things, domestic anti-conuption effo1ts and\nforeign intelligence collection. This Deputy Minister offered Mr. Guo a measure of protection\nagainst the local official seeking revenge for Mr. Guo's exposure of conuption, while also enabling\nMr. Guo to gain deeper insight into the workings of the highest levels of the CCP.\nD. Increasing Business Success and Friction with the Chinese Government\nMr. Guo and his fainily's business success and wealth continued to grow. Between 2012 and\n2014, the family became the largest shareholder of Haitong futemational Securities, which at the\ntime was China's largest publicly traded securities company. PSR ~ 154. The family also\nestablished- outside of China- the ACA Family Fund fuvestment Company (\"ACA\"). PSR ~ 154.\n\n---\n\n11\n\nAt the same time, tensions continued to mount with Chinese officials whom Mr. Guo\nexposed as corrupt. In December 2013, Mr. Guo left mainland China and relocated to Hong Kong\nwhere he resided with his wife and daughter.\n\nThe following October, Mr. Guo received a call that permanently altered his relationship\nwith mainland China. The caller, a highly placed central government official, notified Mr. Guo\nthat he was suspected of spying for the United States and had to return to mainland China for\nquestioning. Knowing that this portended certain imprisonment and potentially torture, which Mr.\nGuo was not willing to endure further, Mr. Guo left Hong Kong for London, where he joined his\nson who was living there.\n\nIn or around January 2015, Mr. Guo and his family established a family office named\nGolden Spring New York, Ltd., with an office in Manhattan. PSR ¶ 154. Also within this time\nframe, the family purchased an apartment in Manhattan’s Sherry-Netherland hotel, which became\nMr. Guo’s primary residence when he later relocated permanently to the United States in 2017.\nThe family also purchased, with approximately €28 million in family funds from ACA, the Lady\nMay yacht.\n\nMr. Guo’s sense that hostilities between his family and the Chinese government were on\nthe verge of erupting proved accurate. While in New York on business in January 2015, Mr. Guo\nreceived a number of calls from Zheng (“Bruno”) Wu. Purportedly acting on behalf of the Special\nInvestigative Team of the Central Commission for Discipline and Inspection of the CCP (“CCDI”),\nWu implored Mr. Guo to stop exposing corruption among Chinese officials and to not reveal any\ninformation that he may have received from the Deputy Minister of State Security.\nAccording to Wu, the Special Investigative Team wanted Mr. Guo to cooperate with China\nand return any evidence he had of corruption among senior leaders. In exchange, the CCP would\n\n---\n\n12\n\nrefrain from seizing Mr. Guo family’s assets, not arrest Mr. Guo’s family members, and not\nphysically harm or kill Mr. Guo. Mr. Guo refused.\n\nLater that month, on January 10, 2015, Chinese authorities conducted a raid on an event at\nthe Pangu Hotel in Beijing where many of Mr. Guo’s close family members and employees were\ngathered. Hundreds of armed police officers entered the hotel and arrested Mr. Guo’s family\nmembers, including his wife, daughter, his five brothers,5 two sisters-in-law, and one niece.\nPolice ordered all employees onto the ground and arrested approximately 270 of them. Mr.\nGuo’s family members were forcibly masked and taken to a detention center. Mr. Guo’s wife and\ndaughter, who endured abuse and torture while detained (see PSR ¶¶ 135, 140), were released after\n10 days but not permitted to return to their home for nearly two years. Instead, they were placed\nin temporary housing and required to report in person each day to a local intelligence office. PSR\n¶ 135.\nMr. Guo’s sisters-in-law were held for three months and his brothers were taken to Dalian\nCity, more than 800km from Beijing, where they were detained for two years. Among the\nemployees, approximately 30 were officially detained and underwent beatings, interrogation, and\ntorture. No formal charges were instituted except for unknown charges against two of Mr. Guo’s\nbrothers.\nBeginning in late January 2015, Chinese authorities began seizing China-based property\nand stock holdings owned by Mr. Guo’s family companies, and valued at approximately $10\nbillion. These included key buildings and other components of the Pangu Plaza development in\nBeijing, and numerous other office towers. Authorities released these assets in or around December\n2016 and January 2017, only to seize them again weeks later.\n\n5 Mr. Guo lost a second brother, who had been a police officer, to suicide in 1996. PSR ¶ 130.\n\n---\n\n13\n\nE. Mr. Guo Becomes a Prominent and Vocal Critic of the CCP from Abroad\nMr. Guo remained undeterred from his overriding goal of becoming a visible and forceful\nadvocate for democracy and the rule of law in China. Following his departure from China to the\nWest he was able to utilize Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube – all of which are blocked by the\n“Great Firewall of China”6 – to publicly expose systemic corruption in, and abuses of, the CCP.\nSee PSR ¶ 153.\nThrough thousands of hours of broadcasts, Mr. Guo has disclosed human rights abuses in\nChina, such as the crackdown on human rights lawyers and illegal organ harvesting from prisoners\nfor use by family members of high-ranking political figures. He has denounced Chinese state\nsuppression of democratic movements in China and Hong Kong. He has publicly revealed China’s\nstrategy of infiltration into Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, and worked to expose\nChina’s covert operations in the United States in political, economic, cultural, and intelligence\narenas, to cite but a handful of examples. Notwithstanding the Government’s theory that Mr. Guo\nis masquerading as a dissident for his own personal gain, indisputable facts – including those drawn\nfrom cases brought by DOJ – establish that Mr. Guo has undertaken his whistleblowing activities\nat tremendous personal cost and risk.\nConcurrent with that activity, Mr. Guo amassed a massive social media following, with\nhundreds of thousands if not more than one million followers at times. Millions of members of the\n\n6 The U.S. Department of Justice has described the “Great Firewall of China” (“GFW”) as\nfollows: “Operated an enforced primarily by the Cyberspace Administration of China and the\nPRC’s Ministry of Public Security (“MPS”), the GFW has the capability to block Internet access\nwithin the PRC to particular servers and applications and is used to monitor and prevent PRC\ncitizens from accessing Internet platforms and services that might allow for the dissemination and\ndiscussion of information that runs afoul of messaging approved by the PRC government and the\nCCP.” Ex. 2 ¶ 7 (Complaint and Affidavit in Support of Application for Arrest Warrants in United\nStates v. Bai et al., No. 23-MJ-0334 (SJB) (E.D.N.Y., April 6, 2023) (“Bai Complaint”).\n\n---\n\n14\n\nChinese diaspora, disaffected by the CCP’s oppressive tactics – most indelibly represented by the\nmassacre of student protestors in Tiananmen – found resonance in Mr. Guo’s messages. Within\nChina, those with access to a VPN could break through the “Great Firewall” and access Mr. Guo’s\nbroadcasts, which for many were their first concrete exposure to events such as Tiananmen and\nother evidence of CCP abuses. 7 It may be difficult to fathom from a U.S. perspective, where we\nenjoy broad First Amendment freedoms, but for many in China, Mr. Guo’s broadcasts were beyond\neye opening – they shattered fundamental beliefs about the world in which they lived. See, e.g.,\nEx. 3 (Declaration of Wansheng Cheng).8 At the same time, the Whistleblower Movement that\nMr. Guo started offered genuine hope for a more democratic future for the Chinese people. Id.\nThe scope and power of Mr. Guo’s influence represented and continues to represent a threat\nthat the CCP emphatically wants to eliminate. The CCP seeks not only to suppress Mr. Guo’s pro-\ndemocracy advocacy and critiques of publicly known abuses and corruption involving the CCP,\nbut also to prevent disclosure of any non-public information he may possess concerning high-level\ncorruption, intelligence operations, or other sensitive matters.\n\n7 By June 2017, the New York Times Beijing office was reporting that even though Mr. Guo’s\nbroadcasts were officially banned in China, unofficially “many people here in Beijing are riveted.”\nChris Buckley, “Tycoon’s Claims Reverberate in China Despite Censorship and Thin Evidence,”\nNew York Times, June 27, 2017, http\nchina-corruption-xi-jinping.html.\n8 During our time representing Mr. Guo, defense counsel have received more than 1,000\nunsolicited statements of support for Mr. Guo from followers, investors, and/or customers of the\nG-Series entities. The statements continue to pour in. Given the volume of statements as well as\nprivacy concerns, we intend to provide the Court and the Government with a sealed supplement\ncontaining a representative sample of these statements, as they provide significant perspective on\nthe meaning of Mr. Guo’s work to his supporters, the nature and circumstances of the offenses of\nconviction, as well as the issue of loss in this case. For illustrative purposes, we include and cite\nto a few letters in this Memorandum, from individuals who have either testified in this case or\nexpressed willingness to do so.\n\n---\n\n15\n\nThe tactics employed by the CCP to silence Mr. Guo have included coercion, threats to\nfamily, asset seizures, lawsuits, payments to influence U.S. government officials, deployment of a\nvast network of operatives to discredit Mr. Guo globally using social media, interrogating,\narresting, and prosecuting supporters of his in China, and forcing supporters to file false claims of\nfraud against him. The scale and ferocity of the CCP’s campaign against Mr. Guo is staggering.\nF. Intensification of CCP Targeting Following Mr. Guo’s Relocation to the United\nStates\nMr. Guo moved from London to the United States in April 2017, entering on a non-\nimmigrant tourist visa. PSR ¶ 137. Between January 2016 and May 2017, Chinese officials had\ncontacted Mr. Guo approximately 30 times to urge him to cooperate with them. They urged him\nto: (1) stop exposing and publicizing corruption among Chinese government officials; (2) not\ncooperate with the U.S. government or talk to the FBI; and (3) not oppose the CCP, advocate for\ndemocratic reform in China, or talk about justice and the rule of law.\nIn exchange, they offered to release Mr. Guo’s family members and employees from\ncustody and release billions of dollars’ worth of family assets that authorities had frozen in China.\nMr. Guo refused.9 The CCP pressure campaign against Mr. Guo became increasingly aggressive\nand far-reaching, eventually overlapping directly with the allegations in this case. These events\nprovide crucial context for understanding the nature and circumstances of the conduct that brings\nMr. Guo before this Court.\n\n9 In May 2017, however, Mr. Guo was able to negotiate for his wife and daughter to leave\nChina and join him in the United States, in exchange for his agreement not to testify against former\nChinese state security officials who had been arrested in New York and charged in federal court.\n\n---\n\n16\n\n1. INTERPOL Red Notice, Interference with VOA Interview, Direct\nIntimidation\n\nOn April 19, 2017, nine days after Mr. Guo arrived in the United States, the Chinese\ngovernment requested that INTERPOL issue a “red notice” identifying Mr. Guo as a fugitive\nwanted for extradition. This occurred just hours before Mr. Guo was to appear on a live televised\ninterview on the Mandarin-language service of Voice of America (“VOA”) – which reaches an\naudience of millions in China and elsewhere – in which Mr. Guo planned to disclose corruption\nallegations against family members of senior CCP officials. See Sasha Gong, “How China\nManaged to Muffle the Voice of America,” Wall Street Journal, May 23, 2017 (“Gong WSJ Op-\nEd”).10\nMr. Guo went forward with the VOA interview as planned, but shortly into the second hour\nof what had been billed as a three-hour session, VOA abruptly ended the broadcast. As later\nexplained by Sasha Gong, Chief of VOA’s Mandarin Service and the journalist who conducted\nthe interview, two days before the broadcast China’s Foreign Ministry summoned VOA’s Beijing-\nbased correspondent and told him that China would view the interview as interference with China’s\ninternal affairs and could have serious repercussions if it went forward.\nThat admonition sent a chill through VOA’s top management in Washington, but\nmanagement eventually permitted a truncated interview to take place. Id.; see also Michael\nForsythe, “China Seeks Arrest of Billionaire Who Accused Officials’ Relatives of Graft,” New\nYork Times, April 19, 2017;11 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017\nReport to Congress, November 2017, at 472 (“UCESRC Report”) (excerpt attached as Exhibit 4).\n\n10  Available at http\namerica-1495580183?st=EgyHCa&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink.\n11 Available at http\nvoice-of-america.html.\n\n---\n\n17\n\nMillions of viewers saw the broadcast as well as its abrupt end, which for many was their first\nintroduction to Mr. Guo.\nIn May 2017 the CCP again attempted to silence Mr. Guo and threaten him more directly,\nby sending the Secretary of the CCDI and three other agents to New York to speak with him in\nperson. Mr. Guo refused to yield to their demands. Instead, he disclosed a broad network of CCP\nspies operating in the United States.\nThe following month, the Chinese government began public criminal proceedings against\nsome of Mr. Guo’s associates in China. See Ex. 4 (UCESRC Report) at 472-73. Authorities posted\nvideos and transcripts of the proceedings, in which three employees of Beijing Pangu Investment,\none of the Guo family companies, were convicted of fraud. Id.\n2. Recruitment of Influential U.S. Political and Business Figures to Lobby for\nMr. Guo’s Repatriation to China\n\nAs confirmed by the U.S. Government through a series of federal prosecutions, the Chinese\ngovernment’s increasingly charged campaign against Mr. Guo proceeded to reach directly into the\nhighest levels of United States government. In approximately May 2017, Low Taek Jho, a\nMalaysian businessman, coordinated a meeting during which Sun Lijun, China’s former Vice\nMinister for Public Security, enlisted former finance chair of the Republican National Committee\n(“RNC”) Elliot Broidy, hip-hop artist Prakazrel Michel, and businessperson Nickie Lum Davis to\nlobby then-President Trump and the Trump Administration to cancel Mr. Guo’s visa or otherwise\nremove Mr. Guo from the United States. See Ex. 5 ¶ 16 (Complaint in Attorney General of the\nUnited States v. Stephen A. Wynn, No. 22-CV-1372 (D.D.C., May 17, 2022)). This request was\nmade expressly on behalf of the PRC. Id.\nThese efforts – which were extremely well-compensated – took off in multiple directions.\nBroidy turned to Steve Wynn, an American real estate developer and owner of multiple luxury\n\n---\n\n18\n\ncasinos and resorts, including the Wynn Macau – billed on Wynn’s website as “the largest\ngambling location in Asia”12 – and the Wynn Palace, a massive luxury hotel opened in Macau in\n2016.\nBroidy was acquainted with Wynn through the RNC, and believed that the combination of\nWynn’s RNC work, business interests in China, and friendship with then-President Trump would\nhelp facilitate access to administration officials. Ex. 5 ¶ 17; see also Niraj Chokshi, “U.S. Accuses\nSteve Wynn of Lobbying Trump on Behalf of China,” New York Times, May 17, 2022.13\nWynn spoke directly with Sun in June 2017 and agreed to raise the matter with the\nPresident, while also engaging in numerous communications with Broidy during that time about\nhaving Mr. Guo placed on the No Fly List and ensuring that when Mr. Guo’s visa expired at the\nend of June any renewal application would be denied. Ex. 5 ¶¶ 20-21.\nIn one message sent by Broidy to Wynn via Wynn’s wife, Broidy stated that Chinese\nPresident Xi Jinping had told President Trump personally at Mar-a-Lago that he wanted Mr. Guo\nreturned to China, and that in exchange President Xi was willing to return certain U.S. citizens\nheld hostage in China, accept a large number of Chinese illegal immigrants for deportation back\nto China, and assist the United States with North Korea. Id. ¶ 21(c).\nDuring a dinner in Washington, D.C., in late June 2017, Wynn personally communicated\nto the President the PRC’s desire to have Mr. Guo returned to China. Id. ¶ 22. During the next two\nmonths, Wynn had multiple telephone calls with Sun during which they discussed Mr. Guo’s visa\nrenewal, the importance of the matter to the PRC, and Wynn’s business interests in Macau. Id. ¶\n23. Wynn made several efforts during this time frame to organize meetings about Mr. Guo with\n\n12 See http\n13 Available at http\nchina.html.\n\n---\n\n19\n\nsenior officials of the National Security Council and the White House. Id. ¶ 25. Ultimately these\nefforts – motivated by Wynn’s desire to protect his business interests in Macau, over which the\nChinese government exerted tight control – were unsuccessful. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28, 29.14\nWynn’s efforts, however, were just one component of this scheme. In late June 2017\nPrakazrel Michel, having himself already participated in multiple meetings in the United States\nand Asia with the goal of persuading Trump Administration officials to repatriate Mr. Guo to\nChina,15 reached out to George Higginbotham, who at the time was serving as a lawyer for the\nUnited States Department of Justice, Tr. 5727, to solicit his assistance. Tr. 5733-34.\nMr. Higginbotham met that summer with the Chinese ambassador to the United States at\nthe Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C.. Tr. 5735-36. During the meeting he relayed the\nmessage that “there were successful efforts being made for the extradition of Mr. Guo Wengui and\nthat there would be additional information forthcoming from General MicMaster [sic].” Tr. 5738.16\nApproximately two months later, Mr. Higginbotham traveled to Macau to personally inform Mr.\nLow that steps were still being taken to persuade the administration to repatriate Mr. Guo, as well\nas to accomplish a separate, unrelated goal. Tr. 5740-41. Mr. Higginbotham received\napproximately $100 million for his efforts in connection with the scheme to repatriate Mr. Guo\nand achieve the other goal. Tr. 5745.17\n\n14 Elliott Broidy pleaded guilty in October 2020 to conspiring to violate foreign lobbying laws\nin connection with these events. He admitted that he had accepted $9 million from Jho Low to\nlobby the Trump Administration to repatriate Mr. Guo. See Kenneth P. Vogel, “Elliott Broidy\nPleads\nGuilty\nin\nForeign\nLobbying\nCase,”\nNew\nYork\nTimes,\nOct.\n20,\n2020,\nhttp\n15 See Ex. 6 ¶¶ 136-149 (Indictment in United States v. Prakazrel Michel et al., No. 19-CR-\n148-CKK (D.D.C., May 2, 2019)).\n16 That was obviously a reference to Gen. H.R. McMaster, who served as U.S. National\nSecurity Advisor from 2017 to 2018.\n17 Mr. Higginbotham pleaded guilty in November 2018 to a conspiracy charge in connection\nwith\nhis\nparticipation\nin\nthese\nunregistered\nlobbying\naffairs.\nSee\n\n---\n\n20\n\n3. The 912 Project – A Centrally Coordinated Operation to Discredit Mr. Guo\nOnline\nThe U.S. Government has also confirmed the contemporaneous social media and Internet\ncampaign the PRC launched against Mr. Guo during the same period. While the CCP was paying\nhundreds of millions of dollars to recruit Washington insiders for a covert lobbying campaign to\ninfluence the actions of the President of the United States, it also was deploying a sophisticated\nteam of operatives to launch what ultimately grew into a massive social media campaign with the\naim of discrediting Mr. Guo. This campaign was aggressive, extensive, effective, and ongoing for\nyears. Its significance, power, and relevance to this case cannot be overstated.\nA detailed description of the overarching PRC operation to use social media to disseminate\nand amplify messages to discredit and undermine its political adversaries – including targeting of\nspecific individuals critical of the CCP – is set forth in the 89-page Complaint and Affidavit in\nSupport of Application for Arrest Warrants in United States v. Bai et al., No. 23-MJ-334-SJB\n(E.D.N.Y., April 6, 2023) (“Bai Complaint”), attached hereto as Ex. 2; see also Ex. 7 (EDNY\nUSAO Press Release in Bai).\nIt is undisputed that a primary focus of this operation, referred to in the Bai Complaint as\n“Victim-1,” was  Mr. Guo. See Ex. 2 ¶¶ 89-108. As explained in the Bai Complaint, which brought\ninterstate harassment conspiracy charges against 34 officers of the Chinese Ministry of Public\n\nhttp\nconspiracy-deceive-us-banks-about-millions. Nickie Lum Davis, who was paid at least $3 million\nfor her role in the scheme, pleaded guilty in August 2020 to aiding and abetting violation of the\nForeign\nAgents\nRegistration\nAct.\nSee\nhttp\nbusinesswoman-pleads-guilty-facilitating-back-channel-lobbying-campaign-drop-1mdb.\nPrakazrel Michel proceeded to trial in 2023 and was convicted in connection with the scheme to\nrepatriate Mr. Guo. See Hannah Ziegler, “Pras of the Fugees Gets 14 Years for Illegal Foreign\nInfluence Scheme,” New York Times, http\nfugees-campaign-finance-prison.html.\n\n---\n\n21\n\nSecurity (“MPS”),18 this operation (the “912 Project”) was coordinated by a group known as the\n“912 Special Project Working Group” (hereinafter the “912 Group”) within the MPS in Beijing\nand directly targeted Mr. Guo from at least 2017 through the filing of the Bai Complaint on April\n6, 2023, three weeks after Mr. Guo’s arrest in this case. Ex. 2 ¶ 89.\nUtilizing thousands of fake online personas across social media sites such as Twitter,\nFacebook, and YouTube, the 912 Group’s campaign against Mr. Guo specifically sought to brand\nhim as a liar, swindler, a con, and more, and demanded government action against him. As\ndiscussed in more detail infra, this long-running apparatus effectively sowed widespread public\ndoubt about Mr. Guo’s credibility, including the validity of the entities involved in this case.\nTo appreciate the scale of the online operation against Mr. Guo, consider studies\nundertaken by independent third parties about just the Twitter component of this campaign:\n• The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (“ASPI”) found that from April 24, 2017\n(five days after the PRC requested an INTERPOL red notice for Mr. Guo), and July\n31, 2019, at least 38,732 tweets from 618 Twitter accounts linked to the Chinese\ngovernment directly targeted Mr. Guo.19 “These tweets consist largely of vitriolic\nattacks on [Guo’s] character, ranging from highly personal criticisms to accusations\nof criminality, treachery against China and criticisms of his relationship with\ncontroversial U.S. political figure Steve Bannon.” Tom Uren et al., “Tweeting\nthrough the Great Firewall: Preliminary analysis of PRC-linked information\noperations against the Hong Kong protests,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute,\nReport No. 25/2019, at 14.20\n\n18 As explained in the Bai Complaint, “[a]lthough the MPS is generally identified as the PRC’s\nprimary domestic law enforcement agency – responsible for public safety, general criminal\ninvestigation, national security and Internet security – its mission extends beyond law enforcement\nand into functions more associated with an intelligence service.” Ex. 2 ¶ 8.\n19 In August 2019 Twitter took down 936 accounts that it determined were part of a coordinated\nstate-backed effort by China to sow disinformation and discord related to pro-democracy protests\nin Hong Kong. Kate Cooper, “Facebook and Twitter Say China Is Spreading Disinformation in\nHong\nKong,”\nNew\nYork\nTimes,\nAug.\n19,\n2019,\nhttp\nfacebook-twitter.html.\n20 The full report is available at http\nfirewall/.\n\n---\n\n22\n\n• In a follow-up report, ASPI found that from January 2018 to April 17, 2020, there\nwere 70,584 tweets, 11,832 images, and 580 videos associated with Mr. Guo from\nPRC-linked accounts.21 They characterized the three central narratives emerging\nfrom this dataset as: (1) Mr. Guo and Steve Bannon are colluding against the PRC;\n(2) Mr. Guo is a discredited liar; and (3) Mr. Guo is immoral and a rapist. Dr. Jake\nWallis et al., “Retweeting Through the Great Firewall: A persistent and undeterred\nthreat actor,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Report No. 33/2020, at 38-41\n(hereinafter “Retweeting”).22\n\n• The Stanford Internet Observatory also analyzed the activity from January 2018 to\nApril 17, 2020, of the 23,750 Twitter accounts taken down by the platform in June\n2020 for spreading disinformation. Of the 348,608 tweets, the overwhelming\nmajority (78.8%) of which were in Chinese, tweets about Mr. Guo made up the\nsecond largest topic in the dataset, after the Hong Kong protests. The study found\nthat “[a]s with the prior 2019 takedown, the campaign targeting Guo was sustained\nacross the timeline of the operation.” Carly Miller et al., “Sockpuppets Spin COVID\nYarns: An Analysis of PRC-Attributed June 2020 Twitter takedown,” Stanford\nInternet Observatory (June 17, 2020), at 16.23\nIn addition to Twitter, the campaign made extensive use of Facebook and YouTube to\ntarget Mr. Guo as well as his supporters, often posting videos about Mr. Guo from YouTube on\nFacebook and then layering comments onto the posts. Bai Complaint ¶¶ 93-108. To take just one\nexample, a post in mid-September 2021 featured a video about Mr. Guo with the caption (in\nChinese) “brags and cheats every day.” Within the next thirty minutes, a series of comments\nappeared in both Chinese and English, describing Mr. Guo as “a real liar” and “a consummate\nswindler,” and asking “Why isn’t he in jail? What is the government doing?” Id. at 98.