郭文贵破产案 · TRANSCRIPT · ECF #1249

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT BRIDGEPORT DIVISION In Re \* Case No. 22-50073 (JAM) \* HO WAN KWOK, \* Bridgeport, Connecticut \* September 12, 2022 Debtor. \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* \* TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION FOR ODER BEFORE THE HONORABLE JULIE A. MANNING UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE APPEARANCES: For the Debtor: AARON ROMNEY, ESQ. Zeisler & Zeisler, P.C. 10 Middle Street, 15th Floor Bridgeport, CT 06604 For the Creditor, Pacific PETER FRIEDMAN, ESQ. Alliance Asia Opportunity O'Melveny & Myers LLP Fund L.P.: Times Square Tower 7 Times Square New York, NY 10036 ANNECCA SMITH, ESQ. Robinson & Cole 28 Trumbull Street Hartford, CT 06103 For the Chapter 11 Trustee: NICHOLAS A. BASSETT, ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service. **Fiore Reporting and Transcription Service, Inc. 4 Research Drive, Suite 402 Shelton, Connecticut 06484 (203)929-9992**

APPEARANCES Cont'd: For the Chapter 11 PATRICK R. LINSEY, ESQ. Trustee: Neubert Pepe & Monteith, PC 195 Church Street New Haven, CT 06510 Chapter 11 Trustee: LUC A. DESPINS, ESQ. Paul Hastings LLP 200 Park Avenue New York, NY 10166 For the Creditors Committee: IRVE GOLDMAN, ESQ. Pullman & Comley 850 Main Street Bridgeport, CT 06601 For the U.S. Trustee: HOLLEY L. CLAIBORN, ESQ. Office of the United States Trustee The Giaimo Federal Building 150 Court Street, Room 302 New Haven, CT 06510 For the Creditor, JAY MARSHALL WOLMAN, ESQ. Logan Cheng: Randazza Legal Group, PLLC 100 Pearl Street, 14th Floor Hartford, CT 06103

(Proceedings commenced at 2:16 p.m.) THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Case Number 22-50073, Ho Wan Kwok. THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon. If we could have appearances for the record, starting with the Chapter 11 Trustee, please? MR. DESPINS: Good morning, Your Honor. Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. BASSETT: Good after -- sorry. Good afternoon, Your Honor. Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings on behalf of the Chapter 11 Trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. LINSEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Patrick Linsey, local counsel of the trustee. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. FRIEDMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. It's Peter Friedman of O'Melveny and Myers on behalf of PAX. THE COURT: Good afternoon. MR. ROMNEY: Good afternoon -- is someone else speaking? MS. SMITH: This is Annecca smith of Robinson and Cole, also Connecticut counsel on behalf of PAX. THE COURT: Good afternoon. Mr. Romney? MR. ROMNEY: Good afternoon, Aaron Romney, Zeisler

| | 4 | |----|-----------------------------------------------------------| | 1 | and Zeisler in behalf of the debtor. | | 2 | THE COURT:<br>Good afternoon.<br>Mr. Goldman. | | 3 | MR. GOLDMAN:<br>Good afternoon, Your Honor.<br>Irve | | 4 | Goldman, Pullman and Comley for the Creditor's Committee. | | 5 | THE COURT:<br>Attorney Claiborn. | | 6 | MS. CLAIBORN:<br>Good afternoon, Your Honor.<br>Holley | | 7 | Claiborn for the U.S. Trustee. | | 8 | THE COURT:<br>Good afternoon.<br>And, Mr. Wolman. | | 9 | MR. WOLMAN:<br>Good afternoon, Your Honor.<br>Jay | | 10 | Wolman of Randazza Legal Group for creditor, Logan Cheng. | | 11 | THE COURT:<br>Good afternoon. | | 12 | I think we've taken everyone's appearances at this | | 13 | point then, so we'll proceed. | | 14 | MR. BALDIGA:<br>Your Honor, William Baldiga, Brown | | 15 | Rudnick. | | 16 | THE COURT:<br>Oh, I'm sorry.<br>I didn't see you | | 17 | anywhere. | | 18 | MR. BALDIGA:<br>Not a problem. | | 19 | THE COURT:<br>Do you -- I don't see Mr. Baldiga. | | 20 | THE COURTROOM DEPUTY:<br>He must be on his phone. | | 21 | THE COURT:<br>Okay. | | 22 | THE COURTROOM DEPUTY:<br>He's on the phone. | | 23 | THE COURT:<br>Oh, okay.<br>You're participating by | | 24 | phone, Mr. Baldiga. | | 25 | MR. BALDIGA:<br>Yes. | | | |

THE COURT: Okay. Sorry. That's why I didn't see you. In any event, good afternoon.

So today, our hearing today is the continued hearing on the motion for an order providing that control of the privilege is passed to the trustee upon appointment and related relief. We've had two hearings on the trustee's motion, August 30 and September 6th.

When we were here last, the Chapter 11 trustee and the debtor's counsel had submitted revised proposed orders with regard to the motion that the trustee had filed, providing that control of the privileges had passed to him. We had some discussions about those proposed orders during our last hearing. Those proposed orders were filed shortly before the hearing on September 6th, which is what I asked for, but I did not have an opportunity to fully review them before our continued hearing on September 6th.

I know the parties then submitted orders on September 7th, which essentially showed -- well, I should say the trustee submitted a supplemental exhibit showing the differences between the trustee's proposed order and the debtor's proposed order, and that was at ECF 835, and then the debtor proposed a summary of disputed issues in a list form at ECF Number 836.

