{"id":"court_sdny_89_5","court":"SDNY","case_no":"23-cr-00118","doc_number":89,"sub_number":5,"doc_type":"ORDER","filed_date":null,"title":"EXHIBIT E UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT","summary_zh":"临时限制令和初步禁令部分批准命令 —— 联邦破产法院康涅狄格州分区，案号 22-50073（对抗诉讼 23-05013）ECF #89。Chapter 11 受信人 Luc A. Despins 对 HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc., Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, Ltd., Anthony DiBattista, Yvette Wang 和 Brian W. Hofmeister 提起诉讼，主张这些实体是 Ho Wan Kwok 的分身或由 Kwok 受益拥有，法院批准了部分临时限制令，禁止被告继续资产分配程序或转让/使用这些实体的资产。","summary_en":"Order Granting in Part Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction — United States Bankruptcy Court, District of Connecticut, Case No. 22-50073 (Adversary Proceeding No. 23-05013), ECF No. 89. Chapter 11 Trustee Luc A. Despins' complaint against HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc., Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, Ltd., Anthony DiBattista, Yvette Wang, and Brian W. Hofmeister alleges that these entities are alter egos of or beneficially owned by Ho Wan Kwok; the court grants in part the temporary restraining order, enjoining defendants from continuing asset assignment proceedings or transferring/using assets of the entities.","body_en":"# **EXHIBIT E**\n\n# **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT**\n\n| In re:<br>HO WAN KWOK, et al.,<br>1<br>Debtors.                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | )<br>)<br>Chapter 11<br>)<br>)<br>Case No. 22-50073 (JAM)<br>)<br>)<br>(Jointly Administered)<br>) |\n|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|\n| LUC A. DESPINS, CHAPTER 11 TRUSTEE FOR THE<br>ESTATE OF HO WAN KWOK,<br>Plaintiff,                                                                                                                                                                                       | )<br>)<br>Adv. P. No. 23-05013 (JAM)<br>)<br>)<br>Re: ECF No. 4<br>)                               |\n| v.<br>HCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC., HCHK PROPERTY<br>MANAGEMENT, INC., LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND<br>STAFFING, INC., HOLY CITY HONG KONG<br>VENTURES, LTD., ANTHONY DIBATTISTA,<br>YVETTE WANG, and BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER,<br>ASSIGNEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS,<br>Defendants. | )<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)<br>)                                           |\n\n# **ORDER GRANTING IN PART EMERGENCY** *EX PARTE* **MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**\n\n<sup>1</sup> The Debtors in these chapter 11 cases are Ho Wan Kwok (also known as Guo Wengui, Miles Guo, and Miles Kwok, as well as numerous other aliases) (last four digits of tax identification number: 9595), Genever Holdings LLC (last four digits of tax identification number: 8202) and Genever Holdings Corporation. The mailing address for the Trustee, Genever Holdings LLC, the Genever Holdings Corporation is Paul Hastings LLP, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 c/o Luc A. Despins, as Trustee for the Estate of Ho Wan Kwok (solely for purposes of notices and communications).\n\n### **I. INTRODUCTION**\n\nBefore the Court is the Emergency *Ex Parte* Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (in pertinent part, the \"TRO Motion\"), ECF No. 4,<sup>2</sup> filed by Mr. Luc A. Despins, in his capacity as the Chapter 11 trustee (the \"Trustee\") for the bankruptcy estate (the \"Estate\") of Mr. Ho Wan Kwok (the \"Individual Debtor\"). For the reasons stated below, the Court **GRANTS IN PART** the TRO Motion and issues the Temporary Restraining Order set forth herein.\n\n# **II. BACKGROUND**\n\nThe Individual Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in this Court on February 15, 2022. (Main Case ECF No. 1.) The Individual Debtor's case is jointly administered with two affiliated corporate Chapter 11 cases. (Main Case ECF Nos. 970 & 1141.) For the reasons set forth therein, on June 15, 2022, the Court entered a memorandum of decision and order appointing a Chapter 11 trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 465.) *In re Kwok*, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022). On July 8, 2022, Mr. Despins was appointed as the Trustee. (Main Case ECF No. 523.)\n\nOn June 8, 2023, the Trustee filed the Complaint Pursuant to Sections 105, 362, 363, 541, 542, 544, and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code Seeking (I) Declaratory Judgment that HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., and Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. are (A) Alter Egos of Debtor; or, (B) in the Alternative, an Order that Debtor Equitably Owns Such Entities and/or Their Property; and (II) Injunctive Relief (the \"Complaint\"). (ECF Nos. 1 (redacted), 2 (sealed).) Twenty-four exhibits are attached to the Complaint.\n\n<sup>2</sup> References to the docket in this adversary proceeding will be styled \"ECF.\" References to the docket in the main case, *In re Kwok*, Case No. 22-50073, will be styled \"Main Case ECF.\"\n\nThe Complaint alleges that HCHK Technologies, Inc., HCHK Property Management, Inc., and Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. (the \"HCHK Entities\") are the alter egos of the Individual Debtor and/or the HCHK Entities are and/or their respective property is beneficially owned by the Individual Debtor. (Complaint ¶¶ 62–73.) Upon these bases, the Complaint seeks declaratory relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542, and 544 that the property of and/or ownership interests in the HCHK Entities is/are property of the Estate, which must be delivered to the Trustee. (*Id.*) Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, Ltd. (\"Holy City\"), which is allegedly wholly owned by Ms. Yvette Wang, is the alleged record owner of a 99.9999% equity interest in each of the HCHK Entities, and Mr. Anthony DiBattista is the alleged record owner of the remaining 0.0001% interest in each of the HCHK Entities. (Complaint ¶¶ 12–14.) The Complaint alleges that Ms. Wang, Mr. DiBattista, and others involved in the management and operations of the HCHK Entities are employees and agents of the Individual Debtor and that through these employees and agents, the Individual Debtor beneficially owns and controls the HCHK Entities and/or their assets. (Complaint ¶¶ 62–73.)