Guo Wengui / Miles Guo — appeal · FORFEITURE · ECF #41

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 1 of 37 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Thurgood Marshall U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500 MOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT Docket Number(s): Caption [use short title] Motion for: Set forth below precise, complete statement of relief sought: MOVING PARTY: OPPOSING PARTY: Plaintiff Defendant Appellant/Petitioner Appellee/Respondent MOVING ATTORNEY: OPPOSING ATTORNEY: [name of attorney, with firm, address, phone number and e-mail] Court- Judge/ Agency appealed from: Please check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND INJUCTIONS PENDING APPEAL: Has movant notified opposing counsel (required by Local Rule 27.1): Has this request for relief been made below? Yes No Yes No (explain): Has this relief been previously sought in this court? Yes No Requested return date and explanation of emergency: The District Court forced sentencing today (June 29), intentionally racing to Opposing counsel’s position on motion: moot this Court’s pending mandamus and stay review. The court issued an Unopposed Opposed Don’t Know unverified $889M order (ECF 858), refused to rule on double-counting, Does opposing counsel intend to file a response: denied 50 PSR objections, and suppressed 7 pending recusal motions. Yes _No Don’t Know Without an immediate administrative stay, these structural Rule 32 and process failures will permanently lock into final judgment. This will cause immediate, irreversible harm to the statutory CVRA and § 853(n) rights of thousands of victims before this Court can act. Is the oral argument on motion requested? Yes No (requests for oral argument will not necessarily be granted) Has the appeal argument date been set? Yes No If yes, enter date: Signature of Moving Attorney: Date: Service : Electronic Other [Attach proof of service] Form T-1080 (rev. 10-23)

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 2 of 37 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Docket No. 25-3046 In re JASON ZEN, Petitioner, Related to S.D.N.Y. Criminal Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE AND FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY PENDING APPELLATE REVIEW Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the inherent supervisory powers of this Court, Petitioner Jason Zen, proceeding pro se as an interested third-party claimant, respectfully and on an emergency basis moves this Court to VACATE the judgment of sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) on June 29, 2026, in United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT, and for an IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY of all related forfeiture, restitution, and victim-allocation proceedings pending the final disposition of the extraordinary volume of active, unresolved petitions before this Court. INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF THE EMERGENCY This motion presents a profound constitutional and procedural crisis that demands immediate appellate correction. On the very day of sentencing, June 29, 2026, the District Court executed a calculated "race against the appellate clock," culminating in the issuance of an extraordinary 17-page Preliminary Order of Forfeiture (POF) (ECF No. 858)(See Exhibit A) immediately followed by the entry of a final criminal judgment.

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 3 of 37 The District Court's actions constitute a direct, aggressive bypass of the Second Circuit's active supervisory authority. At the exact moment the District Court imposed sentence and finalized an staggering $889,000,000 personal money judgment (ECF No. 858), it was fully aware that this Court held active jurisdiction over: 1. 16 Mandamus Petitions arising directly from this underlying matter; 2. 10 Emergency Stay Applications; 3. 9 Administrative Stay Applications; and 4. Multiple unresolved emergency motions for judicial recusal, including Petitioner's multi-layered requests to both the Second Circuit and the Southern District. By forcing this case across the final threshold of criminal sentencing while these extensive supervisory actions remained pending, the District Court attempted to render this Court’s review completely academic by presenting a fait accompli. To achieve this "racing," the District Court systematically trampled upon the mandatory fact-finding frameworks of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 (Rule 32), leaving a massive $889 million deficit completely unverified and stripping thousands of stakeholders of their statutory participation rights. To preserve the integrity of the federal judiciary, this Court must immediately vacate the judgment below. I. THE DISTRICT COURT’S SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS OF FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 AS MANIFESTED IN ECF NO. 858 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 is a rigid, mandatory framework designed to guarantee that no criminal sentence is predicated on speculative or unverified factual records. The District Court’s June 29 Order (ECF No. 858) contains smoking-gun admissions of structural Rule 32 violations:

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 4 of 37 A. The District Court’s Wholesale, Summary Rejection of 50 Material Objections and Arbitrary Redefinition of Victim Loss Violates Rule 32(i)(3)(B) During the sentencing hearing on June 29, 2026, the District Court’s procedural shortcuts reached a crescendo of constitutional defiance. Faced with fifty (50) distinct, material factual objections raised by the defendant to the Presentence Report (PSR)—each capable of shifting the Guidelines calculation—the District Court summarily stated: 'I deny Mr. Kwok’s objections.' This wholesale dismissal, completely devoid of itemized, on-the-record factual findings or explicit statements of non-reliance, represents a textbook violation of the mandatory commands of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B). Furthermore, the District Court explicitly declared from the bench: ' I do not consider whether a person subjectively considers themselves a victim in order ot consider theirs as loss. So the actual and intended loss both exceed $550 million. Mr. Guo makes 50 other objections to the PSR. I reject Mr. Guo's objections.' http This unilateral, paternalistic declaration is legally untenable. By flatly refusing to consider the subjective status and evidence of the actual capital providers—thousands of whom explicitly asserted they suffered no loss—the District Court engineered a completely fabricated and unverified $550 million loss threshold to drastically inflate the sentence. To sentence a defendant by intentionally blinding the court to the direct input of the purported victims violates the foundational core of both Rule 32 verification and the CVRA, rendering the final sentence structurally defective." B. Blatant Violation of Rule 32(i)(3)(B): Explicit Discretionary Refusal to Rule on Material Controverted Disputes

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 5 of 37 Rule 32(i)(3)(B) dictates that for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter, the sentencing court must rule on the dispute prior to sentencing. The District Court explicitly broke this rule. In ECF No. 858, Page 6, Footnote 4, the District Court acknowledges that the underlying inflows used to calculate the astronomical personal liability are heavily contested due to the "possible double-counting of inflows across various components of the G Enterprise." Yet, the District Court summarily stated that because this structural objection was not raised in a specific prior submission, "the Court will not address this objection." A district court cannot use forfeiture technicalities to escape the mandatory command of Rule 32(i)(3)(B). By leaving a multi-hundred-million-dollar fund duplication dispute completely unruled upon, the District Court sentenced the defendant based on a structurally unreliable financial record. C. Violation of Rule 32(i)(2): Arbitrary Denial of an Evidentiary Hearing Faced with an Untraceable $889 Million Judgement Rule 32(i)(2) guarantees the right to introduce evidence on contested sentencing factors. In ECF No. 858, the District Court finalized a $889,000,000 Personal Money Judgment against the defendant. Yet, the face of the same order reveals that the Bankruptcy Trustee in parallel proceedings has launched over 300 adversary proceedings and drained massive professional fees over 3.5 years without ever locating or securing these purported personal funds (ECF No. 858, Page 15). The total absence of physical assets matching this $889 million figure proves that the true routing, ownership, and allocation of these investor-originated transfers remain highly disputed and opaque. To issue an $889,000,000 judgment while simultaneously denying an evidentiary hearing on June 25 (Doc. No. 855) is an arbitrary substitution of administrative haste for the rigid fact-finding required by Rule 32(i)(2).