\n\n21 In June 2020, Twitter announced the takedown of 23,750 core accounts that it determined\nwere part of a coordinated effort by China to spread disinformation, along with 150,000 additional\naccounts dedicated to amplifying the disinformation campaign through retweets and likes. Kate\nCooper, “Twitter Removes Chinese Disinformation Campaign,” New York Times, June 11, 2020,\nhttp\n22 The full report is available at http\nfirewall/.\n23 The full report is available at http\n\n---\n\n23\n\n4. Interference with Mr. Guo’s Social Media Accounts\nNot content with posting content to harass and discredit Mr. Guo, the Chinese government\nalso actively sought to disrupt Mr. Guo’s own social media accounts. In April 2017, Mr. Guo’s\nFacebook and Twitter accounts were briefly suspended, raising concerns about Chinese\ngovernment pressure. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (“UCESRC”)\nheard testimony in September 2017 that Chinese government targeting of Mr. Guo’s Twitter\naccount was ongoing. Ex. 4 at 471. The U.S. Department of Justice likewise recognized in the Bai\nComplaint the PRC’s efforts to “pressur[e] U.S. social media companies to remove [Guo] and\nU.S.-based associates of [Guo] from social media platforms.” Ex. 2 ¶ 89.\nMr. Guo’s social media accounts were indeed suspended shortly before China’s 19th\nNational Congress commenced on October 18, 2017. On October 17, 2017, it was reported that\nYouTube, in response to an allegation of harassment by an unidentified complainant, removed one\nof Mr. Guo’s videos and suspended him from posting any new live-stream videos for 90 days. Bill\nGertz, “YouTube Suspends Account of Chinese Dissident,” The Washington Free Beacon,\nOctober 17, 2017, http\ndissident/.24\nThe YouTube suspension came on the heels of restrictions on Mr. Guo’s Facebook account.\nId. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and\nCounterterrorism, during a hearing on April 9, 2025, the former Director of Global Public Policy\nat Facebook testified that Facebook had indeed acted at the direct behest of the CCP when it took\ndown Mr. Guo’s Facebook profile in April 2017 and subsequently banned him permanently from\n\n24 Gertz also reported in the same article that according to “a U.S. official,” the Chinese case\nunderlying the INTERPOL red notice against Guo was “political and not legal.”\n\n---\n\nFacebook in September 2017. See Cristiano Lima-Strong, \"Transcript: Former Exec Sarah Wynn-\nWilliams Testifies on Facebook's Comiship of China,\" Tech Policy Press, April 9, 2025.25\n5. Hacking Into Computer Systems of Mr. Guo 's Lawyers\nOn September 5, 2017, Mr. Guo filed an application for asylum with the U.S. Depa1iment\nof Homeland Secmity based on his fear of reti·ibution from the CCP for his exposme of political\nco1n1ption. PSR ~ 136. One week later, on September 12, 2017, the computer system of the law\nfom that filed the application, Clark Hill PLC, was hacked. 26 The hacker stole, at a minimum, Mr.\nGuo's asylum application and supporting affidavit, which together contained substantial\nconfidential and sensitive infonnation about the reasons Mr. Guo feared reti·ibution by the CCP\nshould he retmn to China.\nA week after the hack, the law fnm abmptly te1minated its representation of Mr. Guo.\nThen, beginning around September 23, 2017, Mr. Guo' s personal info1mation and confidential\npo1iions of his asylum application and affidavit began to appear on Twitter, causing reputational\nhann and putting Mr. Guo, his family, and his employees at risk.\n6. Weaponizing the Civil Legal System With a False Rape Lawsuit\nOn September 11, 2017, a fonner employee of Mr. Guo filed a civil complaint against him\nin New York State comi falsely alleging that he had raped her on multiple occasions and effectively\nheld her captive for nearly three years, even though Mr. Guo himself had not even been in the\n25 Video of the full hearing is available at http\nactivity/heai·ings/a-time-for-trnth-oversight-of-metas-foreign-relations-and-representations-to-\nthe-united-states-con\n24\n\n---\n\n25\n\nUnited States for three years at that time.27 The initial complaint did not allege when the supposed\nsexual assaults occurred – not which year, month, day, or even season – but did make a point at\nthe outset of lodging unrelated allegations against Mr. Guo, namely, that his public persona as a\nChinese dissident was crafted for the purpose of obtaining political support for asylum, and that\nhe had a “checkered past rife with allegations of economic fraud.” Ex. 8 ¶¶ 17, 18 (Complaint in\nRui Ma v. Guo Wengui et al.).\nNot long after the civil complaint was filed, organized demonstrations against Mr. Guo\nbegan to take place outside his Manhattan apartment building. Demonstrators lined up in formation\nand held uniform preprinted signs calling Mr. Guo a rapist and a liar and urging him to leave the\nUnited States. Images of these protests subsequently appeared in tweets from CCP-linked Twitter\naccounts. See “Retweeting” at 39-40. Consistent with the Ma case complaint, these demonstrations\nand online dissemination of related photos had all the markings of being coordinated by the CCP.\nG. The CCP’s Targeting of Mr. Guo Converges with the Conduct in this Case\n\nIn this context, where Mr. Guo had become a prominent public critic of the CCP, millions\nof Chinese individuals in China and abroad found resonance and hope in his messages, and the\nCCP was waging a fierce campaign to discredit, silence, and repatriate Mr. Guo, the events giving\nrise to the charges in this case took shape. The CCP itself was an active participant in shaping these\nevents.\nOne key element underlying this prosecution was the relationship that Mr. Guo developed\nwith Steve Bannon beginning in late 2017. After Mr. Bannon, a staunch believer that China\n\n27 The case is Rui Ma v. Guo Wengui et al., Sup Ct, NY County, Sept. 11, 2017, Index No.\n158140/2017). An interlocutory appeal of a 2023 order entered in the matter remains pending in\nthe Appellate Division, where plaintiff – who returned to China shortly after filing the complaint\n– now appears to be unrepresented.\n\n---\n\nrepresented the greatest long-tenn threat to the United States, 28 was forced out of his White House\nrole as an advisor to then-President Tnnnp, a shared acquaintance introduced him to Mr. Guo.29\nThe mutual disdain Mr. Guo and Mr. Bannon had for the Chinese government led to a natural\nalliance. 30\nMr. Guo engaged Bannon as a paid consultant in Janmuy 2018. In November 2018,\nfollowing considerable planning throughout the year (Tr. 469-70), the two announced the launch\nof the Rule of Law Foundation (\"ROLF\"). The Rule of Law Foundation, and accompanying Rule\nof Law Society (\"ROLS\") were nonprofit organizations focused on promoting democracy and the\nrnle oflaw in China, in tandem with Mr. Guo's Whistleblower Movement. On June 4, 2020, Mr.\nBannon and Mr. Guo announced creation of the New Federal State of China (\"NFSC\").31\nMeanwhile, the PRC government seized additional Guo family assets in late October\n2018,32 and the 912 Project actively continued to publicly discredit Mr. Guo. In Januaiy 2018 the\n28 See http /09/08/us/politics/steve-bannon-china-trnmp.html.\n29 Mr. Guo had been scheduled to be interviewed by jomnalist Bill Ge11z at the Hudson\nInstitute in Washington, D.C., on October 4, 2017, but the event was abmptly postponed in the\nwake\nof\na\ncyberattack\nthat\nthe\nInstitute\ntraced\nto\nShanghai.\nSee\nhttp\ninto-washington-1 507260255; http /www.hudson.org/node/4 l 042. Ge11z thereafter connected\nBannon with Mr. Guo.\n30 See htt  •\n•\nThe Government has characterized the October 2018 asset seizme as the motive for Mr.\nGuo's creation of the Rule of Law entities and later other G-Series entities - namely, as vehicles\nthrough which he could defraud followers and emich himself after being stripped of assets (see Tr.\n5959) - but considerable trial testimony contradicted that theo1y, including testimony from\nGovernment witness Karen Maistrello, who stated that Mr. Bannon was actively involved\nthroughout 2018 in planning for the launch of the Rule of Law organizations. Tr. 469-70.\n26\n\n---\n\n27\n\n912 Group created a Twitter account specifically to “like” other derogatory Tweets about Mr. Guo.\nBai Complaint ¶ 105.\nFor  example, one Tweet in Chinese stated, “I would like to ask all netizens not to be\nexploited by the media controlled by rumors, gossip, and the rapist, plague ghost [Guo Wengui]!\nPlague ghost [Guo Wengui] is the biggest ‘national thief’ on the Internet. Spreading rhetoric on\nthe Internet every day, using netizens to satisfy his own desires, plague ghost [Guo Wengui]’s\ncrimes are too numerous to mention.” Id.\nAs the ASPI and Stanford studies confirmed, tens of thousands of Twitter accounts were\nengaged in coordinated anti-Guo messaging throughout 2018 and beyond, including targeting Mr.\nGuo’s work with Bannon. The 912 Group also used Facebook to attack Mr. Guo’s credibility, with\none account posting at least nine times in November and December 2018, often referring to Mr.\nGuo as a “big liar.” Id. ¶ 104. The Facebook activity was pointed in its criticism and ongoing for\nyears, see id ¶¶ 94-103, as was 912 Group activity on YouTube. Id. ¶¶ 106-108.\nGiven the disruption to Mr. Guo’s own social media accounts, as well as the popularity of\nhis broadcasts, creation of his own online media platform was a logical and feasible step for Mr.\nGuo. To that end, GTV Media was established in April 2020 by Saraca Media Group, Inc., a Guo\nfamily entity, and the GTV private placement was announced later that month. Tr. 4542. The\nprivate placement raised hundreds of millions of dollars from thousands of investors.\nThe Farm Loan program began shortly thereafter, in June 2020, to create additional\nopportunities for small-scale supporters of the Movement to contribute to its operations and\neventually obtain shares in GTV.33 For those who contributed to the Farm Loan program, the\n\n33 As addressed by defense counsel during trial, the time horizon for conversion had not\nelapsed by the time of Mr. Guo’s arrest. See, e.g. Tr. 6038.\n\n---\n\n28\n\ncontributions demonstrated a meaningful degree of commitment to the Movement and its\nvolunteering and broadcast activities. It was important to Mr. Guo that owners of shares in GTV\nhave a genuine commitment to the Movement given the powerful forces in play trying to\nundermine him.\nG Club, which officially launched in October 2020, similarly provided a way for\nindividuals to support the Movement, find fellowship with like-minded people, and enjoy the\nbenefits that G Club offered, such as discounts on G Fashion. Thousands of individuals purchased\nG Club memberships for fees ranging from $10,000 (for a Tier 1 membership) to $50,000 (for a\nTier 5 membership).\nFinally, the Himalaya Exchange (“HEX”), a cryptocurrency ecosystem, enabled customers\nto purchase two types of tokens, Himalaya dollar (“HDO”) and Himalaya Coin (“HCN”). HDO\nwas a stablecoin, pegged 1:1 to the U.S. dollar and backed by reserves, and HCN was a token with\na floating value. Potential customers had access to separate whitepapers about HDO and HCN on\nthe HEX website in both English and Chinese. Customers could purchase HDO with fiat currency\nand HCN with HDO. HEX proved to be extremely popular, issuing hundreds of millions of dollars\nin HDO, and with active trading of HCN leading to significant increases in value. HEX, and its\naccompanying app, Himalaya Pay (H Pay), were widely used up until HEX was shut down\nfollowing the jury verdict in this case.\nDuring the same period of time that these entities were active, the CCP was assiduously\ncontinuing its online campaign to discredit Mr. Guo through the 912 Project while also taking\nincreasingly aggressive measures within China to undermine support of Mr. Guo. These measures\nincluded interrogations, threats, criminal prosecutions, coerced statements of regret, coerced filing\n\n---\n\n29\n\nof false complaints with U.S. authorities and media outlets in connection with the entities, and\neven templates for a social media smear campaign.\nDuring trial, Government witness Ya Li testified that the CCP called her parents in China\nand asked them to tell her to cease her activities with the Whistleblower Movement because they\nthreatened national security. Tr. 1535. According to Li, the CCP called other relatives as well,\ntrying to locate her, and her parents warned her not to return to China because she would be\narrested. Id. Also during trial, defense witness Jianhu Yi testified that in October 2020, after he\nhad invested in GTV, two plainclothes MSS officers took him from his workplace in Shanghai to\na separate location where three officers interrogated him for 11 hours during which he was not free\nto leave. Tr. 5042-46. Officers confiscated his phone and told him he was facing three to five years’\nimprisonment for investing in an organization hostile to the Chinese government. Tr. 5048-53.\nThey asked him about family members in China, made sure he understood that he could not hide\nfrom them, and tried to persuade him to cooperate. Tr. 5050-51\nYi testified to five subsequent meetings with these officers between October 2020 and\nJanuary 2021. During the second meeting, officers took his GTV stock certificates and told him\nhe would lose all his money because the investments were bogus. Tr. 5052. During the third\nmeeting, they told him to file a lawsuit against Mr. Guo. Tr. 5053. During the fourth meeting, they\nforced him to write a letter seeking to withdraw his investments in GTV, G Dollar, and G Club,\nand to send photos of the letters to the police. Tr. 5054-55.\nDuring the fifth meeting, they told Yi they would provide him with a lawyer, forced him\nto document all of his investments, and provided him with email addresses for sending complaints.\nTr. 5055-56. During the sixth meeting, they required Yi to bring his computer with a VPN installed\nso he could show them the false complaints he had been forced to file. Tr. 5056. Defense Exhibit\n\n---\n\n30\n\n60704, admitted at trial and attached hereto as Exhibit 9, is a copy of the (false) complaint that Yi\nfiled with the FBI. Tr. 5057.\nYi also filed false complaints with the New York State Attorney General, the New York\nTimes, and the Wall Street Journal, all to protect his family. Tr. 5058-59. The lawyer the Chinese\ngovernment provided to Yi  did in fact file a lawsuit against Mr. Guo on behalf of Yi, without Yi’s\nauthorization. Tr. 5066.\n Yi’s testimony is recounted here in some detail not simply to illustrate the lengths to which\nthe CCP has gone to undermine Mr. Guo and lay the groundwork for precisely the type of charges\nin this case, but also because it is entirely consistent with the experiences recounted in unsolicited\nstatements defense counsel has received from multiple other sources, many of whom provided\ndocumentary evidence in support.\nOne such source, Wansheng Cheng, whom undersigned counsel interviewed and whose\nDeclaration is attached hereto as Exhibit 3, described a similar series of interrogations by MSS\nofficers who ultimately forced him to file false complaints about his G-Series investments. The\ninterrogations took place from January 2021 to May 2021, with officers continuing to contact him\nthrough November 2021. Ex. 3 ¶¶ 19-46. Terrified that he might be imprisoned or more seriously\nharmed, Sheng at one point privately swore out a “non-suicide declaration,” which he shared only\nwith close friends and family, as a precaution and testament. Id. ¶ 28 & Ex. A.\nSheng provided counsel with photographs of the original Chinese language instructions the\nofficers provided to him. See id. ¶ 37 & Ex. B (with English translations). These documents\nprovide instructions for filing complaints with the FBI – citing the same website officers had Yi\nuse to file his false complaint, http – as well as with the New York State Attorney\nGeneral’s Office, the SEC, and JPMorgan Chase Bank. Id. Further mirroring Yi’s testimony, the\n\n---\n\n31\n\nsite encouraged contacting mainstream media such as the New York Times and the Wall Street\nJournal, and provided a mobile phone number, email address, and Twitter handle for the Wall\nStreet Journal reporter covering Mr. Guo and his “suspicious” activities. Id.34\nNot surprisingly, the SEC began investigating the GTV securities offerings, including\nofferings through Voice of Guo Media and the marketing of opportunities to invest in what were\nthen referred to as G-Coins and G-Dollars, in or around July 2020. GTV Media Group, Inc., Saraca\nMedia Group, Inc., and Voice of Guo Media, Inc., cooperated with the investigation, which\nresulted in settlement of a civil administrative proceeding based on failures to register the offerings,\nwhich did not qualify for registration exemptions. See Ex. 10 (In re GTV Media Group, Inc. et al.,\nOrder, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-20537 (Sept. 13, 2021)).\nAs part of the settlement, the parties agreed to disgorgement of $486,745,063, along with\n$17,688,365 in prejudgment interest and $35,000,000 in civil penalties. As evidenced at trial, the\nSEC thereafter established a Fair Fund to return funds to investors, each of whom received\napproximately 92% of their initial investment after administrative fee deductions. See Tr. 708,\n1358, 2377.35\n\n34 In addition to coercing him to file false complaints, Cheng reported that one of the MSS\nofficers sent him a handwritten template of “smear campaign” content for him to post online in\norder to disparage and discredit Mr. Guo. A photo of the handwritten Chinese-language template,\nalong with a typed version and English translation, are attached to Cheng’s declaration. See Ex. 3\n¶ 43 & Ex. C.\n35 On March 15, 2023, the date of Mr. Guo’s arrest, the SEC filed a civil complaint against Mr.\nGuo and others alleging fraud in connection with the GTV private placement, farm loans, and G\nClub memberships. SEC v. Ho Wan Kwok et al., No. 23-CV-2200-PGG (SDNY, Mar. 15, 2023).\nThe case has been stayed and remains pending. As discussed below, the jury acquitted Mr. Guo of\nwire fraud and securities fraud in connection with the GTV private placement.\n\n---\n\n32\n\nH. Political Conditions in the United States Set the Stage for a New Administration\nto Turn Against Mr. Guo\nMr. Guo’s close association with Steven Bannon, as well as his creation of the GTV\nplatform, collided with domestic politics in the United States during the run-up to the 2020\npresidential election. The path to Mr. Guo’s prosecution proceeded from there.\nBannon served for a time on the board of the Rule of Law Society, and was also listed in\nthe GTV offering documents as a member of GTV’s Board. He had come under scrutiny by the\nSouthern District of New York for his unrelated “We Build the Wall” crowdfunding campaign not\nlong after he and Mr. Guo announced formation of the Rule of Law entities in November 2018.\nThat investigation came to fruition in August 2020, when Mr. Bannon was arrested in dramatic\nfashion while aboard the Lady May yacht with Mr. Guo. News coverage during that time, informed\nby government sources, touted investigations of their affiliated undertakings, 36  and SEC\nsubpoenas issued to GTV Media and Saraca in July 2020 sought information about ROLS and\nROLF as well as about the GTV private placement.\nOn October 24, 2020, a GTV user posted salacious videos of Hunter Biden on the platform,\nsparking a national media firestorm just days before the presidential election. Mr. Guo did not\ninsist that the posts be removed, and he found himself engulfed in the ensuing political maelstrom.\nThat only intensified after Joseph Biden prevailed in the 2020 election, Mr. Guo publicly supported\nefforts to overturn the election results, and Hunter Biden sought retribution for disclosure of the\nvideos.\n\n36 See, e.g., Aruna Viswanatha, et al., “FBI Probes Chinese Exile, Including Work With Former\nTrump Aide Steve Bannon,” Wall Street Journal, July 8, 20202 (htt); Brian\nSpegele, et al., “Fundraising at Company Tied to Steve Bannon and Guo wengui Faces Probe,”\nWall Street Jonrnal, Aug. 19, 2020 (http).\n\n---\n\n33\n\nIn February 2023, Mother Jones reported that Hunter Biden’s counsel had recently sent a\nseries of letters asking state and federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, to launch\ninvestigations into alleged crimes by people thought to have played a role in distributing material\nfrom Hunter Biden’s laptop.37 The article specifically mentioned Mr. Guo. Two days later, the\nsame magazine reported that Hunter Biden had threatened to sue Mr. Guo as well as Bannon in\nconnection with disclosure of material from the laptop.38\nMr. Guo was arrested the following month, on March 15, 2023. The central allegation\nagainst him in the initial indictment concerned the private placement for the GTV platform on the\nwhich the Hunter Biden videos were initially posted. The Government added a RICO conspiracy\ncount in its second superseding indictment filed on January 3, 2024 (ECF No. 215), and renamed\nthe alleged RICO enterprise as the “G Enterprise” in a third superseding indictment filed on April\n24, 2024 (ECF No. 307).\nMr. Guo proceeded to trial in late May 2024. Steve Bannon’s name and image were placed\nbefore the jury more than one hundred times during the seven-week proceedings. On July 16, 2024,\nthe jury found Mr. Guo not guilty of wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with the GTV\nprivate placement (Counts Five and Six), and not guilty of engaging in an unlawful money\ntransaction (Count Twelve). The jury found Mr. Guo guilty of racketeering conspiracy (Count\nOne), conspiracy to commit wire fraud or bank fraud (Count Two), conspiracy to commit money\nlaundering (Count Three), conspiracy to commit securities fraud (Count Four), substantive wire\n\n37 Dan Friedman, “Why Twitter Was Right to Suppress (Some of) the Material From Hunter’s\nLaptop,” Mother Jones, Feb. 8, 2023 (htt).\n38 Dan Friedman, “Hunter Biden Threatens to Sue Steve Bannon and Exiled Mogul Guo\nWengui,” Mother Jones, Feb. 10, 2023 (http).\n\n---\n\n34\n\nfraud and securities fraud in connection with the Farm Loan program and G Club (Counts Seven\nthrough Ten), and wire fraud in connection with the Himalaya Exchange (Count Eleven).\nThere was no special verdict form and the jury made no determination as to any “loss\namount.”\nI. Affirmative Disavowal of Victim Status by Investors and Customers\nNotwithstanding the conviction, thousands of individuals who invested in G-Series entities\nhave expressly stated that they were not victimized by Mr. Guo. As defense counsel has previously\ndetailed (see ECF No. 799 at 5-9), these individuals include: (a) more than 6,500 HEX customers\nwho have filed petitions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) for return of seized funds (see, e.g.,ECF\nNos. 759, 761 at 3); (b) hundreds of investors in the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC who have\nalso filed § 853(n) petitions (see, e.g.,  ECF Nos. 674, 756); (c) investors who have filed individual\n§ 853(n) petitions or contacted the Government disclaiming victim status, such as those disclosed\nin discovery at USAO_00112534-USAO_00112564; and (d) several hundred individuals who\nhave written directly to defense counsel. As previously noted, we will provide the Court with a\nseparate submission under seal containing a representative sample of the more than 1,000\nstatements sent to defense counsel disclaiming victim status.\nTo be clear, we present these perspectives not to challenge the jury verdict, which we\naccept for purposes of sentencing, but to place that verdict in its proper context and frame its\nlimitations. While the Government presented testimony from a handful of witnesses who identified\nthemselves as victims and claimed that certain statements by Mr. Guo were material to their\ndecisions to send money for particular investments or undertakings, thousands of other individuals\nsent funds to the same entities for reasons unrelated to the alleged misrepresentations that formed\nthe core of the Government’s case. For these individuals the alleged misrepresentations simply\nwere not material.