{"id":"court_sdny_833_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"","doc_number":833,"sub_number":null,"doc_type":"DOC","filed_date":"2026-04-07","title":"SDNY ECF 833","summary_zh":null,"summary_en":null,"body_en":"UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK\n\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA,\n\n            v.\n\nMILES GUO,\n   a/k/a/ “Ho Wan Kwok,”\n   a/k/a “Miles Kwok,”\n   a/k/a “Guo Wengui,”\n   a/k/a “Brother Seven,”\n   a/ka/ “The Principal,”\n   a/ka/ “The Boss,”\n\n                                          Defendant.\n\nS3 23 Cr. 118 (AT)\n\nSENTENCING MEMORANDUM OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY\n\nAttorney for the United States\n\nActing Under Authority Conferred by\n28 U.S.C. § 515.\n\nSouthern District of New York\n\n26 Federal Plaza\n\nNew York, New York 10278\n\nMicah F. Fergenson\nRyan B. Finkel\nJustin Horton\nJuliana N. Murray\nAssistant United States Attorneys\n\nOf Counsel\n\n---\n\n1\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nI. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ............................................................................................. 1\nII. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................................................................... 2\nIII. OFFENSE CONDUCT PROVEN AT TRIAL ..................................................................... 4\nA. Rule of Law ........................................................................................................................ 4\nB. GTV Private Placement ...................................................................................................... 7\nC. The Farm Loan Program .................................................................................................... 9\nD. G|CLUBS ......................................................................................................................... 12\nE. Himalaya Exchange .......................................................................................................... 17\nF. A10 ................................................................................................................................... 20\nG. Obstruction of Justice ....................................................................................................... 20\nIV. VICTIM STATEMENTS ................................................................................................... 28\nV. APPLICATION OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES.................................................. 29\nA. Applicable Law ................................................................................................................ 29\nB. Probation’s Guidelines Calculation and Sentencing Recommendation ........................... 30\nC. The Offense Involved an Actual Loss in Excess of $550 Million ................................... 31\n1.\nThe Trial Record and Tracing Affidavits Prove the Loss Amount Exceeded $550\nMillion............................................................................................................................... 31\n2.\nThe GTV Private Placement Fraud Should Be Included in the Loss Amount\nCalculation ........................................................................................................................ 35\n3.\nWhether an Investor Subjectively Regards Oneself as a “Victim” Is Irrelevant to the\nGuidelines Calculation ...................................................................................................... 38\n4.\nThe Preponderance Standard Applies ....................................................................... 40\n5.\nGuo’s Guidelines Sentence Remains 175 Years Even if the Court Found the Loss\nAmount Was Merely Over $3.5 Million ........................................................................... 41\nD. Responses to Guo’s Other Guidelines Objections ........................................................... 41\nVI. THE COURT SHOULD IMPOSE A SENTENCE OF AT LEAST 30 YEARS’\nIMPRISONMENT .................................................................................................................... 45\nA. The Nature, Circumstances, and Seriousness of the Offense Warrant a Lengthy Sentence\n ............................................................................................................................................... 45\n1.\nGuo Caused Immense Pain and Suffering to Thousands of Victims ........................ 45\n2.\nGuo Led a Five-Year Scheme to Defraud with Serial Efforts to Evade and Obstruct\nJustice ................................................................................................................................ 48\n3.\nGuo Preyed on the Aspirations of a Community ...................................................... 51\n\n---\n\n2\n4.\nThe CCP’s Conduct Is Irrelevant to Guo’s Convictions ........................................... 56\n5.\nGuo’s Extraordinary Personal Enrichment ............................................................... 59\nB. Specific Deterrence and Protection of the Public Is Necessary ....................................... 63\nC. A Substantial Term of Imprisonment is Necessary for General Deterrence and to\nPromote Respect for the Law ................................................................................................ 69\nD. Guo’s History and Characteristics ................................................................................... 70\n1.\nGuo’s Background as a Purportedly Powerful Billionaire Aggravates, Not Mitigates,\nHis Culpability .................................................................................................................. 71\n2.\n ............................... 73\n3.\nGuo’s Immigration Status ......................................................................................... 74\n4.\nMDC Arguments ....................................................................................................... 76\nE. The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities ................................................ 78\nVII. FORFEITURE AND RESTITUTION .............................................................................. 83\nCONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 84\n\n---\n\n1\nI.   PRELIMINARY STATEMENT\nDefendant Miles Guo’s crimes were of extraordinary dimensions. Through daily repetition\nof insidious lies recorded on video, he obtained over a billion dollars and misappropriated hundreds\nof millions of dollars for himself. He developed a cult-like following of thousands of people and\nmanipulated their hopes and aspirations, and the trust they placed in him, to extract their money.\nHe used his victims’ money—victims’ personal savings, their family’s money, their retirement\naccounts, the money from the sale of their homes—to fund a lifestyle of extraordinary excess and\nindulgence, a gilded life of mansions, yachts, race cars, designer clothes, and luxury furnishings.\nIn the wake of his investor-funded extravagances, Guo destroyed hundreds of lives. He has left a\nwreckage of victims and families who have been devastated financially, emotionally, and\npsychologically.\nAnd Guo made, and continues to make, extraordinary efforts to avoid any accountability.\nHe used trusted lieutenants and a maze of shell companies and bank accounts around the world to\ntry to hide his wrongdoing and his overarching control of the sprawling criminal enterprise he\ndirected from this country. His extraordinary contempt for the laws of the United States is difficult\nto overstate. He undertook his continuous and flagrant violations of the laws of the United States,\nvictimizing Americans, after immigrating to the United States and seeking the beneficence of its\nlaws for asylees. He perjuriously declared bankruptcy to avoid court-imposed contempt sanctions,\nand then attempted to obstruct and intimidate a court-appointed bankruptcy trustee, using the same\nbullying tactics he deploys against victims who complain about his frauds. His sustained efforts to\nevade and obstruct law enforcement prior to his arrest, and the continuation of his criminal\nenterprise’s frauds and deception even after his arrest and detention, underscore the risks that Guo\nposes to the public absent an extremely substantial sentence of imprisonment and incapacitation.\n\n---\n\n2\nIndeed, even after being convicted of operating a racketeering enterprise by a unanimous\njury, Guo is entirely unrepentant. He does not even offer the lip service of remorse or acceptance\nof any responsibility for the harms he caused so many individuals and their loved ones, some of\nwhom have been pushed to consider suicide as a result of his crimes, and some of whom confronted\nhim directly by bravely testifying at trial about how he brainwashed, cheated, and harmed them.\nFaced with the overwhelming record of his extraordinarily egregious crimes, Guo refuses, even on\nthe eve of his sentencing, to acknowledge that he has done anything wrong, or caused any harm to\nanyone. Instead, as he stands atop a mountain of destroyed lives, Guo has the gall to tell this Court,\nwith a straight face, that he is the only real victim in this case. Guo’s absurd position, which has\nno grounding in reality, only serves to render his conduct all the more offensive.\nGuo’s extraordinarily vast and harmful criminal conduct, his extraordinary contempt for\nthe laws of the United States, and the extraordinary likelihood that Guo will seek (and is seeking)\nto continue his racketeering enterprise, all warrant a proportionately substantial sentence.  To\nprotect the public from further harm, to deter and disrupt Guo’s criminal enterprise, and to afford\njust punishment for the astonishing scope of Guo’s crimes, the Government respectfully submits\na sentence of at least 30 years’ imprisonment is appropriate.\nII.   PROCEDURAL HISTORY\nA. The Charges, the Arrest, and Pretrial Detention\nOn March 6, 2023, a grand jury returned a sealed indictment charging Guo and Kin Ming\nJe, a/k/a “William Je,” with various fraud and money laundering counts. (Dkt. 2). On March 15,\n2023, Guo was arrested at his $67.5 million penthouse apartment at the Sherry-Netherland Hotel\nin Manhattan, and presented in this District. (Dkt. 8). Guo has been detained since his arrest.\n\n---\n\n3\nThat same day of Guo’s arrest, the FBI conducted judicially authorized searches of three\nof his residences—his Manhattan penthouse apartment; his Greenwich, Connecticut residence; and\nhis Mahwah, New Jersey mansion, which was purchased with fraud proceeds.  During those\nsearches, the FBI recovered, among other things, dozens of electronic devices, more than\napproximately $400,000 in U.S. currency, evidence of Guo’s foreign travel documents, and luxury\nclothing, jewelry, and vehicles that had been purchased with fraud proceeds.\nB. Superseding Indictments\nThe Government filed several superseding indictments after Guo’s arrest, adding charges\nas to Guo and charging co-defendant Yanping “Yvette” Wang. (See Dkt. 19; Dkt. 215). On April\n24, 2024, the Government filed superseding indictment S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT), charging Guo, Je, and\nWang with racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One); conspiracy\nto commit wire fraud and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count Two); conspiracy\nto commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Three); conspiracy to\ncommit securities fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count Four); wire fraud, in violation of\n18 U.S.C. § 1343, in connection with the GTV Private Placement (Count Five), Farm Loan\nProgram (Count Seven), G|CLUBS (Count Nine), and the Himalaya Exchange (Count Eleven);\nand securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, in connection with the GTV\nPrivate Placement (Count Six), Farm Loan Program (Count Eight), and G|CLUBS (Count Ten),\nand unlawful monetary transactions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Count Twelve). (Dkt. 307).\nGuo proceeded to trial on the S3 Indictment.1\n\n1 Wang pled guilty prior to trial. A third defendant, William Je, remains at large.\n\n---\n\n4\nC. Trial\nJury selection began on May 22, 2024. See 5/22/2024 Minute Entry. The Government\ncalled 34 witnesses, and the defense called nine witnesses. Guo elected not to testify. On July 16,\n2024, the jury returned a verdict finding Guo guilty on Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Seven,\nEight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven of the S3 Indictment, and finding him not guilty on Counts Five, Six,\nand Twelve. (Dkt. 395).\nIII.   OFFENSE CONDUCT PROVEN AT TRIAL\nA.   Rule of Law\nGuo’s schemes began on the heels of a series of extraordinary personal financial setbacks.\nIn 2017, one of Guo’s creditors—an investment firm called the Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity\nFund (or “PAX”)—filed suit against Guo, with claims that Guo had failed to deliver on a promise\nto repay a debt, which claim ultimately resulted in an award of over $100 million. (See PSR ¶ 83;\nsee also Tr. 4014). The next year—on October 23, 2018—a Hong Kong court entered an order\nseizing “billions of dollars’ worth” of Guo’s assets in Hong Kong and elsewhere. (Guo Sub. 15;\nDXSTIP_0001 ¶ 8).\nGuo launched his first fraudulent scheme in New York just weeks after Chinese authorities\nseized his assets, on November 21, 2018. (Tr. 423, 470; PSR ¶ 37). At a flashy event at The Pierre\nHotel in Manhattan, Guo announced the founding of two nonprofits and purported charities—the\nRule of Law Society and the Rule of Law Foundation. (Tr. 424). Guo’s pitch to his supporters was\nsimple: “he would donate the first $100 million as a first donor or sponsor,” (Tr. 471), and his\nfollowers’ money would be used to further the mission of “helping the Chinese people.” (Id. 423;\nsee also GXVI-192T (Guo’s broadcast statement that “I bear legal responsibility for what I said\ntoday. In other words, for every U.S. dollar donated by comrades in arms, $2 come from Wengui.\n\n---\n\n5\nAfter donating the 100 million U.S. dollars, Wengui is coordinating a donation of $1 billion to the\nRule of Law fund”)).  But as the Rule of Law Society’s former president and treasurer testified at\ntrial, Guo’s organizations did “nothing” to help the Chinese people. (Tr. 423; see also PSR ¶ 39\n(finding that while “the Rule of Law [organizations] were established purportedly to help people\nin China[,] [i]n actuality this was not true, and the Foundation was used to promote Guo, contrary\nto its promises otherwise”)). And while Guo’s supporters ultimately donated approximately $36\nmillion to the Rule of Law entities that Guo controlled, (see GX WA30), Guo never made the $100\nmillion donation he and his spokespeople had promised. (Tr. 471).\nThe Rule of Law organizations were a prelude to the more massive fraud that was yet to\ncome. In one instance, Guo organized a telecast fundraiser to mark the purported charities’ one-\nyear anniversary, broadcast from his offices and online over his GTV media platform. (Tr. 471-\n72). To help his solicitation of supporters’ donations, Guo’s aides received instructions to make\n“donations” from various entities under Guo’s control, so that these purported contributions could\nbe shown on the screen as Guo urged his followers to add their own money to the coffers. (Id. 473\n(testimony from Rule of Law Society’s president and treasurer that “the final purpose was to have\nthese big amounts of money shown on screen so that people would see that others were donating,\nand we were able to solicit more money this way.”)).\nFunds raised from Rule of Law’s donors were misappropriated in a manner that would\necho throughout the course of his “G Enterprise” schemes. (See, e.g., PSR ¶ 39). Guo spent money\nthat donors believed would be used for charitable purposes on himself, his family, and his own\nself-promotion. COVID-19 N95 masks, purchased with donor money, “went to boss’s house,” i.e.,\nGuo’s mansion in Greenwich. (Tr. 480). Still other donor-financed masks were contributed to the\nNew York Police Department—but Guo, through his right-hand assistant and convicted co-\n\n---\n\n6\ndefendant Yvette Wang, insisted that a letter be sent, falsely characterizing the donation as Guo’s\npersonal gift to the police. (See id. at 480-81). When a Guo aide declined to write the false cover\nletter, Wang told the aide that she “was being paid to execute orders and not to think.” (Id. 481).\nAs was his modus operandi, Guo facilitated his theft of donors’ funds by hiding behind a\nsuperficial organizational legal structure that purported to exclude him from the nonprofits’\ngovernance while he, in truth and in fact, controlled them. (See Tr. 475 (Rule of Law Society’s\npresident and treasurer’s testimony that “Boss”—i.e., Guo—controlled the organizations despite\nnot sitting on their boards)).\nBeyond Guo’s misappropriation of fraudulently solicited donations, the Rule of Law\nscheme solidified Guo’s relationship with his victims—that is, Guo locked his supporters in as\n“donors,” before promising them special access to a series of purportedly guaranteed investment\nopportunities. Guo “used the nonprofit organizations to amass followers who were aligned with\nhis purported campaign against the Chinese Communist Party and who were also inclined to\nbelieve Guo’s statements regarding investment and moneymaking opportunities.” (PSR ¶ 30).\nVictim Jenny Li donated to Rule of Law after trusting Guo’s promise to put up $100 million of his\nown money and his statements that many other supporters were making their own contributions.\n(Tr. 1170-72). Ms. Li—a Nevada resident who took out a second mortgage on her home to finance\nher Guo investments (Tr. 1212)—described how her $6,000 donation to the Rule of Law led to\n$100,000 in follow-on investments that she believed would buy her stock in Guo’s media ventures.\n(See Tr. 1170-75). Victim Le Zhou donated to Rule of Law for the same reasons. When he later\ninvested in G|CLUBS, he—like other victims—was told that he had to show proof of his prior\nRule of Law donations in order to access the GTV stock and other benefits promised to investors.\n(Tr. 194, 232-33).\n\n---\n\n7\nThe Rule of Law scheme acted as a gateway: an entry point for victims of the G Enterprise\nfrauds that continued to adapt and evolve over the five years following Guo’s launch of these\npurported charities.\nB.   GTV Private Placement\nFollowing the ironically named “Rule of Law” announcement and solicitation for\n“donations,” Guo doubled down and expanded his solicitation through false pretenses in the GTV\nPrivate Placement. On April 20, 2020, Guo offered common stock to his followers in an online\nvideo announcing the (unregistered) GTV Private Placement. (GX C26, C26-T). Preying on his\nsupporters’ affinity for him, Guo misrepresented the meaning of “private placement” and claimed\nit simply meant that “we are friends.” (Id.). Guo, and those working for him, distributed a\n“confidential information memorandum” that claimed that investor proceeds would be used to\n“expand and strengthen the business” of GTV Media Group. (GX VK5). Guo also personally\nguaranteed all investor funds. He made that clear in personal appeals to potential investors via\nphone calls, text messages, and video messages. (See Tr. 4465; GX VB36). Guo also broadcasted\nhis personal guarantee through his social media channels in which he stated, by way of example,\n“[t]his is a serious and solemn commitment and responsibility of Wengui Guo to you—to be\nresponsible for this investment forever, this is a legally valid commitment.” (GX C63, C63-T\n(June 2, 2020 video); see also GX Z9 at 37 (“I will be responsible. If there is one of your pennies\nthat’s missing, I, Guo Wengui will be responsible.”). Those guarantees were instrumental in\nattracting hundreds of millions of investments in GTV. (Tr. 4466; 2375).\nGuo’s personal guarantees were lies, as was the representation that he would spend investor\nmoney only on GTV business opportunities. In fact, just one day after the “private placement”\nclosed, on June 3, 2020, Guo ordered Wang to transfer $100 million dollars from a J.P. Morgan\n\n---\n\n8\nSaraca bank account, which account held $291 million of victim investments, to another Saraca\nbank account at J.P. Morgan, which, prior to that transfer, had a $0 balance. (GX Z1). That internal\ntransfer had no business purpose; rather, it was designed to obscure the source of the $100 million,\nto wit, victim investments. On June 5, 2020, the $100 million was transferred to Hayman Capital\nso that Guo could invest $100 million in the “HHKOF,” which is a “very high-risk” investment\nthat bet the Hong Kong dollar peg would break. (Tr. 790-791, 848).