{"id":"court_sdny_858_0","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":858,"sub_number":0,"doc_type":"FORFEITURE","filed_date":"2026-06-29","title":"USDC SDNY DOCUMENT","summary_zh":"没收异议裁定书 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，SDNY 23-cr-00118-AT ECF #858（2026年6月29日立案）。法官 Analisa Torres 裁定部分支持、部分驳回郭文贵对2025年8月11日初步没收令提出的异议，针对郭文贵被判9项罪名成立后检方所主张的约13亿美元没收追缴金及扣押银行账户资金进行审查认定。","summary_en":"Order on objections to preliminary forfeiture order — United States v. Ho Wan Kwok (Miles Guo / Guo Wengui), SDNY 23-cr-00118-AT ECF #858 (filed June 29, 2026). Judge Analisa Torres sustains in part and overrules in part Guo's objections to the August 11, 2025 preliminary order of forfeiture, addressing the government's application for a $1.3 billion personal forfeiture money judgment and forfeiture of specific seized bank account assets following his conviction on nine counts.","body_en":"USDC SDNY\nDOCUMENT\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOC #: ______ ____________\nDATE FILED: __6/29/2026__\n-against-\nMILES GUO, 23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)\nDefendant. ORDER\nANALISA TORRES, District Judge:\nDefendant, Miles Guo, objects to the preliminary order of forfeiture (“POF”) entered by\nthe Court on August 11, 2025. See Objs., ECF No. 799; POF, ECF No. 720; Gov’t Mot., ECF\nNo. 716; Resp., ECF No. 803; see also Reply, ECF No. 804. For the reasons stated below, the\nCourt SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Guo’s objections to the POF.\nBACKGROUND\nThe Court presumes familiarity with the factual background of the case and recounts only\na summary of forfeiture-related proceedings and submissions here.\nA. Jury Verdict\nOn July 16, 2024, a jury convicted Guo of nine counts of various financial crimes:\n(1) one count of racketeering conspiracy (Count One of the third superseding indictment);\n(2) one count each of conspiracy to commit wire fraud or bank fraud, money laundering, and\nsecurities fraud (Counts Two, Three, and Four); (3) one count each of wire fraud and securities\nfraud in connection with the Farm Loan Program (Counts Seven and Eight); (4) one count each\nof wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with G|CLUBS (“G Clubs”) (Counts Nine and\nTen); (5) and one count of wire fraud in connection with the Himalaya Exchange (Count\nEleven). The jury acquitted Guo of one count each of wire and securities fraud in connection\nwith the GTV Private Placement and one count of committing an unlawful monetary transaction\n(Counts Five, Six, and Twelve). See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 395; S3 Superseding Indictment,\n\nECF No. 307. Each of these activities—the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, the Himalaya\nExchange, and the GTV Private Placement—were alleged to be components of the “G\nEnterprise,” a series of investment schemes comprising the racketeering conspiracy detailed in\nCount One. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 16–19.\nB. Applicable Forfeiture Provisions\nAs a result of Guo’s convictions, he is subject to three distinct provisions of the United\nStates Code which call for forfeiture of certain assets to the Government:\n1) 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), which requires a defendant to forfeit any property “constituting,\nor derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained . . . from racketeering\nactivity” (Count One);\n2) 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “which\nconstitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to” fraud or a conspiracy to commit\nfraud (Counts Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven);1 and\n3) 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “involved” in\nmoney laundering, or “traceable to such property [involved in money laundering]”\n(Count Three).\nSee id. ¶¶ 58–61.\nC. Prior Submissions\nOn April 8, 2025, the Court appointed Guo’s present counsel and ordered the parties to\nprovide a joint letter stating the date when Guo would provide his position with respect to\nforfeiture. See Apr. 8 Tr. at 10:14–23, ECF No. 684. The Court subsequently granted four\nextensions, at the parties’ and at Guo’s request, for Guo to articulate his position on the forfeiture\nof various assets. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 698, 704, 706, 708. Then, on June 27, 2025, Guo filed a\nletter claiming that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding potential\n1 The Indictment also cites 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) in this forfeiture allegation, which specifies further rules and\nprocedures related to forfeiture. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 59.\n2\n\nforfeiture and remission of money and property seized by the Government.” ECF No. 710 at 1–\n2. The letter stated Guo “[did] not waive any of [his] rights, including his appellate rights, in this\ncase.” Id. at 1. In response, the Government wrote that although “Guo is not consenting to a\npreliminary order of forfeiture, the Court can enter a preliminary order of forfeiture that imposes\na money judgment and forfeits Guo’s personal interest in specific property.” ECF No. 713.\nA month later, by motion dated July 28, 2025, the Government asked the Court to “enter\na preliminary order of forfeiture setting forth . . . [a] money judgment” in the amount of $1.3\nbillion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(2)(A); Gov’t Mot.2 The Government characterized the $1.3\nbillion as “the proceeds traceable to the commission” of the racketeering and fraud counts\n(Counts One, Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven) and “the property involved”\nin the money laundering offense (Count Three). See POF at 3. The Government argued that\n$1.3 billion is a “conservative estimate of the . . . funds sent by individual victims to certain arms\nof the G Enterprise,” which included the Farm Loan Program, GTV, G Clubs, and the Himalaya\nExchange. Gov’t Mot. at 3; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“If the government seeks a\npersonal money judgment, the court must determine the amount of money that the defendant will\nbe ordered to pay.”).\nThe Government also sought the forfeiture of certain property listed in the POF (the\n“Listed Property”), Gov’t Mot. at 4; POF at 3–11: “cash seized from several bank\naccounts . . . used in furtherance of [Guo’s] crimes and his racketeering enterprise,” which,\n2 Courts may impose money judgments in cases where criminal forfeiture is required. Where a defendant’s assets or\nidentifiable property may not cover the full amount of the proceeds that a forfeiture statute requires the defendant to\nforfeit, money judgments may be used to ensure that the defendant is held liable for the full amount of those\nproceeds. See, e.g., United States v. Kenner, 443 F. Supp. 3d 354, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“If the defendant lacks the\nassets to satisfy the order, the court can award the government a forfeiture money judgment.”); United States v.