\n\n---\n\n35\n\nIn addition, while discussed to some extent supra, Part I.G, the CCP campaign of\nintimidation and coerced complaints against Mr. Guo was considerably more extensive than\npresented at trial or in this memo. As it calls into question the validity of any written victim\nstatements that may have been provided to the Government or other law enforcement authorities,\nit is important at this stage of the case for the Court to have a more complete picture of its scope.\nTo date, defense counsel has received approximately 60 statements that reference CCP\ninterrogation, threats, or detention of the writer based on alleged interactions with Mr. Guo or\nentities involved in this case. At least five of these individuals indicated that they were forced to\nfile false complaints against Mr. Guo, and many more note that they have left China and either\nseek or have been granted asylum elsewhere.\nTestimony offered during trial and accounts provided in statements to defense counsel\nprovide insight into the value that the G-Series entities provided to investors and customers. These\nnarratives are voluminous, credible, and directly at odds with the Government’s theory that certain\nalleged misrepresentations materially induced individuals to part with their money.\nDefense witness Jianhu Yi, for instance, testified that he purchased a G Club memberhip\nbecause of the camaraderie, friendship, and services G Club offered. Tr. 5072. Countless others\nwho purchased G Club memberships have written to defense counsel expressing similar\nsentiments. Wansheng Cheng, for instance, states that he purchased a G Club membership in April\n2022 for $20,000, funded from proceeds of trading activity on the Himalaya Exchange. He writes:\n“I see GǀClub as a recognition of identity – a group where people share the same values. Initially\nI understand that we would [be] provided discounts on certain purchases, then later benefits would\nbe added, which I expected would take some time. I have not tried to get my GǀClub membership\nmoney back and I am not interested in getting it back.” Ex. 3 ¶16.\n\n---\n\n36\n\nDefense witness Lai Dai, who invested $155,000 in GTV, bought a $50,000 G Club\nmembership, and invested $300,000 in HEX, testified that his decision to get a G Club membership\nhad nothing to do with any connection between G Club membership and receiving GTV shares\n(Tr. 5248). To the contrary, he described G Club as a “symbol of identity” (Tr. 5244) that enabled\nhim to join with people who share a common faith and enjoy other benefits (Tr. 5244-45). With\nrespect to HEX, Dai testified that it was immaterial to him whether HDO was backed by gold (Tr.\n5379) or whether it was currently on the Ethereum blockchain (Tr. 5252). He found value in HEX\nregardless of these features, as did thousands of other HEX customers who maintain that they were\nnot victims of any fraud perpetrated by Mr. Guo. The same is true for countless contributors to the\nFarm Loan program, G Club members, and GTV investors.\nMr. Dai submitted a sentencing letter to the Court that provides further perspective on this\naspect of the case:\nThe matter most directly related to me in this case concerns my own investment\nexperience involving companies commonly referred to as the “G-Series.” In this\ncontext, I participated as an ordinary investor with some relevant experience. My\ninvestment decision was not based on blind trust but on my own investment\nexperience and commercial judgment. After reviewing relevant materials and\nbusiness plans, I made my decision while fully understanding that any investment\ninherently involves risk. Based on the information available to me, the relevant\nbusinesses did exist and were operating.\nAmong the investors I personally know, I have not personally encountered anyone\nwho considers themselves to have been harmed. Of course, I understand that\ndifferent individuals may have had different experience, and there may be\ncircumstances of which I am not aware. However, based on my own observations,\nmy experience does not fully align with certain narratives presented during the trial.\nI do not intend to deny others’ experiences; I simply wish to explain that, as a real\nparticipant in these investments, my own experiences and judgment formed the\ncontext in which I made my decision.\nEx. 11.\n\n---\n\n37\n\nGiven the scale of support Mr. Guo has amassed, he clearly is not alone in his fervor to\nbring democratic reform to China. The power of the Chinese government to control the affairs of\nits people and target its enemies, whether they live in China or elsewhere, is overwhelming. This\nfact is central to the appeal of the Whistleblower Movement and the G-Series entities to an untold\nnumber of individuals.\\ To cite just one of the hundreds of letters counsel has received addressing\nthe considerations deemed significant by investors and customers:\nMr. Guo repeatedly and emphatically warned all of his followers that opposing the\nCCP is the most dangering undertaking in the world, and that anyone with the\nslightest hesitation, or anyone motivated by money or fame, should not participate.\n\nThis was the consensus among all committed participants: our investments were\nnot financial speculation – they were votes. Votes to dismantle the CCP, to end the\nhuman tragedies it has inflicted for generations, to secure the safety of our own\nlives and the lives of our children. I chose to invest, chose to follow Mr. Guo, and\nchose to join the New Federal State of China. I regard thse as the most important\nand most correct decisions of my life.\n\nEx. 12 (Statement of\n, March 10, 2026).\n\nIndeed, many HEX customers made a considerable profit from their HCN purchases.\nWansheng Cheng, for instance, states that he put approximately $22,000 in HEX, which he used\nin part to purchase 3,000 HCN. Ex. 3 ¶ 15. At its peak, his HCN holdings had a value of\napproximately $160,000, and it was the funds he maintained in HEX that he used to support\nhimself during his nearly two-year journey from China to the United States following multiple\ninterrogations. Id.\nAs discussed in more detail in the following section, in these unusual circumstances where\nthere has been an extensive disavowal of victim status, and where the jury made no finding as to\nthe scope of any fraud for which they returned a guilty verdict, the Government’s calculation of a\n$1.3 billion fraud in this case is entirely speculative, and no “loss amount” can be assessed absent\na Fatico hearing.\n\n---\n\n38\n\nII.\nDETERMINING A SENTENCE THAT IS SUFFICIENT BUT NOT GREATER\nTHAN NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF SENTENCING\n\nA. Applicable Sentencing Considerations\n\nPursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543\nU.S. 220 (2005), and the Second Circuit’s interpretation of Booker in United States v. Crosby, 397\nF.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005), this Court’s sentencing decision must be based upon the factors set forth\nin 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Section 3553(a) requires the Court to impose a sentence “sufficient, but\nnot greater than necessary” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,\nto provide just punishment, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public,\nand to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other\ncorrectional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).\n\nThe Court is no longer required to impose a sentence within the range specified by the\nGuidelines. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111. Indeed, “[a] district court may not presume that a Guidelines\nsentence is reasonable; it must instead conduct its own independent review of the sentencing\nfactors, aided by the arguments of the prosecution and defense.” Id. The Supreme Court has\nconfirmed that “[t]he Guidelines are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts, they are also\nnot to be presumed reasonable.” Nelson v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 890, 892 (2010) (emphasis in\noriginal).\n\nAlso, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent from the “remedial” opinion in United States v.\nBooker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005):[t]he statute provides no order of priority among all those factors,\nbut since the three just mentioned [§§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (B) & (C)] are the fundamental criteria\ngoverning penology, the statute – absent the mandate of § 3553(b)(1) – authorizes the judge to\napply his own perceptions of just punishment, deterrence, and protection of the public even when\n\n---\n\n39\n\nthese differ from the perceptions of the Commission members who drew up the Guidelines. 543\nU.S. at 304-305 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).\n\nThe factors the Court must consider in determining how to satisfy the enumerated goals of\nsentencing are the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the\ndefendant, the kinds of sentences available, the sentencing range set forth in the U.S. Sentencing\nGuidelines, any policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid\nunwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to any victims of the\noffense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).39\n\nThe Second Circuit has reaffirmed these sentencing principles while emphasizing that “[a]\nsentencing judge has very wide latitude to decide the proper degree of punishment for an individual\noffender and a particular crime.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (en\nbanc). Sentencing must be undertaken with due consideration of the particular circumstances of\nany given case and the background and character of any particular defendant. As the Supreme\nCourt observed in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), and reaffirmed in Gall v. United\nStates, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 598 (2007):\nIt has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing\njudge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a\nunique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify,\nthe crime and the punishment to ensue.\n\n518 U.S. at 113; see also United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 182 (2d Cir. 2008) (“in every case,\nthe district court ‘must make an individualized assessment’ of the appropriate sentence ‘based on\n\n39 The Government, per its letter to the Court dated January 9, 2026, does not seek restitution\nin this case given its impracticability, and instead seeks to return funds to investors and customers\nthrough a remission process. See ECF No. 785 at 4-5. Mr. Guo concurs. ECF No. 789 at 3.\n\n---\n\nthe facts presented' and the factors detailed in § 3553(a)\") (quoting Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct.\n586, 597 (2007)).\nB. The Sentencing Guidelines Calculations in the PSR are in Error\nThe Presentence Report (\"PSR\") at ,, 112-123 calculates an adviso1y Guidelines\nsentencing offense level of 43 for Mr. Guo. The PSR calculates the Guidelines as follows:\nPSR 1\nDescription\nUSSG Section\nLevels\n~ 114\nBase offense level\n2B 1.1( a)(l)\n7\n~ 114\nLoss in excess of $550,000,000\n2B1 .1 (b )(1 )(P)\n+30\n~ 114\n10 or more victims\n2B 1.1 (b )(2)(A)(i)\n+2\n,114\nActed on behalf of a charitable, educational,\n2B 1.1 (b )(9)(A)-\n+2\nreligious, or political organization, or a\n(C)\ngovernment agency etc.\n,114\nRelocated or pa1ticipated in relocating a\n2B1.l(b)(l0)(A) & +2\nfraudulent scheme to another jmisdiction to\n(C)\nevade law enforcement or regulato1y officials,\nand the offense otherwise involved\nsophisticated means and defendant\nintentionally engaged in or caused the conduct\nconstituting sophisticated means\n,114\nDerived more than $1,000,000 in gross\n2B1.l(b)(17)\n+2\nreceipts from one or more financial institutions\nas a result of the offense\n~ 114\nTotal Base Offense Level\n45\n~ 115\nConviction under 18 U.S.C. 1956(h)\n2S 1.1 (b )(2)(B)\n+2\n, 116\n2Sl .l(b)(2)(B) applies and the offense\n2S 1.1 (b )(3)\n+2\ninvolved sophisticated laundering\n,118\nOrganizer or leader of criminal activity that\n3B1.l(a)\n+4\ninvolved 5 or more participants\n~ 119\nObstruction of iustice\n3Cl.1\n+2\n~ 120\nAdjusted Offense Level (Subtotal)\n55\n~ 123\nTOTAL OFFENSE LEVEL\n43\nThe PSR recommends a sentence of 300 months' imprisonment (see PSR Sentencing\nRecommendation at 58), a te1m that, in our respectful view, exceeds what is sufficient in this case\nand far greater than necessaiy for this Criminal Histo1y Catego1y I defendant.\n40\n\n---\n\n41\n\n1. No “Loss Amount” Exists in this Case\n\nAs a threshold matter, Mr. Guo continues to maintain that he is not guilty of any of the\ncharges, and intends to appeal his conviction on numerous grounds. Thus, Mr. Guo does not\nconcede that there is any “loss amount.”\nNor did the trial establish any “loss amount.” The jury was not asked to determine the\namount of loss or the identity of any alleged “victims.” In fact, the Court’s jury charge was explicit\nin that regard. For example, regarding the wire fraud counts, the Court instructed the jury that it\ndid not “need to find that the defendant profited from the fraud.” Tr. 5793. Similarly, regarding\nsecurities fraud, the jury was instructed that it was not required to find “that anyone suffered any\nloss or that the Defendant realized any gain.” Tr. 5802.\nHowever, because the sentencing stage requires acceptance of the jury’s verdict solely for\nthe abstract calculation of a Guidelines level, this submission engages in that evaluation as an\nessential component of sentencing.\n\nAmong the important reasons why the recommendation is far too high is that the Guidelines\ncalculation is erroneous, principally because the $1.3 billion “loss amount” alleged is unsupported\nfor a number of reasons:  (1)  the Government based the $1.3 billion figure solely on inflows to\nthe G-Series entities and not on any rigorious tracing analysis or other evidence establishing loss;\n(2) the “loss amount” improperly includes acquitted conduct, which violates both the Sixth\nAmendment and a 2024 Guidelines amendment; (3)  the “loss amount” erroneously includes funds\nfrom individuals who explicitly deny they were defrauded; and (4)  the “loss amount” incorrectly\nincludes amounts that should be excluded based on other controlling legal principles, such as\noffsets for redemptions, refunds, residual value, or double counting.\n\n---\n\n42\n\nWhile forfeiture and “loss amount” are doctrinally distinct, many of the issues relevant to\nforfeiture, and discussed in Mr. Guo’s submissions with respect to forfeiture (ECF Nos. 799, 804),\napply equally to “loss amount.”\n\nThis case is extremely unusual, if not unique, in that it does not present a categorical fraud\nin which every investor claims that misrepresentations were material to the specific investor’s\ndecision to contribute or that every investor actually was defrauded. Instead, unlike nearly all fraud\ncases, many investors in and customers of the G-Series entities affirmatively deny that they are, in\nfact, victims of any fraud by Mr. Guo.\nAs discussed below, in some instances the investors assert that they have suffered\neconomically from the Government’s conduct, and not Mr. Guo’s. 40  This novel posture,\nconsidering the number and variety of investors who have disclaimed victim status, requires\nscrutiny and precision before any “loss amount” can be determined.\n\nIf the Government attempts to establish any “loss amount,” or disputes any of the grounds\nset forth herein for reducing the “loss amount,” Mr. Guo respectfully submits that a hearing\npursuant to United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978), is necessary to adjudicate this\nessential component of his Guidelines calculation. Due Process and the Sixth Amendment do not\npermit any less.\na. The Fundamental Legal Framework for Calculating “Loss Amount”\nThe Government argues that the “loss” for Guidelines purposes is $1.3 billion dollars, and\nthe PSR, adopts that number. PSR ¶¶ 109, 113-14. The PSR’s and the Government’s arithmetic,\n\n40 This is not a sufficiency argument, or an attempt to relitigate the jury’s verdict, which Mr.\nGuo acknowledges for purposes of sentencing, and for the Guidelines calculation within that\ncontext. Rather, it involves examining the elements of that calculation.\n\n---\n\n43\n\nhowever, based solely on the amount of money flowing into the various entities set forth in GX Z-\n26, is fundamentally and fatally flawed.\nAnalysis commences with the proposition stated in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,\n351 (2007), that the district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating\nthe applicable sentencing range. An incorrect calculation interferes with the court’s duty to impose\na sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to comply with the purposes of sentencing\nas outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 and related case law provide guidance into the sometimes complex task\nof accurately determining loss amount in financial crimes such as fraud. Note A to the Loss Table\nin § 2B1.1(b)(1) provides that “loss” is “the greater of actual loss or intended loss.” Note C(i)\ndefines “actual loss” as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the\noffense,” and Note C(ii) defines “intended loss” as “the pecuniary harm that the defendant\npurposely sought to inflict[,]” including “intended pecuniary harm that would have been\nimpossible or unlikely to occur.” 41 The Government bears the burden of proving loss by a\npreponderance of the evidence. United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 228 (2d Cir. 1997).\nIn arriving at its loss determination, the Court does not need to be exact. However, its\nestimate of loss must still be a reasonable estimate, based upon the evidence. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1,\ncomment. n. B. Additional legal principles that apply to specific aspects of loss are detailed below.\nb. The Government’s Reliance Solely on Inflows to the G-Series Entities is\nFundamentally Flawed\nThe Government asks the Court to adopt a $1.3 billion loss figure based almost entirely on\nits trial exhibit GX Z-26,42 a summary chart derived from analysis performed by the Government’s\n\n41 Note C(iii) defines “pecuniary harm” as monetary harm or harm that is “readily measurable\nin money.”\n42 GX Z-26 was received in evidence at Tr. 4329. A copy is attached hereto as Ex. 13.\n\n---\n\n44\n\nretained expert, Paul Hinton of the Brattle Group. The problem with this reliance is that the Brattle\nGroup’s work consisted of little more than processing bank records and related documents\nprovided by the Government in order to chart the transactions of interest to the Government. The\nwork product, culminating in GX Z-26, was not an independent forensic analysis of investor harm,\nbut a presentation of prosecutorial selections.\nHinton testified that GX Z-26 essentially “was the result of summing up the value of all\nthe transactions in the database, so that’s all the transactions we processed and categorized\naccording to the categories that the government gave us for GTV, Farms, G Club, and Himalaya.”\nTr. 4330. The Brattle Group had no independent understanding of the sources of funds for these\nentities, nor did it have any discretion to deviate from instructions provided by the Government\nabout defining sources of funds. Tr. 4331. It just added up the inflows to each of the categories\ndefined by the Government, based on sources defined by the Government. Tr. 4331, 4355-56.\nHinton was not asked to do any tracing in connection with his analysis. Tr. 4356, 4430. He\ndid not do any detailed flow-of-fund analysis, and thus could not testify how much flowed through\nspecific accounts. Tr. 4458. He did not perform any transaction-level analysis of alleged fraud\nproceeds, or conduct an investor-level accounting of deposits, withdrawals, redemptions, or value\nreceived.\nThere was no evidence, moreover, of the source of “other inflows” of funds that went into\none key account belonging to ACA Capital, a Guo family entity, at First Abu Dhabi Bank. This in\nturn meant that there was no evidence at trial from which any finder of fact could reliably conclude\nthat any alleged fraud proceeds – much less $77 million or $110 million in supposed proceeds\nattributed to the Farm Loans – ever flowed out of that account. See Tr. 4428-30; Ex. 13 at 8. The\nsource of those outflows remains entirely unproven.\n\n---\n\n45\n\nThe Government’s attribution of $517 million in loss to the Himalaya Exchange is similarly\nimpaired. That $517 million figure aggregates gross account inflows without distinguishing\ninvestor deposits from secondary-market trading activity or transfers to other categories such as G\nClub. The Government’s calculation reflects transactional volume only, not any pecuniary loss.\nc. The Government’s “Loss Amount” Improperty Includes Amounts\nAttributable to Conduct for which Mr. Guo was Acquitted\nAs detailed infra, at Part II.B.2, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, as well as a 2024\nGuidelines amendment, preclude inclusion of funds attributable to conduct for which Mr. Guo was\nacquitted in any “loss amount” calculation. That alone excludes the $411 million that the\nGovernment attributes to GTV from inclusion in any “loss amount.”\nd. The Government’s “Loss Amount” Fails to Account for the Volume of\nPurported “Victims” Who Affirmatively Deny They Are “Victims”\n\nAs noted above, this case is markedly dissimilar from the vast majority of fraud cases\nbecause a significant number of investors and customers have come forward to attest that they\nwere not deprived of money or property by fraud. In turn, their investments do not qualify for\ninclusion in any “loss amount.” Among that diverse group are some individuals and entities that\nhave filed petitions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n).\n\nThe impact of those investors’ position is illustrated in United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d\n1010 (2d Cir. 1993), in which the defendants, two lawyers, were accused of deceiving investors\nthey represented for the purpose of purchasing apartments available during a co-op conversion.\nThe alleged fraud consisted of securing for themselves certain opportunities to purchase other\napartments in the building without informing the investors.43\n\nAs the Court summarized in Miller, while\n\n43 A more extended discussion of Miller is included in Mr. Guo’s letter regarding forfeiture,\nECF No. 799, at 4-5.\n\n---\n\n46\n\nthe government contend[ed] that [defendants] diverted to their own benefit property\nintended for the Group; to wit, the Apartments and the profits resulting from their\nresale . . . the government does not surmount the obstacle posed by [the witness’s]\nuncontradicted testimony, which undercuts any understanding as to this specific\nagency relationship that precluded parallel investments by [defendants] in [the\napartment complex’s] apartments in general, or the eight Apartments in particular.\n\nId. at 1020.\n\nThus, while materiality ordinarily would be subject to a “reasonable person” standard,\nMiller establishes otherwise when – as here with so many of the investors and customers – the\npurported “victim” specifically and affirmatively disavows that element, thereby vitiating the\nallegations of fraud with respect to that particular person’s investment. By definition, if an investor\nis not a victim of fraud, then that investor’s investment funds cannot be considered part of any\n“loss amount.”\nAs a result, any “loss amount” herein is diminished in material respects by several\ncategories of persons (or entities) who expressly disavow any status as “victims” of any fraud:\n(1)\nthe 6,512 persons maintaining cryptocurrency accounts with the Himalaya\nExchange. See, e.g., Response of 6.512 Claimants as Members of the Himalaya\nExchange and Their Counsel to Individual Motions, October 22, 2025 (ECF No.\n761) (“HEX Response”);\n(2)\nthe 324 investors in the Hamilton Opportunity Fund SPC (“Hamilton”). See, e.g.,\nSupplemental Third-Party Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner’s Interest in Forfeited\nProperty and to Amend the Prelminary Order of Forfeiture Entered as to Defendant\nMiles Guo, October 22, 2025 (ECF No. 756) (“Hamilton Supplemental”); Third-\nparty Petition to Adjudicate Petitioner’s Interest in Forfeited Property and to Amend\nthe Preliminary Order of Forfeiture, April 7, 2025 (ECF No. 674) (“Hamilton\nPetition”);\n(3)\nthe investors who wrote the Government disclaiming victim status, provided in part\nas discovery at USAO_00112534-USAO_00112564;\n(4)\nthe investors who have contacted defense counsel disclaiming victim status.