Guo Wengui / Miles Guo — appeal · 2Cir ECF 25-2726_dkt_46

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

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In Re: Ranyue Bai,

Petitioner.

Docket No. 25-2726

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In Re: Chunk Chyi,

Petitioner.

Docket No. 26-077

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In Re: Tony,

Petitioner.

Docket No. 26-361

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In Re: Carolyn Sun,

Petitioner.

Docket No. 26-441

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AFFIRMATION IN OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR STAY PENDING MANDAMUS PETITIONS

STATE OF NEW YORK

) COUNTY OF NEW YORK

: ss.: SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK )

MICAH F. FERGENSON, pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1746, hereby affirms under penalty of perjury: Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 1 of 18

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1. I am an Assistant United States Attorney in the Office of Sean Buckley, Attorney for the United States, acting under authority conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515, and I represent the United States in this case. I respectfully submit this affirmation in opposition to the emergency motions (the “Motions”) filed by petitioners Ranyue Bai, Chunk Chyi, Tony, and Carolyn Sun (the “Petitioners”), to stay the sentencing of criminal defendant Miles Guo, pending adjudication of their mandamus petitions. STATEMENT OF FACTS A. The Criminal Case Against Miles Guo 2. On March 6, 2023, a grand jury returned sealed indictment 23 Cr. 118 (AT) charging Guo and Kin Ming Je, a/k/a “William Je,” with various fraud and money laundering counts. (Dkt. 2).1 On March 15, 2023, Guo was arrested and has been detained since his arrest. The Government filed several superseding indictments after Guo’s arrest, adding charges as to Guo and charging co-defendant Yanping “Yvette” Wang. (See Dkt. 19; Dkt. 215). On April 24, 2024, the Government filed superseding indictment S3 23 Cr. 118 (AT) (the “Indictment”), charging Guo, Je, and Wang with racketeering conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One); conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count Two); conspiracy to commit money laundering, in

1 “Dkt.” refers to a docket entry on the District Court’s docket for the criminal case. Unless otherwise noted, case quotations omit all internal quotation marks, citations, and previous alterations. Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 2 of 18

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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Three); conspiracy to commit securities fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count Four); wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, in connection with the GTV Private Placement (Count Five), Farm Loan Program (Count Seven), G|CLUBS (Count Nine), and the Himalaya Exchange (Count Eleven); and securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff, in connection with the GTV Private Placement (Count Six), Farm Loan Program (Count Eight), and G|CLUBS (Count Ten), and unlawful monetary transactions, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Count Twelve). (Dkt. 307). Guo proceeded to trial on the S3 Indictment.2 3. Guo’s roughly eight-week trial began on May 22, 2024. The Government called 34 witnesses, and the defense called nine witnesses. Guo elected not to testify. On July 16, 2024, the jury returned a verdict finding Guo guilty on Counts One, Two, Three, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, Ten, and Eleven of the Indictment, and finding him not guilty on Counts Five, Six, and Twelve. (Dkt. 395). 4. Guo’s sentencing was originally scheduled for November 19, 2024. Guo has requested, and has been granted, numerous adjournments of his sentencing hearing. Guo’s sentencing is scheduled to proceed on June 29, 2026, nearly two

2 Wang pled guilty prior to trial. The third defendant, Je, remains at large. Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 3 of 18

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years after his conviction at trial, before the Honorable Analisa Torres, United States District Judge.3 B. Nonparty Submissions in the District Court 5. Numerous nonparties have filed submissions on the docket in Guo’s criminal case. Many of these submissions relate to the nonparty’s interest in over $600 million of proceeds that have been seized by the Government as fraud proceeds and funds involved in money laundering, while certain pro se submissions have concerned other matters. (See, e.g., Dkt. 529-595 (66 nonparty filings docketed on April 3-4, 2025). 6. Over a year ago, on April 3, 2025, the District Court issued an order regarding “certain nonparty filings and email correspondence the Court has received in connection with” Guo’s criminal case. (Dkt. 528 at 1). The District Court explained that nonparties did not have standing to submit any filing other than “a third-party petition under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)” or “a motion under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (‘CVRA’), which applies only to persons ‘directly and proximately harmed’ by a defendant’s commission of a federal offense.” (Dkt. 528 at 1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(A))). The District Court noted that nonparties had improperly submitted filings, including Chunk Chyi, who had “filed near-daily