\nThese transfers were executed as part of Guo’s plan. Indeed, in the run up to the closing of\nthe Private Placement, beginning on at least May 23, 2020, Guo and his underlings had been\nnegotiating with Hayman regarding Guo’s investment. (Tr. 762; GX HN26). Although that\ninvestment was ultimately made in the name of Guo’s son (and co-conspirator) Mileson, it was\nalways clear that the investment was for Guo and his family—not Guo’s victims, or even GTV.\n(See GX HN33 (“these are the two entities that William and Miles [Kwok] will be investing\nthrough”); Tr. 806 (explaining that the investment terms were “[b]eneficial to Miles Kwok and\nSaraca”); Tr. 811-12 (“I understood that it was Miles Kwok family office that was interested in\nmaking the investment . . . it is typical for family offices to have members of the family be the\nbeneficial owners of the entities that they invest in.”)).\nThe next month, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) began investigating\nthe source of the $100 million HHKOF investment. On July 15, 2020, Hayman’s external counsel\nmessaged Wang and other co-conspirators involved in the G Enterprise—William Je, Max\nKrasner, and Aaron Mitchell—to inquire whether the $100 million used for the HHKOF was from\nthe GTV private placement. (Tr. 833-36). In the next week, Je informed Hayman that “there might\nhave been some money borrowed [from GTV] but they were going to put it back.” (Tr. 838).\nMoreover, Guo and his associates did not provide assurances that the $100 million was not GTV\n\n---\n\n9\nmoney, which ultimately caused Hayman’s founder and chief investment officer to message Je on\nAugust 22, 2020, to confirm that the $100 million “money is not tainted in any way, including that\nit does not represent assets from the GTV offering but that it is a bona fide investment made by\nSaraca and Miles.” (GX HN221). Hayman never received a response to that email. (Tr. 844).\nThis silence from Guo and his associates makes plain that Guo and his associates knew it\nwas wrong to transfer $100 million to the HHKOF sourced from GTV Private Placement money\nthat had been raised from investors. 2 Even worse, the approximately $30 million loss that\ninvestment sustained was not reimbursed by Guo, at all, despite his promises to his investors that\nthey would not lose their money, and that he would make them whole if they did. (Tr. 848; GX\nSTIP19). Through a settlement with the SEC, the entities involved in the GTV Private Placement\ntransferred the remainder of the victim investor funds to the SEC, which has since distributed it to\nvictims through a “fair fund,” less the approximately $30 million Guo lost in the HHKOF. (GX\nSTIP19).\nC.   The Farm Loan Program\nAfter conducting the misleading GTV Private Placement stock offering, which promptly\ndrew the scrutiny of civil and criminal U.S. authorities, Guo sought to evade law enforcement by\nraising money from investors through other schemes that were again fraudulent stock offerings,\nand the proceeds of which Guo again stole for his personal benefit. One of these schemes was the\n\n2 Indeed, co-conspirator Yvette Wang pleaded guilty to precisely this conduct. (See, e.g., Wang\nPlea Tr. at 25-26 (“In about June 2020, I was directed by others to wire approximately 100 million\nU.S. dollars from a bank account in New York to Hayman Capital Management, a hedge fund in\nTexas.  I knew these funds had been received from investors in the GTV offering. . . . I knew what\nI was doing was wrong.”)).\n\n---\n\n10\nso-called “Farm Loan Program,” through which Guo fraudulently obtained over $100 million. And\nGuo used that money from his followers to fund his own lavish lifestyle. (PSR ¶ 47; GX Z26).\nEstablished by Guo in the spring of 2020, shortly after the GTV private placement, the\nFarms were a collective of groups of Guo’s followers located in various countries around the world\nand organized into a hierarchical structure. (PSR ¶ 47; Tr. 1373). Guo was at the top. (Tr. 1316-\n17, 1373 (Guo “told the farms what to do”)). Beneath Guo was a leadership group called the Iron\nBlood Group, which consisted of Guo plus a handful of leaders of prominent Farms, including trial\nwitness Ya Li. (Tr. 1374-75). Each individual Farm also had a leader, who received instructions\nfrom the Iron Blood Group and from Guo. (Tr. 1373). This organization of Guo’s followers was\nat times also called the Himalaya Farm Alliance and the New Federal State of China. (Tr. 1373,\n1376). Similar to a multi-level marketing pyramid scheme, Guo used the Farms to amplify his\nfraud, to collect and bundle funds from victims, and to evade detection and disruption by law\nenforcement.\nThe Farm Loan Program was one of Guo’s scams that used the Farms to collect money\nfrom Guo’s victims and transfer it to companies controlled by Guo, which Guo referred to as\n“headquarter companies.” (Tr. 1377). Guo announced the Farm Loan Program in a video broadcast\non July 22, 2020:\n\n---\n\n11\n\n(GX Z9 at 28; GX C40-V). Guo told his followers that, to get shares of GTV common stock, a\nFarm member would sign a loan contract with the local Farm and send money to the Farm, then\nthe Farm would sign a loan contract with and send money to GTV—ultimately resulting,\nsupposedly, in the individual receiving GTV shares. (Id.; Tr. 1377). Not only were those “loans”\nfake loans, in fact, the victims did not receive stock shares, and their money was instead used for\nthe personal enrichment of Guo and his family.3 (Tr. 1386-88).\nAs an example, Ya Li testified that, as the leader of her Farm, she signed loan contracts\nwith, and collected $3 million from, the members of her Farm as part of the Farm loan program.\nAt Guo’s direction, Ms. Li sent $2 million to the U.S. bank account of a company called Medical\nSupply; and other loan money was being sent by other Farms to a bank account in Abu Dhabi in\nthe name of ACA Capital. (Tr. 1388-89). Ms. Li’s farm did not have a loan contract with either\nMedical Supply or ACA Capital. Instead, Ms. Li was sent and signed a loan contract with a\ndifferent company, called Alfa Global Ventures, which was one of Guo’s “headquarter\n\n3 Nor was interest paid on the loans, except to the New York-based farm, Mountain of Spices, in\nan effort to obscure Guo’s illegal stock offering from the SEC. (Tr. 1386-88).\n\n---\n\n12\ncompanies,” but that contract was never countersigned.4 (Tr. 1381-82, 1385-86). Ms. Li did not\nknow what ultimately happened to the $2 million that she transferred to Medical Supply. (Tr.\n1408).\nFinancial records confirm that Guo stole Farm Loan Program money for his personal\nbenefit. Huge sums of Farm Loan Program money, including money from Medical Supply and at\nleast 84 other bank accounts, were laundered through ACA Capital’s bank account in Abu Dhabi\nand then sent to Guo’s family office entities, such as Lamp Capital LLC, Greenwich Land LLC,\nand Leading Shine NY Ltd., where the money was used to fund Guo’s lavish lifestyle and enrich\nhis family members.  (GXZ26; Tr. 4310). For example, approximately $20 million was transferred\nto Guo’s son5; approximately $5 million was transferred to an entity owned by Guo’s spouse;\napproximately $2.3 million was used to cover maintenance expenses associated with an\napproximately 145-foot luxury yacht worth approximately $37 million, nominally owned by Guo’s\nson and used by Guo; and funds were used to pay for luxury cars and private jet travel. (PSR ¶ 50;\nGX Z26).6\nD.   G|CLUBS\nAround the same time, Guo fraudulently induced his followers to send money to a\n“purported online membership club called G|CLUBS”—“as a mechanism to continue fraudulent\nstock offerings.” (PSR ¶ 51, 54). Much like prior schemes in furtherance of his criminal enterprise,\n\n4 Other Farm loans were not even countersigned by the Farm. (See GX Z29 (686 loan agreements\nfor the Phoenix Farm, worth approximately $23 million, were not signed by the Farm)).\n5 On March 21, 2022, Guo testified in his bankruptcy proceedings that “[w]henever I need any\nexpenses for my basic living, I talk to my son and he will tell his office to give it to me.” (Tr.\n4049).\n6 In addition, approximately $10 million was transferred to the personal bank accounts of Je and\nhis spouse.\n\n---\n\n13\nGuo used G|CLUBS as a vehicle to attract hundreds of millions from those who trusted him most,\nand then spent those millions on himself and his family.\nThe conceit of G|CLUBS was straightforward: victims purchased memberships believing,\nbased on Guo’s personal assurances, that they would receive stock in various G entities such as\nGTV, G|CLUBS, and G|Fashion. (GX Z9 at 11 (“[6/20/20 Guo video:] “G club is not a\nmembership. G club is for you to get the original stocks . . . you can get legal G club, G fashion\nstocks, and that’s it. Simple.”) 7 ; GX Z9 at 101-103 (“[6/21/21 Guo Video:] “All G-Club\ncardholders are entitled to 1:10 of the new GTV stock for the amount of the card. . . . Oh my, this\nis big money. Think about the value of GTV”); GX Z9 at 111 (“[7/5/21 Guo Video:] When paying\n50 thousand dollars for the  membership card, you will have 10 thousand shares of G-Fashion in\nthe future”); GX Z9 at 116 (“[8/11/21 Guo Video:]  why if you have bought the G-Club\nmembership card, you would have stocks now. Why would you lose money? What risks are you\ntaking? Is there such a good opportunity in the world? Will there be such a good opportunity again?\nWill you have such a good opportunity again?”)). “Memberships” in G|CLUBS ranged in price\nfrom $10,000 to $50,000 (Tr. 2977), a price that—as Guo himself acknowledged—only made\nsense if one believed they were purchasing valuable stocks. (GX Z9 at 57). Guo also used his\nnetwork of Farms to promote the G|CLUBS offering of stock sales. (Tr. 3001-02).\nGuo’s promises of stock and, with the stock, wealth, caused his followers to part with\nhundreds of millions of their dollars. In total, G|CLUBS generated at least approximately $240\nmillion for Guo’s personal slush fund (GX Z26), from its approximately 8,000 members.\n(Tr. 3001). But that membership number underrepresents the perniciousness of the G|CLUBS\n\n7 Trial exhibits and the official transcript use variations of “G|CLUBS,” “G club,” and “G-Club.”\n\n---\n\n14\nscheme, because Guo encouraged his victims to purchase multiple memberships each so that, he\nclaimed, they could buy even more stock. (PSR ¶ 55). Of course, Guo’s promises of stock were\nutter lies. (Tr. 2977). Indeed, Guo had been warned by others not to claim G|CLUBS offered stock\nas a benefit of membership. (See GX CT172; Tr. 3026). But Guo was quick to assure his followers\nthat any G|CLUBS disclaimer that disassociated G|CLUBS from stock ownership was “to put it\nbluntly, . . . nonsense.” (GX Z9 at 57). Rather, those general disclaimers and warnings that no\nstock was attendant to G|CLUBS membership were “what we need to have to legally avoid ‘Me\nToo.’” (Id.).\nFully aware of the blatant illegality of falsely promising stock to victims, Guo and his co-\nconspirators draped G|CLUBS with features apparently designed to conceal its fraudulent nature\nfrom law enforcement. For example, G|CLUBS claimed to offer its members G|Fashion discounts,\na temporary opportunity to upload content to GTV, access to Guo’s music, access to a “G|Talks”\nsteaming event, a purported “sweepstakes,” and limited discounts to selected hotels and a London\nrestaurant. (Tr. 3005-06). Those picayune benefits did not comport with the steep price of\nmembership, and Guo himself acknowledged as much. (GX Z9 at 57 (“I don’t think you’d buy G-\nClub for something like the free music. If you were, why would you buy it, right? My suggestion\nwould be don’t buy it.”).) Indeed, the minimal discounts were essentially worthless.8  Even worse,\n\n8 The discounts were extremely narrow and virtually unused by any of the 8,000 members. For\nexample, the available hotel benefit applied a 10% discount that could be used only at three hotels\nin Puerto Rico. (Tr. 3008). The available one-time-use restaurant benefit applied only to a single\nrestaurant in London on a specific evening. (Tr. 3009). The available boat service charter benefit\nwas only usable in Puerto Rico. (Tr. 3010).  None of these “benefits” cost G|CLUB anything, and\nthey all fall criminally short of anything remotely worth the five-figure cost of membership.\n(Tr. 3008-3010).\n\n---\n\n15\nthe “sweepstakes” was fixed to award a Lamborghini to one of Guo’s attorneys, a co-conspirator.\n(Tr. 3030; GX 121).\nSimilar to features of other parts of his enterprise, Guo hid his leadership of G|CLUBS\nbehind figureheads. On paper, Guo was a mere “spokesperson” for G|CLUBS, but he could not be\nterminated (Tr. 3000), and the membership agreement prohibited members from making\ndisparaging statements about him. (Tr. 3021). The “spokesperson” title was a smokescreen. In the\ncase of G|CLUBS, its named CEO, Limarie Reyes, had no functional control of the organization—\nshe simply signed documents, as directed, to transfer membership funds so they could be\nmisappropriated. (Tr. 2975, 2990). Indeed, Ms. Reyes did not speak Mandarin, had no association\nthe purported democracy movement, and had no knowledge of Chinese culture. (Tr. 2983-84).\nThis all despite the fact that G|CLUBS was marketed toward the Mandarin-speaking Chinese\ndiaspora. (See Tr. 3002-03).\nMs. Reyes’ obliviousness was not a flaw in the organizational setup of G|CLUBS, it was a\nfeature of the fraud that facilitated G|CLUBS vacuuming of hundreds of millions from Guo’s\nvictims to transfer that wealth to Guo and his family. G|CLUBS victim proceeds were used to\npurchase:\n• A $26.5 million mansion in Mahwah, New Jersey, which was then custom\nrenovated at great expense and included with wings designed and tailored to the\nspecifications of Guo, his wife, his son, and his daughter. (GX Z12).\n\n---\n\n16\n\n• Millions of dollars spent to furnish the Mahwah mansion including, by way of\nexample: $1,050,000 for a set of four Louis VXI Gilt Bronze Lantern chandeliers;\n$1,185,000 for a jewelry box, cabinet, and candlesticks; $300,000 for Persian rugs;\n$250,000 for an antique Chinese rug; $120,000 for two Baccarat chandeliers;\n$104,000 for a television and surround sound system; two mattresses, which each\ncost $36,000; a $24,000 “eternal forest” coffee table; $19,200 for a small walnut\nbench; and a $53,000 Napoleon III fireplace log holder. (E.g. GX BUCK1 –\nBUCK1296; GX 1B125K).\n• A $832,000 red Lamborghini that Guo parked in his Greenwich garage. (GX\nGC276).\n• A $4.4 million Bugatti Chiron Super Sport custom designed by and for Guo’s son,\nMileson. (GX 218).\n• A $3.5 million Ferrari race car. (GX Z14; GX802).\n• A $2,130,000 yacht for Guo. (GX GC309).\n\n---\n\n17\n• Cash transfers to Guo’s family. (GX GC415).\nThese lavish displays of wealth were, in many cases, personally selected and directed by\nGuo. (See, e.g., GX 1B125M-8; GX 1B125M8-T (video of Guo directing Mahwah mansion\nrenovation and describing the bedrooms for his daughter and her boyfriend); GX PRO466 (“the\nassistant of Mr. Miles Kwok” directing the Mahwah mansion designs on Guo’s behalf); Tr. 2926\n(realtor testimony regarding Guo’s search for the Mahwah mansion); GX 1B125K (a Guo text\nmessage directing that “G-Club or another private company [be used] for payment” for a coffee\ntable ordered from Shenzhen, China); GX 1B125F (Guo text messages regarding the shipment of\na yacht purchased with G|CLUBS funds); GX 1B125I (a Guo text message selecting the font to\nuse for the purchased yacht)).\nE.   Himalaya Exchange\nIn November 2021, Guo and Je launched the Himalaya Exchange (“HEX” or the\n“Exchange”) with a broadcast on GTV. (See Tr. 3669-70, 3675). Guo marketed HEX as a\ncryptocurrency “ecosystem” where investors in his prior schemes could purchase and trade two\ndigital assets of Guo’s creation. (See Tr. 3669-70; PSR ¶¶ 56-57). Guo’s purported\ncryptocurrencies—H Coin and H Dollar (originally G Coin and G Dollar)—were fraudulent.\nIndeed, Wang—Guo’s chief lieutenant, whose compensation package purportedly included H\nDollar—admitted in her own sentencing proceedings after pleading guilty that “the cryptocurrency\nWang was promised by Guo was worthless and illiquid.” (PSR ¶ 28 n.2). As described below, the\nlies that Guo told to solicit investment in these sham coins included that they were backed by gold\nand cash; that they were real cryptocurrencies held and traded on the blockchain when instead they\nexisted only on an offline spreadsheet controlled by William Je’s investment fund; that their price\nwas set by a real market; and that Guo would personally guarantee HEX investors against losses.\n\n---\n\n18\nGuo made these false promises personally. In a music video designed for HEX’s launch, Guo\nappeared in the same Lamborghini that was bought with G CLUBS members’ money and kept in\nGuo’s garage in Greenwich.  (See, e.g., GX GC276; GX C370).\nGuo repeatedly told his followers that H Coin was backed by “20% gold.” (See PSR\n¶ 57(a), (b); see also GX Z9 at 121-122, GX C459-V1, GX C459-2). At trial, HEX’s figurehead\nCEO—who testified that he “was in control of nothing” (Tr. 3634)—explained that Guo’s “20%\ngold” claim was false: none of H Coin’s value was tied to gold, nor was H Dollar secured by gold\nreserves (another of Guo’s lies). (See Tr. 3694; see also Tr. 2653-54). Victims testified that Guo’s\nrepresentations about his coins’ gold reserves were material to their decisions to purchase his\npurported cryptocurrencies. (See, e.g., Tr. 2425).\nGuo and Je told investors that his coins were created and “[a]ll the transactions are recorded\nin distributed ledger, a public ledger, called blockchain.” (GX Z9 at 125; see also GX Z9 at 88\n(Guo’s statement that the blockchain has “an important function: absolute fairness!”)). In fact,\nHEX “wasn’t a blockchain”—it was “just a database.” (Tr. 3658; see also id. 2670). The lie was\nnecessary, the Exchange’s CEO testified, because the truth that Guo’s coins were not on the\nblockchain could have caused their price to crater.  (See id. at 3679).\nThe price of Guo’s coins was also a mirage.  Rather than the product of a market accessible\non a public ledger, H Coin and H Dollar were held almost entirely in wallets controlled by Je’s\nentities. (Tr. 2646). That allowed Guo and his co-conspirators to stage-manage the purported\ncryptocurrencies and give them the illusion of reality.  In June 2022, for example, Je publicly\nshared the news that “a buyer decided to purchase a world-class car” using H Dollar. (PSR ¶ 60).\nThe car was a Ferrari purchased for Guo’s son using victims’ money, (see PSR ¶ 28), and the\ntransaction was actually executed using a bank wire—with a fig-leaf H Dollar “transaction”\n\n---\n\n19\ncreated after the fact. (PSR ¶ 60). HEX’s purported investors could not use H Dollar or H Coin,\neither, or even take custody of the purported cryptocurrencies in accounts or wallets of their own.\nInstead, Guo’s investors got “credits” that “represented” the sham assets, and that could not be\nused outside of Guo’s HEX ecosystem and could not be converted into “fiat currency or crypto-\nassets” at all. (PSR ¶ 61).\nThe obscured centralized control of Guo’s purported cryptocurrencies permitted their price\nto be manipulated by Guo’s co-conspirators. Shortly after their initial public offering, HEX\nreported that the price of Guo’s H Coin had increased from $0.10 to $27—a 26,900% increase\nwithin just a few weeks. (PSR ¶ 58). The allure of the coins’ value “going to the moon”—a phrase\nGuo used to market the coins, and one that “implies a sharp increase in value” (PSR ¶ 59)—was\ncombined with Guo’s false promise that he would personally guarantee HEX’s investors against\nlosses: “It’s all on Brother Seven if we lose money.” (E.g., GX Z9 at 64; GX C302-V7.)\nGuo ultimately collected more than $260 million in victims’ money through HEX. (PSR ¶\n56). That money played a vital role in his ongoing fraud, as both a source of personal enrichment\nand as yet another means of perpetuating and expanding Guo’s racketeering enterprise. In April\n2022, Guo and Je transferred $37 million from HEX “to cover the cost of a luxury yacht that Guo\nhad previously purchased and used.” (PSR ¶ 62). Later that year, Guo and his co-conspirators\nplanned to use HEX investors’ money to purchase a bank that would have afforded the G\nEnterprise an increased ability to launder and misappropriate victim funds and to obstruct law\nenforcement investigations—a plan that was only thwarted by the seizure of HEX’s funds by the\nGovernment pursuant to seizure warrants. (See, e.g., GX GC552; Tr. 2796). After HEX’s fraud-\nfunded coffers were depleted by those seizures, Guo continue to lie about the safety and stability\nof his HEX investors’ money, telling them months after those seizures that “the issue and\n\n---\n\n20\nredemption of HCoin and its stability, are all under the extremely strictest supervision by\nregulations.” (GX Z9 at 184).\nF.   