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 6 of 37 D. Structural Violation of Rule 32(i)(1)(A): Stripping Third-Party Voice via the Sudden Elimination of Restitution In a sudden procedural maneuver at the tail-end of ECF No. 858 (Pages 16-17), the District Court completely abrogated its duty to enter a Restitution Order, declaring it "impractical" due to the number of victims and complexity, and instead authorized a unilateral government "remission process." Restitution is the exact statutory anchor under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) that grants third-party stakeholders a mandatory right to comment on factual inaccuracies in the sentencing record at the time of the hearing. By entirely wiping out restitution hours before sentencing, the District Court successfully engineered an absolute informational vacuum, preventing Petitioner and other affected investors from exposing the flaws of the $889 million model during the sentencing hearing, in direct violation of Rule 32(i) verification mandates. E. The Forced Appearance of a Medically Incapacitated Defendant Under Extralegal Coercion Eviscerated the Right of Presence and Allocution Under Rule 43 and Rule 32 The District Court’s rush to judgment on June 29, 2026, culminated in a shocking, unprecedented violation of the physical integrity and constitutional rights of the defendant. According to the defendant's contemporaneous statement during the sentencing hearing and the real-time, live-text transcription provided by Inner City Press (http), the defendant disclosed from the bench that prior to the hearing, he had collapsed, vomited blood, and had been hospitalized. Rather than granting a mandatory medical continuance, the state engineered a highly coercive, irregular extraction: the defendant was forcibly removed from the hospital, returned to MDC, and met by an unidentified civilian female who sheared off his blood-stained clothing, wiped blood from his

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 7 of 37 face, forced a change of attire, and unilaterally compelled his physical presence in the courtroom.This shocking irregular procedure directly violates multiple structural tenets of federal criminal law: 1. Violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3) (Right to be Present): Rule 43 requires the defendant’s meaningful, competent, and conscious presence at sentencing. Mere physical placement of an incapacitated, bleeding, and medically un-evaluated defendant in a courtroom does not satisfy the constitutional definition of "presence." Forcing a defendant to undergo sentencing immediately following physical trauma and extralegal handling directly poisons the competency of the entire proceeding. 2. Violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (The Right of Allocution): The right of allocution requires the court to address the defendant personally and determine if he wishes to make a statement under conditions that allow for a free, rational, and uncoerced exercise of judgment. A defendant who has just had his clothes cut off by a mysterious operative and is actively recovering from physical collapse cannot legally or psychologically exercise a fair right of allocution. 3. Violation of Fifth Amendment Due Process: The introduction of an unidentified, non-law-enforcement handler to physically alter a defendant's medical and physical state in order to push him through a sentencing sprint constitutes a profound breakdown of judicial integrity. It transforms a federal sentencing into an unconstitutional exercise of raw administrative force, necessitating that the final judgment of sentence be immediately vacated. Inner City Press's tweet history↓

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 8 of 37 II. The District Court's Intentional Suppression and Total Silence Regarding Pending Emergency Recusal Motions Establishes a Structural Constitutional Defect The District Court’s rush to impose sentence and finalize ECF No. 858 on June 29, 2026, involved an even more alarming violation of fundamental due process: the deliberate and systematic ignoring of active, pending judicial disqualification motions. On Friday, June 26, 2026, Petitioner filed an Emergency Motion for Judicial Recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455 directly with the District Court, with copies properly served upon defense counsel(See Exhibit B).In tandem, to my knowledge, about six other similarly situated investors and victims filed

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 9 of 37 identical emergency recusal applications and gave due notice to defense counsel, presenting a collective and severe challenge to the District Court’s appearance of impartiality under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Yet, throughout the entire sentencing proceeding on June 29, 2026, the District Court—as well as counsel—maintained an absolute, calculated silence regarding these pending motions. Not a single mention was made on the record, and no ruling was issued. A district court cannot simply blindfold itself to a properly submitted disqualification motion in order to complete a sentencing sprint. Under long-standing federal jurisprudence, when a substantial challenge to a judge’s qualifications is filed, the court must address and resolve that jurisdictional threshold before finalizing a criminal judgment. By treating these multi-layered recusal motions as non-existent, the District Court willfully acted without a verified mandate of impartiality, transforming the entire sentencing into an unconstitutional star-chamber exercise that must be immediately vacated. III.THE DISTRICT COURT’S "SENTENCING RACING" MANIFESTS AN INTENTIONAL BYPASS OF THE CIRCUIT'S MANDAMUS JURISDICTION Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must disqualify themselves if their impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The frantic timeline of June 29, 2026, shatters the appearance of judicial impartiality. In ECF No. 858, Page 9, the District Court openly acknowledges that 6,512 members of the Himalaya Exchange and numerous third-party petitioners have filed extensive objections to the undocketed and unexamined nature of the records. However, the District Court summarily brushed aside these 6,512 objectors, stating that their statutory rights "shall be assessed through ancillary proceedings... after sentencing." (ECF No. 858, Page 9).

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 10 of 37 This is a direct insult to the Second Circuit's pending jurisdiction. The core of Petitioner’s 16 active mandamus petitions currently before this Court is precisely that third-party records are being improperly excluded and suppressed prior to sentencing, transforming their statutory participation rights into an unconstitutional afterthought. By rushing out ECF No. 858 on the morning of June 29 and forcing the case into final judgment, the District Court deliberately attempted to execute a procedural "fait accompli" to strip this Court of its ability to exercise meaningful, pre-judgment supervisory oversight over those 16 pending petitions. Under § 455(a), this calculated effort to outrun the appellate court is fundamentally disqualifying. IV. ALLOWING THE SENTENCING JUDGMENT TO STAND CAUSES IRREPARABLE SYSTEMIC HARM TO THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANTS If this Court permits the District Court’s rushed judgment to stand uncorrected, Petitioner and thousands of similarly situated third-party investors will suffer immediate, irreversible injury: 1. Permanent Lock-In of a Deficient, Unreviewed $889 Million Model: Post-sentencing, the unexamined $889,000,000 loss framework is legally locked into the criminal judgment. The 16 pending pro se mandamus petitions designed to correct the record pre-sentencing are instantly threatened with academic obsolescence. 2. Permanent Castration of Statutory Participation Rights: By forcing § 853(n) claimants and victims into post-sentencing ancillary procedures, they are restricted to operating entirely within the rigged confines of the District Court's unexamined, double-counted sentencing findings. Assets will be distributed via an unverified "remission process" without any judicial oversight,