Have the parties had any further discussions regarding the trustee's motion for order providing that

control of privileges passed to the trustee upon appointment? MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. Luc Despins, Chapter 11 Trustee. I also wanted to make sure Your Honor had a chance to look at something we filed Friday afternoon, which is Docket Number 846, which is -- which added two provisions that we believe should address the debtor's issues, but -- and there's been a lot of back and forth since then as late as this morning, and what I think would make sense at this point would be for Mr. Bassett to take the Court through what these two provisions that were added on Friday, what they do, what they're supposed to address, and then see -- take the Court through what issues we believe have been resolved, and because I believe some have been resolved, not all unfortunately, but some have been resolved, to save the Court some time. So I would -- with Your Honor's permission, I would turn it over to Mr. Bassett to take Your Honor through this. THE COURT: That's fine. Thank you. Mr. Bassett. MR. BASSETT: Yeah. THE COURT: I'm now looking at 846. Do you want me to be looking at 846? MR. BASSETT: Yes, Your Honor. And again, for the

record, Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings on behalf of the trustee. I think Your Honor -- THE COURT: Why don't we pull up -- why don't we pull up 846 so everyone's looking at the same document at the same time? Okay? MR. BASSETT: Sure. And then, Your Honor -- oh, I apologize. THE COURT: Go right ahead. MR. BASSETT: I was just going to say that I would suggest going to Page 13 of 19 of the PDF, which would be Exhibit B to what we filed, because that contains the redline that I think will be easiest for us to use. THE COURT: 13 of 19? MR. BASSETT: That's correct, Your Honor. It should say Exhibit B on it. THE COURT: I see. MR. BASSETT: And then if you go to the next page, it will be the first page of the redline. THE COURT: I see. Thank you. So then we'll turn to Page 14 of 19 right now. Okay. MR. BASSETT: Perfect. THE COURT: Go right ahead. MR. BASSETT: So, Your Honor -- thank you, Your Honor. And before I dive in and walk Your Honor through

the changes, just a bit of further context. So after the hearing that we had last week, we sat down internally and sort of thought over what we had heard from the debtor at that hearing, and also the comments and the discussion that occurred with the Court. So over a couple of days after the hearing last week, we endeavored to put together this revised proposed order that in our mind was specifically designed to address what we understood to be really the key concerns that the debtor had referenced, and this was our attempt to really kind of bridge the gap and specifically to address some of the concerns that had been raised regarding the sort of balancing test that we've been discussing and some of the specific issues regarding waiver and otherwise that had come up in the discussions with the Court. Now the last point on process I'll just raise is that we had sent this revised proposed order, or actually a version slightly different from it, but that contained most of these changes, on Thursday evening. We were hoping to discuss that on Friday. We didn't have the opportunity to discuss it with the debtor's counsel on Friday, so we went ahead and submitted our revised proposed order, which is what we're looking at here at Docket 846. But the Court on Friday -- because we wanted to

make sure that Your Honor had some time with it had you been able to take a look at it between then and now, that said, we also had continued to have a discussion with counsel for the debtor. Attorney Romney and I had a call yesterday, and then we received a markup containing additional comments from them this morning, which I think he -- I will let him explain it to you, but I think it goes to further evolve some of our issues. But before going to that, I think it would be helpful for me to just walk you through, Your Honor, the key changes that we've made. I think we could go ahead and scroll down. There are no material changes until we get to Paragraph 7. Paragraph 2, there's just a definitional clarification that is not material on -- when we get to Paragraph 7, which is on Page 17 of 19 of the PDF, this is our first major change that we included, again, to address some of the issues that were raised. Now specifically what this would do is -- although the earlier paragraphs of the order remain the same in terms of defining the scope of the trustee privileges that have passed to the trustee and that those paragraphs make clear, that privileges related to assets of the estate to the debtor's financial condition and liabilities, and to post

petition -- the post-petition administration of the estate, of the sort of default rule if you will, is that those privileges would pass to the debtor, or to the trustee, rather, and I think that, you know, gives us the clarification that we are seeking and will really help inform the path forward as to what may or may not be withheld by the debtor in discovery. But what Paragraph 7 does, is it addresses specifically the concern that the debtor had raised that,

you know, he believes, although the documents outside some criminal issues, have not really been identified, he believes that there could be documents that would contain information that's privileged that if disclosed, could result in harm to the debtor.

So what we've tried to do here is build in a provision that would allow the debtor, in a situation where he believes going forward, has a good faith belief that there is information in a document or testimony that sort of now applies to both documents and information, I think that's agreed by the parties.

But to the extent the debtor thinks there is information that if disclosed to the trustee -- information that's privileged, could result in personal harm to the debtor, then there is a process by which we would submit that issue to the Court for resolution.

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Specifically, the debtor would first log the document, would identify on that log the personal harm that is the subject of the claim of privilege, and then after that, either party could seek relief from the Court, but importantly we've built in an expedited process for that to happen, just so we're not, you know, taking a ton of time to resolve these issues as they arise.

And importantly, at the end of this paragraph, Your Honor, after we describe the process for review that we would envision on an expedited basis, which could include in-camera review of documents by the Court, we have language clarifying or adding some important clarity around the sort of definition of personal harm, or what we mean by that.

And what this language at the end makes clear, is that the debtor cannot take a position that he would be personally harmed by revealing documents that could result in the recovery of estate assets. You know, this goes back to what we talked about at the last hearing, where we're concerned that the debtor could take the position that if we're seeking documents from a relative or an affiliate that relates to their assets, which we think could be property of the estate, or assets that are purportedly theirs that we think should be property of the estate, you know, the debtor could not claim in response to that, that he would be harmed because he would take the position that those assets are not

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property of the estate. So that's sort of generally what that clarification at the end of this paragraph is designed to address. The one other thing I would say on Paragraph 7, Your Honor, is that, you know, we did hear the Court loud and clear. I think Your Honor had made a couple of comments at the last hearing that it would be nice to resolve this privilege issue up front once and for all so we don't have a series of disputes that continue to pop up later in the case. We agree with that. We think -- you know, we drafted this paragraph to sort of strike a balance between that concern and also the concerns that the debtor had addressed of not being able to anticipate every potential document that could relate to -- or that could cause personal harm that disclosed to this -- gets kind of a narrow ability for those types of issues to be resolved on a case-by-case basis in the future, but without opening up the door for any and all privilege issues to have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. So that's Paragraph 7. I can answer questions about that before getting to Paragraph 8 if Your Honor would like but -- THE COURT: Well, my question is, is -- Mr. Romney, are you agreeing to the language in Paragraph 7?