\n\nThe Complaint additionally alleges that, on April 20, 2023, a representative of each of the HCHK Entities executed a Deed of Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors (collectively, the \"Deeds of Assignment\"), assigning all of the HCHK Entities' assets to Mr. Brian W. Hofmeister, esquire (in his capacity as assignee for the benefit of creditors, the \"Assignee Defendant,\" and together with the HCHK Entities, Holy City, Ms. Wang, and Mr. DiBattista, collectively, the \"Defendants\"). (Complaint ¶¶ 15, 41.) On April 25, 2023, the Complaint alleges the Deeds of Assignment were filed with the Supreme Court of the State of New York for New York County (the \"State Court\"), after which the State Court issued orders to show cause (each a \"Show Cause Order,\" and together, collectively, the \"Show Cause Orders\") why an assignment for the benefit\n\nof creditors proceeding (each an \"Assignment Proceeding,\" and together, collectively, the \"Assignment Proceedings\") should not begin regarding each of the HCHK Entities. (Complaint ¶¶ 42–45.) The Complaint alleges the first responses to a Show Cause Order are due on or before June 15, 2023 with the relevant hearing on whether to initiate an Assignment Proceeding to be held, on the papers, on June 20, 2023. (Complaint ¶ 43.)\n\nTo prevent the Assignment Proceedings from commencing or continuing, the Complaint seeks injunctive relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, 363, and 549 enjoining the Defendants from transferring or using the assets of the HCHK Entities and from continuing to prosecute the Assignment Proceedings. (Complaint ¶¶ 74–80.) The Complaint additionally seeks related declaratory relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 541, and 544 that the execution of the Deeds of Assignment and the commencement and prosecution of the Assignment Proceedings were and are violations of the automatic stay. (Complaint ¶¶ 62–73.)\n\nOn June 8, 2023, the Trustee additionally filed the TRO Motion, ECF No. 4, and the supporting Affidavit of Chapter 11 Trustee (the \"Trustee Affidavit\"), ECF No. 5, and Certification of Douglass E. Barron (the \"Barron Certification\"), ECF No. 6. In pertinent part, the TRO Motion seeks an *ex parte* temporary restraining order (\"TRO\") pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, 363, and 549 enjoining the Defendants from commencing or prosecuting the Assignment Proceedings and/or otherwise transferring or using the assets of the HCHK Entities. The Trustee Affidavit is sworn under the penalty of perjury and asserts, to the best of the Trustee's knowledge, the veracity of the core allegations of the Complaint and that the exhibits to the Complaint are true and correct copies of documents. The Barron Certification is a declaration of counsel in support of issuing a TRO on an *ex parte* basis. On June 9, 2023, the Trustee filed a supplements to the TRO Motion, Trustee Affidavit, and Barron Certification\n\nregarding a particular facet of the Assignment Proceedings and a particular individual involved with the Defendants. (ECF Nos. 14–16.)\n\n## **III. JURISDICTION**\n\nThe United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). This Court has authority to hear and determine this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) and the Order of Reference of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut dated September 21, 1984. The instant proceedings are statutorily core proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (O).\n\nVenue in this District is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.\n\n## **IV. DISCUSSION**\n\nThe Trustee requests *ex parte* relief because he is concerned that should the Defendants and/or their agents and those acting in concert with them learn of this adversary proceeding before receiving actual notice of a TRO issued by this Court, the Defendants and/or their agents and those acting in concert with them will seek to dissipate potential Estate assets through other means. Unfortunately, upon the basis of the Trustee Affidavit and Barron Certification, the Court concludes the Trustee's concern is justified. In particular, the allegation that Ms. Wang transferred Ace Decade Holdings Limited after this Court had already determined that Ace Decade Holdings Limited was property of the Estate is troubling. Similarly, the apparent sale of the Ferncliff Mansion and the Bombardier jet – which are disputed assets of the Estate – during the pendency of these Chapter 11 cases and upon no notice to the Court and the parties-ininterest is also troubling. Therefore, the Court considers the TRO Motion on an *ex parte* basis.\n\nThe \"underlying purpose\" of an *ex parte* TRO is \"preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.\"\n\n*Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters*, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). \"It is well established that in [the Second] Circuit the standard for an entry of a TRO is the same as for a preliminary injunction.\" *Andino v. Fischer*, 555 F. Supp. 2d 418, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing multiple cases); *see Ross v. Rell*, 398 F.3d 203, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying preliminary injunction standard articulated in *Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.* 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) in appeal regarding temporary restraining order). In addition to injunctive relief under the standard of *Jackson Dairy*, courts sitting in bankruptcy may issue injunctive relief under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), with the \"traditional [TRO] standard as modified to fit the bankruptcy context.\" *Nev. Power Co. v. Calpine Corp. (In re Calpine Corp.)