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 11 of 37 permanently extinguishing third-party property rights before this Court can act. CONCLUSION & RELIEF REQUESTED The District Court’s defiance of Rule 32,its explicit refusal to resolve the disputes regarding the records underlying the forfeiture funds, and its strategic race to outrun 16 mandamus petitions require immediate appellate correction. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court: 1. VACATE the judgment of sentence imposed on June 29, 2026, in United States v. Ho Wan Kwok, No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT, and remand the case for comprehensive restructuring on a clean, complete, and legally reliable record; 2. ENTER AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY of all related forfeiture, restitution, victim-allocation, and ancillary proceedings pending further order of this Court; and 3. DIRECT the District Court to conduct a comprehensive, mandatory evidentiary hearing prior to any subsequent resentencing, ensuring full transparency regarding the source, routing, and legal ownership of the investor-originated transfers at issue. Dated: June 29, 2026 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Jason Zen ___________________________ Petitioner, pro se

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USDC SDNY DOCUMENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DOC #: ______ ____________ DATE FILED: __6/29/2026__ -against- MILES GUO, 23 Cr. 118-1 (AT) Defendant. ORDER ANALISA TORRES, District Judge: Defendant, Miles Guo, objects to the preliminary order of forfeiture (“POF”) entered by the Court on August 11, 2025. See Objs., ECF No. 799; POF, ECF No. 720; Gov’t Mot., ECF No. 716; Resp., ECF No. 803; see also Reply, ECF No. 804. For the reasons stated below, the Court SUSTAINS IN PART and OVERRULES IN PART Guo’s objections to the POF. BACKGROUND The Court presumes familiarity with the factual background of the case and recounts only a summary of forfeiture-related proceedings and submissions here. A. Jury Verdict On July 16, 2024, a jury convicted Guo of nine counts of various financial crimes: (1) one count of racketeering conspiracy (Count One of the third superseding indictment); (2) one count each of conspiracy to commit wire fraud or bank fraud, money laundering, and securities fraud (Counts Two, Three, and Four); (3) one count each of wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with the Farm Loan Program (Counts Seven and Eight); (4) one count each of wire fraud and securities fraud in connection with G|CLUBS (“G Clubs”) (Counts Nine and Ten); (5) and one count of wire fraud in connection with the Himalaya Exchange (Count Eleven). The jury acquitted Guo of one count each of wire and securities fraud in connection with the GTV Private Placement and one count of committing an unlawful monetary transaction (Counts Five, Six, and Twelve). See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 395; S3 Superseding Indictment,

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ECF No. 307. Each of these activities—the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, the Himalaya Exchange, and the GTV Private Placement—were alleged to be components of the “G Enterprise,” a series of investment schemes comprising the racketeering conspiracy detailed in Count One. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 16–19. B. Applicable Forfeiture Provisions As a result of Guo’s convictions, he is subject to three distinct provisions of the United States Code which call for forfeiture of certain assets to the Government: 1) 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), which requires a defendant to forfeit any property “constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person obtained . . . from racketeering activity” (Count One); 2) 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to” fraud or a conspiracy to commit fraud (Counts Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven);1 and 3) 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), which requires a defendant to forfeit all property “involved” in money laundering, or “traceable to such property [involved in money laundering]” (Count Three). See id. ¶¶ 58–61. C. Prior Submissions On April 8, 2025, the Court appointed Guo’s present counsel and ordered the parties to provide a joint letter stating the date when Guo would provide his position with respect to forfeiture. See Apr. 8 Tr. at 10:14–23, ECF No. 684. The Court subsequently granted four extensions, at the parties’ and at Guo’s request, for Guo to articulate his position on the forfeiture of various assets. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 698, 704, 706, 708. Then, on June 27, 2025, Guo filed a letter claiming that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding potential 1 The Indictment also cites 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) in this forfeiture allegation, which specifies further rules and procedures related to forfeiture. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 59. 2

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forfeiture and remission of money and property seized by the Government.” ECF No. 710 at 1– 2. The letter stated Guo “[did] not waive any of [his] rights, including his appellate rights, in this case.” Id. at 1. In response, the Government wrote that although “Guo is not consenting to a preliminary order of forfeiture, the Court can enter a preliminary order of forfeiture that imposes a money judgment and forfeits Guo’s personal interest in specific property.” ECF No. 713. A month later, by motion dated July 28, 2025, the Government asked the Court to “enter a preliminary order of forfeiture setting forth . . . [a] money judgment” in the amount of $1.3 billion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(2)(A); Gov’t Mot.2 The Government characterized the $1.3 billion as “the proceeds traceable to the commission” of the racketeering and fraud counts (Counts One, Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, and Eleven) and “the property involved” in the money laundering offense (Count Three). See POF at 3. The Government argued that $1.3 billion is a “conservative estimate of the . . . funds sent by individual victims to certain arms of the G Enterprise,” which included the Farm Loan Program, GTV, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange. Gov’t Mot. at 3; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (“If the government seeks a personal money judgment, the court must determine the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered to pay.”). The Government also sought the forfeiture of certain property listed in the POF (the “Listed Property”), Gov’t Mot. at 4; POF at 3–11: “cash seized from several bank accounts . . . used in furtherance of [Guo’s] crimes and his racketeering enterprise,” which, 2 Courts may impose money judgments in cases where criminal forfeiture is required. Where a defendant’s assets or identifiable property may not cover the full amount of the proceeds that a forfeiture statute requires the defendant to forfeit, money judgments may be used to ensure that the defendant is held liable for the full amount of those proceeds. See, e.g., United States v. Kenner, 443 F. Supp. 3d 354, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“If the defendant lacks the assets to satisfy the order, the court can award the government a forfeiture money judgment.”); United States v. Peters, 732 F.3d 93, 98–99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming entry of a money judgment in a case alleging forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)); United States v. Kalish, 626 F.3d 165, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming entry of a money judgment in a case alleging forfeiture under 28 U.S.C. § 2461). 3

