{"id":"court_sdny_89_4","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":89,"sub_number":4,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":"2023-01-24","title":"EXHIBIT D UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT","summary_zh":"破产法院令（作为证物提交）——Ho Wan Kwok 破产案，康涅狄格州破产法院案号 22-50073 ECF #89（2023年1月24日立案）。破产法院认定 Ho Wan Kwok 因未遵守关于企业管制权转移之法庭令而构成民事藐视法庭，要求其在指定期限内改正或承担后果。","summary_en":"Bankruptcy Court Order (submitted as exhibit)—In re Ho Wan Kwok et al., U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Connecticut, Case No. 22-50073, ECF #89 (filed January 24, 2023). Bankruptcy court found Ho Wan Kwok in civil contempt for non-compliance with Corporate Governance Order regarding transfer of controlled entities, with requirement to comply by specified deadline or face attorney's fees and sanctions.","body_en":"# **EXHIBIT D**\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\nIn re:\n\nHO WAN KWOK, *et al.*\n\n)\n\n)\n\n)\n\nebtors.\n\nIn re: ) Chapter 11 ) Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) HO WAN KWOK, *et al.*, ) (Jointly Administered)\n\nDebtors. ) Re: ECF Nos. 717 and 913\n\n# **ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO HOLD DEBTOR IN CONTEMPT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ORDER**\n\n#### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is the motion of Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the estate (the \"Estate\") of Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Debtor\"), to hold the Debtor in civil contempt. (ECF No. 913, the \"Contempt Motion.\") The Contempt Motion asserts that the Debtor has not complied with the Court's order regarding the transfer of economic and corporate governance rights from the Debtor to the Trustee. (ECF No. 717, the \"Corporate Governance Order.\") For the reasons stated below, the Court finds the Debtor in civil contempt and will sanction him reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in the event he fails to purge himself of contempt.\n\n#### **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nOn February 15, 2022, the Debtor filed his voluntary Chapter 11 petition, commencing this case. (ECF No. 1.) His individual case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate cases. (ECF Nos. 970 and 1141.) On June 15, 2022, after developments the Court has discussed in a prior opinion, the Court ordered the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). (ECF No. 465.) On July 8, 2022, the Court appointed Mr. Despins as the Chapter 11 Trustee. (ECF No. 523.)\n\nOn July 23, 2022, the Trustee filed a motion to confirm that he held the Debtor's economic and corporate governance rights. (ECF No. 598, the \"Corporate Governance Motion.\") On July 29, 2022, the Debtor filed an objection to the Corporate Governance Motion, which he supplemented with a further objection on August 4, 2022. (ECF Nos. 643 and 678.) Also on August 4, 2022, the Trustee filed a reply in support of the Corporate Governance Motion. (ECF No. 679.) That same date, a hearing was held on the Corporate Governance Motion. The Court granted the Corporate Governance Motion during the hearing and entered the Corporate Governance Order on August 10, 2022. (ECF No. 717.)\n\nOn October 4, 2022, the Trustee filed the Contempt Motion asserting that the Debtor had failed to comply with the Corporate Governance Order and requesting that he be held in civil contempt of court. (ECF No. 913.) On October 25, 2022, the Debtor filed his objection to the Contempt Motion. (ECF No. 1026, the \"Objection.\") On November 14, 2022, the Trustee filed his reply. (ECF No. 1092, the \"Reply.\") The instant matter is fully briefed.\n\nAn evidentiary hearing (the \"Hearing\") on the Contempt Motion was held on November 16, 17, and 18, 2022. On November 17, 2022, the Court entered an order partially resolving the Contempt Motion (ECF No. 1110, the \"Partial Resolution Order\"), which Order the Debtor insisted the Court enter prior to continuing with the evidentiary hearing. During the Hearing, no testimony was heard but evidence, including excerpts from deposition testimony, was admitted.\n\n#### **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are\n\nstatutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E). This Court explicitly retained jurisdiction over all matters all matters arising from or related to the implementation, interpretation, and enforcement of the Corporate Governance Order. There is no constitutional issue precluding the exercise of jurisdiction in the instant case. *Cf*. *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n## **IV. FINDINGS OF FACT**\n\nThe Court has already made the findings of fact contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 below, as set forth in the Partial Resolution Order:\n\n1. The Debtor exclusively beneficially owned and controlled Ace Decade Holdings Limited (\"Ace Decade\") on the February 15, 2022 petition date (the \"Petition Date\") and maintained such exclusive beneficial ownership and control up to and including immediately prior to the date of the Trustee's appointment, and (ii) Dawn State Limited (\"Dawn State\" and, together with Ace Decade, the \"Ace Decade Entities\") is Ace Decade's wholly-owned subsidiary and is exclusively owned and controlled by Ace Decade. For the avoidance of doubt, Yanping \"Yvette\" Wang (hereinafter, Ms. Wang) is not and has never been a beneficial owner of the shares in Ace Decade or Dawn State. (Trustee 6–7, 10, 15.)