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MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, we agreed with the language of Paragraph 7, as well as the other changes that Mr. Bassett is getting into, significantly bridged the gap. We had returned a redline of this document to the trustee's counsel this morning. I had hoped to get it last night but it didn't happen, and as Attorney Bassett was saying, we were speaking as recently as -- actually about an hour ago. We do have a -- there are still some differences. I believe personally, and I'm sharing my view here, that I believe that if given a little bit more time we would be able to bridge those gaps because they are getting to be many, but not all, but in many respect, semantical in nature. My understanding is that the trustee's counsel would prefer to just submit this, have the debtor's counsel submit its redline to that document, and then the Court will rule in whatever way the rules fit. The judge -- the Court can fit. So to answer your question, no, we are not in complete agreement, but we are substantially closer to an agreement than we have ever been with respect to this issue. And as I said, I do believe at this point, given how far we've come, that we could get there with a little more time, but I also do want to make clear that the trustee's position is that it would like to submit this

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issue to the Court. THE COURT: I didn't hear the last thing you said. You said, I want to make clear that the trustee's position, and then I couldn't understand what you said. MR. ROMNEY: Is that it's time to submit this to the Court and not attempt to take a little bit more time to get a completely consensual order. THE COURT: Okay. MR. DESPINS: Your Honor -- Your Honor, this is Luc Despins. Two seconds on that. I mean, of course, you know, if we could take -- the point is, we sent them that markup on Thursday afternoon. That's a -- to me, that's a long time between now and then. And, you know, if they need another half hour to resolve the issues, okay, but I -- my fear is that now we're talking about another week and it just -- you know, a bunch of us don't -- you know, we don't think that's appropriate. By the way, Your Honor, I received an email from Mr. Goldman saying that he was -- he was dropped from the call and he's not able to dial back in, so whoever controls the Zoom should let Mr. Goldman back in because he's not able to join for some reason. THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you. We'll see if we can get him back in.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: He's not in the waiting room. THE COURT: He's not in the waiting room. Yeah, he's not able to connect for some reason. I don't know why. (Pause) THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Despins, for that update. Mr. Romney, I'd like to have Mr. Bassett go through the rest of the changes, and then we're going to talk about -- you know, you say that you're substantially there. I want you to make sure that you're telling me ultimately what your issues still are. And I mean, I -- you're absolute entitled to have your issues, but as I said last week at the hearings, I need to understand what you're Case 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 15 of 52

objecting to. Okay? So just, would you keep that in mind, please, when

Mr. Bassett is going --

MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor. THE COURT: -- through the rest of the changes? Okay. All right. So now we just went through paragraph -- and I'm not saying I don't have questions by the way, but I want to hear from the parties first. So we've now gone through Paragraph 7. So should we go to Paragraph 8, Mr. Bassett? MR. BASSETT: Yes, Your Honor. I'm happy to walk

through Paragraph 8. I think this one will be a shorter discussion. As I'm sure Your Honor recalls from the hearings that we've had, one of the issues that the debtor has raised on a number of occasions is a concern about a quote/unquote, waiver of a privilege occurring. And I think what we've always maintained is that the relief we are seeking is about control of the privilege, and that would mean, obviously that the trustee going forward, to the extent privilege pass -- privilege passes to it, would have the control to, you know, do what it wants with that privilege going forward. But what we have done in this Paragraph 8 to address specifically the concern that has been addressed -- that has been raised about waiver, is to say that for purposes of this order at this time, when we talk about passage of control of privileges to the trustee, all that means right now is that the trustee will be able to review, access, and otherwise use all of the documents and information subject to the claimed privileges. So what that means is, we could use that for all purposes of our investigation. To the extent that the trustee determines based on information he has received that he believes there are claims worth pursuing, for example, to recover state assets, we could use all of the information,

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including the privileged information that we've received for that purpose, but we would not be entitled to further waive the privilege over those documents by, for example, filing them on the public docket so that the rest of the world can see the privileged information. We would not, you know, share privileged documents with third parties.

So the trustee would have access, but would not be able to effect a waiver by providing the privileged information to third parties.

And we've also built in this paragraph, a mechanism for being able to file under seal, and then to the extent that down the road, the trustee does feel that it is appropriate for him to waive a privilege over a particular document, he would be able to come to the Court and request that relief, and we have envisioned that that would happen under the same expedited type of process that we've outlined in the prior paragraph.

Lastly, Your Honor, Paragraph 9, that is basically adopting language that the debtor had proposed in its last order to the Court.

The debtor had a -- had this language in its order where it wanted to clarify that nothing in this order was designed to impact the issues that are involved in the Court's other order related to the corporate governance motion, and in particular, the UBS litigation.

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So this paragraph just incorporates that and makes explicit that nothing herein is intended to effect the privileges at issue in that litigation, which again are subject to the other order.

So those were the changes, Your Honor. I won't speak for Attorney Romney, but I do think that this new version of the order does resolve a lot of the other issues that we had identified and that we had submitted to the Court in our issues list at Docket 835, as I mentioned before as an example.

You know, the issue is to whether this applies to both documents and information that's been resolved. It applies to both documents and information, there's issues with some of the wording in Paragraph 2 that I think are now resolved in light of the new Paragraphs 7 and 8 that we've added.

So I do think the issues are substantially more narrow, but based on the markup that we've received this morning, as Mr. Despins said, you know, I think our view is that there are still issues that remain and we want to have a decision on those issues at this stage. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Romney? MR. ROMNEY: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: With regard to --

MR. ROMNEY: Aaron Romney --

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THE COURT: -- with regard to paragraphs -- MR. ROMNEY: -- Zeisler and Zeisler for the debtor. THE COURT: Hold -- hold on a second. Hold on a second, Mr. Romney. With regard to Paragraph 7 of this marked up document, on Page 17 of 19 of ECF 846, what -- MR. ROMNEY: Yes. THE COURT: -- objections does the debtor have with regard to the language in Paragraph 7? MR. ROMNEY: With regard to Paragraph 7, specifically we felt that the word personal home is ambiguous, and I'm going in no particular order here other than the order with which they show up on the redline that I am looking at that the Court does not yet have. But looking at the case law, we believe that the language, the balancing test would be just home to the debtor rather than personal home. With regard to the submission and the timing of a privilege log, as well as the information that should be on any privilege log, we believe there should just be a reference to Local Rule 26(e), rather than anything that at least arguably not applies that, such as requiring the log contemporaneously with the production deadline. We don't believe that's consistent with applicable case law.

