---
type: court_doc
id: "court_2cir_25-3046_dkt_41"
court: "2Cir"
case_no: "25-3046"
doc_number: 41
doc_type: "FORFEITURE"
filed_date: "2026-06-29"
lang: "zh"
url: "https://mubeitech.com/court/court_2cir_25-3046_dkt_41"
json_url: "https://mubeitech.com/api/court/court_2cir_25-3046_dkt_41"
---
# Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 1 of 37 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

**紧急动议 —— 美国诉 Ho Wan Kwok（郭文贵 / Guo Wengui / Miles Guo）案，2Cir 25-3046 ECF #41（2026-06-29立案）。利害关系第三方主张人 Jason Zen 自行提请动议，请求第二巡回上诉法院撤销地方法院作出的刑事判决，并对相关没收、赔偿及受害者分配程序申请紧急行政中止。动议主张地方法院在多项监督请愿未决的情况下强行推进判决，出具未经核实的8.89亿美元没收令（ECF #858），且违反了《联邦刑事诉讼规则》第32条的 mandatory 事实认定要求。**


> 原始法庭文件为英文；下方为英文全文，顶部为中文摘要。

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 1 of 37
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500
MOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT
Docket Number(s): Caption [use short title]
Motion for:
Set forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought:
MOVING PARTY: OPPOSING PARTY:
Plaintiff Defendant
Appellant/Petitioner Appellee/Respondent
MOVING ATTORNEY: OPPOSING ATTORNEY:
[name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail]
Court- Judge/ Agency appealed from:
Please check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND
INJUCTIONS PENDING APPEAL:
Has movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1):
Has this request for relief been made below? Yes No
Yes No (explain):
Has this relief been previously sought in this court? Yes No
Requested return date and explanation of emergency:
The District Court forced sentencing today (June 29), intentionally racing to
Opposing counsel’s position on motion:
moot this Court’s pending mandamus and stay review. The court issued an
Unopposed Opposed Don’t Know unverified $889M order (ECF 858), refused to rule on double-counting,
Does opposing counsel intend to file a response: denied 50 PSR objections, and suppressed 7 pending recusal motions.
Yes _No Don’t Know Without an immediate administrative stay, these structural Rule 32 and
process failures will permanently lock into final judgment. This will cause
immediate, irreversible harm to the statutory CVRA and § 853(n) rights of
thousands of victims before this Court can act.
Is the oral argument on motion requested? Yes No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted)
Has the appeal argument date been set? Yes No If yes, enter date:
Signature of Moving Attorney:
Date: Service : Electronic Other [Attach proof of service]
Form T-1080 (rev. 10-23)

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Docket No. 25-3046
In re JASON ZEN, Petitioner,
Related to S.D.N.Y. Criminal Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT
EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF
SENTENCE AND FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE
STAY PENDING APPELLATE REVIEW
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the inherent
supervisory powers of this Court, Petitioner Jason Zen, proceeding pro se
as an interested third-party claimant, respectfully and on an emergency
basis moves this Court to VACATE the judgment of sentence imposed by
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(S.D.N.Y.) on June 29, 2026, in United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, No.
1:23-cr-00118-AT, and for an IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY of all
related forfeiture, restitution, and victim-allocation proceedings pending
the final disposition of the extraordinary volume of active, unresolved
petitions before this Court.
INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF THE EMERGENCY
This motion presents a profound constitutional and procedural crisis
that demands immediate appellate correction. On the very day of
sentencing, June 29, 2026, the District Court executed a calculated "race
against the appellate clock," culminating in the issuance of an
extraordinary 17-page Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (POF) (ECF No.
858)(See Exhibit A) immediately followed by the entry of a final criminal
judgment.

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The District Court's actions constitute a direct, aggressive bypass of the
Second Circuit's active supervisory authority. At the exact moment the
District Court imposed sentence and finalized an staggering
$889,000,000 personal money judgment (ECF No. 858), it was fully
aware that this Court held active jurisdiction over:
1. 16 Mandamus Petitions arising directly from this underlying
matter;
2. 10 Emergency Stay Applications;
3. 9 Administrative Stay Applications; and
4. Multiple unresolved emergency motions for judicial recusal,
including Petitioner's multi-layered requests to both the Second
Circuit and the Southern District.
By forcing this case across the final threshold of criminal sentencing
while these extensive supervisory actions remained pending, the District
Court attempted to render this Court’s review completely academic by
presenting a fait accompli. To achieve this "racing," the District Court
systematically trampled upon the mandatory fact-finding frameworks of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 (Rule 32), leaving a massive $889
million deficit completely unverified and stripping thousands of
stakeholders of their statutory participation rights. To preserve the
integrity of the federal judiciary, this Court must immediately vacate the
judgment below.
I. THE DISTRICT COURT’S SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS OF FED. R. CRIM. P.
32 AS MANIFESTED IN ECF NO. 858
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 is a rigid, mandatory framework
designed to guarantee that no criminal sentence is predicated on
speculative or unverified factual records. The District Court’s June 29
Order (ECF No. 858) contains smoking-gun admissions of structural Rule
32 violations:

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A. The District Court’s Wholesale, Summary Rejection of 50 Material
Objections and Arbitrary Redefinition of Victim Loss Violates Rule
32(i)(3)(B)
During the sentencing hearing on June 29, 2026, the District Court’s
procedural shortcuts reached a crescendo of constitutional defiance.
Faced with fifty (50) distinct, material factual objections raised by the
defendant to the Presentence Report (PSR)—each capable of shifting
the Guidelines calculation—the District Court summarily stated: 'I deny
Mr. Kwok’s objections.' This wholesale dismissal, completely devoid of
itemized, on-the-record factual findings or explicit statements of
non-reliance, represents a textbook violation of the mandatory
commands of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). Furthermore, the District
Court explicitly declared from the bench: ' I do not consider whether a
person subjectively considers themselves a victim in order ot consider
theirs as loss. So the actual and intended loss both exceed $550 million.
Mr. Guo makes 50 other objections to the PSR. I reject Mr. Guo's
objections.'
http
This unilateral, paternalistic declaration is legally untenable. By flatly
refusing to consider the subjective status and evidence of the actual
capital providers—thousands of whom explicitly asserted they suffered
no loss—the District Court engineered a completely fabricated and
unverified $550 million loss threshold to drastically inflate the sentence.
To sentence a defendant by intentionally blinding the court to the direct
input of the purported victims violates the foundational core of both
Rule 32 verification and the CVRA, rendering the final sentence
structurally defective."
B. Blatant Violation of Rule 32(i)(3)(B): Explicit Discretionary Refusal to
Rule on Material Controverted Disputes