*, 365 B.R. 401, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (internal citations omitted); *see Marshall v. Picard (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Securities LLC)*, 740 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming affirmance of *Securities Inv. Protection v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Securities LLC (In re Madoff)*, 429 B.R. 423 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)); *Lautenberg Found. v. Picard (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec.)*, 512 F. App'x 18, 20 (2d Cir. 2013); *Ball ex rel. Soundview Elite Ltd. v. Soundview Composite Ltd. (In re Soundview Elite Ltd.)*, 543 B.R. 78, 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016); *Lyondell Chemical Co. v. CenterPoint Energy Gas Services (In re Lyondell Chemical Co.)*, 402 B.R. 571, 588–89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).\n\n#### **A.** *Jackson Dairy* **Standard**\n\nThe general standard for Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a) preliminary injunctive relief in the Second Circuit is \"(a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary relief.\" *Jackson Dairy*, 596 F.2d at 72; *see Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities*\n\n*Master Fund Ltd.*, 598 F.3d 30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding *Jackson Dairy* remained the law of the Second Circuit); *see also Mendez v. Banks*, 65 F.4th 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2023).\n\n# **i. Irreparable Harm**\n\nIrreparable harm is the most important element of a TRO. *See Faiveley Transport Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp.*, 559 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2009). Irreparable harm must be \"likely,\" not merely possible. *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). While outside of bankruptcy proceedings, irreparable harm generally must be the sort that cannot be adequately compensated by legal remedies, *Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc.*, 527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999) (holding that a district court \"had no authority to issue a preliminary injunction preventing petitioners from disposing of their assets pending adjudication of respondents' contract claim for money damages\"), this rule does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings because \"[t]he law of fraudulent conveyances and bankruptcy was developed to prevent [the disposition of assets pending adjudication],\" *Grupo Mexicano*, 527 U.S. at 322. *See Rubin v. Pringle ex rel. Focus Media Inc. (In re Focus Media Inc.)*, 387 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2004); *Soundview Elite*, 543 B.R. at 115; *see also In re Owens Corning*, 419 F.3d 195, 208 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2005).\n\nThe automatic stay provided by section 362(a) is \"'one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws,' designed to relieve 'the financial pressures that drove [debtors] into bankruptcy.'\" *E. Refractories Co. v. Forty Eight Insulations Inc.,* 157 F.3d 169, 172 (2d Cir.1998) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 340 (1977)). Moreover, as House of Representative Report Number 95-595 additionally observes:\n\nThe automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claim in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation procedure under\n\nwhich all creditors are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that.\n\nH.R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 340; *see In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.*, 12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (citing *Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc.*, 550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976) (case under the Bankruptcy Act)). A bankruptcy case is an all-encompassing action intended to equitably – and finally – liquidate, reorganize, or adjust the assets, affairs, and liabilities of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit of all creditors, providing an individual debtor or reorganizing corporate debtor with a fresh start. *See Grogan v. Garner*, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).\n\nFor this reason, the automatic stay, among other things, prevents (i)\"the commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, \" 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1); and (ii) \"any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate,\" 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Under Second Circuit precedent, the automatic stay protects property of a non-debtor where \"a claim against the non-debtor will have an immediate adverse economic consequence for the debtor's estate,\" such as when a debtor owns a non-debtor. *See Queenie, Ltd. v. Nygard Int'l,*  321 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003). Willful violations of the automatic stay *shall* be sanctioned. 11 U.S.C. § 362(k). Bankruptcy proceedings are undermined by violation of the automatic stay.\n\nHere, the Trustee alleges that the property of the HCHK Entities is and/or the HCHK Entities themselves are property of the Estate. (Complaint ¶¶ 62–73.) Pursuant to the Second Circuit's ruling in *Queenie*, if the Trustee is successful on the merits, the Assignment Proceedings – or any other dissipation or exercise of control over the assets of the HCHK Entities – would have been found to have been violations of the automatic stay. Furthermore, the\n\nTrustee asserts that more than \\$35 million in alleged Estate assets could be dissipated through the Assignment Proceedings and, moreover, dissipated with the imprimatur of the State Court and distributed only to the creditors of the Individual Debtor who participate in the Assignment Proceedings. (Complaint ¶¶ 2, 3.) In the context of these Chapter 11 cases, where the scheduled assets are less than \\$4 thousand and the scheduled liabilities exceed \\$300 million, \\$35 million is not an insignificant sum. (Main Case ECF No. 78.) Finally, insofar as the Trustee is correct in his allegations, the Assignment Proceedings invite conflict with these Chapter 11 cases and this Court's bankruptcy jurisdiction, increasing the costs borne by the Estate and decreasing the recovery of creditors. The Court concludes that the Trustee has sufficiently alleged likely irreparable harm to support the issuance of an *ex parte* TRO to preserve the *status quo* pending a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction.\n\n#### **ii. Balance of the Hardships**\n\nAbsent a TRO, the Assignment Proceedings will commence before this Court can conduct a hearing on the Trustee's request for a preliminary injunction, likely causing irreparable harm. The Defendants, however, will suffer minimal hardship by the imposition of an *ex parte* TRO – a delay of a few weeks of the commencement of the Assignment Proceedings should the Defendants prevail at the hearing on the Trustee's request for a preliminary injunction. Moreover, a TRO issued by this Court would prevent the dissipation of the HCHK Entities assets pending the hearing on the Assignment Proceeding. The *status quo* would be preserved both in relation to these Chapter 11 cases and the Assignment Proceedings. Therefore, the Court concludes that in the context of the request for an *ex parte* TRO, the balance of hardships tips decidedly in the Trustee's favor.\n\n# **iii. Likelihood of Success on the Merits or Sufficiently Serious Questions Going to the Merits**\n\nA likelihood of success on the merits is established where \"the moving party is more likely than not to prevail on the merits of the underlying claims.\" *Citigroup*, 598 F.3d at 35. In *Citigroup*, the Second Circuit explained the alternate \"serious questions\" standard as permitting a court \"to grant a preliminary injunction in situations where it cannot determine with certainty that the moving party is more likely than not to prevail on the merits of the underlying claims, but where the costs outweigh the benefits of not granting the injunction.\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted). The Second Circuit continued: \"Because the moving party must not only show that there are 'serious questions' going to the merits, but must additionally establish that 'the balance of hardships tips *decidedly*' in its favor, its overall burden is no lighter than the one it bears under the 'likelihood of success' standard.\" *Id.* (internal citations omitted). Because the Court has determined that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in the Trustee's favor with regards to the imposition of an *ex parte* TRO, the Court need only find that the Trustee has established \"serious questions going to the merits\" to grant an *ex parte* TRO. *Jackson Dairy*, 596 F.2d at 72.\n\nThe Complaint alleges that each of the HCHK Entities are Delaware entities. (Complaint ¶¶ 9–11.) \"Delaware courts use the terms 'piercing the corporate veil' and 'alter ego' theory interchangeably.\" *Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc.*, 320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018). Under Delaware law, alter ego or piercing the corporate veil has two elements: (i) the alleged alter egos are effectively one and the same economic entity and (ii) the corporate form causes an overall element of fraud or injustice. *Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.*, 68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995) (\"To prevail on an alter ego claim under Delaware law, a plaintiff must show (1) that the parent and the subsidiary 'operated as a single economic entity' and (2) that an 'overall element of injustice or unfairness . . . [is] present.'\") (internal citations omitted). Much the same standard is\n\napplied to determinations of equitable ownership. *See LiButti v. United States*, 968 F. Supp. 71, 75 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (determining whether an owner was a nominee for the purposes of tax levy), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds*, 178 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1999); *see Paloian ex rel. Dordevic v. Dordevic (In re Dordevic)*, 633 B.R. 553, 558 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2021) (using common law nominee factors in a bankruptcy proceeding) *aff'd by* 20 b 9807, 21 C5328, 2022 WL 19638995 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2022), *aff'd by* No. 22-2500, 2023 WL 3113706 (7th Cir. April 27, 2023).\n\nThe Complaint advances six categories of allegations in support of the prayer for relief: (i) the HCHK Entities are nominally owned by the Individual Debtor's alleged employees or agents – Ms. Wang and Mr. DiBattista – and also staffed by the Individual Debtor's alleged employees or agents, *e.g.*, Mr. Max Krasner, Mr. Joe Wang, Mr. Bernardo Enriquez, Mr. Alex Hadjicharalambous, and Mr. Elliott Dordick, (Complaint ¶¶ 22–26); (ii) the HCHK Entities are affiliated with Gettr GFashion, GMusic, GClub, GNews, GEdu, Saraca Media, and GTV Media (the \"G-Series Entities\"), which are allegedly affiliated with the Individual Debtor, and the corporate form of the HCHK Entities is disregarded for the benefit of the G-Series Entities, (Complaint ¶¶ 27–30); (iii) the HCHK Entities have a history of paying what are allegedly the expenses of the Individual Debtor, (Complaint ¶¶ 31–32); (iv) the purported creditors of the HCHK Entities alleged in the Assignment Proceedings are either individual supporters of the Individual Debtors or entities affiliated with the Individual Debtor, such as G-Series Entities, (Complaint ¶¶ 33–38); (v) the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York alleges that the HCHK Entities are involved in a billion dollar fraud for the benefit of the Individual Debtor, (Complaint ¶ 39); and (vi) the Individual Debtor asserted his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination when questioned whether he beneficially owned and controlled\n\nthe HCHK Entities, (Complaint ¶ 40). The Trustee Affidavit asserts under penalty of perjury that key supporting allegations are true to the best of the Trustee's knowledge and that the exhibits supporting the Complaint are true and correct copies of documents to the best of the Trustee's knowledge.