<sup>1</sup>\n\n2. But for the Trustee's appointment and his rights under the Bankruptcy Code and the Corporate Governance Order, the Debtor would still exclusively beneficially own and control Ace Decade. (Trustee 6–7, 10, 15.)\n\n<sup>1</sup> Exhibits submitted during the Hearing by the Trustee will be styled Trustee [No.] and exhibits submitted by the Individual Debtor will be styled Kwok [Letter].\n\nFrom the evidence on the record and introduced during the Hearing, the Court makes the following additional findings of fact:\n\n3. Ms. Yvette Wang is the nominee owner of Ace Decade for the benefit of the Debtor. (Trustee 27.)\n\n4. The Debtor has control over Ms. Wang. The Debtor has employed Yvette Wang for several years, and has directed her to take actions on his behalf, including directing her to act on his behalf to purchase properties such as the Sherry-Netherland apartment. (Trustee 29 and 30.)\n\n5. The Debtor did not sufficiently establish that the letter (the \"Letter,\" Kwok B) and the purportedly attached share transfer instrument and share transfer resolution were delivered to Ms. Wang directing her to transfer the corporate and economic rights of Ace Decade to the Trustee. The Debtor represented he does not believe he has any ability to take the actions he directs Ms. Wang to take in the Letter. (Trustee 27, at 87:3–13.) The Debtor represents he sent the Letter to Ms. Wang via personal delivery (Kwok B), and asserts this personal delivery was completed through his personal bodyguards. However, the Debtor does not remember which bodyguard he directed to deliver the Letter, and \"can never remember the names\" of his security guards. (Trustee 27, at 88:3–13.) Beyond the Debtor's deposition testimony and the description \"via personal delivery\" on the Letter, there is no evidence to support the Letter was actually delivered. The Letter does not contain an address. (Kwok B.) There is no receipt nor sworn affidavit regarding service or delivery of the Letter from the unidentified bodyguard. (*Id.)*\n\n6. Even if the Letter was delivered, the language in it signals to its reader that the Debtor does not fully support executing the share transfer instrument. Instead, the Letter states \"The Trustee believes that I control Ace Decade and that I utilize that perceived control to direct you to execute the Share Transfer Instrument and Share Transfer Resolution.\" [emphasis added].\n\nThe Letter further states, “... in compliance with the Trustee’s demands and to the extent that I may have any authority over Ace Decade, I hereby direct you to execute the attached Share Transfer Instrument and Share Transfer Resolution.\" (Kwok B.)\n\n7. The Debtor represents he has had no communications of any kind with Yvette Wang about the contempt motion. (Trustee 27, at 84:5–85:5.)\n\n8. The Trustee has been unable to service Yvette Wang with a subpoena. (Trustee 32– 33).\n\n#### **V. DISCUSSION**\n\n#### **a. Legal Standard**\n\nThis Court has the power to hold parties in contempt of court under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9020. *Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown*, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019); *PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel)*, 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021); *Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.)*, 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990). Contempt may be sought to \"'coerce the defendant into compliance'\" with a court order or to \"'compensate the complainant for losses'\" resulting from noncompliance with a court order. *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *United States v. United Mine Workers*, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)). A finding of civil contempt requires \"(1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.\" *King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.*, 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995); *see Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512 (adding that the contemnor must have notice of the order). \"A long recognized defense to a civil contempt citation is the cited individual's inability to comply with the court's order.\" *United States v. Wendy*, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978).\n\nContempt \"'should not be resorted to where there is [a] *fair ground of doubt* as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct.'\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801 (citing *Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor*, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)). This standard is generally objective – a \"party's subjective belief that she was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate her from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing *McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.*, 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949) (\"The absence of wilfulness [sic] does not relieve from civil contempt.\")). Nevertheless, a party's bad faith may justify \"placing 'the burden of any uncertainty in the decree . . . on [the] shoulders' of the party who violated the court order,\" and \"a party's good faith, even where it does not bar civil contempt, may help to determine an appropriate sanction.\" *Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802 (citing *McComb*, 336 U.S. at 192–93 and *Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.*, 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)).