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Rule 32(i)(3)(B) dictates that for any disputed portion of the presentence
report or other controverted matter, the sentencing court must rule on
the dispute prior to sentencing. The District Court explicitly broke this
rule. In ECF No. 858, Page 6, Footnote 4, the District Court acknowledges
that the underlying inflows used to calculate the astronomical personal
liability are heavily contested due to the "possible double-counting of
inflows across various components of the G Enterprise." Yet, the
District Court summarily stated that because this structural objection
was not raised in a specific prior submission, "the Court will not address
this objection." A district court cannot use forfeiture technicalities to
escape the mandatory command of Rule 32(i)(3)(B). By leaving a
multi-hundred-million-dollar fund duplication dispute completely
unruled upon, the District Court sentenced the defendant based on a
structurally unreliable financial record.
C. Violation of Rule 32(i)(2): Arbitrary Denial of an Evidentiary Hearing
Faced with an Untraceable $889 Million Judgement
Rule 32(i)(2) guarantees the right to introduce evidence on contested
sentencing factors. In ECF No. 858, the District Court finalized a
$889,000,000 Personal Money Judgment against the defendant. Yet, the
face of the same order reveals that the Bankruptcy Trustee in parallel
proceedings has launched over 300 adversary proceedings and drained
massive professional fees over 3.5 years without ever locating or
securing these purported personal funds (ECF No. 858, Page 15). The
total absence of physical assets matching this $889 million figure proves
that the true routing, ownership, and allocation of these
investor-originated transfers remain highly disputed and opaque. To
issue an $889,000,000 judgment while simultaneously denying an
evidentiary hearing on June 25 (Doc. No. 855) is an arbitrary substitution
of administrative haste for the rigid fact-finding required by Rule
32(i)(2).

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D. Structural Violation of Rule 32(i)(1)(A): Stripping Third-Party Voice
via the Sudden Elimination of Restitution
In a sudden procedural maneuver at the tail-end of ECF No. 858 (Pages
16-17), the District Court completely abrogated its duty to enter a
Restitution Order, declaring it "impractical" due to the number of
victims and complexity, and instead authorized a unilateral government
"remission process." Restitution is the exact statutory anchor under the
Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) that grants third-party stakeholders a
mandatory right to comment on factual inaccuracies in the sentencing
record at the time of the hearing. By entirely wiping out restitution
hours before sentencing, the District Court successfully engineered an
absolute informational vacuum, preventing Petitioner and other
affected investors from exposing the flaws of the $889 million model
during the sentencing hearing, in direct violation of Rule 32(i)
verification mandates.
E. The Forced Appearance of a Medically Incapacitated Defendant
Under Extralegal Coercion Eviscerated the Right of Presence and
Allocution Under Rule 43 and Rule 32
The District Court’s rush to judgment on June 29, 2026, culminated in a
shocking, unprecedented violation of the physical integrity and
constitutional rights of the defendant. According to the defendant's
contemporaneous statement during the sentencing hearing and the
real-time, live-text transcription provided by Inner City Press
(http), the
defendant disclosed from the bench that prior to the hearing, he had
collapsed, vomited blood, and had been hospitalized. Rather than
granting a mandatory medical continuance, the state engineered a
highly coercive, irregular extraction: the defendant was forcibly removed
from the hospital, returned to MDC, and met by an unidentified civilian
female who sheared off his blood-stained clothing, wiped blood from his

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face, forced a change of attire, and unilaterally compelled his physical
presence in the courtroom.This shocking irregular procedure directly
violates multiple structural tenets of federal criminal law:
1. Violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3) (Right to be Present): Rule 43
requires the defendant’s meaningful, competent, and conscious
presence at sentencing. Mere physical placement of an
incapacitated, bleeding, and medically un-evaluated defendant in a
courtroom does not satisfy the constitutional definition of
"presence." Forcing a defendant to undergo sentencing immediately
following physical trauma and extralegal handling directly poisons
the competency of the entire proceeding.
2. Violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (The Right of Allocution):
The right of allocution requires the court to address the defendant
personally and determine if he wishes to make a statement under
conditions that allow for a free, rational, and uncoerced exercise of
judgment. A defendant who has just had his clothes cut off by a
mysterious operative and is actively recovering from physical
collapse cannot legally or psychologically exercise a fair right of
allocution.
3. Violation of Fifth Amendment Due Process: The introduction of an
unidentified, non-law-enforcement handler to physically alter a
defendant's medical and physical state in order to push him through
a sentencing sprint constitutes a profound breakdown of judicial
integrity. It transforms a federal sentencing into an unconstitutional
exercise of raw administrative force, necessitating that the final
judgment of sentence be immediately vacated.
Inner City Press's tweet history↓

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II. The District Court's Intentional Suppression and Total Silence
Regarding Pending Emergency Recusal Motions Establishes a Structural
Constitutional Defect
The District Court’s rush to impose sentence and finalize ECF No. 858 on
June 29, 2026, involved an even more alarming violation of
fundamental due process: the deliberate and systematic ignoring of
active, pending judicial disqualification motions. On Friday, June 26,
2026, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for Judicial Recusal pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 455 directly with the District Court, with copies properly
served upon defense counsel(See Exhibit B).In tandem, to my
knowledge, about six other similarly situated investors and victims filed

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identical emergency recusal applications and gave due notice to defense
counsel, presenting a collective and severe challenge to the District
Court’s appearance of impartiality under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Yet,
throughout the entire sentencing proceeding on June 29, 2026, the
District Court—as well as counsel—maintained an absolute, calculated
silence regarding these pending motions. Not a single mention was
made on the record, and no ruling was issued. A district court cannot
simply blindfold itself to a properly submitted disqualification motion in
order to complete a sentencing sprint. Under long-standing federal
jurisprudence, when a substantial challenge to a judge’s qualifications
is filed, the court must address and resolve that jurisdictional threshold
before finalizing a criminal judgment. By treating these multi-layered
recusal motions as non-existent, the District Court willfully acted without
a verified mandate of impartiality, transforming the entire sentencing
into an unconstitutional star-chamber exercise that must be
immediately vacated.
III.THE DISTRICT COURT’S "SENTENCING RACING" MANIFESTS AN
INTENTIONAL BYPASS OF THE CIRCUIT'S MANDAMUS JURISDICTION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must disqualify themselves if their
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The frantic timeline of June
29, 2026, shatters the appearance of judicial impartiality.
In ECF No. 858, Page 9, the District Court openly acknowledges that
6,512 members of the Himalaya Exchange and numerous third-party
petitioners have filed extensive objections to the undocketed and
unexamined nature of the records. However, the District Court
summarily brushed aside these 6,512 objectors, stating that their
statutory rights "shall be assessed through ancillary proceedings... after
sentencing." (ECF No. 858, Page 9).