\nAdded to that significant number are those purported victims whom the Government has\nfailed to identify, but who may be included in any of those four classes of non-victims. Given the\nabundant proof that a considerable number of supposed “victims” reject that classification, it is\n\n---\n\n47\n\nincumbent upon the Government to establish any “loss amount” with sufficient specificity to\npermit the Court to conclude with the requisite confidence that there is any “loss amount” at all.\nThat evaluation requires a Fatico hearing because Mr. Guo disputes the contention that there is\nany loss.\ni.\nThe Himalaya Exchange\nThe Himalaya Exchange (“HEX”) was a viable and popular cryptocurrency exchange, used\nby its investors and users to exchange and make money, which they did. HEX was a commercially\nactive platform and trading HCN was a source of income and profit for many investors who traded\nin HCN.\nGovernment witness Wei Chen testified that she invested more than $500,000 in HCN even\nafter the SEC had seized the money she invested in GTV. Tr. 4499, 4634. In fact, she sold and\npurchased HCN in numerous transactions, sometimes on a seconardary market. Tr. 4671-72. YOU\nARE HERE – add cites from JK The sworn declaration of Wansheng Cheng also documents active\n– and highly profitable – use of HEX. See Ex. 3. Cheng invested approximately $22,000 in HEX,\npurchased 3,000 HCN when they became available, and saw his investment swell to a value of\n$160,000 at its peak. Id. ¶ 15. He relied on HDO and HCN while living in Turkey and Thailand\nafter fleeing China in the wake of persistent CCP interrogations, as well as during further travel en\nroute to the United States, selling 500 HCN at $19 each just prior to HEX being shut down on July\n16, 2024 after the jury verdict in this case. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17, 48. Cheng does not view himself as a\nvictim of any fraud perpetrated by Mr. Guo. Id. ¶ 55.\nAlso, through their counsel, 6,512 members of the Himalaya Exchange – representing\napproximately two-thirds of Himalaya Exchange members, see HEX Response, at 3 – have\nobjected to forfeiture of their accounts (and the assets within them) as proceeds of any fraud – a\nposition that vitiates any claim that it can be considered part of any “loss amount.”  As the HEX\n\n---\n\n48\n\nResponse states, “[m]any investors in the Himalaya Exchange (HEX) have expressed frustration\nat being labeled as victims.” Id. at 2.\nElaborating, the HEX petitioners explicitly reject the Government’s theory of prosecution:\n“[t]he criminal case against [Mr. Guo and his co-defendants] rests on the assertion that they\ndefrauded investors, yet many of these investors insist they were not defrauded and reject the\nvictim label.” Id.\nIn addition, these HEX petitioners effectively concur with Mr. Guo that “[p]rosecutors\nhave not identified specific victims or quantified their alleged losses, which is critical in this\ncontext to substantiate fraud claims.” Id. at 3.\nThese HEX petitioners, moreover, maintain that the only economic harm they suffered was\ndue to the Government’s inappropriate intervention:  “[t]here is no evidence in the record showing\nthat HEX investors suffered losses, except for reputational and financial harm to HEX caused by\nthe government’s actions . . .” in seizing petitioners’ accounts. Id. at 2.\nIndeed, “[t]here is consensus among investors that they were not defrauded by [Guo], Je,\nor Wang, but rather harmed by the U.S. government’s actions, which seized their investments.”\nId. at 3. As they put it, it was the Government that “ironically caused the very financial harm it\naimed to prevent.” Id.\nHCN, moreover, retained value, so investors who held (and continue to hold) HCN were\nprovided assets that retain value, which, as explained infra, at Part II.B.1.e, must be discounted\nfrom any “loss amount.” Upon information and belief, the total number of HCN issued was\n930,222,521, and the closing price the day the Government seized certain HEX accounts\n(September 18, 2022) was $25.30 USD. Subsequently, the closing price on March 15, 2023, the\n\n---\n\n49\n\nday of Mr. Guo’s arrest, was $17.81 USD, and $19.77 USD on July 16, 2024, the day Mr. Guo\nwas convicted.\nThe following day, July 17, 2024, trading in HCN was paused, and the closing price was\n$13.77. See October 22, 2025, Updated and Final Entry of Appearance for Counsel’s 6,512 Clients,\nat 2 (ECF No. 759). Bradford L. Geyer, Esq., the attorney for those 6,512 HCN account-holders,\nstates in that filing that his cllients hold 433,992,619.55 HCN, estimating that the Government’s\ninterference in the HEX, disrupting the HCN market, has cost his clients $5,976,051,078. Id.\nIt is respectfully submitted that the closing price on the day of seizure should be utilized to\ndetermine the value of HCN holdings – $23,534,604,000 – because that event clearly affected the\nprice (a decrease of 30%) more than Mr. Guo’s arrest (since the price had recovered somewhat –\nby 11% – by the time of conviction).\nThat $23.5 billion capitalization of HCN eclipses by nearly 20 times the Government’s\nalleged “loss amount.” Even at the capitalization figures for the date of arrest, or the date of\nconviction, or the next day when trading ceased, the remaining value surpasses the alleged “loss\namount” by orders of magnitude.\nii.\nThe Hamilton Petitioners\nThe Hamilton petitioners advance a similar position. The Hamilton petitioners’ property –\ntotaling $89,992,861.75, see Hamilton Petition at 8 ¶ 20 – “is comprised solely of funds that were\nlawfully invested by the M&A Fund Investors, has no nexus to the conduct charged in either\ncriminal case, and therefore lies wholly outside the scope of property subject to forfeiture in either\nproceeding.” Hamilton Supplemental at 4-5; see also id. ¶ 19 n.6 (investment was “legitimate” and\n“regulated”); id. ¶ 25 (petitioner invested their own funds in a vehicle “wholly unrelated to the\nfraudulent schemes alleged in the [Indictment]”).\n\n---\n\n50\n\nThus, the Hamilton investment cannot constitute a “loss.” The Hamilton petitioners’ funds\nwere not used to commit any of the crimes charged, id. ¶ 26, and “there is no evidence that any of\nthe funds in Account 2770 belonged to Defendant Guo or were ever commingled with tainted\nfunds, such that the Government can argue that seizing Petitioner’s Property satisfies the\nrequirements of 21 U.S.C. § 853.” Id. ¶ 22; see also id. ¶ 27 (“[t]here is no evidence that Defendant\nGuo ever used, directed, or exercised any control over these funds, nor that the funds were part of,\nor the proceeds of, any of Defendant Guo’s criminal activities”).\nMoreover, like the HEX petitioners, the Hamilton petitioners’ position is that they have\nsuffered financially not because of Mr. Guo, but because of the Government’s interference in the\ntransaction for which the Hamilton petitioners’ funds were invested. As the Hamilton Supplement\nrecounts, “[w]hile the transaction did close (Guo Trial, 6/17/2024, 2794:25-2795:4), [the seller]\nnever received the investment money because ‘[t]he money was seized in transit by the U.S.\nMarshals.’ Guo Trial, 6/17/2024, 2796:14-23.” Id. ¶ 26 (footnote omitted).44\niii.\nThe Investors Who Have Either Filed Petitions Pursuant to 21 U.S.C.\n§853(n) or Written the Government Disclaiming Victim Status\nThe public electronic docket in this case includes petitions pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n)\nfrom at least 126 individuals (not including the Hamilton or Himalaya Exchange petitioners)\ninvolving claims totaling more than $28 million. Those petitions, and that total, casts further doubt\non the “loss amount” alleged by the Government.\n\n44 A substantial part of the alleged losses testified to by the Government’s witnesses resulted\nnot from actual losses but from the Government’s seizure of funds in accounts related to GTV, G\nClub, G Bank and Himalaya Exchange. For example, as a result of the GTV seizure, GTV investors\nlost at least 8% of their GTV investments, as 8% was the amount retained by the SEC before\ndistribution pursuant to the SEC’s Fair Fund. Regarding the Farm Loans, payment on those loans\nwas not due until December 1, 2023, and had not been due and payable at the time of seizure by\nthe Government.\n\n---\n\n51\n\nIn addition, discovery produced by the Government included at least one folder containing\n31 emails setting forth complaints by investors that Mr. Guo did not defraud them. That folder is\ndenominated by Bates numbers USAO_00112534-USAO_00112564. Most of the emails do not\nspecify the amount of each individual investment, so a total is impossible to derive from them.\nHowever, those communications should further diminish the potential “loss amount” total even if\nthe amount of investment cannot be quantified.\niv.\nThe Investors Who Have Contacted Defense Counsel\nDefense counsel continues to receive communications from persons who identify\nthemselves as investors in or customers of G-Series entities, and who deny they were victimized.\nThe total number of such statements received currently exceeds 1,000.\nAlso, some have informed counsel that to the extent they lodged complaints to U.S. or\nother authorities regarding Mr. Guo, those complaints were coerced by – and in some instances\nwholly authored by – agents of the CCP. See, e.g., Ex. 3 ¶¶ 36-42 (Declaration of Wansheng\nCheng). Many of the correspondents suffered interrogations and detention by PRC authorities in\nthe process.45\nv.\nThe Unknown Number of Investors Who Deny They Are Victims\nThe discussion above raises the question of how many more persons do not consider\nthemselves victims of any fraud by Mr. Guo. Some may be unaware of the sentencing (and\nattendant forfeiture or remission) proceedings; some may be afraid to come forward because they\nfear retribution from the CCP if they contradict the CCP’s narrative that has endeavored to\n\n45 As noted supra, Part I n. 8, Mr. Guo plans to provide the Court with a supplemental\nsubmission containing represetantive samples of the hundreds of statements received by defense\ncounsel, including those recounting CCP interrogation and coercion.\n\n---\n\n52\n\ndiscredit Mr. Guo for political reasons; and some may not have the means or sophistication to\nunderstand their rights pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §853(n).\nRegardless the reason, it is logical and reasonable to conclude that in this most unusual\ncase the categories listed above do not represent all of the persons in each category (except,\nperhaps, for the Hamilton investors). That “unknown” renders it even more imperative that the\nGovernment be held to its burden to prove the existence of any “loss amount.”\nAt the very least, the amounts attributable to those investors in the categories described\nabove must be eliminated from consideration of any “loss amount.” In turn, given the\nunprecedented nature of the circumstances in this case, the Government must establish with\nprecision any “loss amount” attributable to specific investors. Again, that requires a Fatico\nhearing.46\ne. The Government Fails to Account for Other Offsets That Substantially\nReduce Any “Loss Amount”\nThe $1.3 billion “loss amount” alleged by the Government also fails to account for specific\noffsets that further reduce any “loss amount.” Applicable deductions include redemptions, refunds,\nsettlement payments, the residual value of property that investors retain, and double-counting of\ncertain funds.\nFor example, upon information and belief, HEX made at least $200,000,000 in customer\nredemptions, possibly as much as $268,000,000.. Also, the approximately $487,000,000 obtained\n\n46  Unsurprisingly, for this same reason, the Government has chosen not to seek restitution in\nthe case under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act but rather proceed by way of remission and\n§ 853(n) petitions. The simple and undeniable fact is that the Government cannot identify alleged\n“victims,” or any corresponding “loss amount,” with the requisite precision needed to establish\n“loss.”\n\n---\n\n53\n\nby the SEC in connection with the GTV private placement settlement (also excluded because it is\nbased on acquitted conduct) must be deducted from any loss calculation.\nIn addition, the Government’s erroneous “inflow” theory caused it to double-count money\nthat was subject to account-to-account transfers, which the Government appears never to have\nattempted to parse. As discussed, Government witness Paul Hinton, who conducted certain\nfinancial analysis for the prosecution, testified that he was not asked to, and did not, perform a\ndetailed flow-of-fund analysis, rendering him unable to provide an accounting of funds moving\nfrom one entity or account to another entity or account. Tr. 4458.\nSo, for instance, if an investor used money in a HEX account to buy items through G Club,\nthe Government included in its loss calculations the same money when it was deposited in that\ninvestor’s HEX account, and then again when the same money was transferred to G Club to pay\nfor whatever merchandise the investor had purchased.\nG Club provides a specific example. While G Club may have issued $255 million worth of\nmemberships, not all memberships were paid with fiat currency. G Club accepted HDO and HCN\nas payment methods for G Club membership. Approximately $70 million worth of G Club\nmemberships were issued in exchange for HDO, and approximately $25 million of memberships\nwere issued in exchange for HCN.\nAccordingly, any amount that the Government lists for money sent by individuals to G\nClub is incorrect by approximately $70 million in HDO equivalent purchases as well as at least\n$25 million in HCN equivalent purchases which G Club accepted as payment for memberships.\nTherefore, at least $95 million in account-to-account transfers has been double-counted, and must\nbe removed from any “loss amount.”\n\n---\n\n54\n\nMoreover, other refunds to investors also must be deducted, including G Club refunds\ntotaling at least $1 million. These various payments and accounting errors also require a Fatico\nhearing to resolve.\nf. A Fatico Hearing is Consistent with the Court’s Rulings, and the\nGovernment’s Position, That in this Case “Speculation” and\n“Extrapolation” Based on Limited Investor Experience is Inappropriate\nMr. Guo’s position is wholly consistent with, and reinforced by, the position advanced by\nthe Government and endorsed by the Court during trial with respect to the inferences properly\ndrawn from the experience of a limited quantum of investors.\nWhen addressing the plausible inference to be drawn from the testimony of  defense\nwitness Jianhu Yi, who had testified regarding the pressure and threat campaign that the CCP\nexerted on him, the Government argued strenuously, repetitively, and at length, that the jury should\nnot be allowed to infer from Mr. Yi that what happened to him happened to others.\nAUSA Finkel argued that the Court should not allow argument (and inference) about CCP\nthreats to others because “[t]hat is using speculation to make an argument.” Tr. 5568. The Court\nsustained the Government’s objection, ruling that “[y]ou cannot generalize from Mr. Yi’s\nindividual experience. You cannot speculate that he represents the majority of the complainants,\nbecause we have no evidence about any complainants other than the ones who testified here.” Tr.\n5571. The Court continued, “[d]on’t invite them to speculate.” Tr. 5571.\nWhen the issue was raised again, AUSA Horton reiterated the argument that the defense\ncould not argue an inference beyond Mr. Yi’s own personal circumstances. AUSA Horton\ncontended that “what they’re [the defense] trying to do, and what your Honor ruled on, is to take\na single victim’s, a single investor’s testimony limited to his own experience – and I can go through\nspecific cites in the transcript to show how limited it was – and extrapolate from that to really\n\n---\n\n55\n\nunfortunate innuendo against the victim witnesses in the case, and your Honor said it was a very\nhard no, and that was absolutely correct.” Tr. 5852.\nAgain the Court agreed with the Government’s limiting principle, ruling that the defense\ncould not “generalize and speculate based on the testimony in this case, and so I adhere to my\ndecision.” Tr. 5855.  Yet, that is precisely what the Government seeks to do now at sentencing\nregarding the “loss amount”: “speculate” and “extrapolate” that thousands of investors were\ndefrauded, even though thousands have expressly disclaimed that status.\nThe Government cannot have it both ways. If speculation, extrapolation, and conjecture\nwere not allowed with respect to the inference sought by the defense, it cannot be allowed to\nsupport the unsubstantiated inference proffered by the Government with respect to the “loss\namount.” The same principles must apply here to any “loss amount,” particularly when it could\naccount for such an outsized portion of Mr. Guo’s ultimate Guidelines level.\nIndeed,  at this stage, the defense position  is far less speculative, and far more credible\nand reliable given the thousands of investors who have come forward and filed petitions pursuant\nto 18 U.S.C. § 853(n), and vigorously rejected the claim that they were lied to at all, or that they\nwere induced to make their investments by materially false statements.\n2. Additonal Legal Doctrine Supports a Finding of No Loss\n\nIn addition to the analysis above, there are four independent aspects of the legal doctrine\nthat combine to eliminate any loss in this case:\n(1)\nacquitted conduct – in this case, the conduct alleged in Counts 5, 6, and 12 – cannot\nbe considered for purposes of computing the “loss amount”;\n(2)\ncontrary to the Government’s incorrect position that the “loss amount” is indivisible,\nthe Court must evaluate what portions of the funds invested are properly categorized\nas part of the “loss amount”;\n(3)\nSecond Circuit jurisprudence establishes that a 30-point sentencing enhancement –\nthe amount both the PSR and the Government calculate – requires an enhanced\n\n---\n\n56\n\nburden of proof, borne by the Government, beyond mere preponderance of the\nevidence; and\n(4)\nmany courts have correctly, and for a variety of reasons, concluded that the\nGuidelines’ focus on “loss amount” is disproportionate, not based on empirical\nevidence or experience, and not a valid metric for sentencing purposes.\n\nIn the event the Government maintains that there is some “loss amount,” Mr. Guo\nrespectfully demands a Fatico hearing at which the Government bears the burden of proof to\nprovide evidence in an attempt to establish exactly what that loss is.\na. Acquitted Conduct Cannot Be Used to Calculate Mr. Guo’s Guidelines\nLevel\n\nMr. Guo was acquitted of Counts 5, which charged wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.\n§1343 and § 2 and Count 6, which charged securities fraud in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and\n78ff, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5, and 18 U.S.C. § 2, in relation to the GTV Private Placement investment,\nand Count 12, which charged engaging in and attempting to engage in an unlawful monetary\ntransaction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 and § 2. Yet the Government, and the PSR, would\ninclude the conduct for which Mr. Guo was acquitted in arriving at the “loss amount” for purposes\nof determining the Guidelines offense level.\nWhile the Government relies on United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151 (1997) (per\ncuriam), for the proposition that “the Court may consider at sentencing the GTV-related facts from\nthe trial record[,]” (See ECF No. 716 at 3), in the nearly 30 years since Watts was decided the\nlandscape regarding the treatment of acquitted conduct at sentencing has changed considerably.\nThat is true specifically with respect to the Sentencing Guidelines, as reflected in\nGuidelines amendments as well as doubts expressed by Supreme Court Justices, both of which\nmanifest appreciation of the constitutional dissonance in sentencing a defendant for conduct for\nwhich the jury acquitted.\n\n---\n\n57\n\ni.\nUsing Acquitted Conduct Here Would Violate Mr. Guo’s Fifth and\nSixth Amendment Rights\nAs the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Sixth\nAmendment’s right to trial by jury is among the most “fundamental reservation[s] of power in our\nconstitutional structure.” Id. at 305-306. In addition, that Sixth Amendment right operates in\ncombination with the Fifth Amendment’s right to due process, which “protects the accused against\nconviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the\ncrime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).\nIn that context, Watts decided a narrow issue – “the interaction of the Guidelines with the\nDouble Jeopardy Clause,” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 240 n.4 (2005) – and did not\nendorse ““sentencing enhancement[s]” that exceed the punishment “authorized by the jury\nverdict.” Id. at 240. See also United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 392 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J.,\ndissenting) (“reliance on Watts as authority for enhancements based on acquitted conduct is\nobviously a mistake”); People v. Beck, 939 N.W.2d 213, 224 (Mich. 2019) (finding “Watts\nunhelpful in resolving whether the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing violates due process”\nbecause “Watts addressed only a double-jeopardy challenge”).\nAlso, the Court in Booker specifically cautioned against overreliance on Watts, which “did\nnot even have the benefit of full briefing or oral argument.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 240 n.4; see also,\ne.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12 n.4 (1991) (summary dispositions do “not enjoy the full\nprecedential value of a case argued on the merits”).\nNor are the Sixth Amendment and Due Process implications limited to sentences that\nexceed the statutory maximum because of facts determined by the sentencing court. As Justice\nScalia pointed out in his concurring opinion in Rita, neither Booker nor prior precedent foreclosed\n“as-applied Sixth Amendment challenges to sentences that would not have been upheld as\n\n---\n\n58\n\nreasonable on the facts encompassed by the jury verdict or guilty plea.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 375\n(Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also\nWhite, 551 F.3d at 389 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (“it is clear that the post-Booker development of\nreasonableness review has opened the door for Sixth Amendment challenges” even “to sentences\nwithin the statutory range authorized by the jury’s verdict”).\nSystemic considerations also mandate exclusion of acquitted conduct at sentencing. In the\ncommon-law era, juries deliberately, albeit “indirectly checked” the “severity of sentences” by\nissuing “what today we would call verdicts of guilty to lesser included offenses.” Jones v. United\nStates, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999). For example, juries would “often * * * bring in larceny to be\nunder the value of twelvepence” to avoid a mandatory death sentence.” 4 William Blackstone,\nCommentaries 248.\nNo doubt juries continue to perform that function, even in a non-capital context in which\nthey are not aware of the specific sentences available (although often they are through cross-\nexamination of cooperating witnesses). Disregarding a jury’s conscious choice by re-introducing\nacquitted conduct at sentencing “undermines respect for the law and the jury system.” United\nStates v. Settles, 530 F.3d 920, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.). See also United States v.\nCanania, 532 F.3d 764, 778 n.4 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring) (quoting letter from juror\nto judge calling the use of acquitted conduct a “tragedy” that denigrates “our contribution as\njurors”).\nii.\nThe Impact of the 2024 Sentencing Guidelines Amendment\n\nThe U.S. Sentencing Commission, as part of its 2024 amendments cycle, revised §1B1.3\nto add subsection (c), eliminating acquitted conduct from consideration in calculating a U.S.\n\n---\n\n59\n\nSentencing\nGuidelines\nrange.\nSee\nAmendment\n826,\navailable\nat\nhttp\n\nAmendment 826, effective November 1, 2024, provides that “[r]elevant conduct does not\ninclude conduct for which the defendant was criminally charged and acquitted in federal court,\nunless such conduct also establishes, in whole or in part, the instant offense of conviction.”\nU.S.S.G. §1B1.3(c).\n\nAs Judge Carlton W. Reeves, Chair of the Sentencing Commission declared in announcing\nthe amendment, “Not guilty means not guilty[.]”Sentencing Commission News Release,\n“Commission Votes Unanimously to Pass Package of Reforms Including Limit on Use of\nAcquitted Conduct in Sentencing Guidelines,” April 17, 2024, available at http\nw.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/april-17-2024.\n\nWhen the Amendment was first circulated, Judge Reeves remarked that “‘[w]hat conduct\njudges can consider when using the guidelines’ is . . . ‘of foundational and of fundamental\nimportance to the operation of the entire federal justice system.’” Id. (quoting Prof. Douglas\nBerman), available at http\nhearings-andmeetings/20230405/20230405_transcript.pdf.