\n\nAs the Complaint observes, this Court has already found Ms. Wang to be an employee and/or agent of the Individual Debtor. (Main Case ECF No. 1372.) Ms. Wang is alleged to indirectly nominally control 99.9999% of the ownership interests in each of the HCHK Entities. Many, if not all, of the other names of owners or employees and affiliated entities of the HCHK Entities which the Complaint alleges demonstrate a close connection with the affairs of the Individual Debtor are familiar to the Court in connection with, *e.g.*, the social media and protest campaign, *see, e.g.*, *Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22- 50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2023), ECF No. 133 (hereinafter, the \"Social Media and Protest Decision\"), or the involvement of Golden Spring (New York) Ltd. and Lamp Capital LLC in these Chapter 11 cases, *see e.g.*, Main Case ECF Nos. 1, 86, 117, 139, 197, 318, 760, 1709. Indeed, the Court has previously found that the G-Series Entities are business vehicles of the Individual Debtor, serve the purposes of the Individual Debtor, and have employees who are personally loyal to the Individual Debtor. (*See*  Social Media and Protest Decision.) Moreover, attached to the Complaint are exhibits demonstrating the alleged connection to the G-Series Entities including, among others, the filings of the Assignee Defendant in the State Court, bank records, and emails from the HCHK Entities' professionals. For example, there is an email from an HCHK Entities' professional stating that \"We are representing entities indirectly owned by [the Individual Debtor], owner of GTV media.\" (ECF No. 1 Ex. 14.) The Complaint also alleges that financial documents – not\n\nattached, but in the Trustee's possession – indicate that the HCHK Entities have made several payments for the ultimate benefit of the Individual Debtor, *e.g.*, in connection with the Lady May, the Individual Debtor's yacht, *see HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok (In re Kwok)*, Case No. 22-50073 (JAM), Adv. P. No. 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2023), ECF No. 177, or payment of his employees, such as Ms. Wang. Similarly, the Assignee Defendant's filings suggest that the HCHK Entities' creditors are the G-Series Entities and related individuals. Finally, the Individual Debtor has asserted his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination regarding his control of not just HCHK Technologies, Inc. and HCHK Property Management, Inc. but also, *e.g.*, various G-Series Entities, Ms. Wang, and Mr. DiBattista. (ECF No. 1 Exs. 1, 12.)\n\nCombined with the Trustee's affidavit sworn under penalty of perjury, the Court concludes that the Complaint has *at least* raised sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to support an *ex parte* TRO. Therefore, the Court concludes all *Jackson Dairy* elements are met and a TRO shall issue to maintain the *status quo* pending a trial on the request for a preliminary injunction.\n\n#### **B. Section 105 Injunction**\n\nEven where the automatic stay does not apply – and here the Complaint asserts it does – the Court has authority under section 105(a) to stay suits that may impede an ongoing bankruptcy proceeding. *See McHale v. Alvarez (In re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC)*, 397 B.R. 670, 684 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008). Section 105(a) injunctive relief may enter if (1) there is a likelihood of successful reorganization; (2) there is an imminent irreparable harm to the estate in the absence of an injunction; (3) the balance of harms tips in favor of the moving party; and (4) the public interest weighs in favor of an injunction. *Calpine*, 365 B.R. at 409.\n\nAll of these factors except for (1) and (4) have been addressed above in the discussion of *Jackson Dairy*. The Trustee's investigation is proceeding and there will likely be *some* recovery for creditors, although the ultimate dividend is unknown. The recovery will likely at least be greater than that in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. The public interest supports the issuance of a TRO because the public has an interest, as enshrined in Article I, section 8 of the Constitution, in uniform, federal bankruptcy laws and an equitable distribution to all creditors. As discussed above, such a distribution is presently at risk due to a potential splintering of bankruptcy proceedings between these Chapter 11 cases and the Assignment Proceedings. Therefore, the Court concludes section 105(a) also supports the issuance of a TRO to maintain the *status quo* pending a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction.\n\n#### **V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER**\n\nAccordingly, upon review of the TRO Motion, the Complaint and exhibits attached thereto, the Trustee Affidavit, the Barron Certification, and the record in these Chapter 11 cases and this adversary proceeding and for the reasons stated above, the Court issues an *ex parte* TRO to preserve the *status quo* pending a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction. Therefore, it is hereby\n\n**ORDERED:** Upon receipt of actual notice of this TRO by personal service or otherwise, (i) the Defendants; (ii) the Defendants' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (iii) any person in active concert or participations with the Defendants and/or the Defendants' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys including, without limitation, G-News Operations, LLC (\"G-News\") and Ms. Irene Feng, are temporarily restrained and enjoined from commencing or continuing the Assignment Proceedings (or any other judicial, administrative, or\n\nother actions or proceedings with respect to the HCHK Entities and/or their assets), including Interim Management Agreement (\"IMA\") with G-News; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Upon