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This is a direct insult to the Second Circuit's pending jurisdiction. The
core of Petitioner’s 16 active mandamus petitions currently before this
Court is precisely that third-party records are being improperly excluded
and suppressed prior to sentencing, transforming their statutory
participation rights into an unconstitutional afterthought. By rushing out
ECF No. 858 on the morning of June 29 and forcing the case into final
judgment, the District Court deliberately attempted to execute a
procedural "fait accompli" to strip this Court of its ability to exercise
meaningful, pre-judgment supervisory oversight over those 16 pending
petitions. Under § 455(a), this calculated effort to outrun the appellate
court is fundamentally disqualifying.
IV. ALLOWING THE SENTENCING JUDGMENT TO STAND CAUSES
IRREPARABLE SYSTEMIC HARM TO THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANTS
If this Court permits the District Court’s rushed judgment to stand
uncorrected, Petitioner and thousands of similarly situated third-party
investors will suffer immediate, irreversible injury:
1. Permanent Lock-In of a Deficient, Unreviewed $889 Million
Model: Post-sentencing, the unexamined $889,000,000 loss
framework is legally locked into the criminal judgment. The 16
pending pro se mandamus petitions designed to correct the
record pre-sentencing are instantly threatened with academic
obsolescence.
2. Permanent Castration of Statutory Participation Rights: By
forcing § 853(n) claimants and victims into post-sentencing
ancillary procedures, they are restricted to operating entirely
within the rigged confines of the District Court's unexamined,
double-counted sentencing findings. Assets will be distributed via
an unverified "remission process" without any judicial oversight,

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permanently extinguishing third-party property rights before this
Court can act.
CONCLUSION & RELIEF REQUESTED
The District Court’s defiance of Rule 32,its explicit refusal to resolve the
disputes regarding the records underlying the forfeiture funds, and its
strategic race to outrun 16 mandamus petitions require immediate
appellate correction. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court:
1. VACATE the judgment of sentence imposed on June 29, 2026, in
United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT, and remand
the case for comprehensive restructuring on a clean, complete,
and legally reliable record;
2. ENTER AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY of all related
forfeiture, restitution, victim-allocation, and ancillary proceedings
pending further order of this Court; and
3. DIRECT the District Court to conduct a comprehensive, mandatory
evidentiary hearing prior to any subsequent resentencing,
ensuring full transparency regarding the source, routing, and legal
ownership of the investor-originated transfers at issue.
Dated: June 29, 2026
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jason Zen
___________________________
Petitioner, pro se

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USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOC #: ______ ____________
DATE FILED: __6/29/2026__
-against-
MILES GUO, 23 Cr. 118-1 (AT)
Defendant. ORDER
ANALISA TORRES, District Judge:
Defendant, Miles Guo, objects to the preliminary order of forfeiture (“POF”) entered by
the Court on August 11, 2025. See Objs., ECF No. 799; POF, ECF No. 720; Gov’t Mot., ECF
No. 716; Resp., ECF No. 803; see also Reply, ECF No. 804. For the reasons stated below, the
Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Guo’s objections to the POF.
BACKGROUND
The Court presumes familiarity with the factual background of the case and recounts only
a summary of forfeiture-related proceedings and submissions here.
A. Jury Verdict
On July 16, 2024, a jury convicted Guo of nine counts of various financial crimes:
(1) one count of racketeering conspiracy (Count One of the third superseding indictment);
(2) one count each of conspiracy to commit wire fraud or bank fraud, money laundering, and
securities fraud (Counts Two, Three, and Four); (3) one count each of wire fraud and securities
fraud in connection with the Farm Loan Program (Counts Seven and Eight); (4) one count each
of wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with G|CLUBS (“G Clubs”) (Counts Nine and
Ten); (5) and one count of wire fraud in connection with the Himalaya Exchange (Count
Eleven). The jury acquitted Guo of one count each of wire and securities fraud in connection
with the GTV Private Placement and one count of committing an unlawful monetary transaction
(Counts Five, Six, and Twelve). See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 395; S3 Superseding Indictment,

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ECF No. 307. Each of these activities—the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, the Himalaya
Exchange, and the GTV Private Placement—were alleged to be components of the “G
Enterprise,” a series of investment schemes comprising the racketeering conspiracy detailed in
Count One. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 16–19.
B. Applicable Forfeiture Provisions
As a result of Guo’s convictions, he is subject to three distinct provisions of the United
States Code which call for forfeiture of certain assets to the Government:
1) 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), which requires a defendant to forfeit any property “constituting,
or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained . . . from racketeering
activity” (Count One);
2) 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “which
constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to” fraud or a conspiracy to commit
fraud (Counts Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven);1 and
3) 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “involved” in
money laundering, or “traceable to such property [involved in money laundering]”
(Count Three).
See id. ¶¶ 58–61.
C. Prior Submissions
On April 8, 2025, the Court appointed Guo’s present counsel and ordered the parties to
provide a joint letter stating the date when Guo would provide his position with respect to
forfeiture. See Apr. 8 Tr. at 10:14–23, ECF No. 684. The Court subsequently granted four
extensions, at the parties’ and at Guo’s request, for Guo to articulate his position on the forfeiture
of various assets. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 698, 704, 706, 708. Then, on June 27, 2025, Guo filed a
letter claiming that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding potential
1 The Indictment also cites 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) in this forfeiture allegation, which specifies further rules and
procedures related to forfeiture. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 59.
2

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forfeiture and remission of money and property seized by the Government.” ECF No. 710 at 1–
2. The letter stated Guo “[did] not waive any of [his] rights, including his appellate rights, in this
case.” Id. at 1. In response, the Government wrote that although “Guo is not consenting to a
preliminary order of forfeiture, the Court can enter a preliminary order of forfeiture that imposes
a money judgment and forfeits Guo’s personal interest in specific property.” ECF No. 713.
A month later, by motion dated July 28, 2025, the Government asked the Court to “enter
a preliminary order of forfeiture setting forth . . . [a] money judgment” in the amount of $1.3
billion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(2)(A); Gov’t Mot.2 The Government characterized the $1.3
billion as “the proceeds traceable to the commission” of the racketeering and fraud counts
(Counts One, Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven) and “the property involved”
in the money laundering offense (Count Three). See POF at 3. The Government argued that
$1.3 billion is a “conservative estimate of the . . . funds sent by individual victims to certain arms
of the G Enterprise,” which included the Farm Loan Program, GTV, G Clubs, and the Himalaya
Exchange. Gov’t Mot. at 3; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“If the government seeks a
personal money judgment, the court must determine the amount of money that the defendant will
be ordered to pay.”).
The Government also sought the forfeiture of certain property listed in the POF (the
“Listed Property”), Gov’t Mot. at 4; POF at 3–11: “cash seized from several bank
accounts . . . used in furtherance of [Guo’s] crimes and his racketeering enterprise,” which,
2 Courts may impose money judgments in cases where criminal forfeiture is required. Where a defendant’s assets or
identifiable property may not cover the full amount of the proceeds that a forfeiture statute requires the defendant to
forfeit, money judgments may be used to ensure that the defendant is held liable for the full amount of those
proceeds. See, e.g., United States v. Kenner, 443 F. Supp. 3d 354, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“If the defendant lacks the
assets to satisfy the order, the court can award the government a forfeiture money judgment.”); United States v.
Peters, 732 F.3d 93, 98–99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming entry of a money judgment in a case alleging forfeiture
under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)); United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming entry of a
money judgment in a case alleging forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 2461).
3