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according to the Government, represent “proceeds of the G Enterprise [(the racketeering enterprise defined in Count One)] and property involved in money laundering” (Count Three). Gov’t Mot. at 4–5. The Government categorized these bank accounts based on the date they were seized by the Government and the names in which the accounts were held; each of the account holders “was named in the [superseding] [i]ndictment as a member of the RICO enterprise.” Id. at 4; see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 3(a). The Government attached several seizure warrant affidavits related to these accounts. See Gov’t Mot. Exs. B–E, ECF Nos. 716-2 through 716-5; see also Proposed POF ¶¶ a–u, bb (listing bank accounts), ECF No. 716-1. The Listed Property included a mansion located at 675 Ramapo Valley Road in Mahwah, New Jersey, “its contents,” including, for example, an “Italian giltwood mirror with rococo crest with cross-hatched panels,” and several other luxury items, such as a Bugatti, Lamborghini, and Rolls-Royce. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7; see also Proposed POF ¶ aa (listing “personal property seized by the Government from the [Mahwah] property”). The Government argued that the Mahwah property, the personal property therein, and the luxury items were purchased with funds traceable to G Clubs, the G Enterprise, or money laundering. See Gov’t Mot. at 5–7. Guo did not respond to the Government’s motion, and given that he had represented to the Court that he was “unable to take a position with respect to issues regarding” forfeiture, on August 11, 2025, the Court entered the POF. See POF. Nearly a month later, on September 4, 2025, Guo requested an opportunity “to address” “deficiencies” in the Government’s motion, such as “whether certain property is forfeitable,” “the issue of offsets,” and “the accuracy of the total amount the government seeks.” See ECF No. 724 at 1. By order dated January 8, 2026, the Court directed Guo to file any objections and to specify “whether [Guo] claims a personal 4

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interest in any of” the Listed Property. ECF No. 784.3 Before the Court is Guo’s February 3, 2026 submission. See Objs. LEGAL STANDARD When the Government seeks forfeiture in the form of a money judgment, the Court “must determine the amount of money that the defendant will be ordered to pay,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A), using “evidence already in the record,” id. 32.2(b)(1)(B), including the trial record. See United States v. Mathieu, 853 F. App’x 739, 742 (2d Cir. 2021). The calculation of a forfeiture amount, however, “is not an exact science.” United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d 32, 48 (2d Cir. 2011). As a result, the Court need only make a “reasonable estimate” based on “available information” concerning the appropriate amount of forfeiture. Id.; see id. (noting, additionally, that a court may “use general points of reference as a starting point” and “may make reasonable extrapolations from the evidence established by a preponderance of the evidence” in evaluating a proposed money judgment); see also United States v. Uddin, 551 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court must determine forfeiture—both the proper money judgment amount and whether forfeiture applies to the Listed Property—by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Capoccia, 503 F.3d 103, 116 (2d Cir. 2007). DISCUSSION Guo raises several objections to the POF: (1) the “scope” of his alleged fraud is overbroad and includes those who were not victims of his crimes; (2) he “can only be ordered to 3 The Government argues that Guo has waived any challenges to the POF due largely to his statement in his June 27, 2025 letter that he was not taking a position as to forfeiture. See, e.g., Resp. at 3–4. The Court’s January 8 order did not address waiver, and, because the Court largely concludes in this order that Guo’s challenges to the POF lack merit and prefers to decide the issues on the merits, the Court expresses no view on whether Guo waived his objections. 5

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forfeit assets that he personally obtained”; (3) forfeiture should not cover any alleged proceeds from the GTV Private Placement because he was acquitted of two fraud counts related to GTV; and (4) the money judgment should be offset by certain amounts. See Objs. at 3, 9, 11, 17. The Court finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that approximately $889 million is a reasonable estimate of the gross inflows of cash into the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange—all either components of the racketeering conspiracy of which Guo was convicted or enterprises which formed the basis of his fraud convictions—and that $889 million is, therefore, the proper money judgment amount in this case. See Gov’t Mot. at 3; GXZ26, ECF No. 803-1; Trial Tr. at 4330–32;4 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b)(1)(A). A. Scope The Court rejects Guo’s argument that the POF should not include property traceable to “proceeds” from individuals who claim they “were not victimized” by his fraud. See Objs. at 3– 4, 5. As an initial matter, Guo assumes that forfeiture distinguishes between “investors who were defrauded, and those who insist they were not.” Objs. at 4. It does not. Forfeiture, in this case, applies to proceeds “from racketeering activity,” proceeds from “fraud,” and property “involved in” money laundering. See Resp. at 5 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a), 981(a)(1)(C), and 982(a)(2)). Contrary to Guo’s claims, the scope of his crimes of conviction is not defined by the 4 In his sentencing submission, Guo argues that exhibit GXZ26 does not account for the possible double-counting of inflows across various components of the G Enterprise. See, e.g., ECF No. 822 at 41,53 (claiming that individuals could use Himalaya Exchange funds to purchase a G Club membership); see also ECF No. 826 (correcting sentencing submission). Guo does not cite any evidence showing that this occurred, or suggesting that the Government’s inflow calculation in fact improperly included contributions made from Himalaya Exchange accounts to G Clubs. Id. The Court, therefore, makes this determination on the evidence available in the record, which demonstrates that the Government’s calculation is correct. And, in any event, this argument was not raised in Guo’s objections to the forfeiture order. As such, the Court will not address this objection. 6

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“expectations and reliance” of individual victims on his statements. Cf. Objs. at 5 (claiming that “individual investors’ expectations and reliance are critical to distinguishing between victims of fraud and those who were not victimized”). Indeed, the Second Circuit has held that “reliance is not an element of criminal fraud” and that “the unreasonableness of a fraud victim in relying (or not) on a misrepresentation does not bear on a defendant’s criminal intent.” United States v. Weaver, 860 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2017). In other words, even if an alleged “investor” in a fraudulent scheme disclaims that they relied on the false statements which underpinned the fraud, a fraudulent scheme may nonetheless exist, and all proceeds obtained from such a scheme would be subject to forfeiture. Relatedly, an “investor[’s]” subjective views as to whether they are victims of the scheme have no bearing on whether their contributions to the scheme are “proceeds” that a defendant has obtained from fraud. All that matters is “materiality”—that the statements alleged to be fraudulent have the “natural tendency to influence the decisionmakers to whom they were addressed.” Weaver, 860 F.3d at 96. And materiality is evaluated under an objective test, “rather than from the subjective perspective of the victim.” United States v. Frenkel, 682 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir. 2017). The Court’s conclusion is confirmed by the statutory definitions of the fraud crimes of conviction. Wire fraud criminalizes the knowing participation in any “scheme or artifice to defraud” and the transmittal by wire of certain communications for “the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice [to defraud].” 18 U.S.C. § 1343; see July 9, 2024 Trial Tr. at 5791:25– 5794:6, ECF No. 450. As for securities fraud, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rule violated in this case, see S3 Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 47, 51, prohibits using a “scheme . . . to defraud,” “mak[ing] an untrue statement of material fact” or omitting a material fact in certain circumstances, or “engaging in an act, practice, or course of business which 7

