{"id":"court_sdny_833_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":833,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"MEMORANDUM","filed_date":"2026-04-07","title":"Sentencing Memorandum of the United States of America","summary_zh":"美国政府量刑备忘录——美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵/Guo Wengui/Miles Guo）案，SDNY 1:23-cr-00118（S3 起诉书项下）ECF #833（2026-04-07 提交）。由检方（依据 28 U.S.C. §515 代理美国政府的 Sean Buckley 及助理联邦检察官）提交，梳理审判中认定的 GTV 私募、“农场贷款计划”、G|CLUBS、喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）及 A10 等相关犯罪事实与妨碍司法情节，主张量刑应计入相应损失金额，请求法院对郭文贵判处长期监禁刑，并就没收令与赔偿事宜提出处理意见。","summary_en":"Sentencing memorandum of the United States — in United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 1:23-cr-00118 (S3 indictment) ECF #833 (filed 2026-04-07). Filed by the government (Sean Buckley, Attorney for the United States acting under 28 U.S.C. § 515, and Assistant United States Attorneys), it summarizes offense conduct proven at trial across the GTV private placement, the Farm Loan Program, G|CLUBS, Himalaya Exchange, and A10 schemes as well as alleged obstruction of justice, argues the loss amount should be included in the Guidelines calculation, urges the court to impose a lengthy prison sentence, and addresses forfeiture and restitution.","body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n            v.\n\nMILES GUO,\n   a/k/a/ “Ho Wan Kwok,”\n   a/k/a “Miles Kwok,”\n   a/k/a “Guo Wengui,”\n   a/k/a “Brother Seven,”\n   a/ka/ “The Principal,”\n   a/ka/ “The Boss,”\n\n                                          Defendant.\n\nS3 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nSENTENCING MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY\n\nAttorney for the United States\n\nActing Under Authority Conferred by\n28 U.S.C. § 515.\n\nSouthern District of New York\n\n26 Federal Plaza\n\nNew York, New York 10278\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\nRyan B. Finkel\nJustin Horton\nJuliana N. Murray\nAssistant United States Attorneys\n\nOf Counsel\n\n---\n\n1\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nI. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................................. 1\nII. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................................................................... 2\nIII. OFFENSE CONDUCT PROVEN AT TRIAL ..................................................................... 4\nA. Rule of Law ........................................................................................................................ 4\nB. GTV Private Placement ...................................................................................................... 7\nC. The Farm Loan Program .................................................................................................... 9\nD. G|CLUBS ......................................................................................................................... 12\nE. Himalaya Exchange .......................................................................................................... 17\nF. A10 ................................................................................................................................... 20\nG. Obstruction of Justice ....................................................................................................... 20\nIV. VICTIM STATEMENTS ................................................................................................... 28\nV. APPLICATION OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES.................................................. 29\nA. Applicable Law ................................................................................................................ 29\nB. Probation’s Guidelines Calculation and Sentencing Recommendation ........................... 30\nC. The Offense Involved an Actual Loss in Excess of $550 Million ................................... 31\n1.\nThe Trial Record and Tracing Affidavits Prove the Loss Amount Exceeded $550\nMillion............................................................................................................................... 31\n2.\nThe GTV Private Placement Fraud Should Be Included in the Loss Amount\nCalculation ........................................................................................................................ 35\n3.\nWhether an Investor Subjectively Regards Oneself as a “Victim” Is Irrelevant to the\nGuidelines Calculation ...................................................................................................... 38\n4.\nThe Preponderance Standard Applies ....................................................................... 40\n5.\nGuo’s Guidelines Sentence Remains 175 Years Even if the Court Found the Loss\nAmount Was Merely Over $3.5 Million ........................................................................... 41\nD. Responses to Guo’s Other Guidelines Objections ........................................................... 41\nVI. THE COURT SHOULD IMPOSE A SENTENCE OF AT LEAST 30 YEARS’\nIMPRISONMENT .................................................................................................................... 45\nA. The Nature, Circumstances, and Seriousness of the Offense Warrant a Lengthy Sentence\n ............................................................................................................................................... 45\n1.\nGuo Caused Immense Pain and Suffering to Thousands of Victims ........................ 45\n2.\nGuo Led a Five-Year Scheme to Defraud with Serial Efforts to Evade and Obstruct\nJustice ................................................................................................................................ 48\n3.\nGuo Preyed on the Aspirations of a Community ...................................................... 51\n\n---\n\n2\n4.\nThe CCP’s Conduct Is Irrelevant to Guo’s Convictions ........................................... 56\n5.\nGuo’s Extraordinary Personal Enrichment ............................................................... 59\nB. Specific Deterrence and Protection of the Public Is Necessary ....................................... 63\nC. A Substantial Term of Imprisonment is Necessary for General Deterrence and to\nPromote Respect for the Law ................................................................................................ 69\nD. Guo’s History and Characteristics ................................................................................... 70\n1.\nGuo’s Background as a Purportedly Powerful Billionaire Aggravates, Not Mitigates,\nHis Culpability .................................................................................................................. 71\n2.\n ............................... 73\n3.\nGuo’s Immigration Status ......................................................................................... 74\n4.\nMDC Arguments ....................................................................................................... 76\nE. The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities ................................................ 78\nVII. FORFEITURE AND RESTITUTION .............................................................................. 83\nCONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 84\n\n---\n\n1\nI.   PRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nDefendant Miles Guo’s crimes were of extraordinary dimensions. Through daily repetition\nof insidious lies recorded on video, he obtained over a billion dollars and misappropriated hundreds\nof millions of dollars for himself. He developed a cult-like following of thousands of people and\nmanipulated their hopes and aspirations, and the trust they placed in him, to extract their money.\nHe used his victims’ money—victims’ personal savings, their family’s money, their retirement\naccounts, the money from the sale of their homes—to fund a lifestyle of extraordinary excess and\nindulgence, a gilded life of mansions, yachts, race cars, designer clothes, and luxury furnishings.\nIn the wake of his investor-funded extravagances, Guo destroyed hundreds of lives. He has left a\nwreckage of victims and families who have been devastated financially, emotionally, and\npsychologically.\nAnd Guo made, and continues to make, extraordinary efforts to avoid any accountability.\nHe used trusted lieutenants and a maze of shell companies and bank accounts around the world to\ntry to hide his wrongdoing and his overarching control of the sprawling criminal enterprise he\ndirected from this country. His extraordinary contempt for the laws of the United States is difficult\nto overstate. He undertook his continuous and flagrant violations of the laws of the United States,\nvictimizing Americans, after immigrating to the United States and seeking the beneficence of its\nlaws for asylees. He perjuriously declared bankruptcy to avoid court-imposed contempt sanctions,\nand then attempted to obstruct and intimidate a court-appointed bankruptcy trustee, using the same\nbullying tactics he deploys against victims who complain about his frauds. His sustained efforts to\nevade and obstruct law enforcement prior to his arrest, and the continuation of his criminal\nenterprise’s frauds and deception even after his arrest and detention, underscore the risks that Guo\nposes to the public absent an extremely substantial sentence of imprisonment and incapacitation.\n\n---\n\n2\nIndeed, even after being convicted of operating a racketeering enterprise by a unanimous\njury, Guo is entirely unrepentant. He does not even offer the lip service of remorse or acceptance\nof any responsibility for the harms he caused so many individuals and their loved ones, some of\nwhom have been pushed to consider suicide as a result of his crimes, and some of whom confronted\nhim directly by bravely testifying at trial about how he brainwashed, cheated, and harmed them.\nFaced with the overwhelming record of his extraordinarily egregious crimes, Guo refuses, even on\nthe eve of his sentencing, to acknowledge that he has done anything wrong, or caused any harm to\nanyone. Instead, as he stands atop a mountain of destroyed lives, Guo has the gall to tell this Court,\nwith a straight face, that he is the only real victim in this case. Guo’s absurd position, which has\nno grounding in reality, only serves to render his conduct all the more offensive.\nGuo’s extraordinarily vast and harmful criminal conduct, his extraordinary contempt for\nthe laws of the United States, and the extraordinary likelihood that Guo will seek (and is seeking)\nto continue his racketeering enterprise, all warrant a proportionately substantial sentence.  To\nprotect the public from further harm, to deter and disrupt Guo’s criminal enterprise, and to afford\njust punishment for the astonishing scope of Guo’s crimes, the Government respectfully submits\na sentence of at least 30 years’ imprisonment is appropriate.\nII.   PROCEDURAL HISTORY\nA. The Charges, the Arrest, and Pretrial Detention\nOn March 6, 2023, a grand jury returned a sealed indictment charging Guo and Kin Ming\nJe, a/k/a “William Je,” with various fraud and money laundering counts. (Dkt. 2). On March 15,\n2023, Guo was arrested at his $67.5 million penthouse apartment at the Sherry-Netherland Hotel\nin Manhattan, and presented in this District. (Dkt. 8). Guo has been detained since his arrest.\n\n---\n\n3\nThat same day of Guo’s arrest, the FBI conducted judicially authorized searches of three\nof his residences—his Manhattan penthouse apartment; his Greenwich, Connecticut residence; and\nhis Mahwah, New Jersey mansion, which was purchased with fraud proceeds.  During those\nsearches, the FBI recovered, among other things, dozens of electronic devices, more than\napproximately $400,000 in U.S. currency, evidence of Guo’s foreign travel documents, and luxury\nclothing, jewelry, and vehicles that had been purchased with fraud proceeds.\nB. Superseding Indictments\nThe Government filed several superseding indictments after Guo’s arrest, adding charges\nas to Guo and charging co-defendant Yanping “Yvette” Wang. (See Dkt. 19; Dkt. 215). On April\n24, 2024, the Government filed superseding indictment S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT), charging Guo, Je, and\nWang with racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One); conspiracy\nto commit wire fraud and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count Two); conspiracy\nto commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Three); conspiracy to\ncommit securities fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count Four); wire fraud, in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 1343, in connection with the GTV Private Placement (Count Five), Farm Loan\nProgram (Count Seven), G|CLUBS (Count Nine), and the Himalaya Exchange (Count Eleven);\nand securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, in connection with the GTV\nPrivate Placement (Count Six), Farm Loan Program (Count Eight), and G|CLUBS (Count Ten),\nand unlawful monetary transactions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Count Twelve). (Dkt. 307).\nGuo proceeded to trial on the S3 Indictment.1\n\n1 Wang pled guilty prior to trial. A third defendant, William Je, remains at large.\n\n---\n\n4\nC. Trial\nJury selection began on May 22, 2024. See 5/22/2024 Minute Entry. The Government\ncalled 34 witnesses, and the defense called nine witnesses. Guo elected not to testify. On July 16,\n2024, the jury returned a verdict finding Guo guilty on Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Seven,\nEight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven of the S3 Indictment, and finding him not guilty on Counts Five, Six,\nand Twelve. (Dkt. 395).\nIII.   OFFENSE CONDUCT PROVEN AT TRIAL\nA.   Rule of Law\nGuo’s schemes began on the heels of a series of extraordinary personal financial setbacks.\nIn 2017, one of Guo’s creditors—an investment firm called the Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity\nFund (or “PAX”)—filed suit against Guo, with claims that Guo had failed to deliver on a promise\nto repay a debt, which claim ultimately resulted in an award of over $100 million. (See PSR ¶ 83;\nsee also Tr. 4014). The next year—on October 23, 2018—a Hong Kong court entered an order\nseizing “billions of dollars’ worth” of Guo’s assets in Hong Kong and elsewhere. (Guo Sub. 15;\nDXSTIP_0001 ¶ 8).\nGuo launched his first fraudulent scheme in New York just weeks after Chinese authorities\nseized his assets, on November 21, 2018. (Tr. 423, 470; PSR ¶ 37). At a flashy event at The Pierre\nHotel in Manhattan, Guo announced the founding of two nonprofits and purported charities—the\nRule of Law Society and the Rule of Law Foundation. (Tr. 424). Guo’s pitch to his supporters was\nsimple: “he would donate the first $100 million as a first donor or sponsor,” (Tr. 471), and his\nfollowers’ money would be used to further the mission of “helping the Chinese people.” (Id. 423;\nsee also GXVI-192T (Guo’s broadcast statement that “I bear legal responsibility for what I said\ntoday. In other words, for every U.S. dollar donated by comrades in arms, $2 come from Wengui.\n\n---\n\n5\nAfter donating the 100 million U.S. dollars, Wengui is coordinating a donation of $1 billion to the\nRule of Law fund”)).  But as the Rule of Law Society’s former president and treasurer testified at\ntrial, Guo’s organizations did “nothing” to help the Chinese people. (Tr. 423; see also PSR ¶ 39\n(finding that while “the Rule of Law [organizations] were established purportedly to help people\nin China[,] [i]n actuality this was not true, and the Foundation was used to promote Guo, contrary\nto its promises otherwise”)). And while Guo’s supporters ultimately donated approximately $36\nmillion to the Rule of Law entities that Guo controlled, (see GX WA30), Guo never made the $100\nmillion donation he and his spokespeople had promised. (Tr. 471).\nThe Rule of Law organizations were a prelude to the more massive fraud that was yet to\ncome. In one instance, Guo organized a telecast fundraiser to mark the purported charities’ one-\nyear anniversary, broadcast from his offices and online over his GTV media platform. (Tr. 471-\n72). To help his solicitation of supporters’ donations, Guo’s aides received instructions to make\n“donations” from various entities under Guo’s control, so that these purported contributions could\nbe shown on the screen as Guo urged his followers to add their own money to the coffers. (Id. 473\n(testimony from Rule of Law Society’s president and treasurer that “the final purpose was to have\nthese big amounts of money shown on screen so that people would see that others were donating,\nand we were able to solicit more money this way.”)).\nFunds raised from Rule of Law’s donors were misappropriated in a manner that would\necho throughout the course of his “G Enterprise” schemes. (See, e.g., PSR ¶ 39). Guo spent money\nthat donors believed would be used for charitable purposes on himself, his family, and his own\nself-promotion. COVID-19 N95 masks, purchased with donor money, “went to boss’s house,” i.e.,\nGuo’s mansion in Greenwich. (Tr. 480). Still other donor-financed masks were contributed to the\nNew York Police Department—but Guo, through his right-hand assistant and convicted co-\n\n---\n\n6\ndefendant Yvette Wang, insisted that a letter be sent, falsely characterizing the donation as Guo’s\npersonal gift to the police. (See id. at 480-81). When a Guo aide declined to write the false cover\nletter, Wang told the aide that she “was being paid to execute orders and not to think.” (Id. 481).\nAs was his modus operandi, Guo facilitated his theft of donors’ funds by hiding behind a\nsuperficial organizational legal structure that purported to exclude him from the nonprofits’\ngovernance while he, in truth and in fact, controlled them. (See Tr. 475 (Rule of Law Society’s\npresident and treasurer’s testimony that “Boss”—i.e., Guo—controlled the organizations despite\nnot sitting on their boards)).\nBeyond Guo’s misappropriation of fraudulently solicited donations, the Rule of Law\nscheme solidified Guo’s relationship with his victims—that is, Guo locked his supporters in as\n“donors,” before promising them special access to a series of purportedly guaranteed investment\nopportunities. Guo “used the nonprofit organizations to amass followers who were aligned with\nhis purported campaign against the Chinese Communist Party and who were also inclined to\nbelieve Guo’s statements regarding investment and moneymaking opportunities.” (PSR ¶ 30).\nVictim Jenny Li donated to Rule of Law after trusting Guo’s promise to put up $100 million of his\nown money and his statements that many other supporters were making their own contributions.\n(Tr. 1170-72). Ms. Li—a Nevada resident who took out a second mortgage on her home to finance\nher Guo investments (Tr. 1212)—described how her $6,000 donation to the Rule of Law led to\n$100,000 in follow-on investments that she believed would buy her stock in Guo’s media ventures.\n(See Tr. 1170-75). Victim Le Zhou donated to Rule of Law for the same reasons. When he later\ninvested in G|CLUBS, he—like other victims—was told that he had to show proof of his prior\nRule of Law donations in order to access the GTV stock and other benefits promised to investors.\n(Tr. 194, 232-33).\n\n---\n\n7\nThe Rule of Law scheme acted as a gateway: an entry point for victims of the G Enterprise\nfrauds that continued to adapt and evolve over the five years following Guo’s launch of these\npurported charities.\nB.   GTV Private Placement\nFollowing the ironically named “Rule of Law” announcement and solicitation for\n“donations,” Guo doubled down and expanded his solicitation through false pretenses in the GTV\nPrivate Placement. On April 20, 2020, Guo offered common stock to his followers in an online\nvideo announcing the (unregistered) GTV Private Placement. (GX C26, C26-T). Preying on his\nsupporters’ affinity for him, Guo misrepresented the meaning of “private placement” and claimed\nit simply meant that “we are friends.” (Id.). Guo, and those working for him, distributed a\n“confidential information memorandum” that claimed that investor proceeds would be used to\n“expand and strengthen the business” of GTV Media Group. (GX VK5). Guo also personally\nguaranteed all investor funds. He made that clear in personal appeals to potential investors via\nphone calls, text messages, and video messages. (See Tr. 4465; GX VB36). Guo also broadcasted\nhis personal guarantee through his social media channels in which he stated, by way of example,\n“[t]his is a serious and solemn commitment and responsibility of Wengui Guo to you—to be\nresponsible for this investment forever, this is a legally valid commitment.” (GX C63, C63-T\n(June 2, 2020 video); see also GX Z9 at 37 (“I will be responsible. If there is one of your pennies\nthat’s missing, I, Guo Wengui will be responsible.”). Those guarantees were instrumental in\nattracting hundreds of millions of investments in GTV. (Tr. 4466; 2375).\nGuo’s personal guarantees were lies, as was the representation that he would spend investor\nmoney only on GTV business opportunities. In fact, just one day after the “private placement”\nclosed, on June 3, 2020, Guo ordered Wang to transfer $100 million dollars from a J.P. Morgan\n\n---\n\n8\nSaraca bank account, which account held $291 million of victim investments, to another Saraca\nbank account at J.P. Morgan, which, prior to that transfer, had a $0 balance. (GX Z1). That internal\ntransfer had no business purpose; rather, it was designed to obscure the source of the $100 million,\nto wit, victim investments. On June 5, 2020, the $100 million was transferred to Hayman Capital\nso that Guo could invest $100 million in the “HHKOF,” which is a “very high-risk” investment\nthat bet the Hong Kong dollar peg would break. (Tr. 790-791, 848).\nThese transfers were executed as part of Guo’s plan. Indeed, in the run up to the closing of\nthe Private Placement, beginning on at least May 23, 2020, Guo and his underlings had been\nnegotiating with Hayman regarding Guo’s investment. (Tr. 762; GX HN26). Although that\ninvestment was ultimately made in the name of Guo’s son (and co-conspirator) Mileson, it was\nalways clear that the investment was for Guo and his family—not Guo’s victims, or even GTV.\n(See GX HN33 (“these are the two entities that William and Miles [Kwok] will be investing\nthrough”); Tr. 806 (explaining that the investment terms were “[b]eneficial to Miles Kwok and\nSaraca”); Tr. 811-12 (“I understood that it was Miles Kwok family office that was interested in\nmaking the investment . . . it is typical for family offices to have members of the family be the\nbeneficial owners of the entities that they invest in.”)).\nThe next month, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) began investigating\nthe source of the $100 million HHKOF investment. On July 15, 2020, Hayman’s external counsel\nmessaged Wang and other co-conspirators involved in the G Enterprise—William Je, Max\nKrasner, and Aaron Mitchell—to inquire whether the $100 million used for the HHKOF was from\nthe GTV private placement. (Tr. 833-36). In the next week, Je informed Hayman that “there might\nhave been some money borrowed [from GTV] but they were going to put it back.” (Tr. 838).\nMoreover, Guo and his associates did not provide assurances that the $100 million was not GTV\n\n---\n\n9\nmoney, which ultimately caused Hayman’s founder and chief investment officer to message Je on\nAugust 22, 2020, to confirm that the $100 million “money is not tainted in any way, including that\nit does not represent assets from the GTV offering but that it is a bona fide investment made by\nSaraca and Miles.” (GX HN221). Hayman never received a response to that email. (Tr. 844).\nThis silence from Guo and his associates makes plain that Guo and his associates knew it\nwas wrong to transfer $100 million to the HHKOF sourced from GTV Private Placement money\nthat had been raised from investors. 2 Even worse, the approximately $30 million loss that\ninvestment sustained was not reimbursed by Guo, at all, despite his promises to his investors that\nthey would not lose their money, and that he would make them whole if they did. (Tr. 848; GX\nSTIP19). Through a settlement with the SEC, the entities involved in the GTV Private Placement\ntransferred the remainder of the victim investor funds to the SEC, which has since distributed it to\nvictims through a “fair fund,” less the approximately $30 million Guo lost in the HHKOF. (GX\nSTIP19).\nC.   The Farm Loan Program\nAfter conducting the misleading GTV Private Placement stock offering, which promptly\ndrew the scrutiny of civil and criminal U.S. authorities, Guo sought to evade law enforcement by\nraising money from investors through other schemes that were again fraudulent stock offerings,\nand the proceeds of which Guo again stole for his personal benefit. One of these schemes was the\n\n2 Indeed, co-conspirator Yvette Wang pleaded guilty to precisely this conduct. (See, e.g., Wang\nPlea Tr. at 25-26 (“In about June 2020, I was directed by others to wire approximately 100 million\nU.S. dollars from a bank account in New York to Hayman Capital Management, a hedge fund in\nTexas.  I knew these funds had been received from investors in the GTV offering. . . . I knew what\nI was doing was wrong.”)).\n\n---\n\n10\nso-called “Farm Loan Program,” through which Guo fraudulently obtained over $100 million. And\nGuo used that money from his followers to fund his own lavish lifestyle. (PSR ¶ 47; GX Z26).\nEstablished by Guo in the spring of 2020, shortly after the GTV private placement, the\nFarms were a collective of groups of Guo’s followers located in various countries around the world\nand organized into a hierarchical structure. (PSR ¶ 47; Tr. 1373). Guo was at the top. (Tr. 1316-\n17, 1373 (Guo “told the farms what to do”)). Beneath Guo was a leadership group called the Iron\nBlood Group, which consisted of Guo plus a handful of leaders of prominent Farms, including trial\nwitness Ya Li. (Tr. 1374-75). Each individual Farm also had a leader, who received instructions\nfrom the Iron Blood Group and from Guo. (Tr. 1373). This organization of Guo’s followers was\nat times also called the Himalaya Farm Alliance and the New Federal State of China. (Tr. 1373,\n1376). Similar to a multi-level marketing pyramid scheme, Guo used the Farms to amplify his\nfraud, to collect and bundle funds from victims, and to evade detection and disruption by law\nenforcement.\nThe Farm Loan Program was one of Guo’s scams that used the Farms to collect money\nfrom Guo’s victims and transfer it to companies controlled by Guo, which Guo referred to as\n“headquarter companies.” (Tr. 1377). Guo announced the Farm Loan Program in a video broadcast\non July 22, 2020:\n\n---\n\n11\n\n(GX Z9 at 28; GX C40-V). Guo told his followers that, to get shares of GTV common stock, a\nFarm member would sign a loan contract with the local Farm and send money to the Farm, then\nthe Farm would sign a loan contract with and send money to GTV—ultimately resulting,\nsupposedly, in the individual receiving GTV shares. (Id.; Tr. 1377). Not only were those “loans”\nfake loans, in fact, the victims did not receive stock shares, and their money was instead used for\nthe personal enrichment of Guo and his family.3 (Tr. 1386-88).\nAs an example, Ya Li testified that, as the leader of her Farm, she signed loan contracts\nwith, and collected $3 million from, the members of her Farm as part of the Farm loan program.\nAt Guo’s direction, Ms. Li sent $2 million to the U.S. bank account of a company called Medical\nSupply; and other loan money was being sent by other Farms to a bank account in Abu Dhabi in\nthe name of ACA Capital. (Tr. 1388-89). Ms. Li’s farm did not have a loan contract with either\nMedical Supply or ACA Capital. Instead, Ms. Li was sent and signed a loan contract with a\ndifferent company, called Alfa Global Ventures, which was one of Guo’s “headquarter\n\n3 Nor was interest paid on the loans, except to the New York-based farm, Mountain of Spices, in\nan effort to obscure Guo’s illegal stock offering from the SEC. (Tr. 1386-88).\n\n---\n\n12\ncompanies,” but that contract was never countersigned.4 (Tr. 1381-82, 1385-86). Ms. Li did not\nknow what ultimately happened to the $2 million that she transferred to Medical Supply. (Tr.\n1408).\nFinancial records confirm that Guo stole Farm Loan Program money for his personal\nbenefit. Huge sums of Farm Loan Program money, including money from Medical Supply and at\nleast 84 other bank accounts, were laundered through ACA Capital’s bank account in Abu Dhabi\nand then sent to Guo’s family office entities, such as Lamp Capital LLC, Greenwich Land LLC,\nand Leading Shine NY Ltd., where the money was used to fund Guo’s lavish lifestyle and enrich\nhis family members.  (GXZ26; Tr. 4310). For example, approximately $20 million was transferred\nto Guo’s son5; approximately $5 million was transferred to an entity owned by Guo’s spouse;\napproximately $2.3 million was used to cover maintenance expenses associated with an\napproximately 145-foot luxury yacht worth approximately $37 million, nominally owned by Guo’s\nson and used by Guo; and funds were used to pay for luxury cars and private jet travel. (PSR ¶ 50;\nGX Z26).6\nD.   G|CLUBS\nAround the same time, Guo fraudulently induced his followers to send money to a\n“purported online membership club called G|CLUBS”—“as a mechanism to continue fraudulent\nstock offerings.” (PSR ¶ 51, 54). Much like prior schemes in furtherance of his criminal enterprise,\n\n4 Other Farm loans were not even countersigned by the Farm. (See GX Z29 (686 loan agreements\nfor the Phoenix Farm, worth approximately $23 million, were not signed by the Farm)).