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according to the Government, represent “proceeds of the G Enterprise [(the racketeering
enterprise defined in Count One)] and property involved in money laundering” (Count Three).
Gov’t Mot. at 4–5. The Government categorized these bank accounts based on the date they
were seized by the Government and the names in which the accounts were held; each of the
account holders “was named in the [superseding] [i]ndictment as a member of the RICO
enterprise.” Id. at 4; see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 3(a). The Government attached several
seizure warrant affidavits related to these accounts. See Gov’t Mot. Exs. B–E, ECF Nos. 716-2
through 716-5; see also Proposed POF ¶¶ a–u, bb (listing bank accounts), ECF No. 716-1.
The Listed Property included a mansion located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road in Mahwah,
New Jersey, “its contents,” including, for example, an “Italian giltwood mirror with rococo crest
with cross-hatched panels,” and several other luxury items, such as a Bugatti, Lamborghini, and
Rolls-Royce. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7; see also Proposed POF ¶ aa (listing “personal property
seized by the Government from the [Mahwah] property”). The Government argued that the
Mahwah property, the personal property therein, and the luxury items were purchased with funds
traceable to G Clubs, the G Enterprise, or money laundering. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7.
Guo did not respond to the Government’s motion, and given that he had represented to
the Court that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding” forfeiture, on
August 11, 2025, the Court entered the POF. See POF. Nearly a month later, on September 4,
2025, Guo requested an opportunity “to address” “deficiencies” in the Government’s motion,
such as “whether certain property is forfeitable,” “the issue of offsets,” and “the accuracy of the
total amount the government seeks.” See ECF No. 724 at 1. By order dated January 8, 2026, the
Court directed Guo to file any objections and to specify “whether [Guo] claims a personal
4

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interest in any of” the Listed Property. ECF No. 784.3 Before the Court is Guo’s February 3,
2026 submission. See Objs.
LEGAL STANDARD
When the Government seeks forfeiture in the form of a money judgment, the Court “must
determine the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered to pay,” Fed. R. Crim. P.
32.2(b)(1)(A), using “evidence already in the record,” id. 32.2(b)(1)(B), including the trial
record. See United States v. Mathieu, 853 F. App’x 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2021). The calculation of
a forfeiture amount, however, “is not an exact science.” United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48
(2d Cir. 2011). As a result, the Court need only make a “reasonable estimate” based on
“available information” concerning the appropriate amount of forfeiture. Id.; see id. (noting,
additionally, that a court may “use general points of reference as a starting point” and “may
make reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the
evidence” in evaluating a proposed money judgment); see also United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d
176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009).
The Court must determine forfeiture—both the proper money judgment amount and
whether forfeiture applies to the Listed Property—by a preponderance of the evidence. United
States v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007).
DISCUSSION
Guo raises several objections to the POF: (1) the “scope” of his alleged fraud is
overbroad and includes those who were not victims of his crimes; (2) he “can only be ordered to
3 The Government argues that Guo has waived any challenges to the POF due largely to his statement in his June 27,
2025 letter that he was not taking a position as to forfeiture. See, e.g., Resp. at 3–4. The Court’s January 8 order did
not address waiver, and, because the Court largely concludes in this order that Guo’s challenges to the POF lack
merit and prefers to decide the issues on the merits, the Court expresses no view on whether Guo waived his
objections.
5

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forfeit assets that he personally obtained”; (3) forfeiture should not cover any alleged proceeds
from the GTV Private Placement because he was acquitted of two fraud counts related to GTV;
and (4) the money judgment should be offset by certain amounts. See Objs. at 3, 9, 11, 17.
The Court finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the
evidence that approximately $889 million is a reasonable estimate of the gross inflows of cash
into the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange—all either components of
the racketeering conspiracy of which Guo was convicted or enterprises which formed the basis of
his fraud convictions—and that $889 million is, therefore, the proper money judgment amount in
this case. See Gov’t Mot. at 3; GXZ26, ECF No. 803-1; Trial Tr. at 4330–32;4 Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(b)(1)(A).
A. Scope
The Court rejects Guo’s argument that the POF should not include property traceable to
“proceeds” from individuals who claim they “were not victimized” by his fraud. See Objs. at 3–
4, 5.
As an initial matter, Guo assumes that forfeiture distinguishes between “investors who
were defrauded, and those who insist they were not.” Objs. at 4. It does not. Forfeiture, in this
case, applies to proceeds “from racketeering activity,” proceeds from “fraud,” and property
“involved in” money laundering. See Resp. at 5 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 981(a)(1)(C), and
982(a)(2)). Contrary to Guo’s claims, the scope of his crimes of conviction is not defined by the
4 In his sentencing submission, Guo argues that exhibit GXZ26 does not account for the possible double-counting of
inflows across various components of the G Enterprise. See, e.g., ECF No. 822 at 41,53 (claiming that individuals
could use Himalaya Exchange funds to purchase a G Club membership); see also ECF No. 826 (correcting
sentencing submission). Guo does not cite any evidence showing that this occurred, or suggesting that the
Government’s inflow calculation in fact improperly included contributions made from Himalaya Exchange accounts
to G Clubs. Id. The Court, therefore, makes this determination on the evidence available in the record, which
demonstrates that the Government’s calculation is correct. And, in any event, this argument was not raised in Guo’s
objections to the forfeiture order. As such, the Court will not address this objection.
6

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“expectations and reliance” of individual victims on his statements. Cf. Objs. at 5 (claiming that
“individual investors’ expectations and reliance are critical to distinguishing between victims of
fraud and those who were not victimized”).
Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that “reliance is not an element of criminal fraud”
and that “the unreasonableness of a fraud victim in relying (or not) on a misrepresentation does
not bear on a defendant’s criminal intent.” United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir.
2017). In other words, even if an alleged “investor” in a fraudulent scheme disclaims that they
relied on the false statements which underpinned the fraud, a fraudulent scheme may nonetheless
exist, and all proceeds obtained from such a scheme would be subject to forfeiture. Relatedly, an
“investor[’s]” subjective views as to whether they are victims of the scheme have no bearing on
whether their contributions to the scheme are “proceeds” that a defendant has obtained from
fraud. All that matters is “materiality”—that the statements alleged to be fraudulent have the
“natural tendency to influence the decisionmakers to whom they were addressed.” Weaver, 860
F.3d at 96. And materiality is evaluated under an objective test, “rather than from the subjective
perspective of the victim.” United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017).
The Court’s conclusion is confirmed by the statutory definitions of the fraud crimes of
conviction. Wire fraud criminalizes the knowing participation in any “scheme or artifice to
defraud” and the transmittal by wire of certain communications for “the purpose of executing
such scheme or artifice [to defraud].” 18 U.S.C. § 1343; see July 9, 2024 Trial Tr. at 5791:25–
5794:6, ECF No. 450. As for securities fraud, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
rule violated in this case, see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 47, 51, prohibits using a
“scheme . . . to defraud,” “mak[ing] an untrue statement of material fact” or omitting a material
fact in certain circumstances, or “engaging in an act, practice, or course of business which
7

