{"id":"court_sdny_858_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":858,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"FORFEITURE","filed_date":"2026-06-29","title":"USDC SDNY DOCUMENT","summary_zh":"没收异议裁定书 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 23-cr-00118-AT ECF #858（2026年6月29日立案）。法官 Analisa Torres 裁定部分支持、部分驳回郭文贵对2025年8月11日初步没收令提出的异议，针对郭文贵被判9项罪名成立后检方所主张的约13亿美元没收追缴金及扣押银行账户资金进行审查认定。","summary_en":"Order on objections to preliminary forfeiture order — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 23-cr-00118-AT ECF #858 (filed June 29, 2026). Judge Analisa Torres sustains in part and overrules in part Guo's objections to the August 11, 2025 preliminary order of forfeiture, addressing the government's application for a $1.3 billion personal forfeiture money judgment and forfeiture of specific seized bank account assets following his conviction on nine counts.","body_en":"USDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOC #: ______ ____________\nDATE FILED: __6/29/2026__\n-against-\nMILES GUO, 23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)\nDefendant. ORDER\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge:\nDefendant, Miles Guo, objects to the preliminary order of forfeiture (“POF”) entered by\nthe Court on August 11, 2025. See Objs., ECF No. 799; POF, ECF No. 720; Gov’t Mot., ECF\nNo. 716; Resp., ECF No. 803; see also Reply, ECF No. 804. For the reasons stated below, the\nCourt SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Guo’s objections to the POF.\nBACKGROUND\nThe Court presumes familiarity with the factual background of the case and recounts only\na summary of forfeiture-related proceedings and submissions here.\nA. Jury Verdict\nOn July 16, 2024, a jury convicted Guo of nine counts of various financial crimes:\n(1) one count of racketeering conspiracy (Count One of the third superseding indictment);\n(2) one count each of conspiracy to commit wire fraud or bank fraud, money laundering, and\nsecurities fraud (Counts Two, Three, and Four); (3) one count each of wire fraud and securities\nfraud in connection with the Farm Loan Program (Counts Seven and Eight); (4) one count each\nof wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with G|CLUBS (“G Clubs”) (Counts Nine and\nTen); (5) and one count of wire fraud in connection with the Himalaya Exchange (Count\nEleven). The jury acquitted Guo of one count each of wire and securities fraud in connection\nwith the GTV Private Placement and one count of committing an unlawful monetary transaction\n(Counts Five, Six, and Twelve). See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 395; S3 Superseding Indictment,\n\nECF No. 307. Each of these activities—the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, the Himalaya\nExchange, and the GTV Private Placement—were alleged to be components of the “G\nEnterprise,” a series of investment schemes comprising the racketeering conspiracy detailed in\nCount One. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 16–19.\nB. Applicable Forfeiture Provisions\nAs a result of Guo’s convictions, he is subject to three distinct provisions of the United\nStates Code which call for forfeiture of certain assets to the Government:\n1) 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), which requires a defendant to forfeit any property “constituting,\nor derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained . . . from racketeering\nactivity” (Count One);\n2) 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “which\nconstitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to” fraud or a conspiracy to commit\nfraud (Counts Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven);1 and\n3) 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “involved” in\nmoney laundering, or “traceable to such property [involved in money laundering]”\n(Count Three).\nSee id. ¶¶ 58–61.\nC. Prior Submissions\nOn April 8, 2025, the Court appointed Guo’s present counsel and ordered the parties to\nprovide a joint letter stating the date when Guo would provide his position with respect to\nforfeiture. See Apr. 8 Tr. at 10:14–23, ECF No. 684. The Court subsequently granted four\nextensions, at the parties’ and at Guo’s request, for Guo to articulate his position on the forfeiture\nof various assets. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 698, 704, 706, 708. Then, on June 27, 2025, Guo filed a\nletter claiming that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding potential\n1 The Indictment also cites 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) in this forfeiture allegation, which specifies further rules and\nprocedures related to forfeiture. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 59.