\n5 On March 21, 2022, Guo testified in his bankruptcy proceedings that “[w]henever I need any\nexpenses for my basic living, I talk to my son and he will tell his office to give it to me.” (Tr.\n4049).\n6 In addition, approximately $10 million was transferred to the personal bank accounts of Je and\nhis spouse.\n\n---\n\n13\nGuo used G|CLUBS as a vehicle to attract hundreds of millions from those who trusted him most,\nand then spent those millions on himself and his family.\nThe conceit of G|CLUBS was straightforward: victims purchased memberships believing,\nbased on Guo’s personal assurances, that they would receive stock in various G entities such as\nGTV, G|CLUBS, and G|Fashion. (GX Z9 at 11 (“[6/20/20 Guo video:] “G club is not a\nmembership. G club is for you to get the original stocks . . . you can get legal G club, G fashion\nstocks, and that’s it. Simple.”) 7 ; GX Z9 at 101-103 (“[6/21/21 Guo Video:] “All G-Club\ncardholders are entitled to 1:10 of the new GTV stock for the amount of the card. . . . Oh my, this\nis big money. Think about the value of GTV”); GX Z9 at 111 (“[7/5/21 Guo Video:] When paying\n50 thousand dollars for the  membership card, you will have 10 thousand shares of G-Fashion in\nthe future”); GX Z9 at 116 (“[8/11/21 Guo Video:]  why if you have bought the G-Club\nmembership card, you would have stocks now. Why would you lose money? What risks are you\ntaking? Is there such a good opportunity in the world? Will there be such a good opportunity again?\nWill you have such a good opportunity again?”)). “Memberships” in G|CLUBS ranged in price\nfrom $10,000 to $50,000 (Tr. 2977), a price that—as Guo himself acknowledged—only made\nsense if one believed they were purchasing valuable stocks. (GX Z9 at 57). Guo also used his\nnetwork of Farms to promote the G|CLUBS offering of stock sales. (Tr. 3001-02).\nGuo’s promises of stock and, with the stock, wealth, caused his followers to part with\nhundreds of millions of their dollars. In total, G|CLUBS generated at least approximately $240\nmillion for Guo’s personal slush fund (GX Z26), from its approximately 8,000 members.\n(Tr. 3001). But that membership number underrepresents the perniciousness of the G|CLUBS\n\n7 Trial exhibits and the official transcript use variations of “G|CLUBS,” “G club,” and “G-Club.”\n\n---\n\n14\nscheme, because Guo encouraged his victims to purchase multiple memberships each so that, he\nclaimed, they could buy even more stock. (PSR ¶ 55). Of course, Guo’s promises of stock were\nutter lies. (Tr. 2977). Indeed, Guo had been warned by others not to claim G|CLUBS offered stock\nas a benefit of membership. (See GX CT172; Tr. 3026). But Guo was quick to assure his followers\nthat any G|CLUBS disclaimer that disassociated G|CLUBS from stock ownership was “to put it\nbluntly, . . . nonsense.” (GX Z9 at 57). Rather, those general disclaimers and warnings that no\nstock was attendant to G|CLUBS membership were “what we need to have to legally avoid ‘Me\nToo.’” (Id.).\nFully aware of the blatant illegality of falsely promising stock to victims, Guo and his co-\nconspirators draped G|CLUBS with features apparently designed to conceal its fraudulent nature\nfrom law enforcement. For example, G|CLUBS claimed to offer its members G|Fashion discounts,\na temporary opportunity to upload content to GTV, access to Guo’s music, access to a “G|Talks”\nsteaming event, a purported “sweepstakes,” and limited discounts to selected hotels and a London\nrestaurant. (Tr. 3005-06). Those picayune benefits did not comport with the steep price of\nmembership, and Guo himself acknowledged as much. (GX Z9 at 57 (“I don’t think you’d buy G-\nClub for something like the free music. If you were, why would you buy it, right? My suggestion\nwould be don’t buy it.”).) Indeed, the minimal discounts were essentially worthless.8  Even worse,\n\n8 The discounts were extremely narrow and virtually unused by any of the 8,000 members. For\nexample, the available hotel benefit applied a 10% discount that could be used only at three hotels\nin Puerto Rico. (Tr. 3008). The available one-time-use restaurant benefit applied only to a single\nrestaurant in London on a specific evening. (Tr. 3009). The available boat service charter benefit\nwas only usable in Puerto Rico. (Tr. 3010).  None of these “benefits” cost G|CLUB anything, and\nthey all fall criminally short of anything remotely worth the five-figure cost of membership.\n(Tr. 3008-3010).\n\n---\n\n15\nthe “sweepstakes” was fixed to award a Lamborghini to one of Guo’s attorneys, a co-conspirator.\n(Tr. 3030; GX 121).\nSimilar to features of other parts of his enterprise, Guo hid his leadership of G|CLUBS\nbehind figureheads. On paper, Guo was a mere “spokesperson” for G|CLUBS, but he could not be\nterminated (Tr. 3000), and the membership agreement prohibited members from making\ndisparaging statements about him. (Tr. 3021). The “spokesperson” title was a smokescreen. In the\ncase of G|CLUBS, its named CEO, Limarie Reyes, had no functional control of the organization—\nshe simply signed documents, as directed, to transfer membership funds so they could be\nmisappropriated. (Tr. 2975, 2990). Indeed, Ms. Reyes did not speak Mandarin, had no association\nthe purported democracy movement, and had no knowledge of Chinese culture. (Tr. 2983-84).\nThis all despite the fact that G|CLUBS was marketed toward the Mandarin-speaking Chinese\ndiaspora. (See Tr. 3002-03).\nMs. Reyes’ obliviousness was not a flaw in the organizational setup of G|CLUBS, it was a\nfeature of the fraud that facilitated G|CLUBS vacuuming of hundreds of millions from Guo’s\nvictims to transfer that wealth to Guo and his family. G|CLUBS victim proceeds were used to\npurchase:\n• A $26.5 million mansion in Mahwah, New Jersey, which was then custom\nrenovated at great expense and included with wings designed and tailored to the\nspecifications of Guo, his wife, his son, and his daughter. (GX Z12).\n\n---\n\n16\n\n• Millions of dollars spent to furnish the Mahwah mansion including, by way of\nexample: $1,050,000 for a set of four Louis VXI Gilt Bronze Lantern chandeliers;\n$1,185,000 for a jewelry box, cabinet, and candlesticks; $300,000 for Persian rugs;\n$250,000 for an antique Chinese rug; $120,000 for two Baccarat chandeliers;\n$104,000 for a television and surround sound system; two mattresses, which each\ncost $36,000; a $24,000 “eternal forest” coffee table; $19,200 for a small walnut\nbench; and a $53,000 Napoleon III fireplace log holder. (E.g. GX BUCK1 –\nBUCK1296; GX 1B125K).\n• A $832,000 red Lamborghini that Guo parked in his Greenwich garage. (GX\nGC276).\n• A $4.4 million Bugatti Chiron Super Sport custom designed by and for Guo’s son,\nMileson. (GX 218).\n• A $3.5 million Ferrari race car. (GX Z14; GX802).\n• A $2,130,000 yacht for Guo. (GX GC309).\n\n---\n\n17\n• Cash transfers to Guo’s family. (GX GC415).\nThese lavish displays of wealth were, in many cases, personally selected and directed by\nGuo. (See, e.g., GX 1B125M-8; GX 1B125M8-T (video of Guo directing Mahwah mansion\nrenovation and describing the bedrooms for his daughter and her boyfriend); GX PRO466 (“the\nassistant of Mr. Miles Kwok” directing the Mahwah mansion designs on Guo’s behalf); Tr. 2926\n(realtor testimony regarding Guo’s search for the Mahwah mansion); GX 1B125K (a Guo text\nmessage directing that “G-Club or another private company [be used] for payment” for a coffee\ntable ordered from Shenzhen, China); GX 1B125F (Guo text messages regarding the shipment of\na yacht purchased with G|CLUBS funds); GX 1B125I (a Guo text message selecting the font to\nuse for the purchased yacht)).\nE.   Himalaya Exchange\nIn November 2021, Guo and Je launched the Himalaya Exchange (“HEX” or the\n“Exchange”) with a broadcast on GTV. (See Tr. 3669-70, 3675). Guo marketed HEX as a\ncryptocurrency “ecosystem” where investors in his prior schemes could purchase and trade two\ndigital assets of Guo’s creation. (See Tr. 3669-70; PSR ¶¶ 56-57). Guo’s purported\ncryptocurrencies—H Coin and H Dollar (originally G Coin and G Dollar)—were fraudulent.\nIndeed, Wang—Guo’s chief lieutenant, whose compensation package purportedly included H\nDollar—admitted in her own sentencing proceedings after pleading guilty that “the cryptocurrency\nWang was promised by Guo was worthless and illiquid.” (PSR ¶ 28 n.2). As described below, the\nlies that Guo told to solicit investment in these sham coins included that they were backed by gold\nand cash; that they were real cryptocurrencies held and traded on the blockchain when instead they\nexisted only on an offline spreadsheet controlled by William Je’s investment fund; that their price\nwas set by a real market; and that Guo would personally guarantee HEX investors against losses.\n\n---\n\n18\nGuo made these false promises personally. In a music video designed for HEX’s launch, Guo\nappeared in the same Lamborghini that was bought with G CLUBS members’ money and kept in\nGuo’s garage in Greenwich.  (See, e.g., GX GC276; GX C370).\nGuo repeatedly told his followers that H Coin was backed by “20% gold.” (See PSR\n¶ 57(a), (b); see also GX Z9 at 121-122, GX C459-V1, GX C459-2). At trial, HEX’s figurehead\nCEO—who testified that he “was in control of nothing” (Tr. 3634)—explained that Guo’s “20%\ngold” claim was false: none of H Coin’s value was tied to gold, nor was H Dollar secured by gold\nreserves (another of Guo’s lies). (See Tr. 3694; see also Tr. 2653-54). Victims testified that Guo’s\nrepresentations about his coins’ gold reserves were material to their decisions to purchase his\npurported cryptocurrencies. (See, e.g., Tr. 2425).\nGuo and Je told investors that his coins were created and “[a]ll the transactions are recorded\nin distributed ledger, a public ledger, called blockchain.” (GX Z9 at 125; see also GX Z9 at 88\n(Guo’s statement that the blockchain has “an important function: absolute fairness!”)). In fact,\nHEX “wasn’t a blockchain”—it was “just a database.” (Tr. 3658; see also id. 2670). The lie was\nnecessary, the Exchange’s CEO testified, because the truth that Guo’s coins were not on the\nblockchain could have caused their price to crater.  (See id. at 3679).\nThe price of Guo’s coins was also a mirage.  Rather than the product of a market accessible\non a public ledger, H Coin and H Dollar were held almost entirely in wallets controlled by Je’s\nentities. (Tr. 2646). That allowed Guo and his co-conspirators to stage-manage the purported\ncryptocurrencies and give them the illusion of reality.  In June 2022, for example, Je publicly\nshared the news that “a buyer decided to purchase a world-class car” using H Dollar. (PSR ¶ 60).\nThe car was a Ferrari purchased for Guo’s son using victims’ money, (see PSR ¶ 28), and the\ntransaction was actually executed using a bank wire—with a fig-leaf H Dollar “transaction”\n\n---\n\n19\ncreated after the fact. (PSR ¶ 60). HEX’s purported investors could not use H Dollar or H Coin,\neither, or even take custody of the purported cryptocurrencies in accounts or wallets of their own.\nInstead, Guo’s investors got “credits” that “represented” the sham assets, and that could not be\nused outside of Guo’s HEX ecosystem and could not be converted into “fiat currency or crypto-\nassets” at all. (PSR ¶ 61).\nThe obscured centralized control of Guo’s purported cryptocurrencies permitted their price\nto be manipulated by Guo’s co-conspirators. Shortly after their initial public offering, HEX\nreported that the price of Guo’s H Coin had increased from $0.10 to $27—a 26,900% increase\nwithin just a few weeks. (PSR ¶ 58). The allure of the coins’ value “going to the moon”—a phrase\nGuo used to market the coins, and one that “implies a sharp increase in value” (PSR ¶ 59)—was\ncombined with Guo’s false promise that he would personally guarantee HEX’s investors against\nlosses: “It’s all on Brother Seven if we lose money.” (E.g., GX Z9 at 64; GX C302-V7.)\nGuo ultimately collected more than $260 million in victims’ money through HEX. (PSR ¶\n56). That money played a vital role in his ongoing fraud, as both a source of personal enrichment\nand as yet another means of perpetuating and expanding Guo’s racketeering enterprise. In April\n2022, Guo and Je transferred $37 million from HEX “to cover the cost of a luxury yacht that Guo\nhad previously purchased and used.” (PSR ¶ 62). Later that year, Guo and his co-conspirators\nplanned to use HEX investors’ money to purchase a bank that would have afforded the G\nEnterprise an increased ability to launder and misappropriate victim funds and to obstruct law\nenforcement investigations—a plan that was only thwarted by the seizure of HEX’s funds by the\nGovernment pursuant to seizure warrants. (See, e.g., GX GC552; Tr. 2796). After HEX’s fraud-\nfunded coffers were depleted by those seizures, Guo continue to lie about the safety and stability\nof his HEX investors’ money, telling them months after those seizures that “the issue and\n\n---\n\n20\nredemption of HCoin and its stability, are all under the extremely strictest supervision by\nregulations.” (GX Z9 at 184).\nF.   A10\nFollowing the Government’s seizure of more than $600 million of Guo’s fraud proceeds in\nlate 2022 and early 2023, Guo sought one more cash grab through a purported investment\nopportunity that he called “A10.” A10 was designed to raise additional victim proceeds and secure\nthem offshore, in Abu Dhabi, outside of the jurisdiction of the United States. (Tr. 1460, 2810).\nG|CLUBS was the inspiration and foundation for A10, which involved Guo offering his victims\nan opportunity to buy A10 stock that was, according to Guo, “a completely independent G Club\ncompany established in Abu Dhabi.” (GX VI189, GX VI189-T). At other times, Guo claimed that\nA10 purported to offer victims an opportunity to purchase ownership interest in Guo’s Gettr social\nmedia platform and the Himalya Exchange. (GX Z10).\nAs Ms. Chen, a victim, explained during her trial testimony, A10 was another example of\nGuo “asking us to give money to investment, just keep draining out our pocket[s] . . . but where is\nthe return?” (Tr. 4503). There was none.\nG.   Obstruction of Justice\n1. Obstruction Relating to the Offense Conduct\nGuo’s conduct and his (often successful) efforts at obstruction display an utter contempt\nfor the law. His obstructive conduct has taken many forms—from the complexity of the investment\nschemes described above, to the constant evolution of those investment opportunities after\ndetection or disruption by criminal and civil authorities and other third parties, to moving both the\nenterprise’s operations and fraud proceeds offshore so they would be beyond the jurisdictional\n\n---\n\n21\nreach of both the Bankruptcy Trustee and U.S. law enforcement, to his intimidation of those who\ncomplained or criticized him or otherwise threatened the continuation of his criminal enterprise.\nGuo’s money launderer, William Je, sought to frustrate the Government’s further seizure\nof fraud proceeds by transferring the remaining funds to bank accounts in the UAE (PSR ¶¶ 80-\n81), and even after Guo’s arrest, the G Enterprise relocated to Dubai and redirected victim funds\nto accounts there. (Tr. 1472-77, 1481-87 (“Q: What’s your understanding of why they didn’t want\nto use US dollar? A: Because US dollar will be traced. Q: Traced by whom? A: Traced by US\ngovernment.”); see also PSR ¶¶ 96-97 (Wang’s attempts to coordinate the retrieval of $7.1 million\nin fraud proceeds even after her arrest and detention)).\nGuo also repeatedly labeled those who requested investment refunds as “CCP spies” and\ndirected his thousands of followers to bully and harass them. That harassment took place both\nonline and in person, in the form of paid protests at individuals’ personal family homes. (Tr. 1487-\n89). Guo maintained a “black list” of former supporters who criticized Guo or his organizations.\n(Tr. 1489). Guo shared the personally identifiable information of people on his black list and\ndirected his supporters to post and broadcast it online. (Tr. 1489-90). This intimidated and terrified\nmany investors, who feared the consequences both for themselves and their families back in China\nwere the CCP to learn that they had supported what they had previously believed to be an anti-\nCCP movement. Guo would also refuse to issue refunds to followers who were critical of him or\nthe enterprise. (Tr. 1409-10). In at least two instances, Guo’s protest targets were physically\nassaulted and injured. What was Guo’s response to his loyal followers when he learned of those\nphysical assaults? “Well done.” (Tr. 1488).\n\n---\n\n22\n2. Obstruction Relating to the Bankruptcy Proceedings\nIn addition to the obstruction directly related to the investment scams, and while they were\nongoing, a slew of Guo’s obstructive conduct occurred in connection with his bankruptcy\nproceeding and earlier civil litigation where Guo faced contempt sanctions. (See PSR ¶¶ 64, 83-\n90).\nIn 2017, the investment fund Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (“PAX”) filed a\ncivil lawsuit against Guo in New York Superior Court, seeking the repayment of an overdue loan\nthat Guo had personally guaranteed. In September 2020, PAX secured a judgment against Guo in\nthe amount of approximately $114 million. (Tr. 4018). After PAX secured its judgment, it\nundertook efforts to enforce the judgment by identifying and then attempting to levy upon Guo’s\nassets in the United States.  However, “PAX encountered difficulty identifying assets over which\nGuo exercised control because Guo, who is a self-declared multi-billionaire, had secreted his assets\nin a maze of corporate entities and with family members.”  PAX Lawsuit, Index 652077/2017,\nDkt. 1181, at 7-8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022).  PAX obtained a restraining order in October 2020\nthat covered Guo’s yacht, the “Lady May,” and ordered it not be moved outside the jurisdiction.\n(Tr. 4020; GX 1416). Yet the Lady May was moved outside the jurisdiction.  As a result, on\nFebruary 9, 2022, New York State Supreme Court Justice Ostrager entered a final order of\ncontempt against Guo. (Tr. 4022-27; GX 1413). The court’s order required Guo to pay $134\nmillion in contempt fees in five business days. (Tr. 4027).\nInstead of paying his contempt fees, on February 15, 2022, Guo filed for Chapter 11\nbankruptcy in the District of Connecticut. (Tr. 4027). In his bankruptcy filings, Guo claimed to\nhave as much as $500 million in debt and, despite living in expensive properties, surrounded by\nluxury cars and exorbitantly expensive furniture, declared under penalty of perjury that he had\n\n---\n\n23\nessentially no assets. (Tr. 4039-42; GX 1407; GX 1420). While Guo’s bankruptcy filings made\nnote of his residences in Greenwich and at the Sherry Netherland hotel, they omitted any reference\nto Guo’s mansion in Mahwah, New Jersey. (Tr. 4044). In sworn testimony in connection with his\nbankruptcy proceedings, Guo obstructed and lied under oath. As one example, Guo preposterously\nclaimed, under oath, and in a spurious attempt to distance himself from GTV, that the “G” in\n“GTV” did not stand for “Guo”:\nQ. What does the G in GTV stand for?\nA. God, the goal, like in G-O-A-L.\nQ. The English word “goal?”\nA. Yeah, goal or God.\n(Tr. 4083).\nYet Guo’s obstructive conduct in the bankruptcy went far beyond his own false\ndeclarations and perjurious testimony. Guo engineered a campaign of harassment against the\nTrustee and his family members in the form of protests after labeling the Trustee and others\ninvolved in the bankruptcy as “CCP spies.” As noted, this form of intimidation was part of Guo’s\nplaybook and he used it to continue and facilitate his investment scams.9 In the bankruptcy, the\nTrustee and his family, including his daughters, were the subject of protests, which lasted for 90\ndays. (Tr. 4091). Guo targeted the Trustee and the law firm where he worked, Paul Hastings, with\nprotestors carrying signs like the following:\n\n9 Guo even directed protests of the SEC on the false pretense that the CCP had infiltrated the SEC.\n(PSR ¶ 89).\n\n---\n\n24\n\n(GX VI 194). Guo also targeted the Trustee personally via his family members, protesting outside\ntheir personal homes, and even targeting the public elementary school where the Trustee’s\ndaughter, a teacher, worked. Guo’s paid protestors held signs like this at the Trustee’s daughter’s\napartment and the elementary school where she worked:\n\n---\n\n25\n\n(DX 7007). The Trustee and his family were accused of being CCP “running dogs,” “supporters\nof genocide,” and having blood on their hands. Those allegations, as Guo well knew, were false\nand designed to rile up his supporters and deter the Bankruptcy Trustee (and others who\ncontemplated action against Guo) from both seizing Guo’s property and investigating his finances.\n(Tr. 4214 (the Trustee’s son-in-law testifying that “prior to them showing up at our apartment,\nthey’d show[n] up at Luc's work and Luc’s house, so we had kind of understood by then that\nthey—that this has been a pattern and that they were there because—to put pressure on Luc and\nhis family in order to stop working on this case for the government.”)).\nThere is no doubt that it was Guo who was directing this violence, because evidence of the\nharassment and targeting was recovered from one of his cellphones, which had the device name\n“Boss.” (Tr. 4716-17). That evidence includes a truly chilling photograph of the Trustee and his\n\n---\n\n26\nfamily at the wedding of one of his daughters, where the Trustee’s three daughters were circled in\nred10:\n\n(GX 1B124F; see also Tr. 4717).\nBeyond the targeting and attempted intimidation of the Trustee and his family, Guo ordered\nothers to obstruct the court proceedings in other ways. When Ya Li received a subpoena from the\nbankruptcy trustee, Guo told her to “throw it in the rubbish bin,” and she complied because she\nbelieved Guo when he said that the U.S. Department of Justice had been “weaponized by the CCP.”\n(Tr. 1498-99). In connection with the G Enterprise’s efforts to keep assets outside the reach of the\nbankruptcy trustee even after Guo’s arrest, Yongbing Zhang—the attorney and co-conspirator who\n“won” a Lamborghini in the G|CLUBS “sweepstakes,” and with whom Guo who has continued to\n\n10 The red circles highlighting Despins’s daughters appeared on the photograph that was recovered\nfrom Guo’s cellphone. The Government added only the black redactions, to protect the privacy of\nvictims and/or third parties in this public filing.\n\n---\n\n27\nmeet in the MDC following his arrest and detention—asked Ya Li to sign a false affidavit for filing\nin one of the bankruptcy litigations. (Tr. 1523-29; GX VI 66). When she refused, Zhang threatened\nMs. Li with $38 million in liability. (Tr. 1530). After this threat from Guo’s attorney, Ms. Li\ncontemplated suicide. (Tr. 1530-31).\nMore recently, Guo’s enterprise continues to harass and threaten those that oppose it. On\nMarch 10, 2026, in a video provided to the Government by a victim, Guo’s NFSC presenters\nrequested that Guo’s remaining followers provide statements to Guo’s court appointed counsel. In\naddition, the presenter indicated that the 126 victims who previously provided statements “will all\nhave to bear the consequences.” (Dkt. 832, Stmt. 206-B (translated)).\n\nThat appears to be a reference to the 126 victim statements filed with the Court on November 22,\n2024. (Dkt. 477).\n3. Guo’s Post-Arrest Obstruction\nEven after his arrest Guo has engaged in obstructive conduct. Guo’s criminal Enterprise\ncontinued to operate following his arrest and Guo continued to direct it as it relocated to the UAE,\noutside the reach of U.S. law enforcement. (PSR ¶¶ 103-105). Following his arrest, Guo’s\n\n---\n\n28\nfollowers sought to fabricate evidence at the Mahwah Mansion to make it appear as if it were a\nG|CLUBS property, rather than Guo’s personal family home. (PSR ¶¶ 91-95). Similarly, following\nGuo’s arrest, one of Guo’s top lieutenants, Brother Long Island, instructed Ya Li and others to\ndelete evidence from their phones in case they were arrested.11 (Tr. 1500-02).\nIV.   VICTIM STATEMENTS\nTo date, the Government has received and provided to the Court a total of approximately\n225 victim impact statements.  These statements reflect the extreme harm perpetrated by Guo on\nhundreds of victims located throughout the United States, harm that included extreme financial\nhardships, mental anguish, broken family bonds, and contemplation of self-harm including suicide.\nSpecifically, on November 22, 2024, the Government filed a letter attaching approximately\n126 victim statements. (Dkt. 477). On December 11, 2024, the Government filed seven additional\nvictim statements that it had received. Dkt. 482. On January 2, 2025 and January 3, 2025, the\nGovernment filed a total of 16 additional victim statements. (Dkts. 486, 487). The Court has sealed\ndockets 477, 482, 486, and 487, which entries contain the aforementioned statements. On April 7,\n2026, the Government filed an additional 74 statements under seal. (Dkt. 832). These cover letters\nare provided to the Court as an Exhibit, under seal, in light of the Court’s prior ruling.12\nFor the Court’s convenience, the Government will provide a hard copy of all of these victim\nimpact statements to the Court’s chambers.\n\n11 Prior to Guo’s arrest, Guo himself instructed Ya Li and others to delete evidence from their\nphones. (Tr. 1500-02).\n12 The Government believes that the cover letter at Docket 477, which is attached under seal as\nExhibit A to this filing, should be filed on the docket. That cover letter does not contain any\npersonally identifying information for any victims. It merely summarizes certain statements\nreceived as of that date. Accordingly, the Government respectfully requests permission to file that\nletter on the docket.\n\n---\n\n29\nV.   APPLICATION OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES\nA.   Applicable Law\nIn calculating the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, the Court must either rule on\nthe parties’ factual disputes or “determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter\nwill not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” Fed. R.\nCrim. P. 32(i)(3)(B); see also Gleeson et al., Second Circuit Criminal Handbook § 42-39 (“[T]he\nsentencing judge need not resolve every single dispute a party raises regarding the presentence\nreport.”). “[P]recise calculation of the applicable Guidelines range may not be necessary” if,\namong other things, the Court “decide[s] to impose a non-Guidelines sentence.” United States v.\nCrosby, 397 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2005). In that circumstance, the Court has “leeway” to “avoid\nthe need to resolve all of the factual issues necessary to make precise determinations of some\ncomplicated matters, for example, determination of monetary loss.” Id.\nIf a “factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties\nshall be given an adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding that factor.”\nUnited States v. Berndt, 127 F.3d 251, 257 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)). But the\nCourt also has wide discretion in how to resolve such disputes—and evidentiary hearings are not\nrequired. United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 54 (2d Cir. 2013). In choosing whether to resolve\nmaterial sentencing disputes by hearing or a more summary procedure, courts consider “the nature\nof the dispute, its relevance to the sentencing determination, and the applicable case law.” United\nStates v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1995). Disputed sentencing factors need only be\nproven by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Crosby, 397 F.3d at 112; United States v.\nGuerra, 888 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1989).\n\n---\n\n30\nB.   Probation’s Guidelines Calculation and Sentencing Recommendation\nIn the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the Probation Department calculates an\nadjusted offense level of 55—which exceeds the maximum offense level set forth in the U.S.S.G.\nsentencing table and is therefore “treated as a level 43” as Guo’s case is one of “those rare instances\nwhere the total offense level is calculated in excess of that number”—and a criminal history\ncategory of I. (PSR ¶¶ 120, 123, 126).  Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b), Guo’s Guidelines sentence\nis the maximum statutorily authorized length of imprisonment, which is 2,100 months, or 175\nyears. (PSR ¶ 167). The Government agrees with Probation’s calculation of the Guidelines and\nsubmits that the Court should adopt it.\nAfter describing Guo’s personal circumstances, interviewing Guo, reviewing the trial\nrecord, and considering the offense conduct, the Probation Department recommended that Guo be\nsentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment—20 years on Counts One, Two, Three, Seven, Eight, Nine,\nTen, and Eleven (to run concurrently), and 5 years on Count Four (to run consecutively). (PSR at\n58). The Probation Department pointed out that, although Guo declined to discuss the offense\nconduct during his interview, “he noted that he maintains his innocence.” (PSR at 59). The\nProbation Department emphasized that Guo’s criminal conduct “resulted in astronomical losses\ntotaling more than $1 billion to thousands of victims” and that Guo “played a pivotal role in the\noffense as the leader of the scheme.” (Id. at 61).  