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operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)–(c)
(emphasis added). See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999) (observing that
Congress prohibited the “‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud,” in the fraud
statutes). In other words, the “scope” of Guo’s fraudulent schemes does not depend on whether
each individual making contributions to those schemes believed they were defrauded. Their
beliefs as to whether their individual “investments” had material value, or as to whether they in
fact relied on any material misrepresentations, do not affect whether those investments were
made in a fraudulent scheme.5
The cases cited by Guo, United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993), and
United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024), are inapposite. In Miller, the Second
Circuit held that the Government failed to prove that the defendants intended to deprive a victim
of a property interest on the facts shown at a trial for mail fraud because the property that the
defendants had allegedly diverted “to their own benefit” from the victims was not, in fact, “a
specific, identifiable property interest” belonging to the victims in the first place. Id. at 1017–
1021. Miller, in other words, turned ultimately on the scope of the alleged victims’ contractual
property interests, not on their expectations or beliefs, and, therefore, has no bearing here. See
id. Rainford vacated and remanded a forfeiture order where a district court based its order solely
on “the government’s word.” 110 F.4th at 489. Here, by contrast, there is ample evidence
supporting the POF filed in this case.
Guo further argues that there is “abundant proof that a considerable number of supposed
‘victims’ reject that classification.” Objs. at 6–7. He claims that “6,512 members of the
5 Guo does not argue otherwise—he neither discusses, nor even cites, the elements of his fraud convictions in the
portion of his submission making this argument. See Objs. at 4–9.
8

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Himalaya Exchange” (the enterprise for which Guo was convicted of wire fraud in Count
Eleven) “have objected to forfeiture of their accounts” and “express[] frustration at being labeled
as victims.” Id. at 6. These complaints, as well as those from the “Hamilton petitioners” and
various other third parties, do not affect this order, which addresses solely whether the properties
identified by the Government are, in fact, either proceeds of racketeering activity, proceeds of
fraud, or traceable to funds involved in money laundering, and whether the $1.3 billion money
judgment is a reasonable estimate of the value of Guo’s forfeiture obligations.6 Third-parties’
alleged claims to the property identified in the POF shall be assessed through ancillary
proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2.
B. Possession
Guo argues that he “can only be held liable to forfeit the value of tainted proceeds to the
extent that he at some point personally obtained them,” and that, for various reasons, there is
insufficient evidence that he “obtained” the property listed in the POF. Objs. at 10–11 (emphasis
in original).
Guo misunderstands the nature of forfeiture. For proceeds of a defendant’s crime to be
forfeitable, the property “need not be personally or directly in the possession of the defendant,
his assignees, or his co-conspirators.” United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). Instead, the property need only “have, at some point, been under the
defendant’s control.” Id. Further, property may be forfeited even when the defendant’s control
over the property is temporary. See United States v. Tanner, 942 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2019).
6 The Court acknowledges the voluminous petitions filed under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) seeking to assert a third-party’s
legal interest in property forfeited to the United States, and the Court expresses no opinion as to whether any
petitioner’s claim, properly made and submitted under § 853(n), is meritorious.
9

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At trial, the Government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo was the
“Boss” in control of all of the entities in the G Enterprise and those entities’ assets. Resp. at 7.7
For example, testimony from several witnesses shows that Guo exercised control over assets
involved in the G Enterprise: Karin Maistrello testified that Guo was in control of the Rule of
Law organizations’ funds, a scheme involved in the G Enterprise (see Trial Tr. at 424); multiple
witnesses testified that Guo had control over G Clubs (see Trial Tr. at 1941 (describing Guo as
the “top boss”), 1995:3–15, 1996:2–5 (clarification at sidebar), 1999:4–7, 2975:8–2976:10,
2980:11–22, 2999:20–3000:6 (testimony concerning G Clubs)); and abundant documentary
evidence supports the conclusion that Guo exercised control over the funds involved in his
crimes (see GXC415; Resp. at 7 n.3 (citing trial exhibits depicting Guo exercising control over
funds involved in the G Enterprise)).8
The documentary evidence introduced at trial, see, e.g., GXZ26 (showing cash flows
from certain G Enterprise bank accounts into other bank accounts which are listed in the POF),
also establishes that the particular accounts that the Government argues are subject to forfeiture
contain funds derived from proceeds of the G Enterprise and property involved in money
laundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Notably, Guo does not argue that the funds in these accounts hold
7 Additionally, under each statute serving as the basis for forfeiture in this case, the Court need only find that Guo
obtained the proceeds “directly or indirectly.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(3), 981(a)(2)(A), 982(a)(2).
8 Guo’s sole argument regarding the trial record is that one witness “testified that . . . Guo was not the ultimate
beneficial owner of G Clubs, nor was he the source of funds for G Clubs or G Fashion.” Objs. at 10–11. That
witness, James R. Collins Jr., was an employee at Mercantile Global Holdings, a company which owned a bank that
maintained client relationships with G Clubs, G Fashion, and the Himalaya Exchange. See Trial Tr. at 2753:8–
2756:15. But Collins only testified that Mercantile Bank believed that Guo was not the ultimate beneficial owner of
G Clubs and that G Clubs had represented as much to him. See Trial Tr. at 2758:23–2762:12. He did not testify as
to any personal knowledge of the inner workings of G Clubs, or whether Guo, in fact, exercised control over G
Clubs funds. The Court, therefore, accords Collins’ testimony minimal weight. Guo also attempts to incorporate by
reference arguments made by third parties who have filed ancillary claims to assets subject to forfeiture under 21
U.S.C. § 853(n). See Objs. at 11. The Court will consider those arguments as part of the ancillary proceedings that
shall be conducted after sentencing pursuant to §853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. The Court
expresses no opinion as to whether any third party has a superior legal interest in any forfeited property.
10