A10\nFollowing the Government’s seizure of more than $600 million of Guo’s fraud proceeds in\nlate 2022 and early 2023, Guo sought one more cash grab through a purported investment\nopportunity that he called “A10.” A10 was designed to raise additional victim proceeds and secure\nthem offshore, in Abu Dhabi, outside of the jurisdiction of the United States. (Tr. 1460, 2810).\nG|CLUBS was the inspiration and foundation for A10, which involved Guo offering his victims\nan opportunity to buy A10 stock that was, according to Guo, “a completely independent G Club\ncompany established in Abu Dhabi.” (GX VI189, GX VI189-T). At other times, Guo claimed that\nA10 purported to offer victims an opportunity to purchase ownership interest in Guo’s Gettr social\nmedia platform and the Himalya Exchange. (GX Z10).\nAs Ms. Chen, a victim, explained during her trial testimony, A10 was another example of\nGuo “asking us to give money to investment, just keep draining out our pocket[s] . . . but where is\nthe return?” (Tr. 4503). There was none.\nG.   Obstruction of Justice\n1. Obstruction Relating to the Offense Conduct\nGuo’s conduct and his (often successful) efforts at obstruction display an utter contempt\nfor the law. His obstructive conduct has taken many forms—from the complexity of the investment\nschemes described above, to the constant evolution of those investment opportunities after\ndetection or disruption by criminal and civil authorities and other third parties, to moving both the\nenterprise’s operations and fraud proceeds offshore so they would be beyond the jurisdictional\n\n---\n\n21\nreach of both the Bankruptcy Trustee and U.S. law enforcement, to his intimidation of those who\ncomplained or criticized him or otherwise threatened the continuation of his criminal enterprise.\nGuo’s money launderer, William Je, sought to frustrate the Government’s further seizure\nof fraud proceeds by transferring the remaining funds to bank accounts in the UAE (PSR ¶¶ 80-\n81), and even after Guo’s arrest, the G Enterprise relocated to Dubai and redirected victim funds\nto accounts there. (Tr. 1472-77, 1481-87 (“Q: What’s your understanding of why they didn’t want\nto use US dollar? A: Because US dollar will be traced. Q: Traced by whom? A: Traced by US\ngovernment.”); see also PSR ¶¶ 96-97 (Wang’s attempts to coordinate the retrieval of $7.1 million\nin fraud proceeds even after her arrest and detention)).\nGuo also repeatedly labeled those who requested investment refunds as “CCP spies” and\ndirected his thousands of followers to bully and harass them. That harassment took place both\nonline and in person, in the form of paid protests at individuals’ personal family homes. (Tr. 1487-\n89). Guo maintained a “black list” of former supporters who criticized Guo or his organizations.\n(Tr. 1489). Guo shared the personally identifiable information of people on his black list and\ndirected his supporters to post and broadcast it online. (Tr. 1489-90). This intimidated and terrified\nmany investors, who feared the consequences both for themselves and their families back in China\nwere the CCP to learn that they had supported what they had previously believed to be an anti-\nCCP movement. Guo would also refuse to issue refunds to followers who were critical of him or\nthe enterprise. (Tr. 1409-10). In at least two instances, Guo’s protest targets were physically\nassaulted and injured. What was Guo’s response to his loyal followers when he learned of those\nphysical assaults? “Well done.” (Tr. 1488).\n\n---\n\n22\n2. Obstruction Relating to the Bankruptcy Proceedings\nIn addition to the obstruction directly related to the investment scams, and while they were\nongoing, a slew of Guo’s obstructive conduct occurred in connection with his bankruptcy\nproceeding and earlier civil litigation where Guo faced contempt sanctions. (See PSR ¶¶ 64, 83-\n90).\nIn 2017, the investment fund Pacific Alliance Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. (“PAX”) filed a\ncivil lawsuit against Guo in New York Superior Court, seeking the repayment of an overdue loan\nthat Guo had personally guaranteed. In September 2020, PAX secured a judgment against Guo in\nthe amount of approximately $114 million. (Tr. 4018). After PAX secured its judgment, it\nundertook efforts to enforce the judgment by identifying and then attempting to levy upon Guo’s\nassets in the United States.  However, “PAX encountered difficulty identifying assets over which\nGuo exercised control because Guo, who is a self-declared multi-billionaire, had secreted his assets\nin a maze of corporate entities and with family members.”  PAX Lawsuit, Index 652077/2017,\nDkt. 1181, at 7-8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022).  PAX obtained a restraining order in October 2020\nthat covered Guo’s yacht, the “Lady May,” and ordered it not be moved outside the jurisdiction.\n(Tr. 4020; GX 1416). Yet the Lady May was moved outside the jurisdiction.  As a result, on\nFebruary 9, 2022, New York State Supreme Court Justice Ostrager entered a final order of\ncontempt against Guo. (Tr. 4022-27; GX 1413). The court’s order required Guo to pay $134\nmillion in contempt fees in five business days. (Tr. 4027).\nInstead of paying his contempt fees, on February 15, 2022, Guo filed for Chapter 11\nbankruptcy in the District of Connecticut. (Tr. 4027). In his bankruptcy filings, Guo claimed to\nhave as much as $500 million in debt and, despite living in expensive properties, surrounded by\nluxury cars and exorbitantly expensive furniture, declared under penalty of perjury that he had\n\n---\n\n23\nessentially no assets. (Tr. 4039-42; GX 1407; GX 1420). While Guo’s bankruptcy filings made\nnote of his residences in Greenwich and at the Sherry Netherland hotel, they omitted any reference\nto Guo’s mansion in Mahwah, New Jersey. (Tr. 4044). In sworn testimony in connection with his\nbankruptcy proceedings, Guo obstructed and lied under oath. As one example, Guo preposterously\nclaimed, under oath, and in a spurious attempt to distance himself from GTV, that the “G” in\n“GTV” did not stand for “Guo”:\nQ. What does the G in GTV stand for?\nA. God, the goal, like in G-O-A-L.\nQ. The English word “goal?”\nA. Yeah, goal or God.\n(Tr. 4083).\nYet Guo’s obstructive conduct in the bankruptcy went far beyond his own false\ndeclarations and perjurious testimony. Guo engineered a campaign of harassment against the\nTrustee and his family members in the form of protests after labeling the Trustee and others\ninvolved in the bankruptcy as “CCP spies.” As noted, this form of intimidation was part of Guo’s\nplaybook and he used it to continue and facilitate his investment scams.9 In the bankruptcy, the\nTrustee and his family, including his daughters, were the subject of protests, which lasted for 90\ndays. (Tr. 4091). Guo targeted the Trustee and the law firm where he worked, Paul Hastings, with\nprotestors carrying signs like the following:\n\n9 Guo even directed protests of the SEC on the false pretense that the CCP had infiltrated the SEC.\n(PSR ¶ 89).\n\n---\n\n24\n\n(GX VI 194). Guo also targeted the Trustee personally via his family members, protesting outside\ntheir personal homes, and even targeting the public elementary school where the Trustee’s\ndaughter, a teacher, worked. Guo’s paid protestors held signs like this at the Trustee’s daughter’s\napartment and the elementary school where she worked:\n\n---\n\n25\n\n(DX 7007). The Trustee and his family were accused of being CCP “running dogs,” “supporters\nof genocide,” and having blood on their hands. Those allegations, as Guo well knew, were false\nand designed to rile up his supporters and deter the Bankruptcy Trustee (and others who\ncontemplated action against Guo) from both seizing Guo’s property and investigating his finances.\n(Tr. 4214 (the Trustee’s son-in-law testifying that “prior to them showing up at our apartment,\nthey’d show[n] up at Luc's work and Luc’s house, so we had kind of understood by then that\nthey—that this has been a pattern and that they were there because—to put pressure on Luc and\nhis family in order to stop working on this case for the government.”)).\nThere is no doubt that it was Guo who was directing this violence, because evidence of the\nharassment and targeting was recovered from one of his cellphones, which had the device name\n“Boss.” (Tr. 4716-17). That evidence includes a truly chilling photograph of the Trustee and his\n\n---\n\n26\nfamily at the wedding of one of his daughters, where the Trustee’s three daughters were circled in\nred10:\n\n(GX 1B124F; see also Tr. 4717).\nBeyond the targeting and attempted intimidation of the Trustee and his family, Guo ordered\nothers to obstruct the court proceedings in other ways. When Ya Li received a subpoena from the\nbankruptcy trustee, Guo told her to “throw it in the rubbish bin,” and she complied because she\nbelieved Guo when he said that the U.S. Department of Justice had been “weaponized by the CCP.”\n(Tr. 1498-99). In connection with the G Enterprise’s efforts to keep assets outside the reach of the\nbankruptcy trustee even after Guo’s arrest, Yongbing Zhang—the attorney and co-conspirator who\n“won” a Lamborghini in the G|CLUBS “sweepstakes,” and with whom Guo who has continued to\n\n10 The red circles highlighting Despins’s daughters appeared on the photograph that was recovered\nfrom Guo’s cellphone. The Government added only the black redactions, to protect the privacy of\nvictims and/or third parties in this public filing.\n\n---\n\n27\nmeet in the MDC following his arrest and detention—asked Ya Li to sign a false affidavit for filing\nin one of the bankruptcy litigations. (Tr. 1523-29; GX VI 66). When she refused, Zhang threatened\nMs. Li with $38 million in liability. (Tr. 1530). After this threat from Guo’s attorney, Ms. Li\ncontemplated suicide. (Tr. 1530-31).\nMore recently, Guo’s enterprise continues to harass and threaten those that oppose it. On\nMarch 10, 2026, in a video provided to the Government by a victim, Guo’s NFSC presenters\nrequested that Guo’s remaining followers provide statements to Guo’s court appointed counsel. In\naddition, the presenter indicated that the 126 victims who previously provided statements “will all\nhave to bear the consequences.” (Dkt. 832, Stmt. 206-B (translated)).\n\nThat appears to be a reference to the 126 victim statements filed with the Court on November 22,\n2024. (Dkt. 477).\n3. Guo’s Post-Arrest Obstruction\nEven after his arrest Guo has engaged in obstructive conduct. Guo’s criminal Enterprise\ncontinued to operate following his arrest and Guo continued to direct it as it relocated to the UAE,\noutside the reach of U.S. law enforcement. (PSR ¶¶ 103-105). Following his arrest, Guo’s\n\n---\n\n28\nfollowers sought to fabricate evidence at the Mahwah Mansion to make it appear as if it were a\nG|CLUBS property, rather than Guo’s personal family home. (PSR ¶¶ 91-95). Similarly, following\nGuo’s arrest, one of Guo’s top lieutenants, Brother Long Island, instructed Ya Li and others to\ndelete evidence from their phones in case they were arrested.11 (Tr. 1500-02).\nIV.   VICTIM STATEMENTS\nTo date, the Government has received and provided to the Court a total of approximately\n225 victim impact statements.  These statements reflect the extreme harm perpetrated by Guo on\nhundreds of victims located throughout the United States, harm that included extreme financial\nhardships, mental anguish, broken family bonds, and contemplation of self-harm including suicide.\nSpecifically, on November 22, 2024, the Government filed a letter attaching approximately\n126 victim statements. (Dkt. 477). On December 11, 2024, the Government filed seven additional\nvictim statements that it had received. Dkt. 482. On January 2, 2025 and January 3, 2025, the\nGovernment filed a total of 16 additional victim statements. (Dkts. 486, 487). The Court has sealed\ndockets 477, 482, 486, and 487, which entries contain the aforementioned statements. On April 7,\n2026, the Government filed an additional 74 statements under seal. (Dkt. 832). These cover letters\nare provided to the Court as an Exhibit, under seal, in light of the Court’s prior ruling.12\nFor the Court’s convenience, the Government will provide a hard copy of all of these victim\nimpact statements to the Court’s chambers.\n\n11 Prior to Guo’s arrest, Guo himself instructed Ya Li and others to delete evidence from their\nphones. (Tr. 1500-02).\n12 The Government believes that the cover letter at Docket 477, which is attached under seal as\nExhibit A to this filing, should be filed on the docket. That cover letter does not contain any\npersonally identifying information for any victims. It merely summarizes certain statements\nreceived as of that date. Accordingly, the Government respectfully requests permission to file that\nletter on the docket.\n\n---\n\n29\nV.   APPLICATION OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES\nA.   Applicable Law\nIn calculating the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, the Court must either rule on\nthe parties’ factual disputes or “determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter\nwill not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” Fed. R.\nCrim. P. 32(i)(3)(B); see also Gleeson et al., Second Circuit Criminal Handbook § 42-39 (“[T]he\nsentencing judge need not resolve every single dispute a party raises regarding the presentence\nreport.”). “[P]recise calculation of the applicable Guidelines range may not be necessary” if,\namong other things, the Court “decide[s] to impose a non-Guidelines sentence.” United States v.\nCrosby, 397 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir. 2005). In that circumstance, the Court has “leeway” to “avoid\nthe need to resolve all of the factual issues necessary to make precise determinations of some\ncomplicated matters, for example, determination of monetary loss.” Id.\nIf a “factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties\nshall be given an adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding that factor.”\nUnited States v. Berndt, 127 F.3d 251, 257 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)). But the\nCourt also has wide discretion in how to resolve such disputes—and evidentiary hearings are not\nrequired. United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29, 54 (2d Cir. 2013). In choosing whether to resolve\nmaterial sentencing disputes by hearing or a more summary procedure, courts consider “the nature\nof the dispute, its relevance to the sentencing determination, and the applicable case law.” United\nStates v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1995). Disputed sentencing factors need only be\nproven by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Crosby, 397 F.3d at 112; United States v.\nGuerra, 888 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1989).\n\n---\n\n30\nB.   Probation’s Guidelines Calculation and Sentencing Recommendation\nIn the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), the Probation Department calculates an\nadjusted offense level of 55—which exceeds the maximum offense level set forth in the U.S.S.G.\nsentencing table and is therefore “treated as a level 43” as Guo’s case is one of “those rare instances\nwhere the total offense level is calculated in excess of that number”—and a criminal history\ncategory of I. (PSR ¶¶ 120, 123, 126).  Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b), Guo’s Guidelines sentence\nis the maximum statutorily authorized length of imprisonment, which is 2,100 months, or 175\nyears. (PSR ¶ 167). The Government agrees with Probation’s calculation of the Guidelines and\nsubmits that the Court should adopt it.\nAfter describing Guo’s personal circumstances, interviewing Guo, reviewing the trial\nrecord, and considering the offense conduct, the Probation Department recommended that Guo be\nsentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment—20 years on Counts One, Two, Three, Seven, Eight, Nine,\nTen, and Eleven (to run concurrently), and 5 years on Count Four (to run consecutively). (PSR at\n58). The Probation Department pointed out that, although Guo declined to discuss the offense\nconduct during his interview, “he noted that he maintains his innocence.” (PSR at 59). The\nProbation Department emphasized that Guo’s criminal conduct “resulted in astronomical losses\ntotaling more than $1 billion to thousands of victims” and that Guo “played a pivotal role in the\noffense as the leader of the scheme.” (Id. at 61).  While mindful of Guo’s personal circumstances—\nwhich are sourced almost entirely from Guo—including the “personal losses that [Guo] has\nreportedly suffered at the hands of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party], as well as the potential\ndanger he would face if returned to his native country”—the Probation Department “do[es] not\nbelieve that the personal history and characteristics of the defendant outweigh the need for\nsignificant punishment and deterrence in this case.”  (Id.) (emphasis added).\n\n---\n\n31\nC.   The Offense Involved an Actual Loss in Excess of $550 Million\nAs the Court saw at trial, Guo’s offenses caused losses to thousands of investors. Whatever\nreasonable estimate the Court may choose to employ to compute the harm of Guo’s schemes, the\ntotal losses exceed $550 million and, in fact, exceed a billion dollars. Because Guo’s offense\nresulted in losses exceeding $550 million, his Guidelines offense level increases 30 levels.\nU.S.S.G. § 2B.1(b)(2)(P).\n“Loss” is defined in the Guidelines as “the greater of actual loss or intended loss.” U.S.S.G.\n§ 2B1.1, cmt. 3(A). “Actual loss” is defined as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that\nresulted from the offense.” Id., cmt. 3(A)(i). And “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm” is\ndefined as “pecuniary harm”—that is, “harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily\nmeasurable in money”—that “the defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably should\nhave known, was a potential result of the offense.” Id., cmt. 3(A)(iii), (iv). “Intended loss” is\ndefined as “the pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to inflict,” and includes any\n“intended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or unlikely to occur.” Id., cmt. 3(A)(ii).\nThe “Guidelines do not require that the sentencing court calculate the amount of loss with certainty\nor precision.” United States v. Bryant, 128 F.3d 74, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1997). Instead, a court “need\nonly make a reasonable estimate of the loss,” given the “available information.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1,\ncmt. 3(c); see also United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 250 (2d Cir. 2012) (evidence supporting\na Guidelines loss determination “need not . . . establish loss with absolute precision; it need only\npermit the district court to make a reasonable estimate of the loss given the available information”).\n1. The Trial Record and Tracing Affidavits Prove the Loss Amount Exceeded $550 Million\nThe record before the Court amply supports a loss amount exceeding $550 million. In fact,\nthe trial evidence shows that $1.3 billion is a conservative estimate of the amount of funds sent by\n\n---\n\n32\nindividual victims to certain arms of the G Enterprise’s frauds: GTV, the Farms, G|CLUBS, and\nthe Himalaya Exchange. (See GX Z26; Tr. 4330-32). GX Z26 summarizes thousands of pages of\nbank records, which were also admitted as exhibits. (GX Z26 at 36 (citing source exhibits)). GX\nZ26 establishes, by at least a preponderance of evidence, that $1.3 billion flowed into bank\naccounts associated with the racketeering enterprise, which the jury’s verdict demonstrates were\nthe result of fraud. That exhibit, and the maze of bank accounts it summarizes, also demonstrates\nthe involvement of $1.3 billion in money laundering.\nGuo argues that the Government’s summary witness at trial, Paul Hinton, who testified\nabout his analysis of financial records for the entities that comprise the G Enterprise, does not\nprovide a sufficient basis for the Court to find “any” loss amount. (Guo Sentencing Submission\n(“Guo Sub.”) 44). Guo’s arguments can be dispensed with easily. Guo appears to argue that the\nCourt cannot use the money that flowed into the bank accounts of the G Enterprise as a reasonable\nestimate of the loss amount because Hinton did not perform a “tracing” analysis.13 (Guo Sub. 44).\nBut there is no legal requirement that a district judge’s loss estimate for purposes of calculating\nthe Guidelines be based on any kind of meticulous tracing analysis. See Coppola, 671 F.3d at 250\n(evidence supporting a Guidelines loss determination “need not . . . establish loss with absolute\nprecision; it need only permit the district court to make a reasonable estimate of the loss given the\navailable information”). In any event, even if there were such a requirement, the Court already has\n\n13 At trial, the Government specifically proved, via other witnesses who did perform tracing\nanalyses, the misappropriation of well over $100 million by Guo and his conspirators.  