While mindful of Guo’s personal circumstances—\nwhich are sourced almost entirely from Guo—including the “personal losses that [Guo] has\nreportedly suffered at the hands of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party], as well as the potential\ndanger he would face if returned to his native country”—the Probation Department “do[es] not\nbelieve that the personal history and characteristics of the defendant outweigh the need for\nsignificant punishment and deterrence in this case.”  (Id.) (emphasis added).\n\n---\n\n31\nC.   The Offense Involved an Actual Loss in Excess of $550 Million\nAs the Court saw at trial, Guo’s offenses caused losses to thousands of investors. Whatever\nreasonable estimate the Court may choose to employ to compute the harm of Guo’s schemes, the\ntotal losses exceed $550 million and, in fact, exceed a billion dollars. Because Guo’s offense\nresulted in losses exceeding $550 million, his Guidelines offense level increases 30 levels.\nU.S.S.G. § 2B.1(b)(2)(P).\n“Loss” is defined in the Guidelines as “the greater of actual loss or intended loss.” U.S.S.G.\n§ 2B1.1, cmt. 3(A). “Actual loss” is defined as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that\nresulted from the offense.” Id., cmt. 3(A)(i). And “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm” is\ndefined as “pecuniary harm”—that is, “harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily\nmeasurable in money”—that “the defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should\nhave known, was a potential result of the offense.” Id., cmt. 3(A)(iii), (iv). “Intended loss” is\ndefined as “the pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to inflict,” and includes any\n“intended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur.” Id., cmt. 3(A)(ii).\nThe “Guidelines do not require that the sentencing court calculate the amount of loss with certainty\nor precision.” United States v. Bryant, 128 F.3d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1997). Instead, a court “need\nonly make a reasonable estimate of the loss,” given the “available information.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1,\ncmt. 3(c); see also United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 250 (2d Cir. 2012) (evidence supporting\na Guidelines loss determination “need not . . . establish loss with absolute precision; it need only\npermit the district court to make a reasonable estimate of the loss given the available information”).\n1. The Trial Record and Tracing Affidavits Prove the Loss Amount Exceeded $550 Million\nThe record before the Court amply supports a loss amount exceeding $550 million. In fact,\nthe trial evidence shows that $1.3 billion is a conservative estimate of the amount of funds sent by\n\n---\n\n32\nindividual victims to certain arms of the G Enterprise’s frauds: GTV, the Farms, G|CLUBS, and\nthe Himalaya Exchange. (See GX Z26; Tr. 4330-32). GX Z26 summarizes thousands of pages of\nbank records, which were also admitted as exhibits. (GX Z26 at 36 (citing source exhibits)). GX\nZ26 establishes, by at least a preponderance of evidence, that $1.3 billion flowed into bank\naccounts associated with the racketeering enterprise, which the jury’s verdict demonstrates were\nthe result of fraud. That exhibit, and the maze of bank accounts it summarizes, also demonstrates\nthe involvement of $1.3 billion in money laundering.\nGuo argues that the Government’s summary witness at trial, Paul Hinton, who testified\nabout his analysis of financial records for the entities that comprise the G Enterprise, does not\nprovide a sufficient basis for the Court to find “any” loss amount. (Guo Sentencing Submission\n(“Guo Sub.”) 44). Guo’s arguments can be dispensed with easily. Guo appears to argue that the\nCourt cannot use the money that flowed into the bank accounts of the G Enterprise as a reasonable\nestimate of the loss amount because Hinton did not perform a “tracing” analysis.13 (Guo Sub. 44).\nBut there is no legal requirement that a district judge’s loss estimate for purposes of calculating\nthe Guidelines be based on any kind of meticulous tracing analysis. See Coppola, 671 F.3d at 250\n(evidence supporting a Guidelines loss determination “need not . . . establish loss with absolute\nprecision; it need only permit the district court to make a reasonable estimate of the loss given the\navailable information”). In any event, even if there were such a requirement, the Court already has\n\n13 At trial, the Government specifically proved, via other witnesses who did perform tracing\nanalyses, the misappropriation of well over $100 million by Guo and his conspirators.  For\nexample, the Government walked through summary charts showing how investor funds were used:\n(1) to purchase the Mahwah Mansion and the lavish furnishing and renovation of the mansion for\nGuo and his family (GX Z12A), (2) to purchase a $4 million Ferrari for Guo’s son (GX Z14), and\n(3) to place a highly speculative $100 million bet with a hedge fund for the benefit of Guo’s son\n(GX Z1).\n\n---\n\n33\nbefore it tracing analyses for $634,827,401.97 of fraud proceeds—i.e., an amount exceeding $550\nmillion—that were seized by the Government pursuant to court-authorized seizure warrants.  (Dkt.\n716 (Gov’t motion for preliminary order of forfeiture)).  In connection with its motion for a\npreliminary order of forfeiture against Guo, the Government submitted the sworn warrant\naffidavits that trace that amount of fraud proceeds, and indeed the Court has already relied on those\naffidavits when entering a preliminary forfeiture order against Guo. (Dkt. 720 (preliminary order\nof forfeiture against Guo)). Moreover, because the amount of fraud proceeds actually seized from\nthe Guo Enterprise indisputably exceeds $550 million, Guo’s arguments related to any purported\ndouble-counting, and any redemptions or refunds back to investors, are immaterial and can also\nbe easily dismissed.14  (Guo Sub. 44-45, 52-54, 63-66).\nRelatedly, Guo’s suggestion that the loss amount should be offset by “the value of the\ninvestment an investor retained regardless of the fraud” (Guo Sub. 66) is baseless. On top of the\nfact that no material value was conveyed to the victim investors and customers,15 the principle\ndoes not apply to calculation of the Guidelines loss amount. The Guidelines provide for “credits\n\n14 In arguing, incorrectly, that the victims’ losses were caused by the Government’s seizures, Guo\nmakes a wholly unsupported claim that appears intended to mislead his victims and misdirect the\nblame for their losses.  Regarding the SEC’s Fair Fund distribution for the GTV Private Placement,\nGuo asserts, without any citation: “For example, as a result of the GTV seizure, GTV investors\nlost at least 8% of their GTV investments, as 8% was the amount retained by the SEC before\ndistribution pursuant to the SEC’s Fair Fund.” (Guo Sub. 50 n.44). That is not correct. The SEC\ndoes not, and did not, retain victim investor funds for itself (nor did it “seize” any funds, which\nwere in fact received through a voluntary settlement). Guo’s victims lost 8% of their investment\nbecause Guo misappropriated their funds for a $100 million hedge fund bet that lost $30 million\nbefore U.S. authorities intervened and saved the remainder. (See GX STIP 19). And then Guo lied\nto his followers about it afterwards, on video. (Tr. 1370-73; GX VI 158, 158-T).\n15 At trial, victims testified about how they did not receive stock, or how they received token items\nlike “a cup and also some cookies,” in exchange for tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. (E.g.,\nTr. 409, 1179, 1211-12, 1386-87).\n\n---\n\n34\nagainst loss” in two specific circumstances, neither of which apply here.  First, where the defendant\nreturns the victim’s money or property before the offense was detected, and, second, in cases where\nthe defendant pledged collateral to the victim.  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3(D)(i), (ii). Neither\napplies here.16 Moreover, the defendant’s offense involved fraudulent inducement. The Second\nCircuit has specifically rejected the argument that there should be a reduction of loss based on the\nvalue of a victim’s equity stake in a business—assuming, arguendo, that any victim here actually\nreceived such an equity stake, which they did not in this case—where the defendant’s offense was\nto fraudulently induce the victim to acquire that equity in the first place.  See United States v.\nKomar, 529 F. App’x 28, 29 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that the § 2B1.1(b)(1) “application notes\nsignificantly omit any direction to apply the value of an equity stake as a credit against actual loss,”\nand holding that “[t]he ‘loss’ was the money that the investors were fraudulently induced to invest\n. . . irrespective of the value of the [property]”); see also United States v. Paul, 634 F.3d 668, 677–\n78 (2d Cir. 2011) (rejecting need to consider non-fraud factors that may have reduced a stock’s\nvalue, because “[i]n the instant case . . . the loss to [the victim banks] was not caused by the\ndecline” in stock value, but by the victim banks being fraudulently induced into “the making of\nthe loans in the first instance”); United States v. Turk, 626 F.3d 743, 748 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting\ndefendant’s contention that loss amount is zero “because the properties in which her victims\nthought they were investing arguably had some market value,” and emphasizing that the victims’\n\n16 Additionally, Guo was convicted of money laundering, and the Section 2S1.1 Guideline groups\nwith Section 2B1.1. There is no “credit against loss” in the money laundering context: under\nSection 2S1.1, defendants who launder money are accountable for the “offense level for the\nunderlying offense from which the laundered funds were derived.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1); United\nStates v. Eckstein, No. CR 12-3182 JB, 2016 WL 546663, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 3, 2016) (no “credit\nagainst loss” in money laundering case because that credit “would not reflect a money laundering\nscheme’s full impact.”).\n\n---\n\n35\nloss is the “principal value of the loans they made to [defendant]”); United States v. Stitsky, 536 F.\nApp’x 98, 110–12 (2d Cir. 2013) (“the district court reasonably determined that no offset was\nwarranted for losses resulting from changed economic circumstances because [the victim]\ninvestors would not have been exposed to such risks had defendants not fraudulently induced them\nto invest in the first instance.”); United States v. Shkreli, No. 15 Cr. 637 (KAM), 2018 WL\n9539774, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018), aff’d, 779 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Consistent with\nSecond Circuit precedent, the appropriate calculation of loss for Count Three is [the] amount ‘that\nthe investors were fraudulently induced to invest’ and keep invested in MSMB Capital, based on\nMr. Shkreli’s many misrepresentations relating to the size, investing strategy, and performance of\nhis MSMB Capital fund.” (quoting Komar, 529 F. App’x at 29)); United States v. Bryson, 101 F.\nSupp. 3d 147, 155–56 (D. Conn. 2015) (holding that the loss to “investors who were fraudulently\ninduced to invest” was “the total value of their investment” because “[t]he loss to these investors\nwas caused not by the decline in value of [their investment], but by their having invested in the\nfirst place”).\nAccordingly, given the substantial record before the Court, including the evidence\npresented at a two-month trial over which the Court personally presided and the amount of fraud\nproceeds actually seized, there is absolutely no need for a Fatico hearing in order for the Court to\nmake a reasonable estimate of the loss amount. The loss amount plainly exceeds $550 million.\n(See GX Z26; Tr. 4330-32).\n2. The GTV Private Placement Fraud Should Be Included in the Loss Amount Calculation\nGuo argues that the Court must exclude the GTV Private Placement loss amount of\napproximately $411 million from the loss calculation under the Guidelines because the jury\nacquitted Guo of the substantive wire fraud and securities fraud related to the GTV Private\n\n---\n\n36\nPlacement. (Guo Sub. 56-62). As an initial matter, even if it were excluded, the applicable loss\nstill would exceed $550 million.  In any event, it is black-letter law that a “jury’s verdict of acquittal\ndoes not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge,\nso long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v.\nWatts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam). That is because “acquittal on criminal charges does\nnot prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to\nhis guilt.” Id. at 155. Accordingly, “[a]cquitted conduct may be considered by the sentencing court\nso long as it is based on reliable information and is proven by a preponderance of the evidence,”\nUnited States v. Willis, 14 F.4th 170, 188 (2d Cir. 2021), and “district courts may find facts relevant\nto sentencing—as opposed to elements of the offense—by a preponderance of the evidence and in\nso doing may take into account acquitted conduct when sentencing defendants,” United States v.\nJohnson, 507 F.3d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 2007).\nThe amendment to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c), effective November 1, 2024, does not call for a\ndifferent result here.  Section 1B1.3(c) provides that “[r]elevant conduct does not include conduct\nfor which the defendant was criminally charged and acquitted in federal court unless such conduct\nalso establishes, in whole or in part, the instant offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)\n(emphasis added). The last clause of Section 1B1.3(c) is applicable here. Guo was convicted of\nracketeering conspiracy (Count One), wire fraud conspiracy (Count Two), securities fraud\nconspiracy (Count Three), and money laundering conspiracy (Count Four), which were\nestablished, in whole or in part, by the conduct of the GTV Private Placement. And in cases where\n“certain conduct underlies both an acquitted charge and the instant offense[s] of conviction,” “the\ncourt is in the best position to determine whether such overlapping conduct establishes, in whole\n\n---\n\n37\nor in part, the instant offense of conviction and therefore qualifies as relevant conduct.” U.S.S.G.\n§ 1B1.3(c), App. Note 10.\nThat is the case here. As previously laid out (Dkt. 716), extensive trial evidence established,\nas alleged in the Indictment, that the RICO enterprise began well prior to the 2020 GTV private\nplacement, with the Rule of Law fraud. Guo then continued to defraud his followers with a series\nof interconnected schemes, including the GTV Private Placement in 2020. Multiple investors\ntestified as to how Guo fraudulently induced them into investing in GTV by purporting to\nguarantee investors against loss, claiming their funds would be used to grow GTV’s business, and\ninstead sending $100 million of investor funds to a high-risk hedge fund bet for the benefit of\nGuo’s son.  (See Tr. 209 (Le Zhou); id. at 701 (Patrick Chin); id. at 2376-77 (Minran Wu); id. at\n4465-67, 4471-72 (Wei Chen); id. at 1350-58, 1365-73 (Ya Li)). Further, the GTV Private\nPlacement was connected with and integral to the other arms of the G Enterprise.  Indeed, the Farm\nloan and G Clubs schemes were ways to conceal issuances of GTV stock—and they were promoted\non the GTV platform itself.  (See, e.g., GX Z9 (summary chart of Guo videos, including those\nposted preserved from the GTV website, and including videos where Guo falsely promises GTV\nstock in exchange for Farm loans and G Clubs memberships)). Even the H Coin-related schemes\nwere interconnected with the GTV Private Placement. (See, e.g., Tr. 244 (allocation of H Coin\nbased on prior investment, including in GTV); id. at 1358 (Ya Li testifying that the “[r]einvestment\nrule is once you received the refund from SEC [for the GTV private placement], within 45 days\nyou should invest this money back to the investment project and then you can get five percent of\nH Coin.”)).\nAccordingly, the Court should include the approximately $411 million loss amount for the\nGTV Private Placement in its Guidelines calculation.\n\n---\n\n38\n3. Whether an Investor Subjectively Regards Oneself as a “Victim” Is Irrelevant to the\nGuidelines Calculation\nGuo next argues that funds from any investors who do not regard themselves as “victims”\ncannot count towards this Court’s estimate of the loss amount for purposes of the Guidelines\ncalculation.17 (Guo Sub. 45-52). Guo is wrong as a matter of law. Guo appears to present his\nargument as one of materiality, seeming to claim that if a particular investor claims that Guo’s lies\nwere immaterial to their decision to invest, that investor’s investment amount cannot be considered\nfor purposes of calculating the loss amount under the Guidelines. It is black-letter law, however,\nthat materiality is not a subjective standard, but rather an objective standard relating to what would\nbe important to a reasonable person. See, e.g., United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d\nCir. 2017) (affirming instruction that did not require jury to consider materiality “from the\nsubjective perspective of the victim” because “a matter is material if a reasonable man would attach\nimportance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction\nin question”); see also Tr. 5793 (“[THE COURT:] A material fact is one which would be expected\nto be of concern to a reasonable and prudent person in relying upon the representation or statement\nin making a decision.”). That is because the focus of the criminal law is on the defendant’s intent,\nnot that of the victim, and the same is true of the Guidelines, which treat actual loss and intended\nloss equivalently. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, note (A). Guo’s criminal intent to deceive his victims about\nmaterial information was proven at trial by overwhelming evidence that showed him, indisputably,\nlying over and over to execute a cascading series of scams that betrayed the trust of an affinity\n\n17 In the course of making this argument, Guo repeats quotations from a forfeiture petition claiming\nthat the seizure of funds that were going to be used to purchase Mercantile Bank had nothing to\ndo with this case. That is wrong. For example, the “digital bank” project was one of the investment\nscams that Ya Li testified about and, in fact, helped organize. (Tr. 1342-43, 1430-32).\n\n---\n\n39\ngroup whom he conned to the tune of over a billion dollars. Guo’s video-recorded lies were\nobviously material to any reasonable investor. He lied, for example, about how he would never\nsteal his investors’ money, when he was in fact doing exactly that.\nIn the face of settled law showing his argument is baseless, Guo acknowledges that\n“materiality ordinarily would be subject to a ‘reasonable person’ standard,” but contends that a\nsingle Second Circuit case from over three decades ago, United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010\n(2d Cir. 1993), establishes that if a victim disavows materiality then the victim is no longer a victim\nand his loss is not a loss amount under the Guidelines. (Guo Sub. 45-46). Miller does no such\nthing. That opinion had nothing to do with materiality. It concerned the “money or property”\nelement of mail fraud. Miller, 997 F.2d at 1017 (reversing convictions because the government\n“fail[e]d to establish a § 1341 property interest”). Nor does the portion of Miller excerpted in the\ndefendant’s submission contain dicta relating to materiality. (Guo Sub. 46). In that excerpt, the\nCircuit was considering whether the defendants (who were lawyers) and a group of investors\npurchasing apartments in an apartment building had an agency relationship that prohibited the\ndefendants from also purchasing, in parallel to the group, apartments in the same apartment\nbuilding, such that the putative agency relationship might have established a constructive trust that\ncould be considered the investor group’s proprietary interest under the mail fraud statute. 997 F.2d\nat 1020. The head of the investor group’s testimony, see id. at 1014, however, repudiated the\nexistence of such an agency relationship and thus there was no constructive trust and no proprietary\ninterest, only a breach of “honest and faithful service” by the defendants. 18  Id. at 1020.\n\n18 While Congress had amended the federal fraud statutes to encompass honest services fraud in\n1988, the conduct in Miller occurred prior to 1988 and thus the amendment could not be applied\nretroactively to the defendants’ conduct. See Miller, 997 F.2d at 1016 n.5.\n\n---\n\n40\nAccordingly, and contrary to Guo’s assertions, Miller did not involve a victim who “specifically\nand affirmatively disavow[ed]” the materiality of lies told to him (Guo Sub. 46), and has no bearing\non the well-settled rule that materiality is an objective standard.\nTo the extent Guo may be seeking to offer investors’ subjective views as a mitigation\nargument, the Court can consider that, for whatever it’s worth, in its assessment of the Section\n3553(a) factors. But whatever its merits as a purported mitigation argument—and it is not\nmitigating, in the Government’s view, that Guo successfully convinced some of his fraud victims\nthey were not harmed when he took their money under false and fraudulent pretenses, see infra,\nSection VI.B—the issue is legally irrelevant to the Guidelines and provides no basis for a Fatico\nhearing or further delay of Guo’s sentencing.\n4. The Preponderance Standard Applies\nGuo’s argument that a higher burden of proof applies to the Guidelines loss amount\ncalculation (Guo Sub. 66-70) is foreclosed by long-settled precedent, including the cases cited by\nGuo. Indeed, the case that Guo appears to principally rely on, in fact, rejected the use of a higher\nburden of proof at sentencing “i[n] light of this Court’s continual application of the preponderance\nof the evidence standard” and reversed the district court’s use of the clear and convincing standard.\nUnited States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 2000). To the extent Guo argues\nthat the Court should vary downward from the Guidelines sentence of 175 years’ imprisonment\n(see Guo Sub. 67 (referring to the use of “downward departure (or, in the post-Booker era, a\ndownward variance)”)), that has no bearing on the Court’s reasonable estimate of what the loss\namount is, nor, more specifically, on the standard of proof that applies at sentencing to factual\ndeterminations and Guidelines enhancements under well-established law. Indeed, if the Court\n“decide[s] to impose a non-Guidelines sentence”—as both the Government and the Probation\n\n---\n\n41\nOffice recommend—the Court need not “make precise determinations of some complicated\nmatters” including the “determination of monetary loss.”  Crosby, 397 F.3d at 112.\n5. Guo’s Guidelines Sentence Remains 175 Years Even if the Court Found the Loss\nAmount Was Merely Over $3.5 Million\nLastly, while not an argument about the calculation of the loss amount, Guo argues that\nlarge loss amounts irrationally influence the applicable Guidelines sentence. (Guo Sub. 70-79).\nWhatever the Court may think of this argument in the abstract, it lacks force as to Guo’s Guidelines\ncalculation. As correctly calculated by Probation, Guo’s offense level with a loss amount of $550\nmillion would be 55—well above the maximum offense level of 43, which already advises a\nsentence of life imprisonment (adjusted to account for the 175-year statutory maximum for Guo’s\ncounts of conviction per U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b))—so Guo’s offense level is automatically reduced\nto 43.  Notably, if this Court were to find a loss amount merely of more than $3.5 million, see\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J), Guo’s offense level would still be 43 and his Guidelines sentence would\nstill be 175 years’ imprisonment, because of the other enhancements that apply to Guo’s egregious\nconduct.  As a result, while the evidence clearly supports a finding that the loss amount exceeded\n$550 million in this case, virtually all of Guo’s arguments regarding loss are immaterial to the\nultimate Guidelines calculation.\nD.   Responses to Guo’s Other Guidelines Objections\nGuo’s “[o]bjections to [o]ther [g]uidelines [e]nhancements,” (Guo Sub. 79-82), amount to\ndenials of facts proven at trial or otherwise apparent from the record. These objections are meritless\nand should be rejected.\nGuo objects to the enhancement for the offense involving 10 or more victims, on the ground\nthat there is “no evidence of any victims other than the five witnesses who claimed to have lost\nmoney on their G-Series investments.” (Guo Sub. 79). The victims who testified at trial were just\n\n---\n\n42\nseveral of the many people who watched Guo’s broadcasts and sent millions and millions of their\nown money to Guo because they trusted his false promises. Indeed, more than 200 of Guo’s victims\nhave written the Court to be heard at sentencing. Guo’s continuing denial of their existence is\noffensive, and his objections premised on the erasure of the many people he stole from should be\ndenied.\n Guo objects to the enhancement for committing fraud while “acting on behalf of a\ncharitable, educational, religious, or political organization or a government agency,” on the\npurported grounds that “there was nothing fraudulent about either The Rule of Law Foundation or\nthe Rule of Law Society.” (Guo Sub. 79). The objection is similarly premised on an unwillingness\nto acknowledge the facts proven at trial. Guo’s first count of conviction is for a racketeering\nconspiracy that included both Rule of Law organizations among “[t]he interrelated and\noverlapping entities that form[ed] the G Enterprise.” (S3 Indictment ¶ 3(a); PSR ¶ 25). At trial, the\nRule of Law Society’s former president and treasurer Karin Maistrello testified that the\norganization did “nothing” to support its purported charitable mission. (Tr. 424.) Additional trial\nevidence established that Rule of Law donors’ money was used to fund protests against Guo’s\ncritics, purchase N95 masks for Guo and his family, and promote Guo’s celebrity. (Tr. 476, 481,\n1488 (“[protestors] paid by Rule of Law Foundation”).) Indeed, the Rule of Law organizations\nwere a critical instrumentality of the fraud in this case. (See PSR ¶ 30 (finding that Guo “used the\nnonprofit organizations to amass followers who were aligned with his purported campaign against\nthe Chinese Communist Party and who were also inclined to believe Guo’s statements regarding\ninvestment and moneymaking opportunities”)).\nGuo objects to enhancements for committing fraud by sophisticated means and through\nsophisticated laundering because, among other things, the factual basis is “purely speculative” and\n\n---\n\n43\n“there were no shell corporations” involved in his crimes. (Guo Sub. 79-80). Guo’s objection\ndenies not only reality but the Court’s prior determinations: at Wang’s sentencing, the Court found\nin relevant part that “the conspirators created shell companies . . . and moved their victims’ money\nacross hundreds of bank accounts held in various names” at “Guo and Wang’s direction.” (Dkt.\n491 at 56). That finding drew on extensive trial evidence of Guo’s use of shell entities to commit\nhis fraud and launder its proceeds. (E.g., Tr. 2904-05 (testimony and documentary evidence\nregarding Guo’s personal lawyer’s purported representation of a company owned by Mei Guo, his\ndaughter, to purchase the Mahwah Mansion); see also, e.g., PSR ¶ 62 (finding that Guo and Je\ntransferred Himalaya Exchange funds held by an offshore entity to an escrow account and\n“structured [the transaction] as a purported ‘loan’ to cover the cost of a luxury yacht that Guo had\npreviously purchased and used, which yacht was then-owned by an entity held in the name” of his\ndaughter)). The enhancement has a basis independent from the defense’s erroneous arguments.\nFor example, the defendant invented a false cryptocurrency to enhance his fraud. Such conduct is\nfairly considered “sophisticated.” See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, app. note 9 (defining “sophisticated\nmeans” as “especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution\nor concealment of an offense” including, for example, “[c]onduct such as hiding assets or\ntransactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial\naccounts”). Guo’s objection to enhancements premised on using sophisticated means and\nsophisticated laundering are not serious challenges in the face of the trial record, and should be\nrejected.\nGuo objects to the enhancement for deriving more than $1 million from at least one\nfinancial institution because he “did not personally receive more than $1 million” as a result of his\ncrimes. (Guo Sub. 80). The objection is baseless. Guo’s counts of conviction included Count\n\n---\n\n44\nTwo’s conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. All the Court must do to apply this\nenhancement is to “reasonably conclude[]” by a preponderance of the evidence “that [Guo] must\nhave profited at least $1 million” from one or more financial institutions over the course of his\nbillion-dollar racketeering and fraud conspiracy. United States v. Constantinescu, 147 F.4th 299,\n316 (2d Cir. 2025). The record is replete with such evidence. (See, e.g., PSR ¶ 55(a) (G CLUBS\nfunds, “funneled through bank accounts in other entities’ names, were used to pay personal\nexpenses for Guo and his family, including luxury purchases of an approximately $2.6 million\nyacht”); id. ¶ 55(b) (describing Je’s use of “approximately $26.5 million of G CLUBS funds, which\nhad been funneled through bank accounts in other entities’ names, toward the purchase of Guo’s\n50,000 square foot New Jersey mansion”)).