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money which is not derived from entities involved in the G Enterprise. See POF ¶¶ a–z, bb;
Objs. at 9–11 (instead arguing solely that he did not personally obtain or exercise control over
these funds).
Guo relies in substantial part on Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017), to
support his argument that he cannot be ordered to “forfeit assets that he [did not] personally
obtain[].” Obj. at 9. In that case, the Supreme Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 853, which requires
forfeiture of any property derived from proceeds of certain drug crimes, does not automatically
impose joint and several liability on all convicted parties of a conspiracy. See 581 U.S. at 443.
In Honeycutt, the government sought a money judgment against a defendant, arguing that
he was liable for the entirety of a conspiracy’s profits, even though the defendant was merely a
salaried employee who had assisted his store’s participation in a drug crime, and never benefited
from, let alone exercised control over, the extent of the store’s tainted profits. See id. at 445–47.
Here, however, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo benefitted from and
exercised control over the funds that the Government maintains are subject to forfeiture. See,
e.g., Resp. at 7–8 n.3 (citing trial evidence noting, for example, that Guo directed his co-
conspirators to use “G-Club or another private company” to finance the purchase of an expensive
coffee table). Indeed, since Honeycutt, the Second Circuit has reiterated that the Government
need not show that a defendant personally retained or directly possessed property for forfeiture to
apply. See, e.g., Rajaratnam v. United States, 736 F. App’x 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding
that a forfeiture order could be imposed against a defendant for funds over which the defendant
only had temporary authority and which had subsequently been disbursed).
The Court, therefore, finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of
the evidence that the Listed Property is subject to forfeiture.
11

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C. GTV Private Placement and SEC Disgorgement
Guo argues that funds derived from the GTV Private Placement should not be included in
the forfeiture order and that the money judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount
of funds the Government alleges were involved in GTV. See Objs. at 17.9 Guo contends that
because he was acquitted of wire and securities fraud in connection with the GTV Private
Placement, $411 million in funds derived from the GTV Private Placement that the Government
seeks to forfeit should be excluded from the order. Id. at 11–12; Resp. at 8.
The Court need not resolve this in light of another issue raised by the parties: whether the
money judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount already recovered by the SEC in
administrative proceedings. See SEC Order, ECF No. 799-2. Guo states that GTV has already
disgorged in excess of $411 million as part of an administrative proceeding initiated by the SEC.
See Objs. at 17–18. The Government concedes this, in part, stating that “[t]he actual funds
derived from the GTV [P]rivate [P]lacement were recovered by the SEC, which established a fair
fund for distribution to victims,” and that “[i]f the Court were to deduct the GTV [P]rivate
[P]lacement funds from the forfeiture amount, approximately $411 million would be deducted.”
Mot. at 4 n.2.
However, the parties’ figures diverge. Guo argues that GTV, along with Saraca Media
Group, Inc. and Voice of Guo Media, Inc., has disgorged over $486 million to the SEC and that
the full $486 million should be deducted from the money judgment because it relates to conduct
charged in this case. See Objs. at 18. The Government, however, contends that only $411
9 Guo does not claim that a specific bank account, or item of personal property, solely constitutes proceeds from the
GTV Private Placement, see generally Objs. The Government maintains that all of the relevant funds are proceeds
of the G Enterprise and property involved in money laundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Guo does not argue that any of
the Listed Property should be excluded from forfeiture on this basis, and the Court, therefore, only examines how
the disgorgement affects the money judgment.
12

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million of the $1.3 billion figure derives from the GTV Private Placement and that the remaining
$889 million derives from proceeds traceable to the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, or the
Himalaya Exchange. See GXZ26. The fact that GTV and other entities disgorged $75 million
more than $411 million is relevant to the money judgment only if the excess $75 million is
traceable to proceeds from the fraudulent schemes involved in this case, namely, the Farm Loan
Program, G Clubs, or the Himalaya Exchange.
The Court rejects Guo’s arguments that the purported $75 million disgorged in excess of
$411 million is traceable to his crimes of conviction. First, he claims that $34 million of the total
disgorged funds relate to sales of “G-Coins and G-Dollars,” early precursors to the Himalaya
Exchange. See Objs. at 17–18. However, the sale of G-Coin and G-Dollars from April to June
of 2020 is not covered by the Indictment, which targets the Himalaya Exchange enterprise
transactions that took place from 2021 to 2023. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 53.
Moreover, Guo provides no evidence that the $115 million in disgorged funds
attributable to Voice of Guo Media, Inc. (“VOG”) “overlaps with the so-called Farm Loan
Program.” Objs. at 17–18. The SEC Order reports that VOG pooled funds from “prospective
investors” who wanted to invest less than $100,000 in GTV. See Objs. at 17–18; SEC Order
¶¶ 15–21, ECF No. 799-2. The Indictment’s description of the Farm Loan Program, however,
differs substantially from the SEC Order’s description of VOG’s fundraising efforts. Compare,
e.g., S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 17 (describing “The Himalaya Farm Alliance” as “a collective
of informal groups (each known as a ‘Farm’) located in various cities around the world” which
obtained investments “in the form of ‘loans’ to a Farm” and “promising that such loans would be
convertible into GTV common stock” via a “Loan Agreement”) with SEC Order ¶¶ 16–18
(describing how VOG would provide an investor a one-page “Limited Purpose Agency
13

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Agreement,” stating that, for minimal consideration, a representative of VOG would act as an
“agent” for investors and purchase GTV stock on their behalf).
Although Guo is correct that the SEC obtained $75 million more than $411 million from
GTV and related companies, he has not shown that this surplus coincides with any of the
proceeds that the Government has demonstrated are related to Guo’s crimes of conviction—that
is, the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange.
The Court concludes, therefore, that only $411 million may be deducted from the
proposed money judgment, because the record reflects—and the Government does not contest—
that $411 million in funds traceable to the GTV Private Placement has already been disgorged by
entities related to the G Enterprise in separate proceedings prior to the commencement of this
criminal case. This deduction does not affect the forfeiture of any of the Listed Property.
D. Offsets
Guo argues that the money judgment should be “already offset by the more than
$1 billion already in the Government’s possession in connection with this case” and by the
“funds and assets in the Bankruptcy Trustee’s possession that are among the items the
Government deems forfeitable in this case.” Objs. at 18–20. In response, the Government notes
that the value of property “forfeited to the United States under a Final Order of Forfeiture” will,
indeed “be applied towards the satisfaction of the [m]oney [j]udgment” once all third-party
interests are adjudicated, and that there is no authority to order an offset for any assets not
14