For\nexample, the Government walked through summary charts showing how investor funds were used:\n(1) to purchase the Mahwah Mansion and the lavish furnishing and renovation of the mansion for\nGuo and his family (GX Z12A), (2) to purchase a $4 million Ferrari for Guo’s son (GX Z14), and\n(3) to place a highly speculative $100 million bet with a hedge fund for the benefit of Guo’s son\n(GX Z1).\n\n---\n\n33\nbefore it tracing analyses for $634,827,401.97 of fraud proceeds—i.e., an amount exceeding $550\nmillion—that were seized by the Government pursuant to court-authorized seizure warrants.  (Dkt.\n716 (Gov’t motion for preliminary order of forfeiture)).  In connection with its motion for a\npreliminary order of forfeiture against Guo, the Government submitted the sworn warrant\naffidavits that trace that amount of fraud proceeds, and indeed the Court has already relied on those\naffidavits when entering a preliminary forfeiture order against Guo. (Dkt. 720 (preliminary order\nof forfeiture against Guo)). Moreover, because the amount of fraud proceeds actually seized from\nthe Guo Enterprise indisputably exceeds $550 million, Guo’s arguments related to any purported\ndouble-counting, and any redemptions or refunds back to investors, are immaterial and can also\nbe easily dismissed.14  (Guo Sub. 44-45, 52-54, 63-66).\nRelatedly, Guo’s suggestion that the loss amount should be offset by “the value of the\ninvestment an investor retained regardless of the fraud” (Guo Sub. 66) is baseless. On top of the\nfact that no material value was conveyed to the victim investors and customers,15 the principle\ndoes not apply to calculation of the Guidelines loss amount. The Guidelines provide for “credits\n\n14 In arguing, incorrectly, that the victims’ losses were caused by the Government’s seizures, Guo\nmakes a wholly unsupported claim that appears intended to mislead his victims and misdirect the\nblame for their losses.  Regarding the SEC’s Fair Fund distribution for the GTV Private Placement,\nGuo asserts, without any citation: “For example, as a result of the GTV seizure, GTV investors\nlost at least 8% of their GTV investments, as 8% was the amount retained by the SEC before\ndistribution pursuant to the SEC’s Fair Fund.” (Guo Sub. 50 n.44). That is not correct. The SEC\ndoes not, and did not, retain victim investor funds for itself (nor did it “seize” any funds, which\nwere in fact received through a voluntary settlement). Guo’s victims lost 8% of their investment\nbecause Guo misappropriated their funds for a $100 million hedge fund bet that lost $30 million\nbefore U.S. authorities intervened and saved the remainder. (See GX STIP 19). And then Guo lied\nto his followers about it afterwards, on video. (Tr. 1370-73; GX VI 158, 158-T).\n15 At trial, victims testified about how they did not receive stock, or how they received token items\nlike “a cup and also some cookies,” in exchange for tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars. (E.g.,\nTr. 409, 1179, 1211-12, 1386-87).\n\n---\n\n34\nagainst loss” in two specific circumstances, neither of which apply here.  First, where the defendant\nreturns the victim’s money or property before the offense was detected, and, second, in cases where\nthe defendant pledged collateral to the victim.  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3(D)(i), (ii). Neither\napplies here.16 Moreover, the defendant’s offense involved fraudulent inducement. The Second\nCircuit has specifically rejected the argument that there should be a reduction of loss based on the\nvalue of a victim’s equity stake in a business—assuming, arguendo, that any victim here actually\nreceived such an equity stake, which they did not in this case—where the defendant’s offense was\nto fraudulently induce the victim to acquire that equity in the first place.  See United States v.\nKomar, 529 F. App’x 28, 29 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that the § 2B1.1(b)(1) “application notes\nsignificantly omit any direction to apply the value of an equity stake as a credit against actual loss,”\nand holding that “[t]he ‘loss’ was the money that the investors were fraudulently induced to invest\n. . . irrespective of the value of the [property]”); see also United States v. Paul, 634 F.3d 668, 677–\n78 (2d Cir. 2011) (rejecting need to consider non-fraud factors that may have reduced a stock’s\nvalue, because “[i]n the instant case . . . the loss to [the victim banks] was not caused by the\ndecline” in stock value, but by the victim banks being fraudulently induced into “the making of\nthe loans in the first instance”); United States v. Turk, 626 F.3d 743, 748 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting\ndefendant’s contention that loss amount is zero “because the properties in which her victims\nthought they were investing arguably had some market value,” and emphasizing that the victims’\n\n16 Additionally, Guo was convicted of money laundering, and the Section 2S1.1 Guideline groups\nwith Section 2B1.1. There is no “credit against loss” in the money laundering context: under\nSection 2S1.1, defendants who launder money are accountable for the “offense level for the\nunderlying offense from which the laundered funds were derived.” U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1); United\nStates v. Eckstein, No. CR 12-3182 JB, 2016 WL 546663, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 3, 2016) (no “credit\nagainst loss” in money laundering case because that credit “would not reflect a money laundering\nscheme’s full impact.”).\n\n---\n\n35\nloss is the “principal value of the loans they made to [defendant]”); United States v. Stitsky, 536 F.\nApp’x 98, 110–12 (2d Cir. 2013) (“the district court reasonably determined that no offset was\nwarranted for losses resulting from changed economic circumstances because [the victim]\ninvestors would not have been exposed to such risks had defendants not fraudulently induced them\nto invest in the first instance.”); United States v. Shkreli, No. 15 Cr. 637 (KAM), 2018 WL\n9539774, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018), aff’d, 779 F. App’x 38 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Consistent with\nSecond Circuit precedent, the appropriate calculation of loss for Count Three is [the] amount ‘that\nthe investors were fraudulently induced to invest’ and keep invested in MSMB Capital, based on\nMr. Shkreli’s many misrepresentations relating to the size, investing strategy, and performance of\nhis MSMB Capital fund.” (quoting Komar, 529 F. App’x at 29)); United States v. Bryson, 101 F.\nSupp. 3d 147, 155–56 (D. Conn. 2015) (holding that the loss to “investors who were fraudulently\ninduced to invest” was “the total value of their investment” because “[t]he loss to these investors\nwas caused not by the decline in value of [their investment], but by their having invested in the\nfirst place”).\nAccordingly, given the substantial record before the Court, including the evidence\npresented at a two-month trial over which the Court personally presided and the amount of fraud\nproceeds actually seized, there is absolutely no need for a Fatico hearing in order for the Court to\nmake a reasonable estimate of the loss amount. The loss amount plainly exceeds $550 million.\n(See GX Z26; Tr. 4330-32).\n2. The GTV Private Placement Fraud Should Be Included in the Loss Amount Calculation\nGuo argues that the Court must exclude the GTV Private Placement loss amount of\napproximately $411 million from the loss calculation under the Guidelines because the jury\nacquitted Guo of the substantive wire fraud and securities fraud related to the GTV Private\n\n---\n\n36\nPlacement. (Guo Sub. 56-62). As an initial matter, even if it were excluded, the applicable loss\nstill would exceed $550 million.  In any event, it is black-letter law that a “jury’s verdict of acquittal\ndoes not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge,\nso long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v.\nWatts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam). That is because “acquittal on criminal charges does\nnot prove that the defendant is innocent; it merely proves the existence of a reasonable doubt as to\nhis guilt.” Id. at 155. Accordingly, “[a]cquitted conduct may be considered by the sentencing court\nso long as it is based on reliable information and is proven by a preponderance of the evidence,”\nUnited States v. Willis, 14 F.4th 170, 188 (2d Cir. 2021), and “district courts may find facts relevant\nto sentencing—as opposed to elements of the offense—by a preponderance of the evidence and in\nso doing may take into account acquitted conduct when sentencing defendants,” United States v.\nJohnson, 507 F.3d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 2007).\nThe amendment to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c), effective November 1, 2024, does not call for a\ndifferent result here.  Section 1B1.3(c) provides that “[r]elevant conduct does not include conduct\nfor which the defendant was criminally charged and acquitted in federal court unless such conduct\nalso establishes, in whole or in part, the instant offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)\n(emphasis added). The last clause of Section 1B1.3(c) is applicable here. Guo was convicted of\nracketeering conspiracy (Count One), wire fraud conspiracy (Count Two), securities fraud\nconspiracy (Count Three), and money laundering conspiracy (Count Four), which were\nestablished, in whole or in part, by the conduct of the GTV Private Placement. And in cases where\n“certain conduct underlies both an acquitted charge and the instant offense[s] of conviction,” “the\ncourt is in the best position to determine whether such overlapping conduct establishes, in whole\n\n---\n\n37\nor in part, the instant offense of conviction and therefore qualifies as relevant conduct.” U.S.S.G.\n§ 1B1.3(c), App. Note 10.\nThat is the case here. As previously laid out (Dkt. 716), extensive trial evidence established,\nas alleged in the Indictment, that the RICO enterprise began well prior to the 2020 GTV private\nplacement, with the Rule of Law fraud. Guo then continued to defraud his followers with a series\nof interconnected schemes, including the GTV Private Placement in 2020. Multiple investors\ntestified as to how Guo fraudulently induced them into investing in GTV by purporting to\nguarantee investors against loss, claiming their funds would be used to grow GTV’s business, and\ninstead sending $100 million of investor funds to a high-risk hedge fund bet for the benefit of\nGuo’s son.  (See Tr. 209 (Le Zhou); id. at 701 (Patrick Chin); id. at 2376-77 (Minran Wu); id. at\n4465-67, 4471-72 (Wei Chen); id. at 1350-58, 1365-73 (Ya Li)). Further, the GTV Private\nPlacement was connected with and integral to the other arms of the G Enterprise.  Indeed, the Farm\nloan and G Clubs schemes were ways to conceal issuances of GTV stock—and they were promoted\non the GTV platform itself.  (See, e.g., GX Z9 (summary chart of Guo videos, including those\nposted preserved from the GTV website, and including videos where Guo falsely promises GTV\nstock in exchange for Farm loans and G Clubs memberships)). Even the H Coin-related schemes\nwere interconnected with the GTV Private Placement. (See, e.g., Tr. 244 (allocation of H Coin\nbased on prior investment, including in GTV); id. at 1358 (Ya Li testifying that the “[r]einvestment\nrule is once you received the refund from SEC [for the GTV private placement], within 45 days\nyou should invest this money back to the investment project and then you can get five percent of\nH Coin.”)).\nAccordingly, the Court should include the approximately $411 million loss amount for the\nGTV Private Placement in its Guidelines calculation.\n\n---\n\n38\n3. Whether an Investor Subjectively Regards Oneself as a “Victim” Is Irrelevant to the\nGuidelines Calculation\nGuo next argues that funds from any investors who do not regard themselves as “victims”\ncannot count towards this Court’s estimate of the loss amount for purposes of the Guidelines\ncalculation.17 (Guo Sub. 45-52). Guo is wrong as a matter of law. Guo appears to present his\nargument as one of materiality, seeming to claim that if a particular investor claims that Guo’s lies\nwere immaterial to their decision to invest, that investor’s investment amount cannot be considered\nfor purposes of calculating the loss amount under the Guidelines. It is black-letter law, however,\nthat materiality is not a subjective standard, but rather an objective standard relating to what would\nbe important to a reasonable person. See, e.g., United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d\nCir. 2017) (affirming instruction that did not require jury to consider materiality “from the\nsubjective perspective of the victim” because “a matter is material if a reasonable man would attach\nimportance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction\nin question”); see also Tr. 5793 (“[THE COURT:] A material fact is one which would be expected\nto be of concern to a reasonable and prudent person in relying upon the representation or statement\nin making a decision.”). That is because the focus of the criminal law is on the defendant’s intent,\nnot that of the victim, and the same is true of the Guidelines, which treat actual loss and intended\nloss equivalently. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, note (A). Guo’s criminal intent to deceive his victims about\nmaterial information was proven at trial by overwhelming evidence that showed him, indisputably,\nlying over and over to execute a cascading series of scams that betrayed the trust of an affinity\n\n17 In the course of making this argument, Guo repeats quotations from a forfeiture petition claiming\nthat the seizure of funds that were going to be used to purchase Mercantile Bank had nothing to\ndo with this case. That is wrong. For example, the “digital bank” project was one of the investment\nscams that Ya Li testified about and, in fact, helped organize. (Tr. 1342-43, 1430-32).\n\n---\n\n39\ngroup whom he conned to the tune of over a billion dollars. Guo’s video-recorded lies were\nobviously material to any reasonable investor. He lied, for example, about how he would never\nsteal his investors’ money, when he was in fact doing exactly that.\nIn the face of settled law showing his argument is baseless, Guo acknowledges that\n“materiality ordinarily would be subject to a ‘reasonable person’ standard,” but contends that a\nsingle Second Circuit case from over three decades ago, United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010\n(2d Cir. 1993), establishes that if a victim disavows materiality then the victim is no longer a victim\nand his loss is not a loss amount under the Guidelines. (Guo Sub. 45-46). Miller does no such\nthing. That opinion had nothing to do with materiality. It concerned the “money or property”\nelement of mail fraud. Miller, 997 F.2d at 1017 (reversing convictions because the government\n“fail[e]d to establish a § 1341 property interest”). Nor does the portion of Miller excerpted in the\ndefendant’s submission contain dicta relating to materiality. (Guo Sub. 46). In that excerpt, the\nCircuit was considering whether the defendants (who were lawyers) and a group of investors\npurchasing apartments in an apartment building had an agency relationship that prohibited the\ndefendants from also purchasing, in parallel to the group, apartments in the same apartment\nbuilding, such that the putative agency relationship might have established a constructive trust that\ncould be considered the investor group’s proprietary interest under the mail fraud statute. 997 F.2d\nat 1020. The head of the investor group’s testimony, see id. at 1014, however, repudiated the\nexistence of such an agency relationship and thus there was no constructive trust and no proprietary\ninterest, only a breach of “honest and faithful service” by the defendants. 18  Id. at 1020.\n\n18 While Congress had amended the federal fraud statutes to encompass honest services fraud in\n1988, the conduct in Miller occurred prior to 1988 and thus the amendment could not be applied\nretroactively to the defendants’ conduct. See Miller, 997 F.2d at 1016 n.5.\n\n---\n\n40\nAccordingly, and contrary to Guo’s assertions, Miller did not involve a victim who “specifically\nand affirmatively disavow[ed]” the materiality of lies told to him (Guo Sub. 46), and has no bearing\non the well-settled rule that materiality is an objective standard.\nTo the extent Guo may be seeking to offer investors’ subjective views as a mitigation\nargument, the Court can consider that, for whatever it’s worth, in its assessment of the Section\n3553(a) factors. But whatever its merits as a purported mitigation argument—and it is not\nmitigating, in the Government’s view, that Guo successfully convinced some of his fraud victims\nthey were not harmed when he took their money under false and fraudulent pretenses, see infra,\nSection VI.B—the issue is legally irrelevant to the Guidelines and provides no basis for a Fatico\nhearing or further delay of Guo’s sentencing.\n4. The Preponderance Standard Applies\nGuo’s argument that a higher burden of proof applies to the Guidelines loss amount\ncalculation (Guo Sub. 66-70) is foreclosed by long-settled precedent, including the cases cited by\nGuo. Indeed, the case that Guo appears to principally rely on, in fact, rejected the use of a higher\nburden of proof at sentencing “i[n] light of this Court’s continual application of the preponderance\nof the evidence standard” and reversed the district court’s use of the clear and convincing standard.\nUnited States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704, 708 (2d Cir. 2000). To the extent Guo argues\nthat the Court should vary downward from the Guidelines sentence of 175 years’ imprisonment\n(see Guo Sub. 67 (referring to the use of “downward departure (or, in the post-Booker era, a\ndownward variance)”)), that has no bearing on the Court’s reasonable estimate of what the loss\namount is, nor, more specifically, on the standard of proof that applies at sentencing to factual\ndeterminations and Guidelines enhancements under well-established law. Indeed, if the Court\n“decide[s] to impose a non-Guidelines sentence”—as both the Government and the Probation\n\n---\n\n41\nOffice recommend—the Court need not “make precise determinations of some complicated\nmatters” including the “determination of monetary loss.”  Crosby, 397 F.3d at 112.\n5. Guo’s Guidelines Sentence Remains 175 Years Even if the Court Found the Loss\nAmount Was Merely Over $3.5 Million\nLastly, while not an argument about the calculation of the loss amount, Guo argues that\nlarge loss amounts irrationally influence the applicable Guidelines sentence. (Guo Sub. 70-79).\nWhatever the Court may think of this argument in the abstract, it lacks force as to Guo’s Guidelines\ncalculation. As correctly calculated by Probation, Guo’s offense level with a loss amount of $550\nmillion would be 55—well above the maximum offense level of 43, which already advises a\nsentence of life imprisonment (adjusted to account for the 175-year statutory maximum for Guo’s\ncounts of conviction per U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b))—so Guo’s offense level is automatically reduced\nto 43.  Notably, if this Court were to find a loss amount merely of more than $3.5 million, see\nU.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J), Guo’s offense level would still be 43 and his Guidelines sentence would\nstill be 175 years’ imprisonment, because of the other enhancements that apply to Guo’s egregious\nconduct.  As a result, while the evidence clearly supports a finding that the loss amount exceeded\n$550 million in this case, virtually all of Guo’s arguments regarding loss are immaterial to the\nultimate Guidelines calculation.\nD.   Responses to Guo’s Other Guidelines Objections\nGuo’s “[o]bjections to [o]ther [g]uidelines [e]nhancements,” (Guo Sub. 79-82), amount to\ndenials of facts proven at trial or otherwise apparent from the record. These objections are meritless\nand should be rejected.\nGuo objects to the enhancement for the offense involving 10 or more victims, on the ground\nthat there is “no evidence of any victims other than the five witnesses who claimed to have lost\nmoney on their G-Series investments.” (Guo Sub. 79). The victims who testified at trial were just\n\n---\n\n42\nseveral of the many people who watched Guo’s broadcasts and sent millions and millions of their\nown money to Guo because they trusted his false promises. Indeed, more than 200 of Guo’s victims\nhave written the Court to be heard at sentencing. Guo’s continuing denial of their existence is\noffensive, and his objections premised on the erasure of the many people he stole from should be\ndenied.