\nGuo’s objection to the enhancement for obstruction of justice is based on his inaccurate\nassertion that “[t]here is no evidence to support the purported grounds.” (Guo Sub. 81). That\nevidence is laid out in detail in Section III.G above (“Obstruction of Justice”), and paragraphs 91-\n97 of the PSR.\nGuo’s objection to the four-level enhancement for serving as an organizer or leader of the\ncrime is another unserious effort to deny the reality of the jury’s verdict. (Guo Sub. 81 (asserting\nthat Guo “was not an organizer or leader of any criminal activity”). Guo was convicted of, among\nother things, a count that alleged that Guo “was the leader of, and directed, the G Enterprise.” (S3\nIndictment ¶ 9).19\n\n19 Guo’s submission includes an additional section enumerating “[a]dditional [o]bjections to the\nPSR” that are all premised on his “disagree[ment] with . . . the jury’s verdict.” (Guo Sub. 82-92).\nGuo objects to much of the PSR in this section on the grounds that it “conclude[s] that Mr. Guo is\nguilty of any offense.” (Id. at 82). The Government need not respond to Guo’s objections that are\npremised on a wholesale rejection of the jury’s verdicts of his guilt.\n\n---\n\n45\nVI.   THE COURT SHOULD IMPOSE A SENTENCE OF AT LEAST 30 YEARS’\nIMPRISONMENT\nA.   The Nature, Circumstances, and Seriousness of the Offense Warrant a Lengthy\nSentence\n1. Guo Caused Immense Pain and Suffering to Thousands of Victims\nGuo caused staggering financial losses to thousands of victims. His victims were primarily\nordinary citizens and retail investors, and Guo tricked them out of money they needed for their\nfinancial futures and security. It is rare for a fraud case to cause harm exceeding a billion dollars.\nAnd when that has occurred, the loss often stems from corporate malfeasance, such as accounting\nfraud that causes the decline of a stock price.  The astronomical loss here was caused by Guo’s use\nof lies to take money from thousands of his victims. Guo told lies to take a billion dollars from\nvictims, and he supervised and created a large international organization to help him execute that\nfraud every step of the way.\nWhile the billion-dollar loss figure is enormous on a macrolevel, it is important to\nappreciate the harm inflicted on an individual level as well. As victims recounted during Guo’s\ntrial, they lost retirement savings, incurred debt, and suffered deeply because of this fraud.\nHundreds of additional victim statements corroborate that trial testimony:\n• “I have no job, and I gave all my money to Miles Guo. Now, I have no idea how I\nwill sustain myself for the rest of my life or how to face my family.” Dkt. 832, Stmt.\n158.\n\n• “I was forced to sell our only home, and my wife liquidated her life insurance\ninvestment of nearly 15 years, pouring all the funds into [the defendants] bogus\nprojects. These decisions dealt a devastating blow to our family’s finances and\nfuture security.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 1.\n\n• “[M]y family and I were defrauded of around $500,000, most of which came from\nselling our home. Now, this entire amount has been lost. This has pushed us from\na stable middle-class life to living on borrowed money.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 11.\n\n---\n\n46\n• “This has not only severely impacted on our family’s immediate financial security,\nbut has also had a significant shock to our long-term retirement plans, our children’s\neducation, and other important aspects of our lives.” Dkt. 477. Stmt. 113.\n\n• “This case destroyed everything I had—my family’s savings, our ability to support\neach other, and even our emotional connection. I involved my mother and brother,\nthinking I was helping them, only to see all of us dragged into financial ruin. My\nchildren's futures were deeply affected. The stability and dignity I dreamed of\ngiving them were shattered.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 200.\n\nGuo’s malicious activity permeated beyond significant financial calamity, it caused sheer\ndevastation:\n• “This fraud has devastated my life.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 152.\n\n• “I am in a very bad state of mind and unable to work, I have no money for\ntreatment.” Dkt. 477. Stmt. 42.\n\n• “This scam has seriously damaged our physical and mental health. We cannot sleep\nproperly every day and are in extreme pain. Now we hardly afford the rent of our\napartment and our son’s tuition fees.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 27.\n\n• “This fraud has also shattered my worldview. I once believed the world was a good\nplace where people could trust one another. Now, I don’t know how to trust anyone,\nnot even my closest family members. My paranoia and mood swings have strained\nmy relationship with my loved ones.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 11.\n\n• “Loneliness, helplessness and self-blame accompany me every second” Dkt. 477,\nStmt. 37.\n\n• “Since discovering the fraud, I have experience intense anxiety, fear, and emotional\nbreakdowns. I suffer from chronic insomnia and depression, and my daily life has\nbeen significantly disrupted. The psychological damage caused by this incident is\ndeep and long-lasting, and I am currently undergoing counseling and therapy to\ncope with the aftermath.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 210.\n\n• “It stripped away a significant portion of [my mother’s] life savings—$500,000\nintended to secure my future and that of my family. This loss exacerbated her health\nconditions, robbing her of peace in her final years. The scam preyed on her trust,\nundermining the financial legacy she worked tirelessly to build.” Dkt. 832, Stmt.\n198.\n\n---\n\n47\n• “Each day is spent in agonizing regret and self-reproach, and every night is\nconsumed by endless nightmares. I honestly don't know how much longer I can\nendure living under such a heavy cloud.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 163A.\n\n• “After being defrauded, we fell into severe financial hardship, were forced to cut\nback on daily expenses, and even considered selling assets to maintain basic living\nstandards. More painfully, this scam has inflicted serious emotional trauma on me\nand my family. I have suffered from long-term anxiety and insomnia. Trust within\nmy family has been badly damaged.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 190B.\n\nGuo’s harm affected many so deeply that some considered suicide and self-harm:\no “I lost my money, I lost my passion, my whole body was depressed, I suffered\nfrom severe depression and want to kill myself every day.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 202.\n\n• “Guo Wengui deceived and insulted our beliefs under the guise of democracy and\nthe rule of law. I felt so miserable that I thought about suicide many times. This is\na complete nightmare for me and my family. This is not a simple scam, it is a form\nof brainwashing. They encourage their followers to harass judges and attack people\nwho oppose Miles Guo.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 59.\n\n• “This fraud has left me feeling helpless and in despair, even leading me to consider\nsuicide at one point. The damage caused by this scam to me and my family is\nlifelong and irreparable.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 85.\n\n• Trial Tr. at 1531-32 (Ya Li’s testimony that, upon discovering that Guo’s\nmovement was a scam, she felt “very angry, desperate, I feel guilty, I feel regret,\nand I’m very depressed, and I thought—thought about suicide”).\n\n• “The material losses were catastrophic—we lost nearly everything. But the\npsychological collapse was even more profound. My entire moral compass, built\naround truth, compassion, and community, was manipulated and shattered. I had\ntrusted blindly. When the truth became undeniable, I was overwhelmed with shame,\nguilt, and despair. I struggled with recurring suicidal thoughts. I lost my will to live,\nto hope, to believe in anything again.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 200.\n\nIn addition to the more than 200 statements submitted for sentencing, the FBI interviewed\ndozens upon dozens of victims who recounted the sometimes-excruciating losses they suffered—\nbut many remain afraid to speak publicly, for fear of retribution by Guo and his remaining\nsupporters.  The victims in this case were individuals who believed in Guo’s schemes in the\nmisleading way they were marketed—as a grand opportunity to become rich. Guo knew that was\n\n---\n\n48\na colossal lie (or, more precisely, a torrent of lies). Indeed, Guo himself claimed to personally\nguarantee that none of his victims would suffer loss, that their money was safe, and that he would\nnever use it for himself. But he knew these claims were lies, as he misappropriated victims’ money\nand conned them into investing more and more of their savings. (See Tr. 279, 2430, 1177).\nThe seriousness of Guo’s offenses also is exemplified by the geographic reach of the\nscheme, which literally spanned the globe.  Victims could be found in nearly every corner of the\nearth, and throughout the United States.  The operations of the fraud were also global in scale, with\ncompanies, entities, and bank accounts in an array of jurisdictions including the British Virgin\nIslands, Australia, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and Kyrgyzstan.\n2. Guo Led a Five-Year Scheme to Defraud with Serial Efforts to Evade and Obstruct\nJustice\nThe G Enterprise was a massive, sprawling, and complex universe of fraudulent\nsolicitation, receipt, laundering, and expenditure.  (See PSR ¶ 24 (finding that it operated “through\na series of complex and largely fraudulent and fictitious businesses and investment opportunities\nthat connected dozens of interrelated entities”)). But Guo was its namesake—and its singular and\nindispensable leader. As this Court has found—and as Guo’s own blinkered version of events\nbegins—the G Enterprise “[r]el[ied] on Guo’s massive online presence.” (Dkt. 491 at 55). His\nsubmission concurs, describing how Guo “amassed a massive social media following, with\nhundreds of thousands if not more than one million followers at times. Millions of members of the\nChinese diaspora . . . found resonance in Guo’s messages.” (Guo Sub. 13). And while Guo’s\nenterprise was served by various of his lieutenants (see PSR ¶¶ 31-32 (describing Je as the G\nEnterprise’s “financial architect” and Wang as Guo’s effective “chief of staff”)), it was always\nMiles Guo who, as this Court has put it, “had the final say.” (Dkt. 491 at 57). Put simply, there\ncould have been no GTV, no G|CLUBS, no G Coin (which became H Coin)—there could have\n\n---\n\n49\nbeen no G Enterprise—without Miles Guo. As one victim said, Guo “had videos every day.” (Tr.\n4616). The same victim’s experience was typical in another respect: Guo was not only a figure on\nhis followers’ computer and television screens, broadcasting from his GTV studios for hours a\nday. (See Tr. 1330 (testimony of Ya Li that she watched “[a]ll” of Guo’s videos “everyday”)). Guo\nwas also personally in contact with dozens if not hundreds of his victims—an unusual degree of\nintimacy for the leader and organizer of a mass fraud. Ya Li testified that after becoming a follower\nof Guo’s through his daily broadcasts, she and another supporter sent Guo a picture of a birthday\ncake she made for him—and was soon added to a WhatsApp group chat with Guo himself. (Tr.\n1331-32). Victim Wei Chen testified that Guo communicated with her family personally via\nWhatsApp chat, where he “sent the GTV investment information including wire instruction to my\nhusband.” (Tr. 4689).\nGuo commanded loyalty from his deputies, and awe and respect from his followers. His\nchief of staff, Wang, called Guo “the Principal.” (Tr. 426). A security official in the G Enterprise\ncalled him just “P,” shorthand for the same title at the top of the hierarchy. (Tr. 5484). “A lot of\npeople” called him, simply, “Boss.” (Tr. 5484; see also id. at 421). The enterprise’s takings were\ndivided accordingly. To be sure, Guo was not the only person to profit from the G Enterprise’s\nfraud proceeds. But he took more than the lion’s share of its ill-gotten gains for himself and his\nimmediate family. While Je “transferred at least $10 million of the fraud proceeds into his and his\nspouse’s personal bank accounts,” (PSR ¶ 28), Guo took the rest of “more than approximately\n$300 million of the fraudulent scheme’s proceeds for [his] and [his] family’s benefit.” (PSR ¶ 28).\nFor her part, Wang—the G Enterprise’s chief of staff—was rewarded with far less: a six-figure\ncash salary and an entitlement to Guo’s purported cryptocurrency that her counsel later conceded\n“was worthless and illiquid.” (PSR ¶ 28 & n.2).\n\n---\n\n50\nWith his supporters, Guo encouraged the creation of a cult of personality. “[W]e all use[d]\n[to] call Miles Guo ‘seven brothers’” or Brother Seven, one victim testified, explaining that the\nNew Federal State of China’s seven-sided star banner was “a flag that represents . . . Miles, the\nseven.” (Tr. 223). And Guo, in turn, allowed others a form of access to his cult of personality by\nbestowing titles on a select group of dedicated followers he called “the Iron Blood group.” (Tr.\n196). These were “individuals selected by Miles, to give titles . . . Miles Guo said, those are\nbrothers because those brothers are willing to sacrifice for him and shed the blood with him and\nfor this movement.” (Id. at 196-97; see also Tr. 1315 (Guo called Ya Li, an Iron Blood leader,\n“sister”)).\nWhen victims granted an audience with Guo raised questions or offered criticisms, Guo\nmade a performance of attacking their disloyalty and kicking them out of the group of supporters.\n(See, e.g., Tr. 1199-1200, 1214 (testimony of Jenny Li that when an investor asked Guo for a\nrefund on a Discord “audio meeting,” Guo told the group that “if you ask refund again, you will\nbe kicked out”)). He organized protests targeting his critics. (See, e.g., Tr. 1195). When victims\nsought refunds of their sham investments, Guo would rely on other supporters—including the Iron\nBloods—to vet the requests before Guo personally decided on whether to return their money. His\ndecision would “depend[] on the supporter’s attitude,” Ya Li explained: “If it’s normal, we’ll give\nthem the refund. If—if the supporter’s public criticize him or criticize—criticize the New Federal\nState of China, then we not refund.” (Tr. 1409-10).\nGuo’s personal and intimate leadership of the G Enterprise meaningfully aggravates his\nculpability for his racketeering and fraud convictions. His cultivation of an aura of extraordinary\nleadership was a critical instrumentality of the scheme. See United States v. Raniere, No. 18 Cr.\n204 (NGG), Dkt. 966 (Court’s Sent’g Mem.) at 10-11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2020) (describing unique\n\n---\n\n51\nculpability of a fraudulent organization’s charismatic founder who “made members of” the group\n“call him ‘The Vanguard’” and who exercised control through, among other proxies, “a secret\nsociety” of high-level supporters that he “created”).\nIn addition to manipulating his followers, Guo manipulated U.S. courts and obstructed\njustice to protect and perpetuate his schemes. This conduct is described in detail in Section III.G\nabove. It consisted of removing fraud proceeds beyond the reach of United States authorities;\norganizing and funding protests of critics and dissident former supporters; initiating a bankruptcy\nto evade a New York court judgment and turning that proceeding into a vehicle for the attempted\nprotection of his ill-gotten gains; targeting the homes and workplaces of the bankruptcy’s Trustee\nand his family members; personally directing a prominent supporter to refuse to comply with a\nbankruptcy subpoena before sending one of his lawyers to tell her to submit a false affidavit; and\ncontinuing these acts through his lieutenants after his arrest by, for example, instructing followers\nto delete evidence from electronic devices. See supra Section III.G. Guo’s “attempts to silence his\ncritics and maintain control of his criminal enterprise,” including by “repeatedly obstruct[ing]\njustice and demonstrat[ing] a disregard for the rule of law,” underscore the need for a significant\nsentence. Raniere, Dkt. 966 at 17; see also id. (citing as particular example that defendant “worked\nto silence” victims when they “began to speak out publicly”).\n3. Guo Preyed on the Aspirations of a Community\nExacerbating the deep financial and physical suffering, an aggravating factor present here\nis that Guo preyed on the hopes and aspirations of a particular community—he carried out an\naffinity fraud against the Chinese diaspora who sought to promote democracy in China.20  (See\n\n20 An “‘affinity fraud’ [is a] ‘securities and investment fraud that targets members of an identifiable\ngroup perpetrated by a member within the group or someone claiming a desire to assist group\nmembers.’” United States v. Hawkins, 796 F.3d 843, 853 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lisa M. Fairfax,\n\n---\n\n52\nTr. 1355 (Ya Li explaining that she believed what Guo said in his broadcasts about investments\nbecause she had “already follow[ed] Miles Guo for three years” regarding the CCP “so I trust him,\neverything”); Tr. 1367 (Ya Li did not even read investment documents before signing “[b]ecause\n[she] trust[ed] Miles Guo 100 percent”). As one victim put it: “Miles Guo not only deceived us\nfinancially but also exploited our ideals of democracy and freedom. He claimed to be a fighter for\nChina’s democratic freedom, but in reality, he used this lie to deceive those who genuinely care\nabout China’s future.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 170. In so doing, Guo’s actions strike harder than even a\nserious financial crime because Guo relied on “an entirely different way of persuading people to\nturn over their money because they had such deep hopes that the political system in China, which\nis repressive, that that system would be challenged and possibly changed. It’s very different from\nhaving the motivation of doubling your dollar.” Dkt. 491 at 34-35 (Comments from the Court\nduring sentencing of Yanping Wang).\nNot only did Guo exploit the hopes of thousands, simply so he could live in outrageous\nluxury, he (falsely) portrayed himself as a hero, and a “freedom fighter,” of a movement that he\nseverely damaged:\n• “The criminal actions of Miles Guo and Wang Yanping have severely damaged the\nreputation of Chinese people and caused irreparable harm to the future efforts of\nChinese individuals fighting against the CCP’s tyranny. Guo and Wang are, in fact,\nthe true Communists.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 153.\n\n• “While loudly proclaiming his goal to defeat the CCP, he actually served their\ninterests by discrediting the very cause he claimed to support. By betraying us—\nthe true believers in ending the CCP’s tyranny—he has tarnished the fight against\nthe CCP itself. Now, whenever someone hears about efforts to oppose the CCP,\nthey may question whether it is just another scam.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 157.\n\n“With Friends Like These ...”: Toward a More Efficacious Response to Affinity–Based Securities\nand Investment Fraud, 36 Ga. L Rev. 63, 70 (2001)).\n\n---\n\n53\n• “Their actions did more than steal money; they destroyed the faith and goodwill of\ncountless individuals and damaged the unity and trust among those truly pursuing\ndemocracy. The pain of this betrayal far outweighs the monetary loss.” Dkt. 832,\nStmt. 203.\n\nGuo’s actions show that he used talk of pro-democracy ideals as bait. Guo drew his victims\nin by professing to fight on their behalf for lofty goals of a democratic China, but instead, he\ncollected, and spent to an outrageous degree, their money on himself and his family. Guo’s actions\nharmed the pro-democracy movement he professes to support by erecting an empire of fraud that\nsucked money from those who actually desired a democratic China. The Court observed as much\nat Wang’s sentencing last year, acknowledging that “there are many Chinese people both in China\nand elsewhere who have passionate feelings against the Chinese government and who support a\nchange, who support democracy, and who were inspired by the messaging of Mr. Guo, and that\nthat was a significant reason that they turned over their money to this fraud scheme.” (Dkt. 491 at\n34). The Court recognized that Guo took advantage of his victims’ “such deep hopes that the\npolitical system in China . . . would be changed and possibly challenged,” and used this as “a way\nof persuading people to turn over their money.” (Id.).\nIndeed, even the actions Guo took to allegedly promote democracy in China demonstrate\nhis selfishness and focus on fostering his own cult of personality. He made self-aggrandizing\nvideos of himself rapping, dancing, driving exotic cars, and sailing on expensive yachts:\n\n---\n\n54\n\n---\n\n55\n\n(See, e.g., GX C281-V; GX C370; GX C322-V6).\nGX C281-V is particularly notable. It is an approximately four-minute music video titled\n“Hero,” in which Guo appears in every single frame. In “Hero,” Guo dances, at times in a leather\ncoat with tassels, surrounded by choreographed backup dancers, in front of a private jet, luxury\ncars, and, at times, holding a lightsaber. The camera angles, editing, and song lyrics portray Guo\n\n---\n\n56\nas the leader of a hagiarchy. The “Hero” video’s self-adulation is of a piece with the mythology\nthat Guo fed his supporters, that he was “Brother Seven,” selected to advance their cause. That\nmythology worked because Guo preyed on a group of like-minded individuals that had been\nvictimized by a repressive regime. But Guo’s actions did not help his followers. Indeed, other than\na few lines in “Hero” that pay lip service to “taking down the CCP,” the music video—much like\nall of Guo’s videos and livestreams—just promoted himself.  (See also Tr. 1508 (Ya Li Testimony)\n(“Q. Ms. Li, does buying a multimillion-dollar house, $26 million house, in your view, help fight\nthe CCP? A. No. Q. Does buying a red Lamborghini, in your view, help fight the CCP? A. No.”\n(objections omitted)).21\nGuo tricked and stole from the people he called his “brothers and sisters” and his “fellow\nfighters” against the CCP. Far from treating them like family or comrades, Guo deceived and\npreyed on those seeking to promote democracy in China. Despite Guo’s loud pronouncements, in\nreality, his actions and those of his enterprise advanced Guo’s personal wealth, not the cause of\nfreedom in China. Indeed, by robbing from the adherents of that movement, Guo thwarted the\nprogress of the anti-CCP cause by sowing distrust and diverting its potential funding into his own\npockets.\n4. The CCP’s Conduct Is Irrelevant to Guo’s Convictions\nRather than accept any responsibility for years of his own fraudulent conduct,\napproximately 25% of Guo’s sentencing memorandum recounts activities Guo claims were done\nto him by the CCP. Even if it is all true, none of it excuses Guo’s criminal conduct. As Guo’s\nretained “Fox Hunt” expert Paul Doran made clear during trial, the CCP’s activities, including\n\n21 Nor do Bugattis, Lamborghinis or $35,000 mattresses protect one against CCP activities.\n(Tr. 5145-46 (Doran testimony)).\n\n---\n\n57\n“Operation Fox Hunt,” have “nothing to do with the business opportunities that Miles Guo\npromoted.” (Tr. 5190). Nor does, as Doran further agreed, being “targeted by the CCP . . . give\n[one] license to” raise money by “making false promises online.” (Tr. 5142). The CCP’s actions\nhave no bearing on whether thousands were victimized by Guo and his enterprise, and provide no\nreason for the Court to mitigate the serious punishment that Guo justly deserves. (See, e.g., Tr.\n1534-35 (Ya Li testimony)22; 2429-30 (Minran Wu testimony)).23\nTo be sure, the Government stipulated that from 2017 to 2018, the PRC engaged in certain\nconduct aimed at the defendant. See DX STIP 1. But whether Chinese officials, in 2017, paid some\nto protest against Guo, or sought to repatriate him so that he could answer to criminal conduct for\nwhich he was accused in China, fails to excuse the extremely serious nature of the brazen and\nmassive financial frauds he perpetrated on his victims. Whatever mitigating value the CCP’s\ntargeting may offer, it is sharply outweighed by the remarkable magnitude of Guo’s years-long\ncriminal conduct: outrageous self-enrichment, harassment of others, obstruction of the judicial\n\n22 “Q. If it were true he was targeted by the CCP, how does that change your view of Miles Guo's\nmovement? A. No change. Q. If it were true he was targeted by the CCP, how does that change\nyour view of his investment projects? A. No change. Q. Why doesn't it change your view, Ms. Li?\nA. Even being targeted by CCP, doesn't mean you can scam people's money. I'm also being\ntargeted by CCP. I won't cheat any people's money. That's wrong. Q. How were you targeted by\nthe CCP, Ms. Li? A. My——my parents in China, the CCP police called them and asked them to\ntell me stop what I'm doing because my activities is threatened the national security; and they also\ncalled my parents and other relatives to try to find me, ask them if I'm back to China, how they\ncontact me; and my parents tell me don't go back to China, they will arrest me, but I'm the only\nchild. Q. Ms. Li, after being targeted by the CCP, did you spend supporter money on yourself? A.\nNo. Q. Did you spend investor money on yourself? A. No. Q. Why not? A. Because that's not my\nmoney. It's investment money, supporters' money. And those monies should be used to fight\nagainst the CCP, not for myself.”\n23 “Q. Ms. Wu, if it were true that Miles Guo was targeted by the CCP, does that change your view\nof the investment projects? A. No. Q. Does it change your view of the movement? A. No. Q. Why\ndoesn’t it change your view? A. This movement just a scam. I don't think it's related anything to\nthe CCP. Also if somebody is anti-CCP, it doesn’t mean this guy could scam somebody else. That’s\ndifferent things. You cannot use this anti-CCP to do something illegal.”\n\n---\n\n58\nsystem, and unrestrained fraud that he perpetrated against thousands, so he could buy himself\nmillion-dollar chandeliers and surround himself in luxury.\nIndeed, the record shows that Guo himself used CCP-like tactics against those who\nopposed him. (Compare Tr. 5149 (Doran Testimony) (“Q. So standing outside someone’s home\nand filming them whether surreptitiously or overtly is a CCP tactic, right? A. Yes. Q. Especially\nif you do it at their place of work to and their home, right?); with Tr. 4221 (Copeland testimony)\n(describing harassment perpetrated by Guo’s followers who “would livestream from outside our\nhome, so that was a big reason we wanted to keep the blinds down all the time is because they\nwould kind of like videotape us. If not, they’d be videotaping us moving around our home”). And\nit was Guo who created his own cult of personality that, like the CCP, attacked critics.24 It is the\nheight of hypocrisy for Guo to ask this Court for mercy by citing the same conduct he unleashed\non his victims.\nLast, Guo asks the Court to consider his claimed personal history, which is the same\nmythology he espoused to his victims: a humble upbringing, family trauma (at the hands of the\nCCP), Guo’s self-reported support for the Tiananmen Square protests, political imprisonment,\nunexplained real estate financial success, shortly followed by “whistleblowing,” detention, an\n\n24 See Tr. 5168 (Doran conceding that “one of the ways to promote that cult of personality in China\nis that if the Chinese people express views contrary to President Xi, they're retaliated against. Q.\nPeople criticize the leader, they're retaliated against, right? A. Yes. Q. Those are the rules of the\nChinese Communist Party, right? A. Yes.”); Tr. 1410 (Ya Li testimony) (“Q: Ms. Li, what are the\nrules and ideology of the Himalaya Farm? A: . . . have to support Miles Guo, support Himalaya\nAlliance, and not to criticize Miles Guo and criticize New Federal State of China publicly.”); Tr.\n1489 (Ya Li testimony) (“Black list is the member of the farm, if they start publish, criticize\nAlliance or New Federal State of China or Miles Guo, they will become CCP and a traitor, so their\nname go to black list. Q. What happened to some of the people on the black list? A. Some of their\npersonal information will be post online. Q. Where would that personal information come from?\nA. From Miles Guo. (objections omitted)).\n\n---\n\n59\nescape to Hong Kong, immigration to the U.S., and launch of his purported anti-CCP activity.\n(Guo Sub. 5-15). Those pages in the defendant’s sentencing submission are sourced to Guo’s\nstatements to the Probation Office. 25 The Court need not resolve the truth regarding Guo’s\nupbringing, claimed political imprisonment, and his “mythology,” since it is all immaterial to an\nappropriate sentence. But, suffice to say, the Court should afford little weight to the words of an\nunrepentant serial liar who used that same “legendary” personal history as a weapon to brainwash,\nand rob, thousands of innocent victims.