\n2\n\nforfeiture and remission of money and property seized by the Government.” ECF No. 710 at 1–\n2. The letter stated Guo “[did] not waive any of [his] rights, including his appellate rights, in this\ncase.” Id. at 1. In response, the Government wrote that although “Guo is not consenting to a\npreliminary order of forfeiture, the Court can enter a preliminary order of forfeiture that imposes\na money judgment and forfeits Guo’s personal interest in specific property.” ECF No. 713.\nA month later, by motion dated July 28, 2025, the Government asked the Court to “enter\na preliminary order of forfeiture setting forth . . . [a] money judgment” in the amount of $1.3\nbillion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(2)(A); Gov’t Mot.2 The Government characterized the $1.3\nbillion as “the proceeds traceable to the commission” of the racketeering and fraud counts\n(Counts One, Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven) and “the property involved”\nin the money laundering offense (Count Three). See POF at 3. The Government argued that\n$1.3 billion is a “conservative estimate of the . . . funds sent by individual victims to certain arms\nof the G Enterprise,” which included the Farm Loan Program, GTV, G Clubs, and the Himalaya\nExchange. Gov’t Mot. at 3; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“If the government seeks a\npersonal money judgment, the court must determine the amount of money that the defendant will\nbe ordered to pay.”).\nThe Government also sought the forfeiture of certain property listed in the POF (the\n“Listed Property”), Gov’t Mot. at 4; POF at 3–11: “cash seized from several bank\naccounts . . . used in furtherance of [Guo’s] crimes and his racketeering enterprise,” which,\n2 Courts may impose money judgments in cases where criminal forfeiture is required. Where a defendant’s assets or\nidentifiable property may not cover the full amount of the proceeds that a forfeiture statute requires the defendant to\nforfeit, money judgments may be used to ensure that the defendant is held liable for the full amount of those\nproceeds. See, e.g., United States v. Kenner, 443 F. Supp. 3d 354, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“If the defendant lacks the\nassets to satisfy the order, the court can award the government a forfeiture money judgment.”); United States v.\nPeters, 732 F.3d 93, 98–99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming entry of a money judgment in a case alleging forfeiture\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)); United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming entry of a\nmoney judgment in a case alleging forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 2461).\n3\n\naccording to the Government, represent “proceeds of the G Enterprise [(the racketeering\nenterprise defined in Count One)] and property involved in money laundering” (Count Three).\nGov’t Mot. at 4–5. The Government categorized these bank accounts based on the date they\nwere seized by the Government and the names in which the accounts were held; each of the\naccount holders “was named in the [superseding] [i]ndictment as a member of the RICO\nenterprise.” Id. at 4; see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 3(a). The Government attached several\nseizure warrant affidavits related to these accounts. See Gov’t Mot. Exs. B–E, ECF Nos. 716-2\nthrough 716-5; see also Proposed POF ¶¶ a–u, bb (listing bank accounts), ECF No. 716-1.\nThe Listed Property included a mansion located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road in Mahwah,\nNew Jersey, “its contents,” including, for example, an “Italian giltwood mirror with rococo crest\nwith cross-hatched panels,” and several other luxury items, such as a Bugatti, Lamborghini, and\nRolls-Royce. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7; see also Proposed POF ¶ aa (listing “personal property\nseized by the Government from the [Mahwah] property”). The Government argued that the\nMahwah property, the personal property therein, and the luxury items were purchased with funds\ntraceable to G Clubs, the G Enterprise, or money laundering. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7.\nGuo did not respond to the Government’s motion, and given that he had represented to\nthe Court that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding” forfeiture, on\nAugust 11, 2025, the Court entered the POF. See POF. Nearly a month later, on September 4,\n2025, Guo requested an opportunity “to address” “deficiencies” in the Government’s motion,\nsuch as “whether certain property is forfeitable,” “the issue of offsets,” and “the accuracy of the\ntotal amount the government seeks.” See ECF No. 724 at 1. By order dated January 8, 2026, the\nCourt directed Guo to file any objections and to specify “whether [Guo] claims a personal\n4\n\ninterest in any of” the Listed Property. ECF No. 784.3 Before the Court is Guo’s February 3,\n2026 submission. See Objs.