\n\nNor can any other offense of conviction in this case serve as a “backdoor” for including\nacquitted conduct in any “loss amount” calculation. Not only would that completely defeat the\npurpose of the 2024 Guidelines amendment, and subvert Booker and the Sixth and Fifth\nAmendments, but it would be contrary to longstanding doctrine that when a jury convicts on a\nmulti-object conspiracy, the insufficiency of evidence with respect to one prong does not warrant\nreversal of a conviction because the jury is presumed to have returned its verdict on the objective\nfor which there was sufficient evidence. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1992).\n\n---\n\n60\n\nHere, Griffin counsels that the jury, finding the GTV prong insufficient, would not have\nconsidered it sufficient for the other counts in which (for purposes of sentencing analysis only) it\ndetermined that other objects were sufficient to justify a conviction. That applies not only to\nconspiracy, but also to the RICO charges, which require predicate acts of racketeering. The jury’s\nacquittal precludes any conclusion that the GTV private placement could have served as a RICO\npredicate.\n\nSimilarly, regarding money laundering, the jury could not have considered money raised\nthrough GTV to constitute the predicate “specified unlawful activity” required by 18 U.S.C.\n§1956(h), because the jury acquitted on the GTV-related counts.\n\nAccordingly, inclusion of the acquitted conduct in this case in any “loss amount”\ncalculation is precluded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.\niii.\nThe Reservations Expressed by Supreme Court Justices Regarding\nUse of Acquitted Conduct for Sentencing Purposes\n\nThe Sentencing Commission’s action also removed an obstacle to the Supreme Court’s\nconsideration of the issue. See McClinton v. United States, 600 U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 2400 (2023)\n(Sotomayor, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari); id. at 2403 (Kavanaugh, J., joined\nby Gorsuch, J., and Barrett, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari).\n\nIn McClinton, in denying the petition for certiorari, both Justice Sotomayor and Justice\nKavanaugh expressed interest in revisiting Watts. For example, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that\n“[a]s many jurists have noted, the use of acquitted conduct to increase a defendant’s Sentencing\nGuidelines range and sentence[] raises important questions that go to the fairness and perceived\nfairness of the criminal justice system.” 143 S. Ct. at 2401  (citing  Jones v. United States, 574\nU.S. 948, 949-950 (2014) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting from denial\nof certiorari)); United States v. Bell, 808 F. 3d 926, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J.,\n\n---\n\n61\n\nconcurring in denial of reh’g en banc); United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F. 3d 1328, 1331\n(10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); Watts, 519 U. S. at 170 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (footnotes\nomitted).47\n\nJustice Sotomayor also explained that “[t]he Court’s denial of certiorari today should not\nbe misinterpreted[]” because “[t]he Sentencing Commission, which is responsible for the\nSentencing Guidelines, has announced that it will resolve questions around acquitted-conduct\nsentencing in the coming year.” 143 S. Ct. at 2403. Justice Sotomayor added that “[i]f the\nCommission does not act expeditiously or chooses not to act, however, this Court may need to take\nup the constitutional issues presented.” Id;  see also United States v. Coleman, 138 F.4th 489, 511-\n512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 275 (2025) (“In denying the petition for certiorari in\nMcClinton, four Supreme Court justices encouraged the United States Sentencing Commission to\nresolve questions around the use of acquitted conduct at sentencing . . . Ten months later, the\nSentencing Commission heeded the call”).48\n\nJustice Sotomayor elaborated that “[t]here are also concerns about procedural fairness and\naccuracy when the State gets a second bite at the apple with evidence that did not convince the\n\n47  In Bell, Justice Kavanaugh, while serving on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,\nrecognized that “[a]llowing judges to rely on acquitted or uncharged conduct to impose higher\nsentences than they otherwise would impose seems a dubious infringement of the rights to due\nprocess and to a jury trial.” 808 F. 3d at 928 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of reh’g en\nbanc). Likewise, in United States v. Sabillon-Umana, Justice Gorsuch, while serving on the U.S.\nCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, questioned the assumption “that a district judge may either\ndecrease or increase a defendant’s sentence (within the statutorily authorized range) based on facts\nthe judge finds without the aid of a jury or the defendant’s consent.” 772 F. 3d at 1331.\n48  Justice Kavanaugh echoed that “the Court’s denial of certiorari today should not be\nmisinterpreted[,]” 143 S. Ct. at 2403, adding that “[t]he use of acquitted conduct to alter a\ndefendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range raises important questions.” Id. Again, though, Justice\nKavanaugh noted that because “the Sentencing Commission is currently considering the issue[,]”\nit would be “appropriate for this Court to wait for the Sentencing Commission’s determination\nbefore the Court decides whether to grant certiorari in a case involving the use of acquitted\nconduct.” Id.\n\n---\n\n62\n\njury coupled with a lower standard of proof.” 143 S. Ct. at 2402. Justice Sotomayor also noted that\n“[m]any other state and federal judges have questioned the practice.” 143 S. Ct. at 2401 n.2\n(citations omitted).\n\nIn addition, in McClinton, Justice Sotomayor observed that\nacquitted-conduct sentencing also raises questions about the public’s perception\nthat justice is being done, a concern that is vital to the legitimacy of the criminal\njustice system. Various jurists have observed that the woman on the street would\nbe quite taken aback to learn about this practice. See, e.g., United States v. Canania,\n532 F. 3d 764, 778 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring).\nId., at 2402-03.\n\nWatts, of course, was decided without the benefit of these subsequent developments.49\nAmendment 826 reflects the resolution of the issue and clearly prohibits the use of acquitted\nconduct in determing the applicable Guidelines level. See United States v. Johnson, 754 F. Supp.3d\n305, 312-13 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (noting, in light of the promulgation of Amendment 826, and citing\nMcClinton, that “[t]he practice of sentencing defendants based on acquitted conduct is now firmly\ndisfavored”).\n\nHere, in seeking to include the GTV Private Placement funds in the “loss amount” for\npurposes of the Guidelines calculation, the Government attempts to circumvent not only both the\nletter and spirit of Amendment 826, and the constitutional protections it vindicates, but also the\nclear and consistent momentum undermining Watts.50 Consequently, the acquitted conduct cannot\ncontribute to the “loss amount” determined for Guidelines purposes.\n\n49  Even Watts did not mandate consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing; rather, it held\nonly that there existed “no prohibition against considering . . . acquitted conduct[.]” 519 U.S. at\n152-155.\n50  Even prior to Watts Judge Oakes noted in reluctant concurrence (bound by prevailing Circuit\nlaw) the incongruity of permitting acquitted conduct to contribute to a defendant’s punishment:\n\nwe hold that a person’s sentence for crimes of which he has been convicted may\nbe multiplied fourfold by taking into account conduct of which he has been\n\n---\n\n63\n\nb. Specific Legal Principles Significantly Reduce the “Loss Amount” in this\nCase\n\nSeveral principles developed by the courts in assessing “loss amount” also apply here,  and\nrequire a Fatico hearing. For example, in United States v. Byors, 586 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2009), the\nCourt applied Application Note 3(E), which “provides that the loss should be reduced, or offset,\nby ‘[t]he money returned, and the fair market value of the property returned and the services\nrendered, by the defendant . . . to the victim before the offense was detected.” 586 F.3d at 226\n(quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3(E)(I)).\n\nConsistent with that Application Note, the Court credited the amounts repaid to the victims.\nId.; see also United States v. Avenatti, 2024 WL 4553810 at *2 (9th Cir. October 23, 2024)\n(Guidelines require sentencing courts to credit against loss the money defined in § 2B1.1 cmt.\nn.3(E)(I)).\n\nHowever, the defendant in Byors also argued that other “amounts should not be counted\ntowards the loss because investors received something of value in exchange for their money –\naccording to Byors these investors received what they were promised.” Byors, 586 F.3d at 226.\nThe Court agreed in principle but noted that “[u]nlike the cases defendant relies upon, however,\ndefendant’s victims [in Byors] were left with nothing of value when the fraud was uncovered.” Id.\n\nThus, the Court in Byors distinguished the circumstances from those in United States v.\nLeonard, 529 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir.2008), in which, as the Court in Byors described, the Second\nCircuit ruled that “the District Court erred in calculating loss based on the total value investors\npaid for securities . . . noting that ‘investors did obtain an interest in a company engaged in\n\nacquitted. This is jurisprudence reminiscent of Alice in Wonderland. “Acquittal\nfirst, sentence afterwards.”\n\nUnited States v. Frias, 39 F.3d 391, 392-394 (2d Cir. 1994) (Oakes, J., concurring).\n\n---\n\n64\n\nproducing and distributing a motion picture’ and that the securities likely had some ‘actual value.’”\n586 F.3d at 226.\n\nSimilarly, in United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008), the Court, analyzing\nan Application Note  relating to the determination of “loss amount” in cases involving loan fraud,\nconcluded that the “amended Note 7(b) [to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1] gives the defendant credit for\nobjective facts – payments prior to discovery of fraud and assets pledged to secure the loan – that\nmight alter a loss calculation if based solely on face amounts of loan applications.” Id. at 151; see\nalso United States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555, 558–59 (7th Cir.1991) (describing it as “simple”\nbut “irrational” to treat all frauds as equivalent to thefts, and opting instead to consider whether\nthe defendant intended in fact to retain the face value of the amount he had obtained through the\nmisrepresentation).51\n\nIn Confredo, the Court also discussed United States v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168 (2d Cir.2004),\nin which, according to the Court in Confredo,\na doctor caused his office to submit to medicare and medicaid insurers bills that\nwere higher than the fixed rates established by the Government for the services\nprovided. See id. at 176-77, 193. The district court determined intended loss based\non the combined total of the face value of the bills. See id. at 193. The defendant\nargued that he never intended to receive full reimbursement because he knew the\nrate schedules were carved in stone.\n528 F.3d at 152. The Court in Singh went on to rule that the defendant ““should have a further\nopportunity on remand to show, if he can, that the total amount he expected to receive from the\ninsurers was indeed less than the amounts he actually billed.” 390 F.3d at 194; see also Confredo,\n528 F.3d at 152.\n\n51 In Confredo, the Court noted that “[a]lthough the dispute concerns only one level of\nenhancement, the difference between the resulting maximums of the two arguably applicable\nranges is 27 months.” 528 F.3d at 149. Here, of course, the difference is significantly larger.\n\n---\n\n65\n\nIn Avenatti, which involved a 20-point “loss amount” enhancement, in addition to requiring\ncredit for monies returned to the clients defrauded by defendant, a lawyer who pilfered case\nsettlement funds, the Ninth Circuit also pointed out that “even if Avenatti acted lawfully, his clients\nwould not have received the full settlement amounts.” 2024 WL 4553810 at *1.\n\nConsequently, “[b]y finding that Avenatti’s victims ‘lost’ the full settlement value without\naccounting for Avenatti's fees and costs, the district court enhanced Avenatti’s sentence based on\npecuniary harm that did not occur, and did not ‘result[ ] from [Avenatti's] offense.’” Id. (quoting\nU.S.S.G. §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(I)). The Ninth Circuit concluded that “[s]uch services rendered to\nthe victim must be deducted from the restitution owed.”Id. at *2 (citing United States v. Gagarin,\n950 F.3d 596, 607 (9th Cir. 2020)).\n\nThe Court in Avenatti added that the over-inclusion in the “loss amount” “was contrary to\nthe purpose of the loss enhancement, which is to ensure that a defendant's sentence is proportional\nto the harm he caused.” Id. at *1 (citing § 2B1.1 cmt. Background).52\n\nMore recently, in the forfeiture context, in United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d\nCir. 2024), the Second Circuit expressed the same reservations with respect to blanket assertions\nof forfeiture based on a universe of transactions that were not uniformly fraudulent. In Rainford,\nthe Government’s position was based on a witness’s statement that 40 percent of defendant’s law\nfirm’s cases were of the “slip and fall” variety, but the Court determined that even that 40 percent\nshould have been reduced by another 20 percent  because only 80 percent of those cases were\nfraudulent. Id. at 489.\n\n52  In Avenatti, the Court also distinguished between “loss amount” and forfeiture. 2024 WL\n4553810, at *2 (remanding and directing “the district court to account for the fair market value of\nAvenatti’s legal services and costs in its ‘actual loss’ calculation, without any reliance on\nforfeiture”).\n\n---\n\n66\n\nThus, the Court in Rainford vacated the forfeiture judgment in part because “even if the\ngovernment’s allegations about [the witness’s] statements had been corroborated, the government\narrived at the forfeiture amount by crediting only part of [that] statement.” Id. As the Court stated,\n“[n]either the government nor the district court has explained why the initial forfeiture request of\n$1.6 million should be cut by 60 percent but the resulting $644,000 should not be cut by another\n20 percent to account for slip-and-fall claims that were not fraudulent.” Id.\n\nIn addition, in calculating forfeiture, the Court in Rainford declared that the “Government’s\nword is not evidence.” Id. Thus, in this case, the Government’s assertions that “Guo then continued\nto defraud his followers with a series of interconnected schemes, including the GTV private\nplacement in 2020,” and that “the GTV placement was connected with and integral to the other\narms of the G Enterprise,” ECF No. 716 at 3, are neither evidentiary nor conclusive.\n\nNor are they substantiated. As a result, they are as unpersuasive for purposes of “loss\namount” as they are for forfeiture. See Rainford, 110 F.4th at 489 (while a “district court may take\n‘general points of reference as a starting point for calculating the losses or gains,’ [] an\nunsubstantiated government claim is not a ‘point[ ] of reference’”) (internal citation omitted).\n\nAll these factors – money returned to investors (including redemptions), the value of the\ninvestment an investor retained regardless of the fraud, the fair market value of fees, costs, and\nservices, and whether sufficient evidence established that Mr. Guo intended to retain all of an\ninvestor’s contribution – all serve to reduce the “loss amount” considerably in this case.\nc. Multi-Level Guidelines Enhancements Require a Higher Burden of Proof\n\nDuring the era prior to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Second Circuit,\nas a remedial measure designed to soften the impact of the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines,\nestablished a process through which sentencing courts could ensure that dramatic increases in a\n\n---\n\n67\n\ndefendant’s offense level, imposed by either adjustments or inclusion of relevant conduct, could\nbe alleviated by a secondary level of analysis that subjected the facts to a more demanding standard\nof proof. If those facts did not meet that standard, a downward departure (or, in the post-Booker\nera, a downward variance) from the Guidelines range would be appropriate.\n\nIn addressing the burden of proof issue in the pre-Booker environment, the Second Circuit\nseveral times grappled with the inexorable tension between a defendant’s Due Process and Sixth\nAmendment rights at sentencing, and the preponderance of the evidence standard. For example, in\nUnited States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit clarified its\nvarious opinions on the issue, explaining that\nthe enhancement of a sentence based upon a defendant’s “relevant conduct,” if done\nwithout regard to the weight of the evidence proving the relevant conduct, may\nresult in a total term of incarceration which is excessive, inappropriate, and\nunintended under Sentencing Guidelines.\n\nId. at 708.\n\nThe Court in Cordoba-Murgas cited and quoted from United States v. Gigante, 94 F.3d 53\n(2d Cir. 1996), which included adjustments within that framework:\nthe preponderance standard is no more than a threshold basis for adjustments and\ndepartures, and the weight of the evidence, at some point along a continuum of\nsentence severity, should be considered with regard to both upward adjustments\nand upward departures. With regard to upward adjustments, a sentencing judge\nshould require that the weight of the factual record justify a sentence within the\nadjusted Guidelines range.\n94 F.3d at 56; see also United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 390 (2d Cir. 1992) and 983\nF.2d at 393-95 (Newman, J., concurring).\nUnder such circumstances, the Court in Gigante instructed that in making its\ndetermination,the Court may examine whether the conduct underlying multiple\nupward adjustments was proven by a standard greater than that of preponderance,\nsuch as clear and convincing or even beyond a reasonable doubt where appropriate.\n\n---\n\n68\n\n94 F.3d at 56.\n\nThe Court in Gigante added, “[w]here a higher standard, appropriate to a substantially\nenhanced sentence range, is not met, the court should depart downwardly.” Id. In Cordoba-\nMurgas, the Court similarly declared that “the factual finding by a preponderance of the evidence\nis a preliminary step susceptible to adjustment.” 233 F.3d at 709. The Court also authorized\ndownward departures when the appropriate standard of proof was not satisfied, id. at 708, and\nprovided the following direction to sentencing courts after finding such enhancements or relevant\nconduct by a preponderance of the evidence:\nunder the combination of circumstances that may be present here, including (i)  an\nenormous upward adjustment (ii)  for uncharged conduct (iii)  not proved at trial\nand (iv)  found by only a preponderance of the evidence, (v)  where the court has\nsubstantial doubts as to the accuracy of the finding, the Court would be authorized\nto depart downward from the scheduled adjustment by reason of the extraordinary\ncombination of circumstances.\nId. at 708 (citing United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 389); see also United States v. Allen,\n644 F. Supp.2d 422, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (footnote omitted).\n\nSince Booker, that doctrine has not been disturbed. See United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d\n518 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing both Cordoba-Murgos and Gigante in addressing whether acquitted\nconduct could be used in calculating a Guidelines range); United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694 (2d\nCir. 2007) (citing Cordoba-Murgas in holding that allegations in an indictment were by themselves\ninsufficient to justify an enhanced sentence).\n\nIndeed, the Cordoba-Murgas doctrine was applied in United States v. Allen, 644 F. Supp.2d\n422 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), in which the Court found certain relevant conduct by the preponderance\nstandard, yet noted that “the Guidelines are not mandatory[,]” id. at 434 (footnote omitted), and\nthat “were defendants to be sentenced in accordance with the Guidelines, a downward departure\nmight be appropriate.” Id. at 435.\n\n---\n\n69\n\nIn examining the conduct – which the Court concluded it had “no doubt that [it] in fact\noccurred,” although adding that it was equally “skeptical that any rational jury could make this\nfinding beyond a reasonable doubt,” id. (footnote omitted) – the Court in Allen remarked that “[t]he\nsituation in Cordoba-Murgas exactly parallels that of these defendants” because “[t]he related\nconduct increases their sentencing exposure at least five-fold for conduct proven only by a\npreponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 435 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).\n\nIn addition, the Court in Allen reasoned that “[w]ere the Guidelines mandatory, and no\ndownward departure available, this situation would present serious constitutional problems. Due\nprocess of law has little meaning if it does not protect citizens from such arbitrary exercises of\npower.” Id. at 434.\n\nThe discretion Cordoba-Murgas and its successors in the post-Booker environment afford\nsentencing courts for the purpose of ameliorating disproportionate enhancements and/or relevant\nconduct has been amplified since Booker by the Guidelines’ status as merely advisory, and the\nadded consideration of § 3553(a)’s sentencing factors that are balanced against the Guidelines’\nseverity. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 176 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that question\nof standard of proof is less compelling because Booker makes all Guidelines findings “in the end,\nonly advisory”) ; United States v. Salazar, 489 F.3d 555, 558 (2d Cir. 2007) (“the discretion\nafforded district judges by Booker applies only to their consideration of a Guidelines range as one\nof the § 3553(a) factors after that range has been calculated”).53\n\n53  The panel’s statement in Jones that “[i]n light of this Court’s continual application of the\npreponderance of the evidence standard, it is incorrect to construe the [] language [in United States\nv. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085, 1089 (2d Cir. 1997)] as authorizing the use of a higher standard of\nproof[,]” 531 F.3d at 176, which would appear to deprive the Court of discretion to follow\nCordoba-Murgas and Gigante, are at best confusing and inconsistent. Neither Cordoba-Murgas\nnor Gigante has ever been overruled; indeed, the cases that reassert the preponderance standard –\ni.e., Vaughn, and even Jones itself – all cite Cordoba-Murgas as authority while inexplicably\n\n---\n\n70\n\nConsequently, it is respectfully submitted that the formulation in Cordoba-Murgas should\nbe applied here to “loss amount.54  Such a potential drastic increase in Mr. Guo’s sentence – 30\npoints –  requires attendant safeguards regarding the burden of proof in order to protect Mr. Guo’s\nFifth and Sixth Amendment rights.\n\nIndeed, Due Process places constraints on the information a court can consider and/or rely\nupon, and what measure of reliability is required before it can do so. Here, the “loss amount”\nalleged by the Government fails to surpass any applicable burden of proof, and at the very least\nrequires a Fatico hearing, with an appropriately exacting burden of proof. Due Process and the\nSixth Amendment do not permit any less.\nd. The 30-Point Enhancement Pursuant to § 2B1.1 Irrationally Influences\nMr. Guo’s Applicable Sentencing Guidelines Range\n\nEven if all the foregoing arguments did not eliminate the “loss amount,” the extraordinary\nimpact of the 30-point enhancement for loss amount pursuant to § 2B1.1 on Mr. Guo's applicable\n\nignoring the remainder of Cordoba-Murgas’s instruction to the District Court – namely, that it is\nat least permissible, and even appropriate, to calibrate the burden of proof proportionately with the\neffect a particular adjustment or set of facts exerts on a defendant’s Guidelines level, and depart\ndownward accordingly. In addition, the comment in Jones that the language in Shonubi was merely\ndictum, 531 F.3d at 176, is perplexing because the relevant passage in Shonubi declares “though\nthe Sentencing Commission has favored the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for resolving\nall disputed fact issues at sentencing, U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3., p.s., comment., we have ruled that a more\nrigorous standard should be used in determining disputed aspects of relevant conduct where such\nconduct, if proven, will significantly enhance a sentence.” 