\n\n## **b. Conclusions of Law**\n\n#### **1. The Debtor Had Notice of the Corporate Governance Order**\n\nThe Court concludes that the Individual Debtor had notice of the Corporate Governance Order. *See Gravel*, 6 F.4th at 512. As outlined above, he litigated its entry. Furthermore, he did not contest notice in his Objection or during the Hearing.\n\n# **2. The Corporate Governance Order Clearly and Unambiguously Directs the Debtor to Cooperate with the Trustee**\n\nThe Court concludes that the Corporate Governance Order is clear and unambiguous, s*ee King*, 65 F.3d at 1058, and that there is no fair ground of doubt as to its meaning, *see Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1801. Under the Corporate Governance Order, the Debtor is required to cooperate with the Trustee regarding the Trustee's control of the Ace Decade Entities and also required to\n\nsurrender the Ace Decade Entities, ownership interests in the Ace Decade Entities, and corporate governance documents relating to the Ace Decade Entities.\n\nThe Trustee argues that paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance order needs to be read in concert with paragraph 3 and the underlying provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. In this context, the Trustee argues that the Debtor was clearly and unambiguously directed to cooperate with the Trustee and turn over assets of the Estate and related records to the Trustee. The Debtor argues that the Trustee obtained control over the Ace Decade Entities via operation of law under paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order and, therefore, the Debtor need not do anything to comply with the Corporate Governance Order. The Debtor further argues that the Trustee can assert control over the Ace Decade Entities and the present dispute is manufactured and unnecessary.\n\nThe Court agrees with the Debtor that there is no fair ground of doubt that paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order allows the Trustee to act of his own accord to assert control over corporate entities, including the Ace Decade Entities. Paragraph 2 provides in pertinent part:\n\nFor the avoidance of doubt, the foregoing rights include the Trustee's asserted authority to replace any existing officer, director, manager, or similar person of the Debtor-Controlled Entities. As part of the foregoing, to the extent necessary, the Trustee is authorized to act, in his capacity as the chapter 11 trustee in this Chapter 11 Case, as any such officer, director, manager, or similar person who has been removed.\n\nParagraph 2 does allow the Trustee to issue new shares or membership interests and appoint new directors in the Debtor's corporate entities. However, paragraph 2 does not require the Trustee to do so. Even if the Trustee did issue new shares or membership interests or appoint new directors in the Ace Decade Entities, without the corporate documents and access to any\n\ncorporate accounts, it is unclear how the Trustee would operate the Ace Decade Entities. The Trustee's desire for an orderly and complete transition is reasonable.\n\nMoreover, recourse to self-help may be in contravention of applicable non-bankruptcy law or existing governance documents and could create legal problems for the Trustee. The Debtor raised this exact issue during the August 4<sup>th</sup> hearing on the Corporate Governance Motion and noted that paragraph 2 would \"give [the Trustee] authority that may not be provided for under applicable non-bankruptcy law and the governing documents of particular entities.\" (ECF No. 746, at 63:15–18.) The Trustee assured the Court that his intent was to act where he had authority under applicable non-bankruptcy law and the governing documents. (*Id.* at 64:14–15.) The Trustee stated\n\nThe reason we asked for blanket authority is because we will not exercise that right unless we believe through due diligence we have the power to do it. And if we're doubtful, we'll come back to the Court. But we cannot be in a position where there's a satellite litigation open whether – what state law provides, what foreign law provides, because that's a – that's going to be another case basically.\n\n(*Id.* at 64:19–65:1.) The Debtor then insisted that his intent was not to enter into litigation about corporate governance, but that he was concerned about the Trustee acting contrary to applicable non-bankruptcy law and the governing documents of particular entities. (*Id.* at 65:2–8.) In response to the Debtor's concern, the Court inserted the word \"asserted\" into paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order to address this issue. (*Id.* at 65:11–21.) At that point, the Debtor did not press his objection to paragraph 2. (*Id.* at 65:23–24.) The Court finds the Trustee’s desire to avoid \"satellite litigation\" about corporate governance is reasonable. However, despite paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order and the Debtor's stated intent not to engage in satellite litigation, the Trustee has had to engage in litigation against the Debtor and the Ace Decade Entities in the High Court of England and Wales, Chancery Division, regarding\n\nrecognition of these bankruptcy cases in the United Kingdom. *See* Despins v Kwok (Re Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006) [2023] EWHC 74 (Ch) (20 January 2023). Ace Decade argued against the Trustee's application seeking recognition under the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006 (the \"CBIR\") of the Debtor's Chapter 11 case in that court.\n\nThe Court also disagrees with the Debtor that the Trustee's rights in paragraph 2 end the analysis. Simply because the Trustee has recourse to self-help under paragraph 2 of Corporate Governance Order, does not mean that the Trustee has no other recourse under its terms.