3 When Petitioners filed their stay motions, sentencing was scheduled for April 27, 2026. On April 23, 2026, Judge Torres adjourned sentencing to June 29, 2026. (Dkt. 837). Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 4 of 18

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letters on the docket for the last two weeks.” (Dkt. 528 at 2). The District Court warned Chyi that further filings “in violation of this Order or applicable Court rules may be construed as frivolous, vexatious, or harassing, and may subject the filer to a permanent filing injunction.” (Dkt. 528 at 2). 7. On April 4, 2025, the District Court issued another order related to improper nonparty filings. (Dkt. 596). The District Court noted that Chyi and another had continued to violate the Court’s order from the day prior, and found that Chyi was a vexatious nonparty who was abusing “the public’s right of access to the Court in clear violation of Court orders.” (Dkt. 596). Accordingly, the District Court ordered that any further filings by Chyi “be screened and docketed only if the Court determines that the filing is made in accordance with applicable court rules, in good faith, and with a proper basis under the law.” (Dkt. 596). Additionally, in the same order, the Court also denied nonparty Carolyn Sun’s motions for the reasons stated in the April 3, 2025 order. (Dkt. 596). C. The Mandamus Petitions and the Emergency Motions to Stay 8. The Petitioners have filed mandamus petitions in this Court and more recently filed emergency motions to stay Guo’s sentencing, i.e., the Motions. This Court has ordered that the mandamus petitions filed by Petitioners Chunk Chyi, Tony, and Carolyn Sun, among others, be heard in tandem. (See, e.g., No. 26-77, Dkt. 29 (ordering that Nos. 26-77, 26-361, 26-441, among others, be heard in Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 5 of 18

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tandem)). The mandamus petition filed by the remaining Petitioner, Ranyue Bai, has already been denied. The mandamus petitions and the Motions are described in further detail below. 9. In Re: Ranyue Bai (25-2726): Petitioner Ranyue Bai filed a mandamus petition in this Court on October 28, 2025. (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 5). Bai complained that the District Court did not permit him to continue to file pro se submissions on the criminal case’s docket. As to the undocketed filings, Bai sought to claim that the Government and Guo’s bankruptcy trustee “acted in coordination to commit fraud upon the court.” (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 5 at 4; id., Exs. A-B). Bai asserted that his filings not being docketed on the criminal case’s docket violated his rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”). 10. On November 26, 2025, this Court denied Bai’s petition “because Petitioner has not demonstrated that his right to the writ is clear and indisputable, and that granting the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.” (No. 25-2727, Dkt. 19). This Court further stated that “[i]n view of the large number of submissions received by the district court, which we trust the court will address expeditiously, Petitioner’s mandamus petition as to docketing his submissions is denied without prejudice to renewal if the district court fails to docket the submissions within a reasonable time.” Bai then sought leave to file a supplemental mandamus petition, Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 6 of 18

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which this Court also denied. (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 30). The mandate issued on January 21, 2026. (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 30). 11. Bai nevertheless has continued to submit numerous filings to this Court. (No. 25-2727, Dkt. 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43). Among these filings is Bai’s emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing, filed on April 20, 2026 (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 43). In his emergency motion, Bai argues that his mandamus petition—which has already been denied—will succeed on the merits because his district court motions have not yet been filed on the District Court docket. (No. 25- 2726, Dkt. 43 at 4). Bai asserts that his motion raises his objections to sentencing and forfeiture. (No. 25-2726, Dkt. 43 at 4). 12. In Re: Chunk Chyi (26-77): Petitioner Chunk Chyi filed a mandamus petition in this Court on January 13, 2026. (No. 26-77, Dkt. 1). On April 18, 2026, Chyi filed an emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing. (No. 26-77, Dkt. 12). Chyi contends that a stay is needed for the proper “calculation of loss, restitution, and guideline enhancements.” (No. 26-77, Dkt. 12 at 1). Chyi states that he disputes or has concerns about the number or identity of victims referenced in Guo’s and the Government’s sentencing submissions. (No. 26-77, Dkt. 12 at 2-6). Chyi also complains that his filings are subject to screening prior to docketing on the criminal case’s docket. Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 7 of 18