\nPeters, 732 F.3d 93, 98–99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming entry of a money judgment in a case alleging forfeiture\nunder 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)); United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming entry of a\nmoney judgment in a case alleging forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 2461).\n3\n\naccording to the Government, represent “proceeds of the G Enterprise [(the racketeering\nenterprise defined in Count One)] and property involved in money laundering” (Count Three).\nGov’t Mot. at 4–5. The Government categorized these bank accounts based on the date they\nwere seized by the Government and the names in which the accounts were held; each of the\naccount holders “was named in the [superseding] [i]ndictment as a member of the RICO\nenterprise.” Id. at 4; see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 3(a). The Government attached several\nseizure warrant affidavits related to these accounts. See Gov’t Mot. Exs. B–E, ECF Nos. 716-2\nthrough 716-5; see also Proposed POF ¶¶ a–u, bb (listing bank accounts), ECF No. 716-1.\nThe Listed Property included a mansion located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road in Mahwah,\nNew Jersey, “its contents,” including, for example, an “Italian giltwood mirror with rococo crest\nwith cross-hatched panels,” and several other luxury items, such as a Bugatti, Lamborghini, and\nRolls-Royce. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7; see also Proposed POF ¶ aa (listing “personal property\nseized by the Government from the [Mahwah] property”). The Government argued that the\nMahwah property, the personal property therein, and the luxury items were purchased with funds\ntraceable to G Clubs, the G Enterprise, or money laundering. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7.\nGuo did not respond to the Government’s motion, and given that he had represented to\nthe Court that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding” forfeiture, on\nAugust 11, 2025, the Court entered the POF. See POF. Nearly a month later, on September 4,\n2025, Guo requested an opportunity “to address” “deficiencies” in the Government’s motion,\nsuch as “whether certain property is forfeitable,” “the issue of offsets,” and “the accuracy of the\ntotal amount the government seeks.” See ECF No. 724 at 1. By order dated January 8, 2026, the\nCourt directed Guo to file any objections and to specify “whether [Guo] claims a personal\n4\n\ninterest in any of” the Listed Property. ECF No. 784.3 Before the Court is Guo’s February 3,\n2026 submission. See Objs.\nLEGAL STANDARD\nWhen the Government seeks forfeiture in the form of a money judgment, the Court “must\ndetermine the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered to pay,” Fed. R. Crim. P.\n32.2(b)(1)(A), using “evidence already in the record,” id. 32.2(b)(1)(B), including the trial\nrecord. See United States v. Mathieu, 853 F. App’x 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2021). The calculation of\na forfeiture amount, however, “is not an exact science.” United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48\n(2d Cir. 2011). As a result, the Court need only make a “reasonable estimate” based on\n“available information” concerning the appropriate amount of forfeiture. Id.; see id. (noting,\nadditionally, that a court may “use general points of reference as a starting point” and “may\nmake reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the\nevidence” in evaluating a proposed money judgment); see also United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d\n176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009).\nThe Court must determine forfeiture—both the proper money judgment amount and\nwhether forfeiture applies to the Listed Property—by a preponderance of the evidence. United\nStates v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007).\nDISCUSSION\nGuo raises several objections to the POF: (1) the “scope” of his alleged fraud is\noverbroad and includes those who were not victims of his crimes; (2) he “can only be ordered to\n3 The Government argues that Guo has waived any challenges to the POF due largely to his statement in his June 27,\n2025 letter that he was not taking a position as to forfeiture. See, e.g., Resp. at 3–4. The Court’s January 8 order did\nnot address waiver, and, because the Court largely concludes in this order that Guo’s challenges to the POF lack\nmerit and prefers to decide the issues on the merits, the Court expresses no view on whether Guo waived his\nobjections.\n5\n\nforfeit assets that he personally obtained”; (3) forfeiture should not cover any alleged proceeds\nfrom the GTV Private Placement because he was acquitted of two fraud counts related to GTV;\nand (4) the money judgment should be offset by certain amounts. See Objs. at 3, 9, 11, 17.\nThe Court finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the\nevidence that approximately $889 million is a reasonable estimate of the gross inflows of cash\ninto the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange—all either components of\nthe racketeering conspiracy of which Guo was convicted or enterprises which formed the basis of\nhis fraud convictions—and that $889 million is, therefore, the proper money judgment amount in\nthis case. See Gov’t Mot. at 3; GXZ26, ECF No. 803-1; Trial Tr. at 4330–32;4 Fed. R. Crim. P.\n32(b)(1)(A).\nA. Scope\nThe Court rejects Guo’s argument that the POF should not include property traceable to\n“proceeds” from individuals who claim they “were not victimized” by his fraud. See Objs. at 3–\n4, 5.\nAs an initial matter, Guo assumes that forfeiture distinguishes between “investors who\nwere defrauded, and those who insist they were not.” Objs. at 4. It does not. Forfeiture, in this\ncase, applies to proceeds “from racketeering activity,” proceeds from “fraud,” and property\n“involved in” money laundering. See Resp. at 5 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 981(a)(1)(C), and\n982(a)(2)). Contrary to Guo’s claims, the scope of his crimes of conviction is not defined by the\n4 In his sentencing submission, Guo argues that exhibit GXZ26 does not account for the possible double-counting of\ninflows across various components of the G Enterprise. See, e.g., ECF No. 822 at 41,53 (claiming that individuals\ncould use Himalaya Exchange funds to purchase a G Club membership); see also ECF No. 826 (correcting\nsentencing submission). Guo does not cite any evidence showing that this occurred, or suggesting that the\nGovernment’s inflow calculation in fact improperly included contributions made from Himalaya Exchange accounts\nto G Clubs. Id. The Court, therefore, makes this determination on the evidence available in the record, which\ndemonstrates that the Government’s calculation is correct. And, in any event, this argument was not raised in Guo’s\nobjections to the forfeiture order. As such, the Court will not address this objection.