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And probably the most significant issue in Paragraph 7 is the trustee's language that would require all privilege issues submitted through this process to be considered on an expedited basis and to be briefed within four days. It's -- it was debtor's position that the federal and local rules exist for a reason, and that's because people deserve a reasonable amount of time to respond to issues that are brought before them. Sometimes counsel have other cases. Sometimes counsel have families. Sometimes counsel need to sleep. And four days, just because as distinguished from a particular situation that requires adjudication in, you know, an expedited basis, we don't believe that that is reasonable or fair.

As Attorney Bassett and I were discussing as recently as earlier this afternoon, there is probably a middle ground on this issue. And by probably, I believe there is, meaning there is a number between 4 and the 14 that I think the debtor could live with, but we've -- you know, the clock ran out on us and here we are. Four days is just cutting it a bit close.

The events of the last two days are a perfect illustration for that. The trustee pointed out, they got us a proposed order on Thursday night, and I personally couldn't look at that proposed order until Saturday morning, and that's because I had two deadlines on Friday evening in

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another case, and that happens sometimes and it's not being dilatory or not giving it the attention it deserves. It's just that human beings can only do one thing at once, particularly when we're talking about complex issues that have significant implications on the party's rights, and we believe that four days just because it falls under this order and no showing of cause, is simply not fair or consistent with applicable law. THE COURT: Okay. So you're saying to me that if you had another day, you think you could work this provision out? MR. ROMNEY: This particular provision, I am reasonably -- I am at least reasonably confident that this provision, these are -- this is one provision of a few, but this is probably the most significant one. I believe we could work out a reasonable time line sometime between the 4 and the 14 that the default order is. And yes, I do. MR. BASSETT: Your Honor. It's Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings. On that particular point, Attorney Romney is correct. We did have a discussion about whether there might be a middle ground between regular notice and the expedited notice that we proposed in this language that we're looking at. I think what we said was four days. You know, Attorney Romney said, you know, under the rules you would typically

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have 14. Can we go somewhere in the middle and say maybe, you know, eight days to respond, and then, you know, three days for a reply? Something to that effect. I think that would be fine.

But just to be clear, I mean, the reason for making this expedited is that there are a lot of parties from whom the trustee is seeking discovery where these issues could potentially arise.

As the Court, knows, we've served subpoenas on a number of law firms who used to represent or continue to represent the debtor, and we're going to, I imagine, get privilege logs and information from those firms at varying times.

And you know, it could be that as those issues arise, we need to avail ourselves of this procedure. If it happens a number of times, we just can't be in a position where our investigation is unduly delayed because we have to do through regular notice every time, even though these issues by that point will be very, very familiar to the Court, given how much we've already spent -- how much time we've already spent talking about it. So that's really the logic for it.

But as I said, you know, it sounds like we can -- we can bridge the gap on the timing issue by going to something in the middle.

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THE COURT: Thank you. All right. With regard to Paragraph 7, Mr. Romney, so it sounds to me as though -- I want to make sure the record is accurate. Number 1, the last -- during the last hearing that we had on this issue on September 6th, your colleague stated that this was an advisory opinion and it could be deemed to be that. I'm not going to enter an order if your client is going to take the position that this is an advisory opinion. So you need to clarify for the record whether or not at the entry of this order you're going to appeal it as an advisory opinion, because if you are, then I'm not going to enter this order. I'm going to have to write a written decision and I think you've already abandoned that argument and waived that argument anyway. When I went back and looked at your affidavit in -- that you had submitted, it was actually a declaration that you had submitted after -- to just talk about the meet

and confer, you state in your declaration that you swore to that you wanted the process to be dealt with in an omnibus fashion, and that you didn't want it to be on a piece meal fashion.

And so I want to make sure that you're not changing that position because I -- I'm not going to proceed if you're going to assert contrary positions with regard to

this motion. So what's your position with regard to the entry of an order on the trustee's motion regarding the privileges? MR. ROMNEY: So the -- and I want to make sure I choose my words very carefully here so that I'm precise. I unquestionably signed a declaration that stated my view that this -- that the resolution of these issues would be substantially more efficient if the parties were aware of which line of authority or even subline of authority. The standard to the Court was imposing that I felt that the -- there would be a lot less disputes down the line related to individual documents if we knew the standard the Court was going to apply. I believed that to be the case. I still believe that to be the case, and that's why I signed that declaration and that's why we've been working with trustee's counsel to get to, you know -- to get to a place that whether the Court adjudicates or the parties ultimately consent to that makes everybody's lives, including the Court's, more efficient down the line. Now fast forward to last week. I believe you're referring to Attorney Henzy made the comment about that this could be construed as an advisory opinion. I believe in the

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first hearing concerning this matter, I actually raised the issue that it could be -- but I didn't know, and that arguably it wasn't advisory opinion, and that's why -- that's why I'm on this side of the bench and the Court is on the other side, because I honestly don't know the answer to that as to whether somebody could determine that this is advisory opinion.

But I think really to what the Court's question was, I mean, we have -- I stated, hopefully clearly at the last hearing, we are consenting -- we have -- we would have consented to the entry of a proposed order that we had submitted as of the last hearing.

I intend, if I am permitted by the Court following the conclusion of this hearing, unless the determine is made that was -- the determination is made that we're going to try and take a little bit more time to work this out.

But barring that, I would like the Court's permission to submit yet another order that the debtor would consent to entry, and I believe if the debtor's consent to entry, it would have waived its right to appeal.

And while I have not specifically discussed the question with our client as to how -- have you waived any appellate rights, have you not waived any appellate rights. The only thing I can say as I sit here right now is that the differences between the proposed orders, the one

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that I would propose to submit and the one that has been submitted, I would imagine that the only issues we were reserving our rights to appeal, even in theory, are to the extent that there are differences between the two orders, and I do have authority to submit -- to consent to the proposed order that I already submitted. So in that respect -- THE COURT: But the proposed order that you've already you've just said is changed again. MR. ROMNEY: Correct, and by it will have changed, I mean it will be closer to some -- there will be less differences between it and the trustee's proposed order. So I guess what I'm saying, perhaps not articulately, is I would imagine that the only thing a party could appeal having consented to entry of an order, would be the few -- issues that were materially different than to what they had consented. And in that respect, I wouldn't -- I just don't -- I believe that the debtor is going to consent to an order on this issue. And if the issues is that the Court enters an order that's not -- is materially different than what the debtor was prepared to consent to, then any hypothetical appeal would have to relate to issues to which the debtor was not consenting. Does that make sense, Your Honor? THE COURT: Possibly. But here's the problem.