\nLEGAL STANDARD\nWhen the Government seeks forfeiture in the form of a money judgment, the Court “must\ndetermine the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered to pay,” Fed. R. Crim. P.\n32.2(b)(1)(A), using “evidence already in the record,” id. 32.2(b)(1)(B), including the trial\nrecord. See United States v. Mathieu, 853 F. App’x 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2021). The calculation of\na forfeiture amount, however, “is not an exact science.” United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48\n(2d Cir. 2011). As a result, the Court need only make a “reasonable estimate” based on\n“available information” concerning the appropriate amount of forfeiture. Id.; see id. (noting,\nadditionally, that a court may “use general points of reference as a starting point” and “may\nmake reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the\nevidence” in evaluating a proposed money judgment); see also United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d\n176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009).\nThe Court must determine forfeiture—both the proper money judgment amount and\nwhether forfeiture applies to the Listed Property—by a preponderance of the evidence. United\nStates v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007).\nDISCUSSION\nGuo raises several objections to the POF: (1) the “scope” of his alleged fraud is\noverbroad and includes those who were not victims of his crimes; (2) he “can only be ordered to\n3 The Government argues that Guo has waived any challenges to the POF due largely to his statement in his June 27,\n2025 letter that he was not taking a position as to forfeiture. See, e.g., Resp. at 3–4. The Court’s January 8 order did\nnot address waiver, and, because the Court largely concludes in this order that Guo’s challenges to the POF lack\nmerit and prefers to decide the issues on the merits, the Court expresses no view on whether Guo waived his\nobjections.\n5\n\nforfeit assets that he personally obtained”; (3) forfeiture should not cover any alleged proceeds\nfrom the GTV Private Placement because he was acquitted of two fraud counts related to GTV;\nand (4) the money judgment should be offset by certain amounts. See Objs. at 3, 9, 11, 17.\nThe Court finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the\nevidence that approximately $889 million is a reasonable estimate of the gross inflows of cash\ninto the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange—all either components of\nthe racketeering conspiracy of which Guo was convicted or enterprises which formed the basis of\nhis fraud convictions—and that $889 million is, therefore, the proper money judgment amount in\nthis case. See Gov’t Mot. at 3; GXZ26, ECF No. 803-1; Trial Tr. at 4330–32;4 Fed. R. Crim. P.\n32(b)(1)(A).\nA. Scope\nThe Court rejects Guo’s argument that the POF should not include property traceable to\n“proceeds” from individuals who claim they “were not victimized” by his fraud. See Objs. at 3–\n4, 5.\nAs an initial matter, Guo assumes that forfeiture distinguishes between “investors who\nwere defrauded, and those who insist they were not.” Objs. at 4. It does not. Forfeiture, in this\ncase, applies to proceeds “from racketeering activity,” proceeds from “fraud,” and property\n“involved in” money laundering. See Resp. at 5 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 981(a)(1)(C), and\n982(a)(2)). Contrary to Guo’s claims, the scope of his crimes of conviction is not defined by the\n4 In his sentencing submission, Guo argues that exhibit GXZ26 does not account for the possible double-counting of\ninflows across various components of the G Enterprise. See, e.g., ECF No. 822 at 41,53 (claiming that individuals\ncould use Himalaya Exchange funds to purchase a G Club membership); see also ECF No. 826 (correcting\nsentencing submission). Guo does not cite any evidence showing that this occurred, or suggesting that the\nGovernment’s inflow calculation in fact improperly included contributions made from Himalaya Exchange accounts\nto G Clubs. Id. The Court, therefore, makes this determination on the evidence available in the record, which\ndemonstrates that the Government’s calculation is correct. And, in any event, this argument was not raised in Guo’s\nobjections to the forfeiture order. As such, the Court will not address this objection.\n6\n\n“expectations and reliance” of individual victims on his statements. Cf. Objs. at 5 (claiming that\n“individual investors’ expectations and reliance are critical to distinguishing between victims of\nfraud and those who were not victimized”).\nIndeed, the Second Circuit has held that “reliance is not an element of criminal fraud”\nand that “the unreasonableness of a fraud victim in relying (or not) on a misrepresentation does\nnot bear on a defendant’s criminal intent.” United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir.\n2017). In other words, even if an alleged “investor” in a fraudulent scheme disclaims that they\nrelied on the false statements which underpinned the fraud, a fraudulent scheme may nonetheless\nexist, and all proceeds obtained from such a scheme would be subject to forfeiture. Relatedly, an\n“investor[’s]” subjective views as to whether they are victims of the scheme have no bearing on\nwhether their contributions to the scheme are “proceeds” that a defendant has obtained from\nfraud. All that matters is “materiality”—that the statements alleged to be fraudulent have the\n“natural tendency to influence the decisionmakers to whom they were addressed.” Weaver, 860\nF.3d at 96. And materiality is evaluated under an objective test, “rather than from the subjective\nperspective of the victim.” United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017).\nThe Court’s conclusion is confirmed by the statutory definitions of the fraud crimes of\nconviction. Wire fraud criminalizes the knowing participation in any “scheme or artifice to\ndefraud” and the transmittal by wire of certain communications for “the purpose of executing\nsuch scheme or artifice [to defraud].” 18 U.S.C. § 1343; see July 9, 2024 Trial Tr. at 5791:25–\n5794:6, ECF No. 450. As for securities fraud, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)\nrule violated in this case, see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 47, 51, prohibits using a\n“scheme . . . to defraud,” “mak[ing] an untrue statement of material fact” or omitting a material\nfact in certain circumstances, or “engaging in an act, practice, or course of business which\n7\n\noperates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)–(c)\n(emphasis added). See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999) (observing that\nCongress prohibited the “‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud,” in the fraud\nstatutes). In other words, the “scope” of Guo’s fraudulent schemes does not depend on whether\neach individual making contributions to those schemes believed they were defrauded. Their\nbeliefs as to whether their individual “investments” had material value, or as to whether they in\nfact relied on any material misrepresentations, do not affect whether those investments were\nmade in a fraudulent scheme.5\nThe cases cited by Guo, United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993), and\nUnited States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024), are inapposite. In Miller, the Second\nCircuit held that the Government failed to prove that the defendants intended to deprive a victim\nof a property interest on the facts shown at a trial for mail fraud because the property that the\ndefendants had allegedly diverted “to their own benefit” from the victims was not, in fact, “a\nspecific, identifiable property interest” belonging to the victims in the first place. Id. at 1017–\n1021. Miller, in other words, turned ultimately on the scope of the alleged victims’ contractual\nproperty interests, not on their expectations or beliefs, and, therefore, has no bearing here. See\nid. Rainford vacated and remanded a forfeiture order where a district court based its order solely\non “the government’s word.” 110 F.4th at 489. Here, by contrast, there is ample evidence\nsupporting the POF filed in this case.\nGuo further argues that there is “abundant proof that a considerable number of supposed\n‘victims’ reject that classification.” Objs. at 6–7. He claims that “6,512 members of the\n5 Guo does not argue otherwise—he neither discusses, nor even cites, the elements of his fraud convictions in the\nportion of his submission making this argument. See Objs. at 4–9.\n8\n\nHimalaya Exchange” (the enterprise for which Guo was convicted of wire fraud in Count\nEleven) “have objected to forfeiture of their accounts” and “express[] frustration at being labeled\nas victims.” Id. at 6. These complaints, as well as those from the “Hamilton petitioners” and\nvarious other third parties, do not affect this order, which addresses solely whether the properties\nidentified by the Government are, in fact, either proceeds of racketeering activity, proceeds of\nfraud, or traceable to funds involved in money laundering, and whether the $1.3 billion money\njudgment is a reasonable estimate of the value of Guo’s forfeiture obligations.6 Third-parties’\nalleged claims to the property identified in the POF shall be assessed through ancillary\nproceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2.\nB. Possession\nGuo argues that he “can only be held liable to forfeit the value of tainted proceeds to the\nextent that he at some point personally obtained them,” and that, for various reasons, there is\ninsufficient evidence that he “obtained” the property listed in the POF. Objs. at 10–11 (emphasis\nin original).