receipt of actual notice of this TRO by personal service or otherwise, (i) the Defendants; (ii) the Defendants' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (iii) any person in active concert or participations with the Defendants and/or the Defendants' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, including, without limitation, GNews and Irene Feng, are temporarily restrained and enjoined from any transfer or use of the assets, including cash, of the HCHK Entities (including but not limited to such assets purportedly transferred to the Assignee Defendant and/or held by the Assignee Defendant, and including but not limited to any transfer or use of such assets effectuated pursuant to the IMA), or ownership interests in the HCHK Entities, except as authorized or directed by the Trustee or this Court; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Upon receipt of actual notice of this TRO by personal service or otherwise, the Assignee Defendant shall immediately notify the State Court of the issuance of this TRO; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Pursuant to this Court's discretion to set or waive the amount of any bond to be posted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, the Trustee need not post a bond; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** Any objection or response to the TRO Motion insofar as it requests a preliminary injunction or this Order shall be filed on or before June 23, 2023 at 12:00 p.m. (noon); and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Trustee and the Defendants shall submit lists of witnesses and exhibits on or before June 23, 2023 at 12:00 p.m. (noon); and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** The Trustee shall file any reply on or before June 24, 2023 at 12:00 p.m.\n\n(noon); and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** A hearing on the TRO Motion insofar as it requests the issuance of a\n\npreliminary injunction, shall commence on June 26, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. in the United States\n\nBankruptcy Court, 915 Lafayette Boulevard, Bridgeport, CT; and it is further\n\n**ORDERED:** This Court shall retain jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters arising from the implementation, interpretation, and/or enforcement of this TRO.\n\nEntered at Bridgeport, Connecticut at 2:15 p.m. on June 12, 2023.\n\nDated at Bridgeport, Connecticut this 12th day of June, 2023.\n\n![](_page_16_Picture_9.jpeg)","body_zh":"证物 E\n\n美国康涅狄格区破产法院（United States Bankruptcy Court District of Connecticut）\n\n关于：\nHo Wan Kwok（郭文贵）等人，\n债务人。\n第 11 章\n案件编号：22-50073 (JAM)\n（合并审理）\n\nLUC A. DESPINS（卢克·A·德斯平斯），HO WAN KWOK 破产财团的第 11 章破产受托人，\n原告，\n附随诉讼编号：23-05013 (JAM)\n涉及：ECF No. 4\n\n诉\n\nHCHK TECHNOLOGIES, INC.、HCHK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.、LEXINGTON PROPERTY AND STAFFING, INC.、HOLY CITY HONG KONG VENTURES, LTD.（圣城香港创投有限公司）、ANTHONY DIBATTISTA（安东尼·迪巴蒂斯塔）、YVETTE WANG（王雁平）以及 BRIAN W. HOFMEISTER（布莱恩·W·霍夫迈斯特，作为债权人利益受让人），\n被告。\n\n关于部分准予紧急单方临时限制令及初步禁令动议的裁定\n\n1 本第 11 章破产案件中的债务人为 Ho Wan Kwok（亦称郭文贵、Miles Guo、Miles Kwok 以及其他多个化名）（纳税人识别号后四位：9595）、Genever Holdings LLC（纳税人识别号后四位：8202）及 Genever Holdings Corporation。受托人、Genever Holdings LLC、Genever Holdings Corporation 的邮寄地址为：Paul Hastings LLP（普衡律师事务所）, 200 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10166 转交 Luc A. Despins（作为 Ho Wan Kwok 破产财团的受托人）（仅用于通知和通讯目的）。\n\n一、导言\n\n提交本法院审理的是 Luc A. Despins 先生以 Ho Wan Kwok 先生（即“个人债务人”）破产财团（即“破产财团”）的第 11 章受托人（即“受托人”）身份提起的《紧急单方临时限制令及初步禁令动议》（其相关部分简称“临时限制令动议”），ECF No. 4。2 基于下文所述理由，本法院部分准予该临时限制令动议，并发布本裁定所载的临时限制令。\n\n二、背景\n\n个人债务人于 2022 年 2 月 15 日向本法院提交了自愿第 11 章破产申请。（主案 Main Case ECF No. 1。）个人债务人的案件与两起关联公司的第 11 章案件合并审理。（主案 Main Case ECF Nos. 970 及 1141。）基于其中所述理由，本法院于 2022 年 6 月 15 日作出一项判决备忘录及裁定，指定一名第 11 章受托人。（主案 Main Case ECF No. 465。）In re Kwok, 640 B.R. 514 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2022)。2022 年 7 月 8 日，Despins 先生被指定为受托人。（主案 Main Case ECF No. 523。）\n\n2023 年 6 月 8 日，受托人根据《破产法典》（Bankruptcy Code）第 105、362、363、541、542、544 及 549 条提交了《起诉状》（the \"Complaint\"），请求：(I) 作出宣告性判决，确认 HCHK Technologies, Inc.、HCHK Property Management, Inc. 及 Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc. (A) 为债务人的另一个人格（Alter Egos）；或 (B) 作为备位请求，作出命令裁定债务人衡平拥有该等实体及/或其财产；以及 (II) 禁令救济。（ECF Nos. 1（修订版）、2（密封版）。）起诉状附有二十四份证物。\n\n2 本附随诉讼的案件案卷引用将采用“ECF”样式。主案 In re Kwok（案件编号：22-50073）的案卷引用将采用“Main Case ECF”样式。\n\n起诉状指控 HCHK Technologies, Inc.、HCHK Property Management, Inc. 和 Lexington Property and Staffing, Inc.（合称“HCHK 实体”）是个人债务人的另一个人格，及/或 HCHK 实体及/或其各自财产由个人债务人实益拥有。（起诉状 ¶¶ 62–73。）基于上述理由，起诉状根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 541、542 和 544 请求宣告性救济，确认 HCHK 实体的财产及/或所有权权益属于破产财团财产，必须移交给受托人。（同上。）据称由 Yvette Wang 女士全资拥有的 Holy City Hong Kong Ventures, Ltd.（“Holy City”）据称为各 HCHK 实体 99.9999% 股权的名义登记所有人，而 Anthony DiBattista 先生据称为各 HCHK 实体剩余 0.0001% 权益的名义登记所有人。（起诉状 ¶¶ 12–14。）起诉状指控 Wang 女士、DiBattista 先生以及参与 HCHK 实体管理和运营的其他人员均为个人债务人的雇员及代理人，个人债务人通过这些雇员和代理人实益拥有并控制 HCHK 实体及/或其资产。（起诉状 ¶¶ 62–73。）\n\n起诉状还指控，2023 年 4 月 20 日，各 HCHK 实体的代表签署了一份《为债权人利益转让契约》（合称“转让契约”），将各 HCHK 实体的全部资产转让给 Brian W. Hofmeister 律师（以其作为债权人利益受让人的身份，简称“受让人被告”，并与 HCHK 实体、Holy City、Wang 女士和 DiBattista 先生合称为“各被告”）。（起诉状 ¶¶ 15, 41。）起诉状指控，2023 年 4 月 25 日，转让契约被提交至纽约县纽约州最高法院（Supreme Court of the State of New York for New York County，即“州法院”），随后州法院发布了述因令（各称“述因令”，合称“各项述因令”），责令说明为何不应就各 HCHK 实体启动为债权人利益转让程序（各称“转让程序”，合称“各项转让程序”）。（起诉状 ¶¶ 42–45。）起诉状指控，对述因令的第一批答复应于 2023 年 6 月 15 日或之前提交，有关是否启动转让程序的相关书面审理听证会定于 2023 年 6 月 20 日举行。（起诉状 ¶ 43。）\n\n为防止转让程序启动或继续进行，起诉状根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 105、362、363 和 549 请求禁令救济，禁止各被告转让或使用 HCHK 实体的资产，并禁止其继续推进转让程序。（起诉状 ¶¶ 74–80。）起诉状还根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 362、541 和 544 请求相关的宣告性救济，确认签署转让契约以及启动和推进转让程序曾经且正在违反自动中止（automatic stay）规定。（起诉状 ¶¶ 62–73。）\n\n2023 年 6 月 8 日，受托人还提交了临时限制令动议（ECF No. 4）及支持该动议的《第 11 章受托人宣誓书》（即“受托人宣誓书”，ECF No. 5）和《Douglass E. Barron 证明书》（即“Barron 证明书”，ECF No. 6）。临时限制令动议的相关部分根据 11 U.S.C. §§ 105、362、363 和 549 请求单方临时限制令（“TRO”），禁止各被告启动或推进转让程序及/或以其他方式转让或使用 HCHK 实体的资产。受托人宣誓书系在接受伪证处罚的前提下宣誓作出，并在受托人所知范围内确认起诉状核心指控的真实性，以及起诉状附件为相关文件的真实准确副本。