\n6\n\n“expectations and reliance” of individual victims on his statements. Cf. Objs. at 5 (claiming that\n“individual investors’ expectations and reliance are critical to distinguishing between victims of\nfraud and those who were not victimized”).\nIndeed, the Second Circuit has held that “reliance is not an element of criminal fraud”\nand that “the unreasonableness of a fraud victim in relying (or not) on a misrepresentation does\nnot bear on a defendant’s criminal intent.” United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir.\n2017). In other words, even if an alleged “investor” in a fraudulent scheme disclaims that they\nrelied on the false statements which underpinned the fraud, a fraudulent scheme may nonetheless\nexist, and all proceeds obtained from such a scheme would be subject to forfeiture. Relatedly, an\n“investor[’s]” subjective views as to whether they are victims of the scheme have no bearing on\nwhether their contributions to the scheme are “proceeds” that a defendant has obtained from\nfraud. All that matters is “materiality”—that the statements alleged to be fraudulent have the\n“natural tendency to influence the decisionmakers to whom they were addressed.” Weaver, 860\nF.3d at 96. And materiality is evaluated under an objective test, “rather than from the subjective\nperspective of the victim.” United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017).\nThe Court’s conclusion is confirmed by the statutory definitions of the fraud crimes of\nconviction. Wire fraud criminalizes the knowing participation in any “scheme or artifice to\ndefraud” and the transmittal by wire of certain communications for “the purpose of executing\nsuch scheme or artifice [to defraud].” 18 U.S.C. § 1343; see July 9, 2024 Trial Tr. at 5791:25–\n5794:6, ECF No. 450. As for securities fraud, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)\nrule violated in this case, see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 47, 51, prohibits using a\n“scheme . . . to defraud,” “mak[ing] an untrue statement of material fact” or omitting a material\nfact in certain circumstances, or “engaging in an act, practice, or course of business which\n7\n\noperates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)–(c)\n(emphasis added). See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999) (observing that\nCongress prohibited the “‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud,” in the fraud\nstatutes). In other words, the “scope” of Guo’s fraudulent schemes does not depend on whether\neach individual making contributions to those schemes believed they were defrauded. Their\nbeliefs as to whether their individual “investments” had material value, or as to whether they in\nfact relied on any material misrepresentations, do not affect whether those investments were\nmade in a fraudulent scheme.5\nThe cases cited by Guo, United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993), and\nUnited States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024), are inapposite. In Miller, the Second\nCircuit held that the Government failed to prove that the defendants intended to deprive a victim\nof a property interest on the facts shown at a trial for mail fraud because the property that the\ndefendants had allegedly diverted “to their own benefit” from the victims was not, in fact, “a\nspecific, identifiable property interest” belonging to the victims in the first place. Id. at 1017–\n1021. Miller, in other words, turned ultimately on the scope of the alleged victims’ contractual\nproperty interests, not on their expectations or beliefs, and, therefore, has no bearing here. See\nid. Rainford vacated and remanded a forfeiture order where a district court based its order solely\non “the government’s word.” 110 F.4th at 489. Here, by contrast, there is ample evidence\nsupporting the POF filed in this case.\nGuo further argues that there is “abundant proof that a considerable number of supposed\n‘victims’ reject that classification.” Objs. at 6–7. He claims that “6,512 members of the\n5 Guo does not argue otherwise—he neither discusses, nor even cites, the elements of his fraud convictions in the\nportion of his submission making this argument. See Objs. at 4–9.\n8\n\nHimalaya Exchange” (the enterprise for which Guo was convicted of wire fraud in Count\nEleven) “have objected to forfeiture of their accounts” and “express[] frustration at being labeled\nas victims.” Id. at 6. These complaints, as well as those from the “Hamilton petitioners” and\nvarious other third parties, do not affect this order, which addresses solely whether the properties\nidentified by the Government are, in fact, either proceeds of racketeering activity, proceeds of\nfraud, or traceable to funds involved in money laundering, and whether the $1.3 billion money\njudgment is a reasonable estimate of the value of Guo’s forfeiture obligations.6 Third-parties’\nalleged claims to the property identified in the POF shall be assessed through ancillary\nproceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2.\nB. Possession\nGuo argues that he “can only be held liable to forfeit the value of tainted proceeds to the\nextent that he at some point personally obtained them,” and that, for various reasons, there is\ninsufficient evidence that he “obtained” the property listed in the POF. Objs. at 10–11 (emphasis\nin original).\nGuo misunderstands the nature of forfeiture. For proceeds of a defendant’s crime to be\nforfeitable, the property “need not be personally or directly in the possession of the defendant,\nhis assignees, or his co-conspirators.” United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir.\n2012) (citation omitted). Instead, the property need only “have, at some point, been under the\ndefendant’s control.” Id. Further, property may be forfeited even when the defendant’s control\nover the property is temporary. See United States v. Tanner, 942 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2019).\n6 The Court acknowledges the voluminous petitions filed under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) seeking to assert a third-party’s\nlegal interest in property forfeited to the United States, and the Court expresses no opinion as to whether any\npetitioner’s claim, properly made and submitted under § 853(n), is meritorious.