\nGuo misunderstands the nature of forfeiture. For proceeds of a defendant’s crime to be\nforfeitable, the property “need not be personally or directly in the possession of the defendant,\nhis assignees, or his co-conspirators.” United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir.\n2012) (citation omitted). Instead, the property need only “have, at some point, been under the\ndefendant’s control.” Id. Further, property may be forfeited even when the defendant’s control\nover the property is temporary. See United States v. Tanner, 942 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2019).\n6 The Court acknowledges the voluminous petitions filed under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) seeking to assert a third-party’s\nlegal interest in property forfeited to the United States, and the Court expresses no opinion as to whether any\npetitioner’s claim, properly made and submitted under § 853(n), is meritorious.\n9\n\nAt trial, the Government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo was the\n“Boss” in control of all of the entities in the G Enterprise and those entities’ assets. Resp. at 7.7\nFor example, testimony from several witnesses shows that Guo exercised control over assets\ninvolved in the G Enterprise: Karin Maistrello testified that Guo was in control of the Rule of\nLaw organizations’ funds, a scheme involved in the G Enterprise (see Trial Tr. at 424); multiple\nwitnesses testified that Guo had control over G Clubs (see Trial Tr. at 1941 (describing Guo as\nthe “top boss”), 1995:3–15, 1996:2–5 (clarification at sidebar), 1999:4–7, 2975:8–2976:10,\n2980:11–22, 2999:20–3000:6 (testimony concerning G Clubs)); and abundant documentary\nevidence supports the conclusion that Guo exercised control over the funds involved in his\ncrimes (see GXC415; Resp. at 7 n.3 (citing trial exhibits depicting Guo exercising control over\nfunds involved in the G Enterprise)).8\nThe documentary evidence introduced at trial, see, e.g., GXZ26 (showing cash flows\nfrom certain G Enterprise bank accounts into other bank accounts which are listed in the POF),\nalso establishes that the particular accounts that the Government argues are subject to forfeiture\ncontain funds derived from proceeds of the G Enterprise and property involved in money\nlaundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Notably, Guo does not argue that the funds in these accounts hold\n7 Additionally, under each statute serving as the basis for forfeiture in this case, the Court need only find that Guo\nobtained the proceeds “directly or indirectly.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(3), 981(a)(2)(A), 982(a)(2).\n8 Guo’s sole argument regarding the trial record is that one witness “testified that . . . Guo was not the ultimate\nbeneficial owner of G Clubs, nor was he the source of funds for G Clubs or G Fashion.” Objs. at 10–11. That\nwitness, James R. Collins Jr., was an employee at Mercantile Global Holdings, a company which owned a bank that\nmaintained client relationships with G Clubs, G Fashion, and the Himalaya Exchange. See Trial Tr. at 2753:8–\n2756:15. But Collins only testified that Mercantile Bank believed that Guo was not the ultimate beneficial owner of\nG Clubs and that G Clubs had represented as much to him. See Trial Tr. at 2758:23–2762:12. He did not testify as\nto any personal knowledge of the inner workings of G Clubs, or whether Guo, in fact, exercised control over G\nClubs funds. The Court, therefore, accords Collins’ testimony minimal weight. Guo also attempts to incorporate by\nreference arguments made by third parties who have filed ancillary claims to assets subject to forfeiture under 21\nU.S.C. § 853(n). See Objs. at 11. The Court will consider those arguments as part of the ancillary proceedings that\nshall be conducted after sentencing pursuant to §853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. The Court\nexpresses no opinion as to whether any third party has a superior legal interest in any forfeited property.\n10\n\nmoney which is not derived from entities involved in the G Enterprise. See POF ¶¶ a–z, bb;\nObjs. at 9–11 (instead arguing solely that he did not personally obtain or exercise control over\nthese funds).\nGuo relies in substantial part on Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017), to\nsupport his argument that he cannot be ordered to “forfeit assets that he [did not] personally\nobtain[].” Obj. at 9. In that case, the Supreme Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 853, which requires\nforfeiture of any property derived from proceeds of certain drug crimes, does not automatically\nimpose joint and several liability on all convicted parties of a conspiracy. See 581 U.S. at 443.