Barron 证明书为支持以单方形式发布临时限制令的律师声明。2023 年 6 月 9 日，受托人就转让程序的某一特定方面以及涉及各被告的某一特定个人，提交了临时限制令动议、受托人宣誓书及 Barron 证明书的补充文件。（ECF Nos. 14–16。）\n\n三、管辖权\n\n美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院（United States District Court for the District of Connecticut）根据 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) 对本案具有管辖权。本法院根据 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) 及美国康涅狄格区联邦地区法院于 1984 年 9 月 21 日作出的移送案件命令（Order of Reference），有权审理并裁决本案。本案程序属于法定核心程序。28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (E), (O)。\n\n根据 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 和 1409，本审区的审判管辖地正当。\n\n四、论述\n\n受托人请求单方救济，是因为他担心如果各被告及/或其代理人以及与其协同行动的人员在本法院发布的临时限制令获得实际送达之前获悉本附随诉讼，各被告及/或其代理人以及与其协同行动的人员将试图通过其他手段转移或挥霍破产财团的潜在资产。遗憾的是，根据受托人宣誓书和 Barron 证明书，本法院认定受托人的担忧是有充分理由的。特别是，关于 Wang 女士在本法院已认定 Ace Decade Holdings Limited 属于破产财团财产之后仍将其转让的指控令人不安。同样，在这些第 11 章破产案件审理期间，在未通知本法院和利害关系人的情况下，明显出售 Ferncliff Mansion（弗恩克利夫庄园）和庞巴迪（Bombardier）喷气式飞机——这些属于破产财团的争议资产——的行为也令人不安。因此，本法院在单方审理的基础上对该临时限制令动议进行审理。\n\n单方临时限制令的“根本目的”在于“维持现状并防止不可弥补的损害，且其存续时间仅以举行听证会所必需的时间为限，不得超过该时间”。Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974)。“众所周知，在［第二］巡回区，发布临时限制令的标准与发布初步禁令的标准相同。”Andino v. Fischer, 555 F. Supp. 2d 418, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)（援引多起判例）；参见 Ross v. Rell, 398 F.3d 203, 204–05 (2d Cir. 2005)（在涉及临时限制令的上诉中适用 Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) 所阐述的初步禁令标准）。除根据 Jackson Dairy 标准提供禁令救济外，行使破产管辖权的法院还可根据 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) 发布禁令救济，适用“经修改以适应破产语境的传统［临时限制令］标准”。Nev. Power Co. v. Calpine Corp. (In re Calpine Corp.), 365 B.R. 401, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)（内部引用省略）；参见 Marshall v. Picard (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Securities LLC), 740 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2014)（维持对 Securities Inv. Protection v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Securities LLC (In re Madoff), 429 B.R. 423 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) 的维持判决）；Lautenberg Found. v. Picard (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec.), 512 F. App'x 18, 20 (2d Cir. 2013)；Ball ex rel. Soundview Elite Ltd. v. Soundview Composite Ltd. (In re Soundview Elite Ltd.), 543 B.R. 78, 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016)；Lyondell Chemical Co. v. CenterPoint Energy Gas Services (In re Lyondell Chemical Co.), 402 B.R. 571, 588–89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)。\n\nA. Jackson Dairy 标准\n\n《联邦民事诉讼规则》（Fed. R. Civ. P.）第 65(a) 条项下在第二巡回区准予初步禁令救济的一般标准为：“(a) 不可弥补的损害，以及 (b) 下列情形之一：(1) 胜诉的实质可能性，或 (2) 涉及实体问题的足够严重的争议使其构成合理的诉讼理由，且利益衡量明显偏向于请求初步救济的一方。”Jackson Dairy, 596 F.2d at 72；参见 Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35–38 (2d Cir. 2010)（裁定 Jackson Dairy 仍为第二巡回区的有效先例）；并参见 Mendez v. Banks, 65 F.4th 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2023)。\n\ni. 不可弥补的损害\n\n不可弥补的损害是临时限制令（TRO）最重要的构成要件。参见 Faiveley Transport Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp.，559 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2009)。不可弥补的损害必须是“很可能发生的”，而不仅仅是可能发生的。Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.，555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)。尽管在破产程序之外，不可弥补的损害通常必须属于无法通过普通法法律救济获得充分补偿的类型，Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc.，527 U.S. 308, 333 (1999)（判决地区法院“无权发布初步禁令，以在被申请人就金钱损害赔偿提出的合同索赔获得审判前，阻止申请人处置其资产”），但该规则不适用于破产程序，因为“欺诈性转让和破产法的发展就是为了防止［审判前处置资产］”，Grupo Mexicano，527 U.S. at 322。参见 Rubin v. Pringle ex rel. Focus Media Inc. (In re Focus Media Inc.)，387 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2004)；Soundview Elite，543 B.R. at 115；另见 In re Owens Corning，419 F.3d 195, 208 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2005)。\n\n第 362(a) 条规定的自动中止是“‘破产法向债务人提供的基本保护之一’，旨在缓解‘迫使［债务人］破产的财务压力’”。E. Refractories Co. v. Forty Eight Insulations Inc.，157 F.3d 169, 172 (2d Cir.1998)（援引 H.R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 340 (1977)）。此外，正如第 95-595 号众议院报告（House of Representative Report Number 95-595）进一步指出的：\n\n自动中止还提供了债权人保护。没有它，某些债权人就能够针对债务人的财产采取自己的救济手段。那些先采取行动的人将优先获得债权清偿，从而损害其他债权人的利益。破产旨在提供一种有序的清算程序，在此程序下\n\n所有债权人都受到平等对待。债权人争夺债务人资产的先下手竞争阻碍了这一点。\n\nH.R. Rep. No. 95–595, at 340；参见 In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.，12 B.R. 803, 806 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)（援引 Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc.，550 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1976)（《破产法》（Bankruptcy Act）下的案件））。破产案件是一项包罗万象的诉讼，旨在为了全体债权人的利益，公平且最终地清算、重组或调整破产财产（bankruptcy estate）的资产、事务和负债，为个人债务人或进行重组的公司债务人提供重新开始的机会。参见 Grogan v. Garner，498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)。\n\n出于这一原因，自动中止除其他事项外，禁止(i)“针对债务人提起或继续进行……在依据本篇提起案件之前已经提起或本可以提起的司法、行政或其他诉讼或程序”，11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)；以及(ii)“为获取破产财产的所有权或从破产财产中获取财产、或对破产财产行使控制权而采取的任何行为”，11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3)。根据第二巡回法院的先例，如果“针对非债务人的索赔将对债务人的破产财产产生直接的不利经济后果”，例如当债务人拥有一家非债务人实体时，自动中止亦保护非债务人的财产。参见 Queenie, Ltd. v. Nygard Int'l，321 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003)。故意违反自动中止的行为应当受到制裁。11 U.S.C. § 362(k)。违反自动中止将损害破产程序。\n\n在本案中，受托人（Trustee）指控 HCHK 实体的财产是、且/或 HCHK 实体本身就是破产财产的一部分。（起诉状第 62–73 段。）根据第二巡回法院在 Queenie 案中的裁定，如果受托人在实体法主张上胜诉，则转让程序（Assignment Proceedings）——或对 HCHK 实体资产的任何其他挥霍或控制权行使——将被认定为构成了对自动中止的违反。此外，\n\n受托人声称，涉案超过 3,500 万美元的所谓破产财产资产可能会通过转让程序被挥霍，而且是在州法院的认可下被挥霍，并仅分配给参与转让程序的个人债务人（Individual Debtor）的债权人。（起诉状第 2、3 段。）在这些第 11 章案件的背景下，申报资产不足 4,000 美元，而申报负债超过 3 亿美元，3,500 万美元绝非一笔小数目。（主案 ECF No. 78。）最后，只要受托人的指控属实，转让程序就会引发与这些第 11 章案件及本法院破产管辖权的冲突，增加破产财产所承担的费用，并减少债权人的受偿。本法院认定，受托人已充分主张了很有可能发生的不可弥补的损害，足以支持签发单方临时限制令（ex parte TRO），以在就初步禁令申请举行听证会之前维持现状（status quo）。\n\nii. 利益衡量\n\n若无临时限制令，转让程序将在本法院就受托人的初步禁令申请举行听证会之前启动，很有可能造成不可弥补的损害。然而，发布单方临时限制令给被告造成的困境微乎其微——如果被告在受托人初步禁令申请的听证会上胜诉，转让程序的启动仅延迟数周。此外，本法院签发的临时限制令将防止在转让程序听证会之前 HCHK 实体的资产遭到挥霍。无论相对于这些第 11 章案件还是转让程序，现状都将得以维持。因此，本法院认定，在申请单方临时限制令的背景下，利益衡量明显偏向受托人一方。\n\niii. 实体胜诉可能性或涉及实体争议的充分严重问题\n\n当“动议方在实体主张上胜诉的可能性大于败诉可能性”时，即确立了实体胜诉可能性。Citigroup，598 F.3d at 35。在 Citigroup 案中，第二巡回法院对另一替代性的“严重问题”标准进行了解释，即允许法院“在无法确定动议方在实体主张上胜诉的可能性是否确实大于败诉可能性、但不予准许禁令的代价超过准许禁令的益处的情况下，准予初步禁令”。同上（内部引文省略）。