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You have, as does Mr. Despins and Mr. Bassett, an ongoing obligation to act in good faith with regard to discovery disputes. You had your meet and confer. You filed a declaration in which you said that you thought it should be -- proceed -- these issues of privilege should proceed in an omnibus fashion. After you filed that declaration, the trustee filed his motion to proceed with these issues in an omnibus fashion. If someone files an appeal saying that this -- an entry of any order on this motion is an advisory opinion, I'm not sure that's good faith. In fact, I think it's close to not being good faith, because otherwise you shouldn't have engaged in all of these discussions, including filing orders with the Court. Now I think you should -- you party -- the two of you should continue to work on a consensual order, and I'm going to give you some time to do that until tomorrow afternoon. It sounds -- but I am not going to put this court or anyone else in the position of having to deal with appeals on issues that relate to the administration of this estate, that with regard to the production of documents in which you've already stated in an order that you submitted

-- you had authority to consent to, that at least the post

to this Court, a proposed order that you just said that your

petition information would be made available to the Chapter 11 Trustee.

And you've also stated that you believe there's a balancing test that had to come into play. And so when you talk about the three buckets of the types of law out there, with regard to the attorney/client privilege in an individual case, and specifically -- and there are no cases that have been found by anyone in an individual Chapter 11 case with regard to the privilege passing to the trustee, but there are cases, and you're consenting to that, that they're on a post-petition basis from the time that your client voluntarily subjected himself to the jurisdiction of this Court, and to the date that the trustee became the trustee, the Chapter 11 Trustee, that all that information, the privileges pass -- the control of that passes to the trustee.

Now the trustee had carved out what you asked him to carve out. The trustee has asked -- specifically carved out of this order what you've specifically asked him to carve out. And so why I asked you what you still object to, you and Mr. Bassett, I'm going to give you some time to finalize that.

But I will say one thing I don't understand about Paragraph 7, and I don't know if this is your language, Mr. Romney, or Mr. Bassett's language, or both, but paragraph --

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the fourth line says, "The trustee then 1, the debtor or his counsel as applicable." The debtor can't act in this court on his own. He has his -- he acts through you. And I'm not having filings made by the debtor on his own while he has counsel. So I want that to be very clear. The debtor has no right in this court to file some separate kind of document that isn't signed by you as his counsel and submitted under Rule 11 standards. MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor. I don't believe the intent of this line -- and I -- THE COURT: Well, then let's take -- MR. ROMNEY: -- understand the -- THE COURT: -- out the debtor and say the debtor's counsel. MR. BASSETT: Well, Your Honor. Your Honor, this is Nick Bassett from Paul Hastings. But I do think that may have been our language, but I think the intent behind it was to address the fact that we have served subpoenas on the debtor through his counsel in this case. THE COURT: Then his counsel will have to interpose the objections, not the debtor. MR. BASSETT: Understood, Your Honor. But we've also served subpoenas on a number of other law firms that

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either currently or formerly represented him, so I think Attorney Bassett is -- THE COURT: Then they'll have to interpose their own objections. They're not going to -- MR. BASSETT: Right. What -- THE COURT: -- Mr. Kwok isn't going to be interposing any objections for any of his professionals. MR. BASSETT: Understood, Your Honor. So we can -- we're on the same page. We can clarify that. That's not -- that's not what we had intended by this language, but I understand the Court's concern. THE COURT: Yeah. I'm not going to spend any time on that. Then the debtor's counsel shall by the applicable production deadline, log all such documents in accordance with the requirements of the District Court Local Rule 26(e). Okay? That's going to happen. Then with regard to the deadlines, the dates, it sounds like, Mr. Bassett, you might be able to work with Mr. Romney to change those dates and give Mr. Romney a little more time between the 4 days and the 14 days and Rule 26, correct? MR. BASSETT: Yes, that's correct, Your Honor. And the only other thing I wanted to mention is, I didn't -- I think Mr. Romney, when you had asked him to articulate his issues with Paragraph 7, he had mentioned the expedited

process as one of three.

I just didn't want my silence on the other two to be misunderstood. We do have an issue which we will continue to discuss with Attorney Romney regarding his proposal that the word personal be removed. We do think that is an important word. We're happy to discuss it with him, but we don't consent to simply removing it. And I think he had also mentioned that with respect to the privilege log requirement, he wanted to strike the language saying by the applicable production deadline, and then he also wanted to strike the language that follows the reference to the local district court rule concerning the identification of information necessary to support the claim for personal harm. We also take issue with those changes and we do think it's important to get privilege logs at the time of production, given the context of this case. We also think given the way this carve out or this sort of safety valve provision is drafted, that it's absolute necessary for us to understand what the particular personal harm being claimed is. So again, I just wanted to clarify that we do have issues with those two other aspects of Paragraph 7 that Attorney Romney addressed. THE COURT: Well, with regard to the personal harm

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issue and the term personal, Mr. Romney, I haven't found any cases that talk about the balancing test in an individual case. They all talk about harm to the debtor. The debtor in this case is a person. So the harm that would be suffered would be personal harm. So I'm not persuaded by your argument that the term personal shouldn't be in there. The debtor is a person. The only case law that talks about harm to the debtor talks about it in the context of a corporate case. So I don't understand what your issue is with the term personal. 12 MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, I -- in the case -- in the context of the cases that discuss the balancing test in the individual debtor situation, the language just says harm to the debtor. Now I agree with you, when you're talking about a person, harm to the debtor is harm to debtor, not somebody else or some business that the debtor no longer, you know, owns or controls, or never owned or controlled, but it's -- again, my comment there was to track the language in cases that the -- that the parties have both cited, frankly, talking about balancing the harm to the debtor. And I think that the connotation of personal there is that it has a connotation of physical injury as distinguished from economic injury. That maybe --