\nIn Honeycutt, the government sought a money judgment against a defendant, arguing that\nhe was liable for the entirety of a conspiracy’s profits, even though the defendant was merely a\nsalaried employee who had assisted his store’s participation in a drug crime, and never benefited\nfrom, let alone exercised control over, the extent of the store’s tainted profits. See id. at 445–47.\nHere, however, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo benefitted from and\nexercised control over the funds that the Government maintains are subject to forfeiture. See,\ne.g., Resp. at 7–8 n.3 (citing trial evidence noting, for example, that Guo directed his co-\nconspirators to use “G-Club or another private company” to finance the purchase of an expensive\ncoffee table). Indeed, since Honeycutt, the Second Circuit has reiterated that the Government\nneed not show that a defendant personally retained or directly possessed property for forfeiture to\napply. See, e.g., Rajaratnam v. United States, 736 F. App’x 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding\nthat a forfeiture order could be imposed against a defendant for funds over which the defendant\nonly had temporary authority and which had subsequently been disbursed).\nThe Court, therefore, finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of\nthe evidence that the Listed Property is subject to forfeiture.\n11\n\nC. GTV Private Placement and SEC Disgorgement\nGuo argues that funds derived from the GTV Private Placement should not be included in\nthe forfeiture order and that the money judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount\nof funds the Government alleges were involved in GTV. See Objs. at 17.9 Guo contends that\nbecause he was acquitted of wire and securities fraud in connection with the GTV Private\nPlacement, $411 million in funds derived from the GTV Private Placement that the Government\nseeks to forfeit should be excluded from the order. Id. at 11–12; Resp. at 8.\nThe Court need not resolve this in light of another issue raised by the parties: whether the\nmoney judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount already recovered by the SEC in\nadministrative proceedings. See SEC Order, ECF No. 799-2. Guo states that GTV has already\ndisgorged in excess of $411 million as part of an administrative proceeding initiated by the SEC.\nSee Objs. at 17–18. The Government concedes this, in part, stating that “[t]he actual funds\nderived from the GTV [P]rivate [P]lacement were recovered by the SEC, which established a fair\nfund for distribution to victims,” and that “[i]f the Court were to deduct the GTV [P]rivate\n[P]lacement funds from the forfeiture amount, approximately $411 million would be deducted.”\nMot. at 4 n.2.\nHowever, the parties’ figures diverge. Guo argues that GTV, along with Saraca Media\nGroup, Inc. and Voice of Guo Media, Inc., has disgorged over $486 million to the SEC and that\nthe full $486 million should be deducted from the money judgment because it relates to conduct\ncharged in this case. See Objs. at 18. The Government, however, contends that only $411\n9 Guo does not claim that a specific bank account, or item of personal property, solely constitutes proceeds from the\nGTV Private Placement, see generally Objs. The Government maintains that all of the relevant funds are proceeds\nof the G Enterprise and property involved in money laundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Guo does not argue that any of\nthe Listed Property should be excluded from forfeiture on this basis, and the Court, therefore, only examines how\nthe disgorgement affects the money judgment.\n12\n\nmillion of the $1.3 billion figure derives from the GTV Private Placement and that the remaining\n$889 million derives from proceeds traceable to the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, or the\nHimalaya Exchange. See GXZ26. The fact that GTV and other entities disgorged $75 million\nmore than $411 million is relevant to the money judgment only if the excess $75 million is\ntraceable to proceeds from the fraudulent schemes involved in this case, namely, the Farm Loan\nProgram, G Clubs, or the Himalaya Exchange.\nThe Court rejects Guo’s arguments that the purported $75 million disgorged in excess of\n$411 million is traceable to his crimes of conviction. First, he claims that $34 million of the total\ndisgorged funds relate to sales of “G-Coins and G-Dollars,” early precursors to the Himalaya\nExchange. See Objs. at 17–18. However, the sale of G-Coin and G-Dollars from April to June\nof 2020 is not covered by the Indictment, which targets the Himalaya Exchange enterprise\ntransactions that took place from 2021 to 2023. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 53.