\n\nWith respect to paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order, the Court concludes that it clearly and unambiguously directs the Debtor to cooperate with the Trustee. There is no fair ground of doubt that paragraph 3 requires the Debtor's cooperation with the Trustee in locating the Debtor's nominee, Ms. Wang, and in effectuating turnover of her ownership interest in Ace Decade.\n\nParagraph 3 clearly and unambiguously states, in pertinent part:\n\nIn accordance with [section] 521(a)(3) . . . of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor is hereby directed to . . . (a) cooperate with the Trustee as necessary to enable the Trustee to perform his duties, including, without limitation, the Trustee's investigation into the assets of the Debtor . . ..\"\n\nSection 521 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled \"Debtor's duties.\" Section 521(a)(3)'s language is almost identical to the language of the Corporate Governance Order: \"The debtor shall . . . if a trustee is serving in the case . . . cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties under this title.\" The duty to cooperate under section 521(a)(3) is interpreted broadly. *In re Cambridge Analytica LLC*, 596 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (\"Section 521(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code similarly requires a debtor to 'cooperate with the trustee as necessary to enable the trustee to perform the trustee's duties.' ''Cooperate' is a broad term, indeed, and must be construed that whenever the trustee calls upon the debtor for assistance in the performance of his duties, the debtor is required to respond, at least if the request is not unreasonable.' 'Indeed, '[i]t is well settled that a trustee should not be required to drag information from a reluctant and uncooperative debtor. Because of the extraordinary relief offered under the Bankruptcy Code delay and avoidance tactics are inconsistent with, and offensive to, its purpose and spirit.'\") (internal citations omitted); *see Beach v. Morris (In re Beach)*, 281 B.R. 917, 921 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002) (\"In addition to imposing affirmative duties on the Debtors, these provisions impress the policy that a debtor who voluntarily submits him or herself to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to obtain the benefit of a discharge of debts, must fulfill certain duties to insure that estate assets are administered in accordance with applicable law.\"); *see also* 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.15[5] (16th ed. 2022) (\"The debtor's cooperation may involve informing the trustee of and assisting in locating property of the estate in the possession of third parties, executing documents necessary to convey property and assisting in the collection of accounts receivable.\"). Given the close resemblance of the text of the Bankruptcy Code and the explicit cite to section 521 in the Corporate Governance Order, it is clear and unambiguous that paragraph 3 should be read similarly broadly.\n\nAs set forth above and in the uncontested Partial Resolution Order, the Debtor has been found to have exclusively beneficially owned and controlled Ace Decade and, through it, Dawn State, as of the petition date and as of the appointment of the Trustee. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order, the Trustee \"holds all of the Debtor's economic and governance rights, for the benefit of the Estate, with respect to all Debtor-Controlled Entities.\" Therefore, the Trustee holds the Debtor's economic and governance rights with respect to the Ace Decade Entities in furtherance of his duties to the Estate. The Debtor no longer contests this fact. The Debtor is required by the clear terms of paragraph 3 to cooperate with the Trustee as\n\nnecessary to realize this assertion of control and possession over the Ace Decade Entities for the benefit of the Estate, whether that furthers the Trustee's investigation of assets or some other duty to the Estate. *See Star Direct Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. Crossing Bandwidth, Inc.*, 272 F.R.D. 350, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (\"First, Global Crossing offers no authority, nor is this Court aware of any, to support its argument that the clause \"including, without limitation\" should be read as a limiting clause.\"); *Shugrue v. Cont'l Airlines*, 977 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (\"Even assuming there is some ambiguity as to what was actually attached to the first page of Schedule C, the language on that first page—'[a]ll of Eastern[ ]'s computer programs and software, including without limitation'—makes it clear that the attached list was not an exclusive list.\").\n\nThe Court further holds that there is no fair ground of doubt under paragraph 3 of the Corporate Governance Order that the Debtor is required to surrender to the Trustee the Ace Decade Entities, including the ownership interests in the Ace Decade Entities and corporate governance documents relating to the Ace Decade Entities. Paragraph 3 clearly and unambiguously states, in pertinent part and in language closely mirroring § 521(a)(4):\n\nIn accordance with [section] . . . 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Debtor is hereby directed to . . . (b) surrender to the Trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, including, without limitation, books, documents, records, and papers relating to property of the estate (including, without limitation, his shares in Genever (BVI) and all related corporate governance documents).