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operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)–(c) (emphasis added). See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999) (observing that Congress prohibited the “‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud,” in the fraud statutes). In other words, the “scope” of Guo’s fraudulent schemes does not depend on whether each individual making contributions to those schemes believed they were defrauded. Their beliefs as to whether their individual “investments” had material value, or as to whether they in fact relied on any material misrepresentations, do not affect whether those investments were made in a fraudulent scheme.5 The cases cited by Guo, United States v. Miller, 997 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1993), and United States v. Rainford, 110 F.4th 455 (2d Cir. 2024), are inapposite. In Miller, the Second Circuit held that the Government failed to prove that the defendants intended to deprive a victim of a property interest on the facts shown at a trial for mail fraud because the property that the defendants had allegedly diverted “to their own benefit” from the victims was not, in fact, “a specific, identifiable property interest” belonging to the victims in the first place. Id. at 1017– 1021. Miller, in other words, turned ultimately on the scope of the alleged victims’ contractual property interests, not on their expectations or beliefs, and, therefore, has no bearing here. See id. Rainford vacated and remanded a forfeiture order where a district court based its order solely on “the government’s word.” 110 F.4th at 489. Here, by contrast, there is ample evidence supporting the POF filed in this case. Guo further argues that there is “abundant proof that a considerable number of supposed ‘victims’ reject that classification.” Objs. at 6–7. He claims that “6,512 members of the 5 Guo does not argue otherwise—he neither discusses, nor even cites, the elements of his fraud convictions in the portion of his submission making this argument. See Objs. at 4–9. 8

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Himalaya Exchange” (the enterprise for which Guo was convicted of wire fraud in Count Eleven) “have objected to forfeiture of their accounts” and “express[] frustration at being labeled as victims.” Id. at 6. These complaints, as well as those from the “Hamilton petitioners” and various other third parties, do not affect this order, which addresses solely whether the properties identified by the Government are, in fact, either proceeds of racketeering activity, proceeds of fraud, or traceable to funds involved in money laundering, and whether the $1.3 billion money judgment is a reasonable estimate of the value of Guo’s forfeiture obligations.6 Third-parties’ alleged claims to the property identified in the POF shall be assessed through ancillary proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. B. Possession Guo argues that he “can only be held liable to forfeit the value of tainted proceeds to the extent that he at some point personally obtained them,” and that, for various reasons, there is insufficient evidence that he “obtained” the property listed in the POF. Objs. at 10–11 (emphasis in original). Guo misunderstands the nature of forfeiture. For proceeds of a defendant’s crime to be forfeitable, the property “need not be personally or directly in the possession of the defendant, his assignees, or his co-conspirators.” United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Instead, the property need only “have, at some point, been under the defendant’s control.” Id. Further, property may be forfeited even when the defendant’s control over the property is temporary. See United States v. Tanner, 942 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2019). 6 The Court acknowledges the voluminous petitions filed under 18 U.S.C. § 853(n) seeking to assert a third-party’s legal interest in property forfeited to the United States, and the Court expresses no opinion as to whether any petitioner’s claim, properly made and submitted under § 853(n), is meritorious. 9

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At trial, the Government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo was the “Boss” in control of all of the entities in the G Enterprise and those entities’ assets. Resp. at 7.7 For example, testimony from several witnesses shows that Guo exercised control over assets involved in the G Enterprise: Karin Maistrello testified that Guo was in control of the Rule of Law organizations’ funds, a scheme involved in the G Enterprise (see Trial Tr. at 424); multiple witnesses testified that Guo had control over G Clubs (see Trial Tr. at 1941 (describing Guo as the “top boss”), 1995:3–15, 1996:2–5 (clarification at sidebar), 1999:4–7, 2975:8–2976:10, 2980:11–22, 2999:20–3000:6 (testimony concerning G Clubs)); and abundant documentary evidence supports the conclusion that Guo exercised control over the funds involved in his crimes (see GXC415; Resp. at 7 n.3 (citing trial exhibits depicting Guo exercising control over funds involved in the G Enterprise)).8 The documentary evidence introduced at trial, see, e.g., GXZ26 (showing cash flows from certain G Enterprise bank accounts into other bank accounts which are listed in the POF), also establishes that the particular accounts that the Government argues are subject to forfeiture contain funds derived from proceeds of the G Enterprise and property involved in money laundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Notably, Guo does not argue that the funds in these accounts hold 7 Additionally, under each statute serving as the basis for forfeiture in this case, the Court need only find that Guo obtained the proceeds “directly or indirectly.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(3), 981(a)(2)(A), 982(a)(2). 8 Guo’s sole argument regarding the trial record is that one witness “testified that . . . Guo was not the ultimate beneficial owner of G Clubs, nor was he the source of funds for G Clubs or G Fashion.” Objs. at 10–11. That witness, James R. Collins Jr., was an employee at Mercantile Global Holdings, a company which owned a bank that maintained client relationships with G Clubs, G Fashion, and the Himalaya Exchange. See Trial Tr. at 2753:8– 2756:15. But Collins only testified that Mercantile Bank believed that Guo was not the ultimate beneficial owner of G Clubs and that G Clubs had represented as much to him. See Trial Tr. at 2758:23–2762:12. He did not testify as to any personal knowledge of the inner workings of G Clubs, or whether Guo, in fact, exercised control over G Clubs funds. The Court, therefore, accords Collins’ testimony minimal weight. Guo also attempts to incorporate by reference arguments made by third parties who have filed ancillary claims to assets subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). See Objs. at 11. The Court will consider those arguments as part of the ancillary proceedings that shall be conducted after sentencing pursuant to §853(n) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2. The Court expresses no opinion as to whether any third party has a superior legal interest in any forfeited property. 10

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money which is not derived from entities involved in the G Enterprise. See POF ¶¶ a–z, bb; Objs. at 9–11 (instead arguing solely that he did not personally obtain or exercise control over these funds). Guo relies in substantial part on Honeycutt v. United States, 581 U.S. 443 (2017), to support his argument that he cannot be ordered to “forfeit assets that he [did not] personally obtain[].” Obj. at 9. In that case, the Supreme Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 853, which requires forfeiture of any property derived from proceeds of certain drug crimes, does not automatically impose joint and several liability on all convicted parties of a conspiracy. See 581 U.S. at 443. In Honeycutt, the government sought a money judgment against a defendant, arguing that he was liable for the entirety of a conspiracy’s profits, even though the defendant was merely a salaried employee who had assisted his store’s participation in a drug crime, and never benefited from, let alone exercised control over, the extent of the store’s tainted profits. See id. at 445–47. Here, however, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Guo benefitted from and exercised control over the funds that the Government maintains are subject to forfeiture. See, e.g., Resp. at 7–8 n.3 (citing trial evidence noting, for example, that Guo directed his co- conspirators to use “G-Club or another private company” to finance the purchase of an expensive coffee table). Indeed, since Honeycutt, the Second Circuit has reiterated that the Government need not show that a defendant personally retained or directly possessed property for forfeiture to apply. See, e.g., Rajaratnam v. United States, 736 F. App’x 279, 284 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that a forfeiture order could be imposed against a defendant for funds over which the defendant only had temporary authority and which had subsequently been disbursed). The Court, therefore, finds that the Government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the Listed Property is subject to forfeiture. 11