\nMoreover, Guo provides no evidence that the $115 million in disgorged funds\nattributable to Voice of Guo Media, Inc. (“VOG”) “overlaps with the so-called Farm Loan\nProgram.” Objs. at 17–18. The SEC Order reports that VOG pooled funds from “prospective\ninvestors” who wanted to invest less than $100,000 in GTV. See Objs. at 17–18; SEC Order\n¶¶ 15–21, ECF No. 799-2. The Indictment’s description of the Farm Loan Program, however,\ndiffers substantially from the SEC Order’s description of VOG’s fundraising efforts. Compare,\ne.g., S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 17 (describing “The Himalaya Farm Alliance” as “a collective\nof informal groups (each known as a ‘Farm’) located in various cities around the world” which\nobtained investments “in the form of ‘loans’ to a Farm” and “promising that such loans would be\nconvertible into GTV common stock” via a “Loan Agreement”) with SEC Order ¶¶ 16–18\n(describing how VOG would provide an investor a one-page “Limited Purpose Agency\n13\n\nAgreement,” stating that, for minimal consideration, a representative of VOG would act as an\n“agent” for investors and purchase GTV stock on their behalf).\nAlthough Guo is correct that the SEC obtained $75 million more than $411 million from\nGTV and related companies, he has not shown that this surplus coincides with any of the\nproceeds that the Government has demonstrated are related to Guo’s crimes of conviction—that\nis, the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange.\nThe Court concludes, therefore, that only $411 million may be deducted from the\nproposed money judgment, because the record reflects—and the Government does not contest—\nthat $411 million in funds traceable to the GTV Private Placement has already been disgorged by\nentities related to the G Enterprise in separate proceedings prior to the commencement of this\ncriminal case. This deduction does not affect the forfeiture of any of the Listed Property.\nD. Offsets\nGuo argues that the money judgment should be “already offset by the more than\n$1 billion already in the Government’s possession in connection with this case” and by the\n“funds and assets in the Bankruptcy Trustee’s possession that are among the items the\nGovernment deems forfeitable in this case.” Objs. at 18–20. In response, the Government notes\nthat the value of property “forfeited to the United States under a Final Order of Forfeiture” will,\nindeed “be applied towards the satisfaction of the [m]oney [j]udgment” once all third-party\ninterests are adjudicated, and that there is no authority to order an offset for any assets not\n14\n\ncovered by the POF. See Resp. at 10 & n.7; POF ¶ 7.10 Accordingly, the Court will not deduct\nthe value of any of the Listed Property from the money judgment at this time.11\nE. Ancillary Matters\nGuo also seeks an order directing the Government to take possession of certain assets (the\n“bankruptcy assets”) from the Chapter 11 Trustee of Guo’s estate in bankruptcy proceedings,\nwhich were commenced on February 15, 2022, in the District of Connecticut. See Seizure Mot.,\nECF No. 724, at 1; see generally In re Kwok, No. 22 Bk. 50073 (D. Conn. Bankr. February 15,\n2022); In re Kwok, 172 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2026). Guo argues that the Government’s interest in\nthe forfeited assets is “superior to that of any creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding,” Seizure\nMot. at 5, that ordering the Government to seize the bankruptcy assets will both “make them\navailable to investors in the various entities involved in this case, and for whom restitution will\nbe ordered” and “halt the accumulation of considerable fees and expenses incurred by the\nTrustee” in the bankruptcy proceeding. See id. at 5–7.\nThe Court does not have the power to grant the relief Guo requests.12 Guo merely cites\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(3) for the proposition that the Court “may include\n. . . conditions reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal” in a\npreliminary order of forfeiture. See Seizure Reply at 4, ECF No. 754. Rule 32.2(b)(3) limits the\n10 Guo also argues that if the Court finds, in ancillary proceedings, that any property belongs to a third party, the\nvalue of that property should be deducted from the money judgment. Objs. at 18. Not so. Third-party forfeiture\nproceedings are designed to determine if a third party possesses a superior legal interest in the property subject to\nforfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6); Gov’t Forfeiture Ltr. at 1–2, ECF No. 785. That is a separate question from\nwhether the assets are forfeitable. Property may well have come under Guo’s control due to, for example, fraud,\neven though a third party possessed a superior legal interest in that property. Therefore, if the Court finds that any\nproperty belongs to a third party under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), it will not deduct the value of that property from the\nmoney judgment.