\n Guo objects to the enhancement for committing fraud while “acting on behalf of a\ncharitable, educational, religious, or political organization or a government agency,” on the\npurported grounds that “there was nothing fraudulent about either The Rule of Law Foundation or\nthe Rule of Law Society.” (Guo Sub. 79). The objection is similarly premised on an unwillingness\nto acknowledge the facts proven at trial. Guo’s first count of conviction is for a racketeering\nconspiracy that included both Rule of Law organizations among “[t]he interrelated and\noverlapping entities that form[ed] the G Enterprise.” (S3 Indictment ¶ 3(a); PSR ¶ 25). At trial, the\nRule of Law Society’s former president and treasurer Karin Maistrello testified that the\norganization did “nothing” to support its purported charitable mission. (Tr. 424.) Additional trial\nevidence established that Rule of Law donors’ money was used to fund protests against Guo’s\ncritics, purchase N95 masks for Guo and his family, and promote Guo’s celebrity. (Tr. 476, 481,\n1488 (“[protestors] paid by Rule of Law Foundation”).) Indeed, the Rule of Law organizations\nwere a critical instrumentality of the fraud in this case. (See PSR ¶ 30 (finding that Guo “used the\nnonprofit organizations to amass followers who were aligned with his purported campaign against\nthe Chinese Communist Party and who were also inclined to believe Guo’s statements regarding\ninvestment and moneymaking opportunities”)).\nGuo objects to enhancements for committing fraud by sophisticated means and through\nsophisticated laundering because, among other things, the factual basis is “purely speculative” and\n\n---\n\n43\n“there were no shell corporations” involved in his crimes. (Guo Sub. 79-80). Guo’s objection\ndenies not only reality but the Court’s prior determinations: at Wang’s sentencing, the Court found\nin relevant part that “the conspirators created shell companies . . . and moved their victims’ money\nacross hundreds of bank accounts held in various names” at “Guo and Wang’s direction.” (Dkt.\n491 at 56). That finding drew on extensive trial evidence of Guo’s use of shell entities to commit\nhis fraud and launder its proceeds. (E.g., Tr. 2904-05 (testimony and documentary evidence\nregarding Guo’s personal lawyer’s purported representation of a company owned by Mei Guo, his\ndaughter, to purchase the Mahwah Mansion); see also, e.g., PSR ¶ 62 (finding that Guo and Je\ntransferred Himalaya Exchange funds held by an offshore entity to an escrow account and\n“structured [the transaction] as a purported ‘loan’ to cover the cost of a luxury yacht that Guo had\npreviously purchased and used, which yacht was then-owned by an entity held in the name” of his\ndaughter)). The enhancement has a basis independent from the defense’s erroneous arguments.\nFor example, the defendant invented a false cryptocurrency to enhance his fraud. Such conduct is\nfairly considered “sophisticated.” See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, app. note 9 (defining “sophisticated\nmeans” as “especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution\nor concealment of an offense” including, for example, “[c]onduct such as hiding assets or\ntransactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial\naccounts”). Guo’s objection to enhancements premised on using sophisticated means and\nsophisticated laundering are not serious challenges in the face of the trial record, and should be\nrejected.\nGuo objects to the enhancement for deriving more than $1 million from at least one\nfinancial institution because he “did not personally receive more than $1 million” as a result of his\ncrimes. (Guo Sub. 80). The objection is baseless. Guo’s counts of conviction included Count\n\n---\n\n44\nTwo’s conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud. All the Court must do to apply this\nenhancement is to “reasonably conclude[]” by a preponderance of the evidence “that [Guo] must\nhave profited at least $1 million” from one or more financial institutions over the course of his\nbillion-dollar racketeering and fraud conspiracy. United States v. Constantinescu, 147 F.4th 299,\n316 (2d Cir. 2025). The record is replete with such evidence. (See, e.g., PSR ¶ 55(a) (G CLUBS\nfunds, “funneled through bank accounts in other entities’ names, were used to pay personal\nexpenses for Guo and his family, including luxury purchases of an approximately $2.6 million\nyacht”); id. ¶ 55(b) (describing Je’s use of “approximately $26.5 million of G CLUBS funds, which\nhad been funneled through bank accounts in other entities’ names, toward the purchase of Guo’s\n50,000 square foot New Jersey mansion”)).\nGuo’s objection to the enhancement for obstruction of justice is based on his inaccurate\nassertion that “[t]here is no evidence to support the purported grounds.” (Guo Sub. 81). That\nevidence is laid out in detail in Section III.G above (“Obstruction of Justice”), and paragraphs 91-\n97 of the PSR.\nGuo’s objection to the four-level enhancement for serving as an organizer or leader of the\ncrime is another unserious effort to deny the reality of the jury’s verdict. (Guo Sub. 81 (asserting\nthat Guo “was not an organizer or leader of any criminal activity”). Guo was convicted of, among\nother things, a count that alleged that Guo “was the leader of, and directed, the G Enterprise.” (S3\nIndictment ¶ 9).19\n\n19 Guo’s submission includes an additional section enumerating “[a]dditional [o]bjections to the\nPSR” that are all premised on his “disagree[ment] with . . . the jury’s verdict.” (Guo Sub. 82-92).\nGuo objects to much of the PSR in this section on the grounds that it “conclude[s] that Mr. Guo is\nguilty of any offense.” (Id. at 82). The Government need not respond to Guo’s objections that are\npremised on a wholesale rejection of the jury’s verdicts of his guilt.\n\n---\n\n45\nVI.   THE COURT SHOULD IMPOSE A SENTENCE OF AT LEAST 30 YEARS’\nIMPRISONMENT\nA.   The Nature, Circumstances, and Seriousness of the Offense Warrant a Lengthy\nSentence\n1. Guo Caused Immense Pain and Suffering to Thousands of Victims\nGuo caused staggering financial losses to thousands of victims. His victims were primarily\nordinary citizens and retail investors, and Guo tricked them out of money they needed for their\nfinancial futures and security. It is rare for a fraud case to cause harm exceeding a billion dollars.\nAnd when that has occurred, the loss often stems from corporate malfeasance, such as accounting\nfraud that causes the decline of a stock price.  The astronomical loss here was caused by Guo’s use\nof lies to take money from thousands of his victims. Guo told lies to take a billion dollars from\nvictims, and he supervised and created a large international organization to help him execute that\nfraud every step of the way.\nWhile the billion-dollar loss figure is enormous on a macrolevel, it is important to\nappreciate the harm inflicted on an individual level as well. As victims recounted during Guo’s\ntrial, they lost retirement savings, incurred debt, and suffered deeply because of this fraud.\nHundreds of additional victim statements corroborate that trial testimony:\n• “I have no job, and I gave all my money to Miles Guo. Now, I have no idea how I\nwill sustain myself for the rest of my life or how to face my family.” Dkt. 832, Stmt.\n158.\n\n• “I was forced to sell our only home, and my wife liquidated her life insurance\ninvestment of nearly 15 years, pouring all the funds into [the defendants] bogus\nprojects. These decisions dealt a devastating blow to our family’s finances and\nfuture security.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 1.\n\n• “[M]y family and I were defrauded of around $500,000, most of which came from\nselling our home. Now, this entire amount has been lost. This has pushed us from\na stable middle-class life to living on borrowed money.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 11.\n\n---\n\n46\n• “This has not only severely impacted on our family’s immediate financial security,\nbut has also had a significant shock to our long-term retirement plans, our children’s\neducation, and other important aspects of our lives.” Dkt. 477. Stmt. 113.\n\n• “This case destroyed everything I had—my family’s savings, our ability to support\neach other, and even our emotional connection. I involved my mother and brother,\nthinking I was helping them, only to see all of us dragged into financial ruin. My\nchildren's futures were deeply affected. The stability and dignity I dreamed of\ngiving them were shattered.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 200.\n\nGuo’s malicious activity permeated beyond significant financial calamity, it caused sheer\ndevastation:\n• “This fraud has devastated my life.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 152.\n\n• “I am in a very bad state of mind and unable to work, I have no money for\ntreatment.” Dkt. 477. Stmt. 42.\n\n• “This scam has seriously damaged our physical and mental health. We cannot sleep\nproperly every day and are in extreme pain. Now we hardly afford the rent of our\napartment and our son’s tuition fees.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 27.\n\n• “This fraud has also shattered my worldview. I once believed the world was a good\nplace where people could trust one another. Now, I don’t know how to trust anyone,\nnot even my closest family members. My paranoia and mood swings have strained\nmy relationship with my loved ones.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 11.\n\n• “Loneliness, helplessness and self-blame accompany me every second” Dkt. 477,\nStmt. 37.\n\n• “Since discovering the fraud, I have experience intense anxiety, fear, and emotional\nbreakdowns. I suffer from chronic insomnia and depression, and my daily life has\nbeen significantly disrupted. The psychological damage caused by this incident is\ndeep and long-lasting, and I am currently undergoing counseling and therapy to\ncope with the aftermath.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 210.\n\n• “It stripped away a significant portion of [my mother’s] life savings—$500,000\nintended to secure my future and that of my family. This loss exacerbated her health\nconditions, robbing her of peace in her final years. The scam preyed on her trust,\nundermining the financial legacy she worked tirelessly to build.” Dkt. 832, Stmt.\n198.\n\n---\n\n47\n• “Each day is spent in agonizing regret and self-reproach, and every night is\nconsumed by endless nightmares. I honestly don't know how much longer I can\nendure living under such a heavy cloud.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 163A.\n\n• “After being defrauded, we fell into severe financial hardship, were forced to cut\nback on daily expenses, and even considered selling assets to maintain basic living\nstandards. More painfully, this scam has inflicted serious emotional trauma on me\nand my family. I have suffered from long-term anxiety and insomnia. Trust within\nmy family has been badly damaged.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 190B.\n\nGuo’s harm affected many so deeply that some considered suicide and self-harm:\no “I lost my money, I lost my passion, my whole body was depressed, I suffered\nfrom severe depression and want to kill myself every day.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 202.\n\n• “Guo Wengui deceived and insulted our beliefs under the guise of democracy and\nthe rule of law. I felt so miserable that I thought about suicide many times. This is\na complete nightmare for me and my family. This is not a simple scam, it is a form\nof brainwashing. They encourage their followers to harass judges and attack people\nwho oppose Miles Guo.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 59.\n\n• “This fraud has left me feeling helpless and in despair, even leading me to consider\nsuicide at one point. The damage caused by this scam to me and my family is\nlifelong and irreparable.” Dkt. 477, Stmt. 85.\n\n• Trial Tr. at 1531-32 (Ya Li’s testimony that, upon discovering that Guo’s\nmovement was a scam, she felt “very angry, desperate, I feel guilty, I feel regret,\nand I’m very depressed, and I thought—thought about suicide”).\n\n• “The material losses were catastrophic—we lost nearly everything. But the\npsychological collapse was even more profound. My entire moral compass, built\naround truth, compassion, and community, was manipulated and shattered. I had\ntrusted blindly. When the truth became undeniable, I was overwhelmed with shame,\nguilt, and despair. I struggled with recurring suicidal thoughts. I lost my will to live,\nto hope, to believe in anything again.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 200.\n\nIn addition to the more than 200 statements submitted for sentencing, the FBI interviewed\ndozens upon dozens of victims who recounted the sometimes-excruciating losses they suffered—\nbut many remain afraid to speak publicly, for fear of retribution by Guo and his remaining\nsupporters.  The victims in this case were individuals who believed in Guo’s schemes in the\nmisleading way they were marketed—as a grand opportunity to become rich. Guo knew that was\n\n---\n\n48\na colossal lie (or, more precisely, a torrent of lies). Indeed, Guo himself claimed to personally\nguarantee that none of his victims would suffer loss, that their money was safe, and that he would\nnever use it for himself. But he knew these claims were lies, as he misappropriated victims’ money\nand conned them into investing more and more of their savings. (See Tr. 279, 2430, 1177).\nThe seriousness of Guo’s offenses also is exemplified by the geographic reach of the\nscheme, which literally spanned the globe.  Victims could be found in nearly every corner of the\nearth, and throughout the United States.  The operations of the fraud were also global in scale, with\ncompanies, entities, and bank accounts in an array of jurisdictions including the British Virgin\nIslands, Australia, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and Kyrgyzstan.\n2. Guo Led a Five-Year Scheme to Defraud with Serial Efforts to Evade and Obstruct\nJustice\nThe G Enterprise was a massive, sprawling, and complex universe of fraudulent\nsolicitation, receipt, laundering, and expenditure.  (See PSR ¶ 24 (finding that it operated “through\na series of complex and largely fraudulent and fictitious businesses and investment opportunities\nthat connected dozens of interrelated entities”)). But Guo was its namesake—and its singular and\nindispensable leader. As this Court has found—and as Guo’s own blinkered version of events\nbegins—the G Enterprise “[r]el[ied] on Guo’s massive online presence.” (Dkt. 491 at 55). His\nsubmission concurs, describing how Guo “amassed a massive social media following, with\nhundreds of thousands if not more than one million followers at times. Millions of members of the\nChinese diaspora . . . found resonance in Guo’s messages.” (Guo Sub. 13). And while Guo’s\nenterprise was served by various of his lieutenants (see PSR ¶¶ 31-32 (describing Je as the G\nEnterprise’s “financial architect” and Wang as Guo’s effective “chief of staff”)), it was always\nMiles Guo who, as this Court has put it, “had the final say.” (Dkt. 491 at 57). Put simply, there\ncould have been no GTV, no G|CLUBS, no G Coin (which became H Coin)—there could have\n\n---\n\n49\nbeen no G Enterprise—without Miles Guo. As one victim said, Guo “had videos every day.” (Tr.\n4616). The same victim’s experience was typical in another respect: Guo was not only a figure on\nhis followers’ computer and television screens, broadcasting from his GTV studios for hours a\nday. (See Tr. 1330 (testimony of Ya Li that she watched “[a]ll” of Guo’s videos “everyday”)). Guo\nwas also personally in contact with dozens if not hundreds of his victims—an unusual degree of\nintimacy for the leader and organizer of a mass fraud. Ya Li testified that after becoming a follower\nof Guo’s through his daily broadcasts, she and another supporter sent Guo a picture of a birthday\ncake she made for him—and was soon added to a WhatsApp group chat with Guo himself. (Tr.\n1331-32). Victim Wei Chen testified that Guo communicated with her family personally via\nWhatsApp chat, where he “sent the GTV investment information including wire instruction to my\nhusband.” (Tr. 4689).\nGuo commanded loyalty from his deputies, and awe and respect from his followers. His\nchief of staff, Wang, called Guo “the Principal.” (Tr. 426). A security official in the G Enterprise\ncalled him just “P,” shorthand for the same title at the top of the hierarchy. (Tr. 5484). “A lot of\npeople” called him, simply, “Boss.” (Tr. 5484; see also id. at 421). The enterprise’s takings were\ndivided accordingly. To be sure, Guo was not the only person to profit from the G Enterprise’s\nfraud proceeds. But he took more than the lion’s share of its ill-gotten gains for himself and his\nimmediate family. While Je “transferred at least $10 million of the fraud proceeds into his and his\nspouse’s personal bank accounts,” (PSR ¶ 28), Guo took the rest of “more than approximately\n$300 million of the fraudulent scheme’s proceeds for [his] and [his] family’s benefit.” (PSR ¶ 28).\nFor her part, Wang—the G Enterprise’s chief of staff—was rewarded with far less: a six-figure\ncash salary and an entitlement to Guo’s purported cryptocurrency that her counsel later conceded\n“was worthless and illiquid.” (PSR ¶ 28 & n.2).\n\n---\n\n50\nWith his supporters, Guo encouraged the creation of a cult of personality. “[W]e all use[d]\n[to] call Miles Guo ‘seven brothers’” or Brother Seven, one victim testified, explaining that the\nNew Federal State of China’s seven-sided star banner was “a flag that represents . . . Miles, the\nseven.” (Tr. 223). And Guo, in turn, allowed others a form of access to his cult of personality by\nbestowing titles on a select group of dedicated followers he called “the Iron Blood group.” (Tr.\n196). These were “individuals selected by Miles, to give titles . . . Miles Guo said, those are\nbrothers because those brothers are willing to sacrifice for him and shed the blood with him and\nfor this movement.” (Id. at 196-97; see also Tr. 1315 (Guo called Ya Li, an Iron Blood leader,\n“sister”)).\nWhen victims granted an audience with Guo raised questions or offered criticisms, Guo\nmade a performance of attacking their disloyalty and kicking them out of the group of supporters.\n(See, e.g., Tr. 1199-1200, 1214 (testimony of Jenny Li that when an investor asked Guo for a\nrefund on a Discord “audio meeting,” Guo told the group that “if you ask refund again, you will\nbe kicked out”)). He organized protests targeting his critics. (See, e.g., Tr. 1195). When victims\nsought refunds of their sham investments, Guo would rely on other supporters—including the Iron\nBloods—to vet the requests before Guo personally decided on whether to return their money. His\ndecision would “depend[] on the supporter’s attitude,” Ya Li explained: “If it’s normal, we’ll give\nthem the refund. If—if the supporter’s public criticize him or criticize—criticize the New Federal\nState of China, then we not refund.” (Tr. 1409-10).\nGuo’s personal and intimate leadership of the G Enterprise meaningfully aggravates his\nculpability for his racketeering and fraud convictions. His cultivation of an aura of extraordinary\nleadership was a critical instrumentality of the scheme. See United States v. Raniere, No. 18 Cr.\n204 (NGG), Dkt. 966 (Court’s Sent’g Mem.) at 10-11 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2020) (describing unique\n\n---\n\n51\nculpability of a fraudulent organization’s charismatic founder who “made members of” the group\n“call him ‘The Vanguard’” and who exercised control through, among other proxies, “a secret\nsociety” of high-level supporters that he “created”).\nIn addition to manipulating his followers, Guo manipulated U.S. courts and obstructed\njustice to protect and perpetuate his schemes. This conduct is described in detail in Section III.G\nabove. It consisted of removing fraud proceeds beyond the reach of United States authorities;\norganizing and funding protests of critics and dissident former supporters; initiating a bankruptcy\nto evade a New York court judgment and turning that proceeding into a vehicle for the attempted\nprotection of his ill-gotten gains; targeting the homes and workplaces of the bankruptcy’s Trustee\nand his family members; personally directing a prominent supporter to refuse to comply with a\nbankruptcy subpoena before sending one of his lawyers to tell her to submit a false affidavit; and\ncontinuing these acts through his lieutenants after his arrest by, for example, instructing followers\nto delete evidence from electronic devices. See supra Section III.G. Guo’s “attempts to silence his\ncritics and maintain control of his criminal enterprise,” including by “repeatedly obstruct[ing]\njustice and demonstrat[ing] a disregard for the rule of law,” underscore the need for a significant\nsentence. Raniere, Dkt. 966 at 17; see also id. (citing as particular example that defendant “worked\nto silence” victims when they “began to speak out publicly”).