\n\nSection 521(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Corporate Governance Order based on its language, reaches all equitable interests a debtor may have, such as beneficial ownership in corporate entities. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). The Debtor is required under section 521(a)(4) and the Corporate Governance Order to promptly surrender assets and documents relating to assets upon request. *See Beach*, 281 B.R. at 921; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.16.\n\nBecause the Debtor exclusively beneficially owned and controlled the Ace Decade Entities as of the petition date and as of the appointment of the Trustee, under paragraph 2 of the Corporate Governance Order, the Trustee controls the Ace Decade Entities for the benefit of the Estate. As noted above, the Debtor does not contest this fact. The Debtor is required by the clear terms of paragraph 3 to surrender the Ace Decade Entities to the Trustee, which includes all recorded information relating the Ace Decade Entities, such as shares and corporate governance documents. *See Star Direct*, 272 F.R.D. at 356; *Shugrue*, 977 F. Supp. at 285.\n\nThe Debtor argued in the alternative that the Corporate Governance Order was unclear and ambiguous because paragraphs 2 and 3 of the corporate governance order were in conflict with each other, trapping the Debtor in a \"Catch-22.\" The Debtor argues that paragraph 2 strips him of the economic and corporate governance rights required to comply with paragraph 3.\n\nThe Court holds, however, that paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Corporate Governance Order are not in conflict. While the Trustee came into *de jure* control of the Estate and the Debtor's economic and corporate governance rights by operation of law, the Bankruptcy Code – and the clear and unambiguous Corporate Governance Order – require turnover of *de facto* possession and control pursuant to the Trustee's rights under the Corporate Governance Order. Courts routinely provide remedies that bring parties' *de facto* rights in line with their *de jure* rights. There is nothing in this case to create a fair ground of doubt as to what conduct the Corporate Governance Order is requiring.\n\nThe Court further finds the Debtor's argument regarding a conflict between paragraphs 2 and 3 would render 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3)–(4) useless and cannot be correct as a matter of law. The Debtor is directed by the Bankruptcy Code and the Corporate Governance Order to cooperate with the Trustee and surrender assets of the Estate and related records, even if by\n\noperation of law control has already passed to the Trustee. Complying would not have frustrated the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the Corporate Governance Order, but rather would have furthered them.\n\nAlthough the Court finds the Corporate Governance Order clearly required the Debtor to cooperate with the Trustee, if a reviewing court were to find the Corporate Governance Order is unclear, the burden of that uncertainty is not upon the Trustee, but upon the Debtor, on account of the Debtor's bad faith. *See Taggart*, 139 S. Ct. at 1802. As detailed above, the Court is not persuaded by the Debtor's interpretation of the Order, and, since the burden has been shifted by the Debtor's bad faith, it is sufficient for the Court to find this element in the Trustee's favor.\n\nThe Court finds the Debtor has acted in bad faith for several reasons. Until the hearing, the Debtor's primary argument in his Objection and in his deposition testimony was that he did not own Ace Decade, beneficially or otherwise, as of the petition date and as of the Trustee's appointment. However, during the Hearing he abandoned this argument, sought the entry of the Partial Resolution Order prior to continuing the Hearing, and agreed not to appeal the Partial Resolution Order. Nevertheless, the Partial Resolution Order is not a consent order. The Debtor would not consent to findings in the Partial Resolution Order, which is in tension with his abandonment of his Objection file prior to the Hearing and his agreement not to appeal the order.\n\nFurthermore, the Debtor's only alleged attempt to comply with the Corporate Governance Order came on November 10, 2022, several months after it entered, one month after the Contempt Motion was filed, and less than one week before the Hearing was scheduled to begin. In addition, the Debtor's alleged attempt to comply with the Corporate Governance Order obscured the location of his nominee – Ms. Wang – from the Trustee, who has been unable to serve her with a subpoena. During the Hearing, the Debtor highlighted the Trustee's lack of\n\ncommunication with Ms. Wang despite only informing him she was the nominee owner of Ace Decade shortly before the Hearing. Finally, the Debtor has not sufficiently shown that the Letter was sent to Ms. Wang. The Letter contains no address for Ms. Wang and the Debtor could not remember which of his bodyguards purportedly personally delivered the Letter to Ms. Wang.