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13. In Re: Tony (26-361): Petitioner Tony filed a mandamus petition in this Court on February 17, 2026. (See No. 26-361, Dkt. 7). On April 18, 2026, Tony filed an emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing. (No. 26-361, Dkt. 18). Tony appears to contend that a stay is required because of his concerns about the record in the district court regarding the applicable loss amount calculation under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. (No. 26-361, Dkt. 18 at 2-5). 14. In Re: Carolyn Sun (26-441): Petitioner Carolyn Sun filed a mandamus petition in this Court on February 26, 2026. On April 20, 2026, Sun filed an emergency motion to stay Guo’s sentencing. (No. 26-441, Dkt. 23). Sun appears to principally complain that filings she has emailed to the pro se intake unit’s email address have not been docketed on Guo’s criminal case’s docket. (No. 26-441, Dkt. 23). Sun seeks a stay so that her filings can be included in the record, including for any “forfeiture-related processes.” (No. 26-441, Dkt. 23 at 9). ARGUMENT THE MOTIONS TO STAY SHOULD BE DENIED 15. The Motions should all be denied. As nonparties to the criminal case against Guo, the Petitioners generally lack standing to stay an individual criminal defendant’s sentencing, and similarly lack standing to contest matters such as the applicable Sentencing Guidelines calculation. Under the CVRA, to the extent that the Petitioners are victims of Guo’s crimes, they are entitled to reasonably be heard Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 8 of 18

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at the sentencing hearing—a right that can be exercised only if the sentencing in fact proceeds. They are also entitled to move in the district court to vindicate their rights under the CVRA, but that does not extend to the right to make unlimited court filings that are not related to one of the rights articulated in the CVRA. To the extent the Petitioners’ concerns relate to forfeiture, those concerns are not ripe, as no final order of forfeiture will issue at Guo’s sentencing, and instead the claims and interests of third parties to any specific property for which the Government will seek a final order of forfeiture will be resolved through the ancillary proceeding that follows Guo’s sentencing, during which the Petitioners and any other parties asserting an interest in forfeited property will have the opportunity to be heard in the District Court. A. Applicable Law 16. “A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009). “It is instead an exercise of judicial discretion, and the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Id. “The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 433-34. 17. This Court considers four factors in deciding whether to grant a stay of an order pending appeal: Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 9 of 18

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(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

United States v. Grote, 961 F.3d 105, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2020). The first two factors are the “most critical.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. 18. With respect to the first factor, “[i]t is not enough that the chance of success on the merits be better than negligible.” Id. Here, the Petitioners face a high hurdle, because they must show a likelihood of obtaining a writ of mandamus, which is a remedy that is warranted “only in exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,” and thus is to be used “sparingly.” In re United States, 945 F.3d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 2019). 19. As to the second factor, “simply showing some possibility of irreparable injury fails to satisfy” it. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434-35. The third and fourth “factors merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Id. at 435. “The degree to which a factor must be present varies with the strength of the others; more of one factor excuses less of the other.” S.E.C. v. Daspin, 557 F. App’x 46, 48 (2d Cir. 2014). 20. This Court reviews the denial of a stay for abuse of discretion. Grote, 961 F.3d at 123. Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 10 of 18

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B. Discussion 1. The Petitions Are Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits 21. The Petitioners have failed to show that they are likely to demonstrate the exceptional circumstances that would support mandamus. Their request for an emergency stay, as a nonparty to a criminal case, of an individual criminal defendant’s long-scheduled sentencing following conviction at trial, and while that defendant remains detained in pretrial detention, is baseless. 22. As an initial matter, to the extent the Petitioners seek to contest issues related to the calculation of the loss amount under the Sentencing Guidelines, or to question the credibility of trial witnesses, they have no standing to do so as a nonparty to the criminal case. For example, the stay motion filed by Tony does not make any CVRA-related claims, but instead challenges the loss methodology being used to calculate the Sentencing Guidelines range for Guo. (No. 26-361, Dkt. 18). Third parties do not have the right to make such challenges. 23. To the extent the Petitions are seeking to assert rights as victims under the CVRA, their claims lack merit. First, the rights under the CVRA apply only if the Petitioners are persons “directly and proximately harmed as a result of” Guo’s criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e). While the Petitioners purport to be asserting rights under the CVRA, their Petitions largely involve attacks on the Government’s methodology for identifying victim losses, and none of the Petitions asserts any Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 11 of 18