\n9\n\nAt trial, the Government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo was the\n“Boss” in control of all of the entities in the G Enterprise and those entities’ assets. Resp. at 7.7\nFor example, testimony from several witnesses shows that Guo exercised control over assets\ninvolved in the G Enterprise: Karin Maistrello testified that Guo was in control of the Rule of\nLaw organizations’ funds, a scheme involved in the G Enterprise (see Trial Tr. at 424); multiple\nwitnesses testified that Guo had control over G Clubs (see Trial Tr. at 1941 (describing Guo as\nthe “top boss”), 1995:3–15, 1996:2–5 (clarification at sidebar), 1999:4–7, 2975:8–2976:10,\n2980:11–22, 2999:20–3000:6 (testimony concerning G Clubs)); and abundant documentary\nevidence supports the conclusion that Guo exercised control over the funds involved in his\ncrimes (see GXC415; Resp. at 7 n.3 (citing trial exhibits depicting Guo exercising control over\nfunds involved in the G Enterprise)).8\nThe documentary evidence introduced at trial, see, e.g., GXZ26 (showing cash flows\nfrom certain G Enterprise bank accounts into other bank accounts which are listed in the POF),\nalso establishes that the particular accounts that the Government argues are subject to forfeiture\ncontain funds derived from proceeds of the G Enterprise and property involved in money\nlaundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Notably, Guo does not argue that the funds in these accounts hold\n7 Additionally, under each statute serving as the basis for forfeiture in this case, the Court need only find that Guo\nobtained the proceeds “directly or indirectly.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(3), 981(a)(2)(A), 982(a)(2).\n8 Guo’s sole argument regarding the trial record is that one witness “testified that . . . Guo was not the ultimate\nbeneficial owner of G Clubs, nor was he the source of funds for G Clubs or G Fashion.” Objs. at 10–11. That\nwitness, James R. Collins Jr., was an employee at Mercantile Global Holdings, a company which owned a bank that\nmaintained client relationships with G Clubs, G Fashion, and the Himalaya Exchange. See Trial Tr. at 2753:8–\n2756:15. But Collins only testified that Mercantile Bank believed that Guo was not the ultimate beneficial owner of\nG Clubs and that G Clubs had represented as much to him. See Trial Tr. at 2758:23–2762:12. He did not testify as\nto any personal knowledge of the inner workings of G Clubs, or whether Guo, in fact, exercised control over G\nClubs funds. The Court, therefore, accords Collins’ testimony minimal weight. Guo also attempts to incorporate by\nreference arguments made by third parties who have filed ancillary claims to assets subject to forfeiture under 21\nU.S.C. § 853(n). See Objs. at 11. The Court will consider those arguments as part of the ancillary proceedings that\nshall be conducted after sentencing pursuant to §853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. The Court\nexpresses no opinion as to whether any third party has a superior legal interest in any forfeited property.\n10\n\nmoney which is not derived from entities involved in the G Enterprise. See POF ¶¶ a–z, bb;\nObjs. at 9–11 (instead arguing solely that he did not personally obtain or exercise control over\nthese funds).\nGuo relies in substantial part on Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017), to\nsupport his argument that he cannot be ordered to “forfeit assets that he [did not] personally\nobtain[].” Obj. at 9. In that case, the Supreme Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 853, which requires\nforfeiture of any property derived from proceeds of certain drug crimes, does not automatically\nimpose joint and several liability on all convicted parties of a conspiracy. See 581 U.S. at 443.\nIn Honeycutt, the government sought a money judgment against a defendant, arguing that\nhe was liable for the entirety of a conspiracy’s profits, even though the defendant was merely a\nsalaried employee who had assisted his store’s participation in a drug crime, and never benefited\nfrom, let alone exercised control over, the extent of the store’s tainted profits. See id. at 445–47.\nHere, however, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo benefitted from and\nexercised control over the funds that the Government maintains are subject to forfeiture. See,\ne.g., Resp. at 7–8 n.3 (citing trial evidence noting, for example, that Guo directed his co-\nconspirators to use “G-Club or another private company” to finance the purchase of an expensive\ncoffee table). Indeed, since Honeycutt, the Second Circuit has reiterated that the Government\nneed not show that a defendant personally retained or directly possessed property for forfeiture to\napply. See, e.g., Rajaratnam v. United States, 736 F. App’x 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding\nthat a forfeiture order could be imposed against a defendant for funds over which the defendant\nonly had temporary authority and which had subsequently been disbursed).\nThe Court, therefore, finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of\nthe evidence that the Listed Property is subject to forfeiture.\n11\n\nC. GTV Private Placement and SEC Disgorgement\nGuo argues that funds derived from the GTV Private Placement should not be included in\nthe forfeiture order and that the money judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount\nof funds the Government alleges were involved in GTV. See Objs. at 17.9 Guo contends that\nbecause he was acquitted of wire and securities fraud in connection with the GTV Private\nPlacement, $411 million in funds derived from the GTV Private Placement that the Government\nseeks to forfeit should be excluded from the order. Id. at 11–12; Resp. at 8.\nThe Court need not resolve this in light of another issue raised by the parties: whether the\nmoney judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount already recovered by the SEC in\nadministrative proceedings. See SEC Order, ECF No. 799-2. Guo states that GTV has already\ndisgorged in excess of $411 million as part of an administrative proceeding initiated by the SEC.\nSee Objs. at 17–18. The Government concedes this, in part, stating that “[t]he actual funds\nderived from the GTV [P]rivate [P]lacement were recovered by the SEC, which established a fair\nfund for distribution to victims,” and that “[i]f the Court were to deduct the GTV [P]rivate\n[P]lacement funds from the forfeiture amount, approximately $411 million would be deducted.”\nMot. at 4 n.2.