\n3. Guo Preyed on the Aspirations of a Community\nExacerbating the deep financial and physical suffering, an aggravating factor present here\nis that Guo preyed on the hopes and aspirations of a particular community—he carried out an\naffinity fraud against the Chinese diaspora who sought to promote democracy in China.20  (See\n\n20 An “‘affinity fraud’ [is a] ‘securities and investment fraud that targets members of an identifiable\ngroup perpetrated by a member within the group or someone claiming a desire to assist group\nmembers.’” United States v. Hawkins, 796 F.3d 843, 853 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lisa M. Fairfax,\n\n---\n\n52\nTr. 1355 (Ya Li explaining that she believed what Guo said in his broadcasts about investments\nbecause she had “already follow[ed] Miles Guo for three years” regarding the CCP “so I trust him,\neverything”); Tr. 1367 (Ya Li did not even read investment documents before signing “[b]ecause\n[she] trust[ed] Miles Guo 100 percent”). As one victim put it: “Miles Guo not only deceived us\nfinancially but also exploited our ideals of democracy and freedom. He claimed to be a fighter for\nChina’s democratic freedom, but in reality, he used this lie to deceive those who genuinely care\nabout China’s future.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 170. In so doing, Guo’s actions strike harder than even a\nserious financial crime because Guo relied on “an entirely different way of persuading people to\nturn over their money because they had such deep hopes that the political system in China, which\nis repressive, that that system would be challenged and possibly changed. It’s very different from\nhaving the motivation of doubling your dollar.” Dkt. 491 at 34-35 (Comments from the Court\nduring sentencing of Yanping Wang).\nNot only did Guo exploit the hopes of thousands, simply so he could live in outrageous\nluxury, he (falsely) portrayed himself as a hero, and a “freedom fighter,” of a movement that he\nseverely damaged:\n• “The criminal actions of Miles Guo and Wang Yanping have severely damaged the\nreputation of Chinese people and caused irreparable harm to the future efforts of\nChinese individuals fighting against the CCP’s tyranny. Guo and Wang are, in fact,\nthe true Communists.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 153.\n\n• “While loudly proclaiming his goal to defeat the CCP, he actually served their\ninterests by discrediting the very cause he claimed to support. By betraying us—\nthe true believers in ending the CCP’s tyranny—he has tarnished the fight against\nthe CCP itself. Now, whenever someone hears about efforts to oppose the CCP,\nthey may question whether it is just another scam.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 157.\n\n“With Friends Like These ...”: Toward a More Efficacious Response to Affinity–Based Securities\nand Investment Fraud, 36 Ga. L Rev. 63, 70 (2001)).\n\n---\n\n53\n• “Their actions did more than steal money; they destroyed the faith and goodwill of\ncountless individuals and damaged the unity and trust among those truly pursuing\ndemocracy. The pain of this betrayal far outweighs the monetary loss.” Dkt. 832,\nStmt. 203.\n\nGuo’s actions show that he used talk of pro-democracy ideals as bait. Guo drew his victims\nin by professing to fight on their behalf for lofty goals of a democratic China, but instead, he\ncollected, and spent to an outrageous degree, their money on himself and his family. Guo’s actions\nharmed the pro-democracy movement he professes to support by erecting an empire of fraud that\nsucked money from those who actually desired a democratic China. The Court observed as much\nat Wang’s sentencing last year, acknowledging that “there are many Chinese people both in China\nand elsewhere who have passionate feelings against the Chinese government and who support a\nchange, who support democracy, and who were inspired by the messaging of Mr. Guo, and that\nthat was a significant reason that they turned over their money to this fraud scheme.” (Dkt. 491 at\n34). The Court recognized that Guo took advantage of his victims’ “such deep hopes that the\npolitical system in China . . . would be changed and possibly challenged,” and used this as “a way\nof persuading people to turn over their money.” (Id.).\nIndeed, even the actions Guo took to allegedly promote democracy in China demonstrate\nhis selfishness and focus on fostering his own cult of personality. He made self-aggrandizing\nvideos of himself rapping, dancing, driving exotic cars, and sailing on expensive yachts:\n\n---\n\n54\n\n---\n\n55\n\n(See, e.g., GX C281-V; GX C370; GX C322-V6).\nGX C281-V is particularly notable. It is an approximately four-minute music video titled\n“Hero,” in which Guo appears in every single frame. In “Hero,” Guo dances, at times in a leather\ncoat with tassels, surrounded by choreographed backup dancers, in front of a private jet, luxury\ncars, and, at times, holding a lightsaber. The camera angles, editing, and song lyrics portray Guo\n\n---\n\n56\nas the leader of a hagiarchy. The “Hero” video’s self-adulation is of a piece with the mythology\nthat Guo fed his supporters, that he was “Brother Seven,” selected to advance their cause. That\nmythology worked because Guo preyed on a group of like-minded individuals that had been\nvictimized by a repressive regime. But Guo’s actions did not help his followers. Indeed, other than\na few lines in “Hero” that pay lip service to “taking down the CCP,” the music video—much like\nall of Guo’s videos and livestreams—just promoted himself.  (See also Tr. 1508 (Ya Li Testimony)\n(“Q. Ms. Li, does buying a multimillion-dollar house, $26 million house, in your view, help fight\nthe CCP? A. No. Q. Does buying a red Lamborghini, in your view, help fight the CCP? A. No.”\n(objections omitted)).21\nGuo tricked and stole from the people he called his “brothers and sisters” and his “fellow\nfighters” against the CCP. Far from treating them like family or comrades, Guo deceived and\npreyed on those seeking to promote democracy in China. Despite Guo’s loud pronouncements, in\nreality, his actions and those of his enterprise advanced Guo’s personal wealth, not the cause of\nfreedom in China. Indeed, by robbing from the adherents of that movement, Guo thwarted the\nprogress of the anti-CCP cause by sowing distrust and diverting its potential funding into his own\npockets.\n4. The CCP’s Conduct Is Irrelevant to Guo’s Convictions\nRather than accept any responsibility for years of his own fraudulent conduct,\napproximately 25% of Guo’s sentencing memorandum recounts activities Guo claims were done\nto him by the CCP. Even if it is all true, none of it excuses Guo’s criminal conduct. As Guo’s\nretained “Fox Hunt” expert Paul Doran made clear during trial, the CCP’s activities, including\n\n21 Nor do Bugattis, Lamborghinis or $35,000 mattresses protect one against CCP activities.\n(Tr. 5145-46 (Doran testimony)).\n\n---\n\n57\n“Operation Fox Hunt,” have “nothing to do with the business opportunities that Miles Guo\npromoted.” (Tr. 5190). Nor does, as Doran further agreed, being “targeted by the CCP . . . give\n[one] license to” raise money by “making false promises online.” (Tr. 5142). The CCP’s actions\nhave no bearing on whether thousands were victimized by Guo and his enterprise, and provide no\nreason for the Court to mitigate the serious punishment that Guo justly deserves. (See, e.g., Tr.\n1534-35 (Ya Li testimony)22; 2429-30 (Minran Wu testimony)).23\nTo be sure, the Government stipulated that from 2017 to 2018, the PRC engaged in certain\nconduct aimed at the defendant. See DX STIP 1. But whether Chinese officials, in 2017, paid some\nto protest against Guo, or sought to repatriate him so that he could answer to criminal conduct for\nwhich he was accused in China, fails to excuse the extremely serious nature of the brazen and\nmassive financial frauds he perpetrated on his victims. Whatever mitigating value the CCP’s\ntargeting may offer, it is sharply outweighed by the remarkable magnitude of Guo’s years-long\ncriminal conduct: outrageous self-enrichment, harassment of others, obstruction of the judicial\n\n22 “Q. If it were true he was targeted by the CCP, how does that change your view of Miles Guo's\nmovement? A. No change. Q. If it were true he was targeted by the CCP, how does that change\nyour view of his investment projects? A. No change. Q. Why doesn't it change your view, Ms. Li?\nA. Even being targeted by CCP, doesn't mean you can scam people's money. I'm also being\ntargeted by CCP. I won't cheat any people's money. That's wrong. Q. How were you targeted by\nthe CCP, Ms. Li? A. My——my parents in China, the CCP police called them and asked them to\ntell me stop what I'm doing because my activities is threatened the national security; and they also\ncalled my parents and other relatives to try to find me, ask them if I'm back to China, how they\ncontact me; and my parents tell me don't go back to China, they will arrest me, but I'm the only\nchild. Q. Ms. Li, after being targeted by the CCP, did you spend supporter money on yourself? A.\nNo. Q. Did you spend investor money on yourself? A. No. Q. Why not? A. Because that's not my\nmoney. It's investment money, supporters' money. And those monies should be used to fight\nagainst the CCP, not for myself.”\n23 “Q. Ms. Wu, if it were true that Miles Guo was targeted by the CCP, does that change your view\nof the investment projects? A. No. Q. Does it change your view of the movement? A. No. Q. Why\ndoesn’t it change your view? A. This movement just a scam. I don't think it's related anything to\nthe CCP. Also if somebody is anti-CCP, it doesn’t mean this guy could scam somebody else. That’s\ndifferent things. You cannot use this anti-CCP to do something illegal.”\n\n---\n\n58\nsystem, and unrestrained fraud that he perpetrated against thousands, so he could buy himself\nmillion-dollar chandeliers and surround himself in luxury.\nIndeed, the record shows that Guo himself used CCP-like tactics against those who\nopposed him. (Compare Tr. 5149 (Doran Testimony) (“Q. So standing outside someone’s home\nand filming them whether surreptitiously or overtly is a CCP tactic, right? A. Yes. Q. Especially\nif you do it at their place of work to and their home, right?); with Tr. 4221 (Copeland testimony)\n(describing harassment perpetrated by Guo’s followers who “would livestream from outside our\nhome, so that was a big reason we wanted to keep the blinds down all the time is because they\nwould kind of like videotape us. If not, they’d be videotaping us moving around our home”). And\nit was Guo who created his own cult of personality that, like the CCP, attacked critics.24 It is the\nheight of hypocrisy for Guo to ask this Court for mercy by citing the same conduct he unleashed\non his victims.\nLast, Guo asks the Court to consider his claimed personal history, which is the same\nmythology he espoused to his victims: a humble upbringing, family trauma (at the hands of the\nCCP), Guo’s self-reported support for the Tiananmen Square protests, political imprisonment,\nunexplained real estate financial success, shortly followed by “whistleblowing,” detention, an\n\n24 See Tr. 5168 (Doran conceding that “one of the ways to promote that cult of personality in China\nis that if the Chinese people express views contrary to President Xi, they're retaliated against. Q.\nPeople criticize the leader, they're retaliated against, right? A. Yes. Q. Those are the rules of the\nChinese Communist Party, right? A. Yes.”); Tr. 1410 (Ya Li testimony) (“Q: Ms. Li, what are the\nrules and ideology of the Himalaya Farm? A: . . . have to support Miles Guo, support Himalaya\nAlliance, and not to criticize Miles Guo and criticize New Federal State of China publicly.”); Tr.\n1489 (Ya Li testimony) (“Black list is the member of the farm, if they start publish, criticize\nAlliance or New Federal State of China or Miles Guo, they will become CCP and a traitor, so their\nname go to black list. Q. What happened to some of the people on the black list? A. Some of their\npersonal information will be post online. Q. Where would that personal information come from?\nA. From Miles Guo. (objections omitted)).\n\n---\n\n59\nescape to Hong Kong, immigration to the U.S., and launch of his purported anti-CCP activity.\n(Guo Sub. 5-15). Those pages in the defendant’s sentencing submission are sourced to Guo’s\nstatements to the Probation Office. 25 The Court need not resolve the truth regarding Guo’s\nupbringing, claimed political imprisonment, and his “mythology,” since it is all immaterial to an\nappropriate sentence. But, suffice to say, the Court should afford little weight to the words of an\nunrepentant serial liar who used that same “legendary” personal history as a weapon to brainwash,\nand rob, thousands of innocent victims.\n5. Guo’s Extraordinary Personal Enrichment\nAs described above, Guo profited handsomely from the massive, years’ long scheme that\nhe led at the substantial, and devastating, expense of others. He destroyed the lives of people who\nbelieved he could free them from an oppressive Communist regime so he could buy more than\n$700,000 worth of bespoke Brioni suits (GX CT201); so he could tool around in a Lamborghini\n(GX CT38; Tr. 143), and buy a $4 million Ferrari for his son (see Tr. 1873-1885); so he could\nsleep on $35,000 mattresses (see Tr. 3914-16; GX BUCK375); and so he could bounce around\nbetween his $69 million Manhattan penthouse, his Greenwich estate (GX CT133), and his $26.5\nmillion New Jersey mansion (GX NJ134).\nAs presented at trial, Guo flaunted his immense wealth and, in fact, used it to market and\nperpetrate his fraud scheme. Guo publicly announced and aggressively marketed the Rule of Law\ncharities on social media, including in videos where he represented that he would personally fund\n\n25 Probation also relied on a letter that purports to have been submitted by Guo’s wife. (PSR ¶ 140).\nProbation did not interview her when preparing the PSR. Additionally, the Probation Department\n“attempted to conduct a collateral telephone interview with the defendant’s daughter, Mei Guo;\nhowever, the contact telephone number furnished appears to now be an inactive account and the\ncall could not be completed.”\n\n---\n\n60\nthe charities with $100 million of his own fortune. (GX VI 192; Tr. 694-95). Guo’s victims testified\nat trial that they had the impression that Guo was a “very wealthy” person. (See, e.g., Tr. 191-92\n(Le Zhou); Tr. 692-93 (Patrick Chin, noting Guo’s “luxury apartment, yacht, and the cars”); Tr.\n2372 (Minran Wu, testifying that Guo said he was a “rich, very rich, billionaire”)). Wei Chen\ntestified that Guo’s portrayal of his staggering wealth “played a critical influence in” her decision\nto invest in the GTV Private Placement, because it made her “believe that he is a wealthy person\nand he has resources.” (Tr. 4468-71). Ya Li testified that Guo was a billionaire in China who was\nincluded on China’s “rich list,” and that her understanding of his vast wealth led her to believe that\nher investments in Guo’s fraud vehicles were safe, because Guo could afford to repay any investor\nlosses. (Tr. 1330, 1347-48).\nGuo used the staggering fraud proceeds to fund his ultra-luxury lifestyle—even after filing\nfor bankruptcy—while falsely representing to victims that the purchases were for the benefit of\nthe very followers whose money he was stealing, including G|CLUBS members and Himalaya\nExchange investors. (Tr. 3081, 3266-67).\nAs this Court observed to counsel during trial, Guo “appear[ed] in a number of videos in\nextravagant settings,” and it was “Guo who put[] himself next to the Lamborghini and the jet and\nin a living room with gilded objects.” (Tr. 1363-64). He enjoyed a life of excess while robbing his\nvictims of their livelihoods and safety. For example, Guo bought his Lamborghini with G|CLUBS\nmembers’ money (see GX Z26 at 25; Tr. 3072), and he drove the Lamborghini in the H Coin to\nthe Moon music video (GX 370-V), where he promoted the launch of the Himalaya Exchange (see\nalso GX C370, GX Z9 at 140):\n\n---\n\n61\n\nThe FBI recovered that very Lamborghini from inside the garage of Guo’s Greenwich, Connecticut\nhome when he was arrested there on March 15, 2023:\n\n(GX CT38). Guo bought his $26.5 million Mahwah, New Jersey mansion with fraud proceeds,\nand spent an additional $14 million in fraud proceeds to renovate and customize the mansion to\nhis precise specifications and desires. (See, e.g., Tr. 1510-11, 3893-94).\n\n---\n\n62\nAs described above, Guo extended the shell game that he used to operate his racketeering\nenterprise to his treatment of own personal assets, including his designer cars and his mansion. He\ntitled his Mahwah mansion under the Taurus Fund, which was registered to Guo’s bodyguard,\nScott Barnett, unbeknownst to him (Tr. 5452-53); he titled his Sherry-Netherland penthouse under\nGenever Holdings LLC, which his son owns (Tr. 4043-44); he titled his Greenwich, Connecticut\nresidence shown below under the family office Greenwich Land LLC, whose sole member is his\nwife (Tr. 4043); he registered his red Lamborghini in the name of his daughter’s boyfriend, Defeng\nCao (Tr. 5435-36, 5528); and on and on for all his assets.\n\n(GX 133). Guo’s unrepentant personal use of tens of millions of dollars in fraud proceeds—money\nhe had led his victims to believe would be invested for them, or used to advance their chosen\n\n---\n\n63\ncause—demonstrates that Guo acted out of greed and was driven to defraud his victims by his\ninsatiable, selfish desire for excess wealth.\nB.   Specific Deterrence and Protection of the Public Is Necessary\nUnder Section 3553(a), the need for the sentence to “protect the public from further crimes\nof the defendant” and “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct” must be considered.\n18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C).  A serious and lengthy sentence is warranted to protect the public\nand promote the needs of both general and specific deterrence.\nFirst, Guo’s conduct evinces a complete and utter contempt for the laws of the United\nStates, despite his choosing to immigrate to this country and seek asylum under its legal system.\nHis sustained criminal and obstructive actions demonstrate that neither civil sanctions nor the\nthreat or impositions of criminal or civil penalties deterred him from operating a gargantuan global\nfraud that has injured thousands. Indeed, only a lengthy sentence of incarceration can attempt to\nprotect the public from Guo.  The threat posed by Guo is especially pernicious because the scope\nof his fraud was so vast, so varied, and because Guo consistently adapted his criminality to thwart\ncriminal and civil regulatory authorities when he was at liberty.\nAfter establishing the fraudulent purported dual charities (the Rule of Law Society and the\nRule of Law Foundation) in April 2020, Guo’s enterprise raised money in connection with the\nfraudulent offering of GTV stock. Given that this offering was not registered with the SEC,\ninvestors were required to meet a series of requirements to ensure they were qualified to\nparticipate. Guo and others flouted those requirements and pooled victim money from unqualified\ninvestors, through vehicles such as Voice of Guo (i.e., VOG, the company that former Phoenix\nFarm leader Sara Wei ran at Guo’s direction, as described during trial). The SEC investigated the\noffering, put a stop to it, and ultimately entered into an agreement pursuant to which the money\n\n---\n\n64\nraised (to the extent it was not unlawfully spent) would be redistributed to investors. (GX STIP19).\nOf course, $100 million of the money Guo’s enterprise raised in the GTV Private Placement was\nnot for GTV—it was for Guo and his family.26\nAfter Guo’s actions drew regulatory attention—after the SEC required Guo and GTV to\ndisgorge the money it collected, aside from the $30 million of victim funds lost in the HHKOF\ninvestment—Guo’s  conspiracy adapted. This time, Guo used “Farm Loans”—as opposed to direct\nsales of stock—to sell shares in GTV. That money was routed through a complex web of\nsophisticated monetary transactions before being funneled back to Guo’s family. Then Guo\nchanged tactics again. Now he sold GTV (and other Guo-linked entities’) shares through the guise\nof “memberships” in G|CLUBS.  But G|CLUBS money was not used to fund a media company,\nor even to fund any real member benefits.  Rather, G|CLUBS money was used to purchase luxury\nassets, fancy sports cars, and a literal mansion for the Guo family. G|CLUBS further tried to hide\nits criminality through a figurehead CEO, while Guo’s co-defendant Yvette Wang acted as its de\nfacto CEO. When Guo’s G|CLUBS and the broader enterprise ran into banking difficulties, Guo\nand his acolytes engineered yet another solution:  a fake cryptocurrency called H-Coin and H-\nDollar. In service of those phony cryptocurrencies, Guo and William Je promoted the Himalaya\nExchange, which operated both as a fraud scheme and a money laundering operation to draw\nvictim money into “cryptocurrency” that Guo and the G Enterprise fully controlled.