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particular loss as a result of Guo’s crime. Thus, it is unclear whether the Petitioners actually claim to have been harmed as a result of Guo’s crimes, or whether they instead seek to challenge and prolong Guo’s prosecution as continued supporters of Guo. (See Dkt. 528 (Judge Torres noting that “Chunk Chyi has repeatedly disclaimed victim status”)); No. 26-441, Dkt. 1 at 14 (Carolyn Sun: “Any prior reference to the CVRA was procedural in nature only and did not reflect an assertion or concession of crime-victim status.”). 24. Second, and in any event, the only provision of the CVRA that petitioners apparently invoke, aside from conclusory assertions, is “[t]he right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving . . . sentencing.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). That right, however, can only be exercised if the sentencing proceeding, in fact, occurs and is not stayed or further delayed. And by its own terms, § 3771(a)(4) does not authorize a victim to make any filings on the docket, but instead allows crime victims the right to be reasonably heard in court at certain public proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). 25. To the extent that the Petitioners claim a right under the CVRA to file submissions on a criminal case’s docket as a nonparty regarding any and all issues that have some relation to the criminal case, the Petitioners are mistaken. The CVRA provides no such right, and Petitioners identify no cases where a court has recognized such a right. After all, any such right of carte blanche docketing to any Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 12 of 18

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nonparty, including pro se individuals, would be particularly impractical where, as here, there are thousands of potential victims in a single criminal case. The CVRA does authorize victims to file motions to vindicate the rights set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). See United States v. Sullivan, 118 F.4th 170, 230 (2d Cir. 2024); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c). But such filings must be tailored to one of the rights set forth in the CVRA, and not a generalized attempt to intervene in Guidelines disputes and other sentencing disputes between the Government and the defendant, as the Petitioners here seek to do. Moreover, the CVRA expressly recognizes that “[i]n a case where the court finds that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the crime victims the rights described in subsection (a), the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2). Such reasonable procedures have been followed in the District Court, and the Petitioners offer no reason to believe that Guo’s actual sentencing proceeding would be any different. Among other things, in keeping with common practice in cases involving numerous victims, the Government (and Guo) have received, and transmitted to the Distrct Court, voluminous sets of victim impact statements for the District Court’s consideration in advance of, and at, Guo’s sentencing. (Dkt. 832). 26. One of the Petitioners, Chunk Chyi, is subject to the District Court’s April 5, 2025 order enjoining Chyi from making further filings in the District Court Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 13 of 18

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unless the District Court “determines that the filing is made in accordance with applicable court rules, in good faith, and with a proper basis under the law.” (Dkt. 596). Chyi argues that this order violates Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207, 208 (2d Cir. 1998), which held that a district court “may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant sua sponte without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard.” But Chyi overlooks that the District Court did provide notice before issuing the injunction. Specifically, Judge Torres first issued an order noting that Chyi’s numerous filings were “improper” and “could be construed as threatening or harassing to the Government and the victims of Defendants’ crimes.” (Dkt. 528). Accordingly, Judge Torres warned Chyi that any further such filings “may be construed as frivolous, vexatious, or harassing, and may subject the filer to a permanent filing injunction.” (Id.). It was only after Chyi disregarded that warning by making multiple additional frivolous filings that Judge Torres issued the order that Chyi now challenges. Thus, the record reveals that Judge Torres fully complied with Moates and did not enjoin Chyi’s filings until after providing notice and an opportunity for Chyi to respond. Certainly, there is no basis to find that the District Court’s reasonable response amounts to the level of “exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion,” that would be needed to entitle Chyi to mandamus relief. In re United States, 945 F.3d 616, 622-23 (2d Cir. 2019). Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 14 of 18