\n11 The Court denies Guo’s request to reduce the money judgment “to the extent the Government has declined to\npursue other potentially forfeitable assets in this case,” and to reduce the money judgment by the amount forfeited\nby Haithem Khaled. See Objs. at 19–21. Guo offers no legal basis for either of these requests.\n12 The Court expresses no opinion on the Government’s argument that Guo lacks standing on this issue.\n15\n\nCourt’s authority to conditions required to preserve the property’s value on “appeal,” rather than\nconditions required to preserve value pending related, separate proceedings—like the bankruptcy\nproceeding here.\nFurthermore, several other procedural features of the forfeiture rules indicate that such an\norder would exceed the Court’s power. For example, Rule 32.2(b)(3) “authorizes” the\nGovernment “to seize the specific property subject to forfeiture” upon entry of a preliminary\norder but does not require that the Government do so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3). Nor does\nRule 32.2 state when, or how, the Government may seize property listed in a forfeiture order\nonce it is authorized to do so under Rule 32.2(b)(3). Likewise, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) and (f)\nempower the Court to take certain protective measures concerning assets potentially subject to\nforfeiture, but do not authorize the Court to compel the Government to enact a seizure. See\nResp. at 4.\nMoreover, Guo’s request lacks merit. Guo argues that the Court may impose conditions\n“reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal,” Seizure Reply at 4,\nbut nothing in Rule 32.2 requires the Court to do so. Although the Court acknowledges that the\nChapter 11 Estate in the bankruptcy proceeding has incurred fees owed to the Trustee and\nvarious other professionals, see Seizure Mot. at 7, such fees are not unusual given the remarkable\ncomplexity of that proceeding. See id. (claiming that 300 adversary proceedings have been filed\nin the bankruptcy proceeding).\nF. Restitution\nThe Government requests that the Court find that imposing a restitution order would be\nimpracticable and authorize a remission process. See Gov’t Ltr. at 4–5, ECF No. 785; ECF\nNo. 784 (January 8, 2026 order). Guo agrees. ECF No. 789 at 3. The Court agrees and finds,\n16\n\nbased on the extensive record in this case, that given the “complexity of the case and the number\nof victims involved,” awarding restitution to victims in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3663A\nwould be impractical and would complicate or prolong the sentencing process. See 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3663(c)(3)(A)–(B).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Government has demonstrated\nthat forfeiture applies to the Listed Property due to Guo’s convictions for racketeering\nconspiracy, wire and securities fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Court\nSUSTAINS Guo’s objections to the extent that the Court shall deduct $411 million from the $1.3\nbillion proposed money judgment, such that the money judgment in the final order of forfeiture\nshall be $889 million.\nThe Court DENIES Guo’s motion at ECF No. 724 seeking an order compelling the\nGovernment to seize assets in the bankruptcy proceedings. The Clerk of Court is respectfully\ndirected to terminate the motion at ECF No. 724.\nFinally, the Court finds that restitution is impracticable in this case and authorizes the\nGovernment to compensate victims through a remission process.\nSO ORDERED.\nDated: June 29, 2026\nNew York, New York\n17","body_zh":null,"key_entities":["Guo","forfeiture","GTV","G Clubs","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","Farm Loan","853(n)","Rule 32.2","Kwok","Miles Guo","CIPA","Torres","Analisa Torres","Saraca","RICO"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":307,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":450,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":684,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":710,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":713,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":716,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":720,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":724,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":754,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":784,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":785,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":789,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":799,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":803,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":804,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":822,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":826,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":5763,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-06-29 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-06-29","updated_at":"2026-08-17 09:56:32"}