\nHowever, the parties’ figures diverge. Guo argues that GTV, along with Saraca Media\nGroup, Inc. and Voice of Guo Media, Inc., has disgorged over $486 million to the SEC and that\nthe full $486 million should be deducted from the money judgment because it relates to conduct\ncharged in this case. See Objs. at 18. The Government, however, contends that only $411\n9 Guo does not claim that a specific bank account, or item of personal property, solely constitutes proceeds from the\nGTV Private Placement, see generally Objs. The Government maintains that all of the relevant funds are proceeds\nof the G Enterprise and property involved in money laundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Guo does not argue that any of\nthe Listed Property should be excluded from forfeiture on this basis, and the Court, therefore, only examines how\nthe disgorgement affects the money judgment.\n12\n\nmillion of the $1.3 billion figure derives from the GTV Private Placement and that the remaining\n$889 million derives from proceeds traceable to the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, or the\nHimalaya Exchange. See GXZ26. The fact that GTV and other entities disgorged $75 million\nmore than $411 million is relevant to the money judgment only if the excess $75 million is\ntraceable to proceeds from the fraudulent schemes involved in this case, namely, the Farm Loan\nProgram, G Clubs, or the Himalaya Exchange.\nThe Court rejects Guo’s arguments that the purported $75 million disgorged in excess of\n$411 million is traceable to his crimes of conviction. First, he claims that $34 million of the total\ndisgorged funds relate to sales of “G-Coins and G-Dollars,” early precursors to the Himalaya\nExchange. See Objs. at 17–18. However, the sale of G-Coin and G-Dollars from April to June\nof 2020 is not covered by the Indictment, which targets the Himalaya Exchange enterprise\ntransactions that took place from 2021 to 2023. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 53.\nMoreover, Guo provides no evidence that the $115 million in disgorged funds\nattributable to Voice of Guo Media, Inc. (“VOG”) “overlaps with the so-called Farm Loan\nProgram.” Objs. at 17–18. The SEC Order reports that VOG pooled funds from “prospective\ninvestors” who wanted to invest less than $100,000 in GTV. See Objs. at 17–18; SEC Order\n¶¶ 15–21, ECF No. 799-2. The Indictment’s description of the Farm Loan Program, however,\ndiffers substantially from the SEC Order’s description of VOG’s fundraising efforts. Compare,\ne.g., S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 17 (describing “The Himalaya Farm Alliance” as “a collective\nof informal groups (each known as a ‘Farm’) located in various cities around the world” which\nobtained investments “in the form of ‘loans’ to a Farm” and “promising that such loans would be\nconvertible into GTV common stock” via a “Loan Agreement”) with SEC Order ¶¶ 16–18\n(describing how VOG would provide an investor a one-page “Limited Purpose Agency\n13\n\nAgreement,” stating that, for minimal consideration, a representative of VOG would act as an\n“agent” for investors and purchase GTV stock on their behalf).\nAlthough Guo is correct that the SEC obtained $75 million more than $411 million from\nGTV and related companies, he has not shown that this surplus coincides with any of the\nproceeds that the Government has demonstrated are related to Guo’s crimes of conviction—that\nis, the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange.\nThe Court concludes, therefore, that only $411 million may be deducted from the\nproposed money judgment, because the record reflects—and the Government does not contest—\nthat $411 million in funds traceable to the GTV Private Placement has already been disgorged by\nentities related to the G Enterprise in separate proceedings prior to the commencement of this\ncriminal case. This deduction does not affect the forfeiture of any of the Listed Property.\nD. Offsets\nGuo argues that the money judgment should be “already offset by the more than\n$1 billion already in the Government’s possession in connection with this case” and by the\n“funds and assets in the Bankruptcy Trustee’s possession that are among the items the\nGovernment deems forfeitable in this case.” Objs. at 18–20. In response, the Government notes\nthat the value of property “forfeited to the United States under a Final Order of Forfeiture” will,\nindeed “be applied towards the satisfaction of the [m]oney [j]udgment” once all third-party\ninterests are adjudicated, and that there is no authority to order an offset for any assets not\n14\n\ncovered by the POF. See Resp. at 10 & n.7; POF ¶ 7.10 Accordingly, the Court will not deduct\nthe value of any of the Listed Property from the money judgment at this time.11\nE. Ancillary Matters\nGuo also seeks an order directing the Government to take possession of certain assets (the\n“bankruptcy assets”) from the Chapter 11 Trustee of Guo’s estate in bankruptcy proceedings,\nwhich were commenced on February 15, 2022, in the District of Connecticut. See Seizure Mot.,\nECF No. 724, at 1; see generally In re Kwok, No. 22 Bk. 50073 (D. Conn. Bankr. February 15,\n2022); In re Kwok, 172 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2026). Guo argues that the Government’s interest in\nthe forfeited assets is “superior to that of any creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding,” Seizure\nMot. at 5, that ordering the Government to seize the bankruptcy assets will both “make them\navailable to investors in the various entities involved in this case, and for whom restitution will\nbe ordered” and “halt the accumulation of considerable fees and expenses incurred by the\nTrustee” in the bankruptcy proceeding. See id. at 5–7.\nThe Court does not have the power to grant the relief Guo requests.12 Guo merely cites\nFederal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(3) for the proposition that the Court “may include\n. . . conditions reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal” in a\npreliminary order of forfeiture. See Seizure Reply at 4, ECF No. 754. Rule 32.2(b)(3) limits the\n10 Guo also argues that if the Court finds, in ancillary proceedings, that any property belongs to a third party, the\nvalue of that property should be deducted from the money judgment. Objs. at 18. Not so. Third-party forfeiture\nproceedings are designed to determine if a third party possesses a superior legal interest in the property subject to\nforfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6); Gov’t Forfeiture Ltr. at 1–2, ECF No. 785. That is a separate question from\nwhether the assets are forfeitable. Property may well have come under Guo’s control due to, for example, fraud,\neven though a third party possessed a superior legal interest in that property. Therefore, if the Court finds that any\nproperty belongs to a third party under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), it will not deduct the value of that property from the\nmoney judgment.