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27. The Petitions also raise complaints about the forfeiture proceedings, but those claims are meritless or unripe. To the extent the Petitioners seek to contest issues related to any forfeiture order entered against Guo, they have no standing to do so. And to the extent the Petitioners seek to assert their ownership interest in specific property for which the Government seeks a final order of forfeiture, they may do so in the ancillary proceeding that will take place after Guo’s sentencing. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). Similarly, to the extent the Petitioners seek to make a claim for remission of forfeited property, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. Part 9, such claims can be submitted to the Attorney General, but will only be addressed after (i) Guo is sentenced, (ii) any third-party claims have been adjudicated in the ancillary, and (iii) a final order of forfeiture has been entered. See, e.g., United States v. Romeo, 136 F.4th 372, 381 (2d Cir. 2025). Thus, a stay would only delay the Petitioners—and any other claimants—in asserting any such claims regarding forfeiture. 2. The Petitioners Will Not Be Irreparably Injured Absent a Stay 28. The Petitioners also fail to show irreparable injury. The Petitioners are not parties to Guo’s criminal case. The sentence imposed on Guo will not cause the Petitioners any injury, irreparable or otherwise. As noted above, to the extent the Petitioners seek to exercise rights under the CVRA to be reasonably heard, they may seek to do so at Gou’s public sentencing proceeding—but that can only occur if Guo’s sentencing actually happens. To the extent the Petitioners seek to claim Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 15 of 18

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ownership in specific property that is being forfeited pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n), those claims will be addressed after Guo’s sentencing in the ancillary proceeding. And to the extent the Petitioners instead, or alternatively, seek to make a claim for remission of forfeited property, such claims will likewise be addressed after Guo’s sentencing. 3. A Stay Is Against the Public Interest 31. A stay of Guo’s sentencing, requested by nonparties who are not themselves being sentenced, would in no way serve the public interest. The Petitioners have no legal right or authority to contest Sentencing Guidelines determinations or to file whatever they choose on the criminal case’s docket, while their potential interests in forfeited funds can only be realized after Guo’s sentencing. A stay would thus prejudice the Petitioners’ potential interests in forfeited funds. The same is true for the multitude of victims of Guo’s crimes who have not sought to stay his sentencing, some of whom submitted victim impact statements or other correspondence opposing the many adjournments of Guo’s sentencing to date. (E.g., Dkt. 809 at 3-4). The record demonstrates that any delay in sentencing based on this handful of last-minute collateral petitions would harm the interests of many victims of Guo’s crimes, who have already waited years for this sentencing to occur. It bears emphasis that Guo was convicted by a jury nearly two years ago of orchestrating a massive, years-long, multi-faceted, international Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 16 of 18

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racketeering enterprise. Victims of Guo’s crimes have a “right to proceedings,” including Guo’s sentencing, “free from unreasonable delay.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(7); see also United States v. Bert, 814 F.3d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Certainly, the public is the loser when a criminal trial is not prosecuted expeditiously, as suggested by the aphorism, justice delayed is justice denied.”). This Court should not grant the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, much less the extraordinary remedy of staying the sentencing of a criminal defendant convicted at trial of orchestrating a billion-dollar fraud. CONCLUSION

32. For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners’ motions should be denied. Dated: New York, New York

April 24, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

SEAN BUCKLEY

Attorney for the United States

Acting Under Authority Conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515

By: /s/ Micah F. Fergenson

Micah F. Fergenson

Assistant United States Attorney

(212) 637-2190

Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 17 of 18

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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(g), the undersigned counsel hereby certifies that this opposition complies with the type-volume limitation of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As measured by the word processing system used to prepare this opposition, there are 4,118 words in this opposition.

SEAN BUCKLEY

Attorney for the United States

Acting Under Authority Conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 515

By:

/s/

MICAH F. FERGENSON

Assistant United States Attorney

(212) 637-2190

Case: 25-2726, 04/24/2026, DktEntry: 46.1, Page 18 of 18