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covered by the POF. See Resp. at 10 & n.7; POF ¶ 7.10 Accordingly, the Court will not deduct
the value of any of the Listed Property from the money judgment at this time.11
E. Ancillary Matters
Guo also seeks an order directing the Government to take possession of certain assets (the
“bankruptcy assets”) from the Chapter 11 Trustee of Guo’s estate in bankruptcy proceedings,
which were commenced on February 15, 2022, in the District of Connecticut. See Seizure Mot.,
ECF No. 724, at 1; see generally In re Kwok, No. 22 Bk. 50073 (D. Conn. Bankr. February 15,
2022); In re Kwok, 172 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2026). Guo argues that the Government’s interest in
the forfeited assets is “superior to that of any creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding,” Seizure
Mot. at 5, that ordering the Government to seize the bankruptcy assets will both “make them
available to investors in the various entities involved in this case, and for whom restitution will
be ordered” and “halt the accumulation of considerable fees and expenses incurred by the
Trustee” in the bankruptcy proceeding. See id. at 5–7.
The Court does not have the power to grant the relief Guo requests.12 Guo merely cites
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(3) for the proposition that the Court “may include
. . . conditions reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal” in a
preliminary order of forfeiture. See Seizure Reply at 4, ECF No. 754. Rule 32.2(b)(3) limits the
10 Guo also argues that if the Court finds, in ancillary proceedings, that any property belongs to a third party, the
value of that property should be deducted from the money judgment. Objs. at 18. Not so. Third-party forfeiture
proceedings are designed to determine if a third party possesses a superior legal interest in the property subject to
forfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6); Gov’t Forfeiture Ltr. at 1–2, ECF No. 785. That is a separate question from
whether the assets are forfeitable. Property may well have come under Guo’s control due to, for example, fraud,
even though a third party possessed a superior legal interest in that property. Therefore, if the Court finds that any
property belongs to a third party under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), it will not deduct the value of that property from the
money judgment.
11 The Court denies Guo’s request to reduce the money judgment “to the extent the Government has declined to
pursue other potentially forfeitable assets in this case,” and to reduce the money judgment by the amount forfeited
by Haithem Khaled. See Objs. at 19–21. Guo offers no legal basis for either of these requests.
12 The Court expresses no opinion on the Government’s argument that Guo lacks standing on this issue.
15

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Court’s authority to conditions required to preserve the property’s value on “appeal,” rather than
conditions required to preserve value pending related, separate proceedings—like the bankruptcy
proceeding here.
Furthermore, several other procedural features of the forfeiture rules indicate that such an
order would exceed the Court’s power. For example, Rule 32.2(b)(3) “authorizes” the
Government “to seize the specific property subject to forfeiture” upon entry of a preliminary
order but does not require that the Government do so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3). Nor does
Rule 32.2 state when, or how, the Government may seize property listed in a forfeiture order
once it is authorized to do so under Rule 32.2(b)(3). Likewise, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) and (f)
empower the Court to take certain protective measures concerning assets potentially subject to
forfeiture, but do not authorize the Court to compel the Government to enact a seizure. See
Resp. at 4.
Moreover, Guo’s request lacks merit. Guo argues that the Court may impose conditions
“reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal,” Seizure Reply at 4,
but nothing in Rule 32.2 requires the Court to do so. Although the Court acknowledges that the
Chapter 11 Estate in the bankruptcy proceeding has incurred fees owed to the Trustee and
various other professionals, see Seizure Mot. at 7, such fees are not unusual given the remarkable
complexity of that proceeding. See id. (claiming that 300 adversary proceedings have been filed
in the bankruptcy proceeding).
F. Restitution
The Government requests that the Court find that imposing a restitution order would be
impracticable and authorize a remission process. See Gov’t Ltr. at 4–5, ECF No. 785; ECF
No. 784 (January 8, 2026 order). Guo agrees. ECF No. 789 at 3. The Court agrees and finds,
16

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based on the extensive record in this case, that given the “complexity of the case and the number
of victims involved,” awarding restitution to victims in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3663A
would be impractical and would complicate or prolong the sentencing process. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(c)(3)(A)–(B).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Government has demonstrated
that forfeiture applies to the Listed Property due to Guo’s convictions for racketeering
conspiracy, wire and securities fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Court
SUSTAINS Guo’s objections to the extent that the Court shall deduct $411 million from the $1.3
billion proposed money judgment, such that the money judgment in the final order of forfeiture
shall be $889 million.
The Court DENIES Guo’s motion at ECF No. 724 seeking an order compelling the
Government to seize assets in the bankruptcy proceedings. The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 724.
Finally, the Court finds that restitution is impracticable in this case and authorizes the
Government to compensate victims through a remission process.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 29, 2026
New York, New York
17

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Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 30 of 37
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
United States of America,
v.
Ho Wan Kwok, a/k/a Miles Guo, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF THE HONORABLE ANALISA TORRES
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Must Be Resolved Prior to June 29,2026
Sentencing)
petitioner Jason Zen, appearing pro se as a third-party claimant under 21 U.S.C. §
853(n) and as an affected person who has repeatedly attempted to participate
through submissions to this Court, respectfully moves for recusal of the presiding
judge from further proceedings in this matter. This motion is filed on an emergency
basis because sentencing is scheduled for June 29, 2026, and the appearance-of-
impartiality issue should be resolved before the Court proceeds further on a record
already marked by unresolved docketing disputes, privacy breaches, and pending
appellate supervision.
This motion does not ask the Court to concede the merits of every accusation
raised by Movant or by other participants. It asks only whether, from the
standpoint of an objective observer fully informed of the procedural history, the
Court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned after months of selective non-
docketing of pro se submissions, public exposure of protected personal information
despite requests for sealing or redaction, continued inaction after documented

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allegations of record contamination and Brady-related concerns, and the decision
to press ahead with sentencing while related appellate proceedings remain active.
I. Governing standard
Section 455(a) requires a federal judge to disqualify herself in any proceeding in
which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The test is objective and
turns not on the judge's subjective intent, but on whether a reasonable observer
aware of the relevant facts would harbor substantial doubt about neutrality.
That standard is concerned not only with actual bias but also with the appearance
created by a pattern of procedural choices. Where repeated acts affecting one
class of participants, one side of the record, or one set of safety interests
accumulate into a coherent appearance of partiality, recusal is required to preserve
public confidence in the integrity of the proceedings.
II. Systematic Exclusion of Pro Se Third-Party Submissions
Movant and other pro se third parties have submitted multiple filings under 21
U.S.C. § 853(n), the CVRA, and related procedural theories concerning forfeiture,
victim identification, loss calculations, and record completeness. These filings were
sent to the Court and served on the Government and defense counsel, yet most
were not placed on the docket. By contrast, attorney-filed submissions addressing
similar issues were routinely docketed and considered. This pattern has produced
16 pending mandamus petitions in the Second Circuit, all arising from the same
pattern of selective non-docketing, and has created a record in which only one side
of the record is permitted to mature into an adjudicable form.
III. The Court's handling of personal identifying information creates a serious
appearance of retaliatory or arbitrary treatment

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Movant previously asked that personal identity information and investment details
be filed under seal because public disclosure could create safety risks, including
risks associated with the Chinese Communist Party and with public exposure of a
mainland Chinese investor's identity and financial data. That request was explicit
and tied to Rule 49.1-style privacy concerns and the Court's inherent authority to
protect sensitive information.
In Movant's supplemental mandamus filing, Movant described that the Southern
District uploaded his Second Circuit mandamus filing to the district-court docket as
Dkt. 770 and, in doing so, publicly disclosed personal identifying information
despite an accompanying request for redaction or sealing. The same filing also
described comparable treatment of other pro se petitioners, including public
exposure of unredacted information in Dkts. 732 and 765.
Whether or not each disclosure was intentional in a subjective sense, the
appearance is deeply troubling. An objective observer could reasonably question
neutrality when a court that receives explicit privacy requests from unrepresented
petitioners nonetheless places sensitive identifying information into the public
record, especially where those petitioners have simultaneously been seeking
appellate review of the court's docketing practices.
IV. Movant previously raised Brady-related and record-contamination concerns
that were never meaningfully addressed on the district-court docket
Movant's earlier submissions, later reproduced in the renewed mandamus
appendix, stated that on August 13, 2025 Movant sent prosecutors materials
identified as potentially favorable to the defense and requested disclosure under
Brady and Giglio, then followed up with defense counsel on August 29, 2025 after
receiving no acknowledgment. Those materials included concerns about selective
use of livestream statements, contacts between Trustee Luc Despins and the U.S.