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C. GTV Private Placement and SEC Disgorgement Guo argues that funds derived from the GTV Private Placement should not be included in the forfeiture order and that the money judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount of funds the Government alleges were involved in GTV. See Objs. at 17.9 Guo contends that because he was acquitted of wire and securities fraud in connection with the GTV Private Placement, $411 million in funds derived from the GTV Private Placement that the Government seeks to forfeit should be excluded from the order. Id. at 11–12; Resp. at 8. The Court need not resolve this in light of another issue raised by the parties: whether the money judgment against Guo should be reduced by the amount already recovered by the SEC in administrative proceedings. See SEC Order, ECF No. 799-2. Guo states that GTV has already disgorged in excess of $411 million as part of an administrative proceeding initiated by the SEC. See Objs. at 17–18. The Government concedes this, in part, stating that “[t]he actual funds derived from the GTV [P]rivate [P]lacement were recovered by the SEC, which established a fair fund for distribution to victims,” and that “[i]f the Court were to deduct the GTV [P]rivate [P]lacement funds from the forfeiture amount, approximately $411 million would be deducted.” Mot. at 4 n.2. However, the parties’ figures diverge. Guo argues that GTV, along with Saraca Media Group, Inc. and Voice of Guo Media, Inc., has disgorged over $486 million to the SEC and that the full $486 million should be deducted from the money judgment because it relates to conduct charged in this case. See Objs. at 18. The Government, however, contends that only $411 9 Guo does not claim that a specific bank account, or item of personal property, solely constitutes proceeds from the GTV Private Placement, see generally Objs. The Government maintains that all of the relevant funds are proceeds of the G Enterprise and property involved in money laundering. See Mot. at 4–5. Guo does not argue that any of the Listed Property should be excluded from forfeiture on this basis, and the Court, therefore, only examines how the disgorgement affects the money judgment. 12

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million of the $1.3 billion figure derives from the GTV Private Placement and that the remaining $889 million derives from proceeds traceable to the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, or the Himalaya Exchange. See GXZ26. The fact that GTV and other entities disgorged $75 million more than $411 million is relevant to the money judgment only if the excess $75 million is traceable to proceeds from the fraudulent schemes involved in this case, namely, the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, or the Himalaya Exchange. The Court rejects Guo’s arguments that the purported $75 million disgorged in excess of $411 million is traceable to his crimes of conviction. First, he claims that $34 million of the total disgorged funds relate to sales of “G-Coins and G-Dollars,” early precursors to the Himalaya Exchange. See Objs. at 17–18. However, the sale of G-Coin and G-Dollars from April to June of 2020 is not covered by the Indictment, which targets the Himalaya Exchange enterprise transactions that took place from 2021 to 2023. See S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 53. Moreover, Guo provides no evidence that the $115 million in disgorged funds attributable to Voice of Guo Media, Inc. (“VOG”) “overlaps with the so-called Farm Loan Program.” Objs. at 17–18. The SEC Order reports that VOG pooled funds from “prospective investors” who wanted to invest less than $100,000 in GTV. See Objs. at 17–18; SEC Order ¶¶ 15–21, ECF No. 799-2. The Indictment’s description of the Farm Loan Program, however, differs substantially from the SEC Order’s description of VOG’s fundraising efforts. Compare, e.g., S3 Superseding Indictment ¶ 17 (describing “The Himalaya Farm Alliance” as “a collective of informal groups (each known as a ‘Farm’) located in various cities around the world” which obtained investments “in the form of ‘loans’ to a Farm” and “promising that such loans would be convertible into GTV common stock” via a “Loan Agreement”) with SEC Order ¶¶ 16–18 (describing how VOG would provide an investor a one-page “Limited Purpose Agency 13

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Agreement,” stating that, for minimal consideration, a representative of VOG would act as an “agent” for investors and purchase GTV stock on their behalf). Although Guo is correct that the SEC obtained $75 million more than $411 million from GTV and related companies, he has not shown that this surplus coincides with any of the proceeds that the Government has demonstrated are related to Guo’s crimes of conviction—that is, the Farm Loan Program, G Clubs, and the Himalaya Exchange. The Court concludes, therefore, that only $411 million may be deducted from the proposed money judgment, because the record reflects—and the Government does not contest— that $411 million in funds traceable to the GTV Private Placement has already been disgorged by entities related to the G Enterprise in separate proceedings prior to the commencement of this criminal case. This deduction does not affect the forfeiture of any of the Listed Property. D. Offsets Guo argues that the money judgment should be “already offset by the more than $1 billion already in the Government’s possession in connection with this case” and by the “funds and assets in the Bankruptcy Trustee’s possession that are among the items the Government deems forfeitable in this case.” Objs. at 18–20. In response, the Government notes that the value of property “forfeited to the United States under a Final Order of Forfeiture” will, indeed “be applied towards the satisfaction of the [m]oney [j]udgment” once all third-party interests are adjudicated, and that there is no authority to order an offset for any assets not 14

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covered by the POF. See Resp. at 10 & n.7; POF ¶ 7.10 Accordingly, the Court will not deduct the value of any of the Listed Property from the money judgment at this time.11 E. Ancillary Matters Guo also seeks an order directing the Government to take possession of certain assets (the “bankruptcy assets”) from the Chapter 11 Trustee of Guo’s estate in bankruptcy proceedings, which were commenced on February 15, 2022, in the District of Connecticut. See Seizure Mot., ECF No. 724, at 1; see generally In re Kwok, No. 22 Bk. 50073 (D. Conn. Bankr. February 15, 2022); In re Kwok, 172 F.4th 145 (2d Cir. 2026). Guo argues that the Government’s interest in the forfeited assets is “superior to that of any creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding,” Seizure Mot. at 5, that ordering the Government to seize the bankruptcy assets will both “make them available to investors in the various entities involved in this case, and for whom restitution will be ordered” and “halt the accumulation of considerable fees and expenses incurred by the Trustee” in the bankruptcy proceeding. See id. at 5–7. The Court does not have the power to grant the relief Guo requests.12 Guo merely cites Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(3) for the proposition that the Court “may include . . . conditions reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal” in a preliminary order of forfeiture. See Seizure Reply at 4, ECF No. 754. Rule 32.2(b)(3) limits the 10 Guo also argues that if the Court finds, in ancillary proceedings, that any property belongs to a third party, the value of that property should be deducted from the money judgment. Objs. at 18. Not so. Third-party forfeiture proceedings are designed to determine if a third party possesses a superior legal interest in the property subject to forfeiture. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6); Gov’t Forfeiture Ltr. at 1–2, ECF No. 785. That is a separate question from whether the assets are forfeitable. Property may well have come under Guo’s control due to, for example, fraud, even though a third party possessed a superior legal interest in that property. Therefore, if the Court finds that any property belongs to a third party under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), it will not deduct the value of that property from the money judgment. 11 The Court denies Guo’s request to reduce the money judgment “to the extent the Government has declined to pursue other potentially forfeitable assets in this case,” and to reduce the money judgment by the amount forfeited by Haithem Khaled. See Objs. at 19–21. Guo offers no legal basis for either of these requests. 12 The Court expresses no opinion on the Government’s argument that Guo lacks standing on this issue. 15