\n11 The Court denies Guo’s request to reduce the money judgment “to the extent the Government has declined to\npursue other potentially forfeitable assets in this case,” and to reduce the money judgment by the amount forfeited\nby Haithem Khaled. See Objs. at 19–21. Guo offers no legal basis for either of these requests.\n12 The Court expresses no opinion on the Government’s argument that Guo lacks standing on this issue.\n15\n\nCourt’s authority to conditions required to preserve the property’s value on “appeal,” rather than\nconditions required to preserve value pending related, separate proceedings—like the bankruptcy\nproceeding here.\nFurthermore, several other procedural features of the forfeiture rules indicate that such an\norder would exceed the Court’s power. For example, Rule 32.2(b)(3) “authorizes” the\nGovernment “to seize the specific property subject to forfeiture” upon entry of a preliminary\norder but does not require that the Government do so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3). Nor does\nRule 32.2 state when, or how, the Government may seize property listed in a forfeiture order\nonce it is authorized to do so under Rule 32.2(b)(3). Likewise, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) and (f)\nempower the Court to take certain protective measures concerning assets potentially subject to\nforfeiture, but do not authorize the Court to compel the Government to enact a seizure. See\nResp. at 4.\nMoreover, Guo’s request lacks merit. Guo argues that the Court may impose conditions\n“reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal,” Seizure Reply at 4,\nbut nothing in Rule 32.2 requires the Court to do so. Although the Court acknowledges that the\nChapter 11 Estate in the bankruptcy proceeding has incurred fees owed to the Trustee and\nvarious other professionals, see Seizure Mot. at 7, such fees are not unusual given the remarkable\ncomplexity of that proceeding. See id. (claiming that 300 adversary proceedings have been filed\nin the bankruptcy proceeding).\nF. Restitution\nThe Government requests that the Court find that imposing a restitution order would be\nimpracticable and authorize a remission process. See Gov’t Ltr. at 4–5, ECF No. 785; ECF\nNo. 784 (January 8, 2026 order). Guo agrees. ECF No. 789 at 3. The Court agrees and finds,\n16\n\nbased on the extensive record in this case, that given the “complexity of the case and the number\nof victims involved,” awarding restitution to victims in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3663A\nwould be impractical and would complicate or prolong the sentencing process. See 18 U.S.C.\n§ 3663(c)(3)(A)–(B).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Government has demonstrated\nthat forfeiture applies to the Listed Property due to Guo’s convictions for racketeering\nconspiracy, wire and securities fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Court\nSUSTAINS Guo’s objections to the extent that the Court shall deduct $411 million from the $1.3\nbillion proposed money judgment, such that the money judgment in the final order of forfeiture\nshall be $889 million.\nThe Court DENIES Guo’s motion at ECF No. 724 seeking an order compelling the\nGovernment to seize assets in the bankruptcy proceedings. The Clerk of Court is respectfully\ndirected to terminate the motion at ECF No. 724.\nFinally, the Court finds that restitution is impracticable in this case and authorizes the\nGovernment to compensate victims through a remission process.\nSO ORDERED.\nDated: June 29, 2026\nNew York, New York\n17","body_zh":"USDC SDNY（美国纽约南区联邦地区法院）\n文件\nUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT（美国联邦地区法院）\nSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK（纽约南区） 电子归档\nUNITED STATES OF AMERICA（美利坚合众国） 文件号：______ ____________\n归档日期：__6/29/2026__\n-诉-\nMILES GUO（郭文贵）， 案号：23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)\n被告。 裁定\nANALISA TORRES（阿娜丽莎·托雷斯），地区法官：\n\n被告 Miles Guo（郭文贵）对法院于 2025年8月11日 作出的初步没收裁定（“POF”）提出异议。参见异议书，ECF No. 799；初步没收裁定，ECF No. 720；政府动议，ECF No. 716；答辩意见，ECF No. 803；亦见回复意见，ECF No. 804。基于下述理由，法院部分支持（SUSTAINS IN PART）、部分驳回（OVERRULES IN PART）郭对初步没收裁定的异议。\n\n背景\n\n法院推定知悉本案的事实背景，在此仅概述与没收相关的诉讼程序和提交文件。\n\nA. 陪审团裁决\n\n2024年7月16日，陪审团裁定郭犯有九项各项金融犯罪罪名：(1) 一项敲诈勒索阴谋罪（第三份替代起诉书的第一项罪名）；(2) 电汇欺诈或银行欺诈阴谋罪、洗钱阴谋罪以及证券欺诈阴谋罪各一项（第二、三、四项罪名）；(3) 与农场贷款项目（Farm Loan Program）相关的电汇欺诈罪和证券欺诈罪各一项（第七、八项罪名）；(4) 与 G|CLUBS（“G Clubs”）相关的电汇欺诈罪和证券欺诈罪各一项（第九、十项罪名）；(5) 以及与喜马拉雅交易所（Himalaya Exchange）相关的一项电汇欺诈罪（第十一项罪名）。陪审团宣判郭在与 GTV 机构私募（GTV Private Placement）相关的电汇欺诈和证券欺诈罪（各一项）以及一项进行非法货币交易罪中无罪（第五、六、十二项罪名）。参见陪审团裁决，ECF No. 395；S3 替代起诉书，\n\nECF No. 307。上述各项活动——Farm Loan Program（农场贷款项目）、G Clubs（G俱乐部）、Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）以及 GTV Private Placement（GTV私募）——均被指控为“G Enterprise（G企业）”的组成部分，而该企业是一系列投资骗局，构成了第一项罪名中所详述的敲诈勒索共谋。参见 S3 Superseding Indictment（第三次替代起诉书）¶¶ 16–19。B. 适用的没收条款\n\n鉴于郭的定罪，他受《United States Code（美国法典）》三项不同条款的约束，该等条款要求向政府没收某些资产：\n1) 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)，该条要求被告人没收任何“构成该人从敲诈勒索活动中获得的任何收益，或由该等收益衍生而来的”财产（第一项罪名）；2) 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)，该条要求被告人没收所有“构成可追溯至欺诈或实施欺诈之共谋的收益，或由该等收益衍生而来的”财产（第二、四、七、八、九、十和十一项罪名）；1 以及\n3) 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1)，该条要求被告人没收所有“涉及”洗钱或“可追溯至此类[涉及洗钱的]财产”的财产（第三项罪名）。参见同上 ¶¶ 58–61。C. 先前的意见书\n\n2025年4月8日，本法院指定了郭的现任辩护律师，并命令双方提交一份联合信函，说明郭就没收事宜提出其立场的日期。参见 4月8日庭审记录第 10:14–23 页，ECF No. 684。随后，应双方及郭的请求，法院批准了四次延期，以便郭就各项资产的没收明确阐述其立场。参见例如 ECF Nos. 698, 704, 706, 708。随后，在2025年6月27日，郭提交了一封信函，声称他“无法就涉及政府扣押的资金和财产的潜在没收及发还问题表明立场”。ECF No. 710 第 1–2 页。该信函声明郭在本案中“并未放弃其任何权利，包括其上诉权”。同上，第 1 页。作为回应，政府致函表示，尽管“郭不同意初步没收令，但法院可以作出设定金钱判决并没收郭在特定财产中的个人权益的初步没收令”。ECF No. 713。\n\n1 起诉书在该没收指控中还引用了 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c)，该条规定了与没收相关的进一步规则和程序。参见 S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 59。\n\n一个月后，通过日期为2025年7月28日的动议，政府请求法院“作出设定……金钱判决的初步没收令”，金额为13亿美元。参见 Fed. R. Crim. P.（联邦刑事诉讼规则）32(b)(2)(A)；Gov’t Mot.（政府动议）。2 政府将这13亿美元定性为敲诈勒索和欺诈罪名（第一、二、四、七、八、九、十和十一项罪名）“可追溯至犯罪实施的收益”，以及洗钱罪行（第三项罪名）中“所涉及的财产”。参见 POF（初步没收令）第 3 页。政府辩称，13亿美元是“单个受害者向G企业的某些分支机构汇入资金的保守估计”，这些分支机构包括农场贷款项目、GTV、G俱乐部和喜马拉雅交易所。Gov’t Mot. 第 3 页；参见 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)（“如果政府寻求针对个人的金钱判决，法院必须确定将命令被告人支付的金额。”）。\n\n2 在要求刑事没收的案件中，法院可以作出金钱判决。当被告人的资产或可识别财产可能无法涵盖没收法规要求被告人没收的全部收益金额时，可使用金钱判决来确保被告人对该等收益的全额承担责任。参见例如 United States v. Kenner, 443 F. Supp. 3d 354, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)（“如果被告人缺乏满足该命令的资产，法院可以裁定给予政府一份没收金钱判决。”）；United States v. Peters, 732 F.3d 93, 98–99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013)（维持在主张依据 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2) 没收的案件中作出的金钱判决）；United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2010)（维持在主张依据 28 U.S.C. § 2461 没收的案件中作出的金钱判决）。