103 F.3d at 1085.\n54  Nor does the opinion in United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2008), alter the\nanalysis. In Yannotti, the jury convicted the defendant of RICO conspiracy but deadlocked on the\nsubstantive RICO count. Id. at 118. The jury also deadlocked on an alleged kidnaping conspiracy,\nid. at 119, and the Court made the unremarkable determination that it “could be factored into\nYannotti’s sentence as relevant conduct pursuant to §1B1.3.” Id. at 128. The Court did not address\nCordoba-Murgas or Gigante, or whether the effect of the relevant conduct could be moderated by\nimposition of a higher burden of proof and a downward departure, as those cases authorize.\n\nInterestingly, too, in Yannotti, while the jury had marked on the verdict sheet “not proven”\nwith respect to murders and attempted murders, id. at 118-19, apparently that conduct was not\nincluded in the Guidelines calculation or sentence as relevant conduct (but only the kidnaping\nconspiracy was in dispute). Id. at 127-28.\n\n---\n\n71\n\nGuidelines range has, in similar cases, been rejected by courts because it is disproportionate,\ndistorts the sentencing process, and merits amelioration by greater reliance on other § 3553(a)\nfactors.\n\nThe Guidelines levels in financial fraud cases are driven principally by the “loss amount”\nadjustment. Yet Courts have criticized the rigid and arbitrary nature of the Guidelines in this\ncontext, recognizing the injustice “that sometimes results from the guidelines’ fetish with abstract\narithmetic, as well as the harm that guideline calculations can visit on human beings if not cabined\nby common sense.” United States v. Adelson, 441 F.Supp.2d 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d 301\nFed. App’x. 93 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United  States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 745, 754\n(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (describing “Sentencing Guidelines for white-collar crimes” as “a black stain on\ncommon sense” and sentencing defendant “to a term of incarceration of 60 months in the face of\nan advisory guidelines range of 360 to life”); United States v. Emmenegger, 329 F. Supp. 2d 416,\n427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Lynch, J.) (“[t]he Guidelines place undue weight on the amount of loss\ninvolved in the fraud”).\n\nScholars and commentators, too, have recognized the inordinate impact of “loss amount”\non sentencing in fraud cases. See, e.g., Derek R. Vollrath, Losing the Loss Calculation:  Toward a\nMore Just Sentence Regime in White-Collar Criminal Case, 59 Duke L.J. 1001, 1025 (2010)\n(“Guidelines fail to achieve justice in white-collar criminal cases. Their sentencing\nrecommendations are irrationally high and, due to the Guidelines’ overemphasis on the loss\ncalculation, fail to accurately reflect a defendant’s culpability”); Frank O. Bowman III, Sentencing\nHigh-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds after Booker, 20 Fed. Sent. R. 167, 169, 2008 WL 2201039\nat *4 (Feb. 2008) (“since Booker, virtually every judge faced with a top-level corporate fraud\ndefendant in a very large fraud has concluded that sentences called for by the Guidelines were too\n\n---\n\n72\n\nhigh. This near unanimity suggests that the judiciary sees a consistent disjunction between the\nsentences prescribed by the Guidelines [in corporate fraud cases] and the fundamental requirement\nof § 3553(a) that judges impose sentences ’sufficient but not greater than necessary’ to comply\nwith its objectives”).\n\nIndeed, other examples abound. In United States v. Faibish, Judge Vitaliano remarked that\n“the guidelines, even with its slight revisions, are just mindlessly accelerated once you have\nnumbers of any size added in the loss or gain table.” Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, United\nStates v. Faibish, No. 12-CR-265 (E.D.N.Y., March 10, 2016) (ECF No. 271 at 23-27). In Faibish\nJudge Vitaliano sentenced a defendant convicted of fraud, with a Guidelines level of life, and with\na “cap” of 80 years  to a prison term of 63 months. Id. at 54; see also Robert J. Anello and Richard\nF. Albert, “Rise of ABA Task Force's ‘Shadow Sentencing Guidelines,’” New York Law Journal,\nApril 5, 2016, available at http (“Shadow\nSentencing”) (noting that in United States v. Litvak, 3:13-CR-19 (D. Conn. July 23, 2014), Chief\nJudge Janet C. Hall sentenced a defendant to 24 months’ imprisonment for securities fraud even\nthough the Guidelines recommendation in the PSR was 108-135 months).55\n\n55  See Transcript of Sentencing Proceeding, United States v. Litvak, 3:13-CR-19 (D. Conn.\nJuly 23, 2014) (ECF No. 298 at 135-136, 141-47, 158).  In Litvak, Judge Hall expressed the\nconcern that the Guidelines ”loss” table ”overwhelms” all the other factors to be considered. As\nJudge Hall noted further, ”I think 60 percent of the total offense is attributable to just sheer dollars\nwithout any regard for any other characteristics of the offense. Therefore, I don't find the\nGuidelines helpful at all.” Id.  at 142.\n\nOn appeal, Litvak’s conviction was reversed in part, vacated in part and remanded. United\nStates v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015). On remand, Litvak was retried and again convicted\non the securities fraud count. On May 2, 2017, Judge Hall again sentenced Litvak, , to 24 months\nimprisonment. ECF No. 542.\n\n---\n\n73\n\nSimilarly, in United States v. Ferguson, 584 F. Supp.2d 447 (D. Conn. 2008), the Court\nimposed sentences on five defendants ranging from one-year-and-one-day to four years for their\nroles in a $500 million fraud, notwithstanding an advisory Guidelines range of life in prison.\nIn United States v. Hundley, 02-CR- 441 (LAP) (S.D.N.Y. 2005), four defendants were\nconvicted at trial of conspiracy, bank fraud (involving a loss of approximately $100 million) and\ntax fraud (for evading approximately $29 million in taxes).\nTwo of the defendants additionally were convicted of making false statements and one was\nconvicted of perjury. Yet Judge Preska sentenced the defendants well below their Guidelines\nranges. For example, the defendant convicted of making false statements, but not perjury, faced a\nGuidelines range of 78 to 97 months; he was sentenced to prison for one-year-and-one-day.\n\nIn Adelson, a case involving a conviction at trial for accounting fraud at a publicly traded\ncompany that resulted in a $260 million loss to shareholders, and in which the Court imposed a\n42-month prison sentence despite a Guidelines Total Offense Level of 46 (with a range of 360\nmonths to life imprisonment), Judge Rakoff elaborated on the absence of an underlying rationale\nfor the Guidelines’ fraud loss table:\n[a]s many have noted, the Sentencing Guidelines, because of their arithmetic\napproach and also in an effort to appear “objective”, tend to place great weight on\nputatively measurable quantities, such as weight of drugs in narcotics cases or the\namount of financial loss in fraud cases, without, however, explaining why it is\nappropriate to accord such huge weight to such factors. See generally Kate Stith\n& Jose Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 69\n(1998).\n441 F.Supp.2d at 509 (emphasis added).56\n\n56  In addition, when, as here, as in many fraud cases, the “loss” amount is alleged to exceed\n$1 billion and additional enhancements are added, those enhancements necessarily overlap\nbecause enhancements already are baked into a high loss figure. See United States v. Lauerson,\n362 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Lauerson, 348 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2003); United States\nv. Jackson, 364 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2003). For instance, the PSR in this case includes a two-point\n\n---\n\n74\n\nThe absence of an empirical rationale for the dominance of the loss table, and/or the lack\nof an explanation “why it is appropriate to accord such huge weight to” the table, in sentencing in\nfraud cases has troubled courts. In United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013), Judge\nUnderhill, concurring, commented that “[t]he loss guideline . . . was not developed by the\nSentencing Commission using an empirical approach based on data about past sentencing\npractices.” Id. at 379 (Underhill, J., concurring); see also United States v. Algahaim, 842 F.3d 796,\n800 (2d Cir. 2016) (“[t]his approach, unknown to other sentencing systems, was one the\nCommission was entitled to take, but its unusualness is a circumstance that a sentencing court is\nentitled to consider”).\n\nIn fact, the loss Guidelines suffer from an original, fundamental, and material flaw that\ncompromises its capacity to provide an empirical basis:  in calculating the “average” pre-\nGuidelines sentence for fraud cases, the Sentencing Commission included only sentences of\nimprisonment, and excluded all sentences of probation, thereby distorting the Guidelines not only\nin favor of imprisonment, but also in favor of longer terms of imprisonment. See U.S. Sent'g\nComm'n, Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements, Table\n1(a), p. 22, 34 (1987), at 22, 24 (referring to Table 1(a) at 27), available at http\n\nGuidelines enhancement for more than ten victims, pursuant to § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) (PSR ¶ 114),\nwhich is essentially automatic in modern financial fraud cases. In United States v. Dorvee, 604\nF.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2010), amended 616 F.3d 174, 186 (2d Cir. 2010), the Court cautioned that\nGuidelines enhancements “that are all but inherent to the crime of conviction” can inappropriately\nand disproportionately increase a Guidelines level beyond the point of reasonableness, and that in\nsuch instances, because “adherence to the Guidelines” can lead to a result “fundamentally\nincompatible with § 3553(a),” a sentencing court could correct that imbalance through analysis of\nother § 3553(a) factors. 604 F.3d at 96. That is true with respect to the two-point “sophisticated\nmoney laundering” enhancement under § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B) (PSR ¶ 116) and the four-point\nenhancement for “organizer or leader of criminal activity that involved 5 or more participants”\nunder § 3B1.1(a) (PSR ¶ 118).\n\n---\n\n75\n\nThat was no small omission, since in 1984 nearly 40% of all defendants were sentenced to\nstraight probation. Due to that original bias in favor of imprisonment, “the Sentencing\nCommission’s loss enhancement numbers do not result from any reasoned determination of how\nthe punishment can best fit the crime, nor any approximation of the moral seriousness of the\ncrime.” United States v. Johnson, 2018 WL 1997975, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. April 27, 2018).\n\nInstead, “the numbers assigned by the Sentencing Commission to various sentencing\nfactors appear to be more the product of speculation, whim, or abstract number-crunching than of\nany rigorous methodology – thus maximizing the risk of injustice.” United States v. Gupta, 904 F.\nSupp.2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014). As the Court noted in\nGupta, in focusing largely on the amount of monetary gain or loss occasioned by an offense, the\nSentencing Commission “effectively ignored the statutory requirements that federal sentencing\ntake many factors into account, see 18 U.S.C. §3553(a), and, by contrast, effectively guaranteed\nthat many such sentences would be irrational on their face.” Id.; see also Johnson, 2018 WL\n1997975, at *4 (describing the loss enhancement as a “grievous wrong” and noting “the rigidity\nof the loss amount overriding the diverse reality of complex financial crimes [and] the lack of any\nconsideration of danger to society[]”).\n\nCommentators, too, have expressed reservations. See Mark H. Allenbaugh, “Drawn from\nNowhere:” A Review of the U.S. Sentencing Commission's White-Collar Sentencing Guidelines\nand Loss Data, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 19, 22 (2013); Jillian Hewitt, Fifty Shades of Gray: Sentencing\nTrends in Major White-Collar Cases, 125 Yale L. J. 1018, 1025 (2016) (concluding that review of\nthe post-[United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)] sentencing data “empirically\ncorroborate[d] scholarly criticism that the loss table often vastly overstates the seriousness of an\noffense”).\n\n---\n\n76\n\nIndeed, some have termed the Sentencing Guidelines “fundamentally broken” in high-loss\ncases. See Frank O. Bowman, III, “Comment on Proposed Amendments to Economic Crime\nGuideline, § 2B.1.1,” Feb. 19, 2015, at 2 (citing remarks of Judge Patti B. Saris, Jan. 9, 2015,\navailable at htt\nmeetings/20150109/Remarks.pdf); see also Shadow Sentencing.\n\nThus, the amount of loss is often “a kind of accident[,]” and thus a “relatively weak\nindicator of [] moral seriousness . . . or the need for deterrence.” Emmenegger, 329 F.Supp.2d at\n427. As the Supreme Court instructed in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), when\nthe Sentencing Commission has failed to base its formulation of a guideline upon empirical\nevidence of pre-Guidelines practice and/or review and revision based on judicial decisions and\nsentencing data, or when a guideline “do[es] not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its\ncharacteristic institutional role” because the Commission “did not take account of empirical data\nand national experience,” the sentencing court is free to conclude that the guideline “yields a\nsentence greater than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case” and\n“may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations.” Id. at 101, 109-110;\nsee also Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 264-66 (2009).57\n\nThus, in Corsey, Judge Underhill counseled that “the low marginal utility of the guideline\nin this very high intended loss case should have prompted greater, not lesser, reliance on the section\n3553(a) factors other than the Guidelines.” 723 F.3d at 380. The Court in Corsey  additionally\n\n57  That judicial deference is not required in this instance has been reinforced by the Supreme\nCourt’s decision in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024); see also Van Loon v.\nDep’t of the Treasury, 122 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2024) (applying Loper-Bright to the Office of\nForeign Assets Control’s interpretation of statutory language in the International Emergency\nEconomic Powers Act).\n\n---\n\n77\n\nnoted that the loss Guidelines are “fundamentally flawed, especially as loss amounts climb. The\nhigher the loss amount, the more distorted is the guideline’s advice to sentencing judges.” Id.\n\nHere, the distortion generated by the alleged loss amount’s impact on Mr. Guo’s Guidelines\nlevel is aggravated by the uncertainty with respect to determining an accurate and reliable loss\namount. In turn, the questions regarding a verifiable loss amount reinforce the need for a Fatico.\n\nWritten in another time and for a different purpose, Albert Einstein’s observation that “Not\neverything that can be counted counts, and not everything that counts can be counted,” has\nparticular application to this case. A man’s life and the measure of that life cannot simply be\nreduced to a box on a sentencing grid propelled by an equally mechanistic slot on a “loss” table.\n\nSentencing is not only not an exact science, but not a science at all, given its essentially\nhuman dimension. Rather it is a “fluid and dynamic process[,]” Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S.\n708 (2008), the aim of which is to impose a sentence that is reasonable, that is tailored to the facts\nof the particular case and particular individual being sentenced, and that achieves the statutory\nobjective of a punishment that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish the\ngoals enumerated in § 3553(a)(2).\n\nAs the Supreme Court reminded over 25 years ago, even in the Guidelines era, the “uniform\nand constant . . . tradition for the sentencing judge [is] to consider every convicted person as an\nindividual and every case as a unique study in human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes\nmagnify the crime and the punishment to ensure.” Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996);\nsee also United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 182 (2d Cir. 2008).\n\nIn Gupta, a stock fraud case involving insider trading, in which the defendant was a\nfinancial titan near the pinnacle of global economic wealth and power, Judge Rakoff repeated his\nconcerns expressed earlier in Adelson regarding the disproportionate and unrealistic effect that the\n\n---\n\n78\n\nGuidelines’ loss table has on the measure of an appropriate sentence in that case. Evaluating the\nfull range of factors pertinent to sentencing, Judge Rakoff philosophized on a court’s duty at\nsentencing:\n[i]mposing a sentence on a fellow human being is a formidable responsibility. It\nrequires a court to consider, with great care and sensitivity, a large complex of facts\nand factors. The notion that this complicated analysis, and moral responsibility, can\nbe reduced to the mechanical adding-up of a small set of numbers artificially\nassigned to a few arbitrarily-selected variables wars with common sense. Whereas\napples and oranges may have but a few salient qualities, human beings in their\ninteractions with society are too complicated to be treated like commodities, and\nthe attempt to do so can only lead to bizarre results.\n904 F. Supp.3d at 350.\n\nRather than impose the enormous sentence dictated by the Guidelines, Judge Rakoff\nsentenced the defendant in Gupta to two years’ incarceration. What Judge Rakoff characterized as\nthe “irrationality of this approach” that would have hewed to the Guidelines is present here as well,\nand threatens to create, as Judge Rakoff recognized in Gupta, “in the name of uniformity, a\nsentencing disparity of the most unreasonable kind.” Id. at 351.\n\nThus, courts in this District have on multiple occasions recognized that a “loss amount”\nthat increases a Guidelines level by several orders of magnitude distorts the sentencing process\nand requires amelioration through increased consideration of the other § 3553(a) sentencing\nfactors.\n\nHere, the 30-point enhancement for “loss amount” computed in the PSR comprises more\nthan half the total offense level. See PSR ¶ 114. As Judge Rakoff commented in Gupta, “this [loss\namount] is a very rough surrogate” for determining an appropriate sentence. 904 F. Supp.3d at\n351.\n\nAccordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the Court should, consistent with other courts\nconsidering this issue, exercise its discretion to remedy the distorting effect of any “loss amount,”\n\n---\n\n79\n\nand concentrate instead on other § 3553(a) factors in order to, as the Supreme Court counseled in\nGall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) “make an individualized assessment based on the facts\npresented.” Id. at 50.\n3. Objections to Other Guidelines Enhancements\n\nIn addition to his objection to the 30-level increase in the Guidelines level for loss, Mr.\nGuo also objects to the following enhancements.\nPSR ¶ 114:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for 10 or more victims. There was no\nevidence of any victims other than the five witnesses who claimed to have lost money on their G-\nSeries investments..\nPSR ¶ 114:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for allegedly acting on behalf of a\ncharitable, educational, religious, or political organization or a government agency. There was\nnothing fraudulent about either The Rule of Law Foundation or the Rule of Law Society.  Both\nROLF and ROLS were operating non-profits in compliance with non-profit tax requirements, with\ntheir own leadership and staff. Witnesses called by the Government testified that each entity had\na board of directors, held board meetings and voted on initiatives, and that Mr. Guo was not part\nof either of those boards. Accordingly, that Mr. Guo acted on behalf of a charitable organization,\nspecifically in the context of the alleged fraud scheme, is unfounded. Further, as reflected in\ntestimony at trial, ROLF and the ROLS promoted human rights and democracy in China and\nassisted Chinese nationals who wanted to flee China.\nPSR ¶ 114:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for relocating or participating in\nrelocating  fraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory\nofficials, and the offense otherwise involved sophisticated means and defendant intentionally\nengaged in or caused the conduct constituting sophisticated means. The G-Series entities were\n\n---\n\n80\n\ninternational in scope, and Mr. Guo is a Chinese national whose family, like many wealthy\nfamilies. has financial holdings in a number of different jurisdictions. There is no evidence to\nsupport the notion that the location of any business entities or accounts was selected for the purpose\nof evading law enforcement or regulatory officials. This is purely speculative.\nPSR ¶ 114:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for deriving more than $1 million in\ngross receipts from one of more financial institutions as a result of the offense. Mr. Guo did not\npersonally receive more than $1 million in gross receipts from any financial institution as a result\nof the offense.\nPSR ¶ 114:  For the foregoing reasons, as well as our objection to the 30-point increase for\nloss amount, we object to the Total Base Offense Level calculated in this paragraph.\nPSR ¶ 116:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for “sophisticated laundering” pursuant\nto § 2S1.1(b)(3) for essentially the same reasons we object to the enhancement for relocating the\nfraudulent scheme to another jurisdiction. The multi-jurisidictional nature of the G-Series entities,\nand the attendant use of multiple bank accounts, does not render the conduct in this case\n“sophisticated laundering.” The entities involved were not fictitious, there were no shell\ncorporations, and there was no layering of transactions for the purpose of concealment.\nFurthermore, this enhancement cannot apply if the sophisticated means enhancement under\n§ 2B1.1(b)(10)(A) & (C) is applied, because any conduct that the Court may deem sufficient to\nsupport that enhancement is the same as any conduct that could be found to support this\nenhancement, an outcome expressly precluded by Application Note 5(B) to § 2S1.1.58found to\nsupport that enhancm\n\n58 Application Note 5(B) to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 provides: “If subection (b)(3) applies, and the\nconduct that forms the basis for an enhancement under the guideline applicable to the underlying\n\n---\n\n81\n\nPSR ¶ 118:  We object to the 4-level enhancement pursuant to § 3B1.1(a) for being an\norganizer or leader of criminal activity. While Mr. Guo was a leader of the Whistleblower\nMovement, he was not an organizer or leader of any criminal activity.  In this regard, we note that\nco-defendants Je and Wang had operational control of the relevant businesses and controlled the\nrelevant bank accounts.\nPSR ¶ 119:  We object to the 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to\n§ 3C1.1. There is no evidence to support the purported grounds for this enhancement as set forth\nin PSR ¶ 110. First, there was no evidence that Mr. Guo conspired with others to evade applicable\nlaws or retaliate against anyone who sought return of funds. Second, any signs supporters may\nhave affixed in the Mahwah mansion cannot be attributed to Mr. Guo and the notion that such\nsignage constitutes obstruction is wild speculation. Third, the suggestion that Mr. Guo “and a co-\nconspirator” may have started the fire that engulfed the Sherry-Netherland apartment on the day\nof Mr. Guo’s arrest is beyond preposterous, for reasons set forth in the following section. Fourth,\nthe notion that Mr. Guo “lied in forms related to his bankruptcy proceedings in a manner that was\nalso designed to thwart the investigation of this case” is also based on nothing more than pure\nspeculation. Fifth, there is no evidence to support Mr. Guo’s purported involvement in the\npurported solicitation of a false declaration from Government witness Ya Li for the purpose of\nthwarting the investigation. Sixth, any conduct undertaken by co-defendant Wang cannot be\nattributed to Mr. Guo, and the alleged conduct appears to constitute ordinary business activity.\nSeventh, there is no evidence of any direction by Mr. Guo to destroy evidence. Finally, to the\nextent that this enhancement is based on any protest activities of Movement supporters, there was\n\noffense is the only conduct that forms the basis for application of subsection (b)(3) of this\nguideline, do not apply subsection (b)(3) of this guideline.”