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Court’s authority to conditions required to preserve the property’s value on “appeal,” rather than conditions required to preserve value pending related, separate proceedings—like the bankruptcy proceeding here. Furthermore, several other procedural features of the forfeiture rules indicate that such an order would exceed the Court’s power. For example, Rule 32.2(b)(3) “authorizes” the Government “to seize the specific property subject to forfeiture” upon entry of a preliminary order but does not require that the Government do so. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(3). Nor does Rule 32.2 state when, or how, the Government may seize property listed in a forfeiture order once it is authorized to do so under Rule 32.2(b)(3). Likewise, 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) and (f) empower the Court to take certain protective measures concerning assets potentially subject to forfeiture, but do not authorize the Court to compel the Government to enact a seizure. See Resp. at 4. Moreover, Guo’s request lacks merit. Guo argues that the Court may impose conditions “reasonably necessary to preserve the property’s value pending any appeal,” Seizure Reply at 4, but nothing in Rule 32.2 requires the Court to do so. Although the Court acknowledges that the Chapter 11 Estate in the bankruptcy proceeding has incurred fees owed to the Trustee and various other professionals, see Seizure Mot. at 7, such fees are not unusual given the remarkable complexity of that proceeding. See id. (claiming that 300 adversary proceedings have been filed in the bankruptcy proceeding). F. Restitution The Government requests that the Court find that imposing a restitution order would be impracticable and authorize a remission process. See Gov’t Ltr. at 4–5, ECF No. 785; ECF No. 784 (January 8, 2026 order). Guo agrees. ECF No. 789 at 3. The Court agrees and finds, 16

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based on the extensive record in this case, that given the “complexity of the case and the number of victims involved,” awarding restitution to victims in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3663A would be impractical and would complicate or prolong the sentencing process. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(c)(3)(A)–(B). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Government has demonstrated that forfeiture applies to the Listed Property due to Guo’s convictions for racketeering conspiracy, wire and securities fraud, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. The Court SUSTAINS Guo’s objections to the extent that the Court shall deduct $411 million from the $1.3 billion proposed money judgment, such that the money judgment in the final order of forfeiture shall be $889 million. The Court DENIES Guo’s motion at ECF No. 724 seeking an order compelling the Government to seize assets in the bankruptcy proceedings. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 724. Finally, the Court finds that restitution is impracticable in this case and authorizes the Government to compensate victims through a remission process. SO ORDERED. Dated: June 29, 2026 New York, New York 17

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Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 30 of 37 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK United States of America, v. Ho Wan Kwok, a/k/a Miles Guo, et al., Defendants. Case No. 1:23-cr-00118-AT EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF THE HONORABLE ANALISA TORRES Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Must Be Resolved Prior to June 29,2026 Sentencing) petitioner Jason Zen, appearing pro se as a third-party claimant under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and as an affected person who has repeatedly attempted to participate through submissions to this Court, respectfully moves for recusal of the presiding judge from further proceedings in this matter. This motion is filed on an emergency basis because sentencing is scheduled for June 29, 2026, and the appearance-of- impartiality issue should be resolved before the Court proceeds further on a record already marked by unresolved docketing disputes, privacy breaches, and pending appellate supervision. This motion does not ask the Court to concede the merits of every accusation raised by Movant or by other participants. It asks only whether, from the standpoint of an objective observer fully informed of the procedural history, the Court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned after months of selective non- docketing of pro se submissions, public exposure of protected personal information despite requests for sealing or redaction, continued inaction after documented

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 31 of 37 allegations of record contamination and Brady-related concerns, and the decision to press ahead with sentencing while related appellate proceedings remain active. I. Governing standard Section 455(a) requires a federal judge to disqualify herself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The test is objective and turns not on the judge's subjective intent, but on whether a reasonable observer aware of the relevant facts would harbor substantial doubt about neutrality. That standard is concerned not only with actual bias but also with the appearance created by a pattern of procedural choices. Where repeated acts affecting one class of participants, one side of the record, or one set of safety interests accumulate into a coherent appearance of partiality, recusal is required to preserve public confidence in the integrity of the proceedings. II. Systematic Exclusion of Pro Se Third-Party Submissions Movant and other pro se third parties have submitted multiple filings under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n), the CVRA, and related procedural theories concerning forfeiture, victim identification, loss calculations, and record completeness. These filings were sent to the Court and served on the Government and defense counsel, yet most were not placed on the docket. By contrast, attorney-filed submissions addressing similar issues were routinely docketed and considered. This pattern has produced 16 pending mandamus petitions in the Second Circuit, all arising from the same pattern of selective non-docketing, and has created a record in which only one side of the record is permitted to mature into an adjudicable form. III. The Court's handling of personal identifying information creates a serious appearance of retaliatory or arbitrary treatment

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 32 of 37 Movant previously asked that personal identity information and investment details be filed under seal because public disclosure could create safety risks, including risks associated with the Chinese Communist Party and with public exposure of a mainland Chinese investor's identity and financial data. That request was explicit and tied to Rule 49.1-style privacy concerns and the Court's inherent authority to protect sensitive information. In Movant's supplemental mandamus filing, Movant described that the Southern District uploaded his Second Circuit mandamus filing to the district-court docket as Dkt. 770 and, in doing so, publicly disclosed personal identifying information despite an accompanying request for redaction or sealing. The same filing also described comparable treatment of other pro se petitioners, including public exposure of unredacted information in Dkts. 732 and 765. Whether or not each disclosure was intentional in a subjective sense, the appearance is deeply troubling. An objective observer could reasonably question neutrality when a court that receives explicit privacy requests from unrepresented petitioners nonetheless places sensitive identifying information into the public record, especially where those petitioners have simultaneously been seeking appellate review of the court's docketing practices. IV. Movant previously raised Brady-related and record-contamination concerns that were never meaningfully addressed on the district-court docket Movant's earlier submissions, later reproduced in the renewed mandamus appendix, stated that on August 13, 2025 Movant sent prosecutors materials identified as potentially favorable to the defense and requested disclosure under Brady and Giglio, then followed up with defense counsel on August 29, 2025 after receiving no acknowledgment. Those materials included concerns about selective use of livestream statements, contacts between Trustee Luc Despins and the U.S.