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Attorney's Office, the role of attorney Geyer in presenting large claimant groups,
and the possibility that centrally organized claims had distorted the victim picture
placed before the Court.
Movant also filed a motion seeking intervention for the limited purpose of formally
recording the submission of Brady-related material and asking the Court to require
confirmation of disclosure. According to the renewed mandamus record, that
motion likewise was not ordinarily docketed and therefore did not receive the sort
of transparent judicial handling that would reassure an outside observer that
adverse or inconvenient information had been considered in a neutral manner.
The point here is not that this Court was required to adopt Movant's view of the
evidence. The point is that the combination of non-docketing and silence on
submissions challenging the completeness of the Government's narrative can
create a reasonable appearance that only one side of the procedural record is
permitted to mature into an adjudicable form.
V.This Court's decision to press ahead with sentencing despite active Second
Circuit supervision further undermines the appearance of impartiality
The present recusal issue cannot be evaluated in isolation from the parallel
appellate proceedings already underway in the Second Circuit. This criminal case
has generated an extraordinary volume of mandamus petitions, emergency stay
requests, and related supervisory filings arising from the District Court's handling of
pro se submissions, privacy issues, third-party participation, and unresolved
procedural disputes.
One set of related proceedings included No. 25-3046, in which the Second Circuit,
on May 15, 2026, denied prior mandamus relief without prejudice and expressly
permitted renewal if the District Court failed to docket the relevant submissions
within a reasonable time. The renewed petition has since been filed because the

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District Court still did not docket the previously submitted materials even after that
order and the passage of additional time.
At the same time, other petitioners in related proceedings have sought emergency
relief from the Court of Appeals on overlapping grounds, including nondocketing,
privacy violations, improper handling of victim and third-party submissions,
requests for stays, and requests that the presiding judge be removed or recused.
The significance of that procedural landscape is not merely quantitative. It means
that the conduct of this Court is already the subject of ongoing supervisory
attention by the Court of Appeals in multiple pending matters.
Despite that posture, this Court denied adjournment and announced on June 25,
2026 that sentencing would proceed on June 29, 2026. In the same order, the
Court stated that it could make the factual findings necessary for sentencing
without an evidentiary hearing, that Brady and Rule 17(c) disputes did not justify
delay, and that resolution of third-party petitions under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and the
special-master issue was not required before sentencing
That sequence matters. When a district court knows that the Court of Appeals is
already reviewing, or being asked to review, whether pro se filings were improperly
excluded from the record, whether third-party participation has been mishandled,
whether emergency stays are needed, and whether reassignment or recusal is
warranted, yet nevertheless accelerates the case toward sentencing before those
supervisory proceedings can run their course, a reasonable observer may conclude
that the court is attempting to move the case past a critical threshold before
effective appellate review can occur.
This is especially so here because some of the emergency filings in the Court of
Appeals have expressly raised judicial-removal or recusal concerns, and others seek
to prevent sentencing from going forward before unresolved procedural defects

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are addressed. Proceeding to sentencing in the face of that appellate posture does
not merely create tension with ordinary case management. It creates the
appearance that the District Court is disregarding the practical significance of the
appellate court's ongoing supervisory role.
An objective observer could therefore reasonably see the June 25 order not as a
neutral scheduling determination, but as part of a broader procedural pattern: pro
se filings are not timely docketed; related participation and record-integrity issues
remain unresolved; multiple appellate proceedings remain active; some of those
proceedings explicitly seek recusal or removal; yet sentencing is pressed forward
anyway before those matters can be meaningfully sorted out.
Under § 455(a), that appearance is itself disqualifying. The issue is not whether
every pending appellate filing will ultimately succeed. The issue is whether a
reasonable person, fully informed of the surrounding circumstances, would
question the impartiality of a court that continues toward final sentencing while
higher-court supervision over its own procedural conduct remains actively pending.
On the present record, the answer is yes.
VI. Recusal is required to preserve confidence in any further proceedings
This motion does not rest on disagreement with a single ruling. It rests on the
cumulative appearance produced by repeated exclusion of pro se third-party filings
from the ordinary docket, public handling of sensitive identifying information
despite sealing requests, the absence of meaningful district-court engagement with
Brady-related and record-integrity concerns raised by Movant, and the decision to
proceed toward sentencing while the Second Circuit is still supervising related
docketing disputes in No. 25-3046.Even if each event might be defended in
isolation, the issue under § 455(a) is the appearance seen by a reasonable observer

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who views the record as a whole. On that record, substantial doubt about
impartiality is no longer speculative.
Relief requested
Movant respectfully requests that the Court:
1. Recuse ANALISA TORRES from further proceedings in this matter pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 455(a);
2. If the Court declines to recuse, issue a prompt written order stating the
grounds for denial before sentencing proceeds, so that the issue is preserved
for immediate review;
3. Direct the Clerk to ensure that all previously submitted pro se filings identified
in Movant's mandamus materials are preserved and appropriately handled as
part of the record;
4. Grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper.
Respectfully submitted,
Jason Zen
Petitioner,pro se
6.27.2026

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Certificate of Service
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Case No: 25-3046
SDNY Case: United States v. Kwok, et al., 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT)
I, Jason Zen, hereby certify as follows:
On July 1, 2026, I mailed the true and correct copy of the following
documents:
1. EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE
AND FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY PENDING
APPELLATE REVIEW
2. SDNY Dkt.858
3. EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF THE HONORABLE ANALISA
TORRES Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Must Be Resolved Prior to
June 29,2026 Sentencing)
To
Juliana Murray
Direct: 212-637-2203
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York One
Saint Andrew's Plaza Room 739 New York, NY 10007
Justin Horton
Direct: 212-637-2200
DOJ-USAO Southern District of New York One St. Andrews Plaza New
York, NY 10007
Nathan Rehn
Direct: 212-637-2354
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York 26
Federal Plaza 37th Floor New York, NY 10278
Respectfully submitted,
Jason Zen
_____________________