\n5. Guo’s Extraordinary Personal Enrichment\nAs described above, Guo profited handsomely from the massive, years’ long scheme that\nhe led at the substantial, and devastating, expense of others. He destroyed the lives of people who\nbelieved he could free them from an oppressive Communist regime so he could buy more than\n$700,000 worth of bespoke Brioni suits (GX CT201); so he could tool around in a Lamborghini\n(GX CT38; Tr. 143), and buy a $4 million Ferrari for his son (see Tr. 1873-1885); so he could\nsleep on $35,000 mattresses (see Tr. 3914-16; GX BUCK375); and so he could bounce around\nbetween his $69 million Manhattan penthouse, his Greenwich estate (GX CT133), and his $26.5\nmillion New Jersey mansion (GX NJ134).\nAs presented at trial, Guo flaunted his immense wealth and, in fact, used it to market and\nperpetrate his fraud scheme. Guo publicly announced and aggressively marketed the Rule of Law\ncharities on social media, including in videos where he represented that he would personally fund\n\n25 Probation also relied on a letter that purports to have been submitted by Guo’s wife. (PSR ¶ 140).\nProbation did not interview her when preparing the PSR. Additionally, the Probation Department\n“attempted to conduct a collateral telephone interview with the defendant’s daughter, Mei Guo;\nhowever, the contact telephone number furnished appears to now be an inactive account and the\ncall could not be completed.”\n\n---\n\n60\nthe charities with $100 million of his own fortune. (GX VI 192; Tr. 694-95). Guo’s victims testified\nat trial that they had the impression that Guo was a “very wealthy” person. (See, e.g., Tr. 191-92\n(Le Zhou); Tr. 692-93 (Patrick Chin, noting Guo’s “luxury apartment, yacht, and the cars”); Tr.\n2372 (Minran Wu, testifying that Guo said he was a “rich, very rich, billionaire”)). Wei Chen\ntestified that Guo’s portrayal of his staggering wealth “played a critical influence in” her decision\nto invest in the GTV Private Placement, because it made her “believe that he is a wealthy person\nand he has resources.” (Tr. 4468-71). Ya Li testified that Guo was a billionaire in China who was\nincluded on China’s “rich list,” and that her understanding of his vast wealth led her to believe that\nher investments in Guo’s fraud vehicles were safe, because Guo could afford to repay any investor\nlosses. (Tr. 1330, 1347-48).\nGuo used the staggering fraud proceeds to fund his ultra-luxury lifestyle—even after filing\nfor bankruptcy—while falsely representing to victims that the purchases were for the benefit of\nthe very followers whose money he was stealing, including G|CLUBS members and Himalaya\nExchange investors. (Tr. 3081, 3266-67).\nAs this Court observed to counsel during trial, Guo “appear[ed] in a number of videos in\nextravagant settings,” and it was “Guo who put[] himself next to the Lamborghini and the jet and\nin a living room with gilded objects.” (Tr. 1363-64). He enjoyed a life of excess while robbing his\nvictims of their livelihoods and safety. For example, Guo bought his Lamborghini with G|CLUBS\nmembers’ money (see GX Z26 at 25; Tr. 3072), and he drove the Lamborghini in the H Coin to\nthe Moon music video (GX 370-V), where he promoted the launch of the Himalaya Exchange (see\nalso GX C370, GX Z9 at 140):\n\n---\n\n61\n\nThe FBI recovered that very Lamborghini from inside the garage of Guo’s Greenwich, Connecticut\nhome when he was arrested there on March 15, 2023:\n\n(GX CT38). Guo bought his $26.5 million Mahwah, New Jersey mansion with fraud proceeds,\nand spent an additional $14 million in fraud proceeds to renovate and customize the mansion to\nhis precise specifications and desires. (See, e.g., Tr. 1510-11, 3893-94).\n\n---\n\n62\nAs described above, Guo extended the shell game that he used to operate his racketeering\nenterprise to his treatment of own personal assets, including his designer cars and his mansion. He\ntitled his Mahwah mansion under the Taurus Fund, which was registered to Guo’s bodyguard,\nScott Barnett, unbeknownst to him (Tr. 5452-53); he titled his Sherry-Netherland penthouse under\nGenever Holdings LLC, which his son owns (Tr. 4043-44); he titled his Greenwich, Connecticut\nresidence shown below under the family office Greenwich Land LLC, whose sole member is his\nwife (Tr. 4043); he registered his red Lamborghini in the name of his daughter’s boyfriend, Defeng\nCao (Tr. 5435-36, 5528); and on and on for all his assets.\n\n(GX 133). Guo’s unrepentant personal use of tens of millions of dollars in fraud proceeds—money\nhe had led his victims to believe would be invested for them, or used to advance their chosen\n\n---\n\n63\ncause—demonstrates that Guo acted out of greed and was driven to defraud his victims by his\ninsatiable, selfish desire for excess wealth.\nB.   Specific Deterrence and Protection of the Public Is Necessary\nUnder Section 3553(a), the need for the sentence to “protect the public from further crimes\nof the defendant” and “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct” must be considered.\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C).  A serious and lengthy sentence is warranted to protect the public\nand promote the needs of both general and specific deterrence.\nFirst, Guo’s conduct evinces a complete and utter contempt for the laws of the United\nStates, despite his choosing to immigrate to this country and seek asylum under its legal system.\nHis sustained criminal and obstructive actions demonstrate that neither civil sanctions nor the\nthreat or impositions of criminal or civil penalties deterred him from operating a gargantuan global\nfraud that has injured thousands. Indeed, only a lengthy sentence of incarceration can attempt to\nprotect the public from Guo.  The threat posed by Guo is especially pernicious because the scope\nof his fraud was so vast, so varied, and because Guo consistently adapted his criminality to thwart\ncriminal and civil regulatory authorities when he was at liberty.\nAfter establishing the fraudulent purported dual charities (the Rule of Law Society and the\nRule of Law Foundation) in April 2020, Guo’s enterprise raised money in connection with the\nfraudulent offering of GTV stock. Given that this offering was not registered with the SEC,\ninvestors were required to meet a series of requirements to ensure they were qualified to\nparticipate. Guo and others flouted those requirements and pooled victim money from unqualified\ninvestors, through vehicles such as Voice of Guo (i.e., VOG, the company that former Phoenix\nFarm leader Sara Wei ran at Guo’s direction, as described during trial). The SEC investigated the\noffering, put a stop to it, and ultimately entered into an agreement pursuant to which the money\n\n---\n\n64\nraised (to the extent it was not unlawfully spent) would be redistributed to investors. (GX STIP19).\nOf course, $100 million of the money Guo’s enterprise raised in the GTV Private Placement was\nnot for GTV—it was for Guo and his family.26\nAfter Guo’s actions drew regulatory attention—after the SEC required Guo and GTV to\ndisgorge the money it collected, aside from the $30 million of victim funds lost in the HHKOF\ninvestment—Guo’s  conspiracy adapted. This time, Guo used “Farm Loans”—as opposed to direct\nsales of stock—to sell shares in GTV. That money was routed through a complex web of\nsophisticated monetary transactions before being funneled back to Guo’s family. Then Guo\nchanged tactics again. Now he sold GTV (and other Guo-linked entities’) shares through the guise\nof “memberships” in G|CLUBS.  But G|CLUBS money was not used to fund a media company,\nor even to fund any real member benefits.  Rather, G|CLUBS money was used to purchase luxury\nassets, fancy sports cars, and a literal mansion for the Guo family. G|CLUBS further tried to hide\nits criminality through a figurehead CEO, while Guo’s co-defendant Yvette Wang acted as its de\nfacto CEO. When Guo’s G|CLUBS and the broader enterprise ran into banking difficulties, Guo\nand his acolytes engineered yet another solution:  a fake cryptocurrency called H-Coin and H-\nDollar. In service of those phony cryptocurrencies, Guo and William Je promoted the Himalaya\nExchange, which operated both as a fraud scheme and a money laundering operation to draw\nvictim money into “cryptocurrency” that Guo and the G Enterprise fully controlled.\nIn the summer of 2022, the Government sent a criminal grand jury subpoena to G|CLUBS,\nand in September and October 2022, the U.S. Government seized $630 million from the G\n\n26 Wang Plea Tr. at 25-26 (“In about June 2020, I was directed by others to wire approximately\n100 million U.S. dollars from a bank account in New York to Hayman Capital Management, a\nhedge fund in Texas.  I knew these funds had been received from investors in the GTV\noffering. . . . I knew what I was doing was wrong.”)\n\n---\n\n65\nEnterprise, including hundreds of millions from accounts linked to the Himalaya Exchange. Rather\nthan be dissuaded from criminal activity, Guo’s enterprise adapted yet again; this time, with Guo’s\nlaunch of “A10” and “A15” schemes that collected money by claiming to sell stock in Gettr,\nG|CLUBS, and other Guo-linked entities. Except this money, this time, was to be sent to the\nMiddle East to place it beyond the reach of the U.S. Government.\nGuo’s ability to adapt his criminal schemes to evade civil enforcement, and the threat of\ncriminal enforcement, makes plain that a very lengthy term of incarceration is required to protect\nthe public and specifically deter Guo from future criminal conduct.\nSecond, the risk of recidivism here is acute because Guo continues to claim he did nothing\nwrong. He is not even feigning to the Court that he will reform his ways—he effectively concedes\nthat he will keep doing the same.27 The Court should assume as much because Guo’s is singularly\nmotivated by a desire to live luxuriously and promote himself. He is compelled to seek material\nwealth without regard to honesty or consequence. That fixation will not change, and it presents an\nunacceptable risk that his criminality will continue once released from prison. Indeed, as an\nimmigrant seeking asylum, Guo was highly incentivized to abide by all laws while in the United\n\n27 Also, the fact that a past fraud conviction does not necessarily deter a future one is evidenced\nby the number of first-time fraud defendants in this District who have become recidivists.  See,\ne.g., United States v. Jonathan Ghertler, No. 23 Cr. 100 (ER) (investment fraud scheme following\nover a dozen prior convictions); United States v. Franklin Ray, No. 22 Cr. 228 (AT) (orchestrating\na Ponzi scheme after having served a prior two-year sentence for bank and wire fraud); United\nStates v. Vitaly Borker, No. 22 Cr. 273 (JSR) (defendant convicted of wire fraud for operation of\nfraudulent eyeglasses website after two prior federal convictions for the same conduct); United\nStates v. Joseph Meli, No. 19 Cr. 480 (RA) (defendant convicted of participating in a Broadway\nticket resale investment fraud scheme after previously serving a 78 month sentence for the same\nscheme); United States v. Edward Durante, No. 15 Cr. 171 (ALC) (beginning a new investment\nfraud scheme while serving a 121 month sentence for fraud); United States v. John Galanis, No.\n15 Cr. 643 (PKC) (defendant convicted of securities fraud after 1973 and 1988 convictions for\nmail fraud and securities fraud).\n\n---\n\n66\nStates. Clearly, that incentive did not matter. See Raniere, Dkt. 966 at 16-17 (“Ultimately, [the\ndefendant’s] lack of remorse, coupled with his view that that the conduct for which he was\nconvicted was actually ‘noble,’ strongly suggests the need for a significant sentence.”).\nGuo has never accepted responsibility for what he has done. At no point has he shown any\nwillingness to admit culpability for fraud and deceit or show any remorse whatsoever for his\nconduct. Guo has lied, obfuscated, obstructed, manipulated, and harassed with utter impunity.\nDespite his trial conviction, Guo maintained to the Probation Office “that he is innocent of all of\nthe charges in the Indictment.” (PSR ¶ 111). He “disagrees with” the jury’s verdict. (Guo Sub. at\n82). According to Guo, as in the case of Nxium founder Keith Raniere, “the brave victims who\nhave spoken out . . . are liars,” and “[d]espite everything that has happened and despite the\ncountless victims who have given voice to their great pain, [he] remains unmoved. Indeed, he\nmaintains his innocence.” Raniere, Dkt. 966 at 16.\nGuo’s offensive claim that his prosecution was in some way politically motivated does not\nwithstand an iota of scrutiny and is yet another of his transparent efforts to cast himself as a victim,\nrather than a perpetrator. (See Guo Sub. at 32-33). The criminal investigation into Guo began in\nJuly 2020, parallel to the SEC’s investigation into the GTV Private Placement that had closed its\nfundraising the month prior. The decision to open that investigation had nothing to do with politics.\nGuo’s relationship with Steve Bannon was not a “key element underlying this prosecution.” (Guo\nSub. at 25). Rather, the key element underlying this prosecution was the billion dollars Guo stole\nfrom innocent victims through fraud after fraud. Desperate to distract the Court and the public\nfrom the actual evidence of his crimes, Guo seeks to manufacture conspiracy theories about this\ncase. (Guo Sub. at 32). But none of these distractions, nor politics, have anything to do with the\ninvestigation into, and the prosecutions of, Guo and his co-conspirators for the crimes they\n\n---\n\n67\ncommitted through Guo’s complex fraud, money laundering, and racketeering enterprise—or the\nverdict rendered by an impartial jury during the trial presided over by this Court.\nIn assessing specific deterrence and protection of the public, the Court should weigh\nheavily that the defendant has never accepted responsibility for his truly offensive and blatant\nfraud. But Guo’s rejection of responsibility is worse than just that. A defendant is entitled to claim\ninnocence but Guo goes further: he falsely claims victimhood.  He attempts to denigrate the rule\nof law that brought him to justice. Such indignancy coupled with Guo’s baseless suggestion of\nimpropriety in the prosecution of this case warrants a substantial sentence. See, e.g., Raniere, Dkt.\n966 at 16 (“To make matters worse, [the defendant] and his counsel . . . are engaged in a public\nrelations campaign to cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial system and the jury verdict.”).\nThird, perhaps most troubling is that Guo, and his enterprise, have continued criminal\nactivities for the three years that Guo has been incarcerated. Following his arrest and detention,\nGuo continued to direct his enterprise as it relocated to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), outside\nthe reach of U.S. law enforcement. (PSR ¶¶ 103-105). Victims who have monitored the online\nmusings of Guo and his remaining acolytes further illustrate how Guo continues to operate his\nenterprise, and uses it stifle victims from speaking out against him:\n• “According to Yue Zhou, the Secretary-General of the New Federal State of China\n(NFSC), in the weekly ‘Until We Meet Again’ program every Friday, he and\nseveral other key members visit Ho Wan Kwok every week. Many of the orders\ncurrently being executed by NFSC have been approved by Kwok.” Dkt. 832, Stmt.\n214.\n\n• “Despite the arrest of Guo Wengui, the fraud group has not been dismantled. The\nfarms related to it are still operating, and Guo Wengui is still directing members in\nprison, instructing them to continue to defraud and threaten victims. In addition,\nmembers of the fraud gang are lurking in different countries and are still continuing\nto defraud, launder money and cover up crimes.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 188.\n\n---\n\n68\n• “I am deeply shocked and disappointed that Guo Wengui continues to orchestrate\nnew fraudulent activities directly from prison.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 183B.\n\n• “From within MDC detention, he continues directing the NFSC organization,\nspreading misinformation through Gettr livestreams, promoting false narratives\nsuch as ‘Guo will be acquitted’ and ‘U.S. justice is controlled by the CCP.’ He\nactively promotes new fraudulent schemes including TDCCP and MEME tokens,\nleading to fresh victims.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 213.\n\n• “Even while in custody, he continues to deceive, having created a so-called digital\ncurrency called TDCCP, which has scammed more people. The money he has\nobtained is being used to pay for legal fees and other expenses.” Dkt. 832, Stmt.\n180.\n\n• Guo has shown absolutely no remorse. Instead, he and his group have continued to\nattack victims, spread lines, and even tried to force victims to write statements to\nhelp him avoid punishment. His recent behavior has made it crystal clear that he\nbelieves he is above the law.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 184.\n\nGuo’s ongoing criminal activity is consistent with his apparent belief that the laws of\nsociety do not apply to him. This is exemplified by Guo’s remarkable pattern of obstruction of\ncourt proceedings (see Dkt. 51 at 7-10 (this Court listing instances of the defendant’s obstruction)),\nincluding these proceedings, which provides yet more reason to doubt Guo will respect this Court’s\nsentence, seek to reform, or be willing to abide by the law.  (See Dkt. 51 at 11 (“Defendant’s\nhistory of obstructive behavior in prior cases and his conduct in this matter establish that he is\nlikely to continue this pattern if released.”)).\nLastly, the defense makes much of the claim that certain individuals deny their status as\n“victims.” (Guo Sub. 46 – 51). But the import of this fact is lost on the defense. That Miles Guo\nhas successfully convinced many individuals that they are not his victims underscores the danger\nGuo continues to pose to the community. No matter what the defense claims, the Government\nproved at trial, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Guo knowingly and intentionally defrauded\nthousands. Guo intended to commit crimes, and did so for years. Guo is a gifted conman, with an\n\n---\n\n69\ninnate ability to persuade thousands to do as he wishes. That Guo is so good at robbing people he\nis able to convince them that they are not his victims, is not a mitigating factor. It is an aggravating\none. That Guo has marshalled letters from those who claim they still believe in him, even after his\nconviction for this massive fraud, only underscores the risk that Guo will rally such supporters in\nservice of a future scheme. Guo’s preternatural abilities to commit fraud on a global scale, and\ndestroy or harm the lives of so many, requires this Court to impose a lengthy sentence to protect\nthe public by incapacitating Guo, a protection which only this Court can provide.\nC.   A Substantial Term of Imprisonment is Necessary for General Deterrence and to\nPromote Respect for the Law\nA substantial term of imprisonment is also necessary to deter others from engaging in\nsimilar acts of criminal deception and to promote respect for the law.\nIn enacting Section 3553(a), “Congress viewed deterrence as ‘particularly important in the\narea of white-collar crime.’”  United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing\nS. Rep. No. 98-225, at 76 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259); see United States\nv. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (deterrence of white-collar crime is “of central\nconcern to Congress”). General deterrence is a particularly important sentencing factor in fraud\nand other white-collar cases because the decision to commit those crimes is often a calculated cost-\nbenefit decision. Martin, 455 F.3d at 1240 (“Because economic and fraud-based crimes are more\nrational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, these crimes are prime\ncandidates for general deterrence.”). As Judge Posner observed, “[c]onsiderations of (general)\ndeterrence argue for punishing more heavily those offenses that either are lucrative or are difficult\nto detect and punish, since both attributes go to increase the expedited benefits of a crime and\nhence the punishment required to deter it.” United States v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th\nCir. 1994); see United States v. Zukerman, 897 F.3d 423, 429 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Heffernan).\n\n---\n\n70\nHere, a substantial term of imprisonment is necessary to telegraph the serious consequences\nthat await would-be criminals who attempt a fraud as massive as Guo’s. Guo’s crimes have\nattracted significant public attention, and substantial efforts have been undertaken to recompense\nvictims of those crimes. That notoriety counsels in favor of a 30-year term of imprisonment for\nthe purpose of promoting general deterrence. See, e.g., United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 94\n(2d Cir. 2017) (affirming district court’s sentence which took into account, among other things,\ngeneral deterrence and the fact that the sentence imposed “could have a powerful general deterrent\neffect because the case had attracted an unusually large amount of publicity”). Should Guo receive\nthe leniency he seeks, others may be emboldened to engage in similarly audacious crimes,\nbelieving that such schemes are hard to unravel and, even if they are detected, are unlikely to result\nin significant repercussions, as compared to the potential upside of becoming one of the richest\nmen in the world.  Cf. United States v. Livesay, 587 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (“It is\ndifficult to imagine a would-be white-collar criminal being deterred from stealing millions of\ndollars from his company by the threat of a purely probationary sentence.”).  If anything, an\ninsubstantial sentence for Guo would encourage—rather than deter—would-be criminals, inviting\nthem to live large by building global, billion-dollar fraud schemes that carry minimal\nconsequences.\nD.   Guo’s History and Characteristics\nMiles Guo chose to commit sprawling financial crimes from a platform of wealth and\nprivilege.  Guo had the opportunity to make vastly different choices with his resources and his\napparent personal charisma. Instead, he repeatedly chose to use those advantages to exploit, for\nyears, a community of people who followed and trusted him so that he could use their money to\ncontinue to live a life of ultra-luxury unknown to all but the world’s most wealthy individuals.\n\n---\n\n71\nGuo cannot, and does not, claim his conduct was the product of youthful indiscretion or an\naberrational bad decision. Guo’s personal circumstances do not call for anything other than a\nsubstantial term of imprisonment, and Guo’s arguments that his background and experience\nmitigate his offenses are meritless.\n1. Guo’s Background as a Purportedly Powerful Billionaire Aggravates, Not Mitigates,\nHis Culpability\nGuo’s submission spends nearly eight pages describing how he “achieve[d] economic\nprosperity,” enjoyed “business success” and was a “prominent” person before overseeing the five-\nyear, billion-dollar fraud scheme for which he was convicted at trial. (See Guo Sub. 8-15). At\nsentencing, Guo mobilizes his “extraordinary wealth” and “phenomenal business success” as\nmitigation. (See id. at 87 (“To the pro-democracy movement, [Guo’s] wealth meant power to face\nand to confront the CCP.”)). Guo has made different arguments about his wealth at different times\nand for different purposes. He has argued that his “vast wealth” and lavish lifestyle was\nexculpatory because “[h]e had no reason to steal.” (Tr. 5986). But at other times, Guo has argued\nthat he is indifferent to money, a person so unfocused on material matters that he could hardly\nhave been interested in a scheme to defraud. (See Tr. 6050-51 (arguing that Guo “barely thought\nabout his finances” and asking jury if they “think a man like Mr. Guo, who doesn’t even have a\ncredit card, is going over bank statements and telling people to take money out of the farm loans\nprogram to make a random maintenance payment on his yacht”); but see GX 417 (recording of\nGuo personally ordering the transfer of $100 million of G|CLUB members’ funds to an entity\ncontrolled by Je)).\nThe truth is that Guo’s purported billionaire status was a key instrumentality of his fraud—\na feature Guo used to lure victims toward him, to earn their trust, and to create the impression that\nhe was able to help them become as rich as him one day, too. Guo’s serial claims to have billions\n\n---\n\n72\nof dollars also underwrote his constant promises to personally protect his investors against the risk\nof loss. A February 28, 2021 broadcast on GTV provides just one example. “There will never be\na chance like the one that we have today, where you can be involved in GTV and G Coin. You\nhave my words. . . . Brother Seven has worked all his life. I know what politics is, I know what\nfinance is, and I know what earning big money is. You won’t even understand. You don’t even—\n—you don’t understand even when I explain it to you. Brothers and sisters, you have to trust\nBrother Seven. None of you will pay for this if you lost money. I’ll be the one who pays for it.”\n(GXZ-9 at 67). Guo also invoked his wealth to anticipate and resist questions about whether his\npromises could be too good to be true, suggesting to his investors that he had no motive to rip them\noff because he already had so much money of his own: “So my brothers in arms, I don’t need\nmoney. . . . What I want is the love from my brothers in arms.” (Tr. 1035).\nAt trial, victim after victim testified to the central role these kinds of promises played in\ntheir decision to invest so much of their money in Guo’s purported opportunities. Le Zhou recalled\nhis first time watching Guo’s broadcast, and “learn[ing] he’s a self-made billionaire” who “seemed\nvery knowledgeable, well spoken” and who “mentioned” that “he will bear the legal responsibility\nfor what he talk about.” (Tr. 180; see also id. at 209 (describing how Guo “mentioned all the money\nwe invested, that principal would never lose, lost even a cent” because “[h]e will pay—personally\npay back”). Ya Li had a similar first impression, coming away from her first exposure to Guo\nunderstanding that “[h]e’s a billionaire in China” on the “who in China rich list.” (Tr. 1330).\nMinran Wu recalled that Guo “said he was rich, very rich, billionaire,” (Tr. 2372), and invested in\nGTV (and later in other Guo schemes) because “Guo said . . . [y]ou cannot imagine how great it\nwill be, how profitable it will be.” (Tr. 2375). Wei Chen explained that Guo’s purported wealth\n“played a critical influence in [her] decision” to invest  her family’s money in Guo’s schemes:\n\n---\n\n73\n“That made me believe that he is a wealthy person and he has resources . . . that will make it\nsuccessful.” (Tr. 4468).\nGuo cultivated an image as a billionaire with expertise in politics, media, and\nmoneymaking. He sold his victims not only shares in fraudulent ventures, but the chance to have\nan ownership interest in the kind of opulent lifestyle he showed off for years in his daily broadcasts.\nGuo’s wealth and prior business success, whatever they amount to, are aggravating factors because\nthey facilitated his fraud and enlarged its scope.\n2.\n\n---\n\n---\n\n75\non account of his immigration status after abusing the privileges of the asylum process. That\nsystem permitted Guo to live safely and freely in the United States. Rather than respect the rule of\nlaw that offered him refuge, Guo used the shelter and security provided by this country’s\nimmigration laws to establish and oversee a years-long fraud scheme. Not only that: Guo cynically\nabused the same institutions that could have safeguarded his family and protected any legitimately\nearned wealth by manipulating the U.S. bankruptcy system and obstructing justice in various U.S.\ncourts. See infra Section III.G. Having taken advantage of the U.S. immigration system, Guo\ncannot now be heard to offer its functioning as a ground for leniency.\nSecond, Guo’s immigration argument relies almost exclusively on cases where courts were\nconsidering whether to sentence a defendant to any term of imprisonment, United States v.\nConnolly (Black), No. 16 Cr. 370 (CM), Sent’g Tr. 87, 91-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (declining to impose\ncustodial sentence to avoid “very minor participant” defendant going into immigration custody “a\nshort term of imprisonment”), or release a defendant who had completed almost all of his sentence,\nUnited States v. Diaz, 07 Cr. 387 (CM), 2024 WL 4891908 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. November 26, 2024).\nGuo’s other cited case involved a Court’s decision whether to impose a 10-year or a 14-year\nsentence on a 40-year-old defendant. United States v. Wedd, 15 Cr. 616 (KBF), Dkt. 688 Sent’g\nTr. at 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). In other words, in all of Guo’s cited cases, the defendant’s post-release\nimmigration consequences factored into the court’s sentence because the defendant was all but\ncertain to be released in the relative near term. But there is no just punishment that would result in\n\nimmigration-related argument under seal. Guo’s counsel provided no additional basis—and no\nauthority—for sealing this filing. Because “rights of public access extend to criminal sentencing”\nand “the documents used in conjunction with those proceedings,” United States v. Sehgal, No. 24\nCr. 46 (AT), 2026 WL 539650, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2026), the Court should deny Guo’s\nimplicit sealing motion and require that his Exhibit 16 be filed on the public docket.