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 33 of 37 Attorney's Office, the role of attorney Geyer in presenting large claimant groups, and the possibility that centrally organized claims had distorted the victim picture placed before the Court. Movant also filed a motion seeking intervention for the limited purpose of formally recording the submission of Brady-related material and asking the Court to require confirmation of disclosure. According to the renewed mandamus record, that motion likewise was not ordinarily docketed and therefore did not receive the sort of transparent judicial handling that would reassure an outside observer that adverse or inconvenient information had been considered in a neutral manner. The point here is not that this Court was required to adopt Movant's view of the evidence. The point is that the combination of non-docketing and silence on submissions challenging the completeness of the Government's narrative can create a reasonable appearance that only one side of the procedural record is permitted to mature into an adjudicable form. V.This Court's decision to press ahead with sentencing despite active Second Circuit supervision further undermines the appearance of impartiality The present recusal issue cannot be evaluated in isolation from the parallel appellate proceedings already underway in the Second Circuit. This criminal case has generated an extraordinary volume of mandamus petitions, emergency stay requests, and related supervisory filings arising from the District Court's handling of pro se submissions, privacy issues, third-party participation, and unresolved procedural disputes. One set of related proceedings included No. 25-3046, in which the Second Circuit, on May 15, 2026, denied prior mandamus relief without prejudice and expressly permitted renewal if the District Court failed to docket the relevant submissions within a reasonable time. The renewed petition has since been filed because the

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 34 of 37 District Court still did not docket the previously submitted materials even after that order and the passage of additional time. At the same time, other petitioners in related proceedings have sought emergency relief from the Court of Appeals on overlapping grounds, including nondocketing, privacy violations, improper handling of victim and third-party submissions, requests for stays, and requests that the presiding judge be removed or recused. The significance of that procedural landscape is not merely quantitative. It means that the conduct of this Court is already the subject of ongoing supervisory attention by the Court of Appeals in multiple pending matters. Despite that posture, this Court denied adjournment and announced on June 25, 2026 that sentencing would proceed on June 29, 2026. In the same order, the Court stated that it could make the factual findings necessary for sentencing without an evidentiary hearing, that Brady and Rule 17(c) disputes did not justify delay, and that resolution of third-party petitions under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) and the special-master issue was not required before sentencing That sequence matters. When a district court knows that the Court of Appeals is already reviewing, or being asked to review, whether pro se filings were improperly excluded from the record, whether third-party participation has been mishandled, whether emergency stays are needed, and whether reassignment or recusal is warranted, yet nevertheless accelerates the case toward sentencing before those supervisory proceedings can run their course, a reasonable observer may conclude that the court is attempting to move the case past a critical threshold before effective appellate review can occur. This is especially so here because some of the emergency filings in the Court of Appeals have expressly raised judicial-removal or recusal concerns, and others seek to prevent sentencing from going forward before unresolved procedural defects

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 35 of 37 are addressed. Proceeding to sentencing in the face of that appellate posture does not merely create tension with ordinary case management. It creates the appearance that the District Court is disregarding the practical significance of the appellate court's ongoing supervisory role. An objective observer could therefore reasonably see the June 25 order not as a neutral scheduling determination, but as part of a broader procedural pattern: pro se filings are not timely docketed; related participation and record-integrity issues remain unresolved; multiple appellate proceedings remain active; some of those proceedings explicitly seek recusal or removal; yet sentencing is pressed forward anyway before those matters can be meaningfully sorted out. Under § 455(a), that appearance is itself disqualifying. The issue is not whether every pending appellate filing will ultimately succeed. The issue is whether a reasonable person, fully informed of the surrounding circumstances, would question the impartiality of a court that continues toward final sentencing while higher-court supervision over its own procedural conduct remains actively pending. On the present record, the answer is yes. VI. Recusal is required to preserve confidence in any further proceedings This motion does not rest on disagreement with a single ruling. It rests on the cumulative appearance produced by repeated exclusion of pro se third-party filings from the ordinary docket, public handling of sensitive identifying information despite sealing requests, the absence of meaningful district-court engagement with Brady-related and record-integrity concerns raised by Movant, and the decision to proceed toward sentencing while the Second Circuit is still supervising related docketing disputes in No. 25-3046.Even if each event might be defended in isolation, the issue under § 455(a) is the appearance seen by a reasonable observer

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 36 of 37 who views the record as a whole. On that record, substantial doubt about impartiality is no longer speculative. Relief requested Movant respectfully requests that the Court: 1. Recuse ANALISA TORRES from further proceedings in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); 2. If the Court declines to recuse, issue a prompt written order stating the grounds for denial before sentencing proceeds, so that the issue is preserved for immediate review; 3. Direct the Clerk to ensure that all previously submitted pro se filings identified in Movant's mandamus materials are preserved and appropriately handled as part of the record; 4. Grant such other and further relief as may be just and proper. Respectfully submitted, Jason Zen Petitioner,pro se 6.27.2026

Case: 25-3046, 07/01/2026, DktEntry: 41.1, Page 37 of 37 Certificate of Service United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Case No: 25-3046 SDNY Case: United States v. Kwok, et al., 1:23-CR-118-1 (AT) I, Jason Zen, hereby certify as follows: On July 1, 2026, I mailed the true and correct copy of the following documents: 1. EMERGENCY MOTION TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE AND FOR AN IMMEDIATE ADMINISTRATIVE STAY PENDING APPELLATE REVIEW 2. SDNY Dkt.858 3. EMERGENCY MOTION FOR RECUSAL OF THE HONORABLE ANALISA TORRES Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Must Be Resolved Prior to June 29,2026 Sentencing) To Juliana Murray Direct: 212-637-2203 United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York One Saint Andrew's Plaza Room 739 New York, NY 10007 Justin Horton Direct: 212-637-2200 DOJ-USAO Southern District of New York One St. Andrews Plaza New York, NY 10007 Nathan Rehn Direct: 212-637-2354 United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York 26 Federal Plaza 37th Floor New York, NY 10278 Respectfully submitted, Jason Zen _____________________