\n\n#### **3. The Debtor Has Not Complied with Corporate Governance Order**\n\nThe Court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Debtor has not complied with the Corporate Governance Order. *See King*, 65 F.3d at 1058. The Debtor has not surrendered the Ace Decade Entities, ownership interests in them, or their corporate governance documents to the Trustee. If he had, the Motion would be moot. The Debtor's only purported compliance was the Letter allegedly sent to Ms. Wang, which he failed to sufficiently establish was sent. The Debtor has not cooperated with the Trustee's attempt to locate Ms. Wang and effectuate a surrender. The Debtor only belatedly disclosed that Ms. Wang was the nominee owner of Ace Decade Entities. The Letter, which was produced to the Trustee and during the Hearing, lacks an address for Ms. Wang. The Debtor did not produce the bodyguard who purportedly knew how to find Ms. Wang or otherwise tell the Trustee how to locate Ms. Wang.\n\n#### **4. The Debtor Has Not Diligently Attempted to Comply**\n\nThe Court further concludes that the Debtor has not diligently attempted to comply with the Corporate Governance Order in a reasonable manner. *See id.* As noted immediately above, the only alleged attempt to either cooperate or effectuate a turnover was the Letter. No evidence was introduced to establish that the Letter was sent to Ms. Wang. Nevertheless, assuming the Letter was sent, it was dilatory – not diligent – coming a month after the Contempt Motion was filed and several months after the Corporate Governance Order was entered. Furthermore, again assuming the Letter was sent, it was not sent in a reasonable manner. There is no address on the\n\nLetter. There is no post-mark. There is no acknowledgment of receipt. The Debtor does not even know which of his bodyguards allegedly personally delivered the Letter.\n\n#### **5. The Debtor Could Have Complied**\n\nFinally, the Court concludes that it is not impossible for the Debtor to comply with the Corporate Governance Order. *See Wendy*, 575 F.2d at 1030. The Debtor abandoned his argument that he did not beneficially own or control Ace Decade and, through it, Dawn State, as of the petition date and the appointment of the Trustee. Therefore, it was not impossible for the Debtor to cooperate or to surrender the Ace Decade Entities to the Trustee for the reasons stated above.\n\nThe Trustee introduced into evidence email exchanges showing that Ms. Wang, the nominee owner of Ace Decade, acted under the direction of the Debtor in other transactions, including the New York litigation involving Ace Decade and also matters involving the Sherry Netherland Apartment. (Trustee 29 and 30.) On the basis of this evidence, the Court determines that the Debtor could cause her to turnover her ownership interest over to the Trustee. As of yet, he has not.\n\n#### **VI. CONCLUSION & ORDER**\n\nFor the reasons stated above, the Court finds the Debtor in civil contempt of court. It is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** The Debtor has until at or before 5:00 p.m. (17:00) on March 6, 2023, to purge himself of contempt; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** If the Debtor does not purge himself of contempt at or before 5:00 p.m. (17:00) on March 6, 2023, he will be sanctioned reasonable attorneys' fees and costs that the Trustee has had to incur in pursuing compliance with the Corporate Governance Order as it\n\nrelates to the Ace Decade Entities, which reasonable fees will be determined by the Court, and will be paid to the Estate; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Court may, upon notice, issue further sanctions to secure compliance with the Corporate Governance Order, should the Debtor persist in contempt.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 24th day of January, 2023.\n\n*Julie A. Manning*\\n*United States Bankruptcy Judge*\\n*District of Connecticut*","body_zh":"附件 D\n美国破产法院 康涅狄格区（United States Bankruptcy Court District of Connecticut）\n\n案由：\n\nHO WAN KWOK（郭文贵）等人\n\n债务人。\n\n案由：\n郭文贵等人，\n债务人。\n\n第 11 章\n案号：22-50073 (JAM)\n（合并审理）\n涉及：ECF 编号 717 及 913\n\n准予判定债务人违反公司治理裁定构成藐视法庭动议的裁定\n\n一、引言\n\n本院现审理 Luc A. Despins 以郭文贵（下称“债务人”）破产财产（下称“破产财产”）的第 11 章受托人（下称“受托人”）身份提起的动议，请求判定债务人构成民事藐视法庭。（ECF No. 913，下称“藐视法庭动议”。）该藐视法庭动议主张，债务人未遵守本院关于将经济权利和公司治理权从债务人移交给受托人的裁定。（ECF No. 717，下称“公司治理裁定”。）基于下文所述理由，本院认定债务人构成民事藐视法庭；若其未能消除藐视法庭状态，本院将对其处以合理的律师费及诉讼费用制裁。\n\n二、背景\n\n2022年2月15日，债务人提出自愿第 11 章破产申请，启动了本案。（ECF No. 1。）其个人案件与两起关联公司案件合并审理。（ECF Nos. 970 和 1141。）2022年6月15日，在发生本院于先前意见书中已论述的事态发展后，本院下令指定一名第 11 章受托人。In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。（ECF No. 465。）2022年7月8日，本院指定 Despins 先生为第 11 章受托人。（ECF No. 523。）\n\n2022年7月23日，受托人提出动议，请求确认其持有债务人的经济权利及公司治理权。（ECF No. 598，下称“公司治理动议”。）2022年7月29日，债务人对公司治理动议提出异议，并于2022年8月4日提交了进一步异议予以补充。（ECF Nos. 643 和 678。）同在2022年8月4日，受托人提交了支持公司治理动议的答复意见。（ECF No. 679。）同日，就公司治理动议举行了听证会。本院在听证会期间准予了公司治理动议，并于2022年8月10日作出了公司治理裁定。（ECF No. 717。）\n\n2022年10月4日，受托人提出藐视法庭动议，主张债务人未能遵守公司治理裁定，并请求判定其构成民事藐视法庭。（ECF No. 913。）2022年10月25日，债务人对藐视法庭动议提交了异议。（ECF No. 1026，下称“异议”。）2022年11月14日，受托人提交了答复意见。（ECF No. 1092，下称“答复”。）本案书面答辩已齐备。\n\n2022年11月16日、17日和18日，就藐视法庭动议举行了证据听证会（下称“听证会”）。2022年11月17日，本院作出了部分解决藐视法庭动议的裁定（ECF No. 1110，下称“部分解决裁定”），债务人曾坚持要求本院在继续进行证据听证会之前作出该裁定。在听证会期间，虽未听取证人口供，但采纳了包括取证口供节录在内的证据。\n\n三、管辖权\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)，美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the District of Connecticut）对本案具有管辖权。依据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 以及美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院于1984年9月21日作出的移交裁定，本院有权审理并裁决本案。本案诉讼程序属于法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E)。本院明确保留了对因公司治理裁定的执行、解释和强制执行而产生或与之相关的一切事项的管辖权。本案行使管辖权不存在任何宪法障碍。参见 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–99 (2011)。\n\n依据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，本司法区的审判地是适当的。\n\n四、事实认定\n\n如部分解决裁定所载，本院已作出下述第 1 项和第 2 项中的事实认定：\n\n1. 债务人在2022年2月15日申请日（下称“申请日”）排他性地享有 Ace Decade Holdings Limited（下称“Ace Decade”）的实益所有权及控制权，并一直维持该排他性实益所有权及控制权，直至紧接指定受托人之日前的时刻（含该时刻）；以及 (ii) Dawn State Limited（下称“Dawn State”，与 Ace Decade 合称“Ace Decade 实体”）是 Ace Decade 的全资子公司，由 Ace Decade 排他性拥有并控制。