\n\n---\n\n76\nGuo’s release from criminal custody on anything like that timeline. The Court therefore has little\nreason to consider this circumstance as having a meaningful impact on its sentence in this case.\n4. MDC Arguments\nThe Court should not be swayed by the defense’s argument that Guo should receive a\nlighter sentence than he otherwise deserves because he has been detained at the MDC during the\npendency of this case, since his arrest on March 15, 2023. (See Def. Br. at 99 (stating that the\n“MDC has been a dysfunctional institution for years”)). First, but for Guo’s eight sentencing\nadjournment requests, he would have been sentenced and designated to a different BOP facility\nmore than 17 months ago. To the extent he argues that his 37 months at the MDC somehow justifies\na shorter sentence, he is wrong, and he should not be permitted to manufacture his own allegedly\nmitigating circumstances. In advancing their MDC argument, the defense does not acknowledge\nrecent improvements to the conditions at MDC. However, as numerous judges in this District have\nobserved, conditions at the MDC improved greatly in 2025 (the exact time during which the\ndefendant was detained there).  See, e.g., United States v. Sandy Carazas-Pinez, 23 Cr. 346 (JPC)\n(Sept. 19, 2025 sentencing); United States v. Clinton McCullum, 24 Cr. 667 (JPC) (Aug. 29, 2025\nsentencing); United States v. Jean Carlos Burgos, 24 Cr. 650 (LTS) (May 21, 2025 plea); United\nStates v. Kevin Reshard, 24 Cr. 392 (JMF) (May 14, 2025 sentencing); United States v. Alon\nAlexander et al., 24 Cr. 676 (VEC) (Jan. 16, 2025 bail argument).\nAs the Honorable Jesse M.  Furman, United States District Judge, Southern District of New\nYork, noted in sentencing a defendant in May 2025 (during which time Guo was detained at the\nMDC):\nWith respect to other arguments made in the defense’s\nsubmission, on the MDC front, I’m certainly more than\nfamiliar with the circumstances at the MDC, and the place\nhas still much need for improvement, but it is also a lot better\n\n---\n\n77\nthan it was in January of last year when I wrote my opinion\nin United States v. Chavez that is cited in the defense’s\nsubmission.  As it happens, I just came from a meeting\ninvolving representatives of the MDC and got latest\nstatistics, which is that staffing is up to 75 percent, the\nmedical services staff is significantly higher and fully staffed\namong nurses, the incidents of violence went from 42 in\nDecember, which was a rather significant number, to only\nnine in April; all of which is to say it’s not nearly as bad as\nit was a year and a half ago and it’s definitely trending in the\nright direction.\n\nUnited States v. Kevin Reshard, 24 Cr. 392 (JMF) (May 14, 2025 sentencing).\nAnd as the Honorable John P. Cronan, United States District Judge, Southern District of\nNew York, remarked at a sentencing in August 2025 (also during the time Guo was detained at the\nMDC):\nI also mentioned I have considered the conditions at the\nMDC. Mr. McCullum was arrested federally on November\n19 of last year. I do note that conditions at the jail\nhave improved considerably, with increased staffing levels.\nMr. McCullum talked about lockdowns at the jail.  And\nwhile lockdowns are inevitable at a jail, the number of times\nwhen inmates are experiencing extended lockdowns is rare.\nAs Judge Caproni, who has been involved in overseeing\nconditions at the MDC, remarked at a bail hearing earlier this\nyear in United States v. Alexander, 24 Cr. 676, there have\nbeen a lot of improvements at the MDC.  “There’s a more\nstaffing at the MDC. The number of defendants who end up\nin lockdowns for substantial periods of time are\nminimal.”  The prison has put a lot more staff on, including\nmore medical staff. The conditions at the MDC are not ideal,\nbut there certainly have been improvements, and regardless.\nRegardless, I have considered those conditions.\n\nUnited States v. Clinton McCullum, 24 Cr. 667 (JPC) (Aug. 29, 2025 sentencing); see also United\nStates v. Sandy Carazas-Pinez, 23 Cr. 346 (JPC) (Sept. 19, 2025 sentencing: materially same\nas McCullum).\n\n---\n\n78\nIn sum, none of the defense’s arguments support leniency based on Guo’s incarceration at\nthe MDC. The Section 3553(a) factors compel a significant incarceratory sentence in line with the\nGovernment’s recommendation.\nE.   The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities\nA sentence of at least 30 years’ imprisonment is necessary and appropriate in this case to\nprovide just punishment while avoiding unwarranted sentence disparities. See 18 U.S.C. §\n3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(6). Guo was the singular leader of the G Enterprise and the architect of its\nfraudulent aims.  He caused tremendous losses in excess of a billion dollars, placing him in the\nGuidelines’ highest tier of harm, and was the primary beneficiary reaping the profits of his frauds.\nHe preyed upon thousands of victims worldwide and enlisted a hierarchy of lieutenants to carry it\nout, including co-conspirator Yvette Wang, who herself is serving a 10-year sentence for her role\nin these crimes.  And he stands before the Court unrepentant, defiant, and actively propagating\nmisinformation to undermine the jury’s verdict in this case, and public trust in criminal justice.\nThe severity of Guo’s crimes, and the risk of harm to the public he presents, leaves him\nwith few peers among fraud defendants and distinguishes his conduct even among recent high-\nprofile fraud cases in this District. The exceptional loss amount is just one metric of culpability\nthat alone justifies a substantial sentence in this case.29 While a select few other fraud defendants\n\n29 “One of the central reasons for creating the sentencing guidelines was to ensure stiffer penalties\nfor white-collar crimes and to eliminate disparities between white-collar sentences and sentences\nfor other crimes.” United States v. Davis, 537 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2008). “[T]he sentencing\nguidelines sought to address the inequities of prior sentencing practices that tended to punish white\ncollar economic crimes less severely than other comparable blue collar offenses.” United States v.\nFishman, 631 F. Supp. 2d 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Over a five-year period between 1996 and\n2001, the Commission engaged in a deliberative process to address the Guidelines’ treatment of\nwhite-collar offenses, with the involvement of relevant stakeholders including the defense bar, the\nDepartment of Justice, probation officers, and the U.S. Judicial Conference. See Federal Register\nNotice BAC2210-40, 62 Fed. Reg. 152, 171-74 (1997) (proposals by the Commission for comment\nregarding economic crime sentencing reform). The Commission explained that the resulting\n\n---\n\n79\nhave caused for even larger financial losses, Guo’s scheme was especially cynical: he rallied\nsupporters fervently interested in the cause of democracy promotion in China, and then abused\ntheir trust to pitch them phony investment after phony investment. This meaningfully aggravates\nthe harm that Guo caused. As the Court noted at Wang’s sentencing, “in the Holmes scheme and\nthe Madoff scheme,” investors were not falsely “told that money would go toward the promotion\nof democracy.” (Dkt. 491 at 31-32). Using deception to steal other people’s money is always\nwrong. But Guo’s fraud is distinct from some of history’s worst Ponzi schemes and investment\nscams because of how its mastermind fostered a purported social movement for the purpose of\npreying on its followers—turning them into unwitting victims of fraudulent scheme after\nfraudulent scheme. Guo’s fraud is also distinct from recent precedents in its scope and complexity.\nIt began with a philanthropic appeal; moved on to an unregistered offering of securities in a\nsupposed media venture; transitioned into a purported community lending program designed to\nevade the SEC’s remedial measures; morphed into a private membership club that also offered\nshares of stock; and evolved yet again into a phony pair of fake cryptocurrencies joined with a\nfraudulent purported crypto exchange. It involved years of coordination between dozens of aides\nand lieutenants, operating the machinery of Guo’s fraud empire all over the world. For these\nreasons, sentences like the 25 years imposed in United States v. Bankman-Fried or the 20 years\n\namendments, which became effective on November 1, 2001, were based on the determination that\n“loss serves as a measure of the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s relative culpability.”\nSentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. 30,512, 30,533 (June 6, 2001).\nThus, the 2001 amendments to Section 2B1.1 reflected the considered view of the Commission,\nfollowing a collaborative process with relevant stakeholders, that loss amount should be a central\nconsideration in determining the seriousness of an offense to which that Guideline applies. Indeed,\n“[e]ven if the enhancements may lack robust empirical support related to deterrence, they have\nfoundations in empirical data and national experience related to the goals of fair sentencing and\nretribution.” United States v. Moose, 893 F.3d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 2018).\n\n---\n\n80\nimposed in United States v. Greenwood should be viewed as a low floor, not as sentences imposed\non “defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. §\n3553(a)(6).\nExceptional fraud crimes have been met with exceptional sentences. For masterminding a\ndecades-long Ponzi scheme with losses measured in the dozens of billions of dollars, Bernard\nMadoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison. While the scope and duration of Madoff’s fraud was\n“unprecedented,” United States v. Madoff, No. 09 Cr. 213 (DC), Sent’g Tr. at 43, Judge Chin’s\nsentencing decision noted that “more [was] at stake than money” because, as with Guo, “[t]he\nvictims put their trust in” the defendant and “[t]hat trust was broken in a way that has left many”\nof them “doubting… themselves.” Id. at 49.  While few cases could be “comparable . . . in terms\nof the scope, duration and enormity of the fraud, and the degree of the betrayal,” Madoff, Sent’g\nTr. at 46, this common element of exploitation and broken trust speaks to the exceptional harm\nalso caused by Guo’s crimes.\nAcross the country, other particularly predatory fraud defendants have received outsized\nsentences for conduct more comparable in scope to Guo’s. Tom Petters, age 52 when convicted\nby a jury in 2009, was sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment for a $3.7 billion fraud scheme in large\npart because the sentencing judge was “not satisfied that if he were released at an early sentence\nthat he would not reoffend.” United States v. Petters, No. 08 Cr. 364 (RHK), Dkt. 431 at 46 (D.\nMinn. 2010). Scott Rothstein pleaded guilty to conspiracies to commit racketeering, money\nlaundering, wire fraud, and mail fraud in connection with a fraud scheme he ran through his Florida\nlaw firm that “caus[ed] approximately 400 investors to lose more than $400 million.” United States\nv. Rothstein, No. 09 Cr. 60331 (JIC), Dkt. 334 at 57-58 (S.D. Fla. 2010). The Government\ndescribed the 47-year-old Rothstein’s “post-offense conduct” as “extraordinary,” including by\n\n---\n\n81\nvoluntarily returning from Morocco to turn himself in and providing extraordinary cooperation.\nSee id., Dkt. 277 at 2-3. Nonetheless, the Court imposed a sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment in\nview of Rothstein’s “sophisticated . . . marketing” of his complex scheme, including by trading on\n“all of the trappings of success,” donations to philanthropic institutions to “endear[]” the defendant\nas a “prolific benefactor,” and other extensive efforts to exploit “an appearance of legitimacy.” Id.,\nDkt. 334 at 56-57. In 2019, Edwin Fujinaga, a 70-year-old defendant, was sentenced to 50 years’\nimprisonment after trial convictions for a $1.5 billion scheme to defraud thousands of victims in\nJapan into making investments in purported medical claims that were spent largely instead on\nFujinaga’s personal enrichment. See United States v. Fujinaga, No. 15 Cr. 198 (GMN), Dkt. 346\nat 74-75 (D. Nev. 2019). And in 2009, Judge Richard J. Sullivan sentenced James Nicholson to 40\nyears’ imprisonment in this District for leading a $133 million scheme to defraud victims he\nselected because they placed extraordinary trust in him—emphasizing that the defendant, like Guo,\n“played on those relationships” with his victims “and cultivated them” and “encouraged them.”\nSee United States v. Nicholson, No. 09 Cr. 414 (RJS), Sent’g Tr. 71:11–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).\nThe nature and scope of Guo’s crimes, and his leadership of a racketeering enterprise to\ncarry them out, calls for a greater sentence than those recently imposed on high-profile fraud\ndefendants in this District whose schemes caused extraordinary losses but whose conduct lacked\nGuo’s sustained personal appeal of a charismatic leader to thousands of victims who were led to\nbelieve they were investing not only in failure-proof financial opportunities, but also in their\ncommon aspiration of democracy in China. Samuel Bankman-Fried’s crimes involving the FTX\ncryptocurrency exchange were egregious. He spent “large sums of FTX customer funds on risky\ninvestments, political contributions, Bahamas real estate, and other things in circumstances in\nwhich FTX was seriously exposed to downside of market deterioration, loan calls, and other risks.”\n\n---\n\n82\nUnited States v. Bankman-Fried, No. 22 Cr. 673 (LAK), Dkt. 426 (Sent’g Tr.) at 53 (S.D.N.Y.\n2024). This was outright theft on a grand scale, and Bankman-Fried was sentenced to 25 years’\nimprisonment. While Guo’s loss amount is lower, Guo’s crimes involved an unparalleled personal\nintimacy between the perpetrator of a mass-scale fraud and his victims. He personally guaranteed\nhis investors against any risk of loss—not only in his daily, hours-long broadcasts (see, e.g., GX\nZ9 at 37 (“I will be responsible. If there is one of your pennies that’s missing, I, Guo Wengui, will\nbe responsible.”)), but in direct, individual communications cultivating his victims through phone\ncalls, text messages, and video chats. (See, e.g., Tr. 4465, GX VB36). And as this Court recognized\nat the sentencing of Guo’s co-defendant, his scheme was distinct from other high-profile frauds\nbecause of its cynical manipulation of his victims’ “deep hopes that the political system in China\n. . . would be challenged and possibly changed”—“an entirely different way of persuading people\nto turn over their money.” (Dkt. 491 at 34–35).\nThis combination of charismatic personal leadership and manipulating victims’ deep social\nand political aspirations to evolve and sustain a years-long fraud sets Guo’s conduct above and\napart from financial crimes that involved massive losses but lacked these extraordinary—and\nuniquely harmful—features. Karl Sebastian Greenwood was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment\nfor co-creating and selling a fraudulent cryptocurrency in a scheme that saddled victims with\nbillions in losses. United States v. Greenwood, No. 17 Cr. 630 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. 2023). Unlike Guo,\nGreenwood shared primary culpability for his fraud with his scheme’s co-founder—and their\nOneCoin scheme lacked the intentional manipulation of victims’ aspirations to participate in a\nsocial and political movement. Nor can Guo be meaningfully compared to other recent defendants\nwho accepted responsibility by pleading guilty for their operation of fraudulent crypto-related\nscams. See United States v. Do Kwon, No. 23 Cr. 151 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (15-year sentence,\n\n---\n\n83\nwhere defendant also faced prospect of future criminal prosecution in another country); United\nStates v. Mashinsky, No. 23 Cr. 347 (JGK) (12-year sentence).  Indeed, in contrast to Bankman-\nFried, Greenwood, Kwon, and Mashinsky, Guo’s operation of fraudulent cryptocurrency and\nrelated exchange was just one part of Guo’s multi-scheme, five-year racketeering and fraud\nconspiracy. See supra, Section III.\nJust three years ago, this Court sentenced a fraud defendant who pleaded guilty in advance\nof trial to nearly 18 years’ imprisonment for “operat[ing] four separate fraud schemes” over less\nthan two years “with hundreds of victims.” United States v. Ray, No. 22 Cr. 228 (AT), Dkt. 105\n(Sent’g Tr.) at 36 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). Franklin Ray’s serial frauds raked in just north of $40 million\nfrom retail investors he personally pitched, and his culpability was aggravated by his continuing\nto solicit fraudulent “investments” while on pretrial release. Id. at 40. But his crimes—deserving,\nin this Court’s judgment, of almost 20 years’ imprisonment—pale in comparison to the\ncomplexity, duration, and manipulation brought to bear by Miles Guo in his execution of the five-\nyear, $1.3 billion G Enterprise fraud and racketeering conspiracy.  Guo’s sentence should include\na far greater period of incarceration to account for the comparative severity and scope of his crimes,\nhis persistent denial responsibility, and the threat he continues to pose to the public.\nVII.   FORFEITURE AND RESTITUTION\nOn August 11, 2025, the Court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture (“POF”) against\nGuo, which forfeited his interest in specific property and entered a money judgment of $1.3 billion\nthat is joint and several with Yvette Wang. (Dkt. 720). Approximately six months later, on\nFebruary 3, 2026, Guo filed objections to the POF’s money judgment. (Dkt. 799). On February\n17, 2026, the Government filed its response to Guo’s objections. (Dkt. 803).  For the reasons stated\nin that opposition, Guo’s objections are meritless. Additionally, on January 19, 2026, the\n\n---\n\n84\nGovernment submitted a supplemental preliminary order of forfeiture, which seeks to forfeit\nadditional specific property constituting criminal proceeds of the G Enterprise that the Government\nhas seized abroad and additional G|CLUBS funds. (Dkt. 790). Consistent with Federal Rule of\nCriminal Procedure 32.2, the Court should enter the Government’s supplemental preliminary order\nof forfeiture prior to sentencing, and at sentencing orally announce that it is imposing forfeiture\nconsistent with the August 11, 2025 preliminary order of forfeiture, and the proposed supplemental\norder of forfeiture.\nWith respect to restitution, for the reasons previously set forth in the Government’s January\n9, 2026 filing (Dkt. 785), and as the Court already found in connection with Yvette Wang’s\nsentencing, the Court should make a finding at Guo’s sentencing that restitution would be\nimpracticable in this case and allow for compensation through a remission process.\n CONCLUSION\nMiles Guo claimed to lead a movement. But he did not. Instead, he robbed thousands of\npeople who believed in his message, trusted his promises about investments, and relied on his\ncommitment to guarantee them against losses. Guo’s crimes will forever stand out among this\nnation’s worst and most rampant frauds. There can be no justice in this extraordinary case without\nan extraordinary sentence.\nIn view of the immense toll of Guo’s crimes, the Government respectfully requests that the\n\n---\n\n85\nCourt impose a sentence of at least 30 years’ imprisonment.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY\nAttorney for the United States Acting Under\n\nAuthority Conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515.\n\n      By:\n\n/s/\n\n Micah F. Fergenson\n Ryan B. Finkel\n Justin R. Horton\n\n Juliana N. Murray\n\n Assistant United States Attorneys\n\n 212-637-2190/-6612 /-2276/ -2314\n\nCC: Counsel of record","body_zh":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区）\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国），\n\n诉\n\nMILES GUO（郭文贵），\n又名“Ho Wan Kwok（郭浩云）”，\n又名“Miles Kwok（迈尔斯·郭）”，\n又名“Guo Wengui（郭文贵）”，\n又名“Brother Seven（七哥）”，\n又名“The Principal（校长）”，\n又名“The Boss（老板）”，\n\n被告。\n\nS3 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\n美利坚合众国量刑备忘录\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY（肖恩·巴克利）\n\n美国联邦检察官\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. § 515 授予之职权行事。\n\n纽约南区\n\n26 Federal Plaza\n\nNew York, New York 10278\n\nMicah F. Fergenson（米卡·F·弗根森）\nRyan B. Finkel（莱恩·B·芬克尔）\nJustin Horton（贾斯汀·霍顿）\nJuliana N. Murray（朱莉安娜·N·默里）\n助理联邦检察官\n\n协办律师\n\n---\n\n目录\nI. 引言 ............................................................................................. 1\nII. 诉讼程序沿革 ................................................................................................... 2\nIII. 庭审证实的犯罪行为 .................................................................... 4\nA. Rule of Law（法治基金/法治社会） ....................................................................................................... 4\nB. GTV私募 ...................................................................................................... 7\nC. 农场借款项目 ................................................................................................... 9\nD. G|CLUBS ......................................................................................................... 12\nE. Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所） .......................................................................................................... 17\nF. A10 ................................................................................................................................... 20\nG. 妨碍司法 ....................................................................................................... 20\nIV. 被害人陈述 ................................................................................................... 28\nV. 《量刑指南》之适用 .................................................. 29\nA. 适用法律 ................................................................................................................ 29\nB. 缓刑监督局的《指南》测算与量刑建议 ........................... 30\nC. 罪行涉及超过5.5亿美元的实际损失 ................................... 31\n1. 庭审记录与追查宣誓书证明损失金额超过5.5亿美元 ............................................................................................................... 31\n2. GTV私募欺诈应计入损失金额计算 ........................................................................................................ 35\n3. 投资者主观上是否认为自己是“被害人”与《指南》测算无关 ...................................................................................................... 38\n4. 适用优势证据标准 ....................................................................... 40\n5. 即使法院认定损失金额仅超过350万美元，郭的《指南》建议刑期仍为175年 ........................................................................... 41\nD. 对郭关于《指南》的其他异议之回应 ........................................................... 41\nVI. 法院应判处至少30年监禁 .................................................................................................... 45\nA. 罪行的性质、情节和严重程度理应重判 ............................................................................................................... 45\n1. 郭给成千上万的被害人造成了巨大的痛苦和折磨 ........................ 45\n2. 郭领导了一场长达五年的欺诈计划，并接连企图逃避和妨碍司法 ................................................................................................................ 48\n3. 郭利用了一个群体的期盼进行掠夺 ...................................................... 51\n\n---\n\n4. CCP（中共）的作为与郭的定罪无关 ........................................... 56\n5. 郭极其惊人的个人非法敛财 ............................................................... 59\nB. 有必要实施特别威慑并保护公众 ....................................................... 63\nC. 有必要判处长期监禁以实现一般威慑并树立对法律的尊重 ................................................................................................ 69\nD. 郭的过往经历及个人特征 ................................................................................... 70\n1. 郭自称权势显赫的亿万富翁背景加重而非减轻其罪责 .................................................................................................................. 71\n2. ............................... 73\n3. 郭的移民身份 ......................................................................................... 74\n4. MDC（大都会拘留中心）相关抗辩 ....................................................................................... 76\nE. 避免无合理依据的量刑差异之必要性 ................................................................ 78\nVII. 没收与赔偿 .............................................................................. 83\n结论 ............................................................................................................................. 84\n\n---\n\nI. 引言\n被告郭文贵的罪行规模极其骇人。通过每天在录制的视频中反复散布阴险谎言，他骗取了超过十亿美元，并将数亿美元非法挪为己用。他培养了由数千人组成的狂热邪教式追随者群体，操纵他们的希望、期盼以及对他的信任，以此榨取他们的金钱。他使用被害人的资金——被害人的个人积蓄、家庭财产、退休金账户以及变卖房产所得款项——来资助极其挥霍放纵的生活方式，过着由豪宅、游艇、赛车、名牌服装和奢华家具堆砌而成的纸醉金迷的生活。在郭依靠投资者资金支撑的奢靡挥霍过后，他摧毁了数百人的生活。他留下的，是在经济、情感和心理上均遭受毁灭性打击的被害人及其破碎的家庭。\n\n而且郭曾做出、并仍在做出非同寻常的企图来逃避任何追责。他利用心腹亲信以及遍布全球如迷宫般的空壳公司和银行账户，试图掩盖其不法行为，并掩盖其对自本国发号施令的庞大犯罪帝国的全面掌控。他对美国法律极度藐视的程度难以言表。他在移居美国并寻求美国法律对庇护申请者的庇护恩泽之后，持续且公然违反美国法律，侵害美国民众。他通过作伪证宣告破产以规避法院施加的蔑视法庭制裁，随后又企图妨碍和恐吓法院指定的破产受托人，手段与其用来对付投诉其欺诈行为的被害人时如出一辙。他在被捕前持续逃避和妨碍执法的行径，以及其犯罪帝国在其被捕和羁押后仍在继续进行的欺诈与欺瞒，突显出若不对郭判处极其长期的监禁并剥夺其行动能力，郭将对公众构成巨大风险。\n\n---\n\n事实上，即使在被陪审团一致裁定犯有经营勒索犯罪集团罪之后，郭也完全毫无悔意。对于给如此多个人及其亲人造成的伤害，他甚至连口头上的悔罪或承担任何责任都不愿意做出；其中一些人因他的罪行被逼得萌生自杀念头，还有一些人勇敢地在庭审中出庭作证，当面与他对质，讲述他是如何对他们洗脑、行骗和伤害的。面对其性质极其恶劣之犯罪行为的如山铁证，郭甚至在量刑前夕，仍拒绝承认自己做错了任何事，或对任何人造成了任何伤害。相反，当郭站在成堆被毁掉的人生之巅时，他居然有脸面不改色地告诉本法院，他是本案中唯一的真正被害人。郭这种毫无事实依据的荒谬立场，只会让他的行径显得更加令人愤慨。\n\n郭极其庞大且危害巨大的犯罪行为、他对美国法律的极度蔑视，以及郭极有可能企图（且正在企图）继续经营其勒索犯罪集团的态势，均理应受到相应严厉的判决。为了保护公众免受进一步伤害，为了威慑并瓦解郭的犯罪集团，并使郭令人震惊的犯罪规模得到公正惩处，政府方谨此提请法院，判处至少30年监禁是适当的。\n\nII. 诉讼程序沿革\nA. 指控、逮捕与审前羁押\n2023年3月6日，大陪审团作出了一份未公开起诉书，指控郭以及Kin Ming Je（余建明），又名“William Je”，犯有多项欺诈和洗钱罪名项。(Dkt. 2)。2023年3月15日，郭在其位于曼哈顿Sherry-Netherland Hotel（雪莉-尼德兰酒店）、价值6750万美元的顶层公寓内被捕，并在本法区过堂。(Dkt. 8)。自被捕以来，郭一直处于羁押状态。\n\n---\n\n在郭被捕的同一天，FBI（联邦调查局）根据法院授权对其三处住所进行了搜查——分别是其曼哈顿顶层公寓、其位于康涅狄格州格林威治的住所，以及其使用欺诈收益购买的位于新泽西州马瓦的豪宅。在搜查过程中，FBI缴获了数十台电子设备、超过约40万美元的美国货币、郭的外国旅行证件证据，以及使用欺诈收益购买的奢侈服装、珠宝和车辆等物品。\n\nB. 替代起诉书\n政府方在郭被捕后提交了数份替代起诉书，增加了针对郭的指控，并指控了同案被告Yanping “Yvette” Wang（王雁平）。(参见 Dkt. 19；Dkt. 215)。2024年4月24日，政府方提交了第S3号替代起诉书 S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT)，指控郭、余和王犯有勒索共谋罪，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)（罪名项一）；共谋实施电信欺诈和银行欺诈罪，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1349（罪名项二）；共谋洗钱罪，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)（罪名项三）；共谋实施证券欺诈罪，违反 18 U.S.C. § 371（罪名项四）；与GTV私募有关的电信欺诈罪（罪名项五）、与农场借款项目有关的电信欺诈罪（罪名项七）、与G|CLUBS有关的电信欺诈罪（罪名项九）以及与喜马拉雅交易所（罪名项十一）有关的电信欺诈罪，均违反 18 U.S.C. § 1343；与GTV私募有关的证券欺诈罪（罪名项六）、与农场借款项目有关的证券欺诈罪（罪名项八）以及与G|CLUBS有关的证券欺诈罪（罪名项十），均违反 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) 和 78ff；以及非法货币交易罪，违反 18 U.S.C. § 1957（罪名项十二）。(Dkt. 307)。郭依据第S3号起诉书接受了庭审。1\n\n1 王在庭审前已认罪答辩。第三名被告余建明目前仍然在逃。\n\nC. 审判\n陪审团遴选于 2024 年 5 月 22 日开始。参见 2024 年 5 月 22 日会议记录（Minute Entry）。政府方传唤了 34 名证人，辩方传唤了 9 名证人。Guo（郭文贵）选择不出庭作证。2024 年 7 月 16 日，陪审团作出裁决，裁定郭在 S3 起诉书（S3 Indictment）的第一项、第二项、第三项、第四项、第七项、第八项、第九项、第十项和第十一项罪名项上成立，在第五项、第六项和第十二项罪名项上不成立。（Dkt. 395）。\n\nIII. 庭审证明的犯罪行为\n\nA. 法治\n郭的骗局始于一系列极端的个人财务挫折之后。2017 年，郭的债权人之一——一家名为 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund（太盟亚洲机会基金，简称“PAX”）的投资机构——对郭提起诉讼，指控郭未履行偿还债务的承诺，该主张最终导致了超过 $100 million（1 亿美元）的裁决判赔。（参见 PSR ¶ 83；亦见 Tr. 4014）。次年——即 2018 年 10 月 23 日——一家 Hong Kong（香港）法院下达裁定，扣押了郭在香港及其他地方“价值数十亿美元”的资产。（Guo Sub. 15；DXSTIP_0001 ¶ 8）。\n\n在中国当局扣押其资产仅数周后，郭于 2018 年 11 月 21 日在 New York（纽约）发起了他的第一个诈骗骗局。（Tr. 423, 470；PSR ¶ 37）。在 Manhattan（曼哈顿）The Pierre Hotel（皮埃尔酒店）举行的一场奢华活动中，郭宣布成立两家非营利组织和所谓慈善机构——Rule of Law Society（法治社会）和 Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金）。（Tr. 424）。郭对其支持者的宣传很简单：“他将作为第一位捐赠人或发起人捐赠前 $100 million，” （Tr. 471），并且其追随者的资金将用于推进“帮助中国人民”的使命。（同上，423；亦见 GXVI-192T（郭的广播声明：“我对我今天所说的话负法律责任。换句话说，战友们每捐赠 1 美元，文贵出 2 美元。\n\n在捐赠 1 亿美元之后，文贵正在协调向法治基金捐赠 10 亿美元”）。但正如法治社会的前主席兼财务主管在庭审中所作证的那样，郭的组织在帮助中国人民方面“什么都没做”。（Tr. 423；亦见 PSR ¶ 39（认定虽然“法治[组织]据称是为帮助中国人民而设立的[,] [但]实际上并非如此，该基金会被用于宣传郭个人，这与其所作出的承诺相悖”））。尽管郭的支持者最终向郭控制的法治实体捐赠了约 $36 million，（参见 GX WA30），但郭从未兑现他及其发言人所承诺的 $100 million 捐款。（Tr. 471）。\n\n法治组织只是即将到来的更大规模诈骗的序曲。在一次事件中，郭组织了一场电视募捐活动以庆祝这些所谓慈善机构成立一周年，该活动在其办公室以及通过其 GTV 媒体平台在线播出。（Tr. 471-72）。为了协助其向支持者募集捐款，郭的助手接到了从郭控制的各个实体进行“捐款”的指示，以便在郭敦促其追随者向金库注入自己的资金时，将这些所谓的出资显示在屏幕上。（同上，473（法治社会主席兼财务主管的证词：“最终的目的是在屏幕上显示这些大笔金额，以便让人们看到其他人正在捐款，我们便能够通过这种方式募集到更多资金。”））。\n\n从法治组织的捐赠人处筹集的资金被挪用，其挪用方式在其整个“G Enterprise（G 系列企业）”骗局中反复出现。（例如，参见 PSR ¶ 39）。捐赠人本以为资金会用于慈善目的，郭却将其挥霍在自己、家人以及自我宣传上。使用捐赠人资金购买的 COVID-19 N95 口罩“送到了老板家”，即郭在 Greenwich（格林威治）的豪宅。（Tr. 480）。还有其他由捐赠人出资购买的口罩被捐赠给 New York Police Department（纽约市警察局）——但郭通过其得力助手兼已被定罪的同案被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平）坚决要求寄出一封信件，虚假地将这笔捐赠描绘成郭对警方的个人馈赠。（参见同上，480-81）。当郭的一名助手拒绝撰写这封虚假的附信时，王告诉该助手，她“拿工资是为了执行命令，而不是为了思考”。（同上，481）。\n\n正如其一贯的犯罪手法（modus operandi），郭通过躲在表面上的组织法律架构背后便利其盗窃捐赠人资金的行为，该架构声称将他排除在非营利组织的治理之外，而事实上他在真实且实际地控制着这些组织。（参见 Tr. 475（法治社会主席兼财务主管作证称，尽管“老板”——即郭——并未在董事会任职，但他实际控制着这些组织））。\n\n除了郭挪用通过欺诈手段募集的捐款外，法治骗局还巩固了郭与其受害者之间的关系——也就是说，郭在向其支持者承诺可以优先获得一系列声称有担保的投资机会之前，先将他们套牢为“捐赠人”。郭“利用这些非营利组织集聚了一批支持其针对中国共产党声称开展的运动的追随者，这些人也倾向于相信郭关于投资和赚钱机会的陈述。”（PSR ¶ 30）。受害人 Jenny Li（李珍妮）在轻信了郭拿出自己 $100 million 资金的承诺以及关于许多其他支持者也在出资的陈述后，向法治组织进行了捐款。（Tr. 1170-72）。