\nIn the summer of 2022, the Government sent a criminal grand jury subpoena to G|CLUBS,\nand in September and October 2022, the U.S. Government seized $630 million from the G\n\n26 Wang Plea Tr. at 25-26 (“In about June 2020, I was directed by others to wire approximately\n100 million U.S. dollars from a bank account in New York to Hayman Capital Management, a\nhedge fund in Texas.  I knew these funds had been received from investors in the GTV\noffering. . . . I knew what I was doing was wrong.”)\n\n---\n\n65\nEnterprise, including hundreds of millions from accounts linked to the Himalaya Exchange. Rather\nthan be dissuaded from criminal activity, Guo’s enterprise adapted yet again; this time, with Guo’s\nlaunch of “A10” and “A15” schemes that collected money by claiming to sell stock in Gettr,\nG|CLUBS, and other Guo-linked entities. Except this money, this time, was to be sent to the\nMiddle East to place it beyond the reach of the U.S. Government.\nGuo’s ability to adapt his criminal schemes to evade civil enforcement, and the threat of\ncriminal enforcement, makes plain that a very lengthy term of incarceration is required to protect\nthe public and specifically deter Guo from future criminal conduct.\nSecond, the risk of recidivism here is acute because Guo continues to claim he did nothing\nwrong. He is not even feigning to the Court that he will reform his ways—he effectively concedes\nthat he will keep doing the same.27 The Court should assume as much because Guo’s is singularly\nmotivated by a desire to live luxuriously and promote himself. He is compelled to seek material\nwealth without regard to honesty or consequence. That fixation will not change, and it presents an\nunacceptable risk that his criminality will continue once released from prison. Indeed, as an\nimmigrant seeking asylum, Guo was highly incentivized to abide by all laws while in the United\n\n27 Also, the fact that a past fraud conviction does not necessarily deter a future one is evidenced\nby the number of first-time fraud defendants in this District who have become recidivists.  See,\ne.g., United States v. Jonathan Ghertler, No. 23 Cr. 100 (ER) (investment fraud scheme following\nover a dozen prior convictions); United States v. Franklin Ray, No. 22 Cr. 228 (AT) (orchestrating\na Ponzi scheme after having served a prior two-year sentence for bank and wire fraud); United\nStates v. Vitaly Borker, No. 22 Cr. 273 (JSR) (defendant convicted of wire fraud for operation of\nfraudulent eyeglasses website after two prior federal convictions for the same conduct); United\nStates v. Joseph Meli, No. 19 Cr. 480 (RA) (defendant convicted of participating in a Broadway\nticket resale investment fraud scheme after previously serving a 78 month sentence for the same\nscheme); United States v. Edward Durante, No. 15 Cr. 171 (ALC) (beginning a new investment\nfraud scheme while serving a 121 month sentence for fraud); United States v. John Galanis, No.\n15 Cr. 643 (PKC) (defendant convicted of securities fraud after 1973 and 1988 convictions for\nmail fraud and securities fraud).\n\n---\n\n66\nStates. Clearly, that incentive did not matter. See Raniere, Dkt. 966 at 16-17 (“Ultimately, [the\ndefendant’s] lack of remorse, coupled with his view that that the conduct for which he was\nconvicted was actually ‘noble,’ strongly suggests the need for a significant sentence.”).\nGuo has never accepted responsibility for what he has done. At no point has he shown any\nwillingness to admit culpability for fraud and deceit or show any remorse whatsoever for his\nconduct. Guo has lied, obfuscated, obstructed, manipulated, and harassed with utter impunity.\nDespite his trial conviction, Guo maintained to the Probation Office “that he is innocent of all of\nthe charges in the Indictment.” (PSR ¶ 111). He “disagrees with” the jury’s verdict. (Guo Sub. at\n82). According to Guo, as in the case of Nxium founder Keith Raniere, “the brave victims who\nhave spoken out . . . are liars,” and “[d]espite everything that has happened and despite the\ncountless victims who have given voice to their great pain, [he] remains unmoved. Indeed, he\nmaintains his innocence.” Raniere, Dkt. 966 at 16.\nGuo’s offensive claim that his prosecution was in some way politically motivated does not\nwithstand an iota of scrutiny and is yet another of his transparent efforts to cast himself as a victim,\nrather than a perpetrator. (See Guo Sub. at 32-33). The criminal investigation into Guo began in\nJuly 2020, parallel to the SEC’s investigation into the GTV Private Placement that had closed its\nfundraising the month prior. The decision to open that investigation had nothing to do with politics.\nGuo’s relationship with Steve Bannon was not a “key element underlying this prosecution.” (Guo\nSub. at 25). Rather, the key element underlying this prosecution was the billion dollars Guo stole\nfrom innocent victims through fraud after fraud. Desperate to distract the Court and the public\nfrom the actual evidence of his crimes, Guo seeks to manufacture conspiracy theories about this\ncase. (Guo Sub. at 32). But none of these distractions, nor politics, have anything to do with the\ninvestigation into, and the prosecutions of, Guo and his co-conspirators for the crimes they\n\n---\n\n67\ncommitted through Guo’s complex fraud, money laundering, and racketeering enterprise—or the\nverdict rendered by an impartial jury during the trial presided over by this Court.\nIn assessing specific deterrence and protection of the public, the Court should weigh\nheavily that the defendant has never accepted responsibility for his truly offensive and blatant\nfraud. But Guo’s rejection of responsibility is worse than just that. A defendant is entitled to claim\ninnocence but Guo goes further: he falsely claims victimhood.  He attempts to denigrate the rule\nof law that brought him to justice. Such indignancy coupled with Guo’s baseless suggestion of\nimpropriety in the prosecution of this case warrants a substantial sentence. See, e.g., Raniere, Dkt.\n966 at 16 (“To make matters worse, [the defendant] and his counsel . . . are engaged in a public\nrelations campaign to cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial system and the jury verdict.”).\nThird, perhaps most troubling is that Guo, and his enterprise, have continued criminal\nactivities for the three years that Guo has been incarcerated. Following his arrest and detention,\nGuo continued to direct his enterprise as it relocated to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), outside\nthe reach of U.S. law enforcement. (PSR ¶¶ 103-105). Victims who have monitored the online\nmusings of Guo and his remaining acolytes further illustrate how Guo continues to operate his\nenterprise, and uses it stifle victims from speaking out against him:\n• “According to Yue Zhou, the Secretary-General of the New Federal State of China\n(NFSC), in the weekly ‘Until We Meet Again’ program every Friday, he and\nseveral other key members visit Ho Wan Kwok every week. Many of the orders\ncurrently being executed by NFSC have been approved by Kwok.” Dkt. 832, Stmt.\n214.\n\n• “Despite the arrest of Guo Wengui, the fraud group has not been dismantled. The\nfarms related to it are still operating, and Guo Wengui is still directing members in\nprison, instructing them to continue to defraud and threaten victims. In addition,\nmembers of the fraud gang are lurking in different countries and are still continuing\nto defraud, launder money and cover up crimes.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 188.\n\n---\n\n68\n• “I am deeply shocked and disappointed that Guo Wengui continues to orchestrate\nnew fraudulent activities directly from prison.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 183B.\n\n• “From within MDC detention, he continues directing the NFSC organization,\nspreading misinformation through Gettr livestreams, promoting false narratives\nsuch as ‘Guo will be acquitted’ and ‘U.S. justice is controlled by the CCP.’ He\nactively promotes new fraudulent schemes including TDCCP and MEME tokens,\nleading to fresh victims.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 213.\n\n• “Even while in custody, he continues to deceive, having created a so-called digital\ncurrency called TDCCP, which has scammed more people. The money he has\nobtained is being used to pay for legal fees and other expenses.” Dkt. 832, Stmt.\n180.\n\n• Guo has shown absolutely no remorse. Instead, he and his group have continued to\nattack victims, spread lines, and even tried to force victims to write statements to\nhelp him avoid punishment. His recent behavior has made it crystal clear that he\nbelieves he is above the law.” Dkt. 832, Stmt. 184.\n\nGuo’s ongoing criminal activity is consistent with his apparent belief that the laws of\nsociety do not apply to him. This is exemplified by Guo’s remarkable pattern of obstruction of\ncourt proceedings (see Dkt. 51 at 7-10 (this Court listing instances of the defendant’s obstruction)),\nincluding these proceedings, which provides yet more reason to doubt Guo will respect this Court’s\nsentence, seek to reform, or be willing to abide by the law.  (See Dkt. 51 at 11 (“Defendant’s\nhistory of obstructive behavior in prior cases and his conduct in this matter establish that he is\nlikely to continue this pattern if released.”)).\nLastly, the defense makes much of the claim that certain individuals deny their status as\n“victims.” (Guo Sub. 46 – 51). But the import of this fact is lost on the defense. That Miles Guo\nhas successfully convinced many individuals that they are not his victims underscores the danger\nGuo continues to pose to the community. No matter what the defense claims, the Government\nproved at trial, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Guo knowingly and intentionally defrauded\nthousands. Guo intended to commit crimes, and did so for years. Guo is a gifted conman, with an\n\n---\n\n69\ninnate ability to persuade thousands to do as he wishes. That Guo is so good at robbing people he\nis able to convince them that they are not his victims, is not a mitigating factor. It is an aggravating\none. That Guo has marshalled letters from those who claim they still believe in him, even after his\nconviction for this massive fraud, only underscores the risk that Guo will rally such supporters in\nservice of a future scheme. Guo’s preternatural abilities to commit fraud on a global scale, and\ndestroy or harm the lives of so many, requires this Court to impose a lengthy sentence to protect\nthe public by incapacitating Guo, a protection which only this Court can provide.\nC.   A Substantial Term of Imprisonment is Necessary for General Deterrence and to\nPromote Respect for the Law\nA substantial term of imprisonment is also necessary to deter others from engaging in\nsimilar acts of criminal deception and to promote respect for the law.\nIn enacting Section 3553(a), “Congress viewed deterrence as ‘particularly important in the\narea of white-collar crime.’”  United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing\nS. Rep. No. 98-225, at 76 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259); see United States\nv. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2006) (deterrence of white-collar crime is “of central\nconcern to Congress”). General deterrence is a particularly important sentencing factor in fraud\nand other white-collar cases because the decision to commit those crimes is often a calculated cost-\nbenefit decision. Martin, 455 F.3d at 1240 (“Because economic and fraud-based crimes are more\nrational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, these crimes are prime\ncandidates for general deterrence.”). As Judge Posner observed, “[c]onsiderations of (general)\ndeterrence argue for punishing more heavily those offenses that either are lucrative or are difficult\nto detect and punish, since both attributes go to increase the expedited benefits of a crime and\nhence the punishment required to deter it.” United States v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th\nCir. 1994); see United States v. Zukerman, 897 F.3d 423, 429 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Heffernan).\n\n---\n\n70\nHere, a substantial term of imprisonment is necessary to telegraph the serious consequences\nthat await would-be criminals who attempt a fraud as massive as Guo’s. Guo’s crimes have\nattracted significant public attention, and substantial efforts have been undertaken to recompense\nvictims of those crimes. That notoriety counsels in favor of a 30-year term of imprisonment for\nthe purpose of promoting general deterrence. See, e.g., United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 94\n(2d Cir. 2017) (affirming district court’s sentence which took into account, among other things,\ngeneral deterrence and the fact that the sentence imposed “could have a powerful general deterrent\neffect because the case had attracted an unusually large amount of publicity”). Should Guo receive\nthe leniency he seeks, others may be emboldened to engage in similarly audacious crimes,\nbelieving that such schemes are hard to unravel and, even if they are detected, are unlikely to result\nin significant repercussions, as compared to the potential upside of becoming one of the richest\nmen in the world.  Cf. United States v. Livesay, 587 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (“It is\ndifficult to imagine a would-be white-collar criminal being deterred from stealing millions of\ndollars from his company by the threat of a purely probationary sentence.”).  If anything, an\ninsubstantial sentence for Guo would encourage—rather than deter—would-be criminals, inviting\nthem to live large by building global, billion-dollar fraud schemes that carry minimal\nconsequences.\nD.   Guo’s History and Characteristics\nMiles Guo chose to commit sprawling financial crimes from a platform of wealth and\nprivilege.  Guo had the opportunity to make vastly different choices with his resources and his\napparent personal charisma. Instead, he repeatedly chose to use those advantages to exploit, for\nyears, a community of people who followed and trusted him so that he could use their money to\ncontinue to live a life of ultra-luxury unknown to all but the world’s most wealthy individuals.\n\n---\n\n71\nGuo cannot, and does not, claim his conduct was the product of youthful indiscretion or an\naberrational bad decision. Guo’s personal circumstances do not call for anything other than a\nsubstantial term of imprisonment, and Guo’s arguments that his background and experience\nmitigate his offenses are meritless.\n1. Guo’s Background as a Purportedly Powerful Billionaire Aggravates, Not Mitigates,\nHis Culpability\nGuo’s submission spends nearly eight pages describing how he “achieve[d] economic\nprosperity,” enjoyed “business success” and was a “prominent” person before overseeing the five-\nyear, billion-dollar fraud scheme for which he was convicted at trial. (See Guo Sub. 8-15). At\nsentencing, Guo mobilizes his “extraordinary wealth” and “phenomenal business success” as\nmitigation. (See id. at 87 (“To the pro-democracy movement, [Guo’s] wealth meant power to face\nand to confront the CCP.”)). Guo has made different arguments about his wealth at different times\nand for different purposes. He has argued that his “vast wealth” and lavish lifestyle was\nexculpatory because “[h]e had no reason to steal.” (Tr. 5986). But at other times, Guo has argued\nthat he is indifferent to money, a person so unfocused on material matters that he could hardly\nhave been interested in a scheme to defraud. (See Tr. 6050-51 (arguing that Guo “barely thought\nabout his finances” and asking jury if they “think a man like Mr. Guo, who doesn’t even have a\ncredit card, is going over bank statements and telling people to take money out of the farm loans\nprogram to make a random maintenance payment on his yacht”); but see GX 417 (recording of\nGuo personally ordering the transfer of $100 million of G|CLUB members’ funds to an entity\ncontrolled by Je)).\nThe truth is that Guo’s purported billionaire status was a key instrumentality of his fraud—\na feature Guo used to lure victims toward him, to earn their trust, and to create the impression that\nhe was able to help them become as rich as him one day, too. Guo’s serial claims to have billions\n\n---\n\n72\nof dollars also underwrote his constant promises to personally protect his investors against the risk\nof loss. A February 28, 2021 broadcast on GTV provides just one example. “There will never be\na chance like the one that we have today, where you can be involved in GTV and G Coin. You\nhave my words. . . . Brother Seven has worked all his life. I know what politics is, I know what\nfinance is, and I know what earning big money is. You won’t even understand. You don’t even—\n—you don’t understand even when I explain it to you. Brothers and sisters, you have to trust\nBrother Seven. None of you will pay for this if you lost money. I’ll be the one who pays for it.”\n(GXZ-9 at 67). Guo also invoked his wealth to anticipate and resist questions about whether his\npromises could be too good to be true, suggesting to his investors that he had no motive to rip them\noff because he already had so much money of his own: “So my brothers in arms, I don’t need\nmoney. . . . What I want is the love from my brothers in arms.” (Tr. 1035).\nAt trial, victim after victim testified to the central role these kinds of promises played in\ntheir decision to invest so much of their money in Guo’s purported opportunities. Le Zhou recalled\nhis first time watching Guo’s broadcast, and “learn[ing] he’s a self-made billionaire” who “seemed\nvery knowledgeable, well spoken” and who “mentioned” that “he will bear the legal responsibility\nfor what he talk about.” (Tr. 180; see also id. at 209 (describing how Guo “mentioned all the money\nwe invested, that principal would never lose, lost even a cent” because “[h]e will pay—personally\npay back”). Ya Li had a similar first impression, coming away from her first exposure to Guo\nunderstanding that “[h]e’s a billionaire in China” on the “who in China rich list.” (Tr. 1330).\nMinran Wu recalled that Guo “said he was rich, very rich, billionaire,” (Tr. 2372), and invested in\nGTV (and later in other Guo schemes) because “Guo said . . . [y]ou cannot imagine how great it\nwill be, how profitable it will be.” (Tr. 2375). Wei Chen explained that Guo’s purported wealth\n“played a critical influence in [her] decision” to invest  her family’s money in Guo’s schemes:\n\n---\n\n73\n“That made me believe that he is a wealthy person and he has resources . . . that will make it\nsuccessful.” (Tr. 4468).\nGuo cultivated an image as a billionaire with expertise in politics, media, and\nmoneymaking. He sold his victims not only shares in fraudulent ventures, but the chance to have\nan ownership interest in the kind of opulent lifestyle he showed off for years in his daily broadcasts.\nGuo’s wealth and prior business success, whatever they amount to, are aggravating factors because\nthey facilitated his fraud and enlarged its scope.\n2.\n\n---\n\n---\n\n75\non account of his immigration status after abusing the privileges of the asylum process. That\nsystem permitted Guo to live safely and freely in the United States. Rather than respect the rule of\nlaw that offered him refuge, Guo used the shelter and security provided by this country’s\nimmigration laws to establish and oversee a years-long fraud scheme. Not only that: Guo cynically\nabused the same institutions that could have safeguarded his family and protected any legitimately\nearned wealth by manipulating the U.S. bankruptcy system and obstructing justice in various U.S.\ncourts. See infra Section III.G. Having taken advantage of the U.S. immigration system, Guo\ncannot now be heard to offer its functioning as a ground for leniency.\nSecond, Guo’s immigration argument relies almost exclusively on cases where courts were\nconsidering whether to sentence a defendant to any term of imprisonment, United States v.\nConnolly (Black), No. 16 Cr. 370 (CM), Sent’g Tr. 87, 91-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (declining to impose\ncustodial sentence to avoid “very minor participant” defendant going into immigration custody “a\nshort term of imprisonment”), or release a defendant who had completed almost all of his sentence,\nUnited States v. Diaz, 07 Cr. 387 (CM), 2024 WL 4891908 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. November 26, 2024).