第二巡回法院接着指出：“因为动议方不仅必须证明存在涉及实体争议的‘严重问题’，而且还必须额外证明‘利益衡量明显偏向’己方，所以其总体举证责任并不比‘胜诉可能性’标准下的举证责任轻。”同上（内部引文省略）。由于本法院已认定，在发布单方临时限制令方面，利益衡量明显偏向受托人一方，因此本法院只需认定受托人确立了“涉及实体争议的严重问题”，即可准予单方临时限制令。Jackson Dairy，596 F.2d at 72。\n\n起诉状指控每个 HCHK 实体均为特拉华州实体。（起诉状第 9–11 段。）“特拉华州法院将‘揭开公司面纱’和‘另我’（alter ego）理论交替使用。”Harrison v. Soroof Int'l, Inc.，320 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 n. 4 (D. Del. 2018)。根据特拉华州法律，另我或揭开公司面纱包含两个要件：(i) 被指控的另我实际上是同一个经济实体；以及 (ii) 公司形式导致了欺诈或不公的整体要件。Fletcher v. Atex, Inc.，68 F.3d 1451, 1457 (2d Cir. 1995)（“根据特拉华州法律在另我主张中胜诉，原告必须证明(1)母公司和子公司‘作为单一经济实体运作’，并且(2)存在‘不公或不公道的整体要件……’”）（内部引文省略）。衡平法所有权的认定也采用\n\n大体相同的标准。参见 LiButti v. United States，968 F. Supp. 71, 75 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)（判定所有权人是否属于用于税收征收目的的名义人），aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds，178 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1999)；参见 Paloian ex rel. Dordevic v. Dordevic (In re Dordevic)，633 B.R. 553, 558 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2021)（在破产程序中运用普通法名义人考量因素），aff'd by 20 b 9807, 21 C5328, 2022 WL 19638995 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2022)，aff'd by No. 22-2500, 2023 WL 3113706 (7th Cir. April 27, 2023)。\n\n起诉状提出了六类指控以支持其诉讼请求：(i) HCHK 实体名义上由个人债务人所谓的雇员或代理人——Wang 女士和 DiBattista 先生——所有，并且由个人债务人所谓的雇员或代理人任职，例如 Max Krasner 先生、Joe Wang 先生、Bernardo Enriquez 先生、Alex Hadjicharalambous 先生和 Elliott Dordick 先生，（起诉状第 22–26 段）；(ii) HCHK 实体与 Gettr、GFashion、GMusic、GClub、GNews、GEdu、Saraca Media 和 GTV Media（“G系列实体”）存在关联，这些实体据称与个人债务人存在关联，且为了 G 系列实体的利益而漠视 HCHK 实体的公司形式，（起诉状第 27–30 段）；(iii) HCHK 实体有据称代个人债务人支付费用的历史，（起诉状第 31–32 段）；(iv) 在转让程序中所主张的 HCHK 实体的所谓债权人，要么是个人债务人的个人支持者，要么是与个人债务人存在关联的实体，例如 G 系列实体，（起诉状第 33–38 段）；(v) 纽约南区联邦检察官（United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York）指控 HCHK 实体为了个人债务人的利益参与了一起数十亿美元的欺诈案，（起诉状第 39 段）；以及 (vi) 当被问及是否实际拥有并控制\n\nHCHK 实体时，个人债务人主张了其反对强迫自证其罪的宪法第五修正案权利，（起诉状第 40 段）。受托人宣誓书在受伪证罪处罚的规定下确认，关键支持性指控在受托人知悉的范围内均属真实，且支持起诉状的证据附件在受托人知悉的范围内均为真实且正确的文书副本。\n\n正如起诉书所指出的，本法院此前已认定Wang女士（王女士）为Individual Debtor（个人债务人）的雇员和/或代理人。（主案 ECF No. 1372。）据指控，Wang女士间接名义控制各HCHK Entities（HCHK实体）99.9999%的所有权权益。起诉书指控其表明与个人债务人事态存在密切联系的HCHK实体的所有者或雇员及关联实体的许多（即使不是全部）其他名称，对本法院而言均属熟悉，这与例如社交媒体和抗议活动有关，参见例如Pac. All. Asia Opportunity Fund L.P. v. Kwok (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼号 22-05032 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2023年1月13日)，ECF No. 133（以下简称“《社交媒体与抗议裁定》”），或者与Golden Spring (New York) Ltd.和Lamp Capital LLC卷入这些第11章破产案件有关，参见例如主案 ECF Nos. 1, 86, 117, 139, 197, 318, 760, 1709。事实上，本法院此前已认定，G-Series Entities（G系列实体）是个人债务人的商业工具，服务于个人债务人的目的，并且拥有对个人债务人个人效忠的雇员。（参见《社交媒体与抗议裁定》。）此外，起诉书所附的证物证明了其与G系列实体的被指控关联，包括但不限于Assignee Defendant（受让人被告）在州法院提交的文件、银行记录以及来自HCHK实体专业人士的电子邮件。例如，有一封来自HCHK实体专业人士的电子邮件称：“我们代表由[个人债务人]，即GTV media的所有者间接拥有的实体。”（ECF No. 1 证物 14。）起诉书还指控，财务文件——虽未\n\n附上，但由Trustee（受托人）持有——表明HCHK实体已为个人债务人的最终利益进行了数笔付款，例如与个人债务人的游艇Lady May（梅号游艇）有关的付款，参见HK Int'l Funds Invs. (USA) Ltd., LLC v. Despins ex rel. Kwok (In re Kwok)，案号 22-50073 (JAM)，对抗性诉讼号 22-05003 (JAM) (Bankr. D. Conn. 2023年3月30日)，ECF No. 177，或是向其雇员（如Wang女士）付款。同样，受让人被告提交的文件表明，HCHK实体的债权人是G系列实体及相关个人。最后，个人债务人已就其不仅对HCHK Technologies, Inc.和HCHK Property Management, Inc.，而且还对例如各G系列实体、Wang女士以及DiBattista先生的控制权主张了其宪法第五修正案中反对强迫自证其罪的权利。（ECF No. 1 证物 1、12。）\n\n结合受托人依伪证罪处罚规定签署的宣誓书，本法院得出结论：起诉书至少已就实体问题提出了足够严重的疑问，足以支持作出单方临时限制令（ex parte TRO）。因此，本法院认定满足Jackson Dairy案的所有要素，应签发临时限制令（TRO），以在就初步禁令请求进行审理前维持现状（status quo）。\n\nB. 第105条禁令\n\n即使在自动中止不适用的情况下——而本案起诉书主张自动中止适用——根据第105条(a)款，本法院仍有权中止可能阻碍正在进行的破产程序的诉讼。参见McHale v. Alvarez (In re 1031 Tax Grp., LLC)，397 B.R. 670, 684 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008)。在满足下列条件时，可作出第105条(a)款的禁令救济：(1) 有成功重组的可能性；(2) 在没有禁令的情况下破产财团将面临迫在眉睫的难以弥补的损害；(3) 损害利益权衡偏向动议方；以及 (4) 公共利益支持签发禁令。Calpine，365 B.R. 409页。\n\n除第(1)项和第(4)项外，所有这些因素均已在上述关于Jackson Dairy案的讨论中予以阐述。受托人的调查正在进行中，并且债权人可能会获得一定程度的受偿，尽管最终的分配比例尚不可知。该受偿极有可能至少大于假定的第7章破产清算中的受偿。公共利益支持签发临时限制令，因为正如《宪法》第一条第八款所规定的，公众在统一的联邦破产法以及对所有债权人的公平分配方面享有利益。如上所述，由于这些第11章案件与Assignment Proceedings（财产转让程序）之间破产程序可能出现分裂，此类分配目前正面临风险。因此，本法院认定第105条(a)款亦支持签发临时限制令，以在就初步禁令请求举行听证会前维持现状。\n\nV. 结论与命令\n\n因此，经审查临时限制令动议、起诉书及其所附证物、受托人宣誓书、Barron证明文件，以及这些第11章案件和本对抗性诉讼中的案卷记录，且基于上述理由，本法院签发单方临时限制令，以在就初步禁令请求举行听证会前维持现状。因此，特此\n\n裁定：在通过送达本人或其他方式收到本临时限制令的实际通知后，(i) 各被告；(ii) 各被告的管理人员、代理人、受雇人、雇员及律师；以及 (iii) 与各被告和/或各被告的管理人员、代理人、受雇人、雇员及律师积极协同或参与的任何人，包括但不限于G-News Operations, LLC（“G-News”）及Irene Feng女士，均被暂时限制并禁止提起或继续进行财产转让程序（或针对HCHK实体和/或其资产的任何其他司法、行政或\n\n其他诉讼或程序），包括与G-News订立的《临时管理协议》（“IMA”）；并且进一步\n\n裁定：在通过送达本人或其他方式收到本临时限制令的实际通知后，(i) 各被告；(ii) 各被告的管理人员、代理人、受雇人、雇员及律师；以及 (iii) 与各被告和/或各被告的管理人员、代理人、受雇人、雇员及律师积极协同或参与的任何人，包括但不限于GNews及Irene Feng，均被暂时限制并禁止转让或使用HCHK实体的资产（包括现金）（包括但不限于据称已转让给受让人被告和/或由受让人被告持有的此类资产，并包括但不限于根据IMA实施的对此类资产的任何转让或使用），或HCHK实体中的所有权权益，但经受托人或本法院授权或指示的除外；并且进一步\n\n裁定：在通过送达本人或其他方式收到本临时限制令的实际通知后，受让人被告应立即将本临时限制令的签发通知州法院；并且进一步\n\n裁定：根据本法院依据《联邦民事诉讼规则》第65条设定或免除需缴纳的任何保证金金额的自由裁量权，受托人无需缴纳保证金；并且进一步\n\n裁定：对临时限制令动议中关于请求初步禁令部分或对本裁定提出的任何异议或答复，应于2023年6月23日中午12:00（正午）或之前提交；并且进一步\n\n裁定：受托人与各被告应于2023年6月23日中午12:00（正午）或之前提交证人及证物名单；并且进一步\n\n裁定：受托人应于2023年6月24日中午12:00\n\n（正午）或之前提交任何答辩；并且进一步\n\n裁定：关于临时限制令动议中请求签发\n\n初步禁令部分的听证会，将于2023年6月26日上午10:00在United States Bankruptcy Court（美国破产法院）（地址：915 Lafayette Boulevard, Bridgeport, CT）开始举行；并且进一步\n\n裁定：本法院应保留对因本临时限制令的执行、解释和/或实施所引起的全部事项进行审理和决定的管辖权。\n\n于2023年6月12日下午2:15录入于康涅狄格州Bridgeport（布里奇波特）。\n\n日期：2023年6月12日于康涅狄格州布里奇波特。\n\n[_page_16_Picture_9.jpeg]","key_entities":["HCHK","Kwok","Ho Wan Kwok","Despins","CIPA","Guo","Je","GTV","Miles Guo","Saraca","GETTR","Paul Hastings"],"ecf_references":[{"doc_number":1,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":4,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":5,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":6,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":78,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":133,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":177,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":465,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":523,"court":"SDNY"},{"doc_number":1372,"court":"SDNY"}],"word_count":4775,"status":"published","published_at":null,"created_at":null,"updated_at":"2026-08-23 07:42:30"}