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THE COURT: I did completely disagree with you. MR. ROMNEY: -- that's not correct. THE COURT: The term personal is never defined as physical injury. Where do you -- where is a case that says that? MR. ROMNEY: Well, I suppose where it most comes from is that the practice group in many firms called personal injury is almost exclusively physical injury to an individual. THE COURT: If that -- if that -- this doesn't say personal injury, Mr. Romney. It says personal harm. That's what it says. So I don't think your -- MR. ROMNEY: And -- THE COURT: -- argument on that issue is persuasive. With regard to the other issues, you and Mr. Bassett should continue to try to work those out. I agree with you, Mr. Romney, and I think Mr. Bassett has already stated that he agrees that he will increase the period of time for the motion and the privilege log, but the -- where is the case law that says the privilege log doesn't need to be produced at the time that you're objecting to the production of documents? MR. ROMNEY: My understanding is -- not my understanding. My very clear recollection is that there is

a long line of cases from the District of Connecticut talking about that a privilege log must be produced within a quote/unquote, reasonable period of time from the production date under the circumstances. THE COURT: Okay. Well, then I'll set a -- MR. ROMNEY: I don't have those cases -- THE COURT: -- reasonable period of time if you both can't agree to one, but I'm telling you right now a -- if someone is going to assert a privilege with regard to all this information that you've already consented the entry of an order with regard to these categories of information, the administration of the estate, the assets of the estate, and the claims to and against or by the estate, you've already consented to the entry of that order, then I will set the reasonable time if you and Mr. Bassett don't come up with one. But it's going to be short because we are not going to bog down this case with motion practice and discovery disputes. It's not going to happen. Your client came to this Court voluntarily. He has exposed himself to the jurisdiction of this Court, and under the balancing test that you both cited, as you've just stated, he has exposed all of his assets and liabilities, including claims brought against him and claims that he has brought to the administration of the estate in this court.

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So I would suggest that you and Mr. Bassett come up with a date by which that privilege log needs to be filed after the date for compliance of the subpoena, but I am telling you right now, it's not going to be a long period of time. It's not going to be the 30 days that you have to object to the materials in this subpoena. That's not going to happen. It's not going to be an additional 30 days for a privilege log. Not going to happen. So, Mr. Bassett, have you served these subpoenas -- MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, may I be -- THE COURT: -- yet? Have you served these subpoenas yet? MR. BASSETT: Your Honor, generally speaking, the answer is yes, we have. I have colleagues who have a comprehensive list and would know better than I do. There may be a few of the subpoenas that for whatever reason we're still addressing service issues. But because there was a number of them, we were serving them as quickly as we can. Some had to be served in different ways, but generally speaking, yes, we've certainly served the subpoena on the debtor himself. THE COURT: Okay. So the 30-day period for production of documents has -- the clock has begun.

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MR. BASSETT: It has begun and I think is about to expire in some cases. Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Romney, I think I cut you off. You wanted to say something. I'm sorry, I was asking a question to Mr. Bassett, but go ahead. MR. ROMNEY: Yeah. Thank you, Your Honor. The reason -- and I -- why I think that the reasonable standard applies to privilege log is because in any given case, depending on the volume of electronically stored information that any particular recipient of a subpoena is holding, in some cases, it may be minor. In some it may be voluminous and there's going to require search terms, and someone's going to have to go through these documents to see what would implicate the balancing test and what should simply just be turned over. And in many cases, if not most, it may be most or all the documents in possession of counsel. I just don't know, and the reason for the reasonableness standard, I believe, is if somebody is clearly acting in good faith and they're producing on a rolling basis, and they're logging what they -- what they have flagged within those productions, I think it's just an acceptance of the reality of the volume of information in certain cases. But as long as people are being reasonable and being transparent and working as diligently as they can,

that it makes more sense to be reasonable than it does to impose an artificial time line that may make sense in some or all cases, but might not in a particular situation. And that's why I believe that the great weight of the authority has said that it is a reasonableness case with specific time. It's not an effort to sandbag anyone.

But the debtor has no -- delaying does not help this debtor to the extent it helps anybody else. The issues in this case are going to be decided. They're either going to be decided by the parties working something out, or the Court is going to rule and somebody is going to be happy in any given situation and someone's not going to be.

But this is not a situation where -- certainly, I can't ascertain any reason why anybody would benefit from only -- from delaying just for the sake of delaying. Either the trustee is going to get information or not, and assets are going to be determined to belong to somebody and not somebody else, but it's -- there's just no incentive that I see to delay, and I believe that the debtor -- while anyone can say what they want about anybody, but certainly to my firm, and perceiving -- before my firm was involved for the debtor, I believe that people are working diligently to try and provide information and dealing with a tremendous amount of requests for it from a number of different directions, and I believe that -- well, I know that as long as Zeisler

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and Zeisler and myself are working with the debtor, as well as the other professionals who I've worked with on the debtor's behalf, we are going to do a job, we are going to be reasonable, and we are going to be diligent.

And I don't believe that anything has been done that should lead to a presumption that anything but that will happen, and for that reason I think the customary reasonable language does belong in this order.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand what you said, but you also said that things will move along. So then it won't be arbitrary for me to set a date for that compliance with the privilege log. And then you will add a provision that if for some reason you can't meet that privilege log date, you'll file a motion seeking an extension of that time. That's what you'll do, because we are going to set a date for that.

These Rule 2004 motions have been out there for more than 30 days. The trustee has -- was appointed 60 days ago. It was more than 60 days ago. It was clear that the trustee was going to need to do investigation into this estate and its assets. It's also clear that everyone that was involved in the case before the appointment of the Chapter 11 trustee knew that that would have to occur. This is -- so if we want to talk about

reasonableness, the reasonableness of these issues and the

time to comply with the cooperation with the trustee and to provide the trustee with the information the trustee needs to administer the estate, has at least been pending for 60 days. Actually, 64 days. And if you go back to the time when the trustee -- United States Trustee's office filed the motion for the appointment of an examiner, that was in February of this year. So the reasonableness period of time has been running since, the best case scenario for your client, July 8th, and the worst case scenario since February -- I don't know. I can look at the docket, but I would say 28th or the very beginning of March. So for anyone to make an argument that there somehow -- it's unreasonable, and they haven't been given a reasonable time to comply with these requests is not persuasive. So the reasonableness standard has already been in place, and you will -- you and Mr. Bassett will talk about a date, and it will be subject to extension if some party can Case 22-50073 Doc 1249 Filed 12/19/22 Entered 12/19/22 13:50:05 Page 39 of 52

come in and show why they need the extension. But there is going to be a date in the order.

MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor, but, if I may? With respect to particular document requests, I don't think that it would be reasonable to assume that the

| 1 | recipients of subpoenas would be searching for responsive | |----|---------------------------------------------------------------| | 2 | documents and identifying which ones are privileged and | | 3 | which ones are not, and which ones belong on a privilege log | | 4 | before they've been served with subpoenas. | | 5 | THE COURT:<br>I understand that. | | 6 | MR. BASSETT:<br>Your Honor. | | 7 | THE COURT:<br>But I just -- that's why I asked Mr. | | 8 | Bassett, did he serve the subpoenas.<br>And what I also said | | 9 | was, the 30-day period is what's applicable to the | | 10 | subpoenas. | | 11 | So when someone gets the subpoena, they're on | | 12 | notice that they're being subpoenaed, and they have 30 days | | 13 | to comply with the subpoena. | | 14 | And what the order is going to say is that after | | 15 | the period of time to comply with the service of the | | 16 | subpoena passes, they will have whatever amount of days you | | 17 | both agree to.<br>Ten, 14, days to produce a privilege log on | | 18 | what they claim is privileged, and they would have had to | | 19 | have file a motion to quash or a protective order before | | 20 | then, timely, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil | | 21 | Procedure.<br>And if they don't do that, then they will have | | 22 | waived their right to do all those things.<br>Okay? | | 23 | But the privilege log, when they -- they have an | | 24 | obligation when they're reviewing the documents, to comply | | 25 | with a subpoena to put those documents aside that they claim | | | |

are privileged, or at least partially privileged, and then create that log. And so that's how this is going to proceed. MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor. And my only point, and I thank you for the clarity, I think that's a very reasonable approach. My only point was sometimes when you're dealing with large volumes of documents, it takes some more time to get through everything, depending on the number of bodies one (indiscernible) to it and the number of documents involved, but you're certainly correct. The time to -- THE COURT: The Federal Rules of -- the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure address all your concerns, Mr. Romney. MR. BASSETT: And, Your Honor. Your Honor, I apologize, but I do have to just provide one quick response to something that Mr. Romney keeps emphasizing. When he talks about the burden involved of reviewing many responsive documents and logging a large number of documents, I just want to put this in a bit of context. You know, we had a meet and confer with the debtor on discovery last week, and what we are being told so far, which we frankly find very hard to believe and we are still exploring, is that they don't believe that the debtor has

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very many responsive documents at all, because he does not communicate in writing. So I just -- this idea that there is some voluminous production out there that needs to be reviewed and therefore it's not reasonable to produce a privilege log in a short period of time, that's just not consistent with what we've been told and I don't want the Court to be under a misimpression as to what we expect to find out when we get a production from the debtor. THE COURT: Understood. MR. ROMNEY: If I may? Aaron Romney, Zeisler and Zeisler. My understanding is that when requests are made for communications between the debtor and insert third party, that that includes his agents and with respect to the communications between the debtor's agents and the third parties, that's really what we're getting into, where we're thinking there's going to be large volumes. The statement that I made to Mr. Bassett, and now we're yet again getting into the substance of a meet and confer, that I'd rather avoid those conversations in court because the point of meeting and conferring is to try and work these things out. But the statement that I made with regard to the debtor as an individual speaking with others and my concern

with the volumes of documents would be -- third persons acting on behalf of the debtor or a third party if there's an allegation that there is someone acting on behalf of the debtor.

To the extent that the trustee is solely seeking communication regarding the debtor personally and not his agents, I agree. That should not be a voluminous or burdensome task.

THE COURT: Well, I understand your point, but obviously you don't represent the debtor's agents, and whomever represents the debtor's agents will have to address those issues.

MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor, but it is information that at least in theory pertains to the debtor. And I say at least in theory because we're here talking about a concept and not particular documents.

THE COURT: Which is what you asked the trustee to do when you filed your declaration and at your first meet and confer, which was to deal with these issues on an omnibus basis, and that's what we're doing. And now we're doing it on a limited omnibus basis.

We're doing it in connection with the post- petition assets, administration of the estate, and claims asserted by and against the debtor, and the Rule 2004 Examinations, all of which have been granted. No appeal

from any of those orders were taken. Mr. Bassett has told me that some, if not all, of the subpoenas have served -- been served, and therefore, any party's rights with regard to these issues are governed by applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and will be by this order. So with regard to Paragraph 7, the change that I expect that -- you both to make is to change the wording that -- it should just say the debtor's counsel shall, by the applicable production deadline, log all such documents. Then you're going to talk about dates. You're going to talk about this expedited basis provision being extended for a period of time, and then you're going to talk about a date by which the privilege log will be produced. With regard to Paragraph 8, what -- are there any other objections, Mr. Romney, you have with regard to Paragraph 7? MR. ROMNEY: Not in addition -- not beyond that which I've identified on the Court -- on this record. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. With regard to Paragraph 8, what objections does the debtor have with regard to Paragraph 8? MR. ROMNEY: The objection with respect to Paragraph 8, I don't -- they're minor and really fine point that I don't think are -- will be objectionable. One of them is that where the language refers to

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the trustee not being entitled to waive any trustee privilege, for example, by disclosing privileged documents or information on any public docket. We have a qualification in there that this should apply to, in open court as well, meaning -- spoken word in court as distinguished from written word on the docket. I don't expect that to be controversial, but I wouldn't put words -- or try to put words in anybody's mouth, but we just hadn't gotten around to discussing that point yet. THE COURT: Mr. Bassett, that seems reasonable to me. Does that seem reasonable to you? MR. BASSETT: It does, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. So that takes care of -- MR. BASSETT: There is no issue with it. THE COURT: -- that issue. What else, Mr. Romney? MR. ROMNEY: There's a reference to -- immediately after the language that I just read, there's a reference to the docket in this case. Same concept, any public docket, meaning if it's in an adversary proceeding, if it's in litigation, this -- the rule would apply until the Court orders otherwise. THE COURT: Mr. Bassett? MR. BASSETT: No issue with that either, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Romney, what else, on Paragraph 8? MR. ROMNEY: The only other issue with 8 is to the extent the last sentence refers to the timing issue in the prior paragraph that we've just discussed we would -- we would incorporate whatever changes into this paragraph, although to the extent that it's just referring to the expedited dates of -- and that is defined by agreement in Paragraph 7, there would not -- there would likely not be any reason to further change Paragraph 8 as a result of that issue. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. The two of you are going to talk about that expedited basis provision. So as you said, if you agree, if you both agree, then they'll -- let's assume you both agree, then the debtor has no objections to anything in Paragraph 8 because we've just resolved them. MR. ROMNEY: Correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Great. Thank you. Now what about Paragraph 9? I think that's your language, Mr. Romney, isn't it? MR. ROMNEY: That is -- I believe it is, and whether there were any minor changes to it or not, there's no objection to Paragraph 9. THE COURT: Okay. Great. So then as far -- you