\n\n政府还寻求没收在初步没收令中列出的某些财产（即“列明财产”），Gov’t Mot. 第 4 页；POF 第 3–11 页：“从用于推进[郭的]犯罪及其敲诈勒索企业的若干银行账户中扣押的现金……”，根据政府的主张，这些现金代表了“G企业[（第一项罪名中定义的敲诈勒索企业）]的收益以及涉及洗钱的财产”（第三项罪名）。Gov’t Mot. 第 4–5 页。政府根据被政府扣押的日期以及开立账户的名称对这些银行账户进行了分类；每位账户持有人“在[替代]起诉书中均被指名为 RICO（诈骗及贪污腐败组织法）企业的成员”。同上，第 4 页；参见 S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 3(a)。政府随附了与这些账户相关的数份扣押令宣誓书。参见 Gov’t Mot. Exs. B–E, ECF Nos. 716-2 至 716-5；亦参见 Proposed POF（拟议初步没收令）¶¶ a–u, bb（列出银行账户），ECF No. 716-1。\n\n列明财产包括位于 New Jersey（新泽西州）Mahwah（马瓦）Ramapo Valley Road（拉马波山谷路）675号的一处豪宅、“其内部物品”，例如包括一面“带有洛可可式冠顶和交叉阴影线面板的意大利贴金木镜”，以及其他若干奢侈品，如布加迪、兰博基尼和劳斯莱斯。参见 Gov’t Mot. 第 5–7 页；亦参见 Proposed POF ¶ aa（列出“政府从[马瓦]房产中扣押的个人财产”）。政府辩称，马瓦房产、其中的个人财产以及奢侈品均是用可追溯至G俱乐部、G企业或洗钱的资金购买的。参见 Gov’t Mot. 第 5–7 页。\n\n郭未对政府的动议作出回应，且鉴于他曾向法院表示他“无法就涉及没收的问题表明立场”，法院于2025年8月11日作出了初步没收令。参见 POF。将近一个月后，在2025年9月4日，郭请求获得一个机会来“处理”政府动议中的“缺陷”，例如“某些财产是否可予没收”、“抵销问题”以及“政府所寻求的总金额的准确性”。参见 ECF No. 724 第 1 页。通过日期为2026年1月8日的命令，法院指示郭提交任何异议，并明确说明“[郭]是否对任何列明财产主张个人权益”。ECF No. 784。3 摆在法院面前的是郭于2026年2月3日提交的意见书。参见 Objs.（异议书）。\n\n3 政府辩称，郭已放弃对初步没收令提出任何质疑，主要是因为他在2025年6月27日的信函中声明他对没收不持立场。参见例如 Resp.（答复）第 3–4 页。法院1月8日的命令并未涉及弃权问题，且由于法院在该命令中大体上认定郭对初步没收令提出的质疑缺乏法律依据并倾向于就实质问题作出裁决，法院对郭是否放弃其异议不发表意见。\n\n法律标准\n\n当政府寻求以金钱判决的形式进行没收时，法院“必须确定命令被告人支付的金额”，Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A)，利用“记录中已有的证据”，同上 32.2(b)(1)(B)，包括庭审记录。参见 United States v. Mathieu, 853 F. App’x 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2021)。然而，没收金额的计算“并非一门精确的科学”。United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2011)。因此，法院只需根据有关适当没收金额的“可用信息”作出“合理估计”。同上；参见同上（此外指出，法院在评估拟议的金钱判决时，可以“使用一般参考点作为起点”，并“可以根据按证据优势标准确立的证据进行合理推断”）；亦参见 United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009)。\n\n法院必须根据优势证据标准来确定没收事宜——包括适当的金钱判决金额以及没收是否适用于列明财产。United States v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007)。\n\n讨论\n\n郭对初步没收令提出了若干异议：(1) 他被指控的欺诈的“范围”过宽，且包含了那些并非其犯罪受害者的人员；(2) 他“只能被命令没收他个人获得的资产”；(3) 没收不应涵盖来自GTV私募的任何被指控收益，因为他在与GTV相关的两项欺诈罪名上已被宣判无罪；以及 (4) 金钱判决应抵销某些金额。参见 Objs. 第 3, 9, 11, 17 页。\n\n法院认定，政府已以优势证据证明，约8.89亿美元是对农场贷款项目、G俱乐部和喜马拉雅交易所的总现金流入的合理估计——这些项目要么是郭被定罪的敲诈勒索共谋的组成部分，要么是构成其欺诈定罪基础的企业——因此，在本案中8.89亿美元是适当的金钱判决金额。参见 Gov’t Mot. 第 3 页；GXZ26, ECF No. 803-1；庭审记录第 4330–32 页；4 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1)(A)。\n\n4 在其量刑意见书中，郭辩称证物 GXZ26 未考虑G企业各个组成部分之间资金流入可能存在的重复计算。参见例如 ECF No. 822 第 41, 53 页（声称个人可以使用喜马拉雅交易所的资金购买G俱乐部会员资格）；亦参见 ECF No. 826（更正量刑意见书）。郭未引用任何证据证明发生过这种情况，亦未引用证据表明政府的资金流入计算实际上不当地包含了从喜马拉雅交易所账户向G俱乐部支付的款项。同上。因此，法院根据记录中的可用证据作出此项认定，该等证据表明政府的计算是正确的。并且，无论如何，该论点并未在郭对没收令提出的异议中被提出。因此，法院将不处理该项异议。\n\nA. 范围\n\n法院驳回郭的主张，即初步没收令不应包括可追溯至声称自己“未受其欺诈侵害”之个人的“收益”的财产。参见 Objs. 第 3–4, 5 页。首先，郭假定没收在“被欺诈的投资者与坚称自己未被欺诈的投资者”之间做出了区分。Objs. 第 4 页。事实并非如此。在本案中，没收适用于来自“敲诈勒索活动”的收益、来自“欺诈”的收益以及洗钱“所涉及的”财产。参见 Resp. 第 5 页（引用 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 981(a)(1)(C), 以及 982(a)(2)）。与郭的主张相反，其被定罪罪行的范围并非由单个受害者对其言论的“期望和信赖”所界定。对照 Objs. 第 5 页（声称“单个投资者的期望和信赖对于区分欺诈受害者和未受害者至关重要”）。\n\n事实上，Second Circuit（第二巡回上诉法院）已经裁定“信赖并非刑事欺诈的构成要件”，并且“欺诈受害者在信赖（或不信赖）失实陈述方面的不合理性与被告人的犯罪故意无关”。United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2017)。换言之，即使欺诈骗局中所谓的“投资者”否认他们信赖了构成欺诈基础的虚假陈述，欺诈骗局仍可能存在，并且从该等骗局中获得的所有收益都应予以没收。与之相关的是，“投资者”对于自己是否为骗局受害者所持的主观观点，与他们对该骗局的投入是否属于被告人从欺诈中获得的“收益”毫无关联。\n\n唯一重要的是“重大性”（materiality）——即被指控为欺诈性的陈述具有“对陈述所针对的决策者产生影响的自然倾向”。Weaver，860 F.3d，第96页。而且重大性是根据客观标准来评估的，“而非从受害者的主观视角出发”。United States v. Frenkel，682 F. App’x 20，22 (2d Cir. 2017)。法院的结论得到了被定罪的欺诈罪名的法定定义的印证。电汇欺诈将明知而参与任何“欺诈计划或诡计”以及为了“实施此类[欺诈]计划或诡计之目的”而通过电汇传输特定通信的行为定为犯罪。18 U.S.C. § 1343；见2024年7月9日庭审笔录（July 9, 2024 Trial Tr.）第5791:25–5794:6行，ECF No. 450。至于证券欺诈，本案中违反的Securities and Exchange Commission（证券交易委员会，即“SEC”）规则（见S3替代起诉书（S3 Superseding Indictment）第47、51段）禁止使用“欺诈……计划”、“对重大事实作出不真实陈述”或在特定情形下隐瞒重大事实，或“从事对任何人产生或将产生欺诈或欺骗作用的行为、做法或业务流程”，17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)–(c)（强调为后加）。亦见Neder v. United States，527 U.S. 1，24–25 (1999)（指出国会在欺诈法规中禁止的是“‘欺诈计划’，而非欺诈完成本身”）。换言之，Guo（郭文贵）欺诈计划的“范围”并不取决于向这些计划出资的每个人是否认为自己受到了欺诈。他们对于各自的“投资”是否具有实质价值的看法，或者他们实际上是否依赖了任何重大失实陈述的看法，均不影响这些投资是否是在一项欺诈计划中作出的。5\n\n郭引用的案例United States v. Miller，997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993)以及United States v. Rainford，110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024)并不适用。在Miller案中，第二巡回上诉法院认定，在邮寄欺诈的庭审中所展现的事实表明，政府未能证明被告有意图剥夺受害者的财产权益，因为被指控由被告从受害者处挪用“以牟取自身利益”的财产，实际上从一开始就不属于受害者的“具体的、可识别的财产权益”。出处同前，第1017–1021页。换言之，Miller案最终取决于被指称的受害者的合同财产权益的范围，而非其期望或看法，因此与本案无关。见出处同前。Rainford案撤销并发回了一项没收令，因为地区法院在该案中仅依据“政府的一面之词”便作出了裁定。110 F.4th，第489页。相比之下，本案中有充分的证据支持在本案中提交的拟议没收裁定书（POF）。\n\n郭进一步辩称，有“充分证据表明相当数量的所谓‘受害者’拒绝接受这一定性”。异议书（Objs.）第6–7页。他声称“Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的6,512名成员”（郭在第十一项罪名中因该实体被判定犯有电汇欺诈罪）“已对其账户的没收提出异议”，并“对被贴上受害者标签表示沮丧”。出处同前，第6页。这些申诉，以及来自“Hamilton petitioners（汉密尔顿请愿人）”和其他各个第三方的申诉，均不影响本裁定，因为本裁定仅解决政府所认定的财产在事实上是否属于敲诈勒索活动收益、欺诈收益，或可追溯至涉洗钱资金，以及13亿美元的金钱判决是否是对郭的没收义务价值的合理解释。6 第三方对拟议没收裁定书中所列财产的主张，应根据18 U.S.C. § 853(n)及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》（Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure）第32.2条通过附随程序进行评估。\n\n5 郭并无提出相反主张——在其提出该主张的意见书部分中，他既未讨论，甚至也未引用其欺诈定罪的构成要件。见异议书第4–9页。\n\n6 法院注意到根据18 U.S.C. § 853(n)提交的大量请愿书，这些请愿书旨在主张第三方对被没收归美国的财产拥有合法权益，法院对于任何请愿人根据§ 853(n)妥当提出并呈交的请求是否具有实体理由不发表意见。\n\nB. 占有\n\n郭辩称，他“仅在其于某一时刻个人实际获取了受污染收益的范围内，才承担没收该等收益价值的责任”，并且出于种种原因，指称其“获取”了拟议没收裁定书所列财产的证据不足。异议书第10–11页（强调为原文所加）。\n\n郭误解了没收的性质。被告犯罪的收益要达到可没收的条件，该财产“无需由被告、其受让人或其同谋个人或直接占有”。United States v. Contorinis，692 F.3d 136，147 (2d Cir. 2012)（引文省略）。相反，该财产只需“在某一时刻曾处于被告的控制之下”。出处同前。此外，即使被告对财产的控制是暂时的，财产仍可被没收。见United States v. Tanner，942 F.3d 60，68 (2d Cir. 2019)。7\n\n在庭审中，政府以优势证据证明，郭是控制G Enterprise（G系列企业）所有实体及这些实体资产的“Boss（老板）”。答辩书（Resp.）第7页。8 例如，多名证人的证言显示郭对涉及G系列企业的资产实施了控制：Karin Maistrello作证称郭控制着法治机构（Rule of Law organizations）的资金，该运作是涉及G系列企业的计划之一（见庭审笔录第424页）；多名证人作证称郭对G Clubs拥有控制权（见庭审笔录第1941页（将郭描述为“最高老板”）、第1995:3–15行、第1996:2–5行（法官席旁讨论中的澄清）、第1999:4–7行、第2975:8–2976:10行、第2980:11–22行、第2999:20–3000:6行（关于G Clubs的证言））；并且有大量的书证支持郭对其犯罪所涉资金实施了控制的结论（见GXC415；答辩书第7页脚注3（引用显示郭对涉及G系列企业的资金实施控制的庭审证据物））。\n\n7 此外，根据在本案中作为没收依据的每一项制定法，法院只需认定郭是“直接或间接地”获取了收益。见18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(3)、981(a)(2)(A)、982(a)(2)。\n\n8 郭关于庭审记录的唯一论点是，有一名证人“作证称……郭不是G Clubs的最终实益拥有人，也不是G Clubs或G Fashion的资金来源”。异议书第10–11页。该证人James R. Collins Jr.是Mercantile Global Holdings的一名雇员，该公司拥有一家与G Clubs、G Fashion和Himalaya Exchange保持客户关系的银行。见庭审笔录第2753:8–2756:15行。但Collins仅作证称，Mercantile Bank认为郭不是G Clubs的最终实益拥有人，且G Clubs曾向其作出过如此陈述。见庭审笔录第2758:23–2762:12行。他并未就G Clubs内部运作的任何个人知情情况作证，也未就郭实际上是否对G Clubs资金实施了控制作证。因此，法院对Collins的证言给予极小的证明力权重。郭还试图援引援用根据21 U.S.C. § 853(n)对拟没收资产提出附随权利主张的第三方所作的论点。见异议书第11页。法院将在量刑后依据§ 853(n)及《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32.2条进行的附随程序中一并审理这些论点。法院对于是否有任何第三方对任何被没收财产享有优先合法权益不发表意见。\n\n庭审中引入的书证（见例如GXZ26（显示资金从特定G系列企业银行账户流入拟议没收裁定书中所列的其他银行账户的现金流））亦证明，政府主张应予没收的特定账户中包含来源于G系列企业收益的资金以及涉及洗钱的财产。见动议（Mot.）第4–5页。