为免生疑问，Yanping \"Yvette\" Wang（王雁平，以下称“王女士”）不是且从未是 Ace Decade 或 Dawn State 股份的实益拥有人。（Trustee 6–7, 10, 15。）1\n\n2. 若非受托人的指定及其根据《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）和公司治理裁定所享有的权利，债务人仍将排他性地享有 Ace Decade 的实益所有权及控制权。（Trustee 6–7, 10, 15。）\n\n1 受托人在听证会期间提交的证据标记为 Trustee [编号]，个人债务人提交的证据标记为 Kwok [字母]。\n\n根据记录在案以及在听证会期间引入的证据，本院作出以下补充事实认定：\n\n3. 王雁平女士是为债务人利益而代持 Ace Decade 的名义所有人。（Trustee 27。）\n\n4. 债务人对王女士具有控制力。债务人雇佣王雁平多年，并指示其代表自己行事，包括指示她代表其行事以购买诸如雪莉-荷兰酒店（Sherry-Netherland）公寓等物业。（Trustee 29 和 30。）\n\n5. 债务人未能充分证明，指示王女士将 Ace Decade 的公司和经济权利移交给受托人的信函（下称“该信函”，Kwok B）以及据称随附的股份转让文书和股份转让决议已送达给王女士。债务人曾表示，其认为自己无能力采取其在该信函中指示王女士采取的行动。（Trustee 27，第 87:3–13 行。）债务人声称其通过专人送递方式将该信函发送给王女士（Kwok B），并主张该专人送递是通过其私人保镖完成的。然而，债务人记不清指示了哪名保镖送交该信函，且“从来记不住”其保镖的姓名。（Trustee 27，第 88:3–13 行。）除债务人的取证口供和该信函上“经专人送递”的字样外，没有任何证据支持该信函已被实际送达。该信函未载明地址。（Kwok B。）既无收据，也无该未具名保镖就该信函送达或递送出具的经宣誓的宣誓书。（同上。）\n\n6. 即使该信函已被送达，信中的措辞也向读者表明，债务人并未全力支持签署股份转让文书。相反，该信函写道：“受托人认为我对 Ace Decade 拥有控制权，并且我利用该等被认定的控制权指示你签署《股份转让文书》和《股份转让决议》。”［强调由本院所加］。\n\n该信函进一步写道：“……为遵从受托人的要求，并在我对 Ace Decade 可能拥有的任何权限范围内，我特此指示你签署随附的《股份转让文书》和《股份转让决议》。”（Kwok B。）\n\n7. 债务人声称，就藐视法庭动议而言，其未与王雁平进行过任何形式的沟通。（Trustee 27，第 84:5–85:5 行。）\n\n8. 受托人一直未能向王雁平送达传票。（Trustee 32–33）。\n\n五、讨论\n\na. 法律标准\n\n依据 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 及《联邦破产诉讼程序规则》（Fed. R. Bankr. P.）第 9020 条，本院有权判定当事人构成藐视法庭。Taggart v. Lorenzen ex rel. Brown, 139 S. Ct. 1795, 1801 (2019)；PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Sensenich ex rel. Gravel (In re Gravel), 6 F.4th 503, 512 (2d Cir. 2021)；Mar. Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chauteaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183, 187 (2d. Cir. 1990)。寻求藐视法庭裁定可用于“‘强迫被告遵守’”法院裁定，或用于“‘赔偿申诉人因未遵守法院裁定而遭受的损失’”。Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（援引 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303–04 (1947)）。作出民事藐视法庭认定须满足以下条件：“(1) 被指控藐视人未能遵守的裁定明确且无歧义，(2) 不遵守裁定的证据清晰且有说服力，以及 (3) 被指控藐视人未曾以合理方式努力尝试遵守。”King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 65 F.3d 1051, 1058 (2d Cir. 1995)；参见 Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512（补充指出被指控藐视人必须收到该裁定的通知）。“长期以来公认的针对民事藐视法庭传唤的抗辩事由是，被传唤人无能力遵守法院裁定。”United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1030 (2d Cir. 1978)。\n\n“在被告行为的违法性存在‘相当存疑的理由’时，不应诉诸藐视法庭手段。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801（援引 Cal. Artificial Stone Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609 (1885)）。该标准通常是客观的——“如果当事人主观上认为自己遵守了裁定的想法在客观上是不合理的，该信念通常不能使其免于民事藐视法庭。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（援引 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949)（“缺乏故意［原文如此］并不能免除民事藐视法庭责任。”））。尽管如此，一方当事人的恶意可能足以证明“将‘判令中任何不确定性的负担……置于’违反法院裁定之一方的肩上”是合理的，且“即使一方当事人的善意不能排除民事藐视法庭，其亦可能有助于确定适当的制裁措施。”Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1802（援引 McComb, 336 U.S. at 192–93 以及 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987)）。\n\nb. 法律结论\n\n1. 债务人知悉公司治理裁定\n\n本院认定，个人债务人知悉公司治理裁定。参见 Gravel, 6 F.4th at 512。如上所述，他曾就该裁定的作出进行过诉辩。此外，他在其异议中或在听证会期间均未对收到通知提出异议。\n\n2. 公司治理裁定明确且无歧义地指示债务人与受托人合作\n\n本院认定，公司治理裁定明确且无歧义，参见 King, 65 F.3d at 1058，且对其含义不存在相当存疑的理由，参见 Taggart, 139 S. Ct. at 1801。根据公司治理裁定，债务人被要求就受托人对 Ace Decade 实体的控制与受托人进行合作，并被要求交出 Ace Decade 实体、在 Ace Decade 实体中的所有权权益，以及与 Ace Decade 实体相关的公司治理文件。\n\n受托人主张，公司治理裁定第 2 款需要结合第 3 款及《破产法典》的基础条款一同解读。在此背景下，受托人主张，债务人被明确且无歧义地指示与受托人合作，并向受托人移交破产财产的资产及相关记录。债务人则主张，受托人根据公司治理裁定第 2 款依据法律的实施获得了对 Ace Decade 实体的控制权，因此，债务人无需采取任何行动即可遵守公司治理裁定。债务人进一步主张，受托人可以对 Ace Decade 实体主张控制权，目前的争议纯属人为制造且毫无必要。\n\n法院同意Debtor（债务人）的主张，即不存在合理的怀疑理由表明《公司治理命令》（Corporate Governance Order）第2段允许Trustee（受托人）依其自身意愿采取行动，以主张对包括Ace Decade Entities（Ace Decade实体）在内的公司实体的控制权。第2段相关部分规定：\n\n为免生疑义，前述权利包括受托人所主张的替换Debtor-Controlled Entities（债务人控制的实体）任何现有高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员的权力。作为前述内容的一部分，在必要范围内，受托人获授权以其在本第11章案件（Chapter 11 Case）中作为第11章受托人的身份，担任任何此类已被免职的高级职员、董事、经理或类似人员。\n\n第2段确实允许受托人在债务人的公司实体中发行新股份或会员权益并任命新董事。然而，第2段并未要求受托人必须这样做。即使受托人确实在Ace Decade实体中发行了新股份或会员权益，或者任命了新董事，但在没有公司文件且无法访问任何公司账户的情况下，受托人将如何运营Ace Decade实体尚不明确。受托人希望进行有序且完整的移交是合理的。\n\n此外，诉诸自力救济可能违反适用的非破产法或现有的治理文件，并可能给受托人带来法律问题。债务人在8月4日就《公司治理动议》（Corporate Governance Motion）举行的听证会上正是提出了这一问题，并指出第2段将“赋予[受托人]根据适用的非破产法和特定实体的治理文件可能并未规定的权力”。（ECF No. 746，第63页第15–18行。）受托人向法院保证，其意图是在适用的非破产法和治理文件赋予其权力之处采取行动。（同上，第64页第14–15行。）受托人声明\n\n我们要求获得一揽子权力的原因在于，除非我们通过尽职调查确信我们有权这样做，否则我们不会行使该权利。如果我们存有疑问，我们会回到法院。但我们不能处于这样一种境地，即就是否存在——州法如何规定、外国法如何规定而展开附随诉讼，因为那基本上将成为另一个案件。\n\n（同上，第64页第19行至第65页第1行。）债务人随后坚称其意图并非参与有关公司治理的诉讼，但他担心受托人会违反适用的非破产法和特定实体的治理文件行事。（同上，第65页第2–8行。）针对债务人的担忧，法院在《公司治理命令》第2段中插入了“asserted”（所主张的）一词以解决该问题。（同上，第65页第11–21行。）至此，债务人未再坚持对第2段提出异议。（同上，第65页第23–24行。）法院认定受托人希望避免就公司治理产生“附随诉讼”是合理的。然而，尽管有《公司治理命令》第2段以及债务人表明的不参与附随诉讼的意图，受托人仍不得不在High Court of England and Wales, Chancery Division（英格兰和威尔士高等法院衡平法庭）就这些破产案件在United Kingdom（英国）的承认事宜对债务人和Ace Decade实体提起诉讼。参见 Despins v Kwok (Re Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006) [2023] EWHC 74 (Ch) (20 January 2023)。Ace Decade在该法院反对受托人根据《2006年跨境破产规例》（Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006，简称“CBIR”）寻求对债务人第11章案件予以承认的申请。\n\n法院同样不同意债务人关于第2段中受托人的权利即终结了该项分析的主张。仅仅因为受托人根据《公司治理命令》第2段有权诉诸自力救济，并不意味着受托人根据其条款没有其他救济途径。\n\n关于《公司治理命令》第3段，法院认定其明确且毫无歧义地指示债务人配合受托人。不存在合理的怀疑理由表明第3段要求债务人配合受托人查找债务人的名义持有人Wang女士，并实现其在Ace Decade的所有权权益的移交。\n\n第3段在相关部分明确且毫无歧义地规定：\n\n根据《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）第521(a)(3)条……特此指示债务人……(a)在必要时配合受托人，以使受托人能够履行其职责，包括但不限于受托人对债务人财产的调查……\n\n《破产法典》第521条的标题为“债务人的职责”。第521(a)(3)条的措辞与《公司治理命令》的措辞几乎完全相同：“如果案件中指定了受托人，债务人应当……在必要时配合受托人，以使受托人能够履行本编项下受托人的职责。”第521(a)(3)条项下的配合义务被作宽泛解释。