\nGuo’s other cited case involved a Court’s decision whether to impose a 10-year or a 14-year\nsentence on a 40-year-old defendant. United States v. Wedd, 15 Cr. 616 (KBF), Dkt. 688 Sent’g\nTr. at 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). In other words, in all of Guo’s cited cases, the defendant’s post-release\nimmigration consequences factored into the court’s sentence because the defendant was all but\ncertain to be released in the relative near term. But there is no just punishment that would result in\n\nimmigration-related argument under seal. Guo’s counsel provided no additional basis—and no\nauthority—for sealing this filing. Because “rights of public access extend to criminal sentencing”\nand “the documents used in conjunction with those proceedings,” United States v. Sehgal, No. 24\nCr. 46 (AT), 2026 WL 539650, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2026), the Court should deny Guo’s\nimplicit sealing motion and require that his Exhibit 16 be filed on the public docket.\n\n---\n\n76\nGuo’s release from criminal custody on anything like that timeline. The Court therefore has little\nreason to consider this circumstance as having a meaningful impact on its sentence in this case.\n4. MDC Arguments\nThe Court should not be swayed by the defense’s argument that Guo should receive a\nlighter sentence than he otherwise deserves because he has been detained at the MDC during the\npendency of this case, since his arrest on March 15, 2023. (See Def. Br. at 99 (stating that the\n“MDC has been a dysfunctional institution for years”)). First, but for Guo’s eight sentencing\nadjournment requests, he would have been sentenced and designated to a different BOP facility\nmore than 17 months ago. To the extent he argues that his 37 months at the MDC somehow justifies\na shorter sentence, he is wrong, and he should not be permitted to manufacture his own allegedly\nmitigating circumstances. In advancing their MDC argument, the defense does not acknowledge\nrecent improvements to the conditions at MDC. However, as numerous judges in this District have\nobserved, conditions at the MDC improved greatly in 2025 (the exact time during which the\ndefendant was detained there).  See, e.g., United States v. Sandy Carazas-Pinez, 23 Cr. 346 (JPC)\n(Sept. 19, 2025 sentencing); United States v. Clinton McCullum, 24 Cr. 667 (JPC) (Aug. 29, 2025\nsentencing); United States v. Jean Carlos Burgos, 24 Cr. 650 (LTS) (May 21, 2025 plea); United\nStates v. Kevin Reshard, 24 Cr. 392 (JMF) (May 14, 2025 sentencing); United States v. Alon\nAlexander et al., 24 Cr. 676 (VEC) (Jan. 16, 2025 bail argument).\nAs the Honorable Jesse M.  Furman, United States District Judge, Southern District of New\nYork, noted in sentencing a defendant in May 2025 (during which time Guo was detained at the\nMDC):\nWith respect to other arguments made in the defense’s\nsubmission, on the MDC front, I’m certainly more than\nfamiliar with the circumstances at the MDC, and the place\nhas still much need for improvement, but it is also a lot better\n\n---\n\n77\nthan it was in January of last year when I wrote my opinion\nin United States v. Chavez that is cited in the defense’s\nsubmission.  As it happens, I just came from a meeting\ninvolving representatives of the MDC and got latest\nstatistics, which is that staffing is up to 75 percent, the\nmedical services staff is significantly higher and fully staffed\namong nurses, the incidents of violence went from 42 in\nDecember, which was a rather significant number, to only\nnine in April; all of which is to say it’s not nearly as bad as\nit was a year and a half ago and it’s definitely trending in the\nright direction.\n\nUnited States v. Kevin Reshard, 24 Cr. 392 (JMF) (May 14, 2025 sentencing).\nAnd as the Honorable John P. Cronan, United States District Judge, Southern District of\nNew York, remarked at a sentencing in August 2025 (also during the time Guo was detained at the\nMDC):\nI also mentioned I have considered the conditions at the\nMDC. Mr. McCullum was arrested federally on November\n19 of last year. I do note that conditions at the jail\nhave improved considerably, with increased staffing levels.\nMr. McCullum talked about lockdowns at the jail.  And\nwhile lockdowns are inevitable at a jail, the number of times\nwhen inmates are experiencing extended lockdowns is rare.\nAs Judge Caproni, who has been involved in overseeing\nconditions at the MDC, remarked at a bail hearing earlier this\nyear in United States v. Alexander, 24 Cr. 676, there have\nbeen a lot of improvements at the MDC.  “There’s a more\nstaffing at the MDC. The number of defendants who end up\nin lockdowns for substantial periods of time are\nminimal.”  The prison has put a lot more staff on, including\nmore medical staff. The conditions at the MDC are not ideal,\nbut there certainly have been improvements, and regardless.\nRegardless, I have considered those conditions.\n\nUnited States v. Clinton McCullum, 24 Cr. 667 (JPC) (Aug. 29, 2025 sentencing); see also United\nStates v. Sandy Carazas-Pinez, 23 Cr. 346 (JPC) (Sept. 19, 2025 sentencing: materially same\nas McCullum).\n\n---\n\n78\nIn sum, none of the defense’s arguments support leniency based on Guo’s incarceration at\nthe MDC. The Section 3553(a) factors compel a significant incarceratory sentence in line with the\nGovernment’s recommendation.\nE.   The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities\nA sentence of at least 30 years’ imprisonment is necessary and appropriate in this case to\nprovide just punishment while avoiding unwarranted sentence disparities. See 18 U.S.C. §\n3553(a)(2)(A), (a)(6). Guo was the singular leader of the G Enterprise and the architect of its\nfraudulent aims.  He caused tremendous losses in excess of a billion dollars, placing him in the\nGuidelines’ highest tier of harm, and was the primary beneficiary reaping the profits of his frauds.\nHe preyed upon thousands of victims worldwide and enlisted a hierarchy of lieutenants to carry it\nout, including co-conspirator Yvette Wang, who herself is serving a 10-year sentence for her role\nin these crimes.  And he stands before the Court unrepentant, defiant, and actively propagating\nmisinformation to undermine the jury’s verdict in this case, and public trust in criminal justice.\nThe severity of Guo’s crimes, and the risk of harm to the public he presents, leaves him\nwith few peers among fraud defendants and distinguishes his conduct even among recent high-\nprofile fraud cases in this District. The exceptional loss amount is just one metric of culpability\nthat alone justifies a substantial sentence in this case.29 While a select few other fraud defendants\n\n29 “One of the central reasons for creating the sentencing guidelines was to ensure stiffer penalties\nfor white-collar crimes and to eliminate disparities between white-collar sentences and sentences\nfor other crimes.” United States v. Davis, 537 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2008). “[T]he sentencing\nguidelines sought to address the inequities of prior sentencing practices that tended to punish white\ncollar economic crimes less severely than other comparable blue collar offenses.” United States v.\nFishman, 631 F. Supp. 2d 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Over a five-year period between 1996 and\n2001, the Commission engaged in a deliberative process to address the Guidelines’ treatment of\nwhite-collar offenses, with the involvement of relevant stakeholders including the defense bar, the\nDepartment of Justice, probation officers, and the U.S. Judicial Conference. See Federal Register\nNotice BAC2210-40, 62 Fed. Reg. 152, 171-74 (1997) (proposals by the Commission for comment\nregarding economic crime sentencing reform). The Commission explained that the resulting\n\n---\n\n79\nhave caused for even larger financial losses, Guo’s scheme was especially cynical: he rallied\nsupporters fervently interested in the cause of democracy promotion in China, and then abused\ntheir trust to pitch them phony investment after phony investment. This meaningfully aggravates\nthe harm that Guo caused. As the Court noted at Wang’s sentencing, “in the Holmes scheme and\nthe Madoff scheme,” investors were not falsely “told that money would go toward the promotion\nof democracy.” (Dkt. 491 at 31-32). Using deception to steal other people’s money is always\nwrong. But Guo’s fraud is distinct from some of history’s worst Ponzi schemes and investment\nscams because of how its mastermind fostered a purported social movement for the purpose of\npreying on its followers—turning them into unwitting victims of fraudulent scheme after\nfraudulent scheme. Guo’s fraud is also distinct from recent precedents in its scope and complexity.\nIt began with a philanthropic appeal; moved on to an unregistered offering of securities in a\nsupposed media venture; transitioned into a purported community lending program designed to\nevade the SEC’s remedial measures; morphed into a private membership club that also offered\nshares of stock; and evolved yet again into a phony pair of fake cryptocurrencies joined with a\nfraudulent purported crypto exchange. It involved years of coordination between dozens of aides\nand lieutenants, operating the machinery of Guo’s fraud empire all over the world. For these\nreasons, sentences like the 25 years imposed in United States v. Bankman-Fried or the 20 years\n\namendments, which became effective on November 1, 2001, were based on the determination that\n“loss serves as a measure of the seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s relative culpability.”\nSentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 66 Fed. Reg. 30,512, 30,533 (June 6, 2001).\nThus, the 2001 amendments to Section 2B1.1 reflected the considered view of the Commission,\nfollowing a collaborative process with relevant stakeholders, that loss amount should be a central\nconsideration in determining the seriousness of an offense to which that Guideline applies. Indeed,\n“[e]ven if the enhancements may lack robust empirical support related to deterrence, they have\nfoundations in empirical data and national experience related to the goals of fair sentencing and\nretribution.” United States v. Moose, 893 F.3d 951, 958 (7th Cir. 2018).\n\n---\n\n80\nimposed in United States v. Greenwood should be viewed as a low floor, not as sentences imposed\non “defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. §\n3553(a)(6).\nExceptional fraud crimes have been met with exceptional sentences. For masterminding a\ndecades-long Ponzi scheme with losses measured in the dozens of billions of dollars, Bernard\nMadoff was sentenced to 150 years in prison. While the scope and duration of Madoff’s fraud was\n“unprecedented,” United States v. Madoff, No. 09 Cr. 213 (DC), Sent’g Tr. at 43, Judge Chin’s\nsentencing decision noted that “more [was] at stake than money” because, as with Guo, “[t]he\nvictims put their trust in” the defendant and “[t]hat trust was broken in a way that has left many”\nof them “doubting… themselves.” Id. at 49.  While few cases could be “comparable . . . in terms\nof the scope, duration and enormity of the fraud, and the degree of the betrayal,” Madoff, Sent’g\nTr. at 46, this common element of exploitation and broken trust speaks to the exceptional harm\nalso caused by Guo’s crimes.\nAcross the country, other particularly predatory fraud defendants have received outsized\nsentences for conduct more comparable in scope to Guo’s. Tom Petters, age 52 when convicted\nby a jury in 2009, was sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment for a $3.7 billion fraud scheme in large\npart because the sentencing judge was “not satisfied that if he were released at an early sentence\nthat he would not reoffend.” United States v. Petters, No. 08 Cr. 364 (RHK), Dkt. 431 at 46 (D.\nMinn. 2010). Scott Rothstein pleaded guilty to conspiracies to commit racketeering, money\nlaundering, wire fraud, and mail fraud in connection with a fraud scheme he ran through his Florida\nlaw firm that “caus[ed] approximately 400 investors to lose more than $400 million.” United States\nv. Rothstein, No. 09 Cr. 60331 (JIC), Dkt. 334 at 57-58 (S.D. Fla. 2010). The Government\ndescribed the 47-year-old Rothstein’s “post-offense conduct” as “extraordinary,” including by\n\n---\n\n81\nvoluntarily returning from Morocco to turn himself in and providing extraordinary cooperation.\nSee id., Dkt. 277 at 2-3. Nonetheless, the Court imposed a sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment in\nview of Rothstein’s “sophisticated . . . marketing” of his complex scheme, including by trading on\n“all of the trappings of success,” donations to philanthropic institutions to “endear[]” the defendant\nas a “prolific benefactor,” and other extensive efforts to exploit “an appearance of legitimacy.” Id.,\nDkt. 334 at 56-57. In 2019, Edwin Fujinaga, a 70-year-old defendant, was sentenced to 50 years’\nimprisonment after trial convictions for a $1.5 billion scheme to defraud thousands of victims in\nJapan into making investments in purported medical claims that were spent largely instead on\nFujinaga’s personal enrichment. See United States v. Fujinaga, No. 15 Cr. 198 (GMN), Dkt. 346\nat 74-75 (D. Nev. 2019). And in 2009, Judge Richard J. Sullivan sentenced James Nicholson to 40\nyears’ imprisonment in this District for leading a $133 million scheme to defraud victims he\nselected because they placed extraordinary trust in him—emphasizing that the defendant, like Guo,\n“played on those relationships” with his victims “and cultivated them” and “encouraged them.”\nSee United States v. Nicholson, No. 09 Cr. 414 (RJS), Sent’g Tr. 71:11–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).\nThe nature and scope of Guo’s crimes, and his leadership of a racketeering enterprise to\ncarry them out, calls for a greater sentence than those recently imposed on high-profile fraud\ndefendants in this District whose schemes caused extraordinary losses but whose conduct lacked\nGuo’s sustained personal appeal of a charismatic leader to thousands of victims who were led to\nbelieve they were investing not only in failure-proof financial opportunities, but also in their\ncommon aspiration of democracy in China. Samuel Bankman-Fried’s crimes involving the FTX\ncryptocurrency exchange were egregious. He spent “large sums of FTX customer funds on risky\ninvestments, political contributions, Bahamas real estate, and other things in circumstances in\nwhich FTX was seriously exposed to downside of market deterioration, loan calls, and other risks.”\n\n---\n\n82\nUnited States v. Bankman-Fried, No. 22 Cr. 673 (LAK), Dkt. 426 (Sent’g Tr.) at 53 (S.D.N.Y.\n2024). This was outright theft on a grand scale, and Bankman-Fried was sentenced to 25 years’\nimprisonment. While Guo’s loss amount is lower, Guo’s crimes involved an unparalleled personal\nintimacy between the perpetrator of a mass-scale fraud and his victims. He personally guaranteed\nhis investors against any risk of loss—not only in his daily, hours-long broadcasts (see, e.g., GX\nZ9 at 37 (“I will be responsible. If there is one of your pennies that’s missing, I, Guo Wengui, will\nbe responsible.”)), but in direct, individual communications cultivating his victims through phone\ncalls, text messages, and video chats. (See, e.g., Tr. 4465, GX VB36). And as this Court recognized\nat the sentencing of Guo’s co-defendant, his scheme was distinct from other high-profile frauds\nbecause of its cynical manipulation of his victims’ “deep hopes that the political system in China\n. . . would be challenged and possibly changed”—“an entirely different way of persuading people\nto turn over their money.” (Dkt. 491 at 34–35).\nThis combination of charismatic personal leadership and manipulating victims’ deep social\nand political aspirations to evolve and sustain a years-long fraud sets Guo’s conduct above and\napart from financial crimes that involved massive losses but lacked these extraordinary—and\nuniquely harmful—features. Karl Sebastian Greenwood was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment\nfor co-creating and selling a fraudulent cryptocurrency in a scheme that saddled victims with\nbillions in losses. United States v. Greenwood, No. 17 Cr. 630 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. 2023). Unlike Guo,\nGreenwood shared primary culpability for his fraud with his scheme’s co-founder—and their\nOneCoin scheme lacked the intentional manipulation of victims’ aspirations to participate in a\nsocial and political movement. Nor can Guo be meaningfully compared to other recent defendants\nwho accepted responsibility by pleading guilty for their operation of fraudulent crypto-related\nscams. See United States v. Do Kwon, No. 23 Cr. 151 (PAE) (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (15-year sentence,\n\n---\n\n83\nwhere defendant also faced prospect of future criminal prosecution in another country); United\nStates v. Mashinsky, No. 23 Cr. 347 (JGK) (12-year sentence).  Indeed, in contrast to Bankman-\nFried, Greenwood, Kwon, and Mashinsky, Guo’s operation of fraudulent cryptocurrency and\nrelated exchange was just one part of Guo’s multi-scheme, five-year racketeering and fraud\nconspiracy. See supra, Section III.\nJust three years ago, this Court sentenced a fraud defendant who pleaded guilty in advance\nof trial to nearly 18 years’ imprisonment for “operat[ing] four separate fraud schemes” over less\nthan two years “with hundreds of victims.” United States v. Ray, No. 22 Cr. 228 (AT), Dkt. 105\n(Sent’g Tr.) at 36 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). Franklin Ray’s serial frauds raked in just north of $40 million\nfrom retail investors he personally pitched, and his culpability was aggravated by his continuing\nto solicit fraudulent “investments” while on pretrial release. Id. at 40. But his crimes—deserving,\nin this Court’s judgment, of almost 20 years’ imprisonment—pale in comparison to the\ncomplexity, duration, and manipulation brought to bear by Miles Guo in his execution of the five-\nyear, $1.3 billion G Enterprise fraud and racketeering conspiracy.  Guo’s sentence should include\na far greater period of incarceration to account for the comparative severity and scope of his crimes,\nhis persistent denial responsibility, and the threat he continues to pose to the public.\nVII.   FORFEITURE AND RESTITUTION\nOn August 11, 2025, the Court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture (“POF”) against\nGuo, which forfeited his interest in specific property and entered a money judgment of $1.3 billion\nthat is joint and several with Yvette Wang. (Dkt. 720). Approximately six months later, on\nFebruary 3, 2026, Guo filed objections to the POF’s money judgment. (Dkt. 799). On February\n17, 2026, the Government filed its response to Guo’s objections. (Dkt. 803).  For the reasons stated\nin that opposition, Guo’s objections are meritless. Additionally, on January 19, 2026, the\n\n---\n\n84\nGovernment submitted a supplemental preliminary order of forfeiture, which seeks to forfeit\nadditional specific property constituting criminal proceeds of the G Enterprise that the Government\nhas seized abroad and additional G|CLUBS funds. (Dkt. 790). Consistent with Federal Rule of\nCriminal Procedure 32.2, the Court should enter the Government’s supplemental preliminary order\nof forfeiture prior to sentencing, and at sentencing orally announce that it is imposing forfeiture\nconsistent with the August 11, 2025 preliminary order of forfeiture, and the proposed supplemental\norder of forfeiture.\nWith respect to restitution, for the reasons previously set forth in the Government’s January\n9, 2026 filing (Dkt. 785), and as the Court already found in connection with Yvette Wang’s\nsentencing, the Court should make a finding at Guo’s sentencing that restitution would be\nimpracticable in this case and allow for compensation through a remission process.\n CONCLUSION\nMiles Guo claimed to lead a movement. But he did not. Instead, he robbed thousands of\npeople who believed in his message, trusted his promises about investments, and relied on his\ncommitment to guarantee them against losses. Guo’s crimes will forever stand out among this\nnation’s worst and most rampant frauds. There can be no justice in this extraordinary case without\nan extraordinary sentence.\nIn view of the immense toll of Guo’s crimes, the Government respectfully requests that the\n\n---\n\n85\nCourt impose a sentence of at least 30 years’ imprisonment.\n\nRespectfully submitted,\n\nSEAN BUCKLEY\nAttorney for the United States Acting Under\n\nAuthority Conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515.\n\n      By:\n\n/s/\n\n Micah F. Fergenson\n Ryan B. Finkel\n Justin R. Horton\n\n Juliana N. Murray\n\n Assistant United States Attorneys\n\n 212-637-2190/-6612 /-2276/ -2314\n\nCC: Counsel of record","body_zh":null,"key_entities":[],"ecf_references":[],"word_count":26150,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-04-07 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-04-07","updated_at":"2026-07-06 20:57:20"}