值得注意的是，郭并未辩称这些账户中的资金包含非来源于涉及G系列企业实体的款项。见拟议没收裁定书第a–z、bb段；异议书第9–11页（反而仅辩称他未曾个人获取或对这些资金实施控制）。\n\n郭在很大程度上依赖Honeycutt v. United States，581 U.S. 443 (2017)来支持其主张，即不能命令他“没收他[未曾]个人获取的资产”。异议书第9页。在该案中，最高法院认定，要求没收来源于特定毒品犯罪收益的任何财产的21 U.S.C. § 853，并不会自动对某一合谋中所有被定罪的当事人强加连带责任。见581 U.S.，第443页。\n\n在Honeycutt案中，政府寻求针对一名被告作出金钱判决，辩称该被告应对合谋的全部利润承担责任，即使该被告仅是一名协助其所在商店参与毒品犯罪的受薪雇员，且从未从该商店受污染的利润规模中获益，更谈不上实施控制。见出处同前，第445–47页。然而在本案中，法院以优势证据认定，郭从政府主张应予没收的资金中获益并对其实施了控制。见例如答辩书第7–8页脚注3（引用庭审证据指出，例如，郭指示其同谋使用“G-Club或另一家私营公司”来资助购买一张昂贵的名贵茶几）。事实上，自Honeycutt案以来，第二巡回上诉法院重申，政府无需证明被告个人保留或直接占有了财产即可适用没收。见例如Rajaratnam v. United States，736 F. App’x 279，284 (2d Cir. 2018)（判决可针对被告就其仅拥有临时支配权且随后已被支出的资金作出没收令）。\n\n因此，法院认定，政府已以优势证据证明列明财产（Listed Property）应予没收。\n\nC. GTV私募与SEC追缴违法所得\n\n郭辩称，来源于GTV Private Placement（GTV私募）的资金不应包含在没收令中，且针对郭的金钱判决应扣减政府指控涉及GTV的资金金额。见异议书第17页。9 郭主张，由于他在涉及GTV私募的电汇欺诈和证券欺诈指控中被判无罪，因此政府寻求没收的来源于GTV私募的4.11亿美元资金应从该命令中排除。出处同前，第11–12页；答辩书第8页。\n\n鉴于当事人提出的另一问题，即针对郭的金钱判决是否应扣减SEC在行政程序中已经追回的金额，法院无需就此作出裁决。见SEC命令，ECF No. 799-2。郭陈述称，作为SEC发起的行政程序的一部分，GTV已经交出（disgorged）超过4.11亿美元的非法所得。见异议书第17–18页。政府在一定程度上承认了这一点，指出“[来源于GTV私募的实际资金已被SEC追回，SEC设立了用于向受害者分配的公平基金（fair fund）”，并且“[如果法院从没收金额中扣除GTV私募资金，将扣除约4.11亿美元]”。动议第4页脚注2。\n\n然而，当事人双方的数额存在分歧。郭辩称，GTV以及Saraca Media Group, Inc.和Voice of Guo Media, Inc.已向SEC交出了超过4.86亿美元的非法所得，并且全部4.86亿美元均应从金钱判决中扣除，因为其涉及本案中所指控的行为。见异议书第18页。\n\n然而，Government（政府方）主张，在13亿美元这一数额中，仅有4.11亿美元来源于GTV Private Placement（GTV私募），其余8.89亿美元则来源于可追溯至Farm Loan Program（农场贷款项目）、G Clubs（G系列俱乐部）或Himalaya Exchange（喜马拉雅交易所）的收益。参见GXZ26。GTV及其他实体上缴非法所得的金额比4.11亿美元多出7500万美元这一事实，只有在多出的7500万美元可追溯至本案所涉欺诈计划——即农场贷款项目、G系列俱乐部或喜马拉雅交易所——的收益时，才与金钱判决相关。\n\n脚注9：郭并未声称某一特定银行账户或某件个人财产单独构成来自GTV私募的收益，参见异议书全文。政府方坚称，所有相关资金均为G Enterprise（G系列企业）的收益及涉及洗钱的财产。参见动议书第4–5页。郭并未以此为由主张应将任何Listed Property（列明财产）排除在没收之外，因此，本法院仅审查上缴非法所得对金钱判决的影响。\n\n本法院驳回郭关于据称超出4.11亿美元的7500万美元上缴款项可追溯至其被定罪罪行的主张。首先，他声称全部上缴资金中的3400万美元与“G-Coins and G-Dollars”（G币和G美元）的销售有关，后者是喜马拉雅交易所的早期前身。参见异议书第17–18页。然而，2020年4月至6月期间销售G币和G美元的行为并未包含在起诉书中，起诉书针对的是2021年至2023年期间发生的喜马拉雅交易所企业交易。参见S3 Superseding Indictment（S3替代起诉书）第53段。\n\n此外，郭没有提供任何证据证明归属于Voice of Guo Media, Inc.（“VOG”，郭媒体有限公司）的1.15亿美元上缴资金“与所谓的农场贷款项目重叠”。异议书第17–18页。SEC Order（美国证券交易委员会命令）记载，VOG汇集了希望向GTV投资少于10万美元的“潜在投资者”的资金。参见异议书第17–18页；SEC命令第15–21段，ECF No. 799-2。然而，起诉书对农场贷款项目的描述与SEC命令对VOG募资行为的描述存在实质性差异。对比例如S3替代起诉书第17段（将“The Himalaya Farm Alliance”（喜马拉雅农场联盟）描述为“位于世界各城市之非正式团体的集合（每一团体被称为一个‘农场’）”，这些农场“以向‘农场’提供‘贷款’的形式”获取投资，并“承诺该等贷款将通过‘Loan Agreement’（贷款协议）可转换为GTV普通股”）与SEC命令第16–18段（描述VOG如何向投资者提供一份单页的“Limited Purpose Agency Agreement”（有限目的代理协议），声明为了微不足道的对价，VOG的代表将作为投资者的“代理人”并代表他们购买GTV股票）。\n\n尽管郭关于SEC从GTV及相关公司获得的资金比4.11亿美元多出7500万美元的说法是正确的，但他未能证明该盈余资金与政府方已证明的、与郭被定罪罪行（即农场贷款项目、G系列俱乐部和喜马拉雅交易所）相关的任何收益相重合。\n\n因此，本法院认定，拟议的金钱判决中仅可扣除4.11亿美元，因为记录表明——且政府方对此不持异议——在本次刑事案件开始之前，在单独的诉讼程序中，与G系列企业相关的实体已经上缴了可追溯至GTV私募的4.11亿美元资金。此项扣除不影响任何列明财产的没收。\n\nD. Offsets（抵销）\n\n郭主张，金钱判决应当“扣除政府方就本案已实际控制的10亿多美元”以及“破产受托人实际控制的、属于政府方在本案中认为应予没收项目的资金和资产”。异议书第18–20页。对此，政府方指出，一旦所有第三方权益裁决完毕，根据“Final Order of Forfeiture”（最终没收命令）“向United States（美国）没收”的财产价值确实将“用于冲抵金钱判决”，且没有任何法律依据允许对未包含在POF（初步没收命令）中的任何资产下达抵销裁定。参见回应书第10页及脚注7；POF第7.10段。因此，本法院目前不会从金钱判决中扣除任何列明财产的价值。\n\n脚注10：郭还主张，如果本法院在附属程序中认定任何财产属于第三方，则该财产的价值应从金钱判决中扣除。异议书第18页。事实并非如此。第三方没收程序旨在确定第三方是否对拟予没收的财产享有优先法律权益。参见 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)；政府方没收信函第1–2页，ECF No. 785。这与该等资产是否应予没收是两个独立的问题。财产完全可能由于例如欺诈等原因而落入郭的控制之下，即便第三方对该财产享有优先法律权益。因此，若本法院根据 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6) 认定任何财产属于第三方，亦不会从金钱判决中扣除该财产的价值。\n\n脚注11：对于郭关于“在政府方放弃在本案中追缴其他潜在可没收资产的范围内”减少金钱判决，以及扣减Haithem Khaled被没收金额的请求，本法院予以驳回。参见异议书第19–21页。郭就上述两项请求均未提供任何法律依据。\n\n脚注12：本法院对政府方关于郭在此问题上缺乏诉讼资格的主张不发表意见。\n\nE. Ancillary Matters（附带事项）\n\n郭还请求法院下达命令，指示政府方从District of Connecticut（康涅狄格区）于2022年2月15日启动的破产程序中的郭氏财产Chapter 11 Trustee（第11章破产受托人）处接收特定资产（即“破产资产”）。参见扣押动议，ECF No. 724第1页；参见In re Kwok，案号 22 Bk. 50073 (D. Conn. Bankr. February 15, 2022) 全文；In re Kwok, 172 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2026)。郭主张，政府方对被没收资产的权益“优于破产程序中任何债权人的权益”，扣押动议第5页，指示政府方扣押破产资产既能“使该等资产可供本案涉及的各个实体的投资者使用，且将为其下达赔偿令”，又能“阻止破产程序中受托人产生的高额费用和支出的持续累积”。参见同上第5–7页。\n\n本法院无权准予郭所请求的救济。郭仅引用Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure（《联邦刑事诉讼规则》）第32.2(b)(3)条，主张法院“可以在初步没收命令中包含……在上诉期间为保全财产价值所合理必需的条件”。参见扣押回复书第4页，ECF No. 754。第32.2(b)(3)条将法院的职权限定为在“上诉”期间保全财产价值所需的条件，而非在相关的、独立的诉讼程序（如本案的破产程序）审理期间保全价值所需的条件。\n\n此外，没收规则的若干其他程序性特征表明，下达此类命令将超出本法院的职权范围。例如，第32.2(b)(3)条在作出初步命令后“授权”政府方“扣押拟予没收的特定财产”，但并未要求政府方必须这样做。Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3)。第32.2条也未规定一旦政府方根据第32.2(b)(3)条获得授权，可以在何时或如何扣押没收命令中所列的财产。同样，21 U.S.C. § 853(e) 和 (f) 赋予本法院对潜在可没收资产采取某些保护措施的权力，但未授权本法院强迫政府方实施扣押。参见回应书第4页。\n\n再者，郭的请求缺乏实体依据。郭主张法院可以施加“在上诉期间为保全财产价值所合理必需的”条件，扣押回复书第4页，但第32.2条中没有任何内容要求法院必须这样做。尽管本法院承认破产程序中的第11章破产财产已产生了欠付受托人和各类其他专业人士的费用，参见扣押动议第7页，但鉴于该诉讼程序的显著复杂性，此类费用并不异常。参见同上（声称破产程序中已提起300起对抗性诉讼）。\n\nF. Restitution（赔偿）\n\n政府方请求法院认定下达赔偿命令并不现实，并授权启动减免退还程序。参见政府方信函第4–5页，ECF No. 785；ECF No. 784（2026年1月8日裁定）。郭表示同意。ECF No. 789第3页。本法院予以同意，并根据本案详实的记录认定，鉴于“案件的复杂性和所涉受害者的数量”，依据 18 U.S.C. § 3663A 向受害者判予赔偿并不现实，且会使量刑程序复杂化或延长量刑程序。参见 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(3)(A)–(B)。\n\nCONCLUSION（结论）\n\n基于上述理由，本法院认定，基于郭因共谋勒索勒索/敲诈勒索（RICO）、电汇和证券欺诈以及共谋洗钱而被定罪，政府方已证明没收适用于列明财产。\n\n本法院在以下限度内支持郭的异议：法院应从13亿美元拟议金钱判决中扣除4.11亿美元，使得最终没收命令中的金钱判决金额应为8.89亿美元。\n\n本法院驳回郭在 ECF No. 724 中提出的请求下达命令强制政府方扣押破产程序中资产的动议。谨指示法院书记官终结 ECF No. 724 项下的动议。\n\n最后，本法院认定本案中下达赔偿命令并不现实，并授权政府方通过减免退还程序对受害者进行补偿。\n\nSO ORDERED（特此裁定）。\n\n日期：2026年6月29日\nNew York, New York（纽约州纽约市）","key_entities":["Guo","forfeiture","GTV","G Clubs","Himalaya","Himalaya Exchange","Farm Loan","853(n)","Rule 32.2","Kwok","Miles Guo","CIPA","Torres","Analisa Torres","Saraca","RICO"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":307,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":395,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":450,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":684,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":710,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":713,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":716,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":720,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":724,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":754,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":784,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":785,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":789,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":799,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":803,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":804,"court":"CTB"},{"doc_number":822,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":826,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":5763,"status":"published","published_at":"2026-06-29 00:00:00","created_at":"2026-06-29","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:44:09"}