In re Cambridge Analytica LLC, 596 B.R. 1, 8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019)（“《破产法典》第521(a)(3)条同样要求债务人‘在必要时配合受托人，以使受托人能够履行受托人的职责’。‘确实，“配合”是一个宽泛的词语，必须解释为只要受托人要求债务人在履行职责时提供协助，债务人就必须作出回应，至少在要求并非不合理的情况下如此。’‘确实，“受托人不应被要求从不情愿且不配合的债务人那里强行榨取信息，这已是确立的法理。由于《破产法典》提供了非常规的救济，拖延和规避策略与其目的和精神是不符的，且是对其的冒犯。”’）（内部引用省略）；参见 Beach v. Morris (In re Beach), 281 B.R. 917, 921 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002)（“除了向债务人施加积极义务外，这些条款还体现了这样一项政策：自愿服从破产法院管辖以获得债务免除利益的债务人，必须履行特定职责，以确保破产财产依照适用法律进行管理。”）；另见 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.15[5] (16th ed. 2022)（“债务人的配合可能包括通知受托人第三人占有的破产财产并协助查找其位置、签署转让财产所必需的文件以及协助追回应收账款。”）。鉴于《破产法典》条文的高度相似性以及《公司治理命令》对第521条的明确引用，第3段应当同样作宽泛理解是明确且毫无歧义的。\n\n如上所述以及在未受质疑的《部分解决命令》（Partial Resolution Order）中所述，已认定债务人在申请日及受托人任命之日，排他性地实质拥有并控制Ace Decade，并通过该公司控制Dawn State。根据《公司治理命令》第2段，受托人“为破产财产的利益，持有债务人对所有债务人控制的实体的全部经济权利和治理权利”。因此，受托人持有债务人对Ace Decade实体的经济权利和治理权利，以进一步履行其对破产财产的职责。债务人不再对该事实提出异议。第3段的明确条款要求债务人配合受托人，以实现为破产财产的利益对Ace Decade实体主张控制权和占有权所必需的配合，无论这是促进受托人对资产的调查还是履行对破产财产的其他职责。参见 Star Direct Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. Crossing Bandwidth, Inc., 272 F.R.D. 350, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)（“首先，Global Crossing未提供任何权威依据，本法院亦不知悉有任何依据支持其关于‘包括但不限于’这一条款应被理解为限制性条款的主张。”）；Shugrue v. Cont'l Airlines, 977 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)（“即使假设对于附件C第一页实际附有的内容存在某种歧义，该第一页上的用语——‘Eastern的全部计算机程序和软件，包括但不限于’——明确表明所附清单并非排他性清单。”）。\n\n法院进一步认定，根据《公司治理命令》第3段，不存在合理的怀疑理由表明债务人被要求向受托人移交Ace Decade实体，包括在Ace Decade实体中的所有权权益以及与Ace Decade实体相关的公司治理文件。第3段在相关部分以与§ 521(a)(4)高度镜像的措辞明确且毫无歧义地规定：\n\n根据《破产法典》第……521(a)(4)条……特此指示债务人……(b)向受托人移交破产财产的全部财产以及任何记录信息，包括但不限于与破产财产相关的账簿、文件、记录和文据（包括但不限于其在Genever (BVI)中的股份以及所有相关的公司治理文件）。\n\n《破产法典》第521(a)(4)条以及基于其措辞的《公司治理命令》，涵盖债务人可能拥有的全部衡平法权益，例如在公司实体中的实质所有权。11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)。根据第521(a)(4)条和《公司治理命令》，债务人被要求一经请求即迅速移交资产及与资产相关的文件。参见 Beach, 281 B.R. at 921; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.16。\n\n由于债务人在申请日及受托人任命之日排他性地实质拥有并控制Ace Decade实体，根据《公司治理命令》第2段，受托人为破产财产的利益控制Ace Decade实体。如上所述，债务人对该事实不持异议。第3段的明确条款要求债务人向受托人移交Ace Decade实体，其中包括与Ace Decade实体相关的全部记录信息，例如股份和公司治理文件。参见 Star Direct, 272 F.R.D. at 356; Shugrue, 977 F. Supp. at 285。\n\n债务人另行主张，《公司治理命令》不明确且具有歧义，因为公司治理命令的第2段和第3段相互冲突，使债务人陷入“两难困境”（Catch-22）。债务人主张第2段剥夺了其遵守第3段所必需的经济和公司治理权利。\n\n然而，法院认定《公司治理命令》第2段与第3段并不冲突。虽然受托人依法获得了破产财产以及债务人的经济和公司治理权利的法律上（de jure）控制权，但《破产法典》——以及明确且毫无歧义的《公司治理命令》——要求根据受托人在《公司治理命令》项下的权利移交事实上（de facto）的占有和控制权。法院经常提供使当事人的事实上权利与其法律上权利相一致的救济。在本案中，没有任何内容构成对《公司治理命令》所要求的行为产生合理怀疑的理由。\n\n法院进一步认定，债务人关于第2段与第3段之间存在冲突的主张将使 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(a)(3)–(4) 失去效用，在法律层面上不能成立。根据《破产法典》和《公司治理命令》，债务人被指示配合受托人并移交破产财产的资产和相关记录，即使通过\n\n依法控制权已转移至 Trustee（破产受托人）。遵守裁定不仅不会阻碍《破产法典》及《公司治理裁定》的规定，反而会推进其落实。\n\n尽管本法院认定《公司治理裁定》明确要求 Debtor（债务人）配合受托人，但即便复审法院认定《公司治理裁定》不明确，鉴于债务人的恶意，该不明确性所带来的负担也不应由受托人承担，而应由债务人承担。参见 Taggart 案，139 S. Ct. at 1802。如上文详述，本法院未采信债务人对该裁定的解释，且由于债务人的恶意已导致举证责任转移，本法院足以据此作出有利于受托人的事实认定。\n\n本法院认定债务人存在恶意的理由有数项。在听证会之前，债务人在其异议书以及宣誓证词中的主要抗辩理由是，截至破产申请提交日及受托人任命之日，无论从实益还是其他角度，其均未拥有 Ace Decade（阿斯代克公司）。然而，在听证会期间，他放弃了这一抗辩，在继续举行听证会之前请求作出《部分解决裁定》，并同意不对《部分解决裁定》提起上诉。尽管如此，《部分解决裁定》并非经双方同意的同意裁定。债务人不同意《部分解决裁定》中的各项认定，这与其在听证会前放弃异议文件以及同意不对该裁定提起上诉的做法存在矛盾。\n\n此外，债务人所谓遵守《公司治理裁定》的唯一尝试发生在 2022年11月10日，即在该裁定作出数月之后、藐视法庭动议提交一个月之后，以及听证会原定开始前不到一周之时。另外，债务人所谓遵守《公司治理裁定》的尝试，对受托人隐瞒了其代持人 Ms. Wang（王女士）的下落，导致受托人一直无法向其送达传票。在听证会期间，债务人强调受托人缺乏与王女士的沟通，尽管债务人在听证会前不久才告知受托人王女士是 Ace Decade 的代持所有人。最后，债务人未能充分证明该信函已寄送给王女士。信函上没有王女士的地址，且债务人无法记起据称是其哪位保镖亲自将信函送交给了王女士。\n\n3. 债务人未遵守《公司治理裁定》\n\n本法院根据清楚且有说服力的证据得出结论，债务人未遵守《公司治理裁定》。参见 King 案，65 F.3d at 1058。债务人未向受托人交出 Ace Decade 实体、其中的所有权权益或其公司治理文件。如果他已经交出，该动议即失去实际意义。债务人所谓唯一的合规行为就是据称寄送给王女士的信函，但他未能充分证明该信函确已寄出。债务人未配合受托人寻找王女士并完成交接的努力。债务人直到很晚才披露王女士是 Ace Decade 实体的代持所有人。向受托人提供并在听证会期间出示的信函上缺少王女士的地址。债务人未安排据称知悉如何找到王女士的保镖出庭作证，也未以其他方式告知受托人如何找到王女士。\n\n4. 债务人未曾尽职尝试遵守\n\n本法院进一步得出结论，债务人未曾以合理方式尽职尝试遵守《公司治理裁定》。参见同上判例。正如紧接上文所指出的，所谓配合或实现移交的唯一尝试就是该信函。没有任何证据表明该信函已寄送给王女士。退一步讲，即便该信函确已寄出，也是拖延而非尽职的——它是在藐视法庭动议提交一个月后以及《公司治理裁定》作出数月后才发出的。此外，同样假设该信函确已寄出，其寄送方式亦不合理。信函上没有地址，没有邮戳，没有收据确认。债务人甚至不知道据称亲自送交信函的是其哪位保镖。\n\n5. 债务人本可以遵守\n\n最后，本法院得出结论，债务人遵守《公司治理裁定》并非不可能。参见 Wendy 案，575 F.2d at 1030。债务人放弃了其截至破产申请提交日及受托人任命之日并未实益拥有或控制 Ace Decade 以及通过其控制 Dawn State（道晨州公司）的抗辩。因此，基于上述理由，债务人配合受托人或向受托人交出 Ace Decade 实体并非不可能。\n\n受托人提交了电子邮件往来作为证据，表明 Ace Decade 的代持所有人王女士在其他交易中均按照债务人的指示行事，包括涉及 Ace Decade 的纽约诉讼以及涉及 Sherry Netherland 公寓的事项。（受托人证据 29 和 30。）基于此证据，本法院认定债务人能够促使其将所有权权益移交给受托人。截至目前，他尚未这样做。\n\nVI. 结论与裁定\n\n基于上述理由，本法院认定债务人构成民事藐视法庭。特此\n\n裁定：债务人必须在 2023年3月6日 下午 5:00（17:00）或之前消除其藐视法庭行为；并进一步\n\n裁定：若债务人在 2023年3月6日 下午 5:00（17:00）或之前未消除其藐视法庭行为，他将被处以受托人因谋求其遵守涉及 Ace Decade 实体的《公司治理裁定》而不得不支付的合理律师费及成本制裁，该合理费用将由本法院确定并支付给破产财产；并进一步\n\n裁定：若债务人持续藐视法庭，本法院可在发出通知后作出进一步制裁，以确保《公司治理裁定》得到遵守。\n\n2023年1月24日 签署于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n\nJulie A. Manning\nUnited States Bankruptcy Judge（美国破产法院法官）\nDistrict of Connecticut（康涅狄格区）","key_entities":["Je","Guo","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":598,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":679,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":717,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":746,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":913,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":1026,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":1092,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":1110,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":1372,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":4875,"status":"published","published_at":"2023-01-24 00:00:00","created_at":"2023-01-24","updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:41:35"}