李女士——一位申请了房屋二次抵押贷款以资助其对郭投资的 Nevada（内华达州）居民（Tr. 1212）——描述了她向法治组织捐赠的 $6,000 是如何导致了随后的 $100,000 追加投资，她当时相信这些投资会为她购买郭旗下媒体企业的股票。（参见 Tr. 1170-75）。受害人 Le Zhou（周乐）出于同样的原因向法治组织进行了捐赠。当他后来投资 G|CLUBS 时，他——与其他受害者一样——被告知必须出示其先前的法治捐款证明，才能获取 GTV 股票以及向投资者承诺的其他权益。（Tr. 194, 232-33）。\n\n法治骗局起到了敲门砖的作用：它是 G 系列企业诈骗受害者的切入点，在郭发起这些所谓慈善机构后的五年里，这些诈骗仍在继续调整和演变。\n\nB. GTV 私募\n在以具讽刺意味命名的“法治”公告和募集“捐款”之后，郭变本加厉，在 GTV 私募（GTV Private Placement）中通过虚假借口扩大了其资金募集。2020 年 4 月 20 日，郭在一则宣布（未经注册的）GTV 私募的网络视频中向其追随者发售普通股。（GX C26, C26-T）。郭利用支持者对他的喜爱，曲解了“私募（private placement）”的含义，声称它仅仅意味着“我们是朋友”。（同上）。郭及其工作人员分发了一份“机密信息备忘录（confidential information memorandum）”，声称投资者收益将用于“拓展和加强”GTV Media Group（GTV 传媒集团）的业务。（GX VK5）。郭还对所有投资者的资金进行了个人担保。他在通过电话、短信和视频信息向潜在投资者发出的个人呼吁中明确了这一点。（参见 Tr. 4465；GX VB36）。郭还通过其社交媒体渠道播发了他的个人担保，例如他在其中陈述道：“这是郭文贵对你们严肃庄严的承诺和责任——对这笔投资永远负责，这是一份具有法律效力的承诺。”（GX C63, C63-T（2020 年 6 月 2 日视频）；亦见 GX Z9 第 37 页（“我会负责。如果你们少了一分钱，我郭文贵负责。”））。这些担保在为 GTV 吸引数以亿计的投资方面起到了关键作用。（Tr. 4466；2375）。\n\n郭的个人担保是谎言，他声称将投资者资金仅用于 GTV 业务机会的陈述同样是谎言。事实上，就在“私募”结束仅一天后的 2020 年 6 月 3 日，郭便命令王从存放有 $291 million 受害者投资资金的 J.P. Morgan（摩根大通）Saraca 银行账户中，将 $100 million（1 亿美元）转至摩根大通的另一个 Saraca 银行账户，而在转账之前，该账户的余额为 $0。（GX Z1）。该内部转账没有任何商业目的；相反，其旨在掩盖这 $100 million 的来源，即受害者的投资。2020 年 6 月 5 日，这 $100 million 被转移至 Hayman Capital（海曼资本），以便郭可以将 $100 million 投资于“HHKOF”，这是一项押注港元联系汇率制将会脱钩的“极高风险”投资。（Tr. 790-791, 848）。\n\n执行这些转账是郭计划的一部分。事实上，在私募截止前夕，至少从 2020 年 5 月 23 日开始，郭及其下属就一直在就郭的投资事宜与海曼进行谈判。（Tr. 762；GX HN26）。尽管该投资最终是以郭的儿子（兼同案共犯）Mileson（郭强）的名义进行的，但自始至终都很明确的是，该投资是针对郭及其家人的——而不是针对郭的受害者，甚至不是针对 GTV。（参见 GX HN33（“这是 William 和 Miles [Kwok] 将通过其进行投资的两个实体”）；Tr. 806（解释投资条款“[对] Miles Kwok 和 Saraca 有利”）；Tr. 811-12（“据我理解，是有意进行投资的 Miles Kwok 家族办公室 . . . 家族办公室通常由家族成员作为其所投资实体的实益拥有人。”））。\n\n次月，Securities and Exchange Commission（美国证券交易委员会，简称“SEC”）开始调查 HHKOF 这笔 $100 million 投资的来源。2020 年 7 月 15 日，海曼的外部律师向王以及参与 G 系列企业的其他共犯——William Je（余建明）、Max Krasner 和 Aaron Mitchell——发送消息，询问用于 HHKOF 的 $100 million 是否来自 GTV 私募。（Tr. 833-36）。在接下来的一周里，余通知海曼“可能[从 GTV]借用了一些资金，但他们打算归还。”（Tr. 838）。此外，郭及其同伙未能提供这 $100 million 并非 GTV 资金的保证，这最终导致海曼的创始人兼首席投资官于 2020 年 8 月 22 日向余发送消息，以确认这 $100 million“资金在任何方面均未受污染，包括其不代表来自 GTV 发行的资产，而是由 Saraca 和 Miles 进行的善意投资。”（GX HN221）。海曼从未收到对该邮件的回复。（Tr. 844）。\n\n郭及其同伙的这种沉默清楚地表明，郭及其同伙知道将源自向投资者募集的 GTV 私募资金中的 $100 million 转至 HHKOF 是错误的。2 更糟糕的是，尽管郭向其投资者承诺他们不会损失资金，并且如果受损他将予以全额弥补，但该投资承受的约 $30 million 的损失完全没有得到郭的偿还。（Tr. 848；GX STIP19）。通过与 SEC 达成的和解，参与 GTV 私募的实体将剩余的受害投资者资金转移给了 SEC，SEC 此后扣除郭在 HHKOF 中损失的约 $30 million 后，通过“公平基金（fair fund）”将其分发给了受害者。（GX STIP19）。\n\nC. 农场贷款项目\n在进行了误导性的 GTV 私募股票发售并迅速引来美国民事和刑事当局的审查之后，郭试图通过其他同样是欺诈性股票发售的骗局从投资者处筹集资金以逃避执法，而郭再次将这些所得收益据为己有用于个人利益。其中一个骗局就是\n\n2 事实上，共犯 Yvette Wang 对完全相同的行为进行了认罪答辩。（例如，参见 Wang Plea Tr. 第 25-26 页（“大约在 2020 年 6 月，我受他人指示，从纽约的一个银行账户电汇了大约 1 亿美元至 Hayman Capital Management，一家位于德克萨斯州的对冲基金。我知道这些资金是从 GTV 发售中的投资者那里收到的。 . . . 我知道我所做的是错的。”））。\n\n所谓「农场借贷项目」（Farm Loan Program），郭通过该项目欺诈性获取了超过 1 亿美元。并且郭将这些来自其追随者的资金用于资助自己奢靡的生活方式。（PSR ¶ 47；GX Z26）。农场由郭于 2020 年春季、即 GTV 私募后不久设立，是由位于世界各国的郭之追随者群体组成的集体，并被组织成层级结构。（PSR ¶ 47；Tr. 1373）。郭处于顶端。（Tr. 1316-17, 1373（郭「指示农场该做什么」））。在郭之下是一个名为「铁血组」（Iron Blood Group）的领导小组，由郭加上少数几位重要农场的负责人组成，其中包括庭审证人 Ya Li（李亚）。（Tr. 1374-75）。每个单独的农场也有一名负责人，其接收来自铁血组和郭的指示。（Tr. 1373）。郭的追随者的这一组织有时也被称为「喜马拉雅农场联盟」（Himalaya Farm Alliance）和「新中国联邦」（New Federal State of China）。（Tr. 1373, 1376）。类似于多层级传销骗局，郭利用农场来放大其欺诈行为，从受害者处收取并打包资金，并逃避执法部门的侦查和阻断。\n\n农场借贷项目是郭利用农场从其受害者处敛财并将其转移至由郭控制、被郭称为「总部公司」的公司的骗局之一。（Tr. 1377）。郭于 2020 年 7 月 22 日的视频直播中宣布了农场借贷项目：\n\n---\n\n（GX Z9 at 28；GX C40-V）。郭告知其追随者，为了获得 GTV 普通股股票，农场成员需与当地农场签署借款合同并将钱款寄至农场，随后农场将与 GTV 签署借款合同并将钱款寄给 GTV——据称最终会使该个人获得 GTV 股份。（Id.；Tr. 1377）。这些「贷款」不仅是虚假贷款，事实上，受害者根本没有收到股票份额，他们的钱反而被用于郭及其家族的个人敛财。3（Tr. 1386-88）。\n\n举例而言，Ya Li 证称，作为其所在农场的负责人，作为农场借贷项目的一部分，她与其农场成员签署了借款合同并收取了 300 万美元。在郭的指示下，Li 女士将 200 万美元转入了一家名为 Medical Supply（医疗供应）的公司的美国银行账户；而其他借贷资金则被其他农场寄往阿布扎比一家以 ACA Capital 为名的银行账户。（Tr. 1388-89）。Li 女士的农场与 Medical Supply 或 ACA Capital 均未签订借款合同。相反，Li 女士收到并签署了与另一家名为 Alfa Global Ventures 的公司的借款合同，该公司系郭的「总部公司」之一，但该合同从未被副署。4（Tr. 1381-82, 1385-86）。Li 女士不知道转给 Medical Supply 的 200 万美元最终去向如何。（Tr. 1408）。\n\n3 亦未就借款支付利息，除向位于纽约的农场「香草山」（Mountain of Spices）支付除外，旨在向 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）掩饰郭的非法股票发行。（Tr. 1386-88）。\n\n---\n\n财务记录证实，郭为了个人利益侵吞了农场借贷项目的款项。巨额的农场借贷项目资金（包括来自 Medical Supply 以及至少 84 个其他银行账户的资金）通过 ACA Capital 在阿布扎比的银行账户进行洗钱，随后被转至郭的家族办公室实体，如 Lamp Capital LLC、Greenwich Land LLC 以及 Leading Shine NY Ltd.，资金在这些实体中被用于资助郭的奢靡生活并让其家族成员获利。（GX Z26；Tr. 4310）。例如，约 2,000 万美元被转给郭的儿子5；约 500 万美元被转入郭之配偶拥有的实体；约 230 万美元被用于支付一艘价值约 3,700 万美元、名义上由郭之子所有并由郭使用的约 145 英尺豪华游艇相关的维护费用；且资金被用于支付豪车和私人飞机出行。（PSR ¶ 50；GX Z26）。6\n\nD. G|CLUBS\n\n大约在同一时期，郭欺诈性地诱导其追随者将资金汇往一个「据称名为 G|CLUBS 的在线会员俱乐部」——「作为继续进行欺诈性股票发行的机制」。（PSR ¶ 51, 54）。正如推进其犯罪组织的既往骗局一样，\n\n4 其他农场借款甚至未由农场副署。（见 GX Z29（凤凰城农场价值约 2,300 万美元的 686 份借款协议未由农场签署））。\n5 2022 年 3 月 21 日，郭在其破产程序中证称「每当我需要任何基本生活开销时，我都会跟我儿子说，他会告诉他的办公室给我钱。」（Tr. 4049）。\n6 此外，约 1,000 万美元被转入 Je 及其配偶的个人银行账户。\n\n---\n\n郭将 G|CLUBS 作为工具，从最信任他的人那里吸引了数亿美元，随后将这数亿美元挥霍在自己及其家人身上。\n\nG|CLUBS 的构想简单直接：受害者购买会员资格是基于郭的个人保证，相信他们将获得各种 G 系实体（如 GTV、G|CLUBS 和 G|Fashion）的股票。（GX Z9 at 11（「[2020年6月20日 郭视频：]『G club 不是会员资格。G club 是为了让你们拿到原始股……你们可以拿到合法的 G club、G fashion 股票，就是这样。很简单。』」）7；GX Z9 at 101-103（「[2021年6月21日 郭视频：]『所有 G-Club 持卡人都有权按照卡金额以 1:10 获得新的 GTV 股票……天哪，这是笔大钱。想想 GTV 的价值』」）；GX Z9 at 111（「[2021年7月5日 郭视频：] 花 5 万美元购买会员卡，未来你将拥有 1 万股 G-Fashion」）；GX Z9 at 116（「[2021年8月11日 郭视频：] 为什么你买了 G-Club 会员卡，现在就能拥有股票。你为什么要亏钱？你承担什么风险？世界上有这么好的机会吗？还会有这么好的机会吗？你还会再有这么好的机会吗？」））。G|CLUBS 的「会员资格」价格从 10,000 美元到 50,000 美元不等（Tr. 2977），郭自己也承认，唯有在确信自己是在购买有价值的股票时，这一价格才说得通。（GX Z9 at 57）。郭还利用其农场网络来推广 G|CLUBS 的股票销售发行。（Tr. 3001-02）。\n\n郭关于股票以及伴随股票而来的财富的承诺，致使其追随者掏出了数亿美元的资金。G|CLUBS 从其大约 8,000 名会员中，总计为郭的个人秘密资金池产生了至少约 2.4 亿美元（GX Z26）。（Tr. 3001）。但该会员人数低估了 G|CLUBS 骗局的危害性，\n\n7 庭审证据和正式庭审笔录使用了「G|CLUBS」、「G club」和「G-Club」等变体。\n\n---\n\n因为郭鼓励其受害者每人购买多份会员资格，他声称这样他们就可以购买更多的股票。（PSR ¶ 55）。当然，郭关于股票的承诺纯属谎言。（Tr. 2977）。事实上，他人曾警告郭不要声称 G|CLUBS 提供股票作为会员权益。（见 GX CT172；Tr. 3026）。但郭迅速向其追随者保证，任何将 G|CLUBS 与股权剥离的 G|CLUBS 免责声明「直白地说，……都是废话」。（GX Z9 at 57）。相反，那些关于 G|CLUBS 会员不附带股票的一般性免责声明和警告是「我们在法律上为了避免“Me Too”所必须具备的东西」。（Id.）。\n\n郭及其同谋完全清楚虚假向受害者承诺股票的公然非法性，他们为 G|CLUBS 披上了显然旨在向执法部门隐瞒其欺诈性质的外衣。例如，G|CLUBS 声称向其会员提供 G|Fashion 折扣、向 GTV 上传内容的临时机会、获取郭的音乐的权限、参加「G|Talks」流媒体直播活动的权限、据称的「抽奖活动」，以及精选酒店和一家伦敦餐厅的有限折扣。（Tr. 3005-06）。这些微不足道的权益与高昂的会员价格极不相称，郭本人亦承认了这一点。（GX Z9 at 57（「我认为你不会为了免费音乐之类的东西去买 G-Club。如果是为了那个，你为什么要买呢，对吧？我的建议是不要买。」））。事实上，这些微小的折扣基本上毫无价值。8 更糟糕的是，\n\n8 这些折扣范围极其狭窄，8,000 名会员中几乎无人使用。例如，可用的酒店权益适用的 10% 折扣仅可在波多黎各的三家酒店使用。（Tr. 3008）。可用的一次性餐厅权益仅可在指定晚间用于伦敦的一家餐厅。（Tr. 3009）。可用的租船服务权益仅可在波多黎各使用。（Tr. 3010）。这些「权益」没有一项让 G|CLUB 产生任何成本，而且它们全都严重不足以与五位数的会员费用相提并论。（Tr. 3008-3010）。\n\n---\n\n该「抽奖活动」经过暗箱操作，将一辆兰博基尼奖励给了郭的一名律师，即一名同谋。（Tr. 3030；GX 121）。\n\n与其犯罪组织其他部分的特征类似，郭将自己对 G|CLUBS 的领导隐藏在傀儡身后。在纸面上，郭仅仅是 G|CLUBS 的「代言人」，但他不可被解雇（Tr. 3000），且会员协议禁止会员发表针对他的贬损言论。（Tr. 3021）。「代言人」头衔是一枚烟雾弹。在 G|CLUBS 的案例中，其挂名 CEO Limarie Reyes 对该组织没有实际控制权——她只是按照指示签署文件以转移会员资金以便其被侵吞。（Tr. 2975, 2990）。事实上，Reyes 女士不会讲普通话，与所谓的民主运动毫无关联，且对中国文化一无所知。（Tr. 2983-84）。尽管 G|CLUBS 是面向讲普通话的海外华人华侨进行营销的，事实却全然如此。（见 Tr. 3002-03）。\n\nReyes 女士的不知情并非 G|CLUBS 组织架构中的缺陷，而是该欺诈的一项特征，促成了 G|CLUBS 从郭的受害者手中席卷数亿美元以将该等财富转移给郭及其家族。G|CLUBS 受害者收益被用于购买：\n\n• 位于新泽西州马瓦（Mahwah）的一栋价值 2,650 万美元的豪宅，随后耗巨资进行了定制翻修，并包含了根据郭、其妻子、其儿子及其女儿的要求专门设计和定制的侧翼建筑。（GX Z12）。\n\n---\n\n• 用于装修马瓦豪宅的数百万美元花费，举例而言包括：1,050,000 美元用于购买一套四件路易十六镀金青铜灯笼吊灯；1,185,000 美元用于购买首饰盒、橱柜和烛台；300,000 美元用于波斯地毯；250,000 美元用于古董中国地毯；120,000 美元用于两盏巴卡拉（Baccarat）水晶吊灯；104,000 美元用于电视和环绕声音响系统；两张床垫，每张花费 36,000 美元；一张价值 24,000 美元的「永恒森林」咖啡桌；19,200 美元用于一张胡桃木小长凳；以及 53,000 美元用于拿破仑三世壁炉柴架。（例如 GX BUCK1 – BUCK1296；GX 1B125K）。\n\n• 一辆价值 832,000 美元的红色兰博基尼，郭将其停放在其位于格林威治（Greenwich）的车库中。（GX GC276）。\n\n• 一辆价值 440 万美元的布加迪 Chiron Super Sport，由郭的儿子 Mileson 定制设计并供其使用。（GX 218）。\n\n• 一辆价值 350 万美元的法拉利赛车。（GX Z14；GX802）。\n\n• 一艘供郭使用的价值 2,130,000 美元的游艇。（GX GC309）。\n\n---\n\n• 向郭的家人进行现金转账。（GX GC415）。\n在许多情况下，这些挥霍性财富展示都是由郭本人亲自挑选和指挥的。（参见，例如，GX 1B125M-8；GX 1B125M8-T（郭指导马瓦大宅装修并描述其女儿及其男友卧室的视频）；GX PRO466（“Miles Kwok 先生的助理”代表郭指导马瓦大宅的设计）；Tr. 2926（房产经纪人关于郭寻找马瓦大宅的证词）；GX 1B125K（郭的一条短信，指示对从中国深圳订购的茶几“使用 G-Club 或另一家私人公司付款”）；GX 1B125F（郭关于运送使用 G|CLUBS 资金购买的游艇的短信）；GX 1B125I（郭挑选用于所购游艇字体的短信））。\n\nE. 喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）\n2021年11月，Guo 和 William Je（余建明）通过在 GTV 上的直播推出了 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所，“HEX”或“交易所”）。（参见 Tr. 3669-70, 3675）。郭将 HEX 宣传为一个加密货币“生态系统”，其此前骗局的投资者可在其中购买和交易郭创建的两种数字资产。（参见 Tr. 3669-70；PSR ¶¶ 56-57）。郭所谓的加密货币——H Coin（喜币）和 H Dollar（喜美元）（最初为 G Coin 和 G Dollar）——是欺诈性的。事实上，郭的首席亲信 Wang（王雁平，其薪酬方案据称包含喜美元）在认罪后的个人量刑程序中承认，“郭向王承诺的加密货币毫无价值且不具流动性。”（PSR ¶ 28 n.2）。如下文所述，郭为招揽对这些虚假代币的投资而编造的谎言包括：它们有黄金和现金支持；它们是在区块链上持有和交易的真正加密货币，而实际上它们仅存在于由余建明的投资基金控制的离线电子表格中；它们的价格由真实市场决定；以及郭将个人为 HEX 投资者的损失提供担保。\n\n郭亲自作出了这些虚假承诺。在为 HEX 发布设计的音乐视频中，郭出现在同一辆兰博基尼中，该车是用 G CLUBS 会员的资金购买并存放在郭位于格林威治的车库中。（参见，例如，GX GC276；GX C370）。\n\n郭多次告诉其追随者，喜币由“20%黄金”作为后盾。（参见 PSR ¶ 57(a), (b)；亦参见 GX Z9 第 121-122 页，GX C459-V1，GX C459-2）。在审判中，HEX 的傀儡首席执行官——其作证称自己“什么都控制不了”（Tr. 3634）——解释称郭的“20%黄金”说法是不实的：喜币的价值没有一分与黄金挂钩，喜美元也没有黄金储备作为担保（郭的另一个谎言）。（参见 Tr. 3694；亦参见 Tr. 2653-54）。受害者作证称，郭关于其代币黄金储备的陈述对于他们决定购买其所谓的加密货币具有重大实质影响。（参见，例如，Tr. 2425）。\n\n郭和余告诉投资者，其代币已被创建，并且“所有交易都记录在分布式账本，一个名为区块链的公共账本中。”（GX Z9 第 125 页；亦参见 GX Z9 第 88 页（郭声明区块链具有“一个重要功能：绝对公平！”））。实际上，HEX“并不是区块链”——它“只是一个数据库”。（Tr. 3658；亦参见同上 2670）。该交易所首席执行官作证称，这一谎言是必要的，因为郭的代币不在区块链上的真相可能会导致其价格暴跌。（参见同上第 3679 页）。\n\n郭的代币价格也是一种幻象。喜币和喜美元并非可在公共账本上访问的市场产物，而是几乎完全存放在由余的实体控制的钱包中。（Tr. 2646）。这使得郭及其共谋者能够操纵这些所谓的加密货币并制造现实的假象。例如，在 2022年6月，余公开分享了“一位买家决定使用喜美元购买一辆世界级名车”的消息。（PSR ¶ 60）。该车是用受害者资金为郭的儿子购买的一辆法拉利（参见 PSR ¶ 28），而该交易实际上是通过银行电汇执行的——随后事后补建了一笔作为遮羞布的喜美元“交易”。（PSR ¶ 60）。HEX 的所谓投资者也不能使用喜美元或喜币，甚至不能在他们自己的账户或钱包中托管这些所谓的加密货币。相反，郭的投资者获得的是“代表”这些虚假资产的“积分”，这些积分无法在郭的 HEX 生态系统之外使用，也根本无法转换为“法定货币或加密资产”。（PSR ¶ 61）。\n\n郭所谓的加密货币被遮蔽的中心化控制，使其价格能够被郭的共谋者操纵。在其首次公开发行后不久，HEX 报告称郭的喜币价格已从 $0.10 上涨至 $27——在短短几周内上涨了 26,900%。（PSR ¶ 58）。代币价值“登月”（郭用来宣传代币的一个短语，且该短语“暗示价值急剧上升”，PSR ¶ 59）的诱惑力，与郭声称他将个人为 HEX 投资者的损失提供担保的虚假承诺结合在一起：“要是亏了钱全算七哥的。”（例如，GX Z9 第 64 页；GX C302-V7。）\n\n郭最终通过 HEX 聚敛了超过 $260 million 的受害者资金。（PSR ¶ 56）。这些资金在其持续的欺诈中发挥了至关重要的作用，既是个人谋利的来源，也是延续和扩大郭的诈骗敲诈勒索企业（racketeering enterprise）的又一手段。2022年4月，郭和余从 HEX 转移了 $37 million，“用于支付郭此前购买和使用的一艘豪华游艇的费用。”（PSR ¶ 62）。同年晚些时候，郭及其共谋者计划使用 HEX 投资者的资金购买一家银行，这将使 G 系企业拥有更强的洗钱、挪用受害者资金以及阻碍执法部门调查的能力——这一计划仅因政府根据扣押令状对 HEX 资金的扣押而受挫。（参见，例如，GX GC552；Tr. 2796）。在 HEX 由欺诈资助的金库因这些扣押而耗尽后，郭继续对其 HEX 投资者资金的安全性和稳定性说谎，在这些扣押发生数月后告诉他们，“喜币的发行和兑换及其稳定性，都处于极度最严苛的法规监管之下。”（GX Z9 第 184 页）。\n\nF. A10\n继政府在 2022 年底和 2023 年初扣押了郭超过 $600 million 的欺诈收益之后，郭试图通过一个他称之为“A10”的所谓投资机会再次攫取现金。A10 旨在筹集更多受害者资金并将其转移至阿布扎比的离岸地区，置于美国管辖权之外。（Tr. 1460, 2810）。G|CLUBS 是 A10 的灵感和基础，郭向其受害者提供购买 A10 股票的机会，据郭称，该股票是“一家在阿布扎比建立的完全独立的 G Club 公司”。（GX VI189, GX VI189-T）。在其他时候，郭声称 A10 旨在向受害者提供购买郭的 Gettr（盖特）社交媒体平台和喜马拉雅交易所所有权权益的机会。（GX Z10）。\n\n正如受害者 Chen 女士在审判证词中所解释的那样，A10 是郭“叫我们出钱投资，不断榨干我们的钱包……但回报在哪里？”的又一个例子。（Tr. 4503）。根本没有任何回报。\n\nG. 妨碍司法公正（Obstruction of Justice）\n1. 与犯罪行为相关的妨害行为\n郭的行为及其（通常成功的）妨害企图表明了对法律的彻底藐视。他的妨害行为采取了多种形式——从上述投资骗局的复杂性，到在被刑事和民事当局及其他第三方发现或破坏后这些投资机会的不断演变，再到将企业运作和欺诈收益转移至离岸，以使其超出破产受托人（Bankruptcy Trustee）和美国执法部门的管辖范围，乃至恐吓那些投诉或批评他、或以其他方式威胁其犯罪企业存续的人。\n\n郭的洗钱者 William Je（余建明）试图通过将剩余资金转移至阿联酋的银行账户来挫败政府进一步扣押欺诈收益的行动（PSR ¶¶ 80-81），甚至在郭被捕后，G 系企业仍迁往迪拜并将受害者资金重新转移至那里的账户。（Tr. 1472-77, 1481-87（“问：你对他们为什么不想使用美元的理解是什么？答：因为美元会被追踪。问：被谁追踪？答：被美国政府追踪。”）；亦参见 PSR ¶¶ 96-97（王在被捕和羁押后仍试图协调取回 $7.1 million 欺诈收益））。\n\n郭还屡次将要求退还投资款的人定性为“中共间谍”，并指示他的成千上万名追随者对他们进行霸凌和骚扰。这种骚扰既发生在网上，也发生在现实中，形式为在个人家庭住所进行有偿抗议。（Tr. 1487-89）。郭保留了一份批评郭或其组织的昔日前支持者的“黑名单”。（Tr. 1489）。郭分享了他黑名单上人员的个人身份信息，并指示他的支持者在网上发布和传播。（Tr. 1489-90）。这恐吓并吓坏了许多投资者，他们担心如果中共得知他们支持了他们此前认为是反共运动的组织，自己和在中国的家人会面临后果。郭还会拒绝向批评他或该企业的追随者发放退款。（Tr. 1409-10）。在至少两起事件中，郭的抗议目标遭到了人身攻击并受伤。郭在得知这些肢体袭击后对其忠实追随者的回应是什么？“干得好。”（Tr. 1488）。\n\n2. 与破产程序相关的妨害行为\n除了与投资骗局直接相关且在骗局进行期间发生的妨害行为外，郭的大量妨害行为还发生在其破产程序以及郭面临藐视法庭制裁的早期民事诉讼中。（参见 PSR ¶¶ 64, 83-90）。\n\n2017年，投资基金 Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P.（太平洋联盟亚洲机会基金有限公司，“PAX”）在 New York Superior Court（纽约州最高法院）对郭提起民事诉讼，要求偿还郭个人担保的逾期贷款。2020年9月，PAX 获得了针对郭的约 $114 million 金额的判决书。（Tr. 4018）。在 PAX 获得判决后，它努力通过查明郭在美国的资产并试图对其进行扣押来执行判决。然而，“PAX 在查明郭控制的资产方面遇到了困难，因为自称亿万富翁的郭将其资产隐藏在一个错综复杂的公司实体网络中以及家庭成员手中。”PAX 诉讼案，案卷号 652077/2017，ECF 编号 1181，第 7-8 页（N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022年2月9日）。PAX 于 2020年10月 获得了一项限制令，该限制令涵盖了郭的游艇“Lady May（梅夫人号）”，并命令不得将其移出管辖范围。（Tr. 4020；GX 1416）。然而，梅夫人号仍被移出了管辖范围。结果，在 2022年2月9日，纽约州最高法院法官 Ostrager 对郭作出了民事藐视法庭的最终裁定。（Tr. 4022-27；GX 1413）。法院的裁定要求郭在五个工作日内支付 $134 million 的藐视法庭罚金。（Tr. 4027）。\n\n郭非但没有支付藐视法庭罚金，反而于 2022年2月15日 在 District of Connecticut（康涅狄格区）申请了 Chapter 11（第 11 章）破产。（Tr. 4027）。在破产申报文件中，郭声称负债高达 $500 million，并且尽管他住在昂贵的房产中，周围环绕着豪车和极度昂贵的家具，但在伪证处罚的规定下声明他仅拥有\n\n基本上没有任何资产。（Tr. 4039-42；GX 1407；GX 1420）。虽然Guo（郭文贵）在破产申报文件中提到了他在Greenwich（格林威治）以及在Sherry Netherland hotel（雪莉荷兰酒店）的住所，但他隐瞒了关于郭在新泽西州Mahwah（马瓦）豪宅的任何提述。（Tr. 4044）。在与其破产程序相关的宣誓作证中，郭进行了妨碍并进行了虚假宣誓。举例而言，郭为了企图撇清自己与GTV的关系，荒谬地在宣誓下声称“GTV”中的“G”并不代表“Guo”（郭）：\n问：GTV中的G代表什么？\n答：上帝（God）、目标（goal），就像G-O-A-L里的那个词。\n问：英文单词“goal”？\n答：是的，目标（goal）或上帝（God）。\n（Tr. 4083）。\n\n然而，郭在破产程序中的妨碍行为远不止他自己的虚假声明和伪证。郭在将破产受托人及其他参与破产程序的人员贴上“CCP（中国共产党）间谍”的标签后，策划了一场以抗议形式针对受托人及其家人的骚扰行动。如前所述，这种形式的恐吓是郭惯用伎俩的一部分，他以此继续并协助推进其投资诈骗。9 在破产程序中，受托人及其家人（包括其女儿们）成为了抗议的目标，抗议持续了90天。（Tr. 4091）。郭针对受托人及其工作的律师事务所Paul Hastings（普衡律师事务所），指使抗议者举着如下标语：\n\n9 郭甚至以中共已渗透SEC（美国证券交易委员会）的虚假借口，指挥了针对SEC的抗议。（PSR ¶ 89）。\n\n（GX VI 194）。郭还通过受托人的家人针对受托人个人进行攻击，在其私人住宅外抗议，甚至将目标对准了受托人担任教师的女儿所任教的公立小学。郭雇用的抗议者在受托人女儿的公寓及其任教的小学举着如下标语：\n\n（DX 7007）。受托人及其家人被指控为中共“走狗”、“种族灭绝支持者”且双手沾满鲜血。郭深知这些指控纯属虚构，其目的是煽动其支持者，并阻止破产受托人（以及其他考虑对郭采取行动的人）查封郭的财产和调查其财务状况。（Tr. 4214（受托人的女婿作证称：“在他们出现在我们的公寓之前，他们曾出现在Luc的工作地点和Luc的家，所以我们当时大概明白他们——这已经形成了一种模式，他们出现在那里是因为——给Luc及其家人施加压力，以迫使其停止为政府处理本案。”））。\n\n毫无疑问，正是郭在指挥这种暴力行为，因为骚扰和针对行动的证据是从他的一部设备名称为“Boss”的手机中查获的。（Tr. 4716-17）。该证据包括一张令人不寒而栗的受托人及其家人在其中一个女儿婚礼上的照片，照片中受托人的三个女儿被用红圈圈出10：\n\n（GX 1B124F；另见 Tr. 4717）。\n\n除了针对并企图恐吓受托人及其家人之外，郭还指使他人以其他方式妨碍法院程序。当Ya Li（李雅）收到破产受托人发出的传票时，郭让她“扔进垃圾桶”，她照办了，因为郭声称美国司法部已被“中共武器化”，她信以为真。（Tr. 1498-99）。针对G Enterprise（G系商业机构）在郭被捕后仍试图将资产置于破产受托人触及范围之外的行径，在G|CLUBS“抽奖”中“赢得”一辆兰博基尼且在郭被捕及拘留后继续在MDC（大都会拘留中心）与郭会面的同案共犯律师Yongbing Zhang（张泳兵），要求李雅签署一份虚假宣誓书，以便提交到其中一起破产诉讼中。（Tr. 1523-29；GX VI 66）。当她拒绝时，张以3800万美元的责任赔偿威胁李女士。（Tr. 1530）。在受到郭的律师的这番威胁后，李女士曾试图自杀。（Tr. 1530-31）。\n\n10 标出Despins女儿们的红圈出现在从郭的手机中查获的照片上。政府仅添加了黑色遮蔽涂抹，以在本公开案卷中保护受害者和/或第三方的隐私。\n\n近期，郭的犯罪机构继续骚扰和威胁反对它的人。在一名受害者提供给政府的2026年3月10日的一段视频中，郭的NFSC（新中国联邦）主播要求郭剩余的追随者向郭的法院指定律师提供陈述书。此外，该主播还表示，此前提供陈述书的126名受害者“都将不得不承担后果”。（Dkt. 832，Stmt. 206-B（译文））。\n\n这似乎是指2024年11月22日向法院提交的126份受害者陈述书。（Dkt. 477）。\n\n3. 郭在被捕后的妨碍司法行为\n\n即使在被捕之后，郭仍从事了妨碍司法的行为。郭的犯罪机构在郭被捕后继续运作，并在其转移至美国执法部门管辖范围之外的UAE（阿联酋）期间，郭继续予以指挥。（PSR ¶¶ 103-105）。被捕后，郭的追随者试图在Mahwah（马瓦）豪宅伪造证据，使其看起来像是G|CLUBS的物业，而非郭的私人家庭住宅。（PSR ¶¶ 91-95）。同样，在郭被捕后，郭的核心亲信之一Brother Long Island（长岛哥）指示李雅等人删除手机中的证据，以防被捕。11（Tr. 1500-02）。\n\nIV. 受害者陈述\n\n截至目前，政府共收到并向法院提交了大约225份受害者影响陈述。这些陈述反映了郭对遍布全美的数百名受害者造成的极度伤害，这些伤害包括极度的经济困境、精神痛苦、家庭纽带破裂以及包括自杀在内的自残企图。\n\n具体而言，2024年11月22日，政府提交了一封附有大约126份受害者陈述的信函。（Dkt. 477）。2024年12月11日，政府提交了其收到的另外7份受害者陈述。（Dkt. 482）。2025年1月2日和2025年1月3日，政府共提交了另外16份受害者陈述。（Dkts. 486, 487）。法院已将包含前述陈述的第477、482、486和487号待决案件卷宗予以封存。2026年4月7日，政府在封存状态下另行提交了74份陈述。（Dkt. 832）。鉴于法院先前的裁定，这些转交信函作为物证在封存状态下提供给法院。12\n\n为方便法院审理，政府将向法院法官室提供所有这些受害者影响陈述的纸质副本。\n\n11 在郭被捕之前，郭本人曾指示李雅等人删除其手机中的证据。（Tr. 1500-02）。\n\n12 政府认为，作为本文件物证A在封存状态下附后的第477号卷宗转交信函，应当在案件卷宗上公开提交。该转交信函不包含任何受害者的任何个人身份信息。它仅总结了截至该日期收到的某些陈述。因此，政府恭请法院许可将该信函公开记录于卷宗。\n\nV. 量刑指南的适用\n\nA. 适用法律\n\n在计算适用的《量刑指南》范围时，法院必须对当事方的事实争议作出裁定，或者“认定无需作出裁定，原因在于该事项不会影响量刑，或者法院在量刑时不会考虑该事项”。联邦刑事诉讼规则（Fed. R. Crim. P.）第 32(i)(3)(B) 条；亦见 Gleeson 等人，《第二巡回法院刑事手册》第 42-39 节（“量刑法官无需解决当事方就量刑前调查报告提出的每一项争议。”）。如果法院“决定判处非指南刑罚”，则“可能无需精确计算适用的指南范围”。United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2005)。在那种情况下，法院拥有“自由裁量余地”以“避免需要解决为精确判定某些复杂事项（例如确定金钱损失）所必需的所有事实问题”。同上。\n\n如果“对量刑决定至关重要的因素存在合理争议，应当给予当事方充分的机会就该因素向法院提交信息”。United States v. Berndt, 127 F.3d 251, 257 (2d Cir. 1997)（援引 U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)）。但法院在如何解决此类争议方面也拥有广泛的裁量权——且不需要举行证据听证会。United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 54 (2d Cir. 2013)。在选择是通过听证会还是更简易的程序来解决实质性量刑争议时，法院会考量“争议的性质、其与量刑决定的相关性以及适用的判例法”。United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1995)。有争议的量刑因素只需以优势证据标准予以证明即可。参见例如 Crosby, 397 F.3d at 112; United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1989)。\n\nB. 缓刑监督局的指南计算与量刑建议\n\n在《量刑前调查报告》（“PSR”）中，缓刑监督局（Probation Department）计算出的调整后罪行级别为 55 级——该级别超过了 U.S.S.G.（《美国量刑指南》）量刑表规定的最高罪行级别，鉴于郭的案件属于“计算出的总罪行级别超过该数值的罕见情况之一”，因此“按 43 级处理”——且犯罪前科类别为 I 类。（PSR ¶¶ 120, 123, 126）。根据 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b)，郭的指南量刑为法定授权的最高监禁期限，即 2,100 个月，或 175 年。（PSR ¶ 167）。政府同意缓刑监督局对指南的计算，并提请法院予以采纳。\n\n在说明了郭的个人情况、对郭进行了面谈、审查了庭审记录并考虑了犯罪行为之后，缓刑监督局建议判处郭 25 年监禁——罪名项第一、二、三、七、八、九、十和十一项判处 20 年监禁（并期执行），罪名项第四项判处 5 年监禁（连续执行）。（PSR 第 58 页）。缓刑监督局指出，尽管郭在面谈中拒绝讨论犯罪行为，“但他表示自己坚称无罪”。（PSR 第 59 页）。缓刑监督局强调，郭的犯罪行为“造成数千名受害者总计超过 10 亿美元的天文数字损失”，且郭“作为该计划的头目，在犯罪中发挥了关键作用”。（同上，第 61 页）。在注意到郭的个人情况（这些情况几乎全部来源于郭本人）的同时——包括据报“[郭]在 CCP（中国共产党）手中遭受的个人损失，以及他如果被遣返回母国将面临的潜在危险”——缓刑监督局“并不认为被告人的个人经历和特征足以压倒本案中进行重大惩罚和威慑的必要性”。（同上）（强调为后加）。\n\nC. 本案罪行涉及超过 5.5 亿美元的实际损失\n\n正如本法院在审理中所见，Guo（郭文贵）的罪行给数千名投资者造成了损失。无论本法院选择采用何种合理估算来计算郭氏犯罪计划造成的损害，总损失均超过 5.5 亿美元，且事实上已超过十亿美元。由于郭氏的罪行导致了超过 5.5 亿美元的损失，根据《美国量刑指南》（U.S.S.G.）§ 2B.1(b)(2)(P)，其《量刑指南》罪行等级应增加 30 级。\n\n《量刑指南》将“损失”定义为“实际损失或意图损失中较大者”。U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. 3(A)。“实际损失”被定义为“因罪行导致的合理可预见的金钱损害”。同上，cmt. 3(A)(i)。而“合理可预见的金钱损害”被定义为“被告已知或在当时情况下合理应当知晓属于该罪行潜在结果”的“金钱损害”——即“金钱性质的或在其他方面容易以金钱衡量的损害”。同上，cmt. 3(A)(iii), (iv)。“意图损失”被定义为“被告蓄意企图造成的金钱损害”，并包括任何“本不可能或不太可能发生之意图造成的金钱损害”。同上，cmt. 3(A)(ii)。“《量刑指南》并不要求量刑法院确定无疑或精确无误地计算损失金额。”United States v. Bryant, 128 F.3d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1997)。相反，法院鉴于“现有信息”，“仅需对损失作出合理估算”。U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, cmt. 3(c)；亦见 United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 250 (2d Cir. 2012)（支持《量刑指南》损失认定的证据“无需……以绝对的精确度确立损失；其仅需允许地方法院鉴于现有信息对损失作出合理估算”）。\n\n1. 庭审记录与资金追踪宣誓书证明损失金额超过 5.5 亿美元\n\n本法院面前的记录充分支持了超过 5.5 亿美元的损失金额。事实上，庭审证据表明，13 亿美元是个体受害者向 G Enterprise（G系列企业）欺诈案中某些分支机构汇入资金金额的保守估计，这些分支机构包括：GTV、the Farms（农场）、G|CLUBS 以及 the Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）。（见 GX Z26；Tr. 4330-32）。GX Z26 汇总了数千页银行记录，这些记录亦已被采纳为证据。（GX Z26 第 36 页（援引原始证据项））。GX Z26 至少以证据优势确立了有 13 亿美元流入与该勒索敲诈企业相关的银行账户，而陪审团的裁决证明这些款项均系欺诈所得。该证据项及其所汇总的迷宫般的银行账户，亦证明了其中涉及 13 亿美元的洗钱行为。\n\n郭氏主张，政府方在庭审中的汇总证人 Paul Hinton（保罗·欣顿）曾就其对组成 G系列企业之实体的财务记录分析作证，但其证言并未向本法院认定“任何”损失金额提供充分依据。（Guo Sentencing Submission（《郭氏量刑陈述意见书》，简称“Guo Sub.”）第 44 页）。郭氏的论点很容易被驳回。郭氏似乎主张，由于欣顿未进行“资金追踪”分析，本法院不能将流入 G系列企业银行账户的资金用作损失金额的合理估算。13（Guo Sub. 44）。但法律上并未要求地方法官为了计算《量刑指南》而作出的损失估算必须基于任何一丝不苟的资金追踪分析。见 Coppola, 671 F.3d at 250（支持《量刑指南》损失认定的证据“无需……以绝对的精确度确立损失；其仅需允许地方法院鉴于现有信息对损失作出合理估算”）。在任何情况下，即便存在此种要求，本法院面前也已经掌握了\n\n13 在庭审中，政府方通过其他确实进行了资金追踪分析的证人，特别证明了郭氏及其共谋者挪用了远超 1 亿美元的资金。例如，政府方详细出示了汇总图表，展示了投资者资金如何被用于：(1) 购买 Mahwah Mansion（马瓦豪宅）以及为郭氏及其家人对该豪宅进行奢华装修和购置家具（GX Z12A），(2) 为郭氏之子购买一辆价值 400 万美元的法拉利跑车（GX Z14），以及 (3) 代表郭氏之子的利益与一家对冲基金进行高达 1 亿美元的高投机性对赌（GX Z1）。\n\n对政府方依据法院授权之扣押令扣押的 634,827,401.97 美元欺诈收益——即超过 5.5 亿美元的金额——所作出的资金追踪分析。（Dkt. 716（政府方关于初步没收令的动议））。关于其针对郭氏申请初步没收令的动议，政府方提交了追踪该笔欺诈收益金额的经宣誓的扣押令宣誓书，且事实上本法院在对郭氏作出初步没收令时已经采信了这些宣誓书。（Dkt. 720（针对郭氏的初步没收令））。此外，由于实际从 Guo Enterprise（郭氏企业）扣押的欺诈收益金额无可争议地超过了 5.5 亿美元，郭氏关于任何所谓重复计算、以及任何向投资者赎回或退款的论点均无关紧要，亦可被轻易驳回。14（Guo Sub. 44-45, 52-54, 63-66）。\n\n与此相关的是，郭氏提出的损失金额应当扣减“投资者不考虑欺诈而保留的投资价值”（Guo Sub. 66）的主张毫无根据。除了受害者投资者和客户并未获得任何实质价值这一事实之外，15 该原则亦不适用于《量刑指南》损失金额的计算。《量刑指南》在两种具体情况下规定了“损失抵免”，而这两种情况在此均不适用。第一种是在罪行被发现前被告向受害者返还了资金或财产，第二种是被告向受害者提供了质押担保物。U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3(D)(i), (ii)。两项在此均不适用。16 此外，被告的罪行涉及欺诈性诱导。Second Circuit（第二巡回区联邦上诉法院）已明确驳回了基于受害者在企业中的股权价值而主张扣减损失的论点——退一步讲，即使假定本案中有任何受害者实际获得了此种股权（而本案中他们并未获得）——只要被告的罪行自始就是欺诈性诱导受害者获取该股权。见 United States v. Komar, 529 F. App’x 28, 29 (2d Cir. 2013)（指出 § 2B1.1(b)(1) 的“适用说明极其明显地忽略了将股权价值用作实际损失抵免的任何指示”，并裁定“‘损失’即为投资者被欺诈性诱导进行投资的金钱……不论[财产]的价值为何”）；亦见 United States v. Paul, 634 F.3d 668, 677–78 (2d Cir. 2011)（驳回了考虑可能导致股票价值缩水之非欺诈因素的必要性，因为“在本案中……[受害银行]遭受的损失并非由股票价值的下跌引起”，而是由受害银行被欺诈性诱导“自始发放了贷款”引起）；United States v. Turk, 626 F.3d 743, 748 (2d Cir. 2010)（驳回了被告关于损失金额为零的主张，该主张声称“因为其受害者以为自己所投资的房产可以说具有一定市场价值”，并强调受害者的\n\n14 在错误地主张受害者的损失系由政府方的扣押造成时，郭氏提出了一项完全没有事实支持的指称，该指称似乎意在误导其受害者并转嫁其损失的责任。关于 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）针对 GTV Private Placement（GTV私募）进行的 Fair Fund（公平基金）分配，郭氏在未作任何引证的情况下声称：“例如，由于 GTV 扣押，GTV 投资者失去了其 GTV 投资的至少 8%，因为 8% 是 SEC 依据 SEC 公平基金进行分配之前保留的金额。”（Guo Sub. 50 n.44）。这是不正确的。SEC 既没有、过去也不曾为自身保留受害者投资者的资金（亦未“扣押”任何资金，这些资金实际上是通过自愿和解收到的）。郭氏的受害者损失了其投资的 8%，是因为郭氏挪用了他们的资金用于一项 1 亿美元的对冲基金对赌，在美方当局介入并保住剩余部分之前，该对赌已损失了 3000 万美元。（见 GX STIP 19）。事后郭氏还在视频中就此对其追随者说谎。（Tr. 1370-73；GX VI 158, 158-T）。\n15 在庭审中，受害者作证陈述了他们如何未收到股票，或者他们付出了数万或数十万美元的代价却仅收到诸如“一个杯子还有几块饼干”之类的象征性物品。（例如，Tr. 409, 1179, 1211-12, 1386-87）。\n\n损失即为其“向[被告]提供贷款的本金价值”）；United States v. Stitsky, 536 F. App’x 98, 110–12 (2d Cir. 2013)（“地方法院合理地认定，对于因经济环境变化造成的损失不予冲抵，因为若非被告自始欺诈性诱导他们投资，[受害者]投资者本不会面临此种风险。”）；United States v. Shkreli, No. 15 Cr. 637 (KAM), 2018 WL 9539774, at *18 (E.D.N.Y.（纽约东区联邦地区法院）Feb. 26, 2018), aff’d, 779 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2019)（“根据第二巡回区的先例，罪名项三的适当损失计算应为基于 Shkreli（希克雷利）先生就其 MSMB Capital（MSMB资本）基金的规模、投资策略和业绩所作的诸多虚假陈述而‘被欺诈性诱导投资’并保持投资于 MSMB资本的金额。”（援引 Komar, 529 F. App’x at 29））；United States v. Bryson, 101 F. Supp. 3d 147, 155–56 (D. Conn.（康涅狄格区联邦地区法院）2015)（裁定“被欺诈性诱导投资的投资者”的损失为其“投资的总价值”，因为“这些投资者所遭受的损失并非由[其投资]价值的下降引起，而是由他们自始进行了投资引起”）。\n\n因此，鉴于本法院面前的大量记录，包括在本法院亲自主持的为期两个月的庭审中出示的证据以及实际扣押的欺诈收益金额，本法院为了对损失金额作出合理估算，完全无需举行 Fatico 听证会。损失金额显而易见超过 5.5 亿美元。（见 GX Z26；Tr. 4330-32）。\n\n2. GTV 私募欺诈应当计入损失金额计算\n\n郭氏主张，本法院必须在《量刑指南》下的损失计算中排除约 4.11 亿美元的 GTV私募损失金额，因为陪审团对郭氏裁决无罪释放了涉及 GTV私募的实质性电信欺诈和证券欺诈罪名项\n\n私募。（Guo Sub. 56-62）。首先，即使将其排除在外，适用的损失金额仍将超过5.5亿美元。无论如何，“陪审团的无罪裁决并不阻止量刑法院考虑被判无罪指控背后的行为，只要该行为已达到优势证据标准”，这是明确的法律定论。United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam)。这是因为“在刑事指控中被判无罪并不证明被告无罪；它仅证明对其有罪存在合理怀疑。”同上，第155页。因此，“只要量刑法院所依据的是可靠信息，且该行为已达到优势证据证明标准，量刑法院即可考虑已被判无罪的行为”，United States v. Willis, 14 F.4th 170, 188 (2d Cir. 2021)；且“地区法院可以按优势证据标准认定与量刑相关的事实（区别于犯罪要件），并在如此行事时，可以在对被告量刑时考虑被判无罪的行为”，United States v. Johnson, 507 F.3d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 2007)。\n\n自2024年11月1日起生效的《美国量刑指南》（U.S.S.G.）§ 1B1.3(c)修正案在此并未要求得出不同结果。§ 1B1.3(c)规定，“相关行为不包括被告在联邦法院被提起刑事指控并被判无罪的行为，除非该行为亦全部或部分构成了本次被定罪的罪行。”U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)（强调为后加）。§ 1B1.3(c)的后一条款在此适用。郭文贵被判犯有敲诈勒索阴谋罪（第一项罪名）、电信欺诈阴谋罪（第二项罪名）、证券欺诈阴谋罪（第三项罪名）以及洗钱阴谋罪（第四项罪名），这些罪行均全部或部分由GTV私募的行为所构成。而在“某些行为同时作为被判无罪的指控以及本次被定罪之罪行之基础”的案件中，“法院处于最适合确定此类重叠行为是否全部或部分构成本次被定罪之罪行并因此符合相关行为资格的最佳地位。”U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)，申请附注10。\n\n本案正是如此。如前所述（Dkt. 716），大量庭审证据证明，正如起诉书所指控的那样，该RICO企业早在2020年GTV私募之前便已通过法治基金欺诈开始运作。随后，郭文贵继续通过一系列相互关联的骗局诈骗其追随者，包括2020年的GTV私募。多名投资者作证说明了郭文贵如何通过声称向投资者保证不会亏损、声称其资金将用于发展GTV业务，而实际上却将1亿美元的投资者资金汇入一项为了郭文贵儿子利益的高风险对冲基金赌博，从而欺诈性地诱导他们投资GTV。（见 Tr. 209 (Le Zhou)；同上，第701页 (Patrick Chin)；同上，第2376-77页 (Minran Wu)；同上，第4465-67、4471-72页 (Wei Chen)；同上，第1350-58、1365-73页 (Ya Li)）。此外，GTV私募与G系列企业的其他分支存在关联且不可分割。事实上，农场贷款和G Clubs方案是隐瞒发行GTV股票的手段——并且它们就是在GTV平台本身进行推广的。（例如，见 GX Z9（郭文贵视频的汇总图表，包括从GTV网站保留的发布视频，并包括郭文贵虚假承诺以GTV股票换取农场贷款和G Clubs会员资格的视频））。甚至与喜币（H Coin）相关的方案也与GTV私募相互关联。（例如，见 Tr. 244（根据包括GTV在内的先前投资分配喜币）；同上，第1358页（Ya Li 作证称“再投资规则是一旦你收到SEC（针对GTV私募）的退款，在45天内你应该把这笔钱重新投资到该投资项目中，然后你可以获得百分之五的喜币。”））。\n\n因此，法院在计算量刑指南时，应计入GTV私募约4.11亿美元的损失金额。\n\n3. 投资者主观上是否认为自己是“受害者”与量刑指南计算无关\n\n郭文贵接下来辩称，出于量刑指南计算之目的，任何不认为自己是“受害者”的投资者的资金均不能计入本法院对损失金额的估算中。17（Guo Sub. 45-52）。郭文贵在法律层面上是错误的。郭文贵似乎将其论点表述为关于重大性（materiality）的论点，似乎主张如果某个特定投资者声称郭文贵的谎言对其投资决定并不重要，则出于根据量刑指南计算损失金额的目的，该投资者的投资金额便不能予以考虑。然而，明确的法律定论是，重大性并非主观标准，而是涉及理性人（reasonable person）会认为重要之事项的客观标准。例如，见 United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017)（维持未要求陪审团“从受害者的主观角度”考虑重大性的陪审团指示，因为“如果一个理性人在确定其在涉案交易中的行为选择时会对某事项的存在或不存在赋予重要性，则该事项即属重大”）；亦见 Tr. 5793（“[法庭：]重大事实是指在依赖该陈述或声明作出决定时，预计会引起理智审慎之人的关注的事实。”）。这是因为刑法的重点在于被告的意图，而非受害者的意图，量刑指南亦是如此，其对实际损失和意图造成的损失作同等对待。U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1，附注 (A)。郭文贵在重大信息上欺骗受害者的犯罪意图在庭审中已由压倒性的证据所证实，这些证据无可争辩地表明他一次又一次撒谎，实施了一系列环环相扣的骗局，背叛了一个被其诈骗超过十亿美元的同质群体的信任。郭文贵录在视频中的谎言对任何理性投资者而言显然都是重大的。例如，他谎称自己绝不会窃取投资者的钱财，而实际上他正是在干这档事。\n\n17 在提出该论点的过程中，郭文贵重复引用了一份没收申请书中的引文，声称扣押原本要用于购买商业银行（Mercantile Bank）的资金与本案无关。这是错误的。例如，“数字银行”项目就是 Ya Li 作证提到并且实际上协助组织的投资骗局之一。（Tr. 1342-43, 1430-32）。\n\n面对表明其论点毫无根据的既定法律，郭文贵承认“重大性通常适用‘理性人’标准”，但主张三十多年前第二巡回法院的一个先例 United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993) 确立了如果受害者否认重大性，则该受害者不再是受害者，其损失亦不属于量刑指南下的损失金额。（Guo Sub. 45-46）。Miller 案根本没有确立这一观点。该判决与重大性毫无关系。它涉及的是邮政欺诈罪中“金钱或财产”这一要件。Miller, 997 F.2d at 1017（因政府“未能证明存在第1341条所指的财产权益”而撤销定罪）。被告意见书中摘录的 Miller 判决部分也未包含与重大性相关的附带意见（dicta）。（Guo Sub. 46）。在那段摘录中，巡回法院考虑的是被告（当时为律师）与购买某公寓大楼中公寓的一群投资者之间是否存在代理关系，该代理关系是否禁止被告与该群体平行购买同一公寓大楼中的公寓，从而使该推定的代理关系可能确立了一项可被视为邮政欺诈法规下该投资者群体的专有权益的推定信托。997 F.2d at 1020。然而，投资者群体负责人的证词（见同上，第1014页）否认了此类代理关系的存在，因此不存在推定信托，也不存在专有权益，仅存在被告对“诚实和忠实服务”的违反。18 同上，第1020页。\n\n18 尽管国会已于1988年修订联邦欺诈法规以涵盖诚实服务欺诈，但 Miller 案中的行为发生于1988年之前，因此该修正案不能追溯适用于被告的行为。见 Miller, 997 F.2d at 1016 n.5。\n\n因此，与郭文贵的主张相反，Miller 案并不涉及受害者“明确且肯定地否认”对其所说谎言的重大性（Guo Sub. 46），并且对重大性为客观标准这一成熟确立的规则没有任何影响。\n\n在郭文贵可能试图将投资者的主观观点作为酌情减轻情节提出的范围内，法院可以在评估第3553(a)条因素时考虑这一点（无论其价值几何）。但无论其作为所谓的减轻论点的价值如何——在政府看来，郭文贵以虚假和欺诈性借口拿走受害者的钱后，成功说服了部分欺诈受害者相信他们没有受到伤害，这并不构成减轻情节，见下文第六部分B项——该问题在法律上与量刑指南无关，不能作为举行法蒂科听证会（Fatico hearing）或进一步推迟郭文贵量刑的依据。\n\n4. 适用优势证据标准\n\n郭文贵关于对量刑指南损失金额计算适用更高证明责任的论点（Guo Sub. 66-70）已被长期确立的先例所排除，包括郭文贵自己引用的判例。事实上，郭文贵看似主要依赖的那个案例，实际上“鉴于本法院对优势证据标准的持续适用”而拒绝在量刑中采用更高的证明标准，并撤销了地区法院对清晰且有说服力标准的适用。United States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 2000)。在郭文贵主张法院应从量刑指南建议的175年监禁刑期向下调整的范围内（见 Guo Sub. 67（提及使用“向下偏离（或在后Booker时代，向下变更）”）），根据成熟确立的法律，这与法院对损失金额是多少的合理估算无关，更具体地说，也与量刑时适用于事实认定和量刑指南调整的证明标准无关。事实上，如果法院“决定判处非指南刑罚”——正如政府和缓刑部门一样\n\n缓刑监督官办公室（Probation Office）建议——法院无需“对某些复杂事项作出精确裁定”，包括“对金钱损失的裁定”。Crosby 案，397 F.3d at 112。\n\n5. 即使法院认定损失金额仅超过 350 万美元，郭文贵的《量刑指南》刑期仍为 175 年\n\n最后，虽然这并非关于损失金额计算的抗辩，但郭文贵辩称大额损失金额会不合理地影响适用的《量刑指南》（Guidelines）刑期。（郭文贵陈述书 [Guo Sub.] 第 70-79 页）。无论法院在抽象层面如何看待该论点，该论点在郭文贵的《量刑指南》计算方面均缺乏效力。正如缓刑监督官所正确计算的，在损失金额为 5.5 亿美元的情况下，郭文贵的罪行等级为 55 级——远高于 43 级的最高罪行等级，而 43 级本身已建议判处终身监禁（根据 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b) 调整以计入郭文贵被定罪罪名项的 175 年法定最高刑）——因此郭文贵的罪行等级自动降为 43 级。值得注意的是，如果本法院认定损失金额仅超过 350 万美元，参见 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J)，由于适用于郭文贵恶劣行径的其他加重情节，郭文贵的罪行等级仍将为 43 级，且其《量刑指南》建议刑期仍将为 175 年监禁。因此，尽管证据明确支持本案损失金额超过 5.5 亿美元的认定，但郭文贵关于损失的几乎所有抗辩对最终的《量刑指南》计算而言都是无关紧要的。\n\nD. 对郭文贵其他《量刑指南》异议的回应\n\n郭文贵的“对其他《量刑指南》加重情节的异议”（Guo Sub. 79-82），等同于否认庭审中已证明或在案记录中显而易见的事实。这些异议毫无根据，应予以驳回。\n\n郭文贵对涉及 10 名或以上受害者的罪行加重情节提出异议，理由是“除声称在 G 系列（G-Series）投资中蒙受损失的五名证人外，没有关于任何其他受害者的证据”。（Guo Sub. 79）。在庭审中作证的受害者仅仅是观看郭文贵直播并因轻信其虚假承诺而向其汇出千百万个人资金的众多受害者中的几位。事实上，郭文贵的 200 多名受害者已致信法院，要求在量刑时陈词。郭文贵继续否认他们的存在是令人不能接受的，其以抹杀被其掠夺的众多人员为前提的异议应予以驳回。\n\n郭文贵对在欺诈过程中“代表慈善、教育、宗教或政治组织或政府机构行事”的加重情节提出异议，所谓的理由是“法治基金（The Rule of Law Foundation）或法治协会（Rule of Law Society）均不存在任何欺诈行为”。（Guo Sub. 79）。该异议同样建立在不愿承认庭审已证明之事实的基础之上。郭文贵被定罪的第一项罪名是敲诈勒索阴谋罪，其中包括将这两个法治组织列入“构成 G 集团（G Enterprise）的相互关联且重叠的实体”之中。（第三次替代起诉书 [S3 Indictment] ¶ 3(a)；判决前调查报告 [PSR] ¶ 25）。在庭审中，法治协会前总裁兼财务主管 Karin Maistrello（卡琳·迈斯特雷洛）作证称，该组织“完全没有”开展任何支持其所谓慈善使命的活动。（庭审记录 [Tr.] 第 424 页）。额外的庭审证据确立了法治组织捐赠者的资金被用于资助针对郭文贵批评者的抗议活动、为郭文贵及其家人购买 N95 口罩以及宣传郭文贵的名人地位。（Tr. 476, 481, 1488（“[抗议者] 由法治基金支付报酬”））。事实上，法治组织在本案中是实施欺诈的关键工具。（参见 PSR ¶ 30（认定郭文贵“利用非营利组织聚集那些与其所谓的反中国共产党运动立场一致、且倾向于相信郭文贵关于投资与赚钱机会言论的追随者”））。\n\n郭文贵对通过精细手段（sophisticated means）和精细洗钱实施欺诈的加重情节提出异议，其原因包括事实依据“纯属推测”以及其犯罪行为“不涉及任何空壳公司”。（Guo Sub. 79-80）。郭文贵的异议不仅否认了现实，也否认了法院此前的认定：在 Wang（王雁平）的量刑听证上，法院在相关部分认定，“共谋者设立了空壳公司……并在郭文贵和王雁平的指示下，将受害者的资金转移至以不同名称开设的数百个银行账户中”。（案卷号 [Dkt.] 491 第 56 页）。该认定基于大量庭审证据，证明郭文贵利用空壳实体实施其欺诈并洗钱。（例如，Tr. 2904-05（关于郭文贵个人律师据称代表其女儿 Mei Guo [郭美] 名下的公司购买 Mahwah [马瓦] 豪宅的证言及书面证据）；并参见，例如，PSR ¶ 62（认定郭文贵和 Je [余建明] 将离岸实体持有的喜马拉雅交易所 [Himalaya Exchange] 资金转移至托管账户，并“将其包装为一笔所谓的‘贷款’，以支付郭文贵此前购买并使用的豪华游艇的费用，该游艇当时归其女儿名下的实体所有”））。除辩方的错误论点之外，该加重情节具有独立的事实依据。例如，被告人凭空捏造虚假加密货币以强化其欺诈。此类行为可合理认定为“精细”。参见 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 申请附注 9（将“精细手段”定义为“关于犯罪执行或隐瞒的特别复杂或特别精密的犯罪行为”，包括例如“通过使用虚构实体、空壳公司或离岸金融账户隐藏资产或交易，或两者兼有的行为”）。面对庭审记录，郭文贵对基于使用精细手段和精细洗钱的加重情节提出的异议并非严肃的反驳，应予以驳回。\n\n郭文贵对从至少一家金融机构获取超过 100 万美元的加重情节提出异议，理由是他因其犯罪行为“个人收到的款项并未超过 100 万美元”。（Guo Sub. 80）。该异议毫无根据。郭文贵被定罪的罪名包括第二项罪名所指控的共谋实施电信欺诈和银行欺诈。法院适用该加重情节所必需的全部条件，仅是根据优势证据“合理推定”“郭文贵在其涉及十亿美元的敲诈勒索与欺诈阴谋过程中，必然从一家或多家金融机构牟利至少 100 万美元”。United States v. Constantinescu 案，147 F.4th 299, 316 (2d Cir. 2025)。记录中充斥着此类证据。（参见，例如，PSR ¶ 55(a)（G CLUBS [G 俱乐部] 的资金“通过以其他实体名义设立的银行账户进行转移，用于支付郭文贵及其家人的个人开支，包括购买一艘价值约 260 万美元的豪华游艇”）；同上，¶ 55(b)（记述余建明利用“通过其他实体名义的银行账户转移的大约 2650 万美元 G CLUBS 资金，用于购买郭文贵位于新泽西州占地 50,000 平方英尺的豪宅”））。\n\n郭文贵对妨碍司法公正加重情节的异议基于其不准确的断言，即“没有证据支持所谓的理由”。（Guo Sub. 81）。该证据已在上文第三部分第 G 节（“妨碍司法公正”）及 PSR 第 91-97 段中详细列明。\n\n郭文贵对因作为犯罪组织者或领导者而适用的四级加重情节提出的异议，是又一次不严肃企图否认陪审团裁决事实的行为。（Guo Sub. 81（坚称郭文贵“并非任何犯罪活动的组织者或领导者”））。郭文贵被定罪的罪名之一指控郭文贵“是 G 集团的领导者并对其实施指挥”。（S3 Indictment ¶ 9）。19\n\n19 郭文贵的陈述书还包含一个列举“对 PSR 的额外异议”的补充章节，这些异议完全建立在郭文贵“不同意……陪审团裁决”的基础之上。（Guo Sub. 82-92）。郭文贵在本节中对 PSR 的大部分内容提出异议，理由是该报告“得出了郭文贵先生犯有任何罪行的结论”。（同上，第 82 页）。政府无需对完全建立在全盘否定陪审团对其有罪裁决之上的郭文贵的异议作出回应。\n\nVI. 法院应判处至少 30 年监禁\n\nA. 犯罪行为的性质、情节和严重程度理应判处长期监禁\n\n1. 郭文贵给数千名受害者造成了巨大的痛苦和折磨\n\n郭文贵给数千名受害者造成了惊人的经济损失。其受害者主要是普通公众和散户投资者，郭文贵骗取了他们维持未来生计和安全所必需的资金。欺诈案件造成的损害超过十亿美元是十分罕见的。即使发生这种情况，损失也往往源于公司不当行为，例如导致股价下跌的财务造假。而本案的天文数字损失则是由于郭文贵利用谎言从数千名受害者手中攫取资金造成的。郭文贵通过编造谎言从受害者手中夺走十亿美元，并且他督导并建立了一个大型国际组织，步步协助他实施该欺诈。\n\n虽然十亿美元的损失数额在宏观层面极其庞大，但认识到其在个体层面所造成的伤害同样重要。正如受害者在郭文贵庭审期间所陈述的那样，他们失去了退休储蓄，背负了债务，并因该欺诈而遭受深重痛苦。数百份额外的受害者陈述印证了该庭审证言：\n\n• “我没有工作，我把所有的钱都给了 Miles Guo（郭文贵）。现在，我不知道余生该如何维持生计，也不知道该如何面对我的家人。”Dkt. 832，陈述 158。\n\n• “我被迫卖掉了我们唯一的住房，我妻子退保了变现近 15 年的人寿保险投资，将所有资金投入到[被告人]的虚假项目中。这些决定对我们家庭的财务和未来的保障造成了毁灭性的打击。”Dkt. 477，陈述 1。\n\n• “我和我的家人被骗了大约 50 万美元，其中大部分来自变卖我们的住房。现在，这笔钱全部损失了。这使我们从稳定的中产阶级生活跌落到靠借债度日。”Dkt. 477，陈述 11。\n\n• “这不仅严重影响了我们家庭目前的财务安全，而且对我们的长期退休计划、子女教育以及我们生活的其他重要方面造成了重大冲击。”Dkt. 477，陈述 113。\n\n• “这起案件摧毁了我所拥有的一切——我家庭的积蓄、我们互相抚养支持的能力，甚至是我们的情感维系。我把母亲和哥哥也拉了进来，以为是在帮助他们，结果却看到我们所有人都陷入了经济破产。我孩子们的未来受到了严重影响。我曾梦想给予他们的稳定与尊严全都被粉碎了。”Dkt. 832，陈述 200。\n\n郭文贵的恶意行径所蔓延的影响超越了重大的财务灾难，它造成了彻头彻尾的毁灭：\n\n• “这场欺诈毁了我的一生。”Dkt. 832，陈述 152。\n\n• “我的精神状态极差，无法工作，我也没有钱治病。”Dkt. 477，陈述 42。\n\n• “这场骗局严重损害了我们的身心健康。我们每天都无法正常入睡，处于极度痛苦之中。现在我们几乎付不起公寓租金和我儿子的学费。”Dkt. 477，陈述 27。\n\n• “这场欺诈也击碎了我的世界观。我曾经相信世界是一个美好的地方，人们可以互相信任。现在，我不知道该信任谁，甚至连最亲近的家庭成员也不敢相信。我的偏执和情绪波动使我与挚爱之人的关系变得十分紧张。”Dkt. 477，陈述 11。\n\n• “孤独、无助和自责每分每秒都伴随着我。”Dkt. 477，陈述 37。\n\n• “自发现该欺诈行为以来，我经历了极度的焦虑、恐惧和精神崩溃。