\n\n---\n\n82\n\nno assaultive conduct, no arrests were made, and any protest activity constituted First Amendment-\nprotected free speech on the part of supporters.\nPSR ¶ 123:  For the foregoing reasons, we object to the Total Offense Level calculated in\nthis paragraph.\nC. Additional Objections to the PSR\nWhile accepting the jury’s verdict for purposes of sentencing, Mr. Guo disagrees with it\nand, in addition to the objections above to the Guidelines calculation, presents and preserves for\nappeal his objection to any paragraphs of the PSR that purport to allege or conclude that Mr. Guo\nis guilty of any offense, committed any wrongdoing or illegal acts, or attempted to, conspired to,\nor committed any wrongdoing, fraud, money laundering, or obstruction of justice, or is responsible\nfor alleged losses, much less in the amount of $1.3 billion dollars, and forfeiture of the same.\nThese general objections apply to each of the specific objections set forth both above and\nbelow, as well as to paragraphs 25, 26, 29, 33, 47, and 50 of the PSR.\n¶ 24  The business entities at issue were not fictitious entities “created” to perpetrate a\nfraud or to commit any offense.  Each entity had payrolls, operated publicly, offered services to\nclients and the public, and/or operated pursuant to its business mission(s). GETTR continues to\noperate as a social media platform. It is available to the public. Government witness Limarie Reyes\ntestified to the benefits provided to G-Club members and to the entity’s daily business operations,\nincluding the significant efforts and travel to secure additional member benefits. With respect to\nthe Rule of Law Society (“ROLS”) and Rule of Law Foundation (“ROLF”), neither organization\nsold or promoted the sale of securities, and neither misappropriated any funds.\n\n¶ 27  Mr. Guo did not interact with “approximately 500 accounts” or any accounts to\nconceal the illegal source of funds. Mr. Guo did not control the bank accounts of the entities; they\nwere controlled by co-defendants Je and Wang. None of the funds were illegal or illegally\nobtained.\n\n¶ 28  All expenditures were made to support the pro-democracy movement, and to project\nan image of its wealth and power. The $100 million sent to Hayman Capital should be removed\nbased on the jury’s acquittal for fraud in connection with the GTV private placement. Specific\nitems listed in ¶ 28 were purchased for use by customers or members of the entities that paid for\nthe items, and some of the items were purchased and paid for before the period of the alleged fraud.\nThe Lady May, for instance, was purchased in February 2015 with family funds from ACA. Also,\n\n---\n\n83\n\nthe investors and supporters were not “victims” (because they were not defrauded), and many of\nthem have stated as such.\n\n¶ 30  The purchase of an apartment in NYC in 2015 and the price for it is not relevant and\nshould be deleted. The Sherry-Netherland apartment was purchased years before the period of the\nalleged fraud. At a minimum, this fact should be added to this paragraph.\n\nMr. Guo also objects to ROLF and ROLS being characterized as “purported” non-profit\norganizations. ROLF and ROLS were operating non-profits in compliance with non-profit tax\nrequirements.\n\nMr. Guo objects to the remainder of the paragraph’s allegations that false and materially\nmisleading information was provided to investors.\n\n¶ 31  Mr. Guo objects to the reference in this paragraph to a “scheme.”\n\n¶ 32  Yanping Wang worked for the pro-democracy movement and never managed any\nfunds for Miles Guo.\n\n¶ 34  The word “purported” should be deleted as the jury’s acquittal on the GTV counts\nreflects its recognition of the fact that GTV was a genuine news-focused social media platform to\nfurther the aims of the pro-democracy movement.\n\n¶ 35  The word “purported” should be deleted. Further, Government witness Limarie Reyes\ntestified that G Club was owned and controlled by Haoran He, and that Haoran He approved\nfinancial decisions.\n\n¶ 36  There was nothing “purported” about the Himalaya Exchange and the other entities\nnoted, and it is inaccurate to describe them as “functionally” owned” and “controlled” by Miles\nGuo. The HEX accounts were owned by the individual account holders.\n\n¶¶37-38  Miles Guo did not say he would use his “own” money to finance any charities.\nHe said his family fund would, and bank records for ROLF and ROLS show at least $500,000\nfrom the Guo family funds being donated to the ROLF.\n\n¶ 38  This paragraph should be stricken in its entirety, as it reflects statements made by\nSteve Bannon and not Mr. Guo. Also, Mr. Bannon was paid to serve as a consultant for GTV and\nMr. Guo was acquitted of all GTV related conduct.\n\n¶ 39  There was nothing “purported” about either organization. ROLF was not used to\npromote Miles Guo. As reflected in testimony at trial, ROLF and the ROLS promoted human rights\nand democracy in China and assisted Chinese nationals who wanted to flee China.\n\nN-95 mask donations were not sent to Mr. Guo’s home for his personal use. Cross\nexamination of Karen Maistrello made clear that she did not work for ROLF and lacked any basis\nto assert that the masks were delivered to Mr. Guo’s home.\n\n---\n\n84\n\nFurther, N-95 masks were donated to several agencies in New York City (including hotels,\nthe NYPD, and hospitals) as well as individuals across the United States and in China. Even if\nmasks were delivered to Mr. Guo’s residence during the pandemic, that would be consistent with\nthe majority of organizations, which took steps to ensure that their people were  adequately\nprotected from the virus. For the pro-democracy movement, it was essential that Mr. Guo maintain\nhis health and be able to continue his public campaign.\n\n ¶¶ 40-46  Mr. Guo was acquitted of this conduct. These paragraphs should either be\nstricken or, at a minimum, reflect that fact.\n\n¶ 48  The sentence stating: “Those bank account closures frustrated the ability of GUO,\nJE, and their co-conspirators to collect proceeds from victims seeking to invest in GTV” should\nbe deleted because it states nothing more than the Government’s opinion. Further, the jury found\nall of Mr. Guo’s GTV-related conduct to be lawful. Additionally, these bank seizures occurred\nafter the GTV private placement was completed, meaning that, logically and for formal purposes,\nthe closures could not have frustrated investors’ ability to invest in the GTV private placement.\n\n¶ 49  The first two sentences in this paragraph should be deleted. Mr. Guo’s statement that\nGTV had a market value of $2 billion was correct and, in fact, was an undervaluation of GTV’s\nmarket value. The Government obtained an appraisal by Alvarez & Marsal Valuation Services,\nLLC, that determined GTV’s enterprise value to range from $1.4 billion to $2.6 billion. Thus, the\nreference that Guo “well knew” that “GTV’s market value was far less because among other things,\nGTV was a new business that generated no revenue” is incorrect. Mr. Guo believed GTV’s market\nvalue to be in excess of $2 billion, which is supported by Alvarez & Marsal’s expert valuation. It\nwas further supported by the GTV’s private placement memorandum’s calculation of GTV’s\nvalue, which Mr. Guo did not author and which was vetted by counsel, as well as the fact that at\nthat valuation, GTV raised nearly half a billion dollars in a month. Defense expert Raymond\nDragon testified to both facts at trial as items to consider in determining valuation, which was not\ncontradicted.\n\n¶ 51  The word “purported” should be deleted. G Club was a real business and people did\nmake purchases.\n\n¶¶ 52-53  Limarie Reyes testified to the benefits offered by G Club, and to the millions in\ndollars of prizes awarded to G Club members. Ms. Reyes also testified that G Club hired two\nindependent companies to properly manage G Club’s prize giveaways. Her trial testimony\ncontradicts statements in this paragraph including “G Club did not even make good on prizes it\noffered members for participating in contests.” Regarding the BMW, there was no evidence of\nfraud and no evidence or testimony supporting the narrative in the PSR.\n\nMr. Guo did not run or manage G Club; he was not its CEO. Further, on March 8, 2021,\nthe world was in the midst of the pandemic, and many companies were hampered by performance\ndeficits as a result. G Club was not a fictitious company, nor do these facts relate to Miles Guo.\n\n---\n\n85\n\n¶ 54  Statements by William Je should not be attributed to Mr. Guo. In addition, the video\nexcerpt referenced should include the entire broadcast of Mr. Guo on that date, not just excerpts\ntaken out of context.\n\n¶ 55  There was no evidence at trial that Miles Guo asked investors to purchase multiple\nmemberships in G Club.\n\nTrial witnesses testified that the items noted in sub-paragraphs (a) through (f) were\npurchased for the benefit of G Club members and were not purchased for Mr. Guo’s personal use.\n\nThe “yacht” referenced in paragraph (a) was utilized by G Club members prior to Mr.\nGuo’s arrest, and before it was sold off by G Club owner Haoran He. The proceeds from the sale\nof the “yacht” went to G Club.\n\nWith respect to the Lamborghini referenced in subparagraph (b), a Government exhibit\nshows Mr. Guo, in a promotional video, state that the Lamborghini was for G Club members. The\nGovernment had no evidence to refute Mr. Guo’s statements. There was no evidence of any\npersonal use of that car; in fact, Miles Guo did not have a valid driver’s license and did not drive.\nHis son, moreover, was banned from the United States and neither his daughter nor his wife drives\nan automobile.\n\nThe Bugatti referenced in subparagraph (c) never left the showroom and was never\nreceived by Mr. Guo.\n\nFBI agents at the direction of SDNY prosecutors placed “undercover” calls with Haoran\nHe, pretending to be buyers for the Bugatti. Mr. He, who was unaware he was speaking to\nundercover agents, repeatedly confirmed that the Bugatti and any proceeds from its sale would go\nto G Club. This evidence was not presented.\n\nThe Mahwah “mansion” was for use by G Club members to serve as a secret base for the\npro-democracy movement. While the Government tried to claim that each of the Guo family\nmembers had a wing at Mahwah, it had no explanation for  why there would be a wing at Mahwah\nfor “son” when Mr. Guo’s son was banned from travel to the United States per the U.S.\ngovernment’s denial of his visa renewal request. The Government, moreover, objected when the\ndefense tried to elicit such evidence.\n\nThe need for such a facility was confirmed by Paul Doran, an Operation Fox Hunt expert\ncalled by the defense. The stipulation  between the parties conceded that Mr. Guo was the target\nof a widespread campaign by the Chinese government to silence him, including through\nkidnapping, coercion, and physical harassment. The Government adduced no evidence that Mr.\nGuo or his family was to live at Mahwah. They presented no surveillance evidence (which they\nconducted on Mahwah) of Mr. Guo and his family residing at Mahwah. That there was a “wing”\nfor “son” makes clear that those were titles simply an easy way to note space. Mr. Guo’s son was\nbanned by ICE from entering the US and would have no ability to use a wing in any home in the\nUnited States. When the defense sought to elicit the testimony at trial, the Government objected.\n\n---\n\n86\n\nNor did the Government call ICE agents to testify that Mileson Guo’s (son) visa to enter the United\nStates had been revoked.\n\nFor these reasons ¶ 55 should be stricken in its entirety or these objections noted.\n\n¶ 56  The word “purported” should be deleted. Government witnesses Jesee Brown and\nMr. Roberts testified that the Himalaya Exchange issued a cryptocurrency on the blockchain.\nDefense witness Ms. Sklar, the only cryptocurrency expert to testify in the trial, and auditing firm\nArmino testified that the HCN was a cryptocurrency and that the HDOs in circulation were in fact\na digital asset with a 1-to-1 value backed by currency. Further records reflect that the\ncryptocurrency was traded, and people made money buying, selling, or holding the cryptocurrency.\n\n¶ 57  See response to ¶ 56. Further, the Government witness Jesee Brown testified that\nthere were plans by the Himalaya Exchange to buy gold. Witness Tom Bishop testified that in\nMarch 2022 the Himalaya Exchange paid $5 million to Sharps Pixley, a London-based gold\nbroker. Mr. Brown also testified that the Himalaya Exchange was owned and controlled by\nWilliam Je. Accordingly, this paragraph should reflect the above and the fact that while Mr. Guo\nknew of the Himalaya Exchange’s goal to purchase gold, Mr. Guo did not know the total amount\nof gold the Exchange had purchased at the time of the statements, and that the statements were not\nmade with fraudulent intent.\n\n¶ 60  Actions by William Je, the owner of the Himalaya Exchange, should not be attributed\nto Mr. Guo. No evidence was presented indicating Mr. Guo’s involvement. In addition, the\nGovernment possesses information that the auctioneer of the vehicle did in fact open and maintain\na wallet on the Himalaya Exchange, did received payment of the vehicle purchase in HDOs, and\nthat the HDOs were subsequently redeemed for fiat. This paragraph is misleading.\n\n¶ 61  The Himalaya Exchange White Paper, publicly available on its website, speaks for\nitself regarding the Exchange and how it operated. Bank statements admitted at trial demonstrated\nthat Himalaya Exchange customers were able to redeem at least $70 million HDOs into fiat (upon\ninformation and belief, the redemptions were at least roughly $268 million). Government witness\nYa Li, an HDO holder, testified that she had successfully redeemed HDOs into fiat.\n\n¶ 62  This paragraph should be stricken as it relates to actions taken by Mr. Je and not Mr.\nGuo. The Government witness and Himalaya Exchange CEO Jesee Brown testified that the Board\nof the Himalaya Exchange reviewed and approved by unanimous vote the issuance of the loan.\nMr. Brown did not testify that Mr. Guo was involved in this decision, and no evidence was\npresented showing Mr. Guo’s involvement.\n\n¶ 63  As noted in this paragraph, the A10 program was launched in February 2023, less\nthan two months before Mr. Guo’s arrest and before any aspect of the program could be completed.\nThere was no “scheme,” and there were no false statements. Accordingly, it is misleading to state\nthat Mr. Guo’s statements about the program were not true, as he was incapable of doing anything\nto conclude the program once he was detained.\n\n---\n\n87\n\n¶ 64 Mr. Guo did not “control” millions of dollars in fraud proceeds and he did not\n“regularly move funds.” That sentence should be stricken.\n\nFurther, the first sentence of paragraph 64 does not contain facts but instead reads as a\nGovernment advocacy piece and should be deleted. There is no evidence as to why Mr. Guo filed\nfor bankruptcy. It was filed on February 15, 2022, a fact properly noted in the PSR.\n\nFurther, Mr. Guo is entitled to a lifestyle of his choosing, and one supported by his family\nwealth which existed for many years prior to the conduct alleged in this case. To the pro-\ndemocracy movement, wealth meant power to face and to confront the CCP. The “despite”\nreference suggests that Mr. Guo filed for bankruptcy for nefarious reasons, which is argument and\nnot fact.\n\nSimilarly, the language despite “his control of hundreds of millions of dollars in fraud\nproceeds” is gratuitous and does not undermine Mr. Guo’s filing for bankruptcy. In fact, the\nGovernment’s argument in this regard undercuts its own theory that Mr. Guo committed fraud\nbecause he needed money.\n\n¶ 65  This section should only reference the case agent’s sworn testimony in court as\nsupported by the trial transcripts.\n\n¶¶ 66-79  The Government’s allegations regarding Mr. Guo and the GTV private\nplacement were rejected by the jury’s acquittal on counts 5, 6 and 12.\n\nAdditionally, what Ms. Wang did or did not know is not relevant to Mr. Guo. Therefore,\nthat language “WANG well knew that the funds raised from the GTV Private Placement could not\nbe invested in a high-risk hedge fund held for the benefit of Relative-1” is irrelevant and was\nrejected by the jury in acquitting on the GTV counts. Much of what is in these paragraphs\nrepresents suppositions by the Government rather than facts.\n\n¶ 80  The first sentence of paragraph 80 should stand, and the rest of the paragraph should\nbe deleted because it describes actions by William Je.\n\n¶ 81  The paragraph should be stricken because it describes actions by William Je.\n\n¶ 82  The monies referenced were not fraud proceeds.\n\n¶ 83  This paragraph should clarify that PAX “claimed” that Mr. Guo had personally\nguaranteed the loan. Further, all statements following the second sentence are entirely speculative\nand should be stricken.\n\n¶ 84  Mr. Guo denies that he hid assets and he disputes the findings of the Court in the\nPAX litigation and related findings in the Bankruptcy Court.\n\n¶ 85  Mr. Guo does not object to the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. However,\nhe does object to the remainder of the paragraph because it is argument and not fact. Further, in\n\n---\n\n88\n\nhis initial bankruptcy filing Mr. Guo stated that his lifestyle and all personal expenses were paid\nfor by his family through a long-established family fund based outside  the United States. This fact\nwas in Mr. Guo’s bankruptcy filing and should be included to provide a complete picture.\n\n¶ 86  We object to the use of the terms “formally” and “Guo enterprise.” Prior to its sale\nby the Trustee, Mei Guo was the legal owner of Lady May. Further, the term “Guo enterprise” was\ninvented by the Government and does not appear anywhere except in the  indictment.\n\n¶ 87  This paragraph should be stricken. First, the encrypted communications are\ncommunications on WhatsApp – an application available for download on every cell phone. It is\nused by individuals worldwide and uses encryption by default for its communications.\n\nSecond, at the time of communications between Mr. Guo’s daughter and Ms. Wang\nregarding the Lady May’s ownership, the Lady May was in fact registered under Mei Guo’s name\nand had been under her name for years. It was purchased before the period of the alleged fraud\ncharged. Third, whatever coaching Ms. Wang purportedly undertook, is more appropriately\nreflected in her PSR and not here. There is no evidence that Ms. Wang statements regarding the\nLady May’s ownership were made at Mr. Guo’s bidding, or that he acted upon them.\n\n¶ 88  The text after the first sentence should be stricken. Mr. Guo believed that the CCP\nhad the ability to influence the bankruptcy trustee, who earns approximately $2,000 dollars per\nhour, and that belief was reasonable given the CCP’s ability to enlist assets such as George\nHigginbotham, a DOJ employee, and other prominent professionals  in its efforts to target him.\nFurther, supporters of Mr. Guo enjoy First Amendment protection and are allowed to voice their\nopinions within the bounds of the law.\n\n¶ 89  Miles Guo believed, and as the Operation Fox Hunt expert noted during trial, the\nCCP has engaged in many similar practices to harass those who oppose its goals. Mr. Guo had no\nreason to believe that the SEC could be dissuaded because its decisions were influenced by the\nCCP’s coercion in forcing investors to file false claims against Mr. Guo.\n\n¶ 90  The PAX litigation came on the heels of Mr. Guo’s interview on Voice of America.\nWe object to the entirety of paragraph 90 except for the second sentence which acknowledges that\nPAX won a civil judgment. Further, supporters of Mr. Guo enjoy First Amendment protection,\nand are allowed to voice their opinions within the bounds of the law.\n\nAdditionally, any protest against the bankruptcy trustee, his family, or the SEC was deemed\na lawful exercise of the First Amendment. Despite law enforcement being called, no one was\narrested or charged with a crime. The Trustee and his family members were advised by law\nenforcement that no laws were broken. No individual was punched in the eye by anyone involved\nin the protests against PAX or the Trustee. Further, the “well done” statement attributed to Mr.\nGuo, if accurate, would be an excerpt that is being taken completely out of context. The full\nstatements of Mr. Guo should be included to give full context to any “well done” reference in the\nPSR.\n\n---\n\n89\n\n¶ 91  Mahwah was not purchased with fraud proceeds. It was purchased for use by G Club\nmembers. Footnote 6 merely repeats the text of ¶ 91 and should be stricken as incorrect and\nduplicative.\n\n¶ 92  Mr. Guo objects to “meticulously” to describe the search as unnecessary and\nconclusory without factual support and irrelevant to the PSR. Whether or not the search was\nmeticulous need not be decided here. Regarding the “custom-designed Brioni” suits, there is no\nevidence that these items were purchased with fraud proceeds.\n\n¶ 93  We object to any suggestion that the use of Mahwah by NFSC members was a\n“perpetuation” of “Guo’s criminal enterprise.” The use of Mahwah by members of the NFSC after\nMr. Guo’s arrest was neither new nor staged. Had the Government not seized Mahwah, NFSC\nmembers might be using it still  as it had in the past, and would have commemorated June 4, 2024,\nand 2025, to mark the Tiananmen Square massacre. Upon information and belief, the last such\ncommemoration was attended by several members of the United States Congress, G Club\nmembers, and community leaders.\n\n¶ 95  Acts by NFSC members on the Mahwah grounds (such as hanging of small paper\nplacards next to doors in Mahwah) after Mr. Guo’s arrest are not properly attributable to Mr. Guo.\nThere is no evidence that Mr. Guo directed such conduct. Conduct undertaken by unknown\nmembers of the community is not obstructive or properly attributed to Mr. Guo and should be\nstruck from the PSR.\n\n¶¶ 96-97  This conduct does not pertain to Mr. Guo and should be stricken.\n\n¶ 100  Upon information and belief, the prosecutors have spoken with counsel for William\nJe, who informed them that Mr. Je  has declined to return voluntarily to the United States.\n\n¶ 101  Mr. Guo objects to this paragraph in its entirety. The Government’s view should be\nreflected in its sentencing submission, and not in the PSR. The PSR should contain facts\ndetermined by the Probation Department and the record. It is also noted here that Mr. Guo was the\nfounder and promoter of ROLS and ROLF. Each entity carved its  own mission and had its own\nstaff and Board of Directors. Witnesses called by the Government testified that each entity\nconducted Board meetings and voted on initiatives, and that Mr. Guo was not part of either Board.\nAccordingly, the notion that Mr. Guo acted on behalf of a charitable organization to perpetrate a\nfraud is unfounded and should be stricken.\n\nSimilarly, Mr. Guo has not made a misrepresentation or undertaken fraudulent action or\nviolated orders during the course of his bankruptcy proceeding. He filed for bankruptcy on\nFebruary 15, 2022, is represented by counsel in that matter, and those proceedings continue.\nAccordingly, the paragraph’s reference to Mr. Guo’s bankruptcy should be stricken. Similarly, Mr.\nGuo denies the Government’s characterization of the alleged criminal activity, his alleged role, or\nthat the alleged scheme was moved to another jurisdiction to evade law enforcement or regulatory\nofficials, or that the alleged offense involved sophisticated means, more than 10 alleged victims\nand 5 or more participants, or that Mr. Guo illegally received gross receipts from a financial\ninstitution in an amount more than $1million.\n\n---\n\n90\n\n¶ 102  The Government should be required to detail the specific role it attributes to William\nJe. Its refusal to do so is clearly strategic, as an accurate characterization of Mr. Je’s role would\nmake clear that Mr. Je engaged in independent activity of which Mr. Guo was unaware, and in\nwhich Mr. Guo did not participate. For example, defense witness Leanne Li testified that Mr. Je\nand his staff at the Himalaya Exchange refused to grant her access to conduct an audit of the\nexchange as requested by Mr. Guo. Likewise, direct intervention by Mr. Guo with Mr. Je to allow\nthe audit to occur, in order to account for all of the community’s funds, also was rejected. This\ntestimony makes clear the independence with which Mr. Je operated over financial matters and the\nHimalaya Exchange.\n\n¶¶ 103-105  Mr. Guo objects to these paragraphs as irrelevant; HEX was an ongoing entity\nwith its own leadership and structure. Further, Mr. Guo objects to use of the terms “Guo’s\nenterprise businesses” and the “Guo Enterprise.” These terms are Government inventions and there\nwas no testimony that the various business entities were called “Guo’s enterprise businesses” or\nthe “Guo Enterprise” by anyone other than the Government.