发言原文
2. Appearance of Judicial Impropriety Under Liteky / Caperton The Court has previously recognized that the public disclosure of personal addresses constitutes a serious threat to the judicial process. For example, in Dkt. 7, the prosecution alleged that supporters of the defendant posted the private home addresses of the Chapter 11 Trustee, the Trustee’s family, and other related parties, calling for protests at these locations. In Dkt. 51, Judge Torres cited such postings as evidence of obstruction of justice and intimidation of officers of the Court, and used this as a factor in the defendant’s bail denial. Yet, in direct contradiction to this precedent, the Court itself has publicly posted the private addresses of a victim— myself—and other self-represented petitioners in Dkts. 732 and 765. By treating my filings in a manner that the Court has explicitly condemned in others, the Court demonstrates a clear pattern of bias against pro se petitioners and victims, applying double standards in the administration of Case: 25-2726, 12/22/2025, DktEntry: 26.1, Page 28 of 34 justice and disregarding the privacy protections mandated by Rule 49.1 / 5.2. Furthermore, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), establishes that the probability of bias requiring recusal is heightened when a party is subjected to systemic disadvantage that could influence the outcome. By publicly disclosing my personally identifiable information while previously criticizing similar disclosures by other parties (Dkt. 51), the Court applied a double standard, fostering the appearance of impropriety and undermini