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have a few things to address in Paragraph 7, and if you agree on the expedited basis timing in Paragraph 7, then they'll have no objection to Paragraph 8. So 8 and 9 are no longer at issue. So it's only Paragraph 7. And then obviously, there may be something else that Mr. Romney wants to add, Mr. Bassett. I obviously don't have the redline version of the document he sent to you today, but I'm going to ask you both to work together on that and it should be, Mr. Romney -- I mean, this sounds like there's a very good chance that this will be a consented to order. Do you agree with that? MR. ROMNEY: I do agree with that, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So tomorrow, we have hearings during the day, and our last hearing is at, I believe 3:00 p.m. Well, hold on just a second and I will confirm that for you. It is. It's at 3:00 p.m. tomorrow, and I anticipate, although I could be wrong, of course, that that will not take a great deal of time. So I could hear this -- I could continue this matter until 3:30 tomorrow afternoon via Zoom if -- does anyone have any issue with that? MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, that should be fine. I personally have somewhere I need to be for a childcare issue. I need to leave the office at 4:30 tomorrow. THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROMNEY: I don't have these very often, but I do tomorrow. I imagine one of my colleagues, if we went beyond 4:30, one of my colleagues could step in, but I do have to leave at 4:30, hard stop, tomorrow.

THE COURT: Well, I'm trying -- I understand that, and I appreciate that. I'm trying to give you as much time to work with Attorney Bassett as possible.

The other thing we could do is we could schedule it earlier at say, 1:30. But you decide. I mean, I don't -- you can -- you and Mr. Bassett can talk offline, and you can let the clerk's office know what time you would prefer. I have different pockets of time in between hearings, and then -- why I was saying 3:30, because I think everything will be done for the day. But you could -- you could, you know -- we could start as early as noon, 1:00, or 1:30, but I didn't want you to feel time pressure -- as much time pressure. So that's why I went to 3:30.

But you and Mr. Bassett talk, and then you'll let the courtroom staff know. And whatever time you all want to do it, whether it's at noon, 1:00, 1:30, or 3:30, we can -- or, you know, I -- whatever you -- whatever you decide. Okay? But I -- it sounds to me like we are going to have a consensual order, so I would like that to occur tomorrow. Okay? MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor.

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MR. BASSETT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else we need to address this afternoon? MR. DESPINS: Yes, Your Honor. Luc Despins, trustee. You'll recall at the last hearing, we provided the Court with reference to the complaint filed in the UK to show that the debtor owned Ace Decade. And since then, we've discovered another reference even better than that, which is the debtor's own statement under oath at the 341 hearing, and we just filed this before the hearing. We've shown you extracts of that 341 hearing that lasted hours, so we didn't want to burden the Court with everything. But you'll see in there, the question is, Do you have a question in Ace Decade? And essentially he says, yes, I own it. Are there any other owners? No. So the point is, I'm not asking you to rule on that today. What I would like to see the Court order, because we already have an order in place on this, that's the corporate governance order, that direct the debtors to respond to this issue within, you know, three or four days because now the evidence on this issue that he owns it is as fresh as during this case, in the 341 hearing in April of 2022.

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THE COURT: I apologize, but I don't remember -- I do remember, obviously, the governance order, but what do you mean that they need to respond? Have they been -- MR. DESPINS: Yeah, they need to respond because -- yeah, we sent them a letter. By now, it's been ten days, 15 days, but said, hey, you own this entity as Ace Decade, and we want you to turn over to us all the books and records and the stock, the same way you have to do in Javer (ph) -- THE COURT: I see. MR. DESPINS: -- based on the corporate governance order. And Mr. Henzy said, I'm very busy, I have other clients and all that, and we said, still rightly so, you've just hit me with this, Mr. Despins, so let me review the complaint and all that, and I -- my point is, I wanted Your Honor to see that there's much more recent testimony from the debtor saying, I own it. I'm the sole owner of this entity. And of course I'm not asking you now to say, yes, you're right, but rather you should set a deadline for the debtor's counsel to respond to my letter of, you know, before the Labor Day weekend, the Thursday before the Labor Day weekend that says, provide us with the documents. And so we're asking the Court to set a response deadline at this point, given this new -- I think. I don't know how they would contest that, that that 341 testimony

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that he owns this entity; he's the sole owner. THE COURT: Okay. I have a recollection now of what you're talking about so I will take a look at what was filed on the docket today, and consider your request for the deadline for the debtor to respond to the issues regarding that entity. MR. DESPINS: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. All right. Is there anything further we need to address this afternoon? All right. So, Mr. Romney and Mr. Bassett, when you -- when you're talking, I would appreciate it if possible, for you to send an email to the courtroom deputy box tonight so that the courtroom deputy knows by early tomorrow morning at the latest, what time this hear -- when I say early, by, you know, 8:30, 9:00 tomorrow morning, what time this hearing is going to be continued to tomorrow, and then we will go from there. Okay? We have hearings starting at 10:00 in other cases. As I told you, I have some time. Noon, 1:00, 1:30, 3:30. You decide, but if you would please -- even if you don't send that email to the courtroom deputy until tomorrow morning, I would ask that it be sent at least between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m., please, so that the courtroom deputy can schedule things appropriately. At the moment, the docket will indicate that the

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hearing was held today, and it's continued to tomorrow at a time to be determined. Okay? MR. ROMNEY: Understood, Your Honor. Thank you. MR. BASSETT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. I think that that takes care of everything in the Kwok case today, so we will see the parties tomorrow, and court is adjourned for today. MR. ROMNEY: Thank you. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Court is adjourned. (Proceedings concluded at 3:29 p.m.) I, CHRISTINE FIORE, court-approved transcriber and certified electronic reporter and transcriber, certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above- entitled matter. 20 December 18, 2022 21 Christine Fiore, CERT Transcriber