\n\nThe second sentence in paragraph 103  is factually incorrect. Since 2020, prior to Mr. Guo’s\narrest, Qidong Xia was the leader of the Himalaya Alliance, elected by the Global Alliance\nCommittee to serve as Secretary General of the Alliance. Mr. Guo could not “appoint or announce”\nQidong Xia as the “new” leader. This point is supported by the many on-line videos posted\n(predating Mr. Guo’s arrest) in which Qidong Xia speaks as the leader of the Himalaya Alliance.\n\nThere is some further context for the call referenced in ¶ 103. Mr. Guo had a meeting with\nsenior representatives from the United Arab Emirates’ sovereign fund scheduled for March 17,\n2023, two days after his arrest. Chats between William Je and Yanping Wang confirm the\nscheduling and coordination of this meeting with UAE representatives. The meeting was to finalize\nan investment by the UAE into the Himalaya Exchange and the issuance of government licenses\nto the Himalaya Exchange by the UAE. The UAE was to issue a banking license permitting\npayments and transactions in Euros for the Himalaya Exchange and members of the pro-\ndemocracy movement. Partnership and investment by the UAE sovereign fund would undoubtedly\nhave increased the value of the Himalaya Exchange and its cryptocurrency. That Mr. Guo\nencouraged continuation of efforts to partner and negotiate with the UAE as well as applications\nfor UAE banking licenses post-arrest is lawful and proper.\n\nThe suggestion in PSR ¶ 104 that Mr. Guo used “coded language” during any calls is\nentirely speculative and that reference should be stricken.\n\nMore generally, statements from Mr. Guo to Qidong Xia to continue supporting the leaders\nof the Himalaya Alliance and to keep ongoing overseas Movement operations running well are\nconsistent with the pro-democracy movement and are neither unlawful nor obstructive. Similarly,\nMr. Guo’s statements to fellow freedom fighters on the circumstances surrounding his arrest or\nbusiness negotiations are not improper, and do not bear on any of the charges in the indictment.\n\nFinally, none of these “jail calls” show control by Miles Guo. Rather, it shows the Alliance\nhad a structure similar to independent organizations and was led by community members who had\n\n---\n\nthe \"final say\" in operations for their respective organizations. Advising people to be ale1t that\ntheir conversations are being recorded is common sense and not nefarious.\n,r,r 106-108 These paragraphs as written must be stricken as they do not describe conduct\nby Mr. Guo, other than the Government's supposition and inuendo in these paragraphs that Mr.\nGuo sta1ted the fire. Any intimation or suggestion that the fire was caused by Mr. Guo while he\nwas afready in custody and incommunicado is not suppo1ted by any evidence. Moreover, both the\nA TF and the FBI concluded that the cause of the fire could not be determined and there is no\nevidence to the contra1y. Nor can it be ignored that at the time of the fire, Mr. Guo was in the\ncustody of federal agents and that the other person - Individual-I - in the apaitment at the time of\nthe FBI seai·ch also was not free to roain through the premises. He too was confined and under the\nwatchful eyes of the FBI.\nShould these pai·agraphs remain, the following infonnation should be added:\nGuo' s aiTest occuned on March 15, 2023. More than 12 agents from the FBI anned with a drone\nchose to enter Mr. Guo's Sheny -Netherland apa1tment at 6:00 a.m. through the service elevator.\nMr. Guo' s bedroom is nowhere close to the service elevator, and eve1yone in the apaitment was\nasleep. Mr. Guo was handcuffed and not free to leave. Individual-I, a person who as fai· as we are\nawai·e was never inte1viewed or by the FBI on this issue, was almost simultaneously searched and\nhandcuffed. A search of his person and that of the apartment did not lead to the discove1y of any\nexplosives or remote device capable of igniting a fire. CCTV caineras in the apa1tment, in the sole\npossession and control of the Govermnent, reveal Individual-I doing nothing nefarious. Neither\nthe FBI nor the DOJ chose to have its agents weai· individual body caineras. It was the FBI who\nchose to unplug CCTV cameras in the apartment, which would have recorded actions unde1taken\nduring their time in the apaitment. The manner of the search was chosen by the FBI, not Miles\nGuo. The Government's evidence of the search shows wallboai·ds tom from the walls exposing\nstuds and electrical wiring; all the teai· down was done with the use of sharp metal objects and\nwithout consultation of the New York Fire Depaitment.\nFmther, the fire sta1ted at least several hours after both Mr. Guo and Individual-I had been\nremoved from the Sheny-Netherland. Only law enforcement remained and only law enforcement\nhad access to the apai·tment during the several hours before the fire staited and after the fire was\nextinguished.\nThis was a planned aiTest; the Government chose to enter through the se1vice elevator and\nnow expresses smprise no one heard their banging for entiy. Logic tells you that se1vice elevators\nai·e at the back of the apaitment and designed to be as far from the resident as possible.\nBecause the apaitment was ultimately seized by the bankmptcy Tmstee, the defense had\nonly limited access to the grounds well after it had been cleared. As a result, Mr. Guo could not\neffectively challenge the conclusions of the A TF and the Fire Depaitment; as noted, ATF\nconcluded that the cause of the fire could not be detennined\n91\n\n---\n\n92\n\n¶¶ 107-108  These paragraphs and subparagraphs have no relevance to the issues in the\ncase and only seek to foster the Government’s unsubstantiated inuendo that Mr. Guo was somehow\nresponsible for the fire. Accordingly, they should be stricken.\n\n¶¶ 109, 114  Mr. Guo objects to the adjustments and offense level set forth in these\nparagraphs. Further, the parties have agreed that restitution in this case is impracticable. See ECF\nNos. 785, 789.\n\n¶ 110  This paragraph is not supported by the trial evidence and should be stricken. Should\nthe Court be inclined to credit any of these arguments, Mr. Guo requests a Fatico hearing.\n\n¶¶ 114-123  The objections set forth above as to ¶¶ 88-97 and ¶¶101-114 are repeated\nherein. Mr. Guo objects to each of the adjustments and enhancements noted in these paragraphs\nand the adjusted and total offense levels set forth in ¶¶ 120, 123.\n\n¶ 129  Mr. Guo was born under the name “Guo Wengui” in Jilin Province, China.\n\n¶ 130  For clarification, Mr. Guo’s brother was shot by police during a visit to Mr. Guo’s\noffice to question Mr. Guo, not in the midst of the protests at Tiananmen Square.\n\n¶¶ 173-175  Because of the advisory nature of the Guidelines, Mr. Guo is eligible for a\nsentence of Probation.\n\n¶¶ 179-180  The parties have agreed that restitution in this case is not practical. See ECF\nNos. 785, 789.\n\n¶ 181  The issue of forfeiture has been the subject of briefing by the parties. See ECF Nos.\n799, 803, 804. The money and assets in the Government’s possession and control, the GTV money\n(acquitted conduct), the refunds and redemptions given to investors, the criminal proceeds in the\npossession of the Trustee, and other amounts all must be offsets against any forfeiture judgment\nto be entered against Mr. Guo. Mr. Guo requests a Fatico hearing on the amount of any order of\nforfeiture in this case.\n\nD. Statistical Analysis of Data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission and Other\nSources Demonstrates that a Below-Guidelines Sentence for Mr. Guo Would be\nConsistent with Current Sentences for the Conduct of Conviction and Would\nAvoid Unwarranted Sentence Disparities\nData from the United States Sentencing Commission and other sources establishes that a\nsentence dramatically below the applicable Guidelines range for Mr. Guo conforms generally with\nthe majority of sentences for Mr. Guo’s offense conduct in this District.\n\n---\n\n93\n\nThe analysis below, mirroring PSR ¶¶ 112-14, focuses on convictions for money\nlaundering (applying § 2S1.1) and fraud/theft (applying § 2B1.1). While there are differences in\nthe data set forth below for those respective offenses, they still point decidedly in one direction:  a\nsentence for Mr. Guo decisively below the advisory Guidelines level set forth in the PSR\n(corresponding to Level 43, which we challenge, and Criminal History Category I). See PSR ¶¶\n114, 126.\n1. Sentencing Commission Publications and Data\n\nThe Sentencing Commission publishes each quarter an abstract of federal sentencing\nstatistics entitled U.S. Sentencing Commission Preliminary Quarterly Data Report. The most\nrecent quarterly figures are contained in the United States Sentencing Commission Quarterly Data\nReport, 4th Quarter Release, Preliminary Fiscal Year 2025 Data, Through September 30, 2025\n(“Q4 Preliminary Data Report FY 2025”), which covers sentences imposed between October 1,\n2024 and September 30, 2025 (“Q4 2025”).59\n\nAnnually, the Sentencing Commission publishes a comprehensive Sourcebook of Federal\nSentencing Statistics, the most recent of which includes data for Fiscal Year 2024 (“2024\nSourcebook”).\nThe\n2024\nSourcebook\nis\navailable\nat\nhttp\nsourcebooks/2024/2024_Sourcebook.pdf.\n\nA third category of data that can be extracted from the Sentencing Commission’s publicly\navailable information is found in the Commission’s “Individual Datafiles” for Fiscal Years 2019-\n\n59\n The\nQ4\nPreliminary\nData\nReport\nFY\n2025\nis\navailable\nat\nhttp\nstatistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC_Quarter_Report_4th_FY25.pdf. Prior Quarterly\nData Reports are also available on the Sentencing Commission’s web site, at\nhttp\nstatistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/.\n\n---\n\n94\n\n2023, which can be downloaded from its website. See U.S. Sentencing Commission Datafiles,\navailable at http\n\nThe data regarding federal sentences generally demonstrates that the Guidelines no longer\nconstitute the predominant factor in approximately half of sentences nationally, and a decisive\nmajority of sentences in SDNY. For example, nationally, the Q4 Preliminary Data Report FY 2025\nreveals that 51.4% of sentences are within the Guidelines range, and only 0.4% of sentences are\nabove the Guidelines. Id. at 14.\n\nIn the Second Circuit more specifically, only 31.3% of sentences were within the calculated\nGuidelines range, and in SDNY only 23.8% of sentences were within the advisory Guidelines\nrange, and no court imposed a sentence based on an upward departure. Id.\n\nThe 2024 Sourcebook establishes that nationwide in 2024, defendants in federal court\nconvicted of money laundering were sentenced to an average of 54 months’ imprisonment and a\nmedian of 28 months, and of wire fraud, 21 months and 12 months, respectively. See 2024\nSourcebook at Table 15.\n\nFor Mr. Guo, in Criminal History Category I, the mean and median for money laundering\nwere lower than the overall average, at 41 and 21 months, respectively, as were the fraud/theft/\nembezzlement, at 18 and 7 months respectively. Id. at Table 27. The sentences for money\nlaundering were between 416 and 442 months lower than the 470 months the Sentencing\nCommission assigns to sentences of life imprisonment. See id. at Table 15 n.1.\n\nMoreover, even those defendants sentenced for money laundering within the applicable\nGuidelines range were sentenced to the lower half of the range 21.6% of the time, and sentenced\nto the minimum of the range 51.8% of the time. Id. at Table 34. Similarly, those sentenced for\nfraud were sentenced to the minimum range 53.4% of the time. Id.\n\n---\n\n95\n\nThe data from the Q4 Preliminary Data Report FY 2025 are similar. The mean sentence\nfor money laundering for  2025 nationally was 61 months, with the median at 30 months. See Table\n6 (“Sentence Length By Type of Crime”) at 9. Less than a majority – 28% – of money laundering\nsentences imposed were within the applicable Guidelines range. See Table 10 (“Sentence Imposed\nRelative to the Guideline Range by Type of Crime”) at 17.\n\nIn the SDNY, in 2024 the mean sentence for money laundering convictions was 34 months,\n20 months fewer than the national average. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Statistical Information\nPacket Fiscal Year 2024 Southern District of New York, at Table 7, available at\nhttp\nstatistics/state-district-circuit/2024/nys24.pdf. Similarly, the median SDNY sentence for money\nlaundering was 18 months, 10 months fewer than the national average. Id. at Table 7.\n\nThe Sentencing Commission’s “Interactive Data Files,”60 which provides the ability to\nreview “Individual Datafiles” offer additional support for the conclusion that sentencing Mr. Guo’s\nto life would create disparate result relative to current sentences. The Interactive Data Files reflect\nthe sentences imposed in SDNY on similarly situated defendants spanning a seven-year period.\nThe parameters chosen were: money laundering and fraud crime types with the Guidelines\n§ 2B1.1, a Criminal History Category of I, Sentencing Zone D, a defendant between the ages of\n51 and 60, and within SDNY. Career offenders were omitted from the pool.\n\nThat profile yielded 183 sentences imposed, with an average length of 27 months. In fact,\n56.3% of defendants received a sentence of less than 2 years, with only 2.2% receiving a sentence\nof 10 to less than 15 years.\n\n60  The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s “Interactive Data Analyzer” is available at:\nhttp\n\n---\n\n96\n\n2. Judiciary Sentencing Information Database (JSIN)\n\nAnother database, the Judiciary Sentencing Information (“JSIN,” available at\nhttp), provides data for a specific set of criteria: those defendants nationally who,\nbetween Fiscal Years 2020-2024, were assigned a primary Guidelines of § 2B1.1, had a Final\nOffense Level of 43 (which, as discussed supra, is grossly inflated by the unjustified 30-point “loss\namount” enhancement), and were in Criminal History Category I.\n\nOf the 31 defendants nationally in that particular data subset who were not the subject of a\n§ 5K1.1 motion, representing a fraction of the total of 1,345 federal money laundering cases during\nQ4 2025 (see Q4 Preliminary Data Report FY 2025, at 17 [Table 10]), JSIN reports that the\naverage sentence was 158 months, with the median at 138 months – 312 months shy of the length\nutilized for life imprisonment.\n3. Courts Have Relied on Data in Fashioning Sentences\n\nCourts have increasingly endorsed and relied upon the data in imposing sentence. In United\nStates v. Singh, 877 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2017) and United States v. Jenkins, 854 F.3d 181 (2d Cir.\n2017), the Second Circuit employed statistical comparison as a key element in determining\nwhether a sentence would represent an unwarranted disparity. Indeed, in both cases, the Court held\nthat sentences significantly above the national norm for persons in the same CHC who committed\nthe same offense were substantively unreasonable.61\n\n61  Other courts have also relied upon statistics in reviewing and crafting sentences. See United\nStates v. Stock, 685 F.3d 631, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2012) (observing sentence was “by far the longest”\nimposed for an offense such as the one at bar, and that this might affect the reasonableness of the\nsentence on remand); United States v. Musgrave, 647 Fed. App’x 529, 538 (6th Cir. 2016)\n(sentence reasonable in part because district court “studied sentencing statistics nationally and in\nthe Southern District of Ohio”); United States v. Buesing, 615 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2010)\n(affirming sentence arrived at in part through analysis of Sentencing Commission statistics);\nUnited States v. Kamper, 860 F. Supp.2d 596, 608 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (“[t]he Commission’s\nstatistical work is invaluable to district court judges”);see also Alan Ellis & Mark Allenbaugh,\nUnwarranted Disparity:  Effectively Using Statistics in Federal Sentencing. 101 Crim. L. Rptr. 71\n\n---\n\n97\n\nStatistical comparison to mean and median sentences has also been a feature of courts\nreviewing prior sentences in the context of motions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582, and particularly\nwhen the nature of the offense (often homicide) resulted in a life sentence. For example, in United\nStates v. Russo, 643 F. Supp.3d 325 (E.D.N.Y. 2022), the Court, noting how the sentences imposed\npursuant to guilty pleas coincided with national averages while those imposed after trial were\nlonger, listed a series of cases in which the average sentences were instructive, and illustrated the\ndisparity:\nSee, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 93 (2010) (Roberts, J., concurring)\n(noting that a life-without-parole sentence was “far more severe than the average\nsentence imposed on those convicted of murder or manslaughter, who typically\nreceive under 25 years in prison”); United States v. Qadar, No. 00 Cr. 603 [(ARR),\n2021 WL 3087956, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2021)] (noting that the average\nfederal murder sentence in fiscal year 2020 was approximately 21 years); United\nStates v. Tellier, No. 92 Cr. 869 [(LGS), 2022 WL 1468381, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May\n10, 2022)] (noting that according to U.S. Sentencing Commission statistics, for\nfiscal years 2015-2021, the median sentence and length of imprisonment for murder\nwas 240 months, and the mean sentence and length of imprisonment for murder\nwas 262 and 263 months, respectively).\n\n643 F. Supp.3d at 335-36; see also United States v. White, 96 Cr. 1123 (SHS), 2022 WL 18276933,\nat *4 (December 8, 2022) (citing United States Sentencing Commission, Interactive Data\nAnalyzer, available at http (viewed December 8,\n2022)).\n4. The Data Establishes that in Practice the Guidelines are Not the Predominant\nFactor at Sentencing\n\nThe data set forth above demonstrate that the clear and prevalent practice within SDNY is\nsentencing below the Guidelines range, and that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range\n– notwithstanding that the Guidelines remain the benchmark for sentencing, see Gall v. United\n\n(Apr. 26, 2017), available at http\nstatistics-in-federal-sentencing.pdf.\n\n---\n\n98\n\nStates, 552 U.S. 48, 56 (2007) – is the rather limited exception, and not the rule. Thus, the norm\nnow is for Courts to consider § 3553(a) factors other than the Guidelines as more important when\nfashioning a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the statutory\nobjectives of sentencing enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).\n\nAlso, defendants convicted of similar conduct may vary in culpability, risk of recidivism,\ndangerousness and other variations that judges must now take into account. See Kimbrough, 552\nU.S. at 108 (“some departures from uniformity were a necessary cost of the remedy we adopted”).\n\nMr. Guo compares favorably for each of these touchstones.\nThe data firmly establish that a sentence for Mr. Guo well below the Guidelines would be\nconsistent with many other sentences for this class of offense conduct, and that a longer sentence\nwould create the type of disparity proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).\nE. Mr. Guo’s Medical History and Treatment at MDC\n\nMr. Guo’s medical history is set forth in Exhibit 1, which is respectfully submitted under\nseal to maintain confidentiality of health-related material as mandated by the Health Insurance\nPortability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Public Law 104-191.\nF. Mr. Guo Has Endured 37 Months’ Confinement at MDC During Its Most Violent\nand Chaotic Period\n\nMDC has been a dysfunctional institution for years. As detailed in Exhibit 14, attached\nhereto, MDC has suffered from staffing problems, violence, physical problems with maintenance\nand operations, safety vulnerabilities, leadership issues, and negligence with respect to medical\nand mental health care.\n\nThis Court is of course quite familiar with the serious, multiple, and systemic problems at\nthe institution. See Transcript, United States v. Segura-Genao, 18 Cr. 219 (AT) (S.D.N.Y.\nFebruary 5, 2019) (ECF # 211). Indeed, in 2019 this Court visited MDC, followed by an\n\n---\n\n99\n\nevidentiary hearing that identified many of the problems that currently remain, and remain resistant\nto remediation. Id.\n\nMore recently, during a sentencing proceeding in February 2025, this Court remarked that\n[t]he conditions of confinement at MDC are uniquely difficult. Courts in this district\nhave recognized that MDC is notoriously and, in some instances, egregiously slow\nin providing necessary medical and mental health treatment to inmates. And\nphysical conditions within the facility include mold and contaminated drinking\nwater.\nTranscript of February 25, 2025, Sentencing, United States v. Alptunaer, 23-CR-188 (AT)\n(S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2023) (ECF No. 86 at 36) (citing United States v. Chavez, 710 F.Supp. 3d 227,\n234- 35 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)).\n\nUnfortunately, since the Court’s inspection of MDC in 2019, the facility’s dysfunction has,\nin many respects, worsened even further. As the Court is aware, as a result of those conditions,\ncourts in SDNY and the Eastern District of New York have as a matter of course reduced the length\nof sentences they would otherwise impose. That standard should apply as well to Mr. Guo, whose\ntenure at MDC has corresponded to a particularly violent, volatile, and extraordinarily difficult\nperiod for the institution.\n\nExhibit 14 provides an updated, comprehensive review, prepared by counsel, describing\nthe conditions at MDC during Mr. Guo’s 37 months confined there.\nG. The BOP is in Crisis in Multiple Facets of its Operations Beyond MDC Brooklyn\n\nThe U.S. Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has been in crisis for years, a situation documented\nrepeatedly by the Department of Justice Inspector General  in detailed reports issued for the past\ntwo decades. In addition, as discussed below, certain current developments will exacerbate the\nproblems confronted by BOP, and, inexorably, those imprisoned within its facilities.\n\n---\n\n100\n\nMr. Guo will be subject to the deteriorating conditions in BOP facilities. That decay\ninvolves both physical infrastructure as well as chronic insufficient staffing. Both imperil the\nhealth and safety of inmates like Mr. Guo, and staff as well. A detailed examination of the crises\nconfronting BOP, and the discouraging portents for the future, is presented in Exhibit 15 hereto.\nH. Issues Following Conclusion of Mr. Guo’s Sentence\nMr. Guo will confront other issues after expiration of his sentence in this case. Those issues\nare addressed in sealed Exhibit 16.\nIII.\nFINANCIAL PENALTIES\n\nA. Restitution\n\nThe Government has moved for entry of an order finding that restitution would be\nimpracticable in this case, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3). ECF No. 785 at 5. Mr. Guo\nconcurs. ECF No. 789 at 3. Accordingly, no order of restitution should be imposed.\nB. Forfeiture\n\nMr. Guo has submitted considerable briefing on the issue of forfeiture. See ECF Nos. 799,\n804. Should the Court be inclined to impose a forfeiture money judgment against Mr. Guo, we\nrequest a Fatico hearing prior to entry of any such order.\nC. Fine\n\nGiven that Mr. Guo has Court-appointed counsel and a bankruptcy proceeding pending, no\nfine should be imposed because he lacks the ability to pay.\n\n---\n\n101\nCONCLUSION\nMiles Guo is a complex individual and this is a complex and unique case. For all of the\nreasons discussed in this memorandum and accompanying exhibits, as well as the supplemental\nmaterials provided and to be provided by counsel, Miles Guo respectfully submits, on the unique\nand complex facts of his life and of this case, and considering all of the sentencing factors which\nthe Court must consider, that a sentence substantially below the applicable Guidelines range and\nthe sentencing recommendation in the PSR will be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to\nachieve the purposes of sentencing.\nDated: March 20, 2026\nNew York, New York\nRespectfully submitted,\n           /s/\nJohn F. Kaley\nDoar Rieck Kaley & Mack\n217 Broadway, Suite 707\nNew York, New York 10007\nTel: 212-619-3730\n           /s/\nJoshua L. Dratel\nLaw Offices of Dratel & Lewis\n29 Broadway, Suite 1412\nNew York, New York 10006\nTel: 212-732-0707\n           /s/\nMelinda Sarafa\nSARAFA ZELLAN PLLC\n43 West 43rd Street, Suite 370\nNew York, NY 10036\nTel: 212-785-7575\nTo:\nAll Counsel via ECF","body_zh":null,"key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":36521,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-03-21 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-03-21","updated_at":"2026-07-06 20:57:15"}