我饱受长期失眠和抑郁症的折磨，日常生活的秩序被严重打乱。此次事件造成的心理创伤深重且持久，我目前正在接受心理咨询和治疗以应对其余波。”Dkt. 832, Stmt. 210。\n\n• “它剥夺了[我母亲]大半生的积蓄——这笔500,000美元原本是为了保障我和我家庭的未来。这一损失加重了她的病情，剥夺了她晚年的平静。这场骗局利用了她的信任，毁掉了她辛勤一生建立起来的财产基业。”Dkt. 832, Stmt. 198。\n\n---\n\n• “每一天都在极度的悔恨与自责中度过，每一个夜晚都被无尽的噩梦吞噬。我真的不知道自己还能在如此沉重的阴影下支撑多久。”Dkt. 832, Stmt. 163A。\n\n• “受骗后，我们陷入了严重的经济困境，不得不削减日常开支，甚至考虑变卖资产以维持基本生活水平。更痛苦的是，这场骗局给我和我的家人造成了严重的情感创伤。我长期遭受焦虑和失眠的折磨。家庭内部的信任也遭受了严重破坏。”Dkt. 832, Stmt. 190B。\n\nGuo（郭）造成的伤害对许多人影响极深，以至于一些人考虑过自杀和自残：\no “我失去了金钱，我失去了热情，我整个人都抑郁了，我患上了重度抑郁症，每天都想自杀。”Dkt. 832, Stmt. 202。\n\n• “Guo Wengui（郭文贵）打着民主和法治的幌子欺骗并侮辱了我们的信仰。我感到非常痛苦，以至于多次想过自杀。这对我以及我的家人来说是一场彻底的噩梦。这不是一场单纯的骗局，而是一种洗脑。他们鼓励追随者骚扰法官，攻击反对Miles Guo（郭文贵）的人。”Dkt. 477, Stmt. 59。\n\n• “这场欺诈让我感到无助和绝望，甚至一度导致我想过自杀。这场骗局给我和我的家人造成的伤害是终生且无法弥补的。”Dkt. 477, Stmt. 85。\n\n• 庭审笔录（Trial Tr.）第1531-32页（Ya Li（李亚）作证称，在发现郭的运动是一场骗局后，她感到“非常愤怒、绝望，我感到内疚，我感到后悔，我非常沮丧，我想过——想过自杀”）。\n\n• “物质上的损失是毁灭性的——我们几乎失去了一切。但心理上的崩溃更为深重。我围绕真理、同情心和社群所建立的整个道德指南针被操纵并粉碎了。我曾经盲目信任。当真相无可辩驳时，我被羞耻、内疚和绝望所淹没。我饱受反复出现的自杀念头的折磨。我失去了活下去、怀抱希望以及再次相信任何事物的意愿。”Dkt. 832, Stmt. 200。\n\n除了为量刑提交的200多份陈述外，FBI（联邦调查局）还询问了数十名受害者，他们讲述了自己所遭受的有时令人极度痛苦的损失——但由于害怕遭到郭及其残余支持者的报复，许多人仍不敢公开表态。本案中的受害者是听信了郭的计划在宣传推广中所使用的误导性方式——即作为暴富的绝佳机会——的个人。郭明知那是\n\n---\n\n一个巨大的谎言（或者更确切地说，是一连串的谎言）。事实上，郭本人声称亲自担保他的受害者都不会遭受损失，他们的资金是安全的，而且他绝不会将资金挪作私用。但他明知这些说法全属谎言，因为他挪用了受害者的资金，并诱骗他们将越来越多的积蓄投入其中。（参见 Tr. 279, 2430, 1177）。\n郭犯罪行为的严重性还可以从该计划的地理覆盖范围中得到体现，该计划名副其实地席卷了全球。在地球的几乎每一个角落以及美国各地都可以找到受害者。欺诈的运作也具有全球规模，公司、实体和银行账户分布在包括British Virgin Islands（英属维尔京群岛）、Australia（澳大利亚）、Switzerland（瑞士）、United Arab Emirates（阿拉伯联合酋长国）和Kyrgyzstan（吉尔吉斯斯坦）等一系列司法管辖区。\n2. 郭领导了一场长达五年的欺诈计划，并连续试图逃避和妨碍司法\nG Enterprise（G集团）是一个由欺诈性招揽、收款、洗钱和支出构成的庞大、蔓延且复杂的体系。（参见量刑前报告［PSR］第24段（认定其“通过一系列复杂的、主要由欺诈性和虚构性业务及投资机会组成的网络进行运作，这些业务和机会连接了数十个相互关联的实体”））。但郭是其冠名人——也是其唯一且不可或缺的领导者。正如本法院所认定的那样——也是郭自己带有片面视角的事件叙述的开篇所述——G集团“[依]赖于郭庞大的网络影响力”。（Dkt. 491第55页）。他的量刑意见书对此表示认同，其中描述了郭如何“积累了庞大的社交媒体追随者群体，有时拥有数十万甚至超过一百万的追随者。数百万海外华人……在郭传递的信息中找到了共鸣。”（Guo Sub. 13）。虽然郭的集团由其多名亲信提供协助（参见PSR第31-32段（将Je（余建明）描述为G集团的“财务设计师”，将Wang（王雁平）描述为郭名副其实的“幕僚长”）），但正如本法院所指出的，始终是Miles Guo“拥有最终决定权”。（Dkt. 491第57页）。简而言之，没有Miles Guo，就不可能有GTV，不可能有G|CLUBS，不可能有G Coin（后来成为H Coin）——不可能有\n\n---\n\nG集团。正如一名受害者所言，郭“每天都有视频”。（Tr. 4616）。同一名受害者的经历在另一层面也极具代表性：郭不仅是追随者电脑和电视屏幕上的一个人物，每天从他的GTV演播室直播数小时。（参见 Tr. 1330（Ya Li作证称她“每天”都观看郭的“所有”视频））。郭还与数十甚至数百名受害者保持着个人联系——对于大规模欺诈的领导者和组织者来说，这是一种不同寻常的亲密程度。Ya Li作证称，通过郭的每日直播成为其追随者后，她和另一名支持者向郭发送了一张她为郭制作的生日蛋糕的照片——不久后便被拉入了一个有郭本人在内的WhatsApp群聊。（Tr. 1331-32）。受害者Wei Chen（陈薇）作证称，郭通过WhatsApp聊天亲自与她的家人沟通，在聊天中他“向我丈夫发送了GTV的投资信息，包括汇款指令”。（Tr. 4689）。\n郭掌控着亲信对他的效忠，并赢得追随者的敬畏与尊重。他的幕僚长Wang称郭为“校监（the Principal）”。（Tr. 426）。G集团的一名安保主管仅称他为“P”，即该层级顶端同一头衔的简称。（Tr. 5484）。“很多人”直截了当地称他为“老板（Boss）”。（Tr. 5484；亦参见同前，第421页）。该集团的收益也相应地进行了分配。诚然，郭并非唯一从G集团的欺诈收益中获利的人。但他将绝大部分非法所得据为己有并供其直系亲属享用。虽然Je“将至少1000万美元的欺诈收益转入了他及其配偶的个人银行账户”（PSR第28段），但郭将剩余的“大约超过3亿美元的欺诈计划收益据为己有并用于其家人的利益”。（PSR第28段）。就其本身而言，G集团的幕僚长Wang所获得的回报要少得多：六位数的现金薪水，以及郭声称拥有的加密货币的权益，其辩护律师后来承认该加密货币“毫无价值且缺乏流动性”。（PSR第28段及注2）。\n\n---\n\n在支持者中，郭助长了个人崇拜的形成。一名受害者作证称，“我们以前都叫Miles Guo‘七哥’”或Brother Seven，并解释称New Federal State of China（新中国联邦）的七角星旗帜是“一面代表……Miles、代表七的旗帜”。（Tr. 223）。反过来，郭通过向他称为“铁血组（the Iron Blood group）”的一小批狂热追随者授予头衔，允许他人以某种方式进入他的个人崇拜体系。（Tr. 196）。这些人是“由Miles挑选出来并授予头衔的个人……Miles Guo说，这些人是兄弟，因为这些兄弟愿意为他牺牲，愿意与他一起为这场运动流血。”（同前，第196-97页；亦参见 Tr. 1315（郭称铁血组负责人Ya Li为“妹妹”））。\n当获得接见机会的受害者提出疑问或表达批评时，郭便会做出一副攻击其不忠并将他们踢出支持者群体的姿态。（参见，例如，Tr. 1199-1200, 1214（Jenny Li（李珍妮）作证称，当一名投资者在Discord“语音会议”上向郭要求退款时，郭对所有人说“如果你再要求退款，你就会被踢出去”））。他组织了针对其批评者的抗议活动。（参见，例如，Tr. 1195）。当受害者要求退还其虚假投资款项时，郭会依靠其他支持者——包括铁血组——在郭亲自决定是否退款前对这些请求进行审查。Ya Li解释说，他的决定“取决于支持者的态度”：“如果态度正常，我们会给他们退款。如果——如果支持者公开批评他或批评——批评新中国联邦，那么我们就不退款。”（Tr. 1409-10）。\n郭对G集团亲自且密切的领导，极大地加重了其在勒索敲诈和欺诈定罪中的可受谴责性。他对自己非凡领导力光环的培植，是该犯罪计划的关键犯罪工具。参见 United States v. Raniere, No. 18 Cr. 204 (NGG), Dkt. 966 (Court’s Sent’g Mem.) at 10-11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2020)（描述了一家欺诈组织的极具个人魅力的创始人所具有的独特\n\n---\n\n可受谴责性，该创始人“让该团体的成员称他为‘先锋（The Vanguard）’”，并通过包括他“创立”的高层支持者“秘密会社”在内的其他代理人实施控制）。\n除了操纵其追随者外，郭还操纵美国法院并妨碍司法，以保护和延续其骗局。这一行为在上述第三部分G节中有详细描述。它包括将欺诈收益转移至美国当局管辖范围之外；组织并资助针对批评者和持不同政见的前支持者的抗议活动；提起破产程序以逃避New York（纽约）法院的判决，并将该程序变成企图保护其非法所得的工具；将破产程序受托人及其家人的住所和工作场所作为骚扰目标；亲自指示一名核心支持者拒绝遵守破产传票，随后派其一名律师告知该支持者提交虚假宣誓书；并在其被捕后通过其亲信继续实施这些行为，例如指示追随者从电子设备中删除证据。参见前文第三部分G节。郭“企图压制批评者并维持对其犯罪集团控制的企图”，包括通过“一再妨碍司法并表现出对法治的漠视”，凸显了判处重刑的必要性。Raniere, Dkt. 966 at 17；亦参见同前（引用被告在受害者“开始公开发声”时“试图压制”受害者作为典型示例）。\n3. 郭利用了一个群体的诉求进行侵害\n除了加剧了受害者深重的经济和生理痛苦之外，本案中存在的一个法定量重情节是，郭利用了一个特定群体的希望和诉求进行侵害——他对寻求推动中国民主化的海外华人实施了族群欺诈（affinity fraud）。20（参见\n\n20 “‘族群欺诈’[是指]‘针对某个可识别群体的成员实施的证券和投资欺诈，由该群体内的成员或声称渴望帮助该群体成员的人所实施’。”United States v. Hawkins, 796 F.3d 843, 853 (8th Cir. 2015)（引自 Lisa M. Fairfax,\n\n---\n\n庭审记录（Tr.）1355（Ya Li（李亚）解释称，她之所以相信郭文贵在直播中关于投资的说法，是因为在对抗CCP（中国共产党）方面她“已经追随Miles Guo（郭文贵）三年了”，“所以我信任他，信任他的一切”）；Tr. 1367（Ya Li在签字前甚至没有阅读投资文件，“因为[她]百分之百信任郭文贵”）。正如一名受害者所言：“郭文贵不仅在经济上欺骗了我们，还利用了我们对民主和自由的理想。他声称自己是争取中国民主自由的斗士，但实际上，他利用这个谎言欺骗了那些真正关心中国未来的人。”Dkt. 832，陈述170。郭文贵的行为造成的打击甚至超过了一般的严重金融犯罪，因为郭文贵依赖于“一种完全不同的说服人们交出钱财的方式，因为他们深切期望中国具有压迫性的政治制度能够受到挑战并可能发生改变。这与单纯想要让自己的钱翻倍的动机截然不同。”Dkt. 491第34-35页（法院在对Yanping Wang（王雁平）量刑时的评述）。\n\n郭文贵不仅利用了成千上万人的希望，仅仅是为了让自己能够过上极度奢靡的生活，他还（虚假地）将自己塑造成一场被他严重破坏的运动的英雄和“自由斗士”：\n\n• “郭文贵和王雁平的犯罪行为严重损害了中国人的声誉，并对中国个人未来反抗中共暴政的努力造成了无法弥补的伤害。郭文贵和王雁平实际上是真正的共产党人。”Dkt. 832，陈述153。\n\n• “尽管他大声宣称自己的目标是打倒中共，但他实际上通过败坏他声称支持的事业的名声，为中共的利益服务。通过背叛我们——这些真正坚信终结中共暴政的人——他玷污了反抗中共本身的斗争。现在，每当有人听说反对中共的努力时，他们都可能质疑这是否只是另一场骗局。”Dkt. 832，陈述157。\n\n《“有这样的朋友……”：针对基于信任的证券与投资欺诈寻求更有效的应对》（“With Friends Like These ...”: Toward a More Efficacious Response to Affinity–Based Securities and Investment Fraud），载于《佐治亚法律评论》（36 Ga. L Rev. 63, 70 (2001)）。\n\n---\n\n• “他们的行为不仅仅是偷钱；他们摧毁了无数个人的信仰和善意，破坏了真正追求民主的人士之间的团结与信任。这种背叛带来的痛苦远远超过了金钱上的损失。”Dkt. 832，陈述203。\n\n郭文贵的行为表明，他将宣扬亲民主理想作为诱饵。郭文贵通过声称为实现民主中国的崇高目标而代表受害者进行斗争来吸引他们，但他却收取了他们的钱财，并极度挥霍在自己及其家人身上。郭文贵通过建立一个从真正渴望民主中国的人那里吸取资金的欺诈帝国，损害了他声称支持的亲民主运动。法院在去年对王雁平的量刑听证会上也指出了这一点，承认“无论在中国境内还是其他地方，都有许多中国人对中国政府怀有强烈的反对情绪，他们支持改变，支持民主，并受到郭先生传递的信息的鼓舞，而这是他们将钱财交给这个欺诈计划的重要原因。”（Dkt. 491第34页）。法院认识到，郭文贵利用了受害者“对中国政治制度……将被改变并可能受到挑战的如此深切的希望”，并将其用作“一种说服人们交出钱财的方式”。（同上）。\n\n事实上，就连郭文贵所谓为了在中国促进民主而采取的行动，也表明了他的自私以及对建立个人崇拜的专注。他制作了自我吹嘘的视频，展示自己说唱、跳舞、驾驶豪车以及乘坐昂贵游艇航行：\n\n（参见，例如，政府证据（GX）C281-V；GX C370；GX C322-V6）。\n\nGX C281-V尤为引人注目。这是一支时长约四分钟、题为《英雄》（“Hero”）的音乐视频，郭文贵在其中的每一帧画面中都出现了。在《英雄》中，郭文贵有时身穿带有流苏的皮大衣跳舞，周围有精心编排的伴舞人员，背景是私人飞机、豪华轿车，有时他还手持光剑。摄影角度、剪辑和歌词将郭文贵描绘为\n\n---\n\n圣徒统治集团的领袖。《英雄》视频中的自我吹捧与郭文贵向其支持者灌输的神话如出一辙——即他是被选中来推进他们事业的“七哥”。该神话之所以奏效，是因为郭文贵掠夺了一群遭到压迫政权伤害且志同道合的人。但郭文贵的行为并没有帮助他的追随者。事实上，除了《英雄》中几句口头敷衍的“消灭中共”之外，该音乐视频——就像郭文贵所有的视频和直播一样——只是在推销他自己。（另见Tr. 1508（Ya Li证词）（“问：李女士，在您看来，购买数百万美元的房子，价值2600万美元的豪宅，有助于打击中共吗？答：没有。问：在您看来，购买一辆红色兰博基尼有助于打击中共吗？答：没有。”（异议略））。21\n\n郭文贵欺骗并盗窃了那些被他称为反抗中共的“兄弟姐妹”和“战友”的人。郭文贵非但没有将他们视为家人或同志，反而欺骗并掠夺了那些寻求在中国促进民主的人。尽管郭文贵高调宣称，但实际上，他及其犯罪企业的行为推进的是郭文贵的个人财富，而非中国的自由事业。事实上，通过掠夺该运动的追随者，郭文贵通过散播不信任并将潜在的资金转移到自己的腰包中，阻碍了反共事业的进展。\n\n4. 中共的行为与郭文贵的定罪无关\n\n郭文贵并没有为其多年来的欺诈行为承担任何责任，其量刑备忘录中约有25%的内容在叙述郭文贵声称中共对他实施的各种行动。即使这一切都是真的，也不能成为郭文贵犯罪行为的借口。正如郭文贵聘请的“猎狐”（Fox Hunt）专家Paul Doran（保罗·多兰）在庭审中明确指出的那样，中共的活动，包括\n\n21 布加迪、兰博基尼或35,000美元的床垫也不能保护一个人免受中共活动的侵害。（Tr. 5145-46（Doran证词））。\n\n---\n\n“猎狐行动”（Operation Fox Hunt），“与郭文贵推销的商业投资机会毫无关系”。（Tr. 5190）。正如Doran进一步认同的那样，被“中共列为目标……并不赋予[某人]通过‘在网上作出虚假承诺’来筹集资金的许可”。（Tr. 5142）。中共的行动与成千上万的人是否遭到郭文贵及其企业的侵害无关，也不能成为法院减轻郭文贵理应受到的严厉惩罚的理由。（参见，例如，Tr. 1534-35（Ya Li证词）22；2429-30（Minran Wu（吴敏然）证词）23）。\n\n诚然，政府方承认在2017年至2018年期间，PRC（中华人民共和国）采取了某些针对被告人的行为。见被告方证据约定（DX STIP）1。但是，无论中国官员在2017年是否出资雇人抗议郭文贵，或者是否试图将他遣返以就他在中国被指控的犯罪行为接受追责，都不能为其对受害者实施的极其严重、公然且数额巨大的金融欺诈开脱。无论中共的针对行动可能具有何种酌定从轻情节的价值，与郭文贵长达数年的犯罪行为的巨大严重性相比，都显得微不足道：令人发指的自我敛财、骚扰他人、妨碍司法\n\n22 “问：如果他被中共列为目标是真的，这会改变您对郭文贵运动的看法吗？答：没有改变。问：如果他被中共列为目标是真的，这会改变您对他的投资项目的看法吗？答：没有改变。问：李女士，为什么没有改变您的看法？答：即使被中共列为目标，也不意味着你可以骗取人们的钱财。我也被中共列为目标。我不会骗取任何人的钱财。那是错的。问：李女士，您是如何被中共列为目标的？答：我——我在中国的父母，中共警察给他们打电话，让他们转告我停止我正在做的事情，因为我的活动威胁到了国家安全；他们还打电话给我父母和其他亲戚试图找到我，问他们我是否回到了中国，他们如何联系我；我父母告诉我不要回中国，他们会逮捕我，但我是独生女。问：李女士，在被中共列为目标后，您把支持者的钱花在自己身上了吗？答：没有。问：您把投资者的钱花在自己身上了吗？答：没有。问：为什么没有？答：因为那不是我的钱。那是投资款，是支持者的钱。这些钱应该用来对抗中共，而不是给我自己用的。”\n23 “问：吴女士，如果郭文贵被中共列为目标是真的，这会改变您对这些投资项目的看法吗？答：不会。问：这会改变您对这场运动的看法吗？答：不会。问：为什么没有改变您的看法？答：这场运动就是一个骗局。我认为这与中共没有任何关系。此外，如果有人反共，并不意味着这个人就可以去诈骗别人。那是两码事。你不能利用这种反共来做违法的事情。”\n\n---\n\n系统，以及他对成千上万的人实施的肆无忌惮的欺诈，以便为自己购买价值百万美元的水晶吊灯并让自己沉浸在奢华之中。\n\n事实上，记录显示，郭文贵本人对反对他的人使用了类似中共的手段。（对比Tr. 5149（Doran证词）（“问：那么站在某人的家门外拍摄他们，无论是偷偷拍摄还是公然拍摄，都是中共的手段，对吗？答：是的。问：特别是如果你在他们的工作地点和家中都这么做，对吗？”）；与Tr. 4221（Copeland（科普兰）证词）（描述郭文贵的追随者实施的骚扰，他们“会在我们家门外进行直播，所以这是我们一直想把百叶窗拉上的一个重要原因，因为他们会类似于对我们进行录像。如果不拉上，他们就会录下我们在家中走动的画面”））。而且正是郭文贵建立了自己的个人崇拜，像中共一样攻击批评者。24 郭文贵援引自己施加于受害者身上的同类行为来请求本法院予以宽大处理，这是极其虚伪的。\n\n最后，郭文贵请求法院考虑其所声称的个人履历，这也是他向受害者灌输的同一套神话：卑微的出身、家庭创伤（在中共手中遭受）、郭文贵自述的对天安门广场抗议活动的支持、政治监禁、无法解释的房地产财务成功，随后紧接着是“爆料”、拘留、\n\n24 参见Tr. 5168（Doran承认“在中国宣扬这种个人崇拜的方式之一是，如果中国人民表达了与习近平主席相反的观点，他们就会遭到报复。问：人们批评领导人，就会遭到报复，对吗？答：是的。问：这些都是中国共产党的规则，对吗？答：是的。”）；Tr. 1410（Ya Li证词）（“问：李女士，喜马拉雅农场的规则和意识形态是什么？答：……必须支持郭文贵，支持喜马拉雅联盟，不能公开批评郭文贵和批评新中国联邦。”）；Tr. 1489（Ya Li证词）（“黑名单是农场的成员，如果他们开始发布、批评联盟或新中国联邦或郭文贵，他们就会变成中共分子和叛徒，所以他们的名字就会进入黑名单。问：黑名单上的一些人遭遇了什么？答：他们的一些个人信息会被发布在网上。问：这些个人信息从何而来？答：来自郭文贵。（异议略））。\n\n---\n\n逃往香港、移民美国，以及发起其所谓的反共活动。（Guo Sub. 5-15）。被告量刑陈述书中的这些页码均源自郭向缓刑监督局（Probation Office）所作的陈述。25 法庭无需去查明郭的成长经历、自称的政治监禁及其“神话”背后的真相，因为这些对于作出适当的量刑而言均无关紧要。但是，可以说，法庭不应重视一个死不悔改的惯常撒谎者所说的话，此人利用这套相同的“传奇”个人历史作为武器，对成千上万无辜受害者进行洗脑和洗劫。\n\n5. 郭非同寻常的个人暴富\n\n正如上文所述，郭从其主导的大规模、长达数年的计划中获取了巨额利益，而这是以他人重大且毁灭性的代价为代价的。他毁掉了那些相信他能将其从压迫性共产主义政权中解救出来的人们的生活，只为了让他能购买价值超过 $700,000 的定制 Brioni（布里奥尼）西服（GX CT201）；让他能开着一辆 Lamborghini（兰博基尼）四处闲逛（GX CT38；Tr. 143），并为其儿子购买一辆价值 $4 million 的 Ferrari（法拉利）（见 Tr. 1873-1885）；让他能睡在 $35,000 的床垫上（见 Tr. 3914-16；GX BUCK375）；以及让他能穿梭于其价值 $69 million 的 Manhattan（曼哈顿）顶层公寓、其 Greenwich（格林威治）庄园（GX CT133）与其价值 $26.5 million 的 New Jersey（新泽西）豪宅（GX NJ134）之间。\n\n正如庭审中所展示的，郭炫耀其巨额财富，并且事实上利用这些财富来推销并实施其欺诈计划。郭在社交媒体上公开宣布并大肆宣传法治慈善机构，包括在视频中声称他将亲自用自己的 $100 million 财富资助这些慈善机构。\n\n25 缓刑部门还依据了一封据称由郭的妻子提交的信件。（PSR ¶ 140）。缓刑部门在准备 PSR 时并未对其进行访谈。此外，缓刑部门“试图与被告的女儿 Mei Guo（郭美）进行旁证电话访谈；然而，提供的联系电话似乎现已停机，通话未能完成。”\n\n---\n\n（GX VI 192；Tr. 694-95）。郭的受害者在庭审中作证称，他们对郭的印象是一个“非常富有”的人。（例如，见 Tr. 191-92（Le Zhou（周乐））；Tr. 692-93（Patrick Chin，指出郭的“豪华公寓、游艇和汽车”）；Tr. 2372（Minran Wu，作证称郭说自己是一个“有钱的、非常有钱的亿万富翁”））。Wei Chen 作证称，郭对其惊人财富的描绘在促成她决定投资 GTV 私募方面“起到了关键影响”，因为这让她“相信他是一个有钱人并且拥有资源”。（Tr. 4468-71）。Ya Li 作证称，郭在正被列入中国“富豪榜”的中国亿万富翁，她对郭巨额财富的了解使她相信自己在郭的欺诈工具中的投资是安全的，因为郭有能力偿还投资者的任何损失。（Tr. 1330, 1347-48）。\n\n郭利用惊人的欺诈所得资助其极其奢华的生活方式——甚至在申请破产之后——同时向受害者虚假声称这些采购是为了他正盗取其资金的追随者的利益，包括 G|CLUBS 会员和 Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）投资者。（Tr. 3081, 3266-67）。\n\n正如本法院在庭审期间向辩护律师所指出的，郭“出现在大量奢侈场景的视频中”，并且正是“郭把自己放在兰博基尼和飞机旁，以及摆满镀金物品的起居室中”。（Tr. 1363-64）。他过着极度奢靡的生活，同时剥夺了受害者的生计和安全。例如，郭用 G|CLUBS 会员的钱购买了他的兰博基尼（见 GX Z26 第 25 页；Tr. 3072），并且他在《H Coin to the Moon》音乐视频中驾驶该兰博基尼（GX 370-V），他在其中宣传了喜马拉雅交易所的推出（亦见 GX C370, GX Z9 第 140 页）：\n\n---\n\n2023年3月15日，当郭在其位于 Connecticut（康涅狄格州）格林威治的家中被捕时，FBI（联邦调查局）在其车库内查获了那辆兰博基尼：\n\n（GX CT38）。郭用欺诈所得购买了其位于 New Jersey（新泽西州）Mahwah（马瓦）价值 $26.5 million 的豪宅，并额外花费了 $14 million 的欺诈所得，按照其精确的规格和愿望翻修和定制了该豪宅。（例如，见 Tr. 1510-11, 3893-94）。\n\n---\n\n正如上文所述，郭将其用于运作其诈骗企业的空壳游戏延伸到了对其个人资产的处理上，包括他的名牌汽车和他的豪宅。他将马瓦豪宅登记在 Taurus Fund 名下，而该基金在郭的保镖 Scott Barnett 不知情的情况下被登记在其名下（Tr. 5452-53）；他将其位于 Sherry-Netherland（雪莉-尼德兰）的顶层公寓登记在其儿子所有的 Genever Holdings LLC 名下（Tr. 4043-44）；他将下方所示的康涅狄格州格林威治住宅登记在其家族办公室 Greenwich Land LLC 名下，其唯一成员是他的妻子（Tr. 4043）；他将其红色兰博基尼登记在他女儿的男友 Defeng Cao（曹德丰）名下（Tr. 5435-36, 5528）；对他所有的资产依此类推。\n\n（GX 133）。郭死不悔改地将数千万美元欺诈所得用于个人用途——这些钱曾被他引导受害者相信会被用于为他们投资，或用于推进他们所选择的\n\n---\n\n事业——这表明郭出于贪婪而行动，并且是被其对无限财富永不满足的自私渴望所驱使去欺诈其受害者的。\n\nB.   必须进行特别威慑并保护公众\n\n根据 Section 3553(a)，必须考虑量刑“保护公众免受被告进一步犯罪侵害”以及“对犯罪行为提供充分威慑”的必要性。18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C)。有必要判处严厉且漫长的刑期，以保护公众并满足一般威慑和特别威慑的需求。\n\n首先，郭的行为表现出对 United States（美国）法律完全彻底的蔑视，尽管他选择移民到这个国家并在其法律制度下寻求庇护。他持续的犯罪和妨碍司法的行为表明，无论是民事制裁，还是刑事或民事处罚的威胁或施加，都未能阻止他运作一场伤害了数千人的庞大全球欺诈。事实上，只有漫长的监禁刑期才能尝试保护公众免受郭的侵害。郭所构成的威胁尤其有害，因为其欺诈的范围如此之广、形式如此多样，而且因为郭在逍遥法外时不断调整其犯罪手法以挫败刑事和民事监管机构。\n\n在2020年4月成立了欺诈性的所谓双慈善机构（Rule of Law Society（法治社会）和 Rule of Law Foundation（法治基金会））之后，郭的企业募集了与 GTV 股票欺诈性发行相关的资金。鉴于此次发行未向 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）注册，投资者必须满足一系列要求以确保其具备参与资格。郭等人蔑视这些要求，并通过 Voice of Guo（即 VOG，正如庭审中所述，由前凤凰农场负责人 Sara Wei 在郭的指示下运营的公司）等工具从不合格投资者处汇集受害者的资金。SEC 调查了此次发行，制止了该发行，并最终达成了一项协议，据此\n\n---\n\n筹集到的资金（在未被非法使用的范围内）将重新分配给投资者。（GX STIP19）。当然，郭的企业在 GTV 私募中筹集的资金中有 $100 million 并不是用于 GTV——而是用于郭及其家族。26\n\n在郭的行为引起监管关注之后——在 SEC 要求郭和 GTV 缴出其收取的资金（除了在 HHKOF 投资中损失的 $30 million 受害者资金外）之后——郭的阴谋集团作出了调整。这一次，郭使用“农场贷款”（Farm Loans）——而不是直接出售股票——来出售 GTV 的股份。这笔资金在被输送回郭的家族之前，流经了一个由复杂货币交易构成的网络。随后郭再次改变策略。此时他打着 G|CLUBS “会员”的幌子出售 GTV（以及其他与郭关联的实体）的股份。但 G|CLUBS 的资金并没有用于资助一家媒体公司，甚至没有用于资助任何真正的会员福利。相反，G|CLUBS 的资金被用于为郭氏家族购买奢侈资产、豪车以及真正的豪宅。G|CLUBS 进一步试图通过一名傀儡 CEO 来掩盖其犯罪性质，而郭的同案被告 Yvette Wang（王雁平）则担任其实际 CEO。当郭的 G|CLUBS 和更广泛的企业遭遇银行业务困难时，郭及其追随者策划了又一个解决方案：一种名为 H-Coin 和 H-Dollar 的虚假加密货币。为了服务于这些虚假加密货币，郭和 William Je（余建明）推销了喜马拉雅交易所，该交易所既作为欺诈计划，又作为洗钱运作，旨在将受害者的资金吸引到郭和 G 企业完全控制的“加密货币”中。\n\n2022年夏季，政府向 G|CLUBS 发出了刑事大陪审团传票，并在2022年9月和10月，美国政府从 G\n\n26 Wang Plea Tr. at 25-26（“在2020年6月左右，我受到他人的指示，从纽约的一个银行账户电汇了约 100 million 美元到德克萨斯州的一家对冲基金 Hayman Capital Management。我知道这些资金是从 GTV 发行中的投资者处收到的。……我知道我所做的是错误的。”）\n\n---\n\n企业扣押了 $630 million，包括从与喜马拉雅交易所相关的账户中扣押的数亿美元。郭的企业没有被劝阻停止犯罪活动，而是再次作出了调整；这一次，郭发起了“A10”和“A15”计划，通过声称出售 Gettr、G|CLUBS 以及其他与郭关联实体的股票来募集资金。不同之处在于，这笔资金这一次将被转移至中东，以使其脱离美国政府的管辖范围。\n\n郭调整其犯罪计划以逃避民事执法以及刑事执法威胁的能力清楚地表明，必须判处极长刑期的监禁以保护公众，并对郭未来的犯罪行为产生特别威慑。\n\n其次，这里的再犯风险十分严峻，因为郭继续声称自己没有做错任何事。他甚至没有向法庭假装自己会改过自新——他实际上承认了自己将继续做同样的事情。27 法庭应当作出这样的认定，因为郭完全是由过奢华生活和自我宣传的欲望所驱使的。他被迫去追求物质财富，而不顾诚信或后果。这种执念不会改变，并且构成了一种不可接受的风险，即他一旦从监狱获释，其犯罪行为仍将继续。事实上，作为一名寻求庇护的移民，郭在处于美国\n\n27 此外，以往的欺诈定罪不一定会对未来的定罪起到威慑作用，本司法管辖区内初次犯下欺诈罪的被告人成为累犯的数量就证明了这一点。例如，见 United States v. Jonathan Ghertler, No. 23 Cr. 100 (ER)（在十多次前科之后实施的投资欺诈计划）；United States v. Franklin Ray, No. 22 Cr. 228 (AT)（在因银行欺诈和电汇欺诈服刑两年后策划庞氏骗局）；United States v. Vitaly Borker, No. 22 Cr. 273 (JSR)（被告因运营欺诈性眼镜网站被判犯有电汇欺诈罪，此前曾因同样行为获得两次联邦定罪）；United States v. Joseph Meli, No. 19 Cr. 480 (RA)（被告在此前因百老汇门票转售投资欺诈计划服刑 78 个月后，又因参与同一计划被定罪）；United States v. Edward Durante, No. 15 Cr. 171 (ALC)（在因欺诈服刑 121 个月期间开始了一项新的投资欺诈计划）；United States v. John Galanis, No. 15 Cr. 643 (PKC)（被告在1973年和1988年因邮件欺诈和证券欺诈被定罪后，又被判犯有证券欺诈罪）。\n\n---\n\n州。显然，这种动机根本无关紧要。参见 Raniere 案，Dkt. 966，第 16-17 页（“归根结底，[被告]毫无悔意，加之他认为自己被定罪的行为实际上是‘高尚的’，这强烈表明有必要对其处以重刑。”）。郭从未对自己的所作所为承担过责任。他从未表现出承认自己犯有欺诈和欺骗罪责的意愿，也未对自己的行为流露出丝毫悔意。郭毫无顾忌、逍遥法外地撒谎、混淆视听、妨碍司法、操纵他人和进行骚扰。尽管在审判中已被定罪，郭仍向 Probation Office（缓刑监督局）坚称“自己在起诉书所列的所有罪名项上都是无辜的”。（PSR ¶ 111）。他“不同意”陪审团的裁决。（Guo Sub. 第 82 页）。在郭看来，正如 Nxivm 创始人 Keith Raniere（基思·拉尼尔）案中的情况一样，“站出来发声的勇敢受害者……都是骗子”，并且“尽管发生了一切，尽管有无数受害者控诉他们所承受的巨大痛苦，[他]依然无动于衷。事实上，他坚称自己无罪。”Raniere 案，Dkt. 966，第 16 页。\n\n郭声称对其起诉在某种程度上出于政治动机，这一冒犯性的说法经不起丝毫推敲，不过是他企图将自己塑造成受害者而非作恶者的又一次昭然若揭的尝试。（参见 Guo Sub. 第 32-33 页）。对郭的刑事调查始于 2020 年 7 月，与 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）对上月已结束募资的 GTV Private Placement（GTV 私募）的调查同步进行。启动该项调查的决定与政治毫无关系。郭与 Steve Bannon（史蒂夫·班农）的关系并非“构成此次起诉的关键要素”。（Guo Sub. 第 25 页）。相反，构成此次起诉的关键要素是郭通过一次又一次的欺诈从无辜受害者手中窃取的数十亿美元。为了转移法院和公众对其犯罪实际证据的注意力，郭不顾一切地企图炮制有关本案的阴谋论。（Guo Sub. 第 32 页）。但这些转移视线的伎俩和政治因素，都与针对郭及其同谋通过郭复杂的欺诈、洗钱和敲诈勒索企业所犯罪行的调查与起诉无关，也与在本院主持的审判中由不偏不倚的陪审团作出的裁决无关。\n\n在评估特别威慑和保护公众时，法院应重点考量被告从未对其真正令人震惊且公然的欺诈行为承担过责任。但郭对责任的拒绝甚至不仅于此。被告有权声称自己无罪，但郭走得更远：他虚假地宣称自己是受害者。他企图诋毁将他绳之以法的法治。这种愤慨不服，加之郭对本案起诉不当的毫无根据的暗示，理应受到严厉判决。参见，例如 Raniere 案，Dkt. 966，第 16 页（“更糟糕的是，[被告]及其辩护律师……正在开展公关活动，以质疑司法系统和陪审团裁决的公正性。”）。\n\n第三，或许最令人不安的是，在郭被监禁的三年里，郭及其企业仍在继续从事犯罪活动。在被捕和羁押后，郭继续指挥其企业迁往 United Arab Emirates（阿联酋，UAE），脱离美国执法部门的管辖范围。（PSR ¶¶ 103-105）。持续关注郭及其剩余追随者在线言论的受害者进一步说明了郭如何继续运营其企业，并利用其压制受害者使其不敢发声反对他：\n\n• “据 New Federal State of China（新中国联邦，NFSC）秘书长 Yue Zhou（周跃）在每周五的‘相约星期五’节目中称，他和其余几名核心成员每周都会探视 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵）。NFSC 目前执行的许多指令都经过了 Kwok 的批准。”Dkt. 832，Stmt. 214。\n\n• “尽管郭文贵被捕，该诈骗集团仍未被瓦解。与其相关的农场仍在运作，郭文贵仍在狱中指挥成员，指示他们继续诈骗和威胁受害者。此外，诈骗团伙成员潜伏在不同国家，仍在继续进行诈骗、洗钱和掩盖罪行。”Dkt. 832，Stmt. 188。\n\n• “郭文贵竟直接在狱中继续策划新的诈骗活动，我对此深感震惊和失望。”Dkt. 832，Stmt. 183B。\n\n• “在 MDC（大都会拘留中心）羁押期间，他继续指挥 NFSC 组织，通过 Gettr（盖特）直播散布虚假信息，宣传‘郭将被无罪释放’和‘美国司法受中共控制’等虚假叙事。他积极推广包括 TDCCP 和 MEME 代币在内的新欺诈骗局，导致新的受害者出现。”Dkt. 832，Stmt. 213。\n\n• “即便在羁押期间，他仍在继续行骗，创建了一种名为 TDCCP 的所谓数字货币，骗取了更多人。他所获取的资金正被用于支付律师费和其他开支。”Dkt. 832，Stmt. 180。\n\n• “郭完全没有表现出任何悔意。相反，他和他的团伙继续攻击受害者、散布谎言，甚至企图强迫受害者撰写声明以帮助他逃避惩罚。他近期的行为已极其清楚地表明，他自认为可以凌驾于法律之上。”Dkt. 832，Stmt. 184。\n\n郭持续进行的犯罪活动与其显而易见的信念相一致，即他认为社会法律对他不适用。郭妨碍法庭审理程序的显著行为模式充分证明了这一点（参见 Dkt. 51 第 7-10 页（本院列举的被告妨碍司法的实例）），包括本次诉讼程序，这提供了更多理由令人怀疑郭是否会尊重本院的判决、寻求改造或愿意遵守法律。（参见 Dkt. 51 第 11 页（“被告在以往案件中的妨碍行为史及其在本案中的行为表明，如果将其释放，他很可能会继续这种行为模式。”））。\n\n最后，辩方大肆声称某些个人否认自己的“受害者”身份。（Guo Sub. 46 – 51）。但辩方忽视了这一事实的重要意义。Miles Guo（郭文贵）成功说服许多人相信他们不是他的受害者，这一事实恰恰凸显了郭继续对社会构成的危险。无论辩方如何主张，政府在审判中已排除合理怀疑地证明了郭明知且故意诈骗了数千人。郭意图犯罪，并实施了数年之久。郭是一个极有天赋的骗子，天生具备说服数千人按其意愿行事的能力。郭如此擅长掠夺他人，以至于能够说服他们相信自己不是受害者，这绝非从轻处罚情节，而是一个从重处罚情节。郭在因这起大规模欺诈被定罪后，仍能搜集到那些声称仍然相信他的人的信件，这只会更加凸显郭为未来的骗局纠集此类支持者的风险。郭在操纵全球规模欺诈并毁坏或伤害如此多人生活方面的超常能力，要求本院判处长期监禁，通过剥夺郭的行动能力来保护公众，而这种保护唯有本院才能提供。\n\nC. 为实现一般威慑及促进对法律的尊重，必须判处实质性有期徒刑\n\n为威慑他人从事类似的犯罪欺诈行为并促进对法律的尊重，判处实质性有期徒刑亦属必要。\n\n在制定 Section 3553(a) 时，“国会认为威慑‘在白领犯罪领域尤为重要’。”United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006)（引用 S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 76 (1983)，载于 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259）；参见 United States v. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006)（对白领犯罪的威慑是“国会的核心关切”）。一般威慑在欺诈和其他白领案件中是一项尤为重要的量刑因素，因为实施这些犯罪的决定往往是经过精密权衡的成本效益决策。Martin, 455 F.3d at 1240（“由于经济和欺诈类犯罪比突发的激情犯罪或机会犯罪更具理性、冷静和心机，这些犯罪是一般威慑的主要对象。”）。正如 Posner 法官所指出的，“（一般）威慑的考量主张对那些要么牟利丰厚、要么难以发现和惩处的罪行予以更严厉的惩罚，因为这两种属性都会增加犯罪的预期收益，从而需要相应的惩罚来进行威慑。”United States v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994)；参见 United States v. Zukerman, 897 F.3d 423, 429 (2d Cir. 2018)（引用 Heffernan 案）。\n\n在此，必须判处实质性有期徒刑，以向企图实施像郭这样大规模欺诈的潜在犯罪分子明确传达等待他们的严重后果。郭的罪行引起了公众的极大关注，并且各方已付出巨大努力来赔偿这些罪行的受害者。这种恶名支持为了促进一般威慑的目的而判处 30 年有期徒刑。参见，例如 United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 94 (2d Cir. 2017)（维持地区法院的判决，该判决除其他事项外，还考虑了一般威慑以及所判刑罚“可能产生强大的一般威慑效果，因为该案引起了异常广泛的公众关注”这一事实）。如果郭获得他所谋求的宽大处理，其他人可能会受到鼓舞而从事同样大胆的犯罪，他们会认为此类骗局难以被侦破，而且即便被发现，与成为世界上最富有的人之一的潜在巨大收益相比，也不太可能导致严重的后果。对照 United States v. Livesay, 587 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009)（“很难想象一个企图从其公司盗取数百万美元的潜在白领犯罪分子会被纯粹的缓刑威胁所威慑。”）。退一步讲，对郭处以不关痛痒的刑罚不仅不能威慑、反而会鼓励潜在的犯罪分子，诱使他们通过建立只需承担极小后果的全球性数十亿美元欺诈骗局来过上奢靡的生活。\n\nD. 郭的个人历史与特征\n\n郭文贵选择依仗财富和特权的平台来实施蔓延广泛的金融犯罪。郭本有机会利用其资源和显而易见的个人魅力做出截然不同的选择。相反，他屡次选择利用这些优势，长年盘剥追随和信任他的群体，从而利用他们的金钱继续过着除世界上最富有的人以外无人知晓的极尽奢华的生活。\n\nGuo（郭文贵）不能、也并未声称其行为系年轻轻率或偶发性错误决策所致。郭的个人情况完全不适于除长期监禁以外的任何其他刑罚，且郭主张其背景与经历可减轻其罪责的辩解毫无根据。\n\n1. 郭自称强大亿万富翁的背景加重而非减轻了其罪责\n\n郭的陈述书用了近八页篇幅描述其在统领长达五年、涉及数十亿美元且在审判中被定罪的欺诈计划之前，是如何“实现经济繁荣”、享有“商业成功”并成为一名“显赫”人物的。（见 Guo Sub. 8-15）。在量刑时，郭将其“非凡财富”和“惊人的商业成功”作为酌情从轻情节。（见前引，第 87 页（“[郭的]财富对民主运动而言意味着面对和对抗 CCP（中国共产党）的力量”）。郭在不同时间为了不同目的对其财富提出了截然不同的主张。他曾辩称，其“巨额财富”和奢华生活方式具有开脱罪责的作用，因为“[他]没有偷窃的理由”。（Tr. 5986）。但在其他时候，郭又辩称自己对金钱毫不在意，是一个极度不关注物质事务以至于几乎不可能对欺诈计划产生兴趣的人。（见 Tr. 6050-51（主张郭“几乎不考虑自己的财务状况”，并向陪审团发问是否“认为像郭先生这样一个连信用卡都没有的人，会去查看银行对账单并指示他人从农场贷款计划中提款用于为其游艇支付随意的维护费用”）；但另见 GX 417（郭亲自下令将 G|CLUB 会员的 1 亿美元资金转入由 Je 控制的实体的录音））。\n\n事实是，郭自称的亿万富翁身份是他实施欺诈的关键工具——这是郭用来诱引受害者走向他、赢取他们信任，并制造他某天也能帮助他们变得像他一样富有的假象的特征。郭反复声称拥有数十亿美元，\n\n也为其不断向投资者许下的亲自保障其免受损失风险的承诺提供了背书。2021 年 2 月 28 日在 GTV 上的直播仅提供了一个例证：“永远不会再有像我们今天这样的机会，让你们能参与到 GTV 和 G Coin 中来。我向你们保证。……七哥奋斗了一辈子。我懂什么是政治，我懂什么是金融，我也懂什么是赚大钱。你们甚至都不会明白。你们甚至——我给你们解释你们都听不明白。兄弟姐妹们，你们必须相信七哥。如果亏了钱，你们谁都不用买单。我来买单。”（GXZ-9 第 67 页）。郭还利用自己的财富来预判并抵御关于其承诺是否好得令人难以置信的质疑，向其投资者暗示他没有坑骗他们的动机，因为他自己早已腰缠万贯：“所以战友们，我不缺钱。……我想要的是战友们的爱。”（Tr. 1035）。\n\n在审判中，受害者接二连三地作证，说明这类承诺在他们决定将如此多的资金投入郭所谓的商业机会中起到了核心作用。Le Zhou 回忆了他第一次观看郭的直播，并“得知他是一位白手起家的亿万富翁”，他“看起来非常博学、健谈”，并且“提到”“他将对自己所说的话承担法律责任”。（Tr. 180；另见前引第 209 页（描述郭如何“提到我们投资的所有钱，本金永远不会亏，连一分钱都不会亏”，因为“[他]会偿还——亲自偿还”））。Ya Li 也有相似的第一印象，在初次接触郭后得出的认知是“[他]是在中国的亿万富翁”，位列“中国富豪榜”。（Tr. 1330）。Minran Wu 回忆说，郭“说他很有钱，非常有钱，是亿万富翁”，（Tr. 2372），并且投资了 GTV（以及随后郭的其他计划），因为“郭说……你们无法想象这会有多棒，利润会有多丰厚”。（Tr. 2375）。Wei Chen 解释说，郭所谓的财富在其将家人的钱投入郭的计划的“决定中起到了关键影响”：\n\n“那让我相信他是一个富有的人，他拥有……能让事情成功的资源。”（Tr. 4468）。\n\n郭塑造了一个精通政治、媒体和赚钱之道的亿万富翁形象。他向受害者兜售的不仅是欺诈性企业的股份，还有机会在他多年来每日直播中炫耀的那种奢靡生活方式中拥有一份所有权权益。郭的财富和先前的商业成功，无论其实际数额如何，都是法定加重情节，因为它们为他的欺诈提供了便利并扩大了其规模。\n\n2.\n\n在滥用庇护程序的特权之后以其移民身份为由。该制度允许郭在美国安全自由地生活。郭不仅没有尊重给予他庇护的法治，反而利用本国移民法律提供的庇护与安全，建立并统领了一场长达数年的欺诈计划。不仅如此：郭还通过操纵 U.S. bankruptcy system（美国破产制度）并在各 U.S. courts（美国法院）妨碍司法公正，冷酷地滥用了本可保护其家庭和保护任何合法所得财富的机构。参见下文第 III.G 节。在利用了美国移民制度之后，郭现在绝不能再以该制度的运作为由提出从轻处罚的主张。\n\n其次，郭关于移民的主张几乎完全依赖于法院在考虑是否对被告判处任何监禁刑的先例，United States v. Connolly (Black), No. 16 Cr. 370 (CM), Sent’g Tr. 87, 91-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)（拒绝判处羁押刑以避免“参与程度极低的”被告进入移民拘留“短期监禁”），或释放已服完几乎全部刑期的被告的先例，United States v. Diaz, 07 Cr. 387 (CM), 2024 WL 4891908 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. November 26, 2024)。郭引用的另一判例涉及法院决定是对一名 40 岁的被告判处 10 年还是 14 年刑期。United States v. Wedd, 15 Cr. 616 (KBF), Dkt. 688 Sent’g Tr. at 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)。换言之，在郭引用的所有案例中，被告获释后的移民后果被纳入法院量刑考量，是因为被告几乎确定将在相对较近的期限内获释。但是，没有任何公正的惩罚会导致\n\n在密封状态下提出与移民相关的主张。郭的律师没有为密封此项提交提供额外的依据——也没有提供任何权威判例依据。鉴于“公众获取的权利延伸至刑事量刑”以及“与这些程序相关的文书”，United States v. Sehgal, No. 24 Cr. 46 (AT), 2026 WL 539650, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2026)，法院应驳回郭的默示密封动议，并要求将其证据附件 16 归档至公开案卷。\n\n郭在此类时间表下从刑事拘留中获释。因此，法院几乎没有理由认为该情况会对本案的量刑产生实质性影响。\n\n4. MDC（大都会拘留中心）主张\n\n辩方主张郭应获得比其应得刑罚更轻的判决，理由是自 2023 年 3 月 15 日被捕以来，在本案审理期间他一直被羁押在 MDC（大都会拘留中心），法院不应受此主张动摇。（见 Def. Br. 第 99 页（称“MDC 多年来一直是一个运转失常的机构”））。首先，若非郭八次提出延期量刑的请求，他在 17 个月之前就已经被判刑并指定到不同的 BOP（联邦监狱管理局）设施服刑。就他辩称在 MDC 的 37 个月在某种程度上构成了缩短刑期的正当理由而言，他是错误的，并且不应允许他自行捏造据称的酌情从轻情节。在提出关于 MDC 的主张时，辩方未承认 MDC 条件近期的改善。然而，正如本区的多位法官所指出的，MDC 的条件在 2025 年（恰为被告被羁押在该处的时期）已大为改善。参见，例如，United States v. Sandy Carazas-Pinez, 23 Cr. 346 (JPC)（2025 年 9 月 19 日量刑）；United States v. Clinton McCullum, 24 Cr. 667 (JPC)（2025 年 8 月 29 日量刑）；United States v. Jean Carlos Burgos, 24 Cr. 650 (LTS)（2025 年 5 月 21 日认罪答辩）；United States v. Kevin Reshard, 24 Cr. 392 (JMF)（2025 年 5 月 14 日量刑）；United States v. Alon Alexander et al., 24 Cr. 676 (VEC)（2025 年 1 月 16 日保释辩论）。\n\n正如 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）United States District Judge（美国联邦地区法院法官）Jesse M. Furman 阁下在 2025 年 5 月（郭被羁押在 MDC 期间）对一名被告进行量刑时所指出的：\n\n关于辩方陈述书中提出的其他主张，在 MDC 方面，我当然对 MDC 的情况非常熟悉，该处仍有很大改善空间，但也比\n\n我去年一月在辩方陈述书中引用的 United States v. Chavez 案中撰写意见书时要好得多。碰巧的是，我刚参加完一个有 MDC 代表出席的会议，并获得了最新统计数据，即人员配备率已达 75%，医疗服务人员显著增加且护士岗位满编，暴力事件从 12 月的 42 起（这是一个相当庞大的数字）下降到 4 月的仅 9 起；所有这一切都表明情况远没有一年半前那么糟糕，并且绝对在朝着正确的方向发展。\n\nUnited States v. Kevin Reshard, 24 Cr. 392 (JMF)（2025 年 5 月 14 日量刑）。\n\n并且正如 Southern District of New York（纽约南区）United States District Judge（美国联邦地区法院法官）John P. Cronan 阁下在 2025 年 8 月（亦在郭被羁押在 MDC 期间）的一次量刑中所评论的：\n\n我还提到我已经考虑了 MDC 的条件。McCullum 先生于去年 11 月 19 日被联邦拘捕。我确实注意到监狱的条件有了相当大的改善，人员配备水平有所提高。McCullum 先生谈到了监狱的封锁情况。虽然封锁在监狱中是不可避免的，但囚犯经历长时间封锁的次数是罕见的。正如参与监督 MDC 条件的 Caproni 法官在今年早些时候 United States v. Alexander, 24 Cr. 676 案的保释听证会上所评论的那样，MDC 已经有了很多改善。“MDC 配备了更多的人员。最终陷入长时间封锁的被告人数是极少的。”监狱增派了大量工作人员，包括更多的医护人员。MDC 的条件并不理想，但确实有了改善，无论如何。无论如何，我都已经考虑了这些条件。\n\nUnited States v. Clinton McCullum, 24 Cr. 667 (JPC)（2025 年 8 月 29 日量刑）；另见 United States v. Sandy Carazas-Pinez, 23 Cr. 346 (JPC)（2025 年 9 月 19 日量刑：实质上与 McCullum 相同）。\n\n总而言之，辩方的任何论点均不支持基于郭文贵在 MDC（大都会拘留中心）的羁押情况予以从轻处罚。根据第 3553(a) 条所列考量因素，理应作出与政府建议相符的严厉监禁判决。\n\nE. 避免不合理量刑差异的必要性\n\n在本案中判处至少 30 年监禁是必要且恰当的，既能给予公正的惩处，又能避免不合理的量刑差异。参见 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(6)。郭文贵是 G Enterprise（G 集团）唯一的领导者，也是其诈骗图谋的策划者。他造成了超过十亿美元的巨大损失，使其处于《量刑指南》（Guidelines）最高级别的危害档次，并且他是榨取诈骗收益的主要受益人。他在全世界范围内掠夺了成千上万名受害者，并招募了一批层级分明的亲信来具体执行，其中包括共谋者 Yvette Wang（王雁平），王雁平本人因在这些犯罪中的作用正在服刑 10 年。而他站在法庭面前毫无悔意、公然藐视，并积极传播虚假信息，以图削弱陪审团在本案中的裁决以及公众对刑事司法的信任。\n\n郭文贵罪行的严重性及其对公众构成的危害风险，使他在各类欺诈犯罪被告人中鲜有匹敌，即使在本区（Southern District of New York，纽约南区）近期发生的瞩目欺诈大案中也显得尤为突出。数额巨大的损失金额只是衡量罪责的指标之一，仅凭这一点就足以支持在本案中作出实质性的从严量刑。29 虽然有少数其他欺诈案被告人\n\n29 “制定量刑指南的核心原因之一是确保对白领犯罪施加更严厉的处罚，并消除白领犯罪刑罚与其他犯罪刑罚之间的差距。”United States v. Davis, 537 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2008)。“《量刑指南》旨在解决以往量刑实践中的不平等现象，即过去对白领经济犯罪的惩处往往不如其他具有可比性的蓝领犯罪严厉。”United States v. Fishman, 631 F. Supp. 2d 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)。在 1996 年至 2001 年的五年间，量刑委员会（Commission）进行了一次深入审议程序以处理《量刑指南》对白领犯罪的规定，相关利益方均参与其中，包括辩护律师界、司法部（Department of Justice）、假释监督官以及美国司法会议（U.S. Judicial Conference）。参见《联邦公报》通告 BAC2210-40, 62 Fed. Reg. 152, 171-74 (1997)（委员会关于经济犯罪量刑改革公开征求意见的提案）。委员会解释称，由此产生的\n\n造成的财务损失更为巨大，但郭文贵的犯罪手法尤为恶劣且居心叵测：他热烈召集狂热关注中国民主推进事业的支持者，随后滥用他们的信任，向他们兜售一个又一个虚假投资项目。这显著加重了郭文贵所造成的危害。正如法庭在对王雁平量刑时指出的那样，“在 Holmes（霍姆斯）诈骗案和 Madoff（麦道夫）诈骗案中”，投资者并未被虚假地“告知资金将用于促进民主”。(Dkt. 491 at 31-32)。使用欺诈手段窃取他人钱财永远是错误的。但郭文贵的诈骗与历史上某些最恶劣的庞氏骗局和投资骗局截然不同，因为其主谋蓄意营造并利用所谓的社会运动来掠夺其追随者——将他们变成一个又一个欺诈计划中不知情的受害者。郭文贵的诈骗在规模和复杂性上也与近期的先例截然不同。它始于慈善呼吁；进而转向一家所谓媒体企业的未注册证券发行；随后转变为旨在规避 SEC（美国证券交易委员会）补救措施的所谓社区借贷计划；接着演变为一家同样提供股票的私人会员制俱乐部；最后再次演化为一对挂钩虚假所谓加密货币交易所的伪造加密货币。该案涉及数十名助手和亲信多年的协同配合，在世界各地运转郭文贵诈骗帝国的庞大机器。出于这些原因，在 United States v. Bankman-Fried 案中判处的 25 年监禁或在 20 年监禁等判决，\n\n修正案于 2001 年 11 月 1 日生效，其基础是认定“损失金额可作为衡量犯罪严重程度及被告人相对罪责的尺度”。《美国法院量刑指南》，66 Fed. Reg. 30,512, 30,533 (June 6, 2001)。因此，2001 年对第 2B1.1 条的修正案体现了委员会在与相关利益方协作程序后形成的审慎意见，即损失金额应当是确定适用该指南的犯罪严重程度的核心考量。事实上，“即使这些从重情节在威慑力方面可能缺乏强有力的经验证据支持，但它们在与公平量刑和报应惩罚目标相关的经验数据和国家经验中具有坚实基础。”United States v. Moose, 893 F.3d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 2018)。\n\n在 United States v. Greenwood 案中判处的判决应被视为量刑的过低底线，而不是针对“具有类似前科且被裁定犯有类似行为的被告人”所判处的刑罚。18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)。\n\n极端的欺诈犯罪历来伴随着严厉的重判。因策划了一场损失高达数百亿美元、长达数十年的庞氏骗局，Bernard Madoff（伯纳德·麦道夫）被判处 150 年监禁。虽然麦道夫欺诈的规模和持续时间是“史无前例的”，United States v. Madoff, No. 09 Cr. 213 (DC), Sent’g Tr. at 43，但 Chin 法官的量刑裁决指出，“受害的远不止金钱”，因为与郭文贵的情况一样，“受害者对被告人寄予了信任”，而“这种信任被打破的方式让很多受害者陷入了自我怀疑”。同上，at 49。虽然在“欺诈的规模、持续时间和巨大程度，以及背叛的程度方面”，很少有案件能与之“相提并论”，Madoff, Sent’g Tr. at 46，但这种巧取豪夺与背信弃义的共同特征，同样证明了郭文贵犯罪行为所造成的极端危害。\n\n在全美各地，其他掠夺性尤为严重的欺诈案被告人因在规模上与郭文贵更具可比性的行为而受到了极其严厉的判决。Tom Petters（汤姆·彼得斯）在 2009 年被陪审团定罪时年仅 52 岁，因一项涉案 37 亿美元的诈骗计划被判处 50 年监禁，很大程度上是因为量刑法官“无法确信如果他在服刑较短后获释，他不会再次犯罪”。United States v. Petters, No. 08 Cr. 364 (RHK), Dkt. 431 at 46 (D. Minn. 2010)。Scott Rothstein（斯科特·罗斯坦）因通过其佛罗里达州律师事务所经营的欺诈计划，就共谋从事诈骗、洗钱、电汇欺诈和邮件欺诈罪名进行了认罪答辩，该计划“导致约 400 名投资者损失超过 4 亿美元”。United States v. Rothstein, No. 09 Cr. 60331 (JIC), Dkt. 334 at 57-58 (S.D. Fla. 2010)。政府将时年 47 岁的罗斯坦的“犯罪后表现”描述为“极为异乎寻常”，包括\n\n自愿从摩洛哥回国自首并提供了非同寻常的配合。参见同上，Dkt. 277 at 2-3。尽管如此，鉴于罗斯坦对其复杂骗局进行的“高度精心策划的营销”，包括利用“所有成功的外在包装”、向慈善机构捐款以将自己“塑造成慷慨的资助者”，以及为营造“合法表象”而作出的其他大量努力，法庭对其判处了 50 年监禁。同上，Dkt. 334 at 56-57。2019 年，70 岁的被告人 Edwin Fujinaga（藤永爱德温）在审理后被定罪并被判处 50 年监禁，罪名是一项涉案 15 亿美元的诈骗计划，该计划诱骗日本数千名受害者投资所谓的医疗索赔项目，而这些资金大部分被挪用于藤永个人的挥霍挥霍。参见 United States v. Fujinaga, No. 15 Cr. 198 (GMN), Dkt. 346 at 74-75 (D. Nev. 2019)。2009 年，Richard J. Sullivan 法官在本区判处 James Nicholson（詹姆斯·尼克尔森）40 年监禁，因其领导了一项涉案 1.33 亿美元的诈骗计划，其挑选受害者的原因正是因为他们对被告人给予了极高的信任——法官强调，该被告人与郭文贵一样，“利用了与受害者的这些关系”，“培植了这些关系”并“予以鼓动”。参见 United States v. Nicholson, No. 09 Cr. 414 (RJS), Sent’g Tr. 71:11–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)。\n\n郭文贵罪行的性质和规模，以及他领导敲诈勒索企业实施这些罪行的情况，要求判处比本区近期对备受瞩目的欺诈案被告人所作出的判决更为严厉的刑罚；那些被告人的骗局固然造成了巨大损失，但他们的行为并不具备郭文贵作为具有个人魅力的领袖对成千上万名受害者所施加的持续个人吸引力，这些受害者被诱导相信他们不仅是在投资万无一失的赚钱机会，而且是在投资他们对中国民主的共同向往。Samuel Bankman-Fried（萨缪尔·班克曼-弗里德）涉及 FTX 加密货币交易所的罪行极其恶劣。他将“大量 FTX 客户资金用于高风险投资、政治献金、巴哈马房地产以及其他事项，而当时 FTX 面临着严重的市场恶化下行风险、贷款催收和其他风险”。\n\nUnited States v. Bankman-Fried, No. 22 Cr. 673 (LAK), Dkt. 426 (Sent’g Tr.) at 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2024)。这是赤裸裸的大规模盗窃，班克曼-弗里德被判处 25 年监禁。虽然郭文贵的损失金额较低，但郭文贵的罪行涉及大规模诈骗实施者与其受害者之间前所未有的个人亲密联系。他亲自向投资者保证绝无任何损失风险——不仅在他每天数小时的直播中（参见例如 GX Z9 at 37（“我负责。如果你们少了一分钱，我郭文贵负责。”）），而且在通过电话、短信和视频聊天拉拢受害者的直接、个别沟通中也是如此。（参见例如 Tr. 4465, GX VB36）。正如本法庭在对郭文贵的共同被告人量刑时所认定的那样，他的骗局有别于其他备受瞩目的诈骗案，正是因为他肆无忌惮地利用了受害者“对中国政治体制……将受到挑战并可能发生改变的深切期盼”——这是“一种完全不同的说服人们掏钱的方式”。(Dkt. 491 at 34–35)。\n\n这种将具有个人魅力的领袖气质与操纵受害者深层的社会和政治诉求相结合，以发展并维持长达数年之久的诈骗行为，使郭文贵的行径明显超出并区别于那些涉及巨额损失但缺乏这些非同寻常且危害独特的特征的金融犯罪。Karl Sebastian Greenwood（卡尔·塞巴斯蒂安·格林伍德）因共同创立并销售一种欺诈性加密货币被判处 20 年监禁，该骗局给受害者造成了数十亿美元的损失。United States v. Greenwood, No. 17 Cr. 630 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. 2023)。与郭文贵不同的是，格林伍德与其骗局的联合创始人共同承担主要罪责——而且他们的 OneCoin（维卡币）骗局缺乏蓄意操纵受害者参与社会和政治运动诉求的企图。郭文贵也无法与近期其他通过就其经营涉加密货币欺诈骗局进行认罪答辩而承担责任的被告人进行有实质意义的类比。参见 United States v. Do Kwon, No. 23 Cr. 151 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y. 2024)（判处 15 年监禁，\n\n被告人在该案中同样面临在另一国家接受未来刑事起诉的前景）；United States v. Mashinsky（美国诉马申斯基案），案号 No. 23 Cr. 347 (JGK)（被判处 12 年监禁）。事实上，与 Bankman-Fried（班克曼-弗里德）、Greenwood（格林伍德）、Kwon（权道亨）以及 Mashinsky（马申斯基）相比，Guo（郭文贵）对欺诈性加密货币及相关交易所的运作，仅是其涉及多项计划、为期五年的敲诈勒索与欺诈阴谋的一部分。参见前引第三节。\n\n就在三年前，本法院对一名在审前认罪的欺诈案被告人判处了近 18 年监禁，原因是其在不到两年时间内“运作了四个独立的欺诈计划”，“受害者达数百人”。United States v. Ray（美国诉雷案），案号 No. 22 Cr. 228 (AT)，ECF 编号 Dkt. 105（量刑听证笔录）第 36 页（S.D.N.Y.（纽约南区联邦地区法院）2023 年）。Franklin Ray（富兰克林·雷）的连环欺诈行为从其亲自推销的散户投资者手中攫取了刚过 4000 万美元的资金，且其在审前释放期间继续招揽欺诈性“投资”，使这一罪责进一步加重。同上，第 40 页。但依据本法院的判决本应受到近 20 年监禁的其罪行，与 Miles Guo（郭文贵）在实施为期五年、涉案金额 13 亿美元的 G Enterprise（G 集团）欺诈与敲诈勒索阴谋中所施展的复杂性、持续时间及操纵手段相比，相形见绌。郭的量刑应当包含长得多的监禁期限，以体现其罪行在相对严重性和规模上的程度、其对责任的一贯推卸，以及其继续对公众构成的威胁。\n\nVII. 没收与赔偿\n\n2025 年 8 月 11 日，法院针对郭作出了一项没收初步裁定（“POF”），该裁定没收了其在特定财产中的权益，并作出了一项 13 亿美元的判决金，该笔款项与 Yvette Wang（王雁平）承担连带责任。(Dkt. 720)。大约六个月后，即 2026 年 2 月 3 日，郭对 POF 中的判决金提出了异议。(Dkt. 799)。2026 年 2 月 17 日，政府提交了对郭之异议的回应意见。(Dkt. 803)。基于该反对意见中阐述的理由，郭的异议毫无根据。此外，2026 年 1 月 19 日，政府提交了一份补充没收初步裁定，请求没收构成 G 集团犯罪所得且政府已在海外扣押的额外特定财产，以及额外的 G|CLUBS（G俱乐部）资金。(Dkt. 790)。根据《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第 32.2 条，法院应在量刑前签署政府的补充没收初步裁定，并在量刑时口头宣布其所施加的没收裁定与 2025 年 8 月 11 日的没收初步裁定及拟议的补充没收裁定相一致。\n\n关于赔偿，基于政府在 2026 年 1 月 9 日提交的文件（Dkt. 785）中此前阐述的理由，且正如法院在就王雁平进行量刑时已认定的那样，法院应当在郭的量刑程序中认定，在本案中执行赔偿并不切实可行，并允许通过减免程序进行补偿。\n\n结论\n\n郭文贵声称自己领导着一场运动。但他并未如此。相反，他掠夺了成千上万相信其言论、信任其投资承诺并依赖其保证他们免受损失之承诺的人。郭的罪行将永远成为本国最严重、最猖獗的欺诈行为之一。在这一非同寻常的案件中，若无非同寻常的量刑，便无正义可言。\n\n鉴于郭之罪行所造成的巨大损害，政府谨请法院判处至少 30 年监禁的刑罚。\n\n谨此提交，\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY\n根据 28 U.S.C. § 515 所赋职权代理之美国联邦检察官\n\n签署人：\n\n/s/\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\nRyan B. Finkel\nJustin R. Horton\nJuliana N. Murray\n助理美国联邦检察官\n\n212-637-2190/-6612 /-2276/ -2